MEANING OF ‘GOVERNMENT’

G.R. No. 1051 May 19, 1903

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
FRED L. DORR, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

F. G. Waite for appellants.

Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

LADD, J.:

The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Commission, which is as follows:

Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or
which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or
which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila Freedom" of April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts."

The Attorney-General in his brief indicates the following passages of the article as those upon which he relies to sustain the conviction:

Sidney Adamson, in a late letter in "Leslie's Weekly," has the following to say of the action of the Civil Commission in appointing rascally
natives to important Government positions:

"It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil Commission, through its ex-insurgent office holders, and by its
continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the military rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices,
constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the appointment of
one Tecson as justice of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Islands, reinstating
insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during the struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans."

xxx xxx xxx

There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in a good many instances rascals.

xxx xxx xxx

The commission has exalted to the highest positions in the Islands Filipinos who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of
no personal character.

xxx xxx xxx

Editor Valdez, of "Miau," made serious charges against two of the native Commissioners — charges against Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, which, if true,
would brand the man as a coward and a rascal, and with what result? . . . [Reference is then made to the prosecution and conviction of Valdez for libel
"under a law which specifies that the greater the truth the greater the libel."] Is it the desire of the people of the United States that the natives against
whom these charges have been made (which, if true, absolutely vilify their personal characters) be permitted to retain their seats on the Civil
Commission, the executive body of the Philippine Government, without an investigation?

xxx xxx xxx

It is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by the Civil Commission are rotten and corrupt. The fiscal system, upon
which life, liberty, and justice depends, is admitted by the Attorney-General himself to be most unsatisfactory. It is a fact that the Philippine
judiciary is far from being what it should. Neither fiscals nor judges can be persuaded to convict insurgents when they wish to protect them.

xxx xxx xxx

Now we hear all sorts of reports as to rottenness existing in the province [of Tayabas], and especially the northern end of it; it is said that it is
impossible to secure the conviction of lawbreakers and outlaws by the native justices, or a prosecution by the native fiscals.

xxx xxx xxx

 The long and short of it is that Americans will not stand for an arbitrary government, especially when evidences of carpetbagging and rumors
of graft are too thick to be pleasant.

We do not understand that it is claimed that the defendants succeeded in establishing at the trial the truth of any of the foregoing statements. The only
question which we have considered is whether their publication constitutes an offense under section 8 of Act No. 292, above cited.

Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the
writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3)
the writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such
evil practices.

The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to be punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature
and directed against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to some one of
the results enumerated in the section. The article in question is described in the complaint as "a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tends to obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular Government
of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tends to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which
suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the safety and order
of the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands." But it is "a well-settled rule in considering indictments that
where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in
two or more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive
offense" (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., Mass., 206, 215), and the defendants may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive charges into
which the complaint may be separated has been made out.

We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article in question has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office," or to "instigate" any person or class of persons "to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government." All these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of Act No. 292, each one of which is made an element of a certain form of
libel, may be characterized in general terms as seditious tendencies. This is recognized in the description of the offenses punished by this section, which
is found in the title of the act, where they are defined as the crimes of the "seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."

Excluding from consideration the offense of publishing "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands," which may conceivably stand on a somewhat different footing, the offenses punished by this section all consist in inciting, orally or in
writing, to acts of disloyalty or disobedience to the lawfully constituted authorities in these Islands. And while the article in question, which is, in the main,
a virulent attack against the policy of the Civil Commission in appointing natives to office, may have had the effect of exciting among certain classes
dissatisfaction with the Commission and its measures, we are unable to discover anything in it which can be regarded as having a tendency to produce
anything like what may be called disaffection, or, in other words, a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws. There can be no conviction, therefore, for any of the offenses described in the section on which the complaint is based, unless it is
for the offense of publishing a scurrilous libel against the Government of the of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands.

Can the article be regarded as embraced within the description of "scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands?" In the determination of this question we have encountered great difficulty, by reason of the almost entire lack of
American precedents which might serve as a guide in the construction of the law. There are, indeed, numerous English decisions, most of them of the
eighteenth century, on the subject of libelous attacks upon the "Government, the constitution, or the law generally," attacks upon the Houses of
Parliament, the Cabinet, the Established Church, and other governmental organisms, but these decisions are not now accessible to us, and, if they
were, they were made under such different conditions from those which prevail at the present day, and are founded upon theories of government so
foreign to those which have inspired the legislation of which the enactment in question forms a part, that they would probably afford but little light in the
present inquiry. In England, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, any "written censure upon public men for their conduct as such," as well as any
written censure "upon the laws or upon the institutions of the country," would probably have been regarded as a libel upon the Government. (2 Stephen,
History of the Criminal Law of England, 348.) This has ceased to be the law in England, and it is doubtful whether it was ever the common law of any
American State. "It is true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication tending to "possess the people with an ill opinion of the
Government" is a seditious libel ( per Holt, C. J., in R. vs. Tuchin, 1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and Ellenborough, C. J., in R. vs. Cobbett, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr.,
49), but no one would accept that doctrine now. Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or rebellion or otherwise to disturb the peace and
tranquility of the Kingdom, the utmost latitude is allowed in the discussion of all public affairs." (11 Enc. of the Laws of England, 450.) Judge Cooley says
(Const. Lim., 528): "The English common law rule which made libels on the constitution or the government indictable, as it was administered by the
courts, seems to us unsuited to the condition and circumstances of the people of America, and therefore never to have been adopted in the several
States."

We find no decisions construing the Tennessee statute (Code, sec. 6663), which is apparently the only existing American statute of a similar character to
that in question, and from which much of the phraseology of then latter appears to have been taken, though with some essential modifications.

The important question is to determine what is meant in section 8 of Act No. 292 by the expression "the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands."
Does it mean in a general and abstract sense the existing laws and institutions of the Islands, or does it mean the aggregate of the individuals by whom
the government of the Islands is, for the time being, administered? Either sense would doubtless be admissible.

We understand, in modern political science, . . . by the term government, that institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules of action which are unnecessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing them. Government is the aggregate of authorities which rule a society. By
"dministration, again, we understand in modern times, and especially in more or less free countries, the aggregate of those persons in whose hands the
reins of government are for the time being (the chief ministers or heads of departments)." (Bouvier, Law Dictionary, 891.) But the writer adds that the
terms "government" and "administration" are not always used in their strictness, and that "government" is often used for "administration."
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition Act," it is made an offense to "write, print, utter, or published," or to "knowingly
and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false, scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the
United States, or either House of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or
either House of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or
either or any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States," etc. The term "government" would appear to be used here in the abstract
sense of the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government — the Houses of Congress and the Executive —
which are also specially mentioned.

Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in which the term is used in the enactment under consideration.

It may be said that there can be no such thing as a scurrilous libel, or any sort of a libel, upon an abstraction like the Government in the sense of the
laws and institutions of a country, but we think an answer to this suggestion is that the expression "scurrilous libel" is not used in section 8 of Act No. 292
in the sense in which it is used in the general libel law (Act No. 277) — that is, in the sense of written defamation of individuals — but in the wider sense,
in which it is applied in the common law to blasphemous, obscene, or seditious publications in which there may be no element of defamation whatever.
"The word 'libel' as popularly used, seems to mean only defamatory words; but words written, if obscene, blasphemous, or seditious, are technically
called libels, and the publication of them is, by the law of England, an indictable offense." (Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B. D., 607, 627, per Bramwell
L. J. See Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., 206, 211.)

While libels upon forms of government, unconnected with defamation of individuals, must in the nature of things be of uncommon occurrence, the
offense is by no means an imaginary one. An instance of a prosecution for an offense essentially of this nature is Republica vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates (Pa.),
267, where the defendant was indicted "as a factious and seditious person of a wicked mind and unquiet and turbulent disposition and conversation,
seditiously, maliciously, and willfully intending, as much as in him lay, to bring into contempt and hatred the independence of the United States, the
constitution of this Commonwealth and of the United States, to excite popular discontent and dissatisfaction against the scheme of polity instituted, and
upon trial in the said United States and in the said Commonwealth, to molest, disturb, and destroy the peace and tranquility of the said United States and
of the said Commonwealth, to condemn the principles of the Revolution, and revile, depreciate, and scandalize the characters of the Revolutionary
patriots and statesmen, to endanger, subvert, and totally destroy the republican constitutions and free governments of the said United States and this
Commonwealth, to involve the said United States and this Commonwealth in civil war, desolation, and anarchy, and to procure by art and force a radical
change and alteration in the principles and forms of the said constitutions and governments, without the free will, wish, and concurrence of the people of
the said United States and this Commonwealth, respectively," the charge being that "to fulfill, perfect, and bring to effect his wicked, seditious, and
detestable intentions aforesaid he . . . falsely, maliciously, factiously, and seditiously did make, compose, write, and publish the following libel, to wit; 'A
democracy is scarcely tolerable at any period of national history. Its omens are always sinister and its powers are unpropitious. With all the lights or
experience blazing before our eyes, it is impossible not to discover the futility of this form of government. It was weak and wicked at Athens, it was bad in
Sparta, and worse in Rome. It has been tried in France and terminated in despotism. it was tried in England and rejected with the utmost loathing and
abhorrence. It is on its trial here and its issue will be civil war, desolation, and anarchy. No wise man but discerns its imperfections; no good man but
shudders at its miseries; no honest man but proclaims its fraud, and no brave man but draws his sword against its force. The institution of a scheme of
polity so radically contemptible and vicious is a memorable example of what the villainy of some men can devise, the folly of others receive, and both
establish, in despite of reason, reflection, and sensation.'"

An attack upon the lawfully established system of civil government in the Philippine Islands, like that which Dennie was accused of making upon the
republican form of government lawfully established in the United States and in the State of Pennsylvania would, we think, if couched in scandalous
language, constitute the precise offense described in section 8 of Act No. 292 as a scurrilous libel against the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands.

Defamation of individuals, whether holding official positions or not, and whether directed to their public conduct or to their private life, may always be
adequately punished under the general libel law. Defamation of the Civil Commission as an aggregation, it being "a body of persons definite and small
enough for its individual members to be recognized as such" (Stephen, Digest of the Criminal Law, art. 277), as well as defamation of any of the
individual members of the Commission or of the Civil Governor, either in his public capacity or as a private individual, may be so punished. The general
libel law enacted by the Commission was in force when Act No. 292, was passed. There was no occasion for any further legislation on the subject of
libels against the individuals by whom the Insular Government is administered — against the Insular Government in the sense of the aggregate of such
individuals. There was occasion for stringent legislation against seditious words or libels, and that is the main if not the sole purpose of the section under
consideration. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the Commission, in enacting this section, may have conceived of attacks of a malignant or
scurrilous nature upon the existing political system of the United States, or the political system established in these Islands by the authority of the United
States, as necessarily of a seditious tendency, but it is not so reasonable to suppose that they conceived of attacks upon the personnel of the
government as necessarily tending to sedition. Had this been their view it seems probable that they would, like the framers of the Sedition Act of 1798,
have expressly and specifically mentioned the various public officials and collegiate governmental bodies defamation of which they meant to punish as
sedition.

The article in question contains no attack upon the governmental system of the United States, and it is quite apparent that, though grossly abusive as
respects both the Commission as a body and some of its individual members, it contains no attack upon the governmental system by which the authority
of the United States is enforced in these Islands. The form of government by a Civil Commission and a Civil Governor is not assailed. It is the character
of the men who are intrusted with the administration of the government that the writer is seeking to bring into disrepute by impugning the purity of their
motives, their public integrity, and their private morals, and the wisdom of their policy. The publication of the article, therefore, no seditious tendency
being apparent, constitutes no offense under Act No. 292, section 8.

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted, with costs de oficio.

DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF EACH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner,

vs.
RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSE P. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila,respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-2756 August 26, 1949

J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners,

vs.
EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-3054 August 26, 1949

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente,
vs.
EL TESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-3055 August 26, 1949

LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR, SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY, respondents.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. L-3056 August 26, 1949

ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all taxpayers similarly situated, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE AUDITOR GENERAL and THE INSULAR TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

L-2044
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant City
Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.

L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.

L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr. and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo also as amici curiae.

L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.

L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano
R. Navarro as amici curiae.

TUASON, J.:

Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the
same fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the
personality or sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G. R. No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in
cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of the procedural matters since the decision in the cases wherein
the petitioners' cause of action or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others. Above all, the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-2821.) The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President avowedly issued in virtue of
Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos. L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for houses and lots for
residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the provisions of this
Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive Order No. 192,
which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case, Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the Sugar
Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required export
license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive
Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to
June 30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies
for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order
No. 226, which appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in
November, 1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing,
spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

Notwithstanding allegations in the petitions assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671, the petitioners do not press the point in their oral argument and
memorandum. They rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the Emergency Powers Act (Commonwealth Act No. 671) has ceased to have any
force and effect. This is the basic question we have referred to, and it is to this question that we will presently address ourselves and devote greater
attention. For the purpose of this decision, only, the constitutionality of Act No. 671 will be taken for granted, and any dictum or statement herein which
may appear contrary to that hypothesis should be understood as having been made merely in furtherance of the main thesis.

Act No. 671 in full is as follows:

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING
THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO MEET SUCH EMERGENCY.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it
necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.

"SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provisions of Article VI, section 26, of the Constitution, the President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the
emergency, to promulgate such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy declared in section 1 hereof.
Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a) to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches,
departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government of the Commonwealth including the determination of the
order of precedence of the heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivisions, branches, departments, agencies or
instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriations which would
lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or application of those of an administrative character; (e) to
impose new taxes or to increase, reduce, suspend or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through the issuance of bonds or otherwise,
and to authorize the expenditure of the proceeds thereof; (g) to authorize the national, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in
overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to
exercise such other powers as he may deem to enable the Government to fulfill its responsibities and to maintain and enforce the authority.

SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all
the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the
Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.

Section 26 of Article VI of the Constitution provides:

In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such
restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy.

Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the object to
be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also be
resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.

Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean
"restricted; bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration, extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669;
Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in
duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust
Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).

It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the
Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion
that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to
terminate the delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out, would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that
which was intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law," (Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the
repeal, and even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to override the veto.
Furthermore, this would create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except
by a two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought
not to be, the law. Corwin, President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:

It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may not
abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication to
be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . . .

Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671. Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of
the authority itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the
belief held by the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It would be strange if having no idea about the time the
Emergency Powers Act was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this termination in the same way that it did for the
termination of the effects and incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling the rules and regulations promulgated under
a law if the law itself was to remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new rules and regulations but he could restore the
ones already annulled by the legislature.

More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that
there would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions.
Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the
anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess,
and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic
apprehension; in two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best interests of the country as they saw them, a former
President promulgated an executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief
Executive issued an executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the measure.

Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of
the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on
by the war. Section 3 provides:

The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress of the Philippines report thereto all the rules
and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.

The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship.
The section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the
report in section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and
clear terms for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected to continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations
and executive orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as the initial one.

As a contemporary construction, President Quezon's statement regarding the duration of Act No. 671 is enlightening and should carry much weight,
considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law. Mr. Quezon, who called the National Assembly to a special session, who
recommended the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act, if indeed he was not its author, and who was the very President to be entrusted with its
execution, stated in his autobiography, "The Good Fight," that Act No. 671 was only "for a certain period" and "would become invalid unless reenacted."
These phrases connote automatical extinction of the law upon the conclusion of a certain period. Together they denote that a new legislation was
necessary to keep alive (not to repeal) the law after the expiration of that period. They signify that the same law, not a different one, had to be repassed
if the grant should be prolonged.

What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued
the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be
discerned in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the
National Assembly to meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an
abdication by the National Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions
could not have been conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway,
if we are to uphold the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we
have indicated, the period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations, with the general context of the law and with what we
believe to be the main if not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the inability of Congress to function, a period ending
with the conventing of that body.

It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25,
1946, and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first
special session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special
session, the Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a
regular session, the power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations imposed by the organic law.

Having arrived at this conclusion, we are relieved of the necessity of deciding the question as to which department of government is authorized to inquire
whether the contingency on which the law is predicated still exists. The right of one or another department to declare the emergency terminated is not in
issue. As a matter of fact, we have endeavored to find the will of the National Assembly—call that will, an exercise of the police power or the war power
— and, once ascertained, to apply it. Of course, the function of interpreting statutes in proper cases, as in this, will not be denied the courts as their
constitutional prerogative and duty. In so far as it is insinuated that the Chief Executive has the exclusive authority to say that war not ended, and may
act on the strength of his opinion and findings in contravention of the law as the courts have construed it, no legal principle can be found to support the
proposition. There is no pretense that the President has independent or inherent power to issue such executive orders as those under review. we take it
that the respondents, in sustaining the validity of these executive orders rely on Act No. 600, Act No. 620, or Act No. 671 of the former Commonwealth
and on no other source. To put it differently, the President's authority in this connection is purely statutory, in no sense political or directly derived from
the Constitution.

Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620
contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in
pursuance of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June 6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates
of adjournment of the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be
drawn from this provision is that in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and
regulations. The design to provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was predicated on the consciousness of a prior or
at best simultaneous repeal of their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle, already painted, and easily foreseen, of the
Legislature amending or repealing rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep or return them into force and to issue
new ones independently of the National Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted indefinite continuance of the
operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts Nos. 600 and 620.

The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual
hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would not be altered. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be
approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the
Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending
invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the
National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be able
to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position
to operate.

After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set
up this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino
people by adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its
faults, as the ideal. The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no
matter how serious. Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific
functions of the legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department — unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a
legislative policy according to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death
struggle to preserve the Union. The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of extreme perils more than in normal
circumstances "the various branches, executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to the duties and discharge the
responsibilities committed to them respectively."

These observations, though beyond the issue as formulated in this decision, may, we trust, also serve to answer the vehement plea that for the good of
the Nation, the President should retain his extraordinary powers as long asturmoil and other ills directly or indirectly traceable to the late war harass the
Philippines.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions will be granted. In order to avoid any possible disruption and interruption in the normal operation of the
Government, we have deemed it best to depart in these cases from the ordinary rule to the period for the effectivity of decisions, and to decree, as it is
hereby decreed, that this decision take effect fifteen days from the date of the entry of final judgment provided in section 8 of Rule 53 of the Rules of
Court in relation to section 2 of Rule 35. No costs will be charged.

Ozaeta, J., concurs.

ESSENCE AND MEANING OF DEMOCRACY

G.R. No. L-2089 October 31, 1949

JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner,

vs.
RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o FAUSTINO AGUILAR, Manager, Rural Progress Administration,respondent.

Guillermo B. Guevara for petitioner.

Luis M. Kasilag and Lorenzo B. Vizconde for respondent.

TUASON, J.:

This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from
proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square
meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four grounds
are adduced in support of the petition, to wit:

(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriation complaint
and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land.
 (2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.

(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and expropriation
would impair those existing obligation of contract.

(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA.

We will take up only ground No. 2. Our conclusion on this branch of the case will make superfluous a decision on the other questions raised.

Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, copied verbatim, are as follows:

SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein, through purchaser or farms for
resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will
work the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.

SEC. 2. The President may designated any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government, or he may organize a
new agency to carry out the objectives of this Act. For this purpose, the agency so created or designated shall be considered a public
corporation.

The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, copied verbatim, is as follows:

The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at
cost to individuals.

What lands does this provision have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their location, nature and area? The answer is to be found in
the explanatory statement of Delegate Miguel Cuaderno, member of the Constitutional Convention who was the author or sponsor of the above-quoted
provision. In this speech, which was entitled "Large Estates and Trust in Perpetuity" and is transcribed in full in Aruego's "The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution," Mr. Cuaderno said:

There has been an impairment of public tranquility, and to be sure a continuous of it, because of the existence of these conflicts. In our folklore
the oppression and exploitation of the tenants are vividly referred to; their sufferings at the hand of the landlords are emotionally pictured in our
drama; and even in the native movies and talkies of today, this theme of economic slavery has been touched upon. In official documents these
same conflicts are narrated and exhaustively explained as a threat to social order and stability.

But we should go to Rizal inspiration and illumination in this problem of this conflicts between landlords and tenants. The national hero and his
family were persecuted because of these same conflicts in Calamba, and Rizal himself met a martyr's death because of his exposal of the
cause of the tenant class, because he would not close his eyes to oppression and persecution with his own people as victims.lawphi1.nêt

I ask you, gentlemen of the Convention, knowing this as you do and feeling deeply as you must feel a regret over the immolation of the hero's
life, would you not write in the Constitution the provision on large estates and trust in perpetuity, so that you would be the very instrument of
Providence to complete the labors of Rizal to insure domestic tranquility for the masses of our people?

If we are to be true to our trust, if it is our purpose in drafting our constitution to insure domestic tranquility and to provide for the well-being of
our people, we cannot, we must fail to prohibit the ownership of large estates, to make it the duty of the government to break up existing large
estates, and to provide for their acquisition by purchase or through expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has been provided in the
Constitutions of Mexico and Jugoslavia.

No amendment was offered and there was no debate. According to Dean Aruego, Mr. Cuaderno's resolution was readily and totally approved by the
Convention. Mr. Cuaderno's speech therefore may be taken as embodying the intention of the framers of the organic law, and Act No. 539 should be
construed in a manner consonant with that intention. It is to be presumed that the National Assembly did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope
of its powers.

There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a
restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would be subversive of the Philippine political and social structure. It would be in derogation of individual
rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property of law. The protection against deprivation of property without due process
for public use without just compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraph 1 and 2) in the Bill for private use relieves the owner of his property
without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property should not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2],
Article III, of the Constitution) forbids necessary implication the appropriation of private property for private uses (29 C.J.S., 819). It has been truly said
that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of and citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation,
when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with very just principle and fundamental maxim of a
free government. (29 C.J.S., 820.)

Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state"
created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life
enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of
happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In
paving the way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to
destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the
giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate
has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The
Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a social
middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and happy country.

The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural
Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status;
what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and
received on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a
command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated,
overcrowded, without ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and the destitute. As
will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.

In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of Rights. Without that provision the right of eminent domain, inherent in
the government, may be exercised to acquire large tracts of land as a means reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As
Mr. Aruego says "the primary reason" for Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to remove all doubts as to the power of the government to expropriation
the then existing landed estates to be distributed at costs to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future it would seem such expropriation
necessary to the solution of agrarian problems therein."

In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large section of a town or city, bears
direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic
reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish
economic slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. Although courts
are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is public or not, some go far in the direction of a liberal construction as
to hold that public advantage, and to authorize the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the
interest involved are considerable magnitude. (29 C.J.S., 823, 824. See also People of Puerto Rico vs. Eastern Sugar Associates, 156 Fed. [2nd], 316.)
In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by condemnation. The highest court of New York States has ruled that slum clearance and reaction of
houses for low-income families were public purposes for which New York City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. And this
decision was followed by similar ones in other states. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and
insanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemic, crime and waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas,
enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray vs. La
Guardia, 52 N.E. [2nd], 884; General Development Coop. vs. City of Detroit, 33 N.W. [2ND], 919; Weizner vs. Stichman, 64 N.Y.S. [2nd], 50.) But it will
be noted that in all these case and others of similar nature extensive areas were involved and numerous people and the general public benefited by the
action taken.

The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the benefit of the public to a degree sufficient
to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any
consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all
we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or
leave the premises.

No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to be judge according to its peculiar
circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public
convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by the
majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional,
we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it.
To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area
of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon.

The petition is granted without special findings as to costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Bengzon, Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

Paras and Reyes, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME
COMMISSION, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law, which can be regulated, and the
innate value of human liberty, which can hardly be weighed.

Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former Senator Jovito R. Salonga invoked before this Court his "right to life and
liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him."1 We resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is now back before us, this time as counsel pleading the cause of
petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far worse than his predicament twelve (12) years ago. He postulates that no probable cause likewise
exists in this case, and what is worse is that no bail is recommended.
This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication of probable cause, the existence of which is necessary for the prosecutor to
have an accused held for trial and for a trial judge to issue a warrant for his arrest. It is mandatory therefore that there be probable cause before an
information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued. Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal case is filed, a warrant of arrest issued and a person
consequently incarcerated on unsubstantiated allegations that only feign probable cause.

Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of
Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have
been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by
respondent judge.

The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a
discharge of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest,
a German national. 2 In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in
exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June
1992, after placing him under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2
Sergio Antonino abducted Van Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought
him to a "safe house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry. After four (4) days, Gamatero, Santiago and
Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the
interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him sign certain documents. The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the
chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine ashes using
gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date when the incident happened, but he was certain it was about a year ago.

A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 11, 3 separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street, and the other, along
Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision, Parañaque. The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and
ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were found
to have in their possession several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.

After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case
to the Department of Justice for the institution of criminal proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino, SPO2 Roger
Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority. 4 In his letter to the State
Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson charged that —

Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado Law Offices . . . planned and conspired with other
suspects to abduct and kill the German national Alexander Van Twest in order to eliminate him after forcing the victim to sign
several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several million pesos and caused the withdrawal of
P5M deposit from the victim's bank account.

Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a subpoena to petitioners informing them that a complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of Justice and to submit their counter-affidavits. Attached to the subpoena were copies
of the affidavits executed by Umbal and members of the team who raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5

Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the production of other documents for examination and
copying to enable him to fully prepare for his defense and to submit an intelligible counter-affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was interested in
(a) the "several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several million pesos and the withdrawal of P5M deposits from the
victim's bank account," as stated in the complaint; (b) the complete records of the PACC's investigation, including investigations on other suspects and
their disposition, PACC's Order of Battle for 1992 and early 1993; and, (c) such other written statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other
documents intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition of the members of the panel of prosecutors, which was created to
conduct the preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were members of the legal staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with impartiality.

In its Order of 11 October 1993,8 the new panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez as Chairman, with Rogelio
F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as Members, confirmed that the motion for inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the appeal to the
Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993 resulting in the creation of a new panel. Thereafter, the new panel granted the prayer of petitioner
Mendoza for the production of additional documents used or intended to be used against him. Meanwhile, Task Force Habagat, in compliance with the
order, submitted only copies of the request for verification of the firearms seized from the accused, the result of the request for verification, and
a Philippine Times Journal article on the case with a marginal note of President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to the Chief of the Philippine National Police
directing the submission of a report and summary of actions taken thereon.

Not having been provided with the requested documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted their respective counter-affidavits denying the accusations
against them.9

After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally propounded, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. But before the
new panel could resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file counter-
affidavit, 10 and "in the greater interest of truth, justice and fair play" moved for the admissions of his counter-affidavit 11 confessing participation in the
abduction and slaying of Van Twest and implicating petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however, before petitioners could
refute Bato's counter-affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground that it was extracted through intimidation and duress.

On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard over the radio that the panel had issued a
resolution finding a prima facie case against them and that an information had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the Department of
Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet ready for release, but later that afternoon they were able to secure a copy of
the information for kidnapping with murder against them 12 and the 15-page undated resolution under the letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of
prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC Task Force recommending approval thereof. 13 That same day, the information was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.

On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners' request, gave them until 8 February 1994 to submit their opposition to the issuance of
a warrant of arrest against all the accused. 14 On 7 February 1994, petitioners complied with the order of respondent judge. 15 The following day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review and reversal of the undated resolution of the panel
of prosecutors, 16 which appeal was adopted by petitioner Mendoza. 17 On
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of his appeal before the Secretary of
Justice. 18 However, on even date, respondent judge issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. 19 Hence, on 15 February 1994, petitioners
filed with us the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order.

On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the petition and set the case for hearing on 28 February 1994. After the hearing, we
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent judge from conducting further proceedings on
the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994, petitioners voluntarily surrendered at the Headquarters of the
Capital Command (CAPCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and on 29 February 1994, they were
released on the basis of our temporary restraining order.

Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess
of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence against
petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that probable cause
exists when the certification is flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon
failed to establish probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of
bias and impartiality (sic)." 22

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge who is merely required to
personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the accused probably committed the crime charged.

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.

As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this Court speaking through Associate Justice Sherman Moreland defined probable cause as "the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." This definition is still relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent
cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 25 And as a protection
against false prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was
lawful grounds for arresting the accused. 26

Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence of probable cause. While it appears in that case that we have granted the
prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited latitude in determining the existence of absence of probable cause by affirming the long-standing
procedure that they can base their findings merely on their personal opinion and reasonable belief, yet, this permissiveness should not be interpreted as
giving them arbitrary powers and letting them loose in the determination of the existence of probable cause, a delicate legal question which can result in
the harassment and deprivation of liberty of the person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said —

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of
the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a
thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is it believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the same was done with manifest partiality or
evident bad faith can only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the
case has already proceeded on sufficient proof. 28

Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime
has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is
expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules that probable cause exists; and therefore, a
warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the
records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to
be insufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners.

The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in
the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been
established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber
tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next morning. 29 This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be
pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators
where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. 30Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of the
alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the government investigators did to the place of cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that they did not go
at all because they knew that there would not be any as no burning ever took place? To allege then that the body of Van Twest was completely burned
to ashes in an open field with the use merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.

Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on

16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.
Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in his behalf a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 106253, and on 18 March 1993, a
memorandum before the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors, counsel again manifested that "even then and even as of
this time, I stated in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of death is to be established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to pursue my duties
and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van Twest." 32 Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the
latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead otherwise his obligation to his client would have ceased
except to comply with his duty "to inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative," 34 which he did not.

Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of Van Twest who is reportedly an international fugitive from
justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and never refuted by PACC, is a likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In this regard, we
are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin 35 decided ninety-two years ago where this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly
unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.

Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In his sworn statement, he said that he together with his cohorts was
met by petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they hatched the plan to abduct Van Twest. 36 However, during the preliminary investigation, he stated that he
was not part of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his companions who supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel. 37

Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock interrogation of Van Twest who thereafter signed various documents upon
being compelled to do so. 38 During the clarificatory questioning, however, Umbal changed his story and said that he was asked to go outside of the
"safe house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed certain documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out
of the "safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able to comply with the order of the prosecutors to produce them during the
preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to the P2.5M that was supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van
Twest? These and more remain unanswered.

Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly triggered off by Umbal's confession of 16 September 1993, the application
of the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served in the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15 September 1993, a day before Umbal executed his
sworn statement. In support of the application, the PACC agents claimed that Umbal had been in their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly,
although he was said to be already under their custody, Umbal claims he was never interrogated until 16 September 1993 and only at the security
barracks of Valle Verde V, Pasig, where he was a security guard. 39

The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of prosecutors also considered in filing the charges against petitioners, can hardly be
credited as its probative value has tremendously waned. The records show that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating, was filed after
the panel had considered the case submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this counter-affidavit, Bato moved to suppress the same
on the ground that it was extracted through duress and intimidation.

For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient
to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings
of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole
affair. 40 While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged.
Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial
and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been
met.

Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally
examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the
certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already decided.

In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of
probable cause.

In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the
judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary
inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to
follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge
in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or
released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper — whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should
be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial — is a function of the prosecutor.

In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said —

[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same
functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting
the Fiscal's bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We
cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report
whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when
the circumstances of the case so require.

Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good
faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. 44 On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in
order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that
the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. 45 This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court
the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the
complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an
open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.

But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. If they really believed that
petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough.
They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one" 46

In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the government cannot be ignored. From the gathering
of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a
warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and
improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the
evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only
bears the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround
in securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them.

Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the future reform and be productive
members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of judges and the prudence of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by
the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which determines if an arrest warrant
should issue, the bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of the existence of probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is
charged. Judges and prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence.

In this instance, Salonga v. Paño 47 finds application —

The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to
protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect
the state from useless and expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a
preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process (People v.
Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is
conducted in the sense of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not
only for the purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all
who live in the country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the
pain of going thru a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused (emphasis supplied).

