G.R. No. 162059  Sec. 4.
Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu and known as a government
scholar.
 She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a
student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January
1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
 Petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. President Estrada gave
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.
However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.
 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa
U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of
Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
 On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found
probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
Serana for estafa.
 Petitioner moved to quash the information.
ISSUE:
1. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any
jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent.
2. Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast
to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity.
3. She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from
the coffers of the government.
HELD:
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan:
 The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over this case.
 It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses
covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly
pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their
office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public
official in relation to his office.
 Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in
representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall
under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the express
provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.
(Italics supplied)
 It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the
Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection
(g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of
their responsibilities and functions.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
 "A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law
or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer."
 Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade
27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is
likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
 In Geduspan v. People, We held that while the first part of Section
4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are
by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the
said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of
law.
 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the
Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar
to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By
express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
 Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public
officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over
the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.
 According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act
without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with
then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was
done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in
the information. More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an
answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of defendant or respondent.
 In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while
in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN
D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x."
(Underscoring supplied)
 Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on
this ground.
G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 In 1998, the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigation (Blue Ribbon) and on National Defense
and Security (collectively, Senate Blue Ribbon Committee)
carried out an extensive joint inquiry into the "coup rumors and
the alleged anomalies" in the Armed Forces of the Philippines-
Philippine Retirement Benefits Systems (AFP-RSBS). In its
Report, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee outlined, among
others, the anomalies in the acquisition of lots in Tanauan,
Batangas, Calamba, Laguna and Iloilo City by the AFP-RSBS,
and described the modus operandi of the perpetrators as follows:
 The modus operandi in the buying of the lots was to cover the
same transactions with two deeds of sale. One deed of sale would
be signed only by the seller or sellers (unilateral deed). Another
deed of sale would be signed by the seller or sellers and the
buyer, AFP-RSBS (bilateral deed). These Unilateral Deeds of
Sale recorded lower consideration paid by the System to the
buyer(s) than those stated in the Bilateral Deeds. The motivation
was obviously to evade payment of the correct taxes to the
government and save money for the seller(s), broker(s) and who
knows, probably even for the kickbacks going to certain officials
of RSBS, the buyer.
 Pursuant to the recommendation of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee to "prosecute and/or cause the prosecution of Gen.
Jose Ramiscal Jr. (Ret), past AFP-RSBS President, who had
signed the unregistered deeds of sale covering the acquisition of
certain parcels of land," Ombudsman Investigators conducted a
fact-finding investigation. They executed a Joint Affidavit-
Complaint, stating that based on their findings, B/Gen. Jose
Ramiscal, Jr., among others, may be charged with falsification of
public documents and violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019.
 Petitioner avers that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the crimes charged as provided in Section 4 of R.A. 8249. He
insists that the AFP-RSBS is not a government-owned or
controlled corporation and that he does not fall under Salary
Grade 27 as required in Section 4 of the law, inasmuch as his
position as AFP-RSBS President is not even included under the
Compensation and Classification Act of 1989. Petitioner cites the
ruling of this Court in Inding v. Sandiganbayan 31 to support his
claim
ISSUE:
WON the anti-graft court correctly ruled that it has jurisdiction over the
crimes charged.
HELD:
 In People v. Sandiganbayan 40 and Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a
government-owned and controlled corporation, and that its funds
are in the nature of public funds. Under Section 4(a)(1)(g) of R.A.
No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed by presidents, directors, trustees or
managers of government owned or controlled corporations.
 Under Section 4(b) of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes.
 As gleaned from the material averments of the Information in
Criminal Case No. 28023, the charge against petitioner is estafa
through falsification of public document in the performance of his
duties and in relation to his position as president of the AFP-
RSBS.
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
FACTS:
 The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this
Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air
Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded
by the Government, through the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a
certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of
the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation
of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who
was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having
supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile
(Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
 On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among others, herein
respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile,
he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance
of the resolution finding probable cause.
 Respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against
him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile,
the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired,
respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any
official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
HELD:
 It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no
longer any public officer with whom respondent can be charged
for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved
or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged.
 The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his
criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it
remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and
private respondent.
 Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean
that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
 Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for
his death, he should have been charged.
 The requirement before a private person may be indicted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such
private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with
a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public
officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the
public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted
alone.
 Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an
indictment for conspiracy. If two or more persons enter into a
conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the
agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and
they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything
said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or
furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said,
done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference
whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the
time of trial. The death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.
G.R. No. 154473 April 24, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 155573 April 24, 2009
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
FACTS:
 Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC, delivered
a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and
Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, UP-
Diliman Campus, Quezon City. The speech was subsequently
published in the issues of the Manila Bulletin.
 Petitioner corporation, filed, through its authorized representative,
an Affidavit-Complaint for libel believing that it was the one
alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that:
“ Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into
contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the
government that it offends common sense to say that it
would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.”
 Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent
questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City. Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an
Information for libel against the respondent with the RTC of
Quezon City.
 Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,
contending that Judge Salazar could not impartially preside over
the case because his appointment to the judiciary was made
possible through the recommendation of respondent's father-in-
law. Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered
consolidated with the other libel case pending with another RTC
Branch.
 While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his
part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the
trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted
before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he
can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman
that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
RTC issued the challenged Order dismissing the criminal case and
considering as moot and academic petitioner's motion to inhibit. While
the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer
because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that
the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that
the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office
—he delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair.
Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the
case to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, RTC adhered to its ruling that it was not
vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.
ISSUE:
WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE
HELD:
 The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their
pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of
respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the
conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately
determine which court—the RTC or the Sandiganbayan—has
jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however,
notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise.
 The foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court,
failed to identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction
over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is
shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said
courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it
would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is
committed in relation to office.
 Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the
court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at
the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.30 Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC),31 as amended by Republic Act No.
4363,32 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of
written defamations, thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now,
the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended
parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense xxx.33 [Underscoring and italics ours.]
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-
intervenors.
FACTS:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to
be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized
crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies
in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of
the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was composed of
police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by
petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.;
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-
TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson;
Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC)
headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member
of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was
a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman
Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate
the incident. This panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the
PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident,
with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police operation.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and
recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
(26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The
recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the
withdrawal of the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among
those charged as principal in eleven (11) information for
murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's action.4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1,
1996 eleven (11) amended informations5before the Sandiganbayan,
wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the
accused6 was dropped from the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under
the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of
Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the
"principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG)
27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent
(Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in
the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and
none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
HELD:
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2
of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606,
as amended) is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction —
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal
accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity,
at the time of the commission of the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineer, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants,
and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations;
2. Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade
"27" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution;
4. Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27"
or higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan
trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on
appelas from the final judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court
where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade "27,"
or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.