The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming immensity of government power which when unchecked becomes
tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state actions. But on
occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. In consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case before us, if
uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government agents is not reflective of responsible government.
Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason of their high and prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting
unnecessary injury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice; hence,
the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not
confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and
disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive
prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in this case the "multifactor balancing test" which requires the officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the
interference on the right of the people, the gravity of the crime committed and the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see probable
cause to order the detention of petitioners.48

The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the
preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed
against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal law where it
is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner,
and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. 49

Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were ordinary people submissive to the dictates of government. They would have
been illegally arrested and detained without bail. Then we would not have the opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of injustice are
lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom not otherwise available to those who cower in fear and subjection.

Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other government agents tasked with the enforcement of the law that in the performance
of their duties they must act with circumspection, lest their thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their office and maim their
countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution government agents, particularly the law enforcers, to be more prudent in the
prosecution of cases and not to be oblivious of human rights protected by the fundamental law. While we greatly applaud their determined efforts to
weed society of felons, let not their impetuous eagerness violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a civilized community.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of
petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET ASIDE and
respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from proceeding any further against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati.

SO ORDERED

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, G.R. No. 168081

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,
Respondent. October 17, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight

standards of the airline company.

He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues

that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide

occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against

because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor

of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his

moral character.

The Facts

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight

inches (58) with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166

pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual[1] of PAL.

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29,

1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the companys weight

standards, prompting another leave without pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.

After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weight problem recurred. He again went on leave

without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight

duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several

dates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so. He was advised that his case will be

evaluated on July 3, 1989.[2]

On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight. He was overweight

at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.

On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort

to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitment[3] to reduce

weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

Dear Sir:

I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec.
1989.

From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal weight is achieved.

Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for my weight check.

Respectfully Yours,
F/S Armando Yrasuegui[4]

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was

informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed

to report every two weeks for weight checks.

 Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he

was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the

weight standards.[5]

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service

Division.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was

given another set of weight check dates.[6] Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was

required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks. [7]

When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.

From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed

at 219 poundson August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.

On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight

requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting evidence.[8]

On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer. [9] Notably, he did not deny being overweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his

violation, ifany, had already been condoned by PAL since no action has been taken by the company regarding his case since 1988. He also claimed

that PAL discriminated against him because the company has not been fair in treating the cabin crew members who are similarly situated.

On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing a weight reduction program to lose

at least two (2) pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight. [10]

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost

leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective

immediately.[11]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied,[12] petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL.

Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions

On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that petitioner was illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter

ruling runs as follows:

 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the complainants dismissal illegal, and
ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his former position or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:

a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 until reinstated, which for purposes of
appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15, 1998 at P651,000.00;

b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award.

SO ORDERED.[14]

The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner. [15] However, the weight

standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his duties. [16] Assuming that it did,

petitioner could be transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative factor. [17] Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr.

Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined. [18]

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). [19]

On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and

other benefits.[20]

On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied[21] the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution[22] of PAL.

On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the NLRC.[23]

On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment[24] in the following tenor:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18 November 1998 as modified by our findings
herein, is hereby AFFIRMED and that part of the dispositive portion of said decision concerning complainants entitlement
to backwages shall be deemed to refer to complainants entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent instead of simply backwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality
hereof. Respondent is enjoined to manifests (sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement of complainant, whether physical or
through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failing which, the same shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement through
payroll and execution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals of respondent thus,
are DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.[25]

According to the NLRC, obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of the amount of food intake, is a disease in

itself.[26] As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance or serious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight.[27]

Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter

holding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor

Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight

standards of PAL.[28]
 PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.[29] Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[30]

By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed NLRC decision is declared NULL and
VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[32]

The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC because it looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations[33] in

evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an

employees position.[34]The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the

Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest. [35] Said the CA, the element of willfulness that the

NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper.[36] In other words, the relevant

question to ask is not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify

under this standard.[37]

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable.[38] Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed

because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. [39] It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for

purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.[40]

On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. [41] Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight

standards of PALare a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of violation, justifies an employees separation from the service.[42]

Issues

In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS OBESITY CAN
BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDER PARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS DISMISSAL
FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE;

III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HE WAS DISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHER
GIVEN FLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;

IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRUSHED ASIDE PETITIONERS
CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT [AND] WAGES ALLEGEDLY FOR BEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
 Our Ruling

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) [44] of the Labor Code.

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to

keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight

standards. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:

x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the employer; they were the prescribed weights that a cabin crew
must maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company. In other words, they were standards that
establish continuing qualifications for an employees position. In this sense, the failure to maintain these standards does not fall
under Article 282(a) whose express terms require the element of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet
the employers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to (d) and is therefore one that
falls under Article 282(e) the other causes analogous to the foregoing.

By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after an employee is hired. They apply prior to
employment because these are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after
hiring because an employee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this
perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the
employee can be dismissed simply because he no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure to qualify was
willful or intentional. x x x[45]

Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a physical abnormality and/or illness.[46] Relying

on Nadura v. BenguetConsolidated, Inc.,[47] he says his dismissal is illegal:

Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within the specific causes enumerated in subparagraphs
1(a) to (e), Benguet invokes the provisions of subparagraph 1(f) and says that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a
cause analogous to them.

Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient to convince anyone that, as the trial court
said, illness cannot be included as an analogous cause by any stretch of imagination.

It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the others expressly enumerated in the law are due to the
voluntary and/or willful act of the employee. How Naduras illness could be considered as analogous to any of them is beyond our
understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was contracted through his own voluntary act. [48]

The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the case at bar. First, Nadura was not decided under

the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA) No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura, thus, the rationale

there cannot apply here. Third, in Nadura, the employee who was a miner, was laid off from work because of illness, i.e., asthma. Here, petitioner was

dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. He was not dismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether

or not the dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for his

failure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura, the employee was not accorded due process. Here, petitioner was accorded utmost

leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with the weight standards of PAL.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight

from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during

the clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172,

then the answer is yes. I can do it now.[49]

 True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him a lot of expenses. [50] However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have

easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of PAL.[51] He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to

report when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather

than an illness.

Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals,[52] decided by the United

States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked from 1978 to 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally

retarded at the Ladd Center that was being operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Even respondent

admitted that her performance met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-applied for a similar position. At that time, she stood 52 tall and

weighed over 320 pounds. Respondent claimed that the morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency

and it also put her at greater risk of serious diseases.

Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a handicap. This was in direct violation of Section

504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,[53] which incorporates the remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed,

however, that morbid obesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesity is a mutable

condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and rid herself of concomitant disability.

The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated

against Cook based on perceived disability. The evidence included expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a

dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects within the

musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the

limitation flowing from a given impairment, thus mutability only precludes those conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral

alteration.

Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime

before 1978 at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her height. According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed over

320 pounds in 1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.

In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under

Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA

correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external force influencing or

controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross

and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).[54]

II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,

religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).[55] In

the United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an
otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or

enterprise.[56]

Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providing for it.[57] Further, there is no existing

BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal.[58]

Both arguments must fail.

First, the Constitution,[59] the Labor Code,[60] and RA No. 7277[61] or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons[62] contain provisions similar to

BFOQ.

Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union

(BCGSEU),[63] the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called Meiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this

test, (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; [64] (2) the employer must

establish that the standard is reasonably necessary[65] to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the

standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol,[66] this Court

held that in order to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the

job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly

perform the duties of the job.[67]

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.[68] BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an

inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance. [69]

In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.,[70] the Court did not hesitate to pass upon the validity of a

company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees of a rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable

considering that its purpose is the protection of the interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.

Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,[71] NLRC,[72] and

CA[73]are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public

policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports. [74] It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as

human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. [75]

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards

of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must

necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be

viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.

In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that

cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something

goes wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety
records. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely

and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.

The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most

important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger

safety goes to the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors,

the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand grueling flight schedules.

On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have

constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of respondent that [w]hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight

or not has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their destination; and that the weight standards has nothing to do with

airworthiness of respondents airlines, must fail.

The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell[76] relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to his case. What was involved there were two (2)

airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age

60. They sued the airline company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is another matter. Given the cramped cabin

space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped

cabin area.

In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obese cabin attendant occupies more space than a

slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judicially recognize without introduction of evidence. [77] It would also be absurd to require airline

companies to reconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin attendants like petitioner.

The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers from evacuating the aircraft, should the

occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is to speedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight

necessarily impedes mobility. Indeed, in an emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost seconds

can translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant is blocking the narrow aisles. These

possibilities are not remote.

Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to him prior to his employment. He is

presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. [78] In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked

to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be

done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin angnapagkasunduan.

Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and body frame for both male and female cabin

attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the

clear-cut rules obviate any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part of PAL.
 III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL.

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him. [79] We are constrained, however,

to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that [t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private

respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly

admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondents failure to comply.[80] It is a basic

rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation.[81]

Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with

particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by

simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are

similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees.

Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal

weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the

discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In

the words of the CA, PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet.[82]

We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even
[83]
finality. The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific and specialized jurisdiction. [84] But the principle is not

a hard and fast rule. It only applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodies

grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts must necessarily be

reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.[85]

Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul their findings.

To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty[86] of the Constitution. However, in the absence of

governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. [87] Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked

against acts of private individuals.[88] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,[89] which is the source of our

equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or

wrongful.[90] Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee. [91]

IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.

As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and wages have not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his

full backwages, from the time he was illegally dismissed up to the time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA.[92]
 At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does not require a writ of execution,[93] the option to

exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs to the employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the

courts.

Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL did everything under the sun to frustrate his immediate return to his previous position, [94] there

is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor

Arbiter.[95] In fact, petitioner duly received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature.[96]

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a case [97] that [t]he unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate the

dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of

execution[98] and even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and

pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.[99] He failed to prove that he complied with the return to

work order of PAL. Neither does it appear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order to insist on

the payment of his full backwages.

In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effect wants to render the issues in the present

case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time and again, the Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible.[100]

V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay.

Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner.

Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitled to separation pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor

Code that [a]n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to

his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was

withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act social justice,[101] or based on equity.[102] In both instances,

it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.[103]

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service.[104] It should include regular

allowances which he might have been receiving.[105] We are not blind to the fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act

which would reflect on his moral character. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.
 WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in that petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is

entitled to separation pay in an amount equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances.

SO ORDERED.

DEFINITION AND HIERARCHY OF RIGHTS UNDER THE BILL OF RIGHTS

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.

Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of the
employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de
Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged
abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court reproduced the following stipulation
of facts of the parties — parties —

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at Malacañang in protest against
alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those
working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's canteen, and those present
were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4,
1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated
that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained
further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned
the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved
by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the
following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would
be amounting to an illegal strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The
Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon
meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions
of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall
be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the organizers of the mass
demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang
demonstration will be held the following morning; and
 8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4,
1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that
the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for
the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the
respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in
relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A",
pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a
corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C",
pp. 25-30, rec.)

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the respondent Company prior
notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech
against the alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed
against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969,
found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion
Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor
practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed on September 29, 1969, because
September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to
law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR,
as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that herein petitioners received on
September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of
Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed before
the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).

Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in support of their motion for reconsideration
(Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).

In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners for being pro forma as it
was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp.
12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and addressed to the counsels of the parties
(pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for
reconsideration shall be filed within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the
C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, on the ground that their
failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner
Union and of the office clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the
Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article
of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his
beliefs as the citadel of his person."2

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general principles."3

In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights
to life, liberty and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the
criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled to exercise."5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in
the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only
to protect the minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of
one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.7

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition
of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity."9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between the means
employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main
opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr.
Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms
of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or
"when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the
balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the
gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17

II

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike, concluded that by their
"concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective
bargaining agreement with private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic
society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against alleged abuses of
some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency,
the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from
what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner Union and its
members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the
cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local
police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to
terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who
might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom,
the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason
of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the
municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of
the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to
humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over
property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth
of the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at
all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for
the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent
means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect
imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated
working shifts deny the workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the
mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court, such an injunction would be
trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial
Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute
although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).

The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that they suggested to the Union that
only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed
appreciate the sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their
total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part
of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is
diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their
members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police
persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made
arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when
the Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in
their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack
of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to
carry out its mass demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against the
company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and
workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service
constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or
protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their
rights guaranteed in Section Three."

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid
and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common
action to better shield themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the
morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of
inhibiting speech." 22

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action of employees in giving publicity to
a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban
employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in
relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as
long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15, 1969, the company, "while
expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers
who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce
the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to
them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to them was to
lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he
has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from
police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right to
petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on
them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having
jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with
a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits
for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of
the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own
equipment or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees,
the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a
denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the
State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other
directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for
otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-
being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed by the Constitution.

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a consequence its judgment is null and
void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus
proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by
final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present
evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two
years. 27

Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord
preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police.
Having violated these basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued
in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private
citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial
Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these
human rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing
of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there
are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by
rule on procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer
and its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the required
diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent legal services. 28-a

VI

The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed within five (5) days from notice thereof and
that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As
above intimated, these rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22, 1969 of the order dated September
15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more directly and
concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration or appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be
obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights
sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or
subordinate rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the
aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case
does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment
thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is
unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In
case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or
reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration
could have been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of Industrial are
concerned.

It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that the order sought to be
reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within
which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the
arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the
filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the
resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex
"J", pp. 74-75, rec.)

It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments in suppf such motion are filed
beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration
becomes final and unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so that
any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first
time on appeal, if it appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without
the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the
Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress,
must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them
and in their defense to the said charge.

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason to deny application of a
Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle
and added that

Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court
is not substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the
material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court
a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the contemplation of this
doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or committed with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to
reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If
there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to
reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the
exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the
ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an unreasoning adherence to
"Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according
supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no
actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.

If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial
Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It
should be stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light
of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at is also authorized by Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial
merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan,
etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not "newly discovered," as such term is
understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial
Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this provision the
industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to
the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of
settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17,
1940; Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is ample enough
to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded
on fact, without regard to the technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-
afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their
counsel — erroneously believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.

Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the attainment of which such rules have
been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The Villamor decision was cited with
approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v.
 Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm,
this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For
him the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than
technicalities" view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts have
organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization the administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We
have remained steadfastly opposed, in the highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in
altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil.
156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex,
L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA
citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice
Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended "to help secure substantial
justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or termination of the employment of the
petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a
sanction when it did not include the dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not officers,
were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed
against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the
400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair
labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4,
1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any damage.

The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day absence against their vacation or sick
leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages
for their daily sustenance as well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time
strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our system of Government, but from
men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish
involves an impairment of liberty.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is thatpreservation of liberties does not
depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only
protection against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our
Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the
Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to a group that is important
and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe. 31

The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who
claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its
employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement
selfishness, if not greed.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8) employees for having written
and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment
and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter acted in their individual capacities
when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of
their right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...)
This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small
group of employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).

xxx xxx xxx

 Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their
letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S.
793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-
13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to
select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with the countervailing
right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an interference with the employees'
right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice
within the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case, supra, where the complaint assailed
the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered
all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and October 9, 1969; and

(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation from the service until re instated,
minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

Panganiban, Abad and Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.

J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez and Associates for intervenor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be
more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second petitioner" against
the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the
City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner
non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not
less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than P3 million." 1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law,
no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the same
section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining
or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby
open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation,
the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such
form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses
would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again
on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two
classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant
and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion
of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person
less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful
guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive
character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a
transgression of the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The
lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and
after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that
petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged
nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self incrimination, with
the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal
of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964, which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel
del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of Manila charged with the general
power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such
ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was approved on June 14, 1963, by
Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections
661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This
ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15,
1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to
the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105 hotels and motels (including
herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the validity of the challenged
ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but
likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity.
Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with
citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by
the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file
memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties,
the decision passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the
untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have
admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently
with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged
statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting
the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. 2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or
ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus:
The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the
specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may
condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police
power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs."5 It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to
promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera welfare. 6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note
of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit"
and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the
registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating
for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the stipulation of facts,
far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or
procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting
jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball
machines;14 and prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise
used,15 all of which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often
emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it
may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due process. 16 There is no controlling
and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch "in the
light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," 19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather
serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to
an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be
found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance
No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to
contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels and motels, 150% for the former
and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the
settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular
enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.22 As was explained more in detail in
the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied
from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this
class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable,
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number
of persons who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this
kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the
sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that
taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority
conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation
that the tax so levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held
in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic,
even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure. 26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another
decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful
occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or
cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals
in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As
was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power
embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power." 27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice
every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as
a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or
oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at
correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice
Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the
greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled
license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may
be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to
promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim
of our Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. 29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,30 no
longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right
of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of
the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at
the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. 32 How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of vagueness or uncertainty. It would
appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific
rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the
companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are
those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time
later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the
discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be
charged for every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance
void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.33 to Adderley v.
Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or
requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation
before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack
against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held
and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.

G.R. No. L-20387 January 31, 1968

JESUS P. MORFE, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC, as Executive Secretary, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Jesus P. Morfe for and his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.

FERNANDO, J.:

Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 1 to deter public officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and
improve the tone of morality in public service. It was declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto." 2 Nor was it the first
statute of its kind to deal with such a grave problem in the public service that unfortunately has afflicted the Philippines in the post-war era. An earlier
statute decrees the forfeiture in favor of the State of any property found to have been unlawfully acquired by any public officer or employee. 3

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either within thirty (30) days after its
approval or after his assumption of office "and within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as upon the termination of his position,
shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement
of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar: . . ." 4

In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities after an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office was challenged for being violative of
due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. The lower court in the decision appealed from
sustained plaintiff, then as well as now, a judge of repute of a court of first instance. For it, such requirement of periodical submission of such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause.

We do not view the matter thus and accordingly reverse the lower court.

1. The reversal could be predicated on the absence of evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. For in this action for declaratory relief filed with the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan on January 31, 1962, plaintiff, after asserting his belief "that it was a reasonable requirement for employment that
a public officer make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office and thereby make it possible thereafter to determine whether, after
assuming his position in the public service, he accumulated assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes, the herein plaintiff [having] filed
within the period of time fixed in the aforesaid Administrative Order No. 334 the prescribed sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and
liabilities, . . ." 5 maintained that the provision on the "periodical filing of sworn statement of financial condition, assets, income and liabilities after an
officer or employee had once bared his financial condition, upon assumption of office, is oppressive and unconstitutional." 6

As earlier noted, both the protection of due process and the assurance of the privacy of the individual as may be inferred from the prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure and self-incrimination were relied upon. There was also the allegation that the above requirement amounts to "an
insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials, premised as it is "on the unwarranted and derogatory assumption" that they are
"corrupt at heart" and unless thus restrained by this periodical submission of the statements of "their financial condition, income, and expenses, they
cannot be trusted to desist from committing the corrupt practices defined. . . ." 7 It was further asserted that there was no need for such a provision as
"the income tax law and the tax census law also require statements which can serve to determine whether an officer or employee in this Republic has
enriched himself out of proportion to his reported income." 8

Then on February 14, 1962, came an Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where after practically
admitting the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law and as one of the special affirmative defenses set forth: "1. That when a
government official, like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to give information about his
personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an employee
cannot be segregated from his public life. . . ." 9 The answer likewise denied that there was a violation of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination
as well as unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot be attacked on the ground that it impairs
plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life and liberty because said provision merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the
interest or general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power." 10

On February 27, 1962, plaintiff filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings as in his opinion all his material allegations were admitted. Then on March
10, 1962, an order was issued giving the parties thirty days within which to submit memoranda, but with or without them, the case was deemed
submitted for decision the lower court being of the belief that "there is no question of facts, . . . the defendants [having admitted] all the material
allegations of the complaint." 11

The decision, now on appeal, came on July 19, 1962, the lower court declaring "unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar
as it required periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he
had once submitted such a sworn statement upon assuming office; . . . ." 12

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. The Mayor of Manila, 13 it was the holding of this Court that in the absence of a factual
foundation, the lower court deciding the matter purely "on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail." In the
present case likewise there was no factual foundation on which the nullification of this section of the statute could be based. Hence as noted the decision
of the lower court could be reversed on that ground.
A more extended consideration is not inappropriate however, for as likewise made clear in the above Ermita-Malate Hotel case: "What cannot be
stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more
rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider."

Moreover, in the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration in the above case, we expressly affirmed: "This is not to discount the possibility of a
situation where the nullity of a statute, executive order, or ordinance may not be readily apparent but the threat to constitutional rights, especially those
involving the freedom of the mind, present and ominous." 14 In such an event therefore, "there should not be a rigid insistence on the requirement that
evidence be presented." Also, in the same Resolution, Professor Freund was quoted thus: "In short, when freedom of the mind is imperiled by law, it is
freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect. This dual standard
may not precisely reverse the presumption of constitutionality in civil liberties cases, but obviously it does set up a hierarchy of values within the due
process clause. 15

2. We inquire first whether or not by virtue of the above requirement for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities, there is an
invasion of liberty protected by the due process clause.

Under the Anti-Graft Act of 1960, after the statement of policy, 16 and definition of terms, 17 there is an enumeration of corrupt practices declared unlawful
in addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law. They include persuading, inducing, or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the
official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense; requesting or receiving directly
or indirectly any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself, or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between
the government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law; requesting or receiving directly or
indirectly any gift, present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or
capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given;
accepting or having any member of his family accept employment in a private enterprise which has pending official business with him during the
pendency thereof or within one year after its termination; causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request, without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or
material benefit or advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating against any other
interested party; entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the public officer profited or will profit thereby; having directly or indirectly financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any
interests; becoming interested directly or indirectly, for personal gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act requiring the approval of a
board, panel or group of which he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in such action; approving or granting knowingly any license, permit, privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for or not legally
entitled to such license, permit, privilege or advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one who is not so qualified or entitled and divulging
valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing
such information in advance of its authorized release date. 18

After which come the prohibition on private individuals, 19 prohibition on certain relatives, 20 and prohibition on Members of Congress. 21 Then there is this
requirement of a statement of assets and liabilities, that portion requiring periodical submission being challenged here. 22 The other sections of the Act
deal with dismissal due to unexplained wealth, reference being made to the previous statute, 23 penalties for violation, 24 the vesting of original jurisdiction
in the Court of First Instance as the competent court, 25 the prescription of offenses, 26 the prohibition against any resignation or retirement pending
investigation, criminal or administrative or pending a prosecution, 27suspension and loss of benefits, 28 exception of unsolicited gifts or presents of small
or insignificant value as well as recognition of legitimate practice of one's profession or trade or occupation, 29 the separability clause, 30 and its
effectivity. 31

Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the Anti-Graft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute 32 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The
conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a remedial device.

The statute was framed with that end in view. It is comprehensive in character, sufficiently detailed and explicit to make clear to all and sundry what
practices were prohibited and penalized. More than that, an effort was made, so evident from even a cursory perusal thereof, to avoid evasions and plug
loopholes. One such feature is the challenged section. Thereby it becomes much more difficult by those disposed to take advantage of their positions to
commit acts of graft and corruption.

While in the attainment of such public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is permissible, there must be a showing, clear, categorical, and
undeniable, that what the Constitution condemns, the statute allows. More specifically, since that is the only question raised, is that portion of the statute
requiring periodical submission of assets and liabilities, after an officer or employee had previously done so upon assuming office, so infected with
infirmity that it cannot be upheld as valid?

Or, in traditional terminology, is this requirement a valid exercise of the police power? In the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel decision, 33 there is a
reaffirmation of its nature and scope as embracing the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. It has been negatively put forth by Justice Malcolm as "that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society." 34

Earlier Philippine cases refer to police power as the power to promote the general welfare and public interest; 35 to enact such laws in relation to persons
and property as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each inhabitant; 36 to preserve public order and to
prevent offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good neighborhood
calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 37 In his work on due process, Mott 38 stated that the term police power was first used by Chief Justice Marshall. 39
As currently in use both in Philippine and American decisions then, police power legislation usually has reference to regulatory measures restraining
either the rights to property or liberty of private individuals. It is undeniable however that one of its earliest definitions, valid then as well as now, given by
Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney does not limit its scope to curtailment of rights whether of liberty or property of private individuals. Thus: "But
what are the police powers of a State? They are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its
dominions. And whether a State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments to
be recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of sovereignty, the power
to govern men and things within the limits of its domain." 40 Text writers like Cooley and Burdick were of a similar mind. 41

What is under consideration is a statute enacted under the police power of the state to promote morality in public service necessarily limited in scope to
officialdom. May a public official claiming to be adversely affected rely on the due process clause to annul such statute or any portion thereof? The
answer must be in the affirmative. If the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with an alleged
grievance can invoke the protection of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long as such requirement is observed.

While the soundness of the assertion that a public office is a public trust and as such not amounting to property in its usual sense cannot be denied,
there can be no disputing the proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure guaranteed by the Constitution the mantle of protection
afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked. It was so implicitly held in Lacson v. Romero, 42 in line with the then pertinent statutory
provisions 43 that procedural due process in the form of an investigation at which he must be given a fair hearing and an opportunity to defend himself
must be observed before a civil service officer or employee may be removed. There was a reaffirmation of the view in even stronger language when this
Court through Justice Tuason in Lacson v. Roque 44 declared that even without express provision of law, "it is established by the great weight of authority
that the power of removal or suspension for cause can not, except by clear statutory authority, be exercised without notice and hearing." Such is likewise
the import of a statement from the then Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion, speaking for the Court in Meneses v. Lacson; 45 "At any rate, the
reinstatement directed in the decision appealed from does not bar such appropriate administrative action as the behaviour of petitioners herein may
warrant, upon compliance with the requirements of due process."

To the same effect is the holding of this Court extending the mantle of the security of tenure provision to employees of government-owned or controlled
corporations entrusted with governmental functions when through Justice Padilla in Tabora v. Montelibano, 46 it stressed: "That safeguard, guarantee, or
feeling of security that they would hold their office or employment during good behavior and would not be dismissed without justifiable cause to be
determined in an investigation, where an opportunity to be heard and defend themselves in person or by counsel is afforded them, would bring about
such a desirable condition." Reference was there made to promoting honesty and efficiency through an assurance of stability in their employment
relation. It was to be expected then that through Justice Labrador in Unabia v. City Mayor, 47 this Court could categorically affirm: "As the removal of
petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void. . . ."

It was but logical therefore to expect an explicit holding of the applicability of due process guaranty to be forthcoming. It did in Cammayo v.
Viña, 48 where the opinion of Justice Endencia for the Court contained the following unmistakable language: "Evidently, having these facts in view, it
cannot be pretended that the constitutional provision of due process of law for the removal of the petitioner has not been complied with."

Then came this restatement of the principle from the pen of Justice J.B.L. Reyes "We are thus compelled to conclude that the positions formerly held by
appellees were not primarily confidential in nature so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence reposed in them. The inevitable
corollary is that respondents-appellees, Leon Piñero, et al., were not subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause specified by law and within due
process. . . ." 49 In a still later decision, Abaya v. Subido, 50 this Court, through Justice Sanchez, emphasized "that the vitality of the constitutional
principle of due process cannot be allowed to weaken by sanctioning cancellation" of an employee's eligibility or "of his dismissal from service — without
hearing — upon a doubtful assumption that he has admitted his guilt for an offense against Civil Service rules." Equally emphatic is this observation from
the same case: "A civil service employee should be heard before he is condemned. Jurisprudence has clung to this rule with such unrelenting grasp that
by now it would appear trite to make citations thereof."

If as is so clearly and unequivocally held by this Court, due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in that
limited sense is analogous to property, could he not likewise avail himself of such constitutional guarantee to strike down what he considers to be an
infringement of his liberty? Both on principle, reason and authority, the answer must be in the affirmative. Even a public official has certain rights to
freedom the government must respect. To the extent then, that there is a curtailment thereof, it could only be permissible if the due process mandate is
not disregarded.

Since under the constitutional scheme, liberty is the rule and restraint the exception, the question raised cannot just be brushed aside. In a leading
Philippine case, Rubi v. Provincial Board, 51 liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and
the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case therefore, the rights of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any avocation, are all deemed embraced in the concept
of liberty. This Court in the same case, however, gave the warning that liberty as understood in democracies, is not license. Implied in the term is
restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good, the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No one can do exactly
as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. In the words of Mabini as quoted by Justice Malcolm, "liberty is freedom to do right and
never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and honorable conscience of the individual."

The liberty to be safeguarded is, as pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes, liberty in a social organization, 52 implying the absence of arbitrary restraint not
immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. 53 It was Linton's view that "to belong to a society is to
sacrifice some measure of individual liberty, no matter how slight the restraints which the society consciously imposes." 54 The above statement from
Linton however, should be understood in the sense that liberty, in the interest of public health, public order or safety, of general welfare, in other words
through the proper exercise of the police power, may be regulated. The individual thought, as Justice Cardozo pointed out, has still left a "domain of free
activity that cannot be touched by government or law at all, whether the command is specially against him or generally against him and others." 55

Is this provision for a periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after he had filed one upon assumption of office beyond the
power of government to impose? Admittedly without the challenged provision, a public officer would be free from such a requirement. To the extent then
that there is a compulsion to act in a certain way, his liberty is affected. It cannot be denied however that under the Constitution, such a restriction is
allowable as long as due process is observed.
The more crucial question therefore is whether there is an observance of due process. That leads us to an inquiry into its significance. "There is no
controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as
substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To
satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due
process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light
of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases." 56

It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed
the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed on public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming office. The due process clause is not susceptible to such a
reproach. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.

4. The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by
plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy.
There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental
restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." 57 As a
matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men." 58

The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. As Laski so very aptly stated: "Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his
isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the
consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If
he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders his personality. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be master of himself. I cannot believe
that a man no longer master of himself is in any real sense free." 59

Nonetheless, in view of the fact that there is an express recognition of privacy, specifically that of communication and correspondence which "shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of Court or when public safety and order" 60may otherwise require, and implicitly in the search and seizure
clause, 61 and the liberty of abode 62 the alleged repugnancy of such statutory requirement of further periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets
and liabilities deserves to be further looked into.

In that respect the question is one of first impression, no previous decision having been rendered by this Court. It is not so in the United States where, in
the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 63 Justice Douglas, speaking for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers 'in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the 'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, 64 Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear
witness that the right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."

The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees." 65 It has wider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.1äwphï1.ñët

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,
which the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization —
operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." 66

Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on
the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes
very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the
statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.

5. Could it be said, however, as plaintiff contends, that insofar as the challenged provision requires the periodical filing of a sworn statement of financial
condition, it would be violative of the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure and against self-incrimination?

His complaint cited on this point Davis v. United States. 67 In that case, petitioner Davis was convicted under an information charging him with unlawfully
having in his possession a number of gasoline ration coupons representing so many gallons of gasoline, an offense penalized under a 1940
statute. 68 He was convicted both in the lower court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals over the objection that there was an unlawful search which
resulted in the seizure of the coupons and that their use at the trial was in violation of Supreme Court decisions. 69 In the District Court, there was a
finding that he consented to the search and seizure. The Circuit Court of Appeals did not disturb that finding although expressed doubt concerning it,
affirming however under the view that such seized coupons were properly introduced in evidence, the search and seizure being incidental to an arrest,
and therefore reasonable regardless of petitioner's consent.

In affirming the conviction the United States Supreme Court, through Justice Douglas emphasized that the Court was dealing in this case "not with
private papers or documents, but with gasoline ration coupons which never became the private property of the holder but remained at all times the
property of the government and subject to inspection and recall by it." 70 He made it clear that the opinion was not to be understood as suggesting "that
officers seeking to reclaim government property may proceed lawlessly and subject to no restraints. Nor [does it] suggest that the right to inspect under
the regulations subjects a dealer to a general search of his papers for the purpose of learning whether he has any coupons subject to inspection and
seizure. The nature of the coupons is important here merely as indicating that the officers did not exceed the permissible limits of persuasion in obtaining
them." 71

True, there was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Frankfurter in which Justice Murphy joined, critical of what it considered "a process of devitalizing
interpretation" which in this particular case gave approval "to what was done by arresting officers" and expressing the regret that the Court might be "in
danger of forgetting what the Bill of Rights reflects experience with police excesses."

Even this opinion, however, concerned that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure "does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion. Subject to familiar qualifications every man is under obligation to give testimony. But that obligation can be exacted only under
judicial sanctions which are deemed precious to Anglo-American civilization. Merely because there may be the duty to make documents available for
litigation does not mean that police officers may forcibly or fraudulently obtain them. This protection of the right to be let alone except under responsible
judicial compulsion is precisely what the Fourth Amendment meant to express and to safeguard." 72

It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory provision offends against the unreasonable search and seizure
clause would be futile and unavailing. This is the more so in the light of the latest decision of this Court in Stonehill v. Diokno, 73 where this Court,
through Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with, and that it would be "a legal heresy
of the highest order" to convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes without reference to any of its determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one
of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the sanctity, of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence. . . ." Such is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general
warrants.

It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been shown to exist by such requirement of further
periodical submission of one's financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.

Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit acceptance, by his invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to
the Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." 74 This constitutional provision gives the accused immunity from any
attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may confess, but only
if he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to.75 Or he could remain silent, and the prosecution is powerless to
compel him to talk. 76 Proof is not solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither then could the accused be ordered to write, when what
comes from his pen may constitute evidence of guilt or innocence. 77 Moreover, there can be no search or seizure of his house, papers or effects for the
purpose of locating incriminatory matter. 78

In a declaratory action proceeding then, the objection based on the guaranty against self-incrimination is far from decisive. It is well to note what Justice
Tuason stated: "What the above inhibition seeks to [prevent] is compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts." 79 Necessarily then, the protection it affords
will have to await, in the language of Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the existence of actual cases, "be they criminal, civil or administrative." 80 Prior to such a
stage, there is no pressing need to pass upon the validity of the fear sincerely voiced that there is an infringement of the non-incrimination clause. What
was said in an American State decision is of relevance. In that case, a statutory provision requiring any person operating a motor vehicle, who knows
that injury has been caused a person or property, to stop and give his name, residence, and his license number to the injured party or to a police officer
was sustained against the contention that the information thus exacted may be used as evidence to establish his connection with the injury and therefore
compels him to incriminate himself. As was stated in the opinion: "If the law which exacts this information is invalid, because such information, although
in itself no evidence of guilt, might possibly lead to a charge of crime against the informant, then all police regulations which involve identification may be
questioned on the same ground. We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man's conduct from judicial inquiry or aid him in
fleeing from justice. But, even if a constitutional right be involved, it is not necessary to invalidate the statute to secure its protection. If, in this particular
case, the constitutional privilege justified the refusal to give the information exacted by the statute, that question can be raised in the defense to the
pending prosecution. Whether it would avail, we are not called upon to decide in this proceeding." 81

6. Nor could such a provision be nullified on the allegation that it constitutes "an insult to the personal integrity and official dignity" of public officials. On
its face, it cannot thus be stigmatized. As to its being unnecessary, it is well to remember that this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, "does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." 82 As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It is not the province of the courts to supervise
legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." 83 There can be no
possible objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely
interpret and apply them regardless of whether or not they are wise or salutary." 84 For they, according to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override
legitimate policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law." 85

It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 86 that only congressional power or competence, not
the wisdom of the action taken may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers has in the
main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not
allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to
the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain
unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be
objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of July 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act No. 3019, insofar as it
requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets and liabilities of an official or employee of the government after he had
once submitted such a sworn statement . . . is reversed." Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., reserves his vote.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon seek to compel
respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

The antecedents are as follows.

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on
November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication. 4

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society.5 This is evident
from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:

SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan
and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the
east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de
Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig
River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby
given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which are
hereby in consequence, disallowed.

Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among
the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil
companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil
companies agreed to perform the following:

Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the
Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with
the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx

Section 2. – Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management,
including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and domestic technical, safety, environmental and
economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the
common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations,
shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.

Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the
OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.

The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:

Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent
thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in
compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.

Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’ compliance with the provisions of this MOU.

Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing
future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution, the Sangguniandeclared that the MOU was effective only
for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003
also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.10

Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.11

The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:

1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and

2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. 12

Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA 7160),13 to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has allowed them to stay.

Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions. 14However, he also confusingly argues that the
ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and
in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be
considered as a mere guideline for its full implementation.15

Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. Mandamus is an
extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to
the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. 17

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The
principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the
writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not
issue.18

To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it is a political party
registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.

We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific
interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned
the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as
long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be
permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of
the law and are bound to obey it.23

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or
uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance
is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS
PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." – Article II,
Section 1, Constitution

All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and preferred right to expression of the
electorate during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated.

This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of first impression. We are asked to decide
whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during
elections.

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order1 under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign Materials 2 dated February 22, 2013 and letter3 issued on February 27,
2013.

The facts are not disputed.

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check
mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No.
10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.6Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while
those who voted against it form "Team Buhay":7

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo

Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy

Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter

Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie

Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis

Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa

Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren

Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela

Party List Akbayan

Party List Bayan Muna

Party List Anak Pawis

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for
that election.

On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from
receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9

On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department
regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.11
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to
file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies available to petitioners. The letter
provides as follows:

Dear Bishop Navarra:

It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty. Mavil Majarucon, had already given you notice on February 22, 2013 as regards the
election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups with the following names and
messages, particularly described as follows:

Material size : six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’)

Description : FULL COLOR TARPAULIN

Image of : SEE ATTACHED PICTURES

Message : CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM

BUHAY; (PRO RH) TEAM PATAY

Location : POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY

OF THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY

The three (3) – day notice expired on February 25, 2013.

Considering that the above-mentioned material is found to be in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 promulgated on January 15, 2013 particularly
on the size (even with the subsequent division of the said tarpaulin into two), as the lawful size for election propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by
three feet (3’), please order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material, otherwise, we shall be constrained to file an election
offense case against you.

We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help the Commission on Elections inensuring the conduct of peaceful, orderly, honest and
credible elections.

Thank you and God Bless!

[signed]
ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA
Director IV13

Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. 14 They question respondents’ notice dated February 22, 2013 and
letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin;
and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently
restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order. 15

After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and
letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013.16

On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment17 arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
before this court is not the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to
regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering
its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional. 18

During the hearing held on March 19, 2013, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda within 10 days or by April 1, 2013, taking into
consideration the intervening holidays.19

The issues, which also served as guide for the oral arguments, are:20

I.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE
COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC WHICH WOULD
WARRANT A REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA RULE 65 PETITION[;]

A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES
GOVERNING APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;
 B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL
ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD
ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE[;]

II.

WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR "ELECTION PROPAGANDA"
CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]

III.

WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENT[;]

A. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE COMELEC
POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SAME[;]

B. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]

IV.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE
COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;] [AND]

V.

WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE.

I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES

I.A

This court’s jurisdiction over COMELEC cases

Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the
COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. 21

Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.22 As a special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions,
rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power."23 Instead, respondents claim that the
assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution24 on COMELEC’s power to
decide all questions affecting elections.25 Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,26 Repol v. COMELEC,27 Soriano, Jr. v.
COMELEC,28 Blanco v. COMELEC,29 and Cayetano v. COMELEC,30 to illustrate how judicialintervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and
judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.31

These cases are not applicable.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election protest. 32 At issue was the validity of the
promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution.33 No motion for reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En Banc. This court
declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified:

We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution]34 to mean final orders, rulings and decisionsof the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division.The Supreme Court has no power to review viacertiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of
the Commission on Elections.35 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this general rule. Repolwas another election
protest case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan, Samar.36 This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First
Division issued a status quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending appeal.37 This court’s ponencia discussed the
general rule enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.38However, consistent with
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,39 it clarified the exception:
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.40

Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests — despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC
En Banc, if:

1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;

3) The issue involves the protection of labor;

4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or

5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.

Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repoland decided that the status quo anteorder issued by the COMELEC Division was unconstitutional.

Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC.This case was also an election protest case involving candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa
City.41 Petitioners in Soriano, Jr.filed before this court a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First

Division.42 While the petition was pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest case. 43 Sorianoapplied the
general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court, however, acknowledged the exceptions to the
general rule in ABS-CBN.44

Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a disqualification case of one of the mayoralty candidates of Meycauayan, Bulacan. 45 The
COMELEC Second Division ruled that petitioner could not qualify for the 2007 elections due to the findings in an administrative case that he engaged in
vote buying in the 1995 elections.46No motion for reconsideration was filed before the COMELEC En Banc. This court, however, took cognizance of this
case applying one of the exceptions in ABS-CBN: The assailed resolution was a nullity.47

Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election protest case involving the mayoralty candidates of Taguig City.48 Petitioner assailed
a resolution of the COMELEC denying her motion for reconsideration to dismiss the election protest petition for lack of form and substance.49 This court
clarified the general rule and refused to take cognizance of the review of the COMELEC order. While recognizing the exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court
ruled that these exceptions did not apply.50

Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over
this case. All these cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate.

In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.

Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to
acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcingelection
laws.

I.B

Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,

and limitations on political speech

The main subject of thiscase is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the "chilling effect" caused by respondent
COMELEC’s notice and letter.

Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the notice51 dated February
22,2013 and letter52 dated February 27, 2013 ordering the removal of the tarpaulin.53 It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right to
freedom of expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state and, thus, are unconstitutional. 54

The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the
authority "to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority
which organizes the court and defines its powers."55Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different from the cases cited by respondents.

Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire
to be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through the
election of representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of
speech does not depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the
motives of COMELEC. We evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because the quality of
this freedom in practice will define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.

COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable of repetition. Under the conditions in which it was issued and in
view of the novelty of this case,it could result in a "chilling effect" that would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the
elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or
sanction by the COMELEC. Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for raising
grave abuse of discretion.

Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this court’s expanded exercise of certiorari as provided by the
Constitution as follows:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether ornot there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.56(Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the
Constitution, provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

....

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.

We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are confronted with the
question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful
political speech.

It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C,
Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power
to decide any and allquestions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should not operate to divest this
court of its own jurisdiction.

The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.This provision provides for this court’s original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution.

Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter
coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.

During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people
against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate out weighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.

It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.

I.C

Hierarchy of courts

This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before this court.

Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of
their petition.57 They add that observation of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. 58 While respondents claim
that while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this case.59

On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this court’s discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if warranted by
"compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the issues raised. . . ." 61 Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling reasons
to justify a direct resort [with] this Court."62

In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,63 we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of
the lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and
important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. 64

In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v.
Suelto:65

The Supreme Court is a court of lastresort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals,
bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s
procurement must be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.66 (Emphasis omitted)

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They
are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to
the Constitution.67 To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach
within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a
determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of
Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate
in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over
most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues thatmay not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.

In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become exigent should
not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.68 This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction
[over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons 69 or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition."70 As correctly pointed out by petitioners,71 we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A
direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition toassail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and
executive branches of the government.72

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in
future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a
rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political theorist:

[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments through democratic procedures. It
comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new
society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and enlightened
civilization virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It
contemplates a mode of life that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities.It spurns
the alternative of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant. 73

In a democracy, the citizen’s right tofreely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is recognized. It deserves the
highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation in nation-building isa fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to
engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court.

A second exception is when the issuesinvolved are of transcendental importance. 74 In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to
fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance
prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of
relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the
context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the
public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free
speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.

Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower
courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v. Purganan, 76 this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may
guide the lower courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the
present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.77

This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of
expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is
allowed.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raisedare better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, 78 this court held that:

. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgmentof this Court in the consideration of its validity,
which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.79 (Citation omitted)

In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have
already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception
for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz, 80 cited by petitioners, this court
held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance ofeach and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to
disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence." 81

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not
have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, thiscourt affords great respect to the Constitution and
the powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions
may be guided accordingly in the future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the
injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.

In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort to
this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was consideredas clearly an inappropriate remedy."82 In the past,
questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens’ right to bear
arms,83 government contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration lists,84 and the status and existence of a public office.85

This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy
of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.

I.D

The concept of a political question

Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not within the ambit of this court’s power of
review. They cite Justice Vitug’s separate opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC86 to support their position:

It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the "State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution to be
all that adversarial or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general application, must yield to
the specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly holds, it is true, a vantage point in hierarchy of constitutionally-
enshrined rights but, like all fundamental rights, it is not without limitations.

The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful" and the "weak" in our society but it is to me a genuine attempt
on the part of Congress and the Commission on Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to media coverage and thereby be
equally perceived as giving real life to the candidates’ right of free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The
wisdom in the enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be best in giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to
question; it is a matter that lies beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.87

This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is not in point in this case.

The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal opportunities for media coverage of
candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post the tarpaulin in their
private property, asan exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not
proscribed from deciding on the merits of this case.

In Tañada v. Cuenco,88 this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political question:

What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their
primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, withdiscretionary
power to act.89 (Emphasis omitted)

It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In political forums, particularly the legislature, the
creation of the textof the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the
executive branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.

Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a specific case-to-case basis, where parties affected by
the legal provision seek the courts’ understanding of the law.

The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order to ensure that the rights of the general public are
upheld at all times. In order to preserve this balance, branches of government must afford due respectand deference for the duties and functions
constitutionally delegated to the other. Courts cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence dictates that we are careful not to veto political acts
unless we can craft doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.

The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court
through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.

A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the executive or those
of the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within
the domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with
deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.

Marcos v. Manglapus90 limited the use of the political question doctrine:

When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.91

How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the timethat it had been first invoked in Marcos v.
Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical and social context of the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and
narrowly tailored constitutional doctrines. This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson 92 and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.93

Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution involving the removal of petitioners from
the Commission on Appointments. In times past, this would have involved a quint essentially political question as it related to the dominance of political
parties in Congress. However, in these cases, this court exercised its power of judicial review noting that the requirement of interpreting the
constitutional provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This approach was
again reiterated in Defensor Santiago v. Guingona, Jr. 94

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,95 this court declared again that the possible existence ofa political question did not bar an examination of
whether the exercise of discretion was done with grave abuse of discretion. In that case, this court ruled on the question of whether there was grave
abuse of discretion in the President’s use of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.

In Estrada v. Desierto,96 this court ruled that the legal question as to whether a former President resigned was not a political question even if the
consequences would be to ascertain the political legitimacy of a successor President.

Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the resolution of constitutional issues as leverage. But the
expanded jurisdiction of this court now mandates a duty for it to exercise its power of judicial review expanding on principles that may avert catastrophe
or resolve social conflict.

This court’s understanding of the political question has not been static or unbending. In Llamas v. Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos,97 this court held:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise,
it is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits
prescribed by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or
correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. 98

The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political question was discussed most extensively in Francisco v. HRET.99 In this case, the
House of Representatives arguedthat the question of the validity of the second impeachment complaint that was filed against former Chief Justice Hilario
Davide was a political question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno elaborated on this concept in his concurring and
dissenting opinion:

To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the new Constitution which expanded the definition of
judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of judicial power considerably constricted
the scope of political question. He opined that the language luminously suggests that this duty (and power) is available even against the executive and
legislative departments including the President and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary powers.100 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the political question, as applied in the following cases:

In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held: The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. x x x

In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:

The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with
the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." (Emphasis and italics supplied)

And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

....

In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. 101 (Citations omitted)

As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial
scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.

I.E

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents insist that petitioners should have first
brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions.102

Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 65 that "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law."103 They add that the proper venue to assail the validity of the assailed issuances was in the course of an
administrative hearing to be conducted by COMELEC.104 In the event that an election offense is filed against petitioners for posting the tarpaulin, they
claim that petitioners should resort to the remedies prescribed in Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 105

The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.

Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the
"prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch [or in this case, organ of government] before a court may
come into the picture."106
Petitioners’ exercise of their rightto speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.

In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom
of speech.

Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales, 107 Justice Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized:
"[i]f everthere is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political
expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top." 108 Sovereignty resides in the people.109 Political speech is a direct exercise of
the sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.

Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current controversy is within the exceptions to the principle.
In Chua v. Ang,110 this court held:

On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately: (a)
when there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part ofthe administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable
injury; (f) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the
latter; (g) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (j) whenthe rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there
are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention." 111 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allegethat the assailed issuances violated their right to
freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case
indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion
of administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.

Time and again, we have held that this court "has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling
reasons so warrant, or whenthe purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of
the rules is discretionary upon the court".112Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has threatenedto prosecute private parties who seek
to participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want debated by the publicin the manner they feel would be effective is one of those
cases.

II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

II.A

COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens

Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin.113 However, all of
these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do theybelong to any political party. COMELEC does
not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

II.A.1

First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:

Section 4. The Commission may,during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.114 (Emphasis supplied)

Sanidad v. COMELEC115 involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.116 Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision prohibiting journalists from covering plebiscite issues on the day before and on
plebiscite day.117 Sanidad argued that the prohibition was a violation of the "constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. . .
."118 We held that the "evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time."119 This court found that "[m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates[,]" 120 thus, their right to expression during this period may not be regulated
by COMELEC.121

Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates. II.A.2

Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows:122

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
 ....

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) Based on the
enumeration made on actsthat may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only affects candidates.

Petitioners assail the "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" issued by COMELEC. This was followed bythe assailed letter regarding the "election
propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups. . . ."123

Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of campaign materials only mentions "parties" and "candidates":

Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their
candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or
exhibit election propaganda: Provided, That the size ofthe poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent. Independent
candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which
shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent. Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the
owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates. (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the Fair Election Act, provides as follows:

SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any lawful campaign material in:

a. Authorized common poster areasin public places subject to the requirements and/or limitations set forth in the next following section; and

b. Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.

The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common poster areas and those enumerated under Section 7 (g) of these
Rules and the like is prohibited. Persons posting the same shall be liable together with the candidates and other persons who caused the posting. It will
be presumed that the candidates and parties caused the posting of campaign materials outside the common poster areas if they do not remove the
same within three (3) days from notice which shall be issued by the Election Officer of the city or municipality where the unlawful election propaganda
are posted or displayed.

Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election Officeror other officials of the COMELEC shall apprehend the
violators caught in the act, and file the appropriate charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials
only apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006on "Lawful Election Propaganda" also states that these are "allowed for all registered political parties, national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective
positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . ." Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides
for a similar wording. These provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with candidates and
political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that
these candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.

The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political party. 125 There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named
in the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. Respondents also
cite National Press Club v. COMELEC126 in arguing that its regulatory power under the Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to free speech
during election period.127

National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements, limiting political advertisements to
COMELEC-designated space and time. This case was brought by representatives of mass media and two candidates for office in the 1992 elections.
They argued that the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements is tantamount to censorship, which necessarily
infringes on the freedom of speech of the candidates. 128

This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However, this case does not apply as most of the petitioners
were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in the instant case. Moreover, the subject matter of National Press Club, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No.
6646,129 only refers to a particular kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or television.130 Justice Feliciano emphasized that the
provision did not infringe upon the right of reporters or broadcasters to air their commentaries and opinions regarding the candidates, their qualifications,
and program for government. Compared to Sanidadwherein the columnists lost their ability to give their commentary on the issues involving the
plebiscite, National Press Clubdoes not involve the same infringement.

In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates for the 2013 national elections because of the COMELEC notice
and letter. It was not merelya regulation on the campaigns of candidates vying for public office. Thus, National Press Clubdoes not apply to this case.

Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, defines an"election campaign" as follows:

....
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office which shall include:

(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking
any campaign for or against a candidate;

(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;

(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;

(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or

(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.

The foregoing enumerated acts ifperformed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy to a public office by a
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions or
opinions or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming electionor on attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be
nominated in a forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated
under this Article. (Emphasis supplied)

True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that
the act must be "designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office."

In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the
passing of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.

II.B

The violation of the constitutional right

to freedom of speech and expression

Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their fundamental right to freedom of expression.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article
IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed notice and letter ordering itsremoval for being oversized are valid and constitutional.131

II.B.1

Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.132

No law. . .

While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of
the Constitution even to governmental acts.

In Primicias v. Fugoso,133 respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of Manila for the public meeting and
assembly organized by petitioner Primicias.134 Section 1119 requires a Mayor’s permit for the use of streets and public places for purposes such as
athletic games, sports, or celebration of national holidays.135 What was questioned was not a law but the Mayor’s refusal to issue a permit for the holding
of petitioner’s public meeting.136 Nevertheless, this court recognized the constitutional right to freedom of speech, to peaceful assembly and to petition
for redress of grievances, albeit not absolute,137 and the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Mayor to issue the permit was granted. 138

In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419 where the COMELEC resolved to
approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys.139 The right to freedom of expression was similarly upheld in
this case and, consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set aside. 140

. . . shall be passed abridging. . .

All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute
prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in the
Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .

Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and of the press provided in
the US Constitution. The word "expression" was added in the 1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:

MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says: "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to the Committee the change of the word "speech" to EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND
EXPRESSION after the word "speech," because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would refer to means of expression other than speech.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What does the Committee say?

FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than speech. We accept it.

MR. BROCKA: Thank you.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it accepted?

FR. BERNAS: Yes.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.

FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, expression or of the press . . . ."141 Speech
may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as "[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the
government because speech is the beginning of thought."142

II.B.2

Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech. 143 Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional
actions because he orshe reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the
actions."144 "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with
criticism or requests for justification."145

Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’"146 such that
"‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient
to bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’"147

The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself
as a symbolic manner of communication.

In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 148 students who were members of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be
expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge. 149 In his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz
discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of expression. 150 He adds that freedom of speech includes even the
right to be silent:

Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is
in his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its
messageas clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of
valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids
them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.

The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the
majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or
unpopular views as inthis case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are
protected by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels. 151

Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present Constitution,this court has applied its precedent version to
expressions other than verbal utterances.

In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak,152 petitioners objected to the classification of the motion picture "Kapit sa Patalim" as "For Adults
Only." They contend that the classification "is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression."153 This
court recognized that "[m]otion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse."154 It
adds that "every writer,actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor." 155 This court found that
"[the Board’s] perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive." 156 However, the petition was dismissed solely on the ground
that there were not enough votes for a ruling of grave abuse of discretion in the classification made by the Board. 157

II.B.3
Size does matter

The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The present case is in point.

It is easy to discern why size matters.

First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its messages from greater distances.
Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier for passengers inside moving vehicles to read its content. Compared with the pedestrians, the
passengers inside moving vehicles have lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the fonts and images, the greater the probability that it
will catch their attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they will understand its message.

Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader. From an ordinary person’s perspective, those who post
their messages in larger fonts care more about their message than those who carry their messages in smaller media. The perceived importance given
by the speakers, in this case petitioners, to their cause is also part of the message. The effectivity of communication sometimes relies on the emphasis
put by the speakers and onthe credibility of the speakers themselves. Certainly, larger segments of the public may tend to be more convinced of the
point made by authoritative figures when they make the effort to emphasize their messages.

Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which
the speakers might want to communicate. Rather than simply placing the names and images of political candidates and an expression of support, larger
spaces can allow for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates’ platforms for governance. Larger spaces allow for more precise inceptions of
ideas, catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a more educated and reasoned electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the
possibilities of both good governance and accountability in our government.

These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Too often, the terms of public
discussion during elections are framed and kept hostage by brief and catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the candidate.
Worse, elections sideline political arguments and privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide obstacles to their speech, government
should in fact encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have the better incentive to demand discussion of the more important
issues. Between the candidates and the electorate, the former have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on
appearances and empty promises.

Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place. 158 They are fundamentally part of expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution.

II.B.4

There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.

First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.

Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue isa critical, and indeed defining,
feature of a good polity."159 This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all who
will beaffected by the decision."160 It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people.161 To
ensure order in running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key government positions
to represent the people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government accountable.
Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.

Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.

Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies."162

In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs."163 This court has, thus, adopted the principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,and wide open . . . [including even]
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."164

Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the
ultimate good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:" 165

When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.166

The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to "consider, test, and develop their own conclusions." 167 A free, open, and dynamic
market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This promotes both stability and change where recurring points may crystallize and weak ones
may develop. Of course, free speech is more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and economic arrangements as it includes, "[t]o
paraphrase Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us." 168 In fact, free speech may
"best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."169 It
is in this context that we should guard against any curtailment of the people’s right to participate in the free trade of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is "a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment,"170 among others.
In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc, 171 this court discussed as follows:

The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition
of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees. 172 (Emphasis supplied)

Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "[v]oluntary associations perform [an] important democratic role [in providing] forums for the
development of civil skills, for deliberation, and for the formation of identity and community spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any] governmental
interference."173 They also "provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a free space for the development of individual personality, distinct group
identity, and dissident ideas - and a potential source of opposition to the state."174 Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find those who have
similar and shared values and ideals, to join together and forward common goals.

Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the]
framework [of democratic governance]."175 Federalist framers led by James Madison were concerned about two potentially vulnerable groups: "the
citizenry at large - majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by despotic federal officials" 176 and the minorities who may be oppressed by
"dominant factions of the electorate [that] capture [the] government for their own selfish ends[.]" 177 According to Madison, "[i]t is of great importance in a
republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other
part."178 We should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially in light of any potential oppression against those who find themselves in the
fringes on public issues.

Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. 179 This provides that "nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of
violence[.]"180 "[A] dam about to burst . . . resulting in the ‘banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of restriction’"181 has been
used to describe the effect of repressing nonviolent outlets. 182 In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a
need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. This includes "free expression and political participation" 183 in that they can "vote for
candidates who share their views, petition their legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature alerting other citizens of their
concerns[,]"184 and conduct peaceful rallies and other similar acts.185 Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal,
considering the possibility that repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.

II.B.5

Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Respondents argue that the tarpaulinis election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it. 186 As such, it is subject to regulation
by COMELEC under its constitutional mandate.187 Election propaganda is defined under Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows:
SECTION 1. Definitions . . .

....

4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any
medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being
associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly,
the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances
on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by
commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website,
including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary
estimation.

On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and beliefs about issues and candidates."188 They
argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and appreciation of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their
criticism toward those who voted in its favor.189It was "part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law,"190 which was not paid for by any candidate
or political party.191 Thus, "the questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared
unconstitutional and void."192

This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values." 193 These rights enjoy
precedence and primacy.194 In Philippine Blooming Mills, this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:

Property and property rights can belost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, ofthe influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."195 (Citations omitted)

This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so "when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage."196 A similar idea appeared in our jurisprudence as early as 1969, which was Justice Barredo’s concurring and dissenting
opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC:197
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine democracy thrives only where the power and right of
the people toelect the men to whom they would entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of principles of
our Constitution, "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1,
Article II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed only by
officials whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in it is on this cornerstone that I hold it tobe self-evident that when the freedoms
of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or asa means to enjoy the inalienable right
of the qualified citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by
our officials must be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and at all times. Every holder of power in our
government must be ready to undergo exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way that he
can rightfully gain the confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to
be indulged by the people only at certain periods of time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances,
when exercised in the name of suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly enjoyed.It stands to reason therefore,
that suffrage itself would be next to useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time. 198 (Emphasis supplied)

Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this court discussed that some types of speech may be subject to regulation:

Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the
equal right of others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech,
e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctionshave therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and
evaluation ofthe permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel,
lewd and obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized. 199 (Citations omitted)

We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech "both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,"200 "foster[ing] informed and civicminded deliberation."201 On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction." 202 The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech. In Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion, he discussed that "[t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it
subject of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615."203 He adds that "[w]hile indeed the RH issue, by itself,is not an electoralmatter,
the slant that the petitioners gave the issue converted the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the plea
to support one and oppose the other."204

While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.

The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 9006 as an aid to
interpret the law insofar as the facts of this case requires, states:

4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any
medium, which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being
associated with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly,
the election of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances
on TV shows and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by
commercial advertisers. Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website,
including, but not limited to, social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary
estimation. (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.

Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:

SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:

1. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office, and shall include any of the following:

....

Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be considered acts of election campaigning or partisan
politicalactivity unless expressed by government officials in the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.

In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters should be deemed narrowly tailored only in relation to the
facts and issues in this case. It also appears that such wording in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 does not similarly appear in Republic Act No. 9006,
the law it implements.

We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.

As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos,205 this court recognized the need for full discussion of public affairs. We acknowledged that free speech
includes the right to criticize the conduct of public men:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct
of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of official dom. Men in public life may suffer
under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned
with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. 206

Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, allowing for criticism, save for some exceptions. 207 In
the 1951 case of Espuelas v. People,208 this court noted every citizen’s privilege to criticize his or her government, provided it is "specific and therefore
constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up."209

The 1927 case of People v. Titular210 involved an alleged violation of the Election Law provision "penaliz[ing] the anonymous criticism of a candidate by
means of posters or circulars."211 This court explained that it is the poster’s anonymous character that is being penalized. 212 The ponente adds that he
would "dislike very muchto see this decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public opinion." 213

In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing214 discussed the importance of allowing individuals to vent their views. According to this court, "[i]ts value may lie in the fact
that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter [and] [t]hat is to ensurea true ferment of ideas."215

Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms against their government contributes to every society’s goal for development. It puts
forward matters that may be changed for the better and ideas that may be deliberated on to attain that purpose. Necessarily, it also makes the
government accountable for acts that violate constitutionally protected rights.

In 1998, Osmeña v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from selling print space and air time for
campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a democracy-enhancing measure.216This court mentioned how "discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the government established by our Constitution."217

As pointed out by petitioners, "speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of elections when the free exercise thereof informs the
people what the issues are, and who are supporting what issues." 218 At the heart of democracy is every advocate’s right to make known what the people
need to know,219 while the meaningful exercise of one’s right of suffrage includes the right of every voter to know what they need to know in order to
make their choice.

Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,220 this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the freedom of expression especially in relation to
information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage:

We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic
and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and
wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.

We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. 221(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Speech with political consequences isat the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this court.

Justice Brion pointed out that freedomof expression "is not the god of rights to which all other rights and even government protection of state interest
must bow."222

The right to freedom of expression isindeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still subjectto some restrictions. The degree of
restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.223 Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint
of the speaker or the subject of the expression.

II.B.6

Content-based regulation

COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The order was made simply because petitioners failed to
comply with the maximum size limitation for lawful election propaganda. 224

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it applies only to political speech and not to other forms of
speech such as commercial speech.225 "[A]ssuming arguendo that the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner
regulation, it’s still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective."226

The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based.227 Regardless, the disposition of this case will be the same.
Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based.

As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned order applies only to posters and tarpaulins that may affect the
elections because they deliver opinions that shape both their choices. It does not cover, for instance, commercial speech.

Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non-candidates will be adjudged as "election paraphernalia." There are
no existing bright lines to categorize speech as election-related and those that are not. This is especially true when citizens will want to use their
resources to be able to raise public issues that should be tackled by the candidates as what has happened in this case. COMELEC’s discretion to limit
speech in this case is fundamentally unbridled.

Size limitations during elections hit ata core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.228 Thus, in
Chavez v. Gonzales:

A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will
pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposedare neither overbroad nor vague. 229 (Citations omitted)

Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high.’"230 "Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality."231

Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest
endangered by the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the
right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional
rights.

Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech."232 In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.233

This court has attempted to define "content-neutral" restraints starting with the 1948 case of Primicias v. Fugoso.234The ordinance in this case was
construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to determine the public places that may be used for the procession ormeeting, but not the power to refuse
the issuance of a permit for such procession or meeting. 235 This court explained that free speech and peaceful assembly are "not absolute for it may be
so regulated that it shall not beinjurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society."236

The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams237 involved the National Traffic Commission resolution that prohibited the passing of animal-drawn vehicles
along certain roads at specific hours.238 This court similarly discussed police power in that the assailed rules carry outthe legislative policy that "aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public." 239

As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado240 recognized that "more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. . . ." 241 It is with this backdrop
that the state is justified in imposing restrictions on incidental matters as time, place, and manner of the speech.

In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must follow which include informing the licensing
authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly. 242 This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if
there would be valid objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the
opportunity to be heard.243 This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985.

Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita,244 this court
discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and manner. 245 In 2010, this court found in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza246 that respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by
changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard. 247

We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.

II.B.7

Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the provisions imposing a size limit for tarpaulins are content-neutral regulations as these
"restrict the mannerby which speech is relayed but not the content of what is conveyed." 248

If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating such restraints on
freedom of speech.249 "When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for
its validity,"250 and it is subject only to the intermediate approach.251

This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases.252 A content-neutral government regulation is sufficiently
justified:

[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.253

On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is protected speech by
petitioners who are non-candidates. On the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or substantial, it must also be
compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for example, that "the welfare of children and the
State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, 254 constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . .
utterances in TV broadcast."255

Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal opportunity for public information campaigns among candidates in connection with the
holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election. 256

Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that "[s]ize limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of public information campaigns among
candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives candidates and their supporters the incentive to post larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places
candidates with more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against candidates with more humble financial capabilities." 257

First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to freely express his choice and exercise his
right of free speech."258 In any case, faced with both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the tension in
a way that protects the right of participation."259

Second, the pertinent election lawsrelated to private property only require that the private property owner’s consent be obtained when posting election
propaganda in the property.260 This is consistent with the fundamental right against deprivation of property without due process of law.261 The present
facts do not involve such posting of election propaganda absent consent from the property owner. Thus, this regulation does not apply in this case.

Respondents likewise cite the Constitution262 on their authority to recommend effective measures to minimize election spending. Specifically, Article IX-
C, Section 2(7) provides:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

....

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) This does not
qualify as a compelling and substantial government interest to justify regulation of the preferred right to freedom of expression.

The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on the two feet (2’) by three feet (3’) size limitation under Section 6(c) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements the Fair Election Act that provides for the same size limitation.263

This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that "[c]ompared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial
considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance."264 In fact, speech with political consequences, as in this case, should be encouraged
and not curtailed. As petitioners pointed out, the size limitation will not serve the objective of minimizing election spending considering there is no limit on
the number of tarpaulins that may be posted.265

The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so at the effects of such
restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative
avenues for the actor to make speech.

In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum sizeof the tarpaulin would render ineffective
petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.

The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences. These should be
encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.

The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.

The action of the COMELEC in thiscase is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the stature of petitioners and their message,
there are indicators that this will cause a "chilling effect" on robust discussion during elections.

The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In the words of Marshall McLuhan, "the medium is the message."266 McLuhan’s
colleague and mentor Harold Innis has earlier asserted that "the materials on which words were written down have often counted for more than the
words themselves."267

III
Freedom of expression and equality

III.A

The possibility of abuse

Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of private individuals for the endorsement of their electoral campaigns.
On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when endorsement materials in the form of tarpaulins, posters, or media advertisements are made
ostensibly by "friends" but in reality are really paid for by the candidate or political party. This skirts the constitutional value that provides for equal
opportunities for all candidates.

However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this case, this is not the situation that confronts us. In such cases, it will simply be a
matter for investigation and proof of fraud on the part of the COMELEC.

The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of
abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidate’s real levels of
expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia
would be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement will be
the least restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.

On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of a candidate, others will spend their own resources in order to lend support for the
campaigns. This may be without agreement between the speaker and the candidate or his or her political party. In lieu of donating funds to the
campaign, they will instead use their resources directly in a way that the candidate or political party would have doneso. This may effectively skirt the
constitutional and statutory limits of campaign spending.

Again, this is not the situation in this case.

The message of petitioners in thiscase will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in their election posters or media ads. The
message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire
of Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily
advocates a stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally — will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.

The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a "literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride
prevailing vices or follies,"268 and this may target any individual or group in society, private and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a
greater purpose, often used for "political and social criticism"269 "because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . .
Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed."270 Northrop Frye, wellknown in this literary field,
claimed that satire had two defining features: "one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of
attack."271 Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices.

The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not refer to a list of dead individuals nor could the Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have
intended it to mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and
parodies the intention of those in the list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the
theme of its author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of petitioners to endorse.

The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are
more declarative and descriptive and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they usually simply exhort the public to vote
for a person with a brief description of the attributes of the candidate. For example "Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vote
for [z], Iba kami sa Makati."

This court’s construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or subsequent punishment that entails
evaluation of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of one’s speech. This is especially true when the expression involved has political consequences. In
this case, it hopes to affect the type of deliberation that happens during elections. A becoming humility on the part of any human institution no matter
how endowed with the secular ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails that we are not the keepers of all wisdom.

Humanity’s lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides space for the weakest dissent. Tolerance has always been a libertarian virtue whose
version is embedded in our Billof Rights. There are occasional heretics of yesterday that have become our visionaries. Heterodoxies have always given
us pause. The unforgiving but insistent nuance that the majority surely and comfortably disregards provides us with the checks upon reality that may
soon evolve into creative solutions to grave social problems. This is the utilitarian version. It could also be that it is just part of human necessity to evolve
through being able to express or communicate.

However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical document. It contains other provisions which, taken together with the guarantee of free
expression, enhances each other’s value. Among these are the provisions that acknowledge the idea of equality. In shaping doctrine construing these
constitutional values, this court needs to exercise extraordinary prudence and produce narrowly tailored guidance fit to the facts as given so as not to
unwittingly cause the undesired effect of diluting freedoms as exercised in reality and, thus, render them meaningless.

III.B.

Speech and equality:

Some considerations We first establish that there are two paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving priority to equality vis-à-vis
liberty.272

In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over
speech."273 This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing,
unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued within society’s ideological ladder. 274 This view acknowledges that there are dominant
political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is
especially true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance

This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find one’s authentic self or to participate in the self determination of one’s communities
is not new only to law. It has always been a philosophical problematique.

In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how institutionalized inequality exists as a
background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation as merely "protect[ing] the already established machinery of
discrimination."275 In his view, any improvement "in the normal course of events" within an unequal society, without subversion, only strengthens existing
interests of those in power and control.276

In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become meaningless if not taken in a real context. This
tendency to tackle rights in the abstract compromises liberties. In his words:

Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from a whole series of synthetic judgments. It stipulates
the ability to determine one’s own life: to be able to determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this
autonomy is never the contingent, private individual as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is rather the individual as a human being who is
capable of being free with the others. And the problem of making possible such a harmony between every individual liberty and the other is not that of
finding a compromise between competitors, or between freedom and law, between general and individual interest, common and private welfare in an
established society, but of creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In
other words, freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the existing societies. 277 (Emphasis in the original)

Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all opinions presented to and deliberated by the people — "implies a necessary condition,
namely, that the people must be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information,
and that, on this basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought." 278 He submits that "[d]ifferent opinions and ‘philosophies’ can no
longer compete peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is organized and delimited by those who
determine the national and the individual interest."279 A slant toward left manifests from his belief that "there is a ‘natural right’ of resistance for
oppressed and overpowered minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate." 280 Marcuse, thus, stands for an equality
that breaks away and transcends from established hierarchies, power structures, and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as
"repressive tolerance."

Legal scholars

The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal scholars for "stringent protections of expressive liberty," 281 especially by political
egalitarians. Considerations such as "expressive, deliberative, and informational interests," 282 costs or the price of expression, and background facts,
when taken together, produce bases for a system of stringent protections for expressive liberties. 283

Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed that "public discussion is a political duty."284 Cass
Sustein placed political speech on the upper tier of his twotier model for freedom of expression, thus, warranting stringent protection. 285 He defined
political speech as "both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue." 286

But this is usually related also tofair access to opportunities for such liberties.287 Fair access to opportunity is suggested to mean substantive equality
and not mere formal equalitysince "favorable conditions for realizing the expressive interest will include some assurance of the resources required for
expression and some guarantee that efforts to express views on matters of common concern will not be drowned out by the speech of betterendowed
citizens."288 Justice Brandeis’ solution is to "remedy the harms of speech with more speech." 289 This view moves away from playing down the danger as
merely exaggerated, toward "tak[ing] the costs seriously and embrac[ing] expression as the preferred strategy for addressing them."290 However, in
some cases, the idea of more speech may not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the need for context and "the specification of substantive
values before [equality] has full meaning."291 Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon adds that "equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather than a
substantive sense."292 Thus, more speech can only mean more speech from the few who are dominant rather than those who are not.

Our jurisprudence

This court has tackled these issues.

Osmeña v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the validity of Section 11(b) ofthe Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. 293 This section
"prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
Elections."294 This court explained that this provision only regulates the time and manner of advertising in order to ensure media equality among
candidates.295 This court grounded this measure on constitutional provisions mandating political equality:296 Article IX-C, Section 4

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. (Emphasis supplied)

Article XIII, Section 1

Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priorityto the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reducesocial, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. (Emphasis supplied)

Article II, Section 26

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitution’s guarantee for more substantive expressive freedoms that take equality of opportunities
into consideration during elections.

The other view

However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or equality inthe ability of citizens as speakers should not
have a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under this view, "members of the public are trusted to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and
government is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive ideological
market."297 This is consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of
speech.

The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision uses negative rather than affirmative language. It uses ‘speech’ as its subject and not
‘speakers’.298 Consequently, the Constitution protects free speech per se, indifferent to the types, status, or associations of its speakers. 299 Pursuant to
this, "government must leave speakers and listeners in the private order to their own devices in sorting out the relative influence of speech." 300

Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC formulates this view that freedom of speech includes "not only the right to express one’s
views, but also other cognate rights relevant to the free communication [of] ideas, not excluding the right to be informed on matters of public
concern."301 She adds:

And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of elections — qualifications of voters and candidates, education, means of transportation,
health, public discussion, private animosities, the weather, the threshold of a voter’s resistance to pressure — the utmost ventilation of opinion of men
and issues, through assembly, association and organizations, both by the candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to truly reflect
the will of the electorate.302 (Emphasis supplied)

Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only to emphasize free speech primacy such that"courts, as a rule are wary to impose
greater restrictions as to any attempt to curtail speeches with political content," 303 thus:

the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"
and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." 304

This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ submission "that the market place of ideas is still the best alternative to censorship."305

Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the argument, the majority of the US Supreme Court in the campaign expenditures case of Buckley
v. Valeo "condemned restrictions (even if content-neutral) on expressive liberty imposed in the name of ‘enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others’ and
thereby ‘equaliz[ing] access to the political arena."306 The majority did not use the equality-based paradigm.

One flaw of campaign expenditurelimits is that "any limit placed on the amount which a person can speak, which takes out of his exclusive judgment the
decision of when enough is enough, deprives him of his free speech." 307

Another flaw is how "[a]ny quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the sum of public information and runs counter to our
‘profound national commitment that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’"308

In fact, "[c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to raise funds does not ease the plight of those without funds in the first place . . . [and]
even if one’s main concern isslowing the increase in political costs, it may be more effective torely on market forces toachieve that result than on active
legal intervention."309 According to Herbert Alexander, "[t]o oppose limitations is not necessarily to argue that the sky’s the limit [because in] any
campaign there are saturation levels and a point where spending no longer pays off in votes per dollar."310

III. C.

When private speech amounts

to election paraphernalia

The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for human potentiality and the effect of speech. It
valorizes the ability of human beings to express and their necessity to relate. On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration
the effects it will have in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect
of drowning out the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and effect of the
guarantee of free speech. Those who have more will have better access to media that reaches a wider audience than those who have less. Those who
espouse the more popular ideas will have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters of society.To be really heard and understood, the
marginalized view normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or
regulation that allows public officials to make judgments of the value of such viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal approach.

However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to some expression during electoral campaigns.

Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political parties or their political
parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.

Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political
party which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such
regulation is inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can
catalyze candid, uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.

This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount toan election paraphernalia to be validly regulated
by law.

Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as
members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object
the endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least
restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no
situation may the speech be prohibited or censored onthe basis of its content. For this purpose, it will notmatter whether the speech is made with or on
private property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of
a social advocacy.

Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any
relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read
by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.

IV
Right to property

Other than the right to freedom of expression311 and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage,312 the present case also involves one’s right to
property.313

Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the circumvention of regulations relating to election propaganda by applying such
regulations to private individuals.314 Certainly, any provision or regulation can be circumvented. But we are not confronted with this possibility.
Respondents agree that the tarpaulin in question belongs to petitioners. Respondents have also agreed, during the oral arguments, that petitioners were
neither commissioned nor paid by any candidate or political party to post the material on their walls.

Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is
likewise protected by the Constitution.

In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz: 315

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.316 (Citation omitted)

This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is "so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s
private property."317 Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides thatno person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. This court explained:

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th
Amendment, protects these essential attributes.

Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution
protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the
free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 127.
(Buchanan v. Warley 245 US 60 [1917])318

This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:

The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the
part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public
or private, except inthe common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared
personal poster on his own front dooror on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what
overzealous and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do. 319 Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private
citizens, to remove the tarpaulin from their own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s
interpretation of its powers.

Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression
may be made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental
right to speech.

Respondents have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest they seek to promote justifies the intrusion into petitioners’ property rights. Election
laws and regulations must be reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individual’s right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due process
clause will be violated.

COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election propaganda in private property without the consent of
the owners of such private property. COMELEC has incorrectly implemented these regulations. Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act
of respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right to
property.

V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech

We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned notice and letter violated the right of petitioners to the free
exercise of their religion.

At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state. 320 This takes many forms. Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, for
instance provides:

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.

There are two aspects of this provision.321 The first is the none stablishment clause.322 Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship.323

The second aspect is atissue in this case.

Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any secular
regulation.324 The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law.

The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners’
claim that "the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic
dogma, faith, and moral teachings. . . ."325

The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be motivated by moral, ethical, and religious
considerations. In terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts range from belief, to expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and
then to acts of a secular character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may
not have any religious bearing.

Definitely, the characterizations ofthe religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court. Certainly, our powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by
bare claims that acts are religious in nature.

Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 326 in claiming that the court "emphatically"
held that the adherents ofa particular religion shall be the ones to determine whether a particular matter shall be considered ecclesiastical in
nature.327 This court in Ebralinagexempted Jehovah’s Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony "out of respect for their religious beliefs, [no
matter how] "bizarre" those beliefsmay seem to others."328 This court found a balance between the assertion of a religious practice and the compelling
necessities of a secular command. It was an early attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.

In Estrada v. Escritor,329 this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:

With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically intoaccount not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."330
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. 331

As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church."332 That the position of
the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit
of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their
respective votes on the RH Law.

The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the expression onthe tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter.
With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely
on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubtas to its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.

Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission333 cited by petitioners finds no application in the
present case. The posting of the tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in the
Austriacase such as "proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities withattached
religious significance."334

A FINAL NOTE

We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case. However, it was misdirected.

COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their registered political parties.
It is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral exercise.

The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office.Their message may be construed
generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations.

They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."

But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.

That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue — and a complex piece of legislation at that —
can easily be interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were
expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.

Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and non-judgmental. Some may have expected that the
authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and humility.

But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good
conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.

Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can often be expressed by dominant institutions,
even religious ones. That they made their point dramatically and in a large way does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they
have basis, or that they have been expressed in good taste.

Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an
expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their
ecclesiastical duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have very real secular consequences. Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.

What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary
issues. This is not speechby candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their
election. It is the substantive content of the right to suffrage.

This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our
Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the
COMELEC in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

 DECISION

REYES, J.:

The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to
urge others to vote for a particular candidate. The right to express one's preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free
speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.

This is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by 1-United Transport Koalisyon (petitioner), a party-list
organization, assailing Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 96152 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

The Facts

On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006, otherwise known as the "Fair Elections Act", was passed. Section 9 thereof provides:

Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their
candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or
exhibit election propaganda: Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent.

Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the
size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent.

Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall
be allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates.

On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the
May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:

SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - During the campaign period, it is unlawful:

xxxx

(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places, or in private
properties without the consent of the owner thereof.

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx

5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;

6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or
operator of the transportation service and/or terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section
18 (n) of these Rules.3

In its letter4 dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its president, Melencio F. Vargas, sought clarification from the COMELEC as regards the
application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-a-vis privately owned public utility vehicles
(PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in the aforementioned provisions impedes the right to free speech of
the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.

On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214,5 which denied the petitioner's request to reconsider the
implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615. The COMELEC en banc, adopting the
recommendation of Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim, opined that:

From the foregoing, x x x the primary fact in consideration here is actually whether 1 -UTAK or any other [PUV] owners in the same position do in fact
possess a franchise and/or certificate of public convenience and operate as a public utility. If it does not, then the ruling in Adiong applies
squarely. If it does, then its operations, pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, will be placed directly under the supervision and regulation
of the Commission for the duration of the election period so as to ensure equality of opportunity, time, and space for all candidates in the placement of
political advertisements. Having placed their property for use by the general public and having secured a license or permit to do so, 1-UTAK and other
PUV owners, as well as transport terminal owners, cannot now complain that their property is subject to regulation by the State. Securing a franchise or
a certificate of public convenience in their favor does not exempt them from the burdens imposed by the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9006 x x x, and
other related statutes. It must be stressed that the Constitution itself, under Section 6, Article XII, commands that the use of property bears a social
function and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good; and there is no higher Common good than that as espoused in R.A. No.
9006 - the equalization of opportunities for all candidates for political office during elections - a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely implements.

As required in Adiong, and in compliance with the O'Brien standards, the prohibition furthers two important and substantial governmental interests -
equalizing opportunity, time, and space for all candidates, and putting to a stop excessive campaign spending. The regulation bears a clear and
reasonable nexus with these Constitutionally- and statutorily-sanctioned objectives, and the infringement of freedom is merely incidental and limited as
to time. The Commission has not taken away all avenues of expression available to PUV and transport terminal owners. They may express their political
preferences elsewhere.

The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in transport terminals is exactly because it is public and can be seen by all; and
although it is true that private vehicles ply the same route as public vehicles, the exposure of a [PUV] servicing the general, riding public is much more
compared to private vehicles. Categorizing PUVs and transport terminals as 'public places' under Section 7 (f) of Reso. No. 9615 is therefore
logical. The same reasoning for limiting political advertisements in print media, in radio, and in television therefore holds true for political advertisements
in PUVs and transport terminals.6

Hence, the instant petition.

Arguments of the Petitioner

The petitioner maintains that Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the right to free speech of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals; that the prohibition curtails their ideas of who should be voted by the public. The petitioner also claims that
there is no substantial public interest threatened by the posting of political advertisements on PUVs and transport terminals to warrant the prohibition
imposed by the COMELEC. Further, the petitioner posits that the ownership of the PUVs per se, as well as the transport terminals, remains private and,
hence, the owners thereof could not be prohibited by the COMELEC from expressing their political opinion lest their property rights be unduly intruded
upon.

Further, assuming that substantial public interest exists in the said prohibition imposed under Resolution No. 9615, the petitioner claims that the
curtailment of the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals is much greater than is necessary to achieve the desired
governmental purpose, i.e., ensuring equality of opportunity to all candidates in elective office.

Arguments of COMELEC

On the other hand, the COMELEC posits that privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals are public spaces that are subject to its regulation. It
explains that under the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, including the power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises and permits for the operation of transportation utilities.

The COMELEC points out that PUVs and private transport terminals hold a captive audience - the commuters, who have no choice but be subjected to
the blare of political propaganda. Thus, the COMELEC avers, it is within its constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned PUVs and transport
terminals from concurrently serving campaign materials to the captive audience that they transport.

The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a valid content-neutral regulation and, thus, does not impinge on the constitutional right to
freedom of speech. It avers that the assailed regulation is within the constitutional power of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. The COMELEC alleges that the regulation simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity, time, and space for all candidates - an
important and substantial governmental interest, which is totally unrelated to the suppression of free expression; that any restriction on free speech is
merely incidental and is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the said governmental interest.

The Issue

The petitioner presents the following issues for the Court's resolution:

I. [WHETHER] RESOLUTION NO. 9615 VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH OF THE OWNERS OF [PUVs] AND TRANSPORT TERMINALS.

II. [WHETHER] RESOLUTION NO. 9615 IS VOID AS A RESTRAINT TO FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY THE
O'BRIEN TEST.

III. [WHETHER] THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE TO GIVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE ELECTORATE IS NOT IMPAIRED BY
POSTING POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS ON PUVs AND TRANSPORT TERMINALS.

IV. [WHETHER] THE OWNERSHIP OF FACILITIES IS DIFFERENT AND INDEPENDENT FROM THE FRANCHISE OR OPERATION OF THE PUBLIC
UTILITY, THE FORMER BEING BEYOND THE POWER OF REGULATION BY THE COMELEC.7

In sum, the issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, which
prohibits the posting of any election campaign or propaganda material, inter alia, in PUVs and public transport terminals are valid regulations.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Resolution No. 9615, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution and the provisions of R.A. No. 9006, lays down the
administrative rules relative to the COMELEC's exercise of its supervisory and regulatory powers over all franchises and permits for the operation of
transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, and all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government.

Like any other administrative regulations, Resolution No. 9615, or any part thereof, must not run counter to the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In this regard, an administrative regulation, even if it purports to advance a
legitimate governmental interest, may not be permitted to run roughshod over the cherished rights of the people enshrined in the Constitution.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in

relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are prior restraints on speech.

Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without prior restraint or censorship and
subsequent punishment.9 Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. 10 Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.11
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.

Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport
terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.

The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the
prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment
for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.

It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The
rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends on how well we protect our freedom of speech and of the press. 12 It has been our constant
holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.13

Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,14 the Court struck down the COMELEC's prohibition against the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile places." The
Court ratiocinated that:

Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation
strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by
the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by
newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased
opinions with less reason can we sanction the prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an
individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.15 (Emphases ours)

The assailed prohibition on posting

election campaign materials is an
invalid content-neutral regulation
repugnant to the free speech clause.

The COMELEC claims that while Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 may incidentally restrict the right to free speech of owners of
PUVs and transport terminals, the same is nevertheless constitutionally permissible since it is a valid content-neutral regulation. The Court does not
agree.

A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards,16 is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites
concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 17

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign
materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-
neutral regulation.

It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers an important and substantial governmental interest, i.e.,
ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further
conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said prohibition is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

The COMELEC may only regulate

the franchise or permit to operate and
not the ownership per se of PUVs
and transport terminals.

The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 is not within the COMELEC's constitutionally
delegated power of supervision or regulation. It is not disputed that the COMELEC has the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of
all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation utilities during an election period. Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus provides:

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.

Nevertheless, the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC over franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly
unrestrained, has its limits. Notwithstanding the ostensibly broad supervisory and regulatory powers granted to the COMELEC during an election period
under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Court had previously set out the limitations thereon. In Adiong, the Court, while recognizing that the
COMELEC has supervisory power vis-a-vis the conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, nevertheless held that
such supervisory power does not extend to the very freedom of an individual to express his preference of candidates in an election by placing election
campaign stickers on his vehicle.

In National Press Club v. COMELEC,18 while the Court upheld the constitutionality of a prohibition on the selling or giving free of charge, except to the
COMELEC, of advertising space and commercial time during an election period, it was emphasized that the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers
to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply among
candidates.

Further, in Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC,19 the Court, notwithstanding the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC
under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, declared unconstitutional a regulation prohibiting the release of election surveys prior to the election
since it "actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper
columnists, radio and [television (TV)] commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers." 20

In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during an election period.
As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization "of all
franchises or permits for the operation," inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The COMELEC's constitutionally delegated powers of
supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the
same.

There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate transportation for the use of the public and the ownership per se of the vehicles
used for public transport. Thus, in Tatad v. Garcia, Jr.,21the Court explained that:

What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a
franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is
not their ownership but their use to serve the public x x x.

The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before one can
own the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.

xxxx

In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve
the public.

xxxx

The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said
facilities without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve
the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the
owner thereof.

This dichotomy between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities used to serve the public can be very well appreciated when we
consider the transportation industry. Enfranchised airline and shipping companies may lease their aircraft and vessels instead of owning them
themselves.22 (Emphases ours)

The franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is a privilege granted to certain persons to engage in the business of transporting people or
goods; it does not refer to the ownership of the vehicleper se. Ownership is a relation in private law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person is
completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by public law or the concurrence with the rights of another. 23 Thus, the owner of a thing has
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 24

One such limitation established by law, as regards PUVs, is the franchise or permit to operate. However, a franchise or permit to operate a PUV is a
limitation only on certain aspects of the ownership of the vehicle pertinent to the franchise or permit granted, but not on the totality of the rights of the
owner over the vehicle. Otherwise stated, a restriction on the franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is necessarily a limitation on
ownership, but a limitation on the rights of ownership over the PUV is not necessarily a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate the same.

A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations affecting the operation of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the
passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or, in certain cases,
nationality.25 Thus, a government issuance, which purports to regulate a franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations
affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of
the vehicle used for public transport.

The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect
considerations pertinent to the operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate in an election will not in any
manner affect the operation of the PUV as such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an election campaign
material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.

The dichotomy between the regulation of the franchise or permit to operate of a PUV and that of the very ownership thereof is better exemplified in the
case of commercial advertisements posted on the vehicle. A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a
regulation on the ownership of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have any relation to its
operation as a PUV.

On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses, because it hinders police authorities from seeing
whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate. It has a direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a
PUV, i.e.,the safety of the passengers.

In the same manner, the COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport terminals owned by private persons. The
ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for use by the public commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport
terminals may be required by local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to circumstances affecting the operation of
the transport terminal as such. The regulation of such permit to operate should similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of the
transport terminal. A regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of election campaign
materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same.
Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or
regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership - it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the
PUV or transport terminal.

The rulings in National Press Club

and Osmena v. COMELEC26
find no application to this case.

The COMELEC pointed out that the issue presented in the instant case is akin to the Court's rulings in National Press Club and Osmeña. It explained
that in both cases, the Court sustained Section II(b) of R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1997, which prohibits newspapers, radio
broadcasting or TV stations, and other mass media from selling or giving print space or airtime for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
COMELEC, during the election campaign. The COMELEC averred that if the legislature can empower it to impose an advertising ban on mass media, it
could likewise empower it to impose a similar ban on PUVs and transport terminals.

The Court does not agree.

The restriction imposed under Section ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646 has a direct relation to the enjoyment and utilization of the franchise or permit to operate of
newspapers, radio broadcasting and TV stations, and other mass media, which the COMELEC has the power to regulate pursuant to Section 4, Article
IX-C of the Constitution. The print space or airtime is an integral part of the franchise or permit to operate of mass media utilities. Thus, the restriction
under Section ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is within the confines of the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution.

On the other hand, the prohibition on the posting of election campaign materials under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, as already
explained, does not have any relation to the franchise or permit of PUVs and transport terminals to operate as such and, hence, is beyond the power of
the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution.

The restriction on free speech of

owners of PUVs and transport
terminals is not necessary to
further the stated governmental
interest.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 likewise failed to satisfy the fourth requisite of a valid content-neutral regulation, i.e., the incidental
restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. There is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals to free speech to further the governmental interest. While ensuring equality of time, space, and
opportunity to candidates is an important and substantial governmental interest and is essential to the conduct of an orderly election, this lofty aim may
be achieved sans any intrusion on the fundamental right of expression.

First, while Resolution No. 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 9006, the prohibition on posting of election
campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein.

Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in
elections. Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006 mandates that "all registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space"
and outlines the guidelines to be observed in the implementation thereof, viz:

Section 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. - All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space.
The following guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC:

6.1 Print advertisements shall not exceed one-fourth (1/4) page in broadsheet and one-half (1/2) page in tabloids thrice a week per newspaper,
magazine or other publications, during the campaign period.

6.2 a. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120)
minutes of television advertisement and one hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.

b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes of television
advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.

For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of
performance for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.

6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for advertising, promoting or opposing any political party or the
candidacy of any person for public office within five (5) days after its signing. In every case, it shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or
by the duly authorized representative of the political party.

6.4 No franchise or permit to operate a radio or television station shall be granted or issued, suspended or cancelled during the election period. In all
instances, the COMELEC shall supervise the use and employment of press, radio and television facilities insofar as the placement of political
advertisements is concerned to ensure that candidates are given equal opportunities under equal circumstances to make known their qualifications and
their stand on public issues within the limits set forth in the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166 on election spending.

The COMELEC shall ensure that radio or television or cable television broadcasting entities shall not allow the scheduling of any program or permit any
sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including said candidate and/or political
party in such program respecting, however, in all instances the right of said broadcast entities to air accounts of significant news or news worthy events
and views on matters of public interest.

6.5 All members of media, television, radio or print, shall scrupulously report and interpret the news, taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to
distort the truth by omission or improper emphasis. They shall recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly.
6.6 Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air correspondent or personality who is a candidate for any elective public office
or is a campaign volunteer for or employed or retained in any capacity by any candidate or political party shall be deemed resigned, if so required by
their employer, or shall take a leave of absence from his/her work as such during the campaign period: Provided, That any media practitioner who is an
official of a political party or a member of the campaign staff of a candidate or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any candidate or
political party.

6.7 No movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or biography of a candidate shall be publicly exhibited in a theater, television station or
any public forum during the campaign period.

6.8 No movie, cinematograph or documentary portrayed by an actor or media personality who is himself a candidate shall likewise be publicly exhibited
in a theater or any public forum during the campaign period.

Section 9 of R.A. No. 9006 authorizes political parties and party-list groups and independent candidates to erect common poster areas and candidates
to post lawful election campaign materials in private places, with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property, which are allocated
equitably and impartially.

Further, Section 1327 of R.A. No. 716628 provides for the authorized expenses of registered political parties and candidates for every voter; it affords
candidates equal opportunity in their election campaign by regulating the amount that should be spent for each voter. Likewise, Section 1429 of R.A. No.
7166 requires all candidates and treasurers of registered political parties to submit a statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection with
the election. Section 14 is a post-audit measure that aims to ensure that the candidates did not overspend in their election campaign, thereby enforcing
the grant of equal opportunity to candidates under Section 13.

A strict implementation of the foregoing provisions of law would suffice to achieve the governmental interest of ensuring equal time, space, and
opportunity for candidates in elections. There is thus no necessity of still curtailing the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals
by prohibiting them from posting election campaign materials on their properties.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of

Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine.

The COMELEC further points out that PUVs and transport terminals hold a "captive audience" - commuters who have no choice but be subjected to the
blare of political propaganda. The COMELEC further claims that while owners of privately owned PUVs and transport terminals have a right to express
their views to those who wish to listen, they have no right to force their message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.

The COMELEC's claim is untenable.

The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be
restricted.30 The "captive-audience" doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which
the communication cannot be avoided.31

A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from some kinds of
speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the
privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.32

In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,33 the Supreme Court of the United States of America (U.S. Supreme Court) struck down the
order of New York Public Service Commission, which prohibits public utility companies from including inserts in monthly bills discussing controversial
issues of public policy. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "[t]he prohibition cannot be justified as being necessary to avoid forcing appellant's views on a
captive audience, since customers may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by throwing the bill insert into a wastebasket."34

Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,35 the U.S. Supreme Court nullified a city ordinance, which made it a public nuisance and a punishable
offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or place. The U.S. Supreme Court
opined that the degree of captivity is not so great as to make it impracticable for an unwilling viewer to avoid exposure, thus:

The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content. Its effect is to deter drive-in theaters from showing movies
containing any nudity, however innocent or even educational. This discrimination cannot be justified as a means of preventing significant intrusions on
privacy. The ordinance seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places where the offended viewer readily can avert his
eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in theater is not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to
it." x x x Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech
on the basis of its content.36 (Emphasis ours)

Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to
the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience
doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they
incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find
the same unbearably intrusive.

The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights,37 a case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political advertisements
on government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the advertising space on the buses was not a
public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses, "although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of
commercial venture."38 In the same way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, the city's
transit system has the discretion on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.

Concurring in the judgment, Justice Douglas opined that while Lehman, a candidate for state office who sought to avail himself of advertising space on
government-run buses, "clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience
incapable of declining to receive it."39 Justice Douglas concluded: "the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes
the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience."40

The COMELEC's reliance on Lehman is utterly misplaced.

In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city government; the city government, as owner of the buses, had the right
to decide which type of advertisements would be placed on its buses. The U.S. Supreme Court gave primacy to the city government's exercise of its
managerial decision, viz:

Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be jeopardized by a requirement that short-term candidacy or issue-oriented
advertisements be displayed on car cards. Users would be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There could be lurking doubts about favoritism,
and sticky administrative problems might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians. In these circumstances, the managerial decision to
limit car card space to innocuous and less controversial commercial and service-oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity of First
Amendment violation. Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries, office buildings, military compounds, and other public
facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every would be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not require.41 (Emphasis
ours)

Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of advertisements that would be
placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.

Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political advertisements on their buses. Considering that what were involved
were facilities owned by the city government, impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and
transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign
materials on their properties.

Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport

terminals from posting election campaign
materials violates the equal protection
clause.

Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection clause. One of the
basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.42 "Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others."43

"The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the
government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken."44

Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of
operation of statutes does not mean their indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law
as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 45

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is
necessary that the four requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.46

It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and applies equally
to the members of the purported class. However, the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction
and is not germane to the purpose of the law.

A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs
to secure from the government either a franchise or a permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner
affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.

As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other
properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners
of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting election campaign materials on their
properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction
between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial differences do not make
for a valid classification.47

The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from private
vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many
people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g., commercial establishments,
would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting of
election campaign materials.

Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private vehicles and other properties bears no relation to the stated
purpose of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to candidates in elections. To stress,
PUVs and transport terminals are private properties. Indeed, the nexus between the restriction on the freedom of expression of owners of PUVs and
transport terminals and the government's interest in ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections was not established by the
COMELEC.
In sum, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are content-neutral
regulations, which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time,
space and opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as
there is
no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.

On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one's political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom of expression. A
restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life. 48

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 issued by the Commission on Elections are hereby declared NULL and VOID for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

CITIZEN SHIP AND ALIENAGE

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-appellant of
violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:

On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped packages. Anita
Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland"
(Decision, p. 6)

Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's representation, Anita Reyes
no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated box one by two feet in size
(1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box
ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted
therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane
wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted
from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).

He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about 1:30
o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section. Job Reyes informed the NBI
that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer, went to the Reyes'
office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).

Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the top flaps,
removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been
contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
 The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained bricks or cake-
like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana
leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).

The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt" acknowledging custody of
the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).

Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office, the
agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was
invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the
dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified
by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).

Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.

In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS CONTAINED IN THE
FOUR PARCELS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE FOUR PARCELS
CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 55)

1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable
search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in
evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).

Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as
follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)

was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the
pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]),
this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence was
not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to the
present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.

In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de Leon,
66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et al., GR
No. 81510, March 14, 1990).

It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the
medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a
private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act
of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?

We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from
interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .

. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966] and
Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).

In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures declared that:

(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to
governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was
not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by
process duly served.

The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the owner
thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for illegal
possession of narcotics.

And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government and
its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d 903
(1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).

Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:

The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen — the owner of a motel in which appellant stayed overnight
and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the motel owner's own initiative.
Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents, and made it available to the authorities.

The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private citizen.
Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."

The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense
charged.

Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the
case which resulted in his conviction.

The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or the
lack of it.

First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original Records,
pp. 119-122; 167-168).

It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to
his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI
agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.

Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed
by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass on the
part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed. 1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of
California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific request of
the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional meaning of the
term.

That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:

First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection against
whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the
relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden
zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner Bernas , Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if
the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter,
expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it matters not
whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).

The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people, does
not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re: Sec. 2, Art.
III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof (SeeSoliven v.
Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced deviate in no
manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did
not shift to anyone else.

Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the
exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an
act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.

Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged
violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.

2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under the
constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.

Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact", that
appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified that
accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their
testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other hand, is that
appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:

Fiscal Formoso:

You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate the accused together with the girl?

WITNESS:

Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any written
statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)

The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records, neither
was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined the assailed
judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation which was utilized
in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.

3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained
prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-minute
conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to
leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily
be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels
and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As
stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash
amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such undertaking to take
custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to why he readily agreed to
do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-serving evidence which deserve
no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).

Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of
hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz, also
a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN, October
8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).

Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37
N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castañares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]). As
records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the
German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records, p. 40).
On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.

Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117040. January 27, 2000]

RUBEN SERRANO, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ISETANN DEPARTMENT STORE, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition seeking review of the resolutions, dated March 30, 1994 and August 26, 1994, of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner Ruben Serranos complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for
reconsideration. The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters and prevent pilferage of
merchandise.[1] Initially hired on October 4, 1984 on contractual basis, petitioner eventually became a regular employee on April 4, 1985. In 1988, he
became head of the Security Checkers Section of private respondent. [2]

Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the services of an
independent security agency. For this reason, it wrote petitioner the following memorandum:[3]

October 11, 1991

MR. RUBEN SERRANO

PRESENT

Dear Mr. Serrano,

......In view of the retrenchment program of the company, we hereby reiterate our verbal notice to you of your termination as Security
Section Head effective October 11, 1991.

......Please secure your clearance from this office.

Very truly yours,

[Sgd.] TERESITA A. VILLANUEVA

Human Resources Division Manager

The loss of his employment prompted petitioner to file a complaint on December 3, 1991 for illegal dismissal, illegal layoff, unfair labor practice,
underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of salary and overtime pay. [4]
The parties were required to submit their position papers, on the basis of which the Labor Arbiter defined the issues as follows:[5]

Whether or not there is a valid ground for the dismissal of the complainant.

Whether or not complainant is entitled to his monetary claims for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of salaries, 13th month pay
for 1991 and overtime pay.

Whether or not Respondent is guilty of unfair labor practice.

Thereafter, the case was heard. On April 30, 1993, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. He ruled that
private respondent failed to establish that it had retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent
failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment would
be terminated; that private respondent had not shown that petitioner and other employees in the security section were so inefficient so as to justify their
replacement by a security agency, or that "cost-saving devices [such as] secret video cameras (to monitor and prevent shoplifting) and secret code tags
on the merchandise" could not have been employed; instead, the day after petitioners dismissal, private respondent employed a safety and security
supervisor with duties and functions similar to those of petitioner.

Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered:[6]

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby decreed:

(a)......Finding the dismissal of the complainant to be illegal and concomitantly, Respondent is ordered to pay
complainant full backwages without qualification or deduction in the amount of P74,740.00 from the time of his
dismissal until reinstatement (computed till promulgation only) based on his monthly salary of P4,040.00/month
at the time of his termination but limited to (3) three years;

(b)......Ordering the Respondent to immediately reinstate the complainant to his former position as security
section head or to a reasonably equivalent supervisorial position in charges of security without loss of seniority
rights, privileges and benefits. This order is immediately executory even pending appeal;

(c)......Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant unpaid wages in the amount of P2,020.73 and
proportionate 13th month pay in the amount of P3,198.30;

(d)......Ordering the Respondent to pay complainant the amount of P7,995.91, representing 10% attorneys fees
based on the total judgment award of P79,959.12.

All other claims of the complainant whether monetary or otherwise is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, in its resolution of March 30, 1994, reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered petitioner to
be given separation pay equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, unpaid salary, and proportionate 13th month pay. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.

The NLRC held that the phase-out of private respondents security section and the hiring of an independent security agency constituted an exercise by
private respondent of "[a] legitimate business decision whose wisdom we do not intend to inquire into and for which we cannot substitute our judgment";
that the distinction made by the Labor Arbiter between "retrenchment" and the employment of "cost-saving devices" under Art. 283 of the Labor Code
was insignificant because the company official who wrote the dismissal letter apparently used the term "retrenchment" in its "plain and ordinary sense: to
layoff or remove from ones job, regardless of the reason therefor"; that the rule of "reasonable criteria" in the selection of the employees to be retrenched
did not apply because all positions in the security section had been abolished; and that the appointment of a safety and security supervisor referred to by
petitioner to prove bad faith on private respondents part was of no moment because the position had long been in existence and was separate from
petitioners position as head of the Security Checkers Section.

Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following issue:

IS THE HIRING OF AN INDEPENDENT SECURITY AGENCY BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO REPLACE ITS CURRENT
SECURITY SECTION A VALID GROUND FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE EMPLOYEES CLASSED UNDER THE LATTER? [7]

Petitioner contends that abolition of private respondents Security Checkers Section and the employment of an independent security agency do not fall
under any of the authorized causes for dismissal under Art. 283 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner Laid Off for Cause

Petitioners contention has no merit. Art. 283 provides:

Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to
the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the
 establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In
case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at
least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered
as one (1) whole year.

In De Ocampo v. National Labor Relations Commission,[8] this Court upheld the termination of employment of three mechanics in a transportation
company and their replacement by a company rendering maintenance and repair services. It held:

In contracting the services of Gemac Machineries, as part of the companys cost-saving program, the services rendered by the
mechanics became redundant and superfluous, and therefore properly terminable. The company merely exercised its business
judgment or management prerogative. And in the absence of any proof that the management abused its discretion or acted in a
malicious or arbitrary manner, the court will not interfere with the exercise of such prerogative. [9]

In Asian Alcohol Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, [10] the Court likewise upheld the termination of employment of water pump tenders
and their replacement by independent contractors. It ruled that an employers good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in
doubt by the availment of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote economy and
efficiency.

Indeed, as we pointed out in another case, the "[management of a company] cannot be denied the faculty of promoting efficiency and attaining economy
by a study of what units are essential for its operation. To it belongs the ultimate determination of whether services should be performed by its personnel
or contracted to outside agencies . . . [While there] should be mutual consultation, eventually deference is to be paid to what management
decides."[11] Consequently, absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of
judgment by an employer.[12]

In the case at bar, we have only the bare assertion of petitioner that, in abolishing the security section, private respondents real purpose was to avoid
payment to the security checkers of the wage increases provided in the collective bargaining agreement approved in 1990. [13] Such an assertion is not a
sufficient basis for concluding that the termination of petitioners employment was not a bona fide decision of management to obtain reasonable return
from its investment, which is a right guaranteed to employers under the Constitution.[14] Indeed, that the phase-out of the security section constituted a
"legitimate business decision" is a factual finding of an administrative agency which must be accorded respect and even finality by this Court since
nothing can be found in the record which fairly detracts from such finding. [15]

Accordingly, we hold that the termination of petitioners services was for an authorized cause, i.e., redundancy. Hence, pursuant to Art. 283 of the Labor
Code, petitioner should be given separation pay at the rate of one month pay for every year of service.

Sanctions for Violations of the Notice Requirement

Art. 283 also provides that to terminate the employment of an employee for any of the authorized causes the employer must serve "a written notice on
the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof." In the case at bar, petitioner was
given a notice of termination on October 11, 1991. On the same day, his services were terminated. He was thus denied his right to be given written
notice before the termination of his employment, and the question is the appropriate sanction for the violation of petitioners right.

To be sure, this is not the first time this question has arisen. In Sebuguero v. NLRC,[16] workers in a garment factory were temporarily laid off due to the
cancellation of orders and a garment embargo. The Labor Arbiter found that the workers had been illegally dismissed and ordered the company to pay
separation pay and backwages. The NLRC, on the other hand, found that this was a case of retrenchment due to business losses and ordered the
payment of separation pay without backwages. This Court sustained the NLRCs finding. However, as the company did not comply with the 30-day
written notice in Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the Court ordered the employer to pay the workers P2,000.00 each as indemnity.

The decision followed the ruling in several cases involving dismissals which, although based on any of the just causes under Art. 282,[17] were effected
without notice and hearing to the employee as required by the implementing rules.[18] As this Court said: "It is now settled that where the dismissal of one
employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process."[19]

The rule reversed a long standing policy theretofore followed that even though the dismissal is based on a just cause or the termination of employment is
for an authorized cause, the dismissal or termination is illegal if effected without notice to the employee. The shift in doctrine took place in 1989
in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC.[20] In announcing the change, this Court said:[21]

The Court holds that the policy of ordering the reinstatement to the service of an employee without loss of seniority and the payment
of his wages during the period of his separation until his actual reinstatement but not exceeding three (3) years without qualification
or deduction, when it appears he was not afforded due process, although his dismissal was found to be for just and authorized
cause in an appropriate proceeding in the Ministry of Labor and Employment, should be re-examined. It will be highly prejudicial to
the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of an employee who has been shown to be guilty of the charges that
warranted his dismissal from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if not undesirable, remains
in the service.

....
 However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend to private respondent his right to an investigation
before causing his dismissal. The rule is explicit as above discussed. The dismissal of an employee must be for just or authorized
cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement. Thus, it must be imposed a sanction for
its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as required by law before dismissing petitioner from employment.
Considering the circumstances of this case petitioner must indemnify the private respondent the amount of P1,000.00. The measure
of this award depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission committed by the employer.

The fines imposed for violations of the notice requirement have varied from P1,000.00[22] to P2,000.00[23] to P5,000.00[24] to P10,000.00.[25]

Need for Reexamining the Wenphil Doctrine

Today, we once again consider the question of appropriate sanctions for violations of the notice requirement in light of our experience during the last
decade or so with the Wenphil doctrine. The number of cases involving dismissals without the requisite notice to the employee, although effected for just
or authorized causes, suggests that the imposition of fine for violation of the notice requirement has not been effective in deterring violations of the notice
requirement. Justice Panganiban finds the monetary sanctions "too insignificant, too niggardly, and sometimes even too late." On the other hand, Justice
Puno says there has in effect been fostered a policy of "dismiss now, pay later" which moneyed employers find more convenient to comply with than the
requirement to serve a 30-day written notice (in the case of termination of employment for an authorized cause under Arts. 283-284) or to give notice
and hearing (in the case of dismissals for just causes under Art. 282).

For this reason, they regard any dismissal or layoff without the requisite notice to be null and void even though there are just or authorized causes for
such dismissal or layoff. Consequently, in their view, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages.

Validity of Petitioners Layoff Not Affected by Lack of Notice

We agree with our esteemed colleagues, Justices Puno and Panganiban, that we should rethink the sanction of fine for an employers disregard of the
notice requirement. We do not agree, however, that disregard of this requirement by an employer renders the dismissal or termination of employment
null and void. Such a stance is actually a reversion to the discredited pre-Wenphil rule of ordering an employee to be reinstated and paid backwages
when it is shown that he has not been given notice and hearing although his dismissal or layoff is later found to be for a just or authorized cause. Such
rule was abandoned in Wenphil because it is really unjust to require an employer to keep in his service one who is guilty, for example, of an attempt on
the life of the employer or the latters family, or when the employer is precisely retrenching in order to prevent losses.

The need is for a rule which, while recognizing the employees right to notice before he is dismissed or laid off, at the same time acknowledges the right
of the employer to dismiss for any of the just causes enumerated in Art. 282 or to terminate employment for any of the authorized causes mentioned in
Arts. 283-284. If the Wenphil rule imposing a fine on an employer who is found to have dismissed an employee for cause without prior notice is deemed
ineffective in deterring employer violations of the notice requirement, the remedy is not to declare the dismissal void if there are just or valid grounds for
such dismissal or if the termination is for an authorized cause. That would be to uphold the right of the employee but deny the right of the employer to
dismiss for cause. Rather, the remedy is to order the payment to the employee of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that
the dismissal was for a just cause. But, otherwise, his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because his dismissal is
ineffectual.

For the same reason, if an employee is laid off for any of the causes in Arts. 283-284, i.e., installation of a labor-saving device, but the employer did not
give him and the DOLE a 30-day written notice of termination in advance, then the termination of his employment should be considered ineffectual and
he should be paid backwages. However, the termination of his employment should not be considered void but he should simply be paid separation pay
as provided in Art. 283 in addition to backwages.

Justice Puno argues that an employers failure to comply with the notice requirement constitutes a denial of the employees right to due process.
Prescinding from this premise, he quotes the statement of Chief Justice Concepcion in Vda. de Cuaycong v. Vda. de Sengbengco[26] that "acts of
Congress, as well as of the Executive, can deny due process only under the pain of nullity, and judicial proceedings suffering from the same flaw are
subject to the same sanction, any statutory provision to the contrary notwithstanding." Justice Puno concludes that the dismissal of an employee without
notice and hearing, even if for a just cause, as provided in Art. 282, or for an authorized cause, as provided in Arts. 283-284, is a nullity. Hence, even if
just or authorized causes exist, the employee should be reinstated with full back pay. On the other hand, Justice Panganiban quotes from the statement
in People v. Bocar[27] that "[w]here the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction."

Violation of Notice Requirement Not a Denial of Due Process

The cases cited by both Justices Puno and Panganiban refer, however, to the denial of due process by the State, which is not the case here. There are
three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the
nullity of the employees dismissal or layoff.

The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power,
such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, 1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property
of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized
methods.

The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear
upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the
adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any
charge against him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to
determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment.
Even in cases of dismissal under Art. 282, the purpose for the requirement of notice and hearing is not to comply with Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. The time for notice and hearing is at the trial stage. Then that is the time we speak of notice and hearing as the essence of procedural due
process. Thus, compliance by the employer with the notice requirement before he dismisses an employee does not foreclose the right of the latter to
question the legality of his dismissal. As Art. 277(b) provides, "Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission."

Indeed, to contend that the notice requirement in the Labor Code is an aspect of due process is to overlook the fact that Art. 283 had its origin in Art. 302
of the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1882 which gave either party to the employer-employee relationship the right to terminate their relationship by
giving notice to the other one month in advance. In lieu of notice, an employee could be laid off by paying him a mesada equivalent to his salary for one
month.[28] This provision was repealed by Art. 2270 of the Civil Code, which took effect on August 30, 1950. But on June 12, 1954, R.A. No. 1052,
otherwise known as the Termination Pay Law, was enacted reviving the mesada. On June 21, 1957, the law was amended by R.A. No. 1787 providing
for the giving of advance notice or the payment of compensation at the rate of one-half month for every year of service.[29]

The Termination Pay Law was held not to be a substantive law but a regulatory measure, the purpose of which was to give the employer the opportunity
to find a replacement or substitute, and the employee the equal opportunity to look for another job or source of employment. Where the termination of
employment was for a just cause, no notice was required to be given to the employee. [30] It was only on September 4, 1981 that notice was required to
be given even where the dismissal or termination of an employee was for cause. This was made in the rules issued by the then Minister of Labor and
Employment to implement B.P. Blg. 130 which amended the Labor Code. And it was still much later when the notice requirement was embodied in the
law with the amendment of Art. 277(b) by R.A. No. 6715 on March 2, 1989. It cannot be that the former regime denied due process to the employee.
Otherwise, there should now likewise be a rule that, in case an employee leaves his job without cause and without prior notice to his employer, his act
should be void instead of simply making him liable for damages.

The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot
really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282
(i.e., serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of the employer, gross and habitual neglect of duties, fraud or willful
breach of trust of the employer, commission of crime against the employer or the latters immediate family or duly authorized representatives, or other
analogous cases).

Justice Puno disputes this. He says that "statistics in the DOLE will prove that many cases have been won by employees before the grievance
committees manned by impartial judges of the company." The grievance machinery is, however, different because it is established by agreement of the
employer and the employees and composed of representatives from both sides. That is why, in Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Court of
Appeals,[31] which Justice Puno cites, it was held that "Since the right of [an employee] to his labor is in itself a property and that the labor agreement
between him and [his employer] is the law between the parties, his summary and arbitrary dismissal amounted to deprivation of his property without due
process of law." But here we are dealing with dismissals and layoffs by employers alone, without the intervention of any grievance machinery.
Accordingly in Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation,[32] although a professor was dismissed without a hearing by his university, his dismissal for
having made homosexual advances on a student was sustained, it appearing that in the NLRC, the employee was fully heard in his defense.

Lack of Notice Only Makes Termination Ineffectual

Not all notice requirements are requirements of due process. Some are simply part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to a party can be
exercised. Others are simply an application of the Justinian precept, embodied in the Civil Code, [33] to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith toward ones fellowmen. Such is the notice requirement in Arts. 282-283. The consequence of the failure either of the
employer or the employee to live up to this precept is to make him liable in damages, not to render his act (dismissal or resignation, as the case may be)
void. The measure of damages is the amount of wages the employee should have received were it not for the termination of his employment without
prior notice. If warranted, nominal and moral damages may also be awarded.

We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employers failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a
denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely
ineffectual. It is similar to the failure to observe the provisions of Art. 1592, in relation to Art. 1191, of the Civil Code [34] in rescinding a contract for the
sale of immovable property. Under these provisions, while the power of a party to rescind a contract is implied in reciprocal obligations, nonetheless, in
cases involving the sale of immovable property, the vendor cannot exercise this power even though the vendee defaults in the payment of the price,
except by bringing an action in court or giving notice of rescission by means of a notarial demand.[35] Consequently, a notice of rescission given in the
letter of an attorney has no legal effect, and the vendee can make payment even after the due date since no valid notice of rescission has been given. [36]

Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal. This is
clear from Art. 279 which provides:

Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or
their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.[37]

Thus, only if the termination of employment is not for any of the causes provided by law is it illegal and, therefore, the employee should be reinstated and
paid backwages. To contend, as Justices Puno and Panganiban do, that even if the termination is for a just or authorized cause the employee
concerned should be reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art. 279 by adding another ground for considering a dismissal illegal. What is
more, it would ignore the fact that under Art. 285, if it is the employee who fails to give a written notice to the employer that he is leaving the service of
the latter, at least one month in advance, his failure to comply with the legal requirement does not result in making his resignation void but only in making
him liable for damages.[38] This disparity in legal treatment, which would result from the adoption of the theory of the minority cannot simply be explained
by invoking President Ramon Magsaysays motto that "he who has less in life should have more in law." That would be a misapplication of this noble
phrase originally from Professor Thomas Reed Powell of the Harvard Law School.
Justice Panganiban cites Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC,[39] in support of his view that an illegal dismissal results not only from want of legal cause but
also from the failure to observe "due process." The Pepsi-Cola case actually involved a dismissal for an alleged loss of trust and confidence which, as
found by the Court, was not proven. The dismissal was, therefore, illegal, not because there was a denial of due process, but because the dismissal was
without cause. The statement that the failure of management to comply with the notice requirement "taints the dismissal with illegality" was merely a
dictum thrown in as additional grounds for holding the dismissal to be illegal.

Given the nature of the violation, therefore, the appropriate sanction for the failure to give notice is the payment of backwages for the period when the
employee is considered not to have been effectively dismissed or his employment terminated. The sanction is not the payment alone of nominal
damages as Justice Vitug contends.

Unjust Results of Considering Dismissals/Layoffs Without Prior Notice As Illegal

The refusal to look beyond the validity of the initial action taken by the employer to terminate employment either for an authorized or just cause can
result in an injustice to the employer. For not giving notice and hearing before dismissing an employee, who is otherwise guilty of, say, theft, or even of
an attempt against the life of the employer, an employer will be forced to keep in his employ such guilty employee. This is unjust.

It is true the Constitution regards labor as "a primary social economic force." [40] But so does it declare that it "recognizes the indispensable role of the
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investment."[41] The Constitution bids the State to "afford full protection
to labor."[42] But it is equally true that "the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the
employer."[43] And it is oppression to compel the employer to continue in employment one who is guilty or to force the employer to remain in operation
when it is not economically in his interest to do so.

In sum, we hold that if in proceedings for reinstatement under Art. 283, it is shown that the termination of employment was due to an authorized cause,
then the employee concerned should not be ordered reinstated even though there is failure to comply with the 30-day notice requirement. Instead, he
must be granted separation pay in accordance with Art. 283, to wit:

In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one month for every year of service, whichever is higher. In
case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half
(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six months shall be considered one (1) whole
year.

If the employees separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or
only granted separation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance.

On the other hand, with respect to dismissals for cause under Art. 282, if it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the just causes
mentioned in said Art. 282, then, in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to hear him before he is
dismissed renders the termination of his employment without legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is MODIFIED by ordering private respondent
Isetann Department Store, Inc. to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, his unpaid salary, and his
proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time his employment was terminated on October 11, 1991 up to the time the
decision herein becomes final. For this purpose, this case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for computation of the separation pay, backwages, and
other monetary awards to petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 149454. May 28, 2004]

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE and LEONARDO T. YABUT, respondents.

[G.R. No. 149507. May 28, 2004]

CASA MONTESSORI INTERNATIONALE, petitioner, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
 By the nature of its functions, a bank is required to take meticulous care of the deposits of its clients, who have the right to expect high standards
of integrity and performance from it. Among its obligations in furtherance thereof is knowing the signatures of its clients. Depositors are not estopped
from questioning wrongful withdrawals, even if they have failed to question those errors in the statements sent by the bank to them for verification.

The Case

Before us are two Petitions for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 23, 2001 Decision[2] and the August 17,
2001 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 63561. The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that defendant bank [Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI)] is held liable only for one-half of the value of the forged checks in the amount of P547,115.00 after deductions subject to REIMBURSEMENT from
third party defendant Yabut who is likewise ORDERED to pay the other half to plaintiff corporation [Casa Montessori Internationale (CASA)].[4]

The assailed Resolution denied all the parties Motions for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts of the case are narrated by the CA as follows:

On November 8, 1982, plaintiff CASA Montessori International[5] opened Current Account No. 0291-0081-01 with defendant BPI[,] with CASAs President
Ms. Ma. Carina C. Lebron as one of its authorized signatories.

In 1991, after conducting an investigation, plaintiff discovered that nine (9) of its checks had been encashed by a certain Sonny D. Santos since 1990 in
the total amount of P782,000.00, on the following dates and amounts:

Check No. Date Amount

1. 839700 April 24, 1990 P 43,400.00

2. 839459 Nov. 2, 1990 110,500.00

3. 839609 Oct. 17, 1990 47,723.00

4. 839549 April 7, 1990 90,700.00

5. 839569 Sept. 23, 1990 52,277.00

6. 729149 Mar. 22, 1990 148,000.00

7. 729129 Mar. 16, 1990 51,015.00

8. 839684 Dec. 1, 1990 140,000.00

9. 729034 Mar. 2, 1990 98,985.00

Total -- P 782,600.00[6]

It turned out that Sonny D. Santos with account at BPIs Greenbelt Branch [was] a fictitious name used by third party defendant Leonardo T. Yabut who
worked as external auditor of CASA. Third party defendant voluntarily admitted that he forged the signature of Ms. Lebron and encashed the checks.

The PNP Crime Laboratory conducted an examination of the nine (9) checks and concluded that the handwritings thereon compared to the
standard signature of Ms. Lebron were not written by the latter.

On March 4, 1991, plaintiff filed the herein Complaint for Collection with Damages against defendant bank praying that the latter be ordered to
reinstate the amount of P782,500.00[7] in the current and savings accounts of the plaintiff with interest at 6% per annum.

On February 16, 1999, the RTC rendered the appealed decision in favor of the plaintiff. [8]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 Modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA apportioned the loss between BPI and CASA. The appellate court took into
account CASAs contributory negligence that resulted in the undetected forgery. It then ordered Leonardo T. Yabut to reimburse BPI half the total amount
claimed; and CASA, the other half.It also disallowed attorneys fees and moral and exemplary damages.

Hence, these Petitions.[9]

Issues

In GR No. 149454, Petitioner BPI submits the following issues for our consideration:

I. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding this case NOT in accord with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court to the effect that
forgery cannot be presumed; that it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence; and that the burden of proof lies on the party alleging the
forgery.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding this case not in accord with applicable laws, in particular the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL)
which precludes CASA, on account of its own negligence, from asserting its forgery claim against BPI, specially taking into account the absence of any
negligence on the part of BPI.[10]

In GR No. 149507, Petitioner CASA submits the following issues:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that there is no showing that [BPI], although negligent, acted in bad faith x x x thus denying the
prayer for the award of attorneys fees, moral damages and exemplary damages to [CASA]. The Honorable Court also erred when it did not order [BPI] to
pay interest on the amounts due to [CASA].

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it declared that [CASA] was likewise negligent in the case at bar, thus warranting its conclusion that the
loss in the amount of P547,115.00 be apportioned between [CASA] and [BPI] x x x.[11]

These issues can be narrowed down to three. First, was there forgery under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL)? Second, were any of the
parties negligent and therefore precluded from setting up forgery as a defense? Third, should moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and
interest be awarded?

The Courts Ruling

The Petition in GR No. 149454 has no merit, while that in GR No. 149507 is partly meritorious.

First Issue:
Forged Signature Wholly Inoperative

Section 23 of the NIL provides:

Section 23. Forged signature; effect of. -- When a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it is
wholly inoperative, and no right x x x to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto, can be acquired through or under such signature, unless the
party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority. [12]

Under this provision, a forged signature is a real [13] or absolute defense,[14] and a person whose signature on a negotiable instrument is forged is
deemed to have never become a party thereto and to have never consented to the contract that allegedly gave rise to it. [15]

The counterfeiting of any writing, consisting in the signing of anothers name with intent to defraud, is forgery. [16]

In the present case, we hold that there was forgery of the drawers signature on the check.

First, both the CA[17] and the RTC[18] found that Respondent Yabut himself had voluntarily admitted, through an Affidavit, that he had forged the
drawers signature and encashed the checks. [19] He never refuted these findings.[20] That he had been coerced into admission was not corroborated by
any evidence on record.[21]

Second, the appellate and the trial courts also ruled that the PNP Crime Laboratory, after its examination of the said checks, [22] had concluded that
the handwritings thereon -- compared to the standard signature of the drawer -- were not hers.[23] This conclusion was the same as that in the
Report[24] that the PNP Crime Laboratory had earlier issued to BPI -- the drawee bank -- upon the latters request.

Indeed, we respect and affirm the RTCs factual findings, especially when affirmed by the CA, since these are supported by substantial evidence
on record.[25]
Voluntary Admission Not
Violative of Constitutional Rights

The voluntary admission of Yabut did not violate his constitutional rights (1) on custodial investigation, and (2) against self-incrimination.

In the first place, he was not under custodial investigation. [26] His Affidavit was executed in private and before private individuals.[27] The mantle of
protection under Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution[28] covers only the period from the time a person is taken into custody for investigation of
his possible participation in the commission of a crime or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime although not yet in
custody.[29]

Therefore, to fall within the ambit of Section 12, quoted above, there must be an arrest or a deprivation of freedom, with questions propounded on
him by the police authorities for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any information. [30] The said constitutional provision does not apply
to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner[31] whereby an individual orally admits to authorship of a crime.[32] What the Constitution
proscribes is the compulsory or coercive disclosure of incriminating facts.[33]

Moreover, the right against self-incrimination[34] under Section 17 of Article III[35] of the Constitution, which is ordinarily available only in criminal
prosecutions, extends to all other government proceedings -- including civil actions, legislative investigations,[36] and administrative proceedings that
possess a criminal or penal aspect[37] -- but not to private investigations done by private individuals. Even in such government proceedings, this right
may be waived,[38] provided the waiver is certain; unequivocal; and intelligently, understandingly and willingly made. [39]

If in these government proceedings waiver is allowed, all the more is it so in private investigations. It is of no moment that no criminal case has yet
been filed against Yabut. The filing thereof is entirely up to the appropriate authorities or to the private individuals upon whom damage has been
caused. As we shall also explain later, it is not mandatory for CASA -- the plaintiff below -- to implead Yabut in the civil case before the lower court.

Under these two constitutional provisions, [t]he Bill of Rights[40] does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.[41] Moreover, the Bill of Rights is a charter of liberties for the individual and a
limitation upon the power of the [S]tate.[42] These rights[43] are guaranteed to preclude the slightest coercion by the State that may lead the accused to
admit something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.[44]

Yabut is not an accused here. Besides, his mere invocation of the aforesaid rights does not automatically entitle him to the constitutional
protection.[45] When he freely and voluntarily executed[46] his Affidavit, the State was not even involved. Such Affidavit may therefore be admitted without
violating his constitutional rights while under custodial investigation and against self-incrimination.

Clear, Positive and Convincing

Examination and Evidence

The examination by the PNP, though inconclusive, was nevertheless clear, positive and convincing.

Forgery cannot be presumed.[47] It must be established by clear, positive and convincing evidence. [48] Under the best evidence rule as applied to
documentary evidence like the checks in question, no secondary or substitutionary evidence may inceptively be introduced, as the original writing itself
must be produced in court.[49] But when, without bad faith on the part of the offeror, the original checks have already been destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, secondary evidence may be produced.[50] Without bad faith on its part, CASA proved the loss or destruction of the original checks
through the Affidavit of the one person who knew of that fact[51] -- Yabut. He clearly admitted to discarding the paid checks to cover up his misdeed.[52] In
such a situation, secondary evidence like microfilm copies may be introduced in court.

The drawers signatures on the microfilm copies were compared with the standard signature. PNP Document Examiner II Josefina de la Cruz
testified on cross-examination that two different persons had written them.[53] Although no conclusive report could be issued in the absence of the original
checks,[54] she affirmed that her findings were 90 percent conclusive.[55] According to her, even if the microfilm copies were the only basis of comparison,
the differences were evident.[56] Besides, the RTC explained that although the Report was inconclusive, no conclusive report could have been given by
the PNP, anyway, in the absence of the original checks.[57] This explanation is valid; otherwise, no such report can ever be relied upon in court.

Even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the contents of a document -- such as the drawers
signature on a check -- is the subject of inquiry.[58] As to whether the document has been actually executed, this rule does not apply; and testimonial as
well as any other secondary evidence is admissible. [59] Carina Lebron herself, the drawers authorized signatory, testified many times that she had never
signed those checks. Her testimonial evidence is admissible; the checks have not been actually executed. The genuineness of her handwriting is
proved, not only through the courts comparison of the questioned handwritings and admittedly genuine specimens thereof, [60] but above all by her.

The failure of CASA to produce the original checks neither gives rise to the presumption of suppression of evidence [61] nor creates an unfavorable
inference against it.[62] Such failure merely authorizes the introduction of secondary evidence[63] in the form of microfilm copies. Of no consequence is the
fact that CASA did not present the signature card containing the signatures with which those on the checks were compared.[64] Specimens of standard
signatures are not limited to such a card. Considering that it was not produced in evidence, other documents that bear the drawers authentic signature
may be resorted to.[65] Besides, that card was in the possession of BPI -- the adverse party.

We have held that without the original document containing the allegedly forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison that would
establish forgery;[66]and that a comparison based on a mere reproduction of the document under controversy cannot produce reliable results. [67] We have
also said, however, that a judge cannot merely rely on a handwriting experts testimony,[68] but should also exercise independent judgment in evaluating
the authenticity of a signature under scrutiny.[69] In the present case, both the RTC and the CA conducted independent examinations of the evidence
presented and arrived at reasonable and similar conclusions. Not only did they admit secondary evidence; they also appositely considered testimonial
and other documentary evidence in the form of the Affidavit.

The best evidence rule admits of exceptions and, as we have discussed earlier, the first of these has been met. [70] The result of examining a
questioned handwriting, even with the aid of experts and scientific instruments, may be inconclusive; [71] but it is a non sequitur to say that such result is
not clear, positive and convincing. The preponderance of evidence required in this case has been satisfied. [72]
 Second Issue:
Negligence Attributable to BPI Alone

Having established the forgery of the drawers signature, BPI -- the drawee -- erred in making payments by virtue thereof. The forged signatures are
wholly inoperative, and CASA -- the drawer whose authorized signatures do not appear on the negotiable instruments -- cannot be held liable
thereon. Neither is the latter precluded from setting up forgery as a real defense.

Clear Negligence
in Allowing Payment
Under a Forged Signature

We have repeatedly emphasized that, since the banking business is impressed with public interest, of paramount importance thereto is the trust
and confidence of the public in general. Consequently, the highest degree of diligence[73] is expected,[74] and high standards of integrity and performance
are even required, of it.[75] By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, [76] always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.[77]

BPI contends that it has a signature verification procedure, in which checks are honored only when the signatures therein are verified to be the
same with or similar to the specimen signatures on the signature cards. Nonetheless, it still failed to detect the eight instances of forgery. Its negligence
consisted in the omission of that degree of diligence required [78] of a bank. It cannot now feign ignorance, for very early on we have already ruled that a
bank is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and if it pays a forged check, it must be considered as making the payment out of its own funds,
and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the account of the depositor whose name was forged.[79] In fact, BPI was the same bank involved
when we issued this ruling seventy years ago.

Neither Waiver nor Estoppel

Results from Failure to
Report Error in Bank Statement

The monthly statements issued by BPI to its clients contain a notice worded as follows: If no error is reported in ten (10) days, account will be
correct.[80] Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if CASA failed to report the error. Neither is it estopped from questioning the mistake after
the lapse of the ten-day period.

This notice is a simple confirmation[81] or circularization -- in accounting parlance -- that requests client-depositors to affirm the accuracy of items
recorded by the banks.[82] Its purpose is to obtain from the depositors a direct corroboration of the correctness of their account balances with their
respective banks.[83] Internal or external auditors of a bank use it as a basic audit procedure [84] -- the results of which its client-depositors are neither
interested in nor privy to -- to test the details of transactions and balances in the banks records. [85] Evidential matter obtained from independent sources
outside a bank only serves to provide greater assurance of reliability[86] than that obtained solely within it for purposes of an audit of its own financial
statements, not those of its client-depositors.

Furthermore, there is always the audit risk that errors would not be detected [87] for various reasons. One, materiality is a consideration in audit
planning;[88] and two, the information obtained from such a substantive test is merely presumptive and cannot be the basis of a valid waiver.[89] BPI has
no right to impose a condition unilaterally and thereafter consider failure to meet such condition a waiver. Neither may CASA renounce a right[90] it has
never possessed.[91]

Every right has subjects -- active and passive. While the active subject is entitled to demand its enforcement, the passive one is duty-bound to
suffer such enforcement.[92]

On the one hand, BPI could not have been an active subject, because it could not have demanded from CASA a response to its notice. Besides,
the notice was a measly request worded as follows: Please examine x x x and report x x x. [93] CASA, on the other hand, could not have been a passive
subject, either, because it had no obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to respond.

Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their own deed or representation, anything contrary to that established as the truth, in
legal contemplation.[94] Our rules on evidence even make a juris et de jure presumption[95] that whenever one has, by ones own act or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief, one cannot -- in any litigation arising from
such act or omission -- be permitted to falsify that supposed truth.[96]

In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or representation that misled BPI. The formers omission, if any, may only be deemed an innocent
mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences of periodic audits. Since its conduct was due to such ignorance founded upon an innocent
mistake, estoppel will not arise.[97] A person who has no knowledge of or consent to a transaction may not be estopped by it. [98] Estoppel cannot be
sustained by mere argument or doubtful inference x x x. [99] CASA is not barred from questioning BPIs error even after the lapse of the period given in the
notice.

Loss Borne by
Proximate Source
of Negligence

For allowing payment[100] on the checks to a wrongful and fictitious payee, BPI -- the drawee bank -- becomes liable to its depositor-drawer. Since
the encashing bank is one of its branches,[101] BPI can easily go after it and hold it liable for reimbursement. [102] It may not debit the drawers
account[103] and is not entitled to indemnification from the drawer.[104] In both law and equity, when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the
wrongful act of a third person, the loss must be borne by the one whose negligence was the proximate cause of the loss or who put it into the power of
the third person to perpetrate the wrong.[105]

Proximate cause is determined by the facts of the case.[106] It is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. [107]

Pursuant to its prime duty to ascertain well the genuineness of the signatures of its client-depositors on checks being encashed, BPI is expected to
use reasonable business prudence.[108] In the performance of that obligation, it is bound by its internal banking rules and regulations that form part of the
contract it enters into with its depositors.[109]

Unfortunately, it failed in that regard. First, Yabut was able to open a bank account in one of its branches without privity;[110] that is, without the
proper verification of his corresponding identification papers. Second, BPI was unable to discover early on not only this irregularity, but also the marked
differences in the signatures on the checks and those on the signature card. Third, despite the examination procedures it conducted, the Central
Verification Unit[111] of the bank even passed off these evidently different signatures as genuine. Without exercising the required prudence on its part, BPI
accepted and encashed the eight checks presented to it. As a result, it proximately contributed to the fraud and should be held primarily liable [112] for the
negligence of its officers or agents when acting within the course and scope of their employment.[113] It must bear the loss.

CASA Not Negligent

in Its Financial Affairs

In this jurisdiction, the negligence of the party invoking forgery is recognized as an exception[114] to the general rule that a forged signature is
wholly inoperative.[115]Contrary to BPIs claim, however, we do not find CASA negligent in handling its financial affairs. CASA, we stress, is not precluded
from setting up forgery as a real defense.

Role of Independent Auditor

The major purpose of an independent audit is to investigate and determine objectively if the financial statements submitted for audit by a
corporation have been prepared in accordance with the appropriate financial reporting practices [116] of private entities. The relationship that arises
therefrom is both legal and moral.[117] It begins with the execution of the engagement letter[118] that embodies the terms and conditions of the audit and
ends with the fulfilled expectation of the auditors ethical[119] and competent performance in all aspects of the audit.[120]

The financial statements are representations of the client; but it is the auditor who has the responsibility for the accuracy in the recording of data
that underlies their preparation, their form of presentation, and the opinion[121] expressed therein.[122] The auditor does not assume the role of employee
or of management in the clients conduct of operations [123] and is never under the control or supervision[124] of the client.

Yabut was an independent auditor[125] hired by CASA. He handled its monthly bank reconciliations and had access to all relevant documents and
checkbooks.[126] In him was reposed the clients[127] trust and confidence[128] that he would perform precisely those functions and apply the appropriate
procedures in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. [129] Yet he did not meet these expectations. Nothing could be more horrible to a
client than to discover later on that the person tasked to detect fraud was the same one who perpetrated it.

Cash Balances
Open to Manipulation

It is a non sequitur to say that the person who receives the monthly bank statements, together with the cancelled checks and other debit/credit
memoranda, shall examine the contents and give notice of any discrepancies within a reasonable time. Awareness is not equipollent with discernment.

Besides, in the internal accounting control system prudently installed by CASA, [130] it was Yabut who should examine those documents in order to
prepare the bank reconciliations.[131] He owned his working papers,[132] and his output consisted of his opinion as well as the clients financial statements
and accompanying notes thereto.CASA had every right to rely solely upon his output -- based on the terms of the audit engagement -- and could thus be
unwittingly duped into believing that everything was in order. Besides, [g]ood faith is always presumed and it is the burden of the party claiming
otherwise to adduce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. [133]

Moreover, there was a time gap between the period covered by the bank statement and the date of its actual receipt. Lebron personally received
the December 1990 bank statement only in January 1991[134] -- when she was also informed of the forgery for the first time, after which she immediately
requested a stop payment order. She cannot be faulted for the late detection of the forged December check. After all, the bank account with BPI was not
personal but corporate, and she could not be expected to monitor closely all its finances. A preschool teacher charged with molding the minds of the
youth cannot be burdened with the intricacies or complexities of corporate existence.

There is also a cutoff period such that checks issued during a given month, but not presented for payment within that period, will not be reflected
therein.[135] An experienced auditor with intent to defraud can easily conceal any devious scheme from a client unwary of the accounting processes
involved by manipulating the cash balances on record -- especially when bank transactions are numerous, large and frequent. CASA could only be
blamed, if at all, for its unintelligent choice in the selection and appointment of an auditor -- a fault that is not tantamount to negligence.

Negligence is not presumed, but proven by whoever alleges it. [136] Its mere existence is not sufficient without proof that it, and no other
cause,[137] has given rise to damages.[138] In addition, this fault is common to, if not prevalent among, small and medium-sized business entities, thus
leading the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), through the Board of Accountancy (BOA), to require today not only accreditation for the practice
of public accountancy,[139] but also the registration of firms in the practice thereof. In fact, among the attachments now required upon registration are the
code of good governance[140] and a sworn statement on adequate and effective training.[141]
 The missing checks were certainly reported by the bookkeeper [142] to the accountant[143] -- her immediate supervisor -- and by the latter to the
auditor. However, both the accountant and the auditor, for reasons known only to them, assured the bookkeeper that there were no irregularities.

The bookkeeper[144] who had exclusive custody of the checkbooks[145] did not have to go directly to CASAs president or to BPI. Although she
rightfully reported the matter, neither an investigation was conducted nor a resolution of it was arrived at, precisely because the person at the top of the
helm was the culprit. The vouchers, invoices and check stubs in support of all check disbursements could be concealed or fabricated -- even in collusion
-- and management would still have no way to verify its cash accountabilities.

Clearly then, Yabut was able to perpetrate the wrongful act through no fault of CASA. If auditors may be held liable for breach of contract and
negligence,[146] with all the more reason may they be charged with the perpetration of fraud upon an unsuspecting client. CASA had the discretion to
pursue BPI alone under the NIL, by reason of expediency or munificence or both. Money paid under a mistake may rightfully be recovered,[147] and under
such terms as the injured party may choose.

Third Issue:
Award of Monetary Claims

Moral Damages Denied

We deny CASAs claim for moral damages.

In the absence of a wrongful act or omission,[148] or of fraud or bad faith,[149] moral damages cannot be awarded.[150] The adverse result of an action
does not per se make the action wrongful, or the party liable for it. One may err, but error alone is not a ground for granting such damages. [151] While no
proof of pecuniary loss is necessary therefor -- with the amount to be awarded left to the courts discretion[152] -- the claimant must nonetheless
satisfactorily prove the existence of its factual basis[153] and causal relation[154] to the claimants act or omission.[155]

Regrettably, in this case CASA was unable to identify the particular instance -- enumerated in the Civil Code -- upon which its claim for moral
damages is predicated.[156] Neither bad faith nor negligence so gross that it amounts to malice [157] can be imputed to BPI. Bad faith, under the law, does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; [158] it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. [159]

As a general rule, a corporation -- being an artificial person without feelings, emotions and senses, and having existence only in legal
contemplation -- is not entitled to moral damages,[160] because it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish.[161] However, for breach of the
fiduciary duty required of a bank, a corporate client may claim such damages when its good reputation is besmirched by such breach, and social
humiliation results therefrom.[162] CASA was unable to prove that BPI had debased the good reputation of, [163] and consequently caused incalculable
embarrassment to, the former. CASAs mere allegation or supposition thereof, without any sufficient evidence on record, [164] is not enough.

Exemplary Damages Also Denied

We also deny CASAs claim for exemplary damages.

Imposed by way of correction[165] for the public good,[166] exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. [167] As we have said earlier,
there is no bad faith on the part of BPI for paying the checks of CASA upon forged signatures. Therefore, the former cannot be said to have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.[168] The latter, having no right to moral damages, cannot demand exemplary
damages.[169]

Attorneys Fees Granted

Although it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate, [170] we find that CASA is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees based on
factual, legal, and equitable justification.[171]

When the act or omission of the defendant has compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect the latters interest,[172] or where the court deems
it just and equitable,[173] attorneys fees may be recovered. In the present case, BPI persistently denied the claim of CASA under the NIL to recredit the
latters account for the value of the forged checks. This denial constrained CASA to incur expenses and exert effort for more than ten years in order to
protect its corporate interest in its bank account.Besides, we have already cautioned BPI on a similar act of negligence it had committed seventy years
ago, but it has remained unrelenting. Therefore, the Court deems it just and equitable to grant ten percent (10%)[174] of the total value adjudged to CASA
as attorneys fees.

Interest Allowed

For the failure of BPI to pay CASA upon demand and for compelling the latter to resort to the courts to obtain payment, legal interest may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the Court, the same to run from the filing[175] of the Complaint.[176] Since a court judgment is not a loan or a forbearance of
recovery, the legal interest shall be at six percent (6%) per annum.[177] If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs
in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of x x x legal interest, which is six percent per
annum.[178] The actual base for its computation shall be on the amount finally adjudged, [179] compounded[180] annually to make up for the cost of
money[181] already lost to CASA.

Moreover, the failure of the CA to award interest does not prevent us from granting it upon damages awarded for breach of contract.[182] Because
BPI evidently breached its contract of deposit with CASA, we award interest in addition to the total amount adjudged. Under Section 196 of the NIL, any
case not provided for shall be governed by the provisions of existing legislation or, in default thereof, by the rules of the law merchant.[183] Damages are
not provided for in the NIL. Thus, we resort to the Code of Commerce and the Civil Code. Under Article 2 of the Code of Commerce, acts of commerce
shall be governed by its provisions and, in their absence, by the usages of commerce generally observed in each place; and in the absence of both
rules, by those of the civil law.[184] This law being silent, we look at Article 18 of the Civil Code, which states: In matters which are governed by the Code
of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by its provisions. A perusal of these three statutes unmistakably shows that the award
of interest under our civil law is justified.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 149454 is hereby DENIED, and that in GR No. 149507 PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification: BPI is held liable for P547,115, the total value of the forged checks less the amount already recovered
by CASA from Leonardo T. Yabut, plus interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum -- compounded annually, from the filing of the complaint
until paid in full; and attorneys fees of ten percent (10%) thereof, subject to reimbursement from Respondent Yabut for the entire amount, excepting
attorneys fees. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulation Commission for such action as it may
deem appropriate against Respondent Yabut. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex
parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-
001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA
No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain
Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar
(Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar." 1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and
ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered
only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live
Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 6 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5
April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines 8 but she opted to continue her studies
abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts
where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. 9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario
de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days
after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and
Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13

14 15
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001.

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004
elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical
condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of her father's
funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. 18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother,
the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began
preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools for the next
semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and
inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As early as 2004, the petitioner
already quit her job in the U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to
arrange the sale of their family home there.26

The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One
Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005. 27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and
parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of
school age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address in the
U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country
on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006. 33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to
this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the couple's
name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine
citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July
2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her
children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. 38 Consequently, the BI issued Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names
of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine
Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the
DFA.42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation
of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, 44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No.
9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI 46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport. 48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the
United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that she had taken her oath as
MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In the same questionnaire, the
petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered
"6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." 53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes
and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54

55
On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-
born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24
May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject
of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was
docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her
petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of
reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized
American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator
wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted
that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under
the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to
reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if
Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006
Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the
statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to
misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016
Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give
way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
 i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that
is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations which are false.
The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local
Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015
Resolution by denying the same.70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez
(Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, 71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that
petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction
that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5
Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. 74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have a nationality.76 According to
Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in order to give effect to treaty obligations
assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because
it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling. 79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that
petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was sometime in 2010 or
2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed thereat
and her frequent trips to the U.S.82

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born citizens who are
repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years
and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have validly reestablished
her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year
residency requirement for President.

Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition, 85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency
issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency
required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years
and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should
be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI. 87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an
American citizen and as such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification
case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. 89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the alleged lack of residency and
natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. 91 A
petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the COMELEC. 92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor
that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are
found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born
status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of
the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan RTC. 97 She
believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by
her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in
Corinthian Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as
long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with.100She reasoned out that there was no requirement that renunciation of foreign
citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she
has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The
COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive
portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex
parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary restraining orders were
issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from the
Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments
were held in these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio
P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D.
Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she
made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from
going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper
authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
 (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused
registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation
of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary
action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House
of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision
in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15,
1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the
Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of
a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution,
cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the
law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of
"ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40
of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of
ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or
continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has
the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications provided in §4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its
statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured
in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast,
whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of
prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought.
That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set
aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make,
extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v.
COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary
to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only
in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the
House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the
other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No.
9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as
a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent
court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations,
are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand be
established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither
can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior
authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be
found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations
regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings 108 are not mentioned in the
enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner
admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule
that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say
that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. 110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has Filipino parents and is
therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The
private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule
128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of improbability of the fact
in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) 111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born
in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970,
also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the
figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were
230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens,
or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as
against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino. 112

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in
Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the
foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines
is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more
than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies
behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of
being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino
parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born
Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is
15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines on
that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in
the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would
have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners
abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that
is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the
thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't
make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to
sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are
not separate disciplines.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings,
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of
the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 115

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother
not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate
children?

Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children
of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a
Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no
need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their
parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also be considered as
Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the
principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not necessary to include a
provision on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are
not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, 117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and
constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
 During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be
governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate
children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making
unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings
as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no
more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on
assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were
able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already
impliedly so recognized.

In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to
recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and
1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently silent, it
is silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that
it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications of the argument that
foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to deny
foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to
equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1
which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance,
including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v.
Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject
matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil
Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory,
we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-
SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the
issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous.
Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this
instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. 121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination
of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire
Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act
to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her
favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling. 123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity).
Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 126 "General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are
"basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle
against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation." 128 These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on
our country:

Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant
international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every
child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to
such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article
14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
"nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory
of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their
principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR. 132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not
signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription
against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v.
Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only
sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out,
the Court was content with the practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the
United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or
acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" when the case was
decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the Judgments
Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were
considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on
international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of
the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which
are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments,
were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law" under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings
as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in
166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of jus
sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the
country in which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be
adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even
the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent
with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents
are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls
itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world
community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using
the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-
born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain
"Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to
his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission on
Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will ... recover
his natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and
remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how
citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not
for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase
"from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two
types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are
natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to undergo the
process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they
would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for
the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. 146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing
standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the
condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of
the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should
be respected."148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her
application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born
Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological
parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an
amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of
Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The
law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway.
And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material representation when she stated in her
COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.

The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In
answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years 11 months"
which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new
domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile.152 To
successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. 153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good.
These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled
abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of their household items
weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner
issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006;
receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the
U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their
U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a
Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family
stayed with affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to relocate
to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and
Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but maintained there was
no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the basis of the position that the
earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by
the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments,
the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino
cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24
May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence
presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the elections. Japzon v.
COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court decreeing that
residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v.
COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v.
COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that
residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of
petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address
in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and
permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in
Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed
here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the
years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No.
6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as
temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become
economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country"164in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say
in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for
repatriation shortly thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by
the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner.
There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings there apply to
a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as "period of residence
before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident only in November 2006.
In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her
husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time
she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of residence in the
Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that the first version was
vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the
evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in
evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of residence made in
a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence
where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought
to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to
have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC
done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was
false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July
2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005.
When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her
with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July
2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the
media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue immediately, also in the
press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, the
stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and were not
hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1
September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she misunderstood the
question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012
COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015
representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for
denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in his COC must not only
refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public
office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus
manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as
much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC
said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that
"based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional
requirement of residency for election as President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided
favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores,
above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was
not even considered by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has
been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us
that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general
public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence
different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts
of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale
of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and
Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough
to go to school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family
lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.

Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure
from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating that her parents are "Ronald
Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine
company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to
consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of
the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner,
v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in
connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First Division is
AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a
candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209835, September 22, 2015

ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to set aside the Resolution1 dated November 6,
2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed in toto the Resolution2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division
canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.

Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.4 were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan,
Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed a Petition5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes
despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.

During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the petition and the
petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the petition during the
conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in his petition.

Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225.6 He claimed
that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a
brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.

On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when he
declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the resolution
reads:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED. 7chanrobleslaw

The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and also in
consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found that while petitioner
complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian
citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced
their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his
domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for elective office
in said locality which he failed to do.

Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that petitioner won over private respondent.8 Private respondent
filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.9

On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.

On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the
COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.

On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. 10

On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution11 of the May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En
Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in favor of
petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan,
Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.

On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution.12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office13 on
December 20, 2013.

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:cralawlawlibrary

THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.

THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN
SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."

EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS
REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS PRIOR
TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON RESIDENCY.14chanrobleslaw

Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer
of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by registered mail
without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a mode of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent
violated Section 4, paragraphs (1)15 and (4),16 Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his
petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright.

We are not convinced.

While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of
their Rules of Procedure.cralawlawlibrary

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these
rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.chanrobleslaw

Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square
with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially
impaired.17

In Hayudini v. COMELEC,18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC
despite its failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523, i.e., pertaining
to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served personally on petitioner, respectively, and held
that:cralawlawlibrary

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is
uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public
interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle
was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising
its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in
resolving election disputes."

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even
suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the
purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary
interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal
has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. 19chanrobleslaw

Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections held on
May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public interest, which
justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:cralawlawlibrary

This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which requires service
of a copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also consider the efforts exerted by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition
to respondent after being made aware that such service is necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for petitioner to personally serve a
copy of the petition to respondent since he was in Canada at the time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel records.

The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the latter an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in the petition
even prior to the service of summons by the Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during the conference held on
10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations against him. He even filed a Memorandum containing his
defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process which is the very essence of
this Commission's Rules of Procedure.

Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow to substantive considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at
promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, x x x

xxxx

When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order, x x x.

Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which warrants the relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure,
consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in several cases.20chanrobleslaw

Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had
worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right of
suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad,
thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate running for public
office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents'
vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the
law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in canceling his COC.

We are not persuaded.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of the law.21 The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does
it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.22

RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. 23 This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. 24 However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective
public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
chanrobleslaw

Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective local official.
Section 39 thereof states:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.chanrobleslaw

Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made material
misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceeding the day of elections.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence,25 that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."26 A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan,
Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is
required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship. 29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his
domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.

The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?

In Japzon v. COMELEC,30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we had the occasion to state, thus:cralawlawlibrary

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. 31chanrobleslaw

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes.
He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice
which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a
period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No.
9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by
physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013
was even less than the one year residency required by law.

Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant
case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on
the sufficiency of evidence.33

Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the
day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.

Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance
with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on Elections,34 we held:cralawlawlibrary

x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second
District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. 35chanrobleslaw

Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately
proceeding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of
the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to COCs, to wit:cralawlawlibrary

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.chanrobleslaw

We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a
material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for
which he filed the certificate of candidacy.36 We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective
office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective office as provided for in the
Local Government Code.37 Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.38 We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material misrepresentation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated
November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 210164, August 18, 2015

ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Only natural-born Filipinos who owe total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines could run for and hold elective public office.

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Per Curiam Resolution2 dated
December 9, 2013 of respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), which affirmed the Resolution3 dated
September 6, 2013 of the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec, relying on our ruling in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,4 disqualified petitioner
Rommel C. Arnado (Arnado) from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, set aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
and declared respondent Florante T. Capitan (Capitan) as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship after he was naturalized as citizen of the United States of America
(USA). Subsequently, and in preparation for his plans to run for public office in the Philippines, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No.
92255 (RA 9225) before the Consul General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA. He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
July 10, 2008 and, on even date, an Order of Approval of Citizenship Retention and Re acquisition was issued in his favor. On April 3, 2009, Arnado
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

On November 30, 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010
national and local elections.

Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, however, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground, among
others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing
aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.

While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes for the mayoralty
post of Kauswagan. He was proclaimed the winning candidate.

On October 5, 2010, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's continued use of his US passport effectively negated his April
3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus, he was disqualified to run for public office for failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225. The Comelec
First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession should be followed.

Arnado moved for reconsideration. In the meantime, Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another mayoralty candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, intervened in the case. He argued that the Comelec First Division erred in applying the rule on succession.

On February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling of the Comelec First Division. It held that Arnado's use of his US
passport did not operate to revert his status to dual citizenship. The Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his
US passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the time of the relevant foreign trips. The Comelec En
Banc further noted that, after receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for his subsequent trips.

Maquiling then sought recourse to this Court by filing a petition docketed as G.R No. 195649.

While G.R No. 195649 was pending, the period for the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began. On
October 1, 2012, Arnado filed his CoC6 for the same position. Respondent Capitan also filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan.

On April 16, 2013, this Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. Voting 10-5, it annulled and set aside the Comelec En Banc's February 2, 2011
Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and declared Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in
the May 10, 2010 elections. In so ruling, the majority of the Members of the Court opined that in his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado
effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado's act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his
"Affidavit of Renunciation." Tills does not mean that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after
complying with the requirements that he perfonned positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow
a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

xxxx

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he
took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.7

The issuance of this Court's April 16, 2013 Decision sets the stage for the present controversy.

On May 9, 2013 or shortly after the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling, Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April3, 2009."8cralawrednad
The following day or on May 10, 2013, Capitan, Arnado's lone rival for the mayoralty post, filed a Petition 9 seeking to disqualify him from running for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan and/or to cancel his CoC based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC)
and was raffled to the Comelec's Second Division. The resolution of said petition was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado
garnered 8,902 votes (84% of the total votes cast) while Capitan obtained 1,707 (16% of the total votes cast) votes only.

On May 14, 2013, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.

Unfazed, Capitan filed another Petition10 this time seeking to nullify Arnado's proclamation. He argued that with the April 16, 2013 Decision of this Court
in Maquiling, there is no doubt that Arnado is disqualified from running for any local elective office. Hence, Arnado's proclamation is void and without any
legal effect.

Ruling of the Comelec Second Division

On September 6, 2013, the Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and disqualify Arnado
from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. Following Maquiling, it ratiocinated that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to
comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. While he executed the April 3,
2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same was deemed withdrawn or recalled when he subsequently traveled abroad using his US passport, as held
in Maquiling.

The Comelec Second Division also noted that Arnado failed to execute another Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections.
While a May 9, 2013 Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009" was submitted in evidence, the same would
not suffice because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.

The dispositive portion of the Comelec Second Division's Resolution reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is granted. Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is disqualified from running in the 13 May
2013 National and Local Elections.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

Aggrieved, Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration. 12 He argued that the Comelec Second Division erred in applying Maquiling claiming that
the said case is not on all fours with the present controversy; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period reckoned from the
filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the
ballots, their overwhelming support for him as their mayor. Arnado prayed that the Comelec Second Division's September 6, 2013 Resolution be
reversed and that he be declared as eligible to run for mayor ofKauswagan.

On December 9, 2013, the Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec Second Division. It accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado
and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan. The dispositive portion of the Comelec En Banc's Resolution
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DISMISSED. The Proclamation of Private Respondent Rommel C.
Arnado as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. FLORANTE T. CAPITAN is hereby
DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte inthe May 13, 2013 Elections.

SO ORDERED.13

Hence, on December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary prayer for injunctive relief to maintain the status quo ante. On December

26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or Temporary Restraining Order 14 in view of the issuance by the
Comelec En Banc of a Writ of Execution to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.

On January 14, 2014, this Court issued a Resolution15 requiring the respondents to file their respective comments on the petition. In the same
Resolution, this Court granted Arnado's ancillary relief for temporary restraining order.

Capitan thus filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order dated January 14, 2014, 16 contending that the acts sought to be
restrained by Arnado are already fait accompli. He alleged that the Comelec En Banc had already issued a Writ of Execution17 and pursuant thereto a
Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014 he took
his oath of office. Since then, he has assumed and performed the duties and functions of his office.

In a Resolution18 dated February 25, 2014, this Court ordered the issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order directing the parties to allow Arnado to continue
performing his functions as mayor of Kauswagan pending resolution of this case.

Issues

In support of his Petition, Arnado raises the following issues:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

I
ND
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2 DIVISION VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND/OR LATE
FILING, ETC.

II
WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COM.
ELIAS YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION.

III

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISENFRANCHISING 84% OF THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN
IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.

IV

WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012. 19

Arnado claims that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion and violated his right to procedural due process in not dismissing Capitan's
Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC). He avers that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter subsequently filed a similar case docketed as SPC
No. 13-019. In addition, SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day prescriptive period reckoned from the time of the filing of his CoC on October
1, 2012.

Arnado likewise claims that the proceeding before the Comelec is peppered with procedural infirmities. He asserts that the Comelec violated its own
rules in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate; that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was not set for trial and no
hearing for the reception of evidence was ever conducted; and, that the Comelec did not follow its own rules requiring the issuance of a notice of
promulgation of resolutions.

Arnado further claims that the Comelec En Banc not only committed grave abuse of discretion but also violated his constitutional right to due process
when it allowed Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph (Commissioner Yusoph) to participate in the review of the Decision he penned for the Second Division.
Furthermore, the Comelec En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it disqualified him from running in the May 13, 2013 elections, thereby
disenfranchising 84% of the voters of Kauswagan who all voted for him.

Finally, Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of his former counsel, Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance20 on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a
citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and, therefore, is qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13,
2013 elections.

Our Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Petition for certiorari is limited to the

determination of whether the respondent
tribunal acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court
will not interfere with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion. 21 Thus, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper. Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the "capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." 22 "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave."23 Grave abuse of
discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. 24cralawrednad

In this case, and as will be discussed below, there is no showing that the Comelec En Banc acted capriciously or whimsically in issuing its December 9,
2013 Resolution. Neither did it act contrary to law or jurisprudence.

Arnado's allegations that Capitan

violated the rule against forumshopping
and that the latter's petition in
SPA No.13-309(DC) was filed late,
unsubstantiated and erroneous.

There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition.25cralawred It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in the other.26 Thus, there is forum-shopping when in both actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as would represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27cralawrednad

Here, Arnado failed to substantiate his claim of forum-shopping. He merely made a general averment that in resolving the petitions of Capitan in SPA
No. 13-309 (OC) and SPC No. 13-019, the Comelec En Banc, as well as its Second Division, failed to comply with this Court's Revised Circular No. 28-
91,28without demonstrating how forum-shopping was supposed to be present. He has not shown that the petitions in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No.
13-019 involved the same parties, issues, and reliefs. In fact, Arnado did not even bother to submit to this Court a copy of the Petition in SPC No. 13-019
(annulment of proclamation case). As the party insisting that Capitan committed forum-shopping, Arnado bears the burden of establishing the same.
After all, it is settled that he who alleges has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not sufficient. 29cralawrednad

Besides, and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the parties in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 are not the same. In the first case,
the parties are only Capitan and Arnado. In the second case, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte is impleaded as
respondent. There is also dissimilitude in the reliefs sought. The former case sought to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC while the latter case
prayed for the annulment of Arnado's proclamation as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in the filing of Capitan's Petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC), it appears that Arnado either failed to grasp the import of
Capitan's allegations therein or he made a deliberate partial misrepresentation in stating that the same is one for cancellation of CoC. A copy30 thereof
annexed to Arnado's herein petition states that it is a petition "to disqualify and/or cancel the certificate of candidacy" of Arnado. The allegations therein
state in no uncertain terms that it is one for disqualification based on Arnado's failure to comply with the requisites of RA 9225 and on the ruling of this
Court in Maquiling. Thus, the Comelec Second Division appropriately treated it as a petition for disqualification with the alternative prayer to cancel
Arnado's CoC. It is elementary that the nature of the action is determined by the allegations in the petition.31cralawrednad

Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure,32 a petition for disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. 33 Thus,
the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.34cralawrednad

The other procedural lapses allegedly

committed by the Comelec are likewise
unsubstantiated. Assuming the allegations of
Arnado to be true, the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

Arnado's claim that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan's motion to consolidate
likewise lacks substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the
dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant and
pertinent thereto.35 Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant, Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged
inaction of the Comelec on said motion. And even assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec En Banc and
subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation.
In Cayago v. Hon. Lina,36it was held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the
unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. "[I]t is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in
a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny that same jurisdiction."37cralawrednad

In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9
reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.- When an action or proceeding involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another
action or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket number.

In Muñoz v. Comelec,38 this Court accentuated "that the term 'may' is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that
opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. If he chooses to exercise the right, he must comply with the conditions
attached thereto, which in this case require that the cases to be consolidated must involve similar questions of law and fact." 39 In this case, the
consolidation of SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and SPC No. 13-019 does not appear to be necessary. As earlier mentioned, said cases do not even involve the
same parties and reliefs sought. Hence, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec in not consolidating them.

Arnado's protestation that the Comelec violated its own rules when it decided SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without setting it for trial likewise deserves scant
consideration. The proceedings in a special action for disqualification of candidates under Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure are summary in
nature where a trial type proceeding may be dispensed with. 40 In Diangka v. Comelec,41 this Court held that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings specially where the
law calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 25 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for
disqualifications are subject to summary hearings. In relation thereto, Section 3, Rule 17 of the said Rules provides that it remains in the sound
discretion of the COMELEC whether clarification questions are to be asked the witnesses-affiants, and whether the adverse party is to be granted
opportunity to cross-examine said witnesses affiants. Furthermore, when the COMELEC en banc reviews and evaluates a party's petition, or as in the
case at bar, a party's answer and the supporting papers attached thereto, the same is tantamount to a fair "hearing" of his case.42

Arnado's claim that the Comelec En Banc

committed grave abuse of discretion and violated
his right to due process in allowing Commissioner
Yusoph to participate in the deliberation of the assailed
Comelec En Banc Resolution is likewise bereft of
substantiation.

Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013
Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca and Luie
Tito F. Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said
Resolution. The September 6, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec Second Division does not state who the ponente is. The same goes true with the
questioned December 9, 2013 Per Curiam Resolution43 of the Comelec En Banc. As a per curiam resolution, it was arrived at by the Comelec En
Banc as a whole and without any particular ponente. Hence, we need not belabor Arnado's claim of denial of due process as his basis therefor lacks
factual moorings.

Arnado has not yet satisfied the twin

requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 at
the time he filed his CoC for the May 13, 2013
elections; subsequent compliance does not suffice.

Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from running for any elective local
position. In Mercado v. anzano,44 it was clarified that the phrase "dual citizenship" in said Section 4(d) must be understood as referring to "dual
allegiance.''45 Subsequent, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of
the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath46 prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities- Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

In the case at bench, the Comelec Second Division, as affirmed by the Comelec En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of
Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,47 his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn
when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13,
2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9,
2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed.

The Comelec En Banc did not err, nor did it commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying
Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado's disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections —
being a candidate without total and undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines - still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections
on October 1, 2012. The Comelec En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion
had it departed therefrom.

Moreover, it cannot be validly argued that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his qualification because at the time this
Court promulgated its Decision in Maquiling on April 16, 2013, the period for filing the CoC for local elective office had already lapsed. Or, as Justice
Arturo D. Brion puts it in his Dissenting Opinion, "[t]o the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a replacement oath of renunciation in
2013, then there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to grave abuse of discretion." Besides, shortly after learning of the Court's
April 16, 2013 ruling in Maquiling or on May 9, 2013, Arnado substantially complied therewith by executing an affidavit affirming his April3, 2009 Affidavit
of Renunciation.

The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to
run for public office of a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It was
settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel
and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court
in Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that matters dealing with qualifications for public
elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from
strictly complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the deficiency in his qualification by submitting
another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that in this case, we should similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for
local elective office.

The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for
emphasis, are the same. Arnado's use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of
Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his
qualification. Maquiling, therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, which
means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established. 48 Under the doctrine, "[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle
of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the same." 49 It
enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue. 50cralawrednad

It may not be amiss to add that as early as 2010, the year when Balua filed a petition to disqualify him, Arnado has gotten wind that the use of his US
passport might pose a problem to his candidacy. In other words, when Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he was not totally unaware that the use
of his US passport after he had executed the Affidavit of Renunciation might have an impact on his qualification and candidacy. In fact, at that
time, Maquiling had already reached this Court. But despite the petitions filed against him questioning his qualification to run for public office in 2010,
Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 unmindful of any possible legal setbacks in his candidacy for the 2013 elections and without executing another
Affidavit of Renunciation. In short, the argument that Arnado should be given the opportunity to correct the deficiency in his CoC since Maquiling was
promulgated after the lapse of the period for filing a CoC for the 2013 elections, is totally bereft of merit. Consistent with our April 16, 2013 ruling
in Maquiling, Arnado should be made to face the consequences of his inaction since he could have remedied it at the time he filed his CoC on October
1, 2012 or even before that. There is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every election period if only to avert possible
questions about his qualifications.

The alleged November 30, 2009

Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance cannot be given any
probative weight.

As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the original or certified true copy thereof was not presented. In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the
outcome of the case was never presented before the Comelec much less in the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in this
petition. In Jacot v. Dal,51 this Court disallowed the belated presentation of similar evidence on due process considerations.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi- judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot
be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Courts have neither the time nor the
resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly.
Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence. Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7 February 2007 during the
proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that "In the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect." Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.- The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered
must be specified.

Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this
document would be contrary to due process. Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice. 52

Moreover, in Maquiling it was mentioned that Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 201 0, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco"
appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
records:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

DATE OF Arrival:01/12/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :057782700
DATE OF Arrival:03/23/2010
NATIONALITY :USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT :05778270053
Despite the existence of such statement in Maquiling, We are puzzled why Arnado never bothered to correct or refute it. He neither alleged nor
presented evidence in this petition to prove that he did not travel abroad on those dates using his US passport.

Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, however, dissents and maintains the same position he had taken in Maquiling that Arnado's use of his US passport in
2009 is an isolated act justified by the circumstances at that time. At any rate, Arnado started to use his Philippine passport in his travels abroad
beginning December 11, 2009 and thenceforth. This, according to J. Leonen, is borne out by Arnado's Philippine passport.

With due respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving an issue that had already been settled with finality in
the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado's argument in this case-that he is
qualified to run for mayor as he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections- is premised only on the
alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in
2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja,54 it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over issues neither raised in the
pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. They cannot render judgment based on issues that have never been raised before
them. Equally settled is the rule that "points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not be, and
ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process
underlie this rule."55 The same goes true with J. Brion's theory that what was cancelled by virtue of Maquiling was only the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation where Arnado expressly renounced any foreign citizenship; not the July 10, 2008 Oath of Allegiance which carried with it an implied
abdication of foreign citizenship. For J. Brion, "[t]he requirement of an express renunciation x x x does not negate the effect of, or make any less real, the
prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the oath of allegiance." Again, this was never raised in this petition. At any rate,
the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by Section 356 of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public
office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or
at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of Section 5(2) are not useless or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires
an explicit renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado's 2008 implied renunciation is sufficient, the same
has also been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009, following the ruling in Maquiling.

Otherwise, we would give more weight to an implied renunciation than to an express one specifically required by law.

Besides, the Decision of this Court in Maquiling holding that Arnado's use of his US passport effectively recanted his Affidavit of Renunciation has
already become final and immutable. We can no longer resurrect in this case the issues that have already been resolved there with fmality.

In maintaining that Arnado used his Philippine passport in travelling abroad in the first quarter of 2010, J. Leonen relies on the copy thereof attached to
the rollo of the Maquiling case. But said copy of Arnado's Philippine passport57 is a mere "CERTIFIED TRUE COPY FROM THE MACIDNE COPY ON
FILE" as attested to by Rosario P. Palacio, Records Officer Ill of the Comelec. 58 This is clearly stamped on aforesaid copy of Arnado's Philippine
passport. A machine copy or photocopy is a mere secondary evidence.59 As such, it cannot be admitted in evidence until and unless the offeror has
proven the due execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the original. 60 In this case, however, Arnado's Philippine passport is not missing.
Thus, said photocopy of Arnado's Philippine passport cannot sway us to depart from the uncontroverted certification of the Bureau ofimmigration that
Arnado used his US passport on January 12, 2010 and March 23, 2010. Consequently, even assuming that the recently discovered November 30, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance is true and authentic, Arnado once more performed positive acts on January 12, 2010 and March 23,
2010, which effectively negated the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit resulting in his disqualification to run for an elective public office.

Landslide election victory cannot

override eligibility requirements.

In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide
majority during the 2013 elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same "cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications."61 In Velasco v. Comelec,62 this Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass
election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the
Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular
vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39, 63a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy when it
comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 4064 of the same law. After all, "[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the
requirements for election to local public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that disqualify
local candidates."65cralawrednad
Finally, this case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec.66 In that case, petitioner Lopez was also a natural-born Filipino who lost his
Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez
filed his candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on
October 29, 2007 without first making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections,
this Court still affmned the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a local elective position for his failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225. Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the
defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.67

In fine, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc in sustaining the Resolution of the Comelec Second Division
disqualifying Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections and in accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte and proclaiming Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by
this Court is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

THE CASE

This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44
of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent
Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a U.S.
passport.

FACTS

Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of
America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. 4 On the same day an Order of
Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor.5

The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.6

On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which
states:

I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 7

On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:

I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.

I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.

I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal
orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.

I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 8

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. 9

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification
issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado
has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April
2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.

Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears
in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel records:

DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 057782700

DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010

NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

PASSPORT : 05778270012

On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three
(3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte.

Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following documents as evidence: 14

1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April 2009;

2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado,
attesting that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s
ancestral house in Kauswagan;

3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide
resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;

4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado,
Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and

5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03
April 2009.

THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION

Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, 15 the COMELEC First Division
considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
residency requirement under the Local Government Code."17

In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.

xxxx

Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s
unexplained use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship. As noted by
the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or
sojourn in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US
nationals.19

The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC

First Division reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby
GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect. 20

The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention

Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution
and that the said Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following contentions:22

1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of
Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;

2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;

3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine
passport after he obtained it;

4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one
for disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23

5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the case; and

7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in
the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s
Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section
44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and the
nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the
winner.

Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by
Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost
the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.

RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."

As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification
even after elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44
of the Local Government Code to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well
within the period prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.

However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the
following premises:

First:

By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a
citizen of another country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.

xxxx

The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More
succinctly, the use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In
Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after
taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of citizens who are
not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose
greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US
passport after his renunciation. Thus the mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.

xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only
issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about three (3)
months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad.
This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on the following
dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US
passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken,
the respondent used whatever is within his control during that time.25

In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for
under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.

"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person
becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he
voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to
have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly,
all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26

On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:

Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his
US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his
declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements was obviously only for the
purpose of complying with the requirements for running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself
is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to
serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the
qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.

Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of votes does not validate his election.
It has been held that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him after
election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox
populi suprema est lex because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is
to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
enacted the law.27

THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US
passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his
continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the
review of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."

There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the
first.

The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.

The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.

A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s
qualifications to run for public office.

The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case.

OUR RULING

Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution
before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered stray and the
second-placer should be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification,
the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.

The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Mercado v. Manzano28

clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:

That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with
the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. 29

Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that
the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the
outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.

Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one
to run for an elective position.

Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:

Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
 xxxx

(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31

Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship.
There is no question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate
General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship.
Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen.

After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.

By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country.32

However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs
positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.33

Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions
for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of
entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport
and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against anyone who, in
electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another
country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of
Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" 37 and that he "divest(s)
himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America." 38

We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen.
Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a
disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct
from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of
candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take
not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for
public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and
American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he
first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.

This Court has previously ruled that:

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x. 41

The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.

We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his
"Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office
pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow
a person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.

Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June
2009, as a result of which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later. 43

The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for
the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less
of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this
country.

The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the
same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his
Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November 2009.

Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his
certificate of candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his
subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.

Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens.
It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of
the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.

We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he
took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.

We now resolve the next issue.

Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-
recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the winner in the elections.

The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe
Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045 having intervened. 46

Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year
interruption.

The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled
to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."

The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, thus:

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that
produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that some
other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which
case the court issues its mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of holding the election
and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no
question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result
can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to
the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier
statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."

The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case
based on the eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the
contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been legally elected president of the
municipality of Imus at the general election held in that town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to
be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that
no one was elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49

On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the
Court comparing one process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.

Let us examine the statement:

"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."

What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter
established, what stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing
upon him that "wreath?"

An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a
candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified
candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to
his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of
failure to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.

The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires
certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those
qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest
number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule
otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off
our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.

This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and
employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.

The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.51 (Emphasis supplied)

This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be
interpreted without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53

We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be
disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of candidacy
are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
elections will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v.
COMELEC:

The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and
unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For one,
such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with
the basic information to make an informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.

The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local
government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section 78
may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition
useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
(Citations omitted)

What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to
delay any disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?

It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the
sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to
matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1

Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.

With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates.

We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.

Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election.

Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of
an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates
form part of that voice and must also be respected.

As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as
players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not
possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s
disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence
of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a
qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-
placer among the qualified candidates.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a
substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his
disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.

The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as
provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he
filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar
against the individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have
produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer
to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., G.R. No. 166006

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
FERTIPHIL CORPORATION,
Respondent. March 14, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

THE Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees

and other issuances. The Constitution vests that power not only in the Supreme Court but in all Regional Trial Courts.

The principle is relevant in this petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification that of

the RTC in Makati City,[2] finding petitioner Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) liable to private respondent Fertiphil Corporation (Fertiphil) for the levies it paid

under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465.

The Facts

Petitioner PPI and private respondent Fertiphil are private corporations incorporated under Philippine laws.[3] They are both engaged in the

importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and agricultural chemicals.

On June 3, 1985, then President Ferdinand Marcos, exercising his legislative powers, issued LOI No. 1465 which provided, among others, for

the imposition of a capital recovery component (CRC) on the domestic sale of all grades of fertilizers in the Philippines.[4] The LOI provides:

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of
not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such
capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.[5] (Underscoring supplied)

Pursuant to the LOI, Fertiphil paid P10 for every bag of fertilizer it sold in the domestic market to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority

(FPA). FPA then remitted the amount collected to the Far East Bank and Trust Company, the depositary bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA

from July 8, 1985 to January 24, 1986.[6]

After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. With the return of democracy, Fertiphil demanded

from PPI a refund of the amounts it paid under LOI No. 1465, but PPI refused to accede to the demand. [7]

Fertiphil filed a complaint for collection and damages [8] against FPA and PPI with the RTC in Makati. It questioned the constitutionality of LOI

No. 1465 for being unjust, unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition that amounted to a denial of due process of law.[9] Fertiphil

alleged that the LOI solely favored PPI, a privately owned corporation, which used the proceeds to maintain its monopoly of the fertilizer industry.

In its Answer,[10] FPA, through the Solicitor General, countered that the issuance of LOI No. 1465 was a valid exercise of the police power of

the State in ensuring the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. It also averred that Fertiphil did not sustain any damage from the LOI because

the burden imposed by the levy fell on the ultimate consumer, not the seller.

RTC Disposition

On November 20, 1991, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Fertiphil, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant Planters Product, Inc., ordering the latter to pay the former:

1) the sum of P6,698,144.00 with interest at 12% from the time of judicial demand;
2) the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees;
3) the cost of suit.
 SO ORDERED.[11]

Ruling that the imposition of the P10 CRC was an exercise of the States inherent power of taxation, the RTC invalidated the levy for violating the basic

principle that taxes can only be levied for public purpose, viz.:

It is apparent that the imposition of P10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country by LOI 1465 is purportedly in the exercise of
the power of taxation. It is a settled principle that the power of taxation by the state is plenary. Comprehensive and supreme, the
principal check upon its abuse resting in the responsibility of the members of the legislature to their constituents. However, there are
two kinds of limitations on the power of taxation: the inherent limitations and the constitutional limitations.

One of the inherent limitations is that a tax may be levied only for public purposes:

The power to tax can be resorted to only for a constitutionally valid public purpose. By the same token, taxes
may not be levied for purely private purposes, for building up of private fortunes, or for the redress of private
wrongs. They cannot be levied for the improvement of private property, or for the benefit, and promotion of
private enterprises, except where the aid is incident to the public benefit. It is well-settled principle of
constitutional law that no general tax can be levied except for the purpose of raising money which is to be
expended for public use. Funds cannot be exacted under the guise of taxation to promote a purpose that is not
of public interest. Without such limitation, the power to tax could be exercised or employed as an authority to
destroy the economy of the people. A tax, however, is not held void on the ground of want of public interest
unless the want of such interest is clear. (71 Am. Jur. pp. 371-372)

In the case at bar, the plaintiff paid the amount of P6,698,144.00 to the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority pursuant to the P10 per
bag of fertilizer sold imposition under LOI 1465 which, in turn, remitted the amount to the defendant Planters Products, Inc. thru the
latters depository bank, Far East Bank and Trust Co. Thus, by virtue of LOI 1465 the plaintiff, Fertiphil Corporation, which is a
private domestic corporation, became poorer by the amount of P6,698,144.00 and the defendant, Planters Product, Inc., another
private domestic corporation, became richer by the amount of P6,698,144.00.

Tested by the standards of constitutionality as set forth in the afore-quoted jurisprudence, it is quite evident that LOI 1465 insofar as
it imposes the amount of P10 per fertilizer bag sold in the country and orders that the said amount should go to the defendant
Planters Product, Inc. is unlawful because it violates the mandate that a tax can be levied only for a public purpose and not to
benefit, aid and promote a private enterprise such as Planters Product, Inc. [12]

PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[13] PPI then filed a notice of appeal with the RTC but it failed to pay the requisite appeal docket

fee. In a separate but related proceeding, this Court[14] allowed the appeal of PPI and remanded the case to the CA for proper disposition.

CA Decision

On November 28, 2003, the CA handed down its decision affirming with modification that of the RTC, with the following fallo:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to
the MODIFICATION that the award of attorneys fees is hereby DELETED.[15]

In affirming the RTC decision, the CA ruled that the lis mota of the complaint for collection was the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465, thus:

The question then is whether it was proper for the trial court to exercise its power to judicially determine the constitutionality of the
subject statute in the instant case.

As a rule, where the controversy can be settled on other grounds, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law (Lim v.
Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 [1995]). The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts
of political departments are valid, absent a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.

However, the courts are not precluded from exercising such power when the following requisites are obtaining in a controversy
before it: First, there must be before the court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question must be
ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity; and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 [2000]).
 Indisputably, the present case was primarily instituted for collection and damages. However, a perusal of the complaint also reveals
that the instant action is founded on the claim that the levy imposed was an unlawful and unconstitutional special
assessment. Consequently, the requisite that the constitutionality of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is present,
making it proper for the trial court to rule on the constitutionality of LOI 1465.[16]

The CA held that even on the assumption that LOI No. 1465 was issued under the police power of the state, it is still unconstitutional because it did not

promote public welfare. The CA explained:

In declaring LOI 1465 unconstitutional, the trial court held that the levy imposed under the said law was an invalid exercise
of the States power of taxation inasmuch as it violated the inherent and constitutional prescription that taxes be levied only for public
purposes. It reasoned out that the amount collected under the levy was remitted to the depository bank of PPI, which the latter used
to advance its private interest.

On the other hand, appellant submits that the subject statutes passage was a valid exercise of police power. In addition, it disputes
the court a quos findings arguing that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated (PFI),
a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PPI.

Of the three fundamental powers of the State, the exercise of police power has been characterized as the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It may be exercised as long as the activity or the
property sought to be regulated has some relevance to public welfare (Constitutional Law, by Isagani A. Cruz, p. 38, 1995 Edition).

Vast as the power is, however, it must be exercised within the limits set by the Constitution, which requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. Thus, our courts have laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure as follows:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals (National
Development Company v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192 SCRA 257 [1990]).

It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial courts holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be sure, ensuring the
continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public interest. However, the method by
which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public welfare. The governments
commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt
to mask the subject statutes impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity,
like PPI, as identical with the general interest of the countrys farmers or even the Filipino people in general. Well to stress,
substantive due process exacts fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed. When a statutes public
purpose is spoiled by private interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for being an arbitrary
exercise of government power. To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes
cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private individuals.[17]

The CA did not accept PPIs claim that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Inc., a foundation created to

hold in trust the stock ownership of PPI. The CA stated:

Appellant next claims that the collections under LOI 1465 was for the benefit of Planters Foundation, Incorporated (PFI), a
foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of farmers, the stock ownership of PFI on the strength of Letter of Undertaking
(LOU) issued by then Prime Minister Cesar Virata on April 18, 1985 and affirmed by the Secretary of Justice in an Opinion
dated October 12, 1987, to wit:

2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer
pricing formula a capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of
funding the unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters
Foundation, Inc. (Planters Foundation), which unpaid capital is estimated at approximately P206 million (subject
to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) (such unpaid portion of the outstanding capital stock of
Planters being hereafter referred to as the Unpaid Capital), and subsequently for such capital increases as may
be required for the continuing viability of Planters.

The capital recovery component shall be in the minimum amount of P10 per bag, which will be added to the
price of all domestic sales of fertilizer in the Philippines by any importer and/or fertilizer mother company. In this
connection, the Republic hereby acknowledges that the advances by Planters to Planters Foundation which
were applied to the payment of the Planters shares now held in trust by Planters Foundation, have been
assigned to, among others, the Creditors. Accordingly, the Republic, through FPA, hereby agrees to deposit the
proceeds of the capital recovery component in the special trust account designated in the notice dated April 2,
1985, addressed by counsel for the Creditors to Planters Foundation. Such proceeds shall be deposited by FPA
on or before the 15th day of each month.

The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the
Unpaid Capital and/or (b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost
accruing from the date hereof on the amounts which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital
and/or the Subsidy Receivables and (d) the capital increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the
 purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the carrying cost shall be at such rate as will represent the full and
reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currency-
denominated obligations. (Records, pp. 42-43)

Appellants proposition is open to question, to say the least. The LOU issued by then Prime Minister Virata taken together with the
Justice Secretarys Opinion does not preponderantly demonstrate that the collections made were held in trust in favor of millions of
farmers. Unfortunately for appellant, in the absence of sufficient evidence to establish its claims, this Court is constrained to rely on
what is explicitly provided in LOI 1465 that one of the primary aims in imposing the levy is to support the successful rehabilitation
and continued viability of PPI.[18]

PPI moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.[19] It then filed the present petition with this Court.

Issues

Petitioner PPI raises four issues for Our consideration, viz.:

I
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465 CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED AND BE DECREED VIA A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT IN A CASE FILED FOR COLLECTION AND DAMAGES WHERE THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY IS NOT THE
VERY LIS MOTA OF THE CASE. NEITHER CAN LOI 1465 BE CHALLENGED BY ANY PERSON OR ENTITY WHICH HAS NO
STANDING TO DO SO.

II
LOI 1465, BEING A LAW IMPLEMENTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASSURING THE FERTILIZER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION
IN THE COUNTRY, AND FOR BENEFITING A FOUNDATION CREATED BY LAW TO HOLD IN TRUST FOR MILLIONS OF
FARMERS THEIR STOCK OWNERSHIP IN PPI CONSTITUTES A VALID LEGISLATION PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF
TAXATION AND POLICE POWER FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES.

III
THE AMOUNT COLLECTED UNDER THE CAPITAL RECOVERY COMPONENT WAS REMITTED TO THE
GOVERNMENT, AND BECAME GOVERNMENT FUNDS PURSUANT TO AN EFFECTIVE AND VALIDLY ENACTED LAW WHICH
IMPOSED DUTIES AND CONFERRED RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF OPERATIVE FACT PRIOR TO ANY
DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOI 1465.

IV
THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST VEXATION (SHOULD BE ENRICHMENT) FINDS NO APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT
CASE.[20] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

We shall first tackle the procedural issues of locus standi and the jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues.

Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a
mere procedural technicality which may be waived.

PPI argues that Fertiphil has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 because it does not have a personal and

substantial interest in the case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. [21] It asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from

the CRC imposition because incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the farmers themselves, not on the seller fertilizer company.[22]

We cannot agree. The doctrine of locus standi or the right of appearance in a court of justice has been adequately discussed by this Court in a

catena of cases. Succinctly put, the doctrine requires a litigant to have a material interest in the outcome of a case. In private suits, locus standi requires

a litigant to be a real party in interest, which is defined as the

[23]
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
 In public suits, this Court recognizes the difficulty of applying the doctrine especially when plaintiff asserts a public right on behalf of the

general public because of conflicting public policy issues. [24] On one end, there is the right of the ordinary citizen to petition the courts to be freed from

unlawful government intrusion and illegal official action. At the other end, there is the public policy precluding excessive judicial interference in official

acts, which may unnecessarily hinder the delivery of basic public services.

In this jurisdiction, We have adopted the direct injury test to determine locus standi in public suits. In People v. Vera,[25] it was held that

a person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct

injury as a result. The direct injury test in public suits is similar to the real party in interest rule for private suits under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules

of Civil Procedure.[26]

Recognizing that a strict application of the direct injury test may hamper public interest, this Court relaxed the requirement in cases of

transcendental importance or with far reaching implications. Being a mere procedural technicality, it has also been held that locus standi may be waived

in the public interest.[27]

Whether or not the complaint for collection is characterized as a private or public suit, Fertiphil has locus standi to file it. Fertiphil suffered a

direct injury from the enforcement of LOI No. 1465. It was required, and it did pay, the P10 levy imposed for every bag of fertilizer sold on the domestic

market. It may be true that Fertiphil has passed some or all of the levy to the ultimate consumer, but that does not disqualify it from attacking the

constitutionality of the LOI or from seeking a refund. As seller, it bore the ultimate burden of paying the levy. It faced the possibility of severe sanctions

for failure to pay the levy. The fact of payment is sufficient injury to Fertiphil.

Moreover, Fertiphil suffered harm from the enforcement of the LOI because it was compelled to factor in its product the levy. The levy certainly

rendered the fertilizer products of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers much more expensive. The harm to their business consists not only in fewer clients

because of the increased price, but also in adopting alternative corporate strategies to meet the demands of LOI No. 1465. Fertiphil and other fertilizer

sellers may have shouldered all or part of the levy just to be competitive in the market. The harm occasioned on the business of Fertiphil is sufficient

injury for purposes of locus standi.

Even assuming arguendo that there is no direct injury, We find that the liberal policy consistently adopted by this Court on locus standi must

apply. The issues raised by Fertiphil are of paramount public importance. It involves not only the constitutionality of a tax law but, more importantly, the

use of taxes for public purpose. Former President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465 with the intention of rehabilitating an ailing private company. This is clear

from the text of the LOI. PPI is expressly named in the LOI as the direct beneficiary of the levy. Worse, the levy was made dependent and conditional

upon PPI becoming financially viable. The LOI provided that the capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable.

The constitutionality of the levy is already in doubt on a plain reading of the statute. It is Our constitutional duty to squarely resolve the issue as the final

arbiter of all justiciable controversies. The doctrine of standing, being a mere procedural technicality, should be waived, if at all, to adequately thresh out

an important constitutional issue.

RTC may resolve constitutional issues; the constitutional issue was adequately
raised in the complaint; it is the lis mota of the case.

PPI insists that the RTC and the CA erred in ruling on the constitutionality of the LOI. It asserts that the constitutionality of the LOI cannot be

collaterally attacked in a complaint for collection.[28] Alternatively, the resolution of the constitutional issue is not necessary for a determination of the

complaint for collection.[29]

Fertiphil counters that the constitutionality of the LOI was adequately pleaded in its complaint. It claims that the constitutionality of LOI No.

1465 is the very lis mota of the case because the trial court cannot determine its claim without resolving the issue. [30]

It is settled that the RTC has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, presidential decree or an executive order. This is clear

from Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Underscoring supplied)

In Mirasol v. Court of Appeals,[31] this Court recognized the power of the RTC to resolve constitutional issues, thus:

On the first issue. It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.[32]

In the recent case of Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department of Foreign Affairs,[33] this Court reiterated:

There is no denying that regular courts have jurisdiction over cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by administrative agencies.Such jurisdiction, however, is not limited to the Court of Appeals or to this Court alone
for even the regional trial courts can take cognizance of actions assailing a specific rule or set of rules promulgated by administrative
bodies. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts.[34]

Judicial review of official acts on the ground of unconstitutionality may be sought or availed of through any of the actions cognizable by courts

of justice, not necessarily in a suit for declaratory relief. Such review may be had in criminal actions, as in People v. Ferrer[35] involving the

constitutionality of the now defunct Anti-Subversion law, or in ordinary actions, as in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds[36] involving the constitutionality of

laws prohibiting aliens from acquiring public lands. The constitutional issue, however, (a) must be properly raised and presented in the case, and (b) its

resolution is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.[37]

Contrary to PPIs claim, the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 was properly and adequately raised in the complaint for collection filed with

the RTC. The pertinent portions of the complaint allege:

 6. The CRC of P10 per bag levied under LOI 1465 on domestic sales of all grades of fertilizer in the Philippines,
is unlawful, unjust, uncalled for, unreasonable, inequitable and oppressive because:
xxxx

(c) It favors only one private domestic corporation, i.e., defendant PPPI, and imposed at the expense
and disadvantage of the other fertilizer importers/distributors who were themselves in tight business situation
and were then exerting all efforts and maximizing management and marketing skills to remain viable;

xxxx

(e) It was a glaring example of crony capitalism, a forced program through which the PPI, having
been presumptuously masqueraded as the fertilizer industry itself, was the sole and anointed beneficiary;

7. The CRC was an unlawful; and unconstitutional special assessment and its imposition is tantamount to illegal exaction
amounting to a denial of due process since the persons of entities which had to bear the burden of paying the CRC derived no
benefit therefrom; that on the contrary it was used by PPI in trying to regain its former despicable monopoly of the fertilizer industry
to the detriment of other distributors and importers.[38] (Underscoring supplied)

The constitutionality of LOI No. 1465 is also the very lis mota of the complaint for collection. Fertiphil filed the complaint to compel PPI to

refund the levies paid under the statute on the ground that the law imposing the levy is unconstitutional. The thesis is that an unconstitutional law is

void. It has no legal effect. Being void, Fertiphil had no legal obligation to pay the levy. Necessarily, all levies duly paid pursuant to an unconstitutional

law should be refunded under the civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The refund is a mere consequence of the law being declared

unconstitutional. The RTC surely cannot order PPI to refund Fertiphil if it does not declare the LOI unconstitutional. It is the unconstitutionality of the LOI

which triggers the refund. The issue of constitutionality is the very lis mota of the complaint with the RTC.

The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is an exercise of the power of taxation.

At any rate, the Court holds that the RTC and the CA did not err in ruling against the constitutionality of the LOI.

PPI insists that LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise either of the police power or the power of taxation. It claims that the LOI was implemented for

the purpose of assuring the fertilizer supply and distribution in the country and for benefiting a foundation created by law to hold in trust for millions of

farmers their stock ownership in PPI.

Fertiphil counters that the LOI is unconstitutional because it was enacted to give benefit to a private company. The levy was imposed to pay

the corporate debt of PPI. Fertiphil also argues that, even if the LOI is enacted under the police power, it is still unconstitutional because it did not

promote the general welfare of the people or public interest.

Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police

power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, [39] while

the power of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the regulation of a behavior or

conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The lawful subjects and lawful means tests are used to determine the validity of a law enacted under the

police power.[40] The power of taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.

We agree with the RTC that the imposition of the levy was an exercise by the State of its taxation power. While it is true that the power of

taxation can be used as an implement of police power, [41] the primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if

revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. [42]
 In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Edu,[43] it was held that the imposition of a vehicle registration fee is not an exercise by the State of its police

power, but of its taxation power, thus:

It is clear from the provisions of Section 73 of Commonwealth Act 123 and Section 61 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code that the legislative intent and purpose behind the law requiring owners of vehicles to pay for their registration is mainly
to raise funds for the construction and maintenance of highways and to a much lesser degree, pay for the operating expenses of the
administering agency. x x x Fees may be properly regarded as taxes even though they also serve as an instrument of regulation.

Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). If the purpose is primarily
revenue, or if revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax. Such is the
case of motor vehicle registration fees. The same provision appears as Section 59(b) in the Land Transportation Code. It is patent
therefrom that the legislators had in mind a regulatory tax as the law refers to the imposition on the registration, operation or
ownership of a motor vehicle as a tax or fee. x x x Simply put, if the exaction under Rep. Act 4136 were merely a regulatory fee, the
imposition in Rep. Act 5448 need not be an additional tax. Rep. Act 4136 also speaks of other fees such as the special permit fees
for certain types of motor vehicles (Sec. 10) and additional fees for change of registration (Sec. 11). These are not to be understood
as taxes because such fees are very minimal to be revenue-raising. Thus, they are not mentioned by Sec. 59(b) of the Code as
taxes like the motor vehicle registration fee and chauffeurs license fee. Such fees are to go into the expenditures of the Land
Transportation Commission as provided for in the last proviso of Sec. 61. [44] (Underscoring supplied)

The P10 levy under LOI No. 1465 is too excessive to serve a mere regulatory purpose. The levy, no doubt, was a big burden on the seller or

the ultimate consumer. It increased the price of a bag of fertilizer by as much as five percent. [45] A plain reading of the LOI also supports the conclusion

that the levy was for revenue generation. The LOI expressly provided that the levy was imposed until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable.

Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. The P10 levy is unconstitutional
because it was not for a public purpose. The levy was imposed to give undue benefit
to PPI.

An inherent limitation on the power of taxation is public purpose. Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. They cannot be used for purely

private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. [46] The reason for this is simple. The power to tax exists for the general welfare; hence,

implicit in its power is the limitation that it should be used only for a public purpose. It would be a robbery for the State to tax its citizens and use the

funds generated for a private purpose. As an old United States case bluntly put it: To lay with one hand, the power of the government on the property of

the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is nonetheless a robbery

because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation.[47]

The term public purpose is not defined. It is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. Jurisprudence states that public

purpose should be given a broad interpretation. It does not only pertain to those purposes which are traditionally viewed as essentially government

functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public

money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform.

While the categories of what may constitute a public purpose are continually expanding in light of the expansion of government functions, the

inherent requirement that taxes can only be exacted for a public purpose still stands. Public purpose is the heart of a tax law. When a tax law is only a

mask to exact funds from the public when its true intent is to give undue benefit and advantage to a private enterprise, that law will not satisfy the

requirement of public purpose.

The purpose of a law is evident from its text or inferable from other secondary sources. Here, We agree with the RTC and that CA that the levy

imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose.
 First, the LOI expressly provided that the levy be imposed to benefit PPI, a private company. The purpose is explicit from Clause 3 of the law,

thus:

3. The Administrator of the Fertilizer Pesticide Authority to include in its fertilizer pricing formula a capital contribution component of
not less than P10 per bag. This capital contribution shall be collected until adequate capital is raised to make PPI viable. Such
capital contribution shall be applied by FPA to all domestic sales of fertilizers in the Philippines.[48] (Underscoring supplied)

It is a basic rule of statutory construction that the text of a statute should be given a literal meaning. In this case, the text of the LOI is plain that

the levy was imposed in order to raise capital for PPI. The framers of the LOI did not even hide the insidious purpose of the law. They were cavalier

enough to name PPI as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes levied under the LOI. We find it utterly repulsive that a tax law would expressly name a

private company as the ultimate beneficiary of the taxes to be levied from the public. This is a clear case of crony capitalism.

Second, the LOI provides that the imposition of the P10 levy was conditional and dependent upon PPI becoming financially viable. This

suggests that the levy was actually imposed to benefit PPI. The LOI notably does not fix a maximum amount when PPI is deemed financially

viable. Worse, the liability of Fertiphil and other domestic sellers of fertilizer to pay the levy is made indefinite. They are required to continuously pay the

levy until adequate capital is raised for PPI.

Third, the RTC and the CA held that the levies paid under the LOI were directly remitted and deposited by FPA to Far East Bank and Trust

Company, the depositary bank of PPI.[49] This proves that PPI benefited from the LOI. It is also proves that the main purpose of the law was to give

undue benefit and advantage to PPI.

Fourth, the levy was used to pay the corporate debts of PPI. A reading of the Letter of Understanding[50] dated May 18, 1985 signed by then

Prime Minister Cesar Virata reveals that PPI was in deep financial problem because of its huge corporate debts. There were pending petitions for

rehabilitation against PPI before the Securities and Exchange Commission. The government guaranteed payment of PPIs debts to its foreign

creditors. To fund the payment, President Marcos issued LOI No. 1465. The pertinent portions of the letter of understanding read:

Republic of the Philippines

Office of the Prime Minister
Manila

LETTER OF UNDERTAKING

May 18, 1985

TO: THE BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

LISTED IN ANNEX A HERETO WHICH ARE
CREDITORS (COLLECTIVELY, THE CREDITORS)
OF PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC. (PLANTERS)

Gentlemen:

This has reference to Planters which is the principal importer and distributor of fertilizer, pesticides and agricultural chemicals in the
Philippines. As regards Planters, the Philippine Government confirms its awareness of the following: (1) that Planters has
outstanding obligations in foreign currency and/or pesos, to the Creditors, (2) that Planters is currently experiencing financial
difficulties, and (3) that there are presently pending with the Securities and Exchange Commission of the Philippines a petition filed
at Planters own behest for the suspension of payment of all its obligations, and a separate petition filed by Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company, Manila Offshore Branch for the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver for Planters.

In connection with the foregoing, the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) confirms that it considers and continues to consider
Planters as a major fertilizer distributor. Accordingly, for and in consideration of your expressed willingness to consider and
participate in the effort to rehabilitate Planters, the Republic hereby manifests its full and unqualified support of the successful
 rehabilitation and continuing viability of Planters, and to that end, hereby binds and obligates itself to the creditors and Planters, as
follows:

xxxx

2. Upon the effective date of this Letter of Undertaking, the Republic shall cause FPA to include in its fertilizer pricing
formula a capital recovery component, the proceeds of which will be used initially for the purpose of funding the unpaid portion of the
outstanding capital stock of Planters presently held in trust by Planters Foundation, Inc. (Planters Foundation), which unpaid capital
is estimated at approximately P206 million (subject to validation by Planters and Planters Foundation) such unpaid portion of the
outstanding capital stock of Planters being hereafter referred to as the Unpaid Capital), and subsequently for such capital increases
as may be required for the continuing viability of Planters.

xxxx

The capital recovery component shall continue to be charged and collected until payment in full of (a) the Unpaid Capital
and/or (b) any shortfall in the payment of the Subsidy Receivables, (c) any carrying cost accruing from the date hereof on the
amounts which may be outstanding from time to time of the Unpaid Capital and/or the Subsidy Receivables, and (d) the capital
increases contemplated in paragraph 2 hereof. For the purpose of the foregoing clause (c), the carrying cost shall be at such rate as
will represent the full and reasonable cost to Planters of servicing its debts, taking into account both its peso and foreign currency-
denominated obligations.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

By:
(signed)
CESAR E. A. VIRATA
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance[51]

It is clear from the Letter of Understanding that the levy was imposed precisely to pay the corporate debts of PPI. We cannot agree with PPI

that the levy was imposed to ensure the stability of the fertilizer industry in the country. The letter of understanding and the plain text of the LOI clearly

indicate that the levy was exacted for the benefit of a private corporation.

All told, the RTC and the CA did not err in holding that the levy imposed under LOI No. 1465 was not for a public purpose. LOI No. 1465 failed

to comply with the public purpose requirement for tax laws.

The LOI is still unconstitutional even if enacted under the police power; it did not
promote public interest.

Even if We consider LOI No. 1695 enacted under the police power of the State, it would still be invalid for failing to comply with the test of lawful subjects

and lawful means. Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of particular class,

requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals.[52]

For the same reasons as discussed, LOI No. 1695 is invalid because it did not promote public interest. The law was enacted to give undue advantage to

a private corporation. We quote with approval the CA ratiocination on this point, thus:

It is upon applying this established tests that We sustain the trial courts holding LOI 1465 unconstitutional. To be sure,
ensuring the continued supply and distribution of fertilizer in the country is an undertaking imbued with public interest. However, the
method by which LOI 1465 sought to achieve this is by no means a measure that will promote the public welfare. The governments
commitment to support the successful rehabilitation and continued viability of PPI, a private corporation, is an unmistakable attempt
to mask the subject statutes impartiality. There is no way to treat the self-interest of a favored entity, like PPI, as identical with the
general interest of the countrys farmers or even the Filipino people in general. Well to stress, substantive due process exacts
fairness and equal protection disallows distinction where none is needed. When a statutes public purpose is spoiled by private
interest, the use of police power becomes a travesty which must be struck down for being an arbitrary exercise of government
power. To rule in favor of appellant would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for
purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private individuals. (Underscoring supplied)

The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void; the doctrine of operative fact
is inapplicable.
 PPI also argues that Fertiphil cannot seek a refund even if LOI No. 1465 is declared unconstitutional. It banks on the doctrine of operative fact,

which provides that an unconstitutional law has an effect before being declared unconstitutional. PPI wants to retain the levies paid under LOI No. 1465

even if it is subsequently declared to be unconstitutional.

We cannot agree. It is settled that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal, unless it has been raised in the court a
[53]
quo. PPI did not raise the applicability of the doctrine of operative fact with the RTC and the CA. It cannot belatedly raise the issue with Us in order to

extricate itself from the dire effects of an unconstitutional law.

At any rate, We find the doctrine inapplicable. The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties

and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. [54] Being void, Fertiphil is not

required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general

rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.[55] It nullifies the effects of an

unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have

consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.[56]

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid

law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy [57] or would put in limbo

the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.[58]

Here, We do not find anything iniquitous in ordering PPI to refund the amounts paid by Fertiphil under LOI No. 1465. It unduly benefited from

the levy. It was proven during the trial that the levies paid were remitted and deposited to its bank account. Quite the reverse, it would be inequitable and

unjust not to order a refund. To do so would unjustly enrich PPI at the expense of Fertiphil. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that every

person who, through an act of performance by another comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground shall

return the same to him. We cannot allow PPI to profit from an unconstitutional law. Justice and equity dictate that PPI must refund the amounts paid by

Fertiphil.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated November 28, 2003 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and G.R. No. 159796
ENVIRONMENTALIST CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC.
(ECN), Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J.,
-versus- QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC), NATIONAL CARPIO,
POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT GROUP CORONA,
(PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES CARPIO MORALES,
GROUP (SPUG), and PANAYELECTRIC COMPANY INC. AZCUNA,
(PECO), TINGA,
Respondents. CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR. and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 17, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come before this Court in

this original action praying that Section 34 of Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA),

imposing the Universal Charge,[1] and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR)[2] which seeks to implement the said imposition, be declared

unconstitutional. Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or

temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.[3] The

assailed provision of law reads:

SECTION 34. Universal Charge. Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, a universal charge to be determined,
fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users for the following purposes:

(a) Payment for the stranded debts[4] in excess of the amount assumed by the National Government and stranded contract costs of
NPC[5] and as well as qualified stranded contract costs of distribution utilities resulting from the restructuring of the industry;

(b) Missionary electrification;[6]

(c) The equalization of the taxes and royalties applied to indigenous or renewable sources of energy vis--vis imported energy fuels;

(d) An environmental charge equivalent to one-fourth of one centavo per kilowatt-hour (P0.0025/kWh), which shall accrue to an
environmental fund to be used solely for watershed rehabilitation and management. Said fund shall be managed by NPC
under existing arrangements; and

(e) A charge to account for all forms of cross-subsidies for a period not exceeding three (3) years.

The universal charge shall be a non-bypassable charge which shall be passed on and collected from all end-users on a monthly
basis by the distribution utilities. Collections by the distribution utilities and the TRANSCO in any given month shall be remitted to
the PSALM Corp. on or before the fifteenth (15th) of the succeeding month, net of any amount due to the distribution utility. Any
end-user or self-generating entity not connected to a distribution utility shall remit its corresponding universal charge directly to the
TRANSCO. The PSALM Corp., as administrator of the fund, shall create a Special Trust Fund which shall be disbursed only for the
purposes specified herein in an open and transparent manner. All amount collected for the universal charge shall be distributed to
the respective beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided by the ERC.

The Facts

Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect.[7]

On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group[8] (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory

Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-

165.[9]

On May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge

for the Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special

Trust Fund (STF)managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and

Liabilities Management Group (PSALM)[10] for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas.[11]

On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order[12] in ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the

share of the NPC-SPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO)

and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis.

On June 26, 2003, the ERC rendered its Decision[13] (for ERC Case No. 2002-165) modifying its Order of December 20, 2002, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the provisional authority granted to petitioner National Power
Corporation-Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) in the Order dated December 20, 2002 is hereby modified to the effect
that an additional amount of P0.0205 per kilowatt-hour should be added to the P0.0168 per kilowatt-hour provisionally authorized by
the Commission in the said Order. Accordingly, a total amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour is hereby APPROVED for withdrawal
from the Special Trust Fund managed by PSALM as its share from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification (UC-ME)
effective on the following billing cycles:

(a) June 26-July 25, 2003 for National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO); and
(b) July 2003 for Distribution Utilities (Dus).

Relative thereto, TRANSCO and Dus are directed to collect the UC-ME in the amount of P0.0373 per kilowatt-hour and
remit the same to PSALM on or before the 15th day of the succeeding month.

In the meantime, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit, not later than April 30, 2004, a detailed report to include Audited
Financial Statements and physical status (percentage of completion) of the projects using the prescribed format.

Let copies of this Order be furnished petitioner NPC-SPUG and all distribution utilities (Dus).

SO ORDERED.

On August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the above-mentioned Decision, which

the ERC granted in its Order dated October 7, 2003, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner National Power Corporation-
Small Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 26, 2003 is hereby modified
accordingly.

Relative thereto, NPC-SPUG is directed to submit a quarterly report on the following:

1. Projects for CY 2002 undertaken;

2. Location
3. Actual amount utilized to complete the project;
4. Period of completion;
5. Start of Operation; and
6. Explanation of the reallocation of UC-ME funds, if any.
SO ORDERED.[15]

Meanwhile, on April 2, 2003, ERC decided ERC Case No. 2002-194, authorizing the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for its 2003

Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.[16]

On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all other

end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003.[17]

Hence, this original action.

Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following grounds:
 1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 of the IRR
of the said law is a tax which is to be collected from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The power to tax is
strictly a legislative function and as such, the delegation of said power to any executive or administrative agency like the ERC
is unconstitutional, giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to
be determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.

2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where the funds collected should be used.

3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
representation as the consumers were not given a chance to be heard and represented.[18]

Petitioners contend that the Universal Charge has the characteristics of a tax and is collected to fund the operations of the NPC. They argue

that the cases[19] invoked by the respondents clearly show the regulatory purpose of the charges imposed therein, which is not so in the case at bench.

In said cases, the respective funds[20] were created in order to balance and stabilize the prices of oil and sugar, and to act as buffer to counteract the

changes and adjustments in prices, peso devaluation, and other variables which cannot be adequately and timely monitored by the legislature. Thus,

there was a need to delegate powers to administrative bodies. [21] Petitioners posit that the Universal Charge is imposed not for a similar purpose.

On the other hand, respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) contends that unlike a tax which is imposed to

provide income for public purposes, such as support of the government, administration of the law, or payment of public expenses, the assailed Universal

Charge is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry. Thus, it is exacted by the State

in the exercise of its inherent police power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the

latter merely exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.[22]

Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC, and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), share the same view that the Universal

Charge is not a tax because it is levied for a specific regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the country's electric power industry, and is,

therefore, an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. Respondents further contend that said Universal Charge does not possess the

essential characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and that its rate is

uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability to pay. Moreover, respondents deny that

there is undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the EPIRA sets forth sufficient determinable standards which would guide the ERC in the

exercise of the powers granted to it. Lastly, respondents argue that the imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and confiscatory since it is

an exercise of the police power of the State and it complies with the requirements of due process. [23]

On its part, respondent PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental

Fund components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165. Otherwise,

PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA, which imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR. [25]

The Issues

The ultimate issues in the case at bar are:

1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax; and

2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC.[26]
 Before we discuss the issues, the Court shall first deal with an obvious procedural lapse.

Petitioners filed before us an original action particularly denominated as a Complaint assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of the EPIRA

imposing the Universal Charge and Rule 18 of the EPIRA's IRR. No doubt, petitioners have locus standi. They impugn the constitutionality of Sec. 34 of

the EPIRA because they sustained a direct injury as a result of the imposition of the Universal Charge as reflected in their electric bills.

However, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when they filed this Complaint directly with us. Furthermore, the Complaint is

bereft of any allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the ERC or any of the public respondents, in order for the Court to consider it as a

petition for certiorarior prohibition.

Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2) of the 1987 Constitution[27] categorically provides that:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

But this Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the

regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief. [28] It has

long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where

exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.[29] This circumstance

alone warrants the outright dismissal of the present action.

This procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we opt to resolve the constitutional issue raised herein. We are aware that if the constitutionality of

Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is not resolved now, the issue will certainly resurface in the near future, resulting in a repeat of this litigation, and probably

involving the same parties. In the public interest and to avoid unnecessary delay, this Court renders its ruling now.

The instant complaint is bereft of merit.

The First Issue

 To resolve the first issue, it is necessary to distinguish the States power of taxation from the police power.

The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is

to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it.[30] It is based on the principle that taxes

are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need.[31] Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power

to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.[32]

On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.[33] It is

the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin

maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not

to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of

instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. [34] We have held that the power to "regulate"

means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility

and of its patrons.[35]

The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue

is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is

incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.[36]

In exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. Such

can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed[37] and which can be amply discerned as

regulatory in character. The EPIRA resonates such regulatory purposes, thus:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State:

(a) To ensure and accelerate the total electrification of the country;

(b) To ensure the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power;
(c) To ensure transparent and reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair competition and full public accountability to
achieve greater operational and economic efficiency and enhance the competitiveness of Philippine products in the global
market;
(d) To enhance the inflow of private capital and broaden the ownership base of the power generation, transmission and distribution
sectors;
(e) To ensure fair and non-discriminatory treatment of public and private sector entities in the process of restructuring the electric
power industry;
(f) To protect the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities and other providers of electric power;
(g) To assure socially and environmentally compatible energy sources and infrastructure;
(h) To promote the utilization of indigenous and new and renewable energy resources in power generation in order to reduce
dependence on imported energy;
(i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC);
(j) To establish a strong and purely independent regulatory body and system to ensure consumer protection and enhance the
competitive operation of the electricity market; and
(k) To encourage the efficient use of energy and other modalities of demand side management.

From the aforementioned purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's

police power. Public welfare is surely promoted.

Moreover, it is a well-established doctrine that the taxing power may be used as an implement of police power. [38] In Valmonte v. Energy Regulatory

Board, et al.[39] and in Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,[40] this Court held that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) and the Sugar Stabilization Fund

(SSF) were exactions made in the exercise of the police power. The doctrine was reiterated in Osmea v. Orbos[41] with respect to the OPSF. Thus, we
disagree with petitioners that the instant case is different from the aforementioned cases. With the Universal Charge, a Special Trust Fund (STF) is also

created under the administration of PSALM.[42] The STF has some notable characteristics similar to the OPSF and the SSF, viz.:

1) In the implementation of stranded cost recovery, the ERC shall conduct a review to determine whether there is under-recovery
or over recovery and adjust (true-up) the level of the stranded cost recovery charge. In case of an over-recovery, the ERC shall
ensure that any excess amount shall be remitted to the STF. A separate account shall be created for these amounts which
shall be held in trust for any future claims of distribution utilities for stranded cost recovery. At the end of the stranded cost
recovery period, any remaining amount in this account shall be used to reduce the electricity rates to the end-users.[43]

2) With respect to the assailed Universal Charge, if the total amount collected for the same is greater than the actual availments
against it, the PSALM shall retain the balance within the STF to pay for periods where a shortfall occurs. [44]

3) Upon expiration of the term of PSALM, the administration of the STF shall be transferred to the DOF or any of the DOF
attached agencies as designated by the DOF Secretary. [45]

The OSG is in point when it asseverates:

Evidently, the establishment and maintenance of the Special Trust Fund, under the last paragraph of Section 34, R.A. No. 9136, is
well within the pervasive and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical and economic survival
and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign authority we designate as the police power of the State.[46]

This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily in pursuit of the State's police objectives.

The STF reasonably serves and assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the

viability of the country's electric power industry.

The Second Issue

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in

matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation

of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the

ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own

judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. [47]

In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an

exception to this principle.[48] Given the volume and variety of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will

deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies - the principal agencies

tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its

policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of

the law and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are

denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the

only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the

delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.[49]

The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions,

and that it contains sufficient standards.

Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and

approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end-users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as Universal Charge,

the amount nevertheless is made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the law itself. For one, Sec. 43(b)(ii) of the EPIRA provides:

SECTION 43. Functions of the ERC. The ERC shall promote competition, encourage market development, ensure customer choice
and penalize abuse of market power in the restructured electricity industry. In appropriate cases, the ERC is authorized to issue
cease and desist order after due notice and hearing. Towards this end, it shall be responsible for the following key functions in the
restructured industry:

xxxx

(b) Within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate and enforce, in accordance with law, a National Grid Code and a
Distribution Code which shall include, but not limited to the following:

xxxx

(ii) Financial capability standards for the generating companies, the TRANSCO, distribution utilities and suppliers: Provided, That
in the formulation of the financial capability standards, the nature and function of the entity shall be considered: Provided, further,
That such standards are set to ensure that the electric power industry participants meet the minimum financial standards to protect
the public interest. Determine, fix, and approve, after due notice and public hearings the universal charge, to be imposed on all
electricity end-users pursuant to Section 34 hereof;

Moreover, contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Sec.

51(d) and (e) of the EPIRA[50] clearly provides:

SECTION 51. Powers. The PSALM Corp. shall, in the performance of its functions and for the attainment of its objective, have the
following powers:

xxxx

(d) To calculate the amount of the stranded debts and stranded contract costs of NPC which shall form the basis for ERC in the
determination of the universal charge;

(e) To liquidate the NPC stranded contract costs, utilizing the proceeds from sales and other property contributed to it, including the
proceeds from the universal charge.

Thus, the law is complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.

As to the second test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "interest of law and order;" [51] "adequate and efficient

instruction;"[52] "public interest;"[53] "justice and equity;"[54] "public convenience and welfare;"[55] "simplicity, economy and efficiency;"[56]"standardization and

regulation of medical education;"[57] and "fair and equitable employment practices."[58] Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total

electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power [59] and watershed rehabilitation and

management[60] meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient

standards.

It may be noted that this is not the first time that the ERC's conferred powers were challenged. In Freedom from Debt Coalition v. Energy Regulatory

Commission,[61] the Court had occasion to say:

 In determining the extent of powers possessed by the ERC, the provisions of the EPIRA must not be read in separate parts. Rather,
the law must be read in its entirety, because a statute is passed as a whole, and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Its
meaning cannot to be extracted from any single part thereof but from a general consideration of the statute as a whole. Considering
the intent of Congress in enacting the EPIRA and reading the statute in its entirety, it is plain to see that the law has expanded the
jurisdiction of the regulatory body, the ERC in this case, to enable the latter to implement the reforms sought to be accomplished by
the EPIRA. When the legislators decided to broaden the jurisdiction of the ERC, they did not intend to abolish or reduce the powers
already conferred upon ERC's predecessors. To sustain the view that the ERC possesses only the powers and functions listed
under Section 43 of the EPIRA is to frustrate the objectives of the law.

In his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion[62] in the same case, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno described the immensity of

police power in relation to the delegation of powers to the ERC and its regulatory functions over electric power as a vital public utility, to wit:

Over the years, however, the range of police power was no longer limited to the preservation of public health, safety and
morals, which used to be the primary social interests in earlier times. Police power now requires the State to "assume an affirmative
duty to eliminate the excesses and injustices that are the concomitants of an unrestrained industrial economy." Police power is now
exerted "to further the public welfare a concept as vast as the good of society itself." Hence, "police power is but another name for
the governmental authority to further the welfare of society that is the basic end of all government." When police power is delegated
to administrative bodies with regulatory functions, its exercise should be given a wide latitude. Police power takes on an even
broader dimension in developing countries such as ours, where the State must take a more active role in balancing the many
conflicting interests in society. The Questioned Order was issued by the ERC, acting as an agent of the State in the exercise of
police power. We should have exceptionally good grounds to curtail its exercise. This approach is more compelling in the field of
rate-regulation of electric power rates. Electric power generation and distribution is a traditional instrument of economic growth that
affects not only a few but the entire nation. It is an important factor in encouraging investment and promoting business. The engines
of progress may come to a screeching halt if the delivery of electric power is impaired. Billions of pesos would be lost as a result of
power outages or unreliable electric power services. The State thru the ERC should be able to exercise its police power with great
flexibility, when the need arises.

This was reiterated in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Commission [63] where the Court held that the

ERC, as regulator, should have sufficient power to respond in real time to changes wrought by multifarious factors affecting public utilities.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users

is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or abandoned per

Resolution[64] of August 3, 2004.[65] Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which

essentially involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from reviewing the same.[66]

As a penultimate statement, it may be well to recall what this Court said of EPIRA:

One of the landmark pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in recent years is the EPIRA. It established a new policy, legal
structure and regulatory framework for the electric power industry. The new thrust is to tap private capital for the expansion and
improvement of the industry as the large government debt and the highly capital-intensive character of the industry itself have long
been acknowledged as the critical constraints to the program. To attract private investment, largely foreign, the jaded structure of
the industry had to be addressed. While the generation and transmission sectors were centralized and monopolistic, the distribution
side was fragmented with over 130 utilities, mostly small and uneconomic. The pervasive flaws have caused a low utilization of
existing generation capacity; extremely high and uncompetitive power rates; poor quality of service to consumers; dismal to
forgettable performance of the government power sector; high system losses; and an inability to develop a clear strategy for
overcoming these shortcomings.

Thus, the EPIRA provides a framework for the restructuring of the industry, including the privatization of the assets of the National
Power Corporation (NPC), the transition to a competitive structure, and the delineation of the roles of various government agencies
and the private entities. The law ordains the division of the industry into four (4) distinct
sectors, namely: generation, transmission, distribution and supply.
Corollarily, the NPC generating plants have to privatized and its transmission business spun off and privatized thereafter.[67]

Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the

Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. [68] Indubitably, petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the
EPIRA.We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and Rule 18 of its IRR are

unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.