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Santiago vs COA (Topic: Appointment distinguished from of right in recompense for services rendered by him as Acting

designation) Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. In


fact it was referred as the petitioner's "salary differential."
FACTS: The petitioner, Teodoro Santiago, was employed in the
COA as State Auditor IV with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In On the difference between appointment and designation
1988, he was assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the DOTC and
detailed to the Manila International Airport Authority. Later, the OSG’s 2nd contention: The OSG’s main argument is that the
board of directors of the MIAA passed a resolution requesting the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9 (taas kayo nga provision) because
COA for petitioner's indefinite detail to the MIAA as Assistant he was not appointed to the second position in the MIAA but only
General Manager for Finance and Administration. This was designated thereto. It is stressed that under the said provision, "the
subsequently authorized by COA. compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the
retirement benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed
The following were the conditions set forth in the by law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment." The
resolution: 1. He will retain his plantilla position in COA; 2. His petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly approved
compensation from MIAA, shall be the difference between the salary appointment but only in a designation.
of AGM for Finance and Administration (MIAA) and that of State
Auditor IV (COA); 3. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable Petitioner’s argument: Petitioner maintains that there is no
against COA. substantial distinction between appointment and designation.

The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction
differential salary of P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total between appointment and designation. While appointment is the
compensation of P13,068.00. Thereafter, petitioner retired after selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise
working in the government for 44 years. the functions of a given office, designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law,
In computing his retirement benefits, the GSIS used as upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering this the highest basic appointment (or election).
salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his employment.
The COA disagreed, however, and paid his retirement benefits on the A person may also be designated in an acting capacity, as
basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV. when he is called upon to fill a vacancy pending the selection of a
permanent appointee thereto or, more usually, the return of the
Petitioner requested recomputation based on what he regular incumbent. In the absence of the permanent Secretary for
claimed as his highest basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was example, an undersecretary is designated acting head of the
denied hence he came to the court to seek reversal of the decision of department.
the COA.
Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in
ISSUE: WON P13,068 should be the highest basic salary rate of question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to
petitioner - YES include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was
intended between the two terms in Section 9 of EO 966. We think
RULING: On Double Appointment this to be the more reasonable interpretation, especially considering
that the provision includes in the highest salary rate "compensation
Double appointments are not prohibited as long as the positions for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This need not
involved are not incompatible, except that the officer or employee always be conferred by a permanent appointment.
appointed cannot receive additional or double compensation unless
specifically authorized by law. However, the additional compensation As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner.
received by the petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar because of It cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of the
its express approval by the COA and is allowed by law. petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the COA as otherwise there
would have been no need for his designation thereto. The second
On the computation of the highest basic salary office was distinct and separate from his position in the COA.

OSG’s 1st contention: The OSG argues that the additional Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of
compensation received by the petitioner was merely an honorarium the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance.
and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the
provision of Section 9 EO 966 and so should not be added to his
salary in computing his retirement benefits.
Sevilla vs Santos
We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is
defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in FACTS: The petitioner has been in the government service since
appreciation for services rendered, a voluntary donation in 1949. His last appointment was Assistant City Engineer of Palayan
consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. City which he discharged until he was designated Acting City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City by President Marcos. He unhesitatingly
The additional compensation given to the petitioner was assumed the latter position and discharged its functions and
in the nature of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter
responsibilities until "People Power" and the EDSA Revolution may not lay such a claim to the position of City Engineering of
intervened. Cabanatuan City for he holds no appointment to the latter office.

As narrated by the CA: “On August 18, 1986, OIC Mayor The power of appointment is essentially discretionary. Its
of Cabanatuan City appointed defendant Santos as city engineer of exercise may not be controlled by the courts. The appointing
Cabanatuan City and thereafter assumed office. On that very same authority in this particular case is the Mayor of Cabanatuan City. The
day, a memorandum informing petitioner Sevilla of the appointment appointment of Santos by OIC City Mayor Vergara was valid and
of defendant Santos was sent by then OIC Mayor. Sevilla was on binding for it was confirmed by the Minister of Public Works and
leave at that time and so the memo was received by an administrative Highways, and approved by the CSC.
officer.
There was no usurpation of a public office in this case
A few months later, petitioner Sevilla was designated by hence quo warranto cannot be granted.
the Minister of the DPWH as acting district engineer of Pasay City.
Petitioner Sevilla served in that capacity until he was removed from Dimaandal vs COA
that office by the new DPWH Secretary forcing him to return to the
Cabanatuan City Engineer's Office which, however, was already FACTS: Petitioner Zosimo M. Dimaandal, then
occupied by Nerito Santos. And so, he filed a petition for quo holding the position of Supply Officer III, was designated
warranto against defendant Santos. Acting Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration by
then Governor Vicente A. Mayo of Batangas.
In his quo warranto petition, Sevilla argued that, being the
presidential appointee, he could not be removed from office by an Pursuant to the designation, petitioner filed a claim
OIC mayor. The lower court granted Sevilla’s petition but upon
for the difference in salary and RATA of Assistant Provincial
appeal, the CA reversed the decision hence the case at bar.
Treasurer and Supply Officer III for the whole year of 1993 in
ISSUE: May an officer who was appointed to an office in an "acting" the total amount of P61,308.00. However, the Provincial
capacity, bring a quo warranto action against the permanent Auditor disallowed P52,908.00 of the claim. Rather, what was
appointee to the position? - NO allowed was only the amount of P8,400.00 which corresponds
to the difference in the allowances attached to the designation
RULING: The petition is devoid of merit. An "acting"
and the position occupied by the appellant.
appointment is merely temporary, one which is good only until
another appointment is made to take its place. Hence, petitioner's The disallowance was premised on the following
right to hold office as "Acting City Engineer of Cabanatuan
reasons (among others): The designation is temporary in
City" was merely temporary. It lapsed upon the appointment of
Nerito Santos as the permanent city engineer of Cabanatuan City on
nature and does not amount to the issuance of an appointment
August 18, 1986. as could entitle the designee to receive the salary of the
position to which he is designated
Petitioner was the incumbent city engineer of Palayan
City when he was designated as Acting City Engineering of The Governor sought reconsideration but the
Cabanatuan City. Provincial Auditor denied the request and appellant was
required to refund the amount of P52,908.00 which was
There is a difference between an appointment and
disallowed. Hence, respondent appealed to the COA which
a designation. Appointment is the selection by the proper authority of
sustained the decision of the Provincial Auditor thus
an individual who is to exercise the functions of an
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the eventually leading to the case at bar.
imposition of additional duties, upon a person already in the public
service by virtue of an earlier appointment or election.
Petitioner avers that the respondent Commissions
decision is probably not in accordance with applicable
A mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee decisions of the SC. He cited cases which laid down the rule
security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an that de facto officers are entitled to salary for services actually
"acting" capacity only. Where the person is merely designated and rendered. Petitioner contends that he may be considered as a
not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a de facto officer by reason of services rendered in favor of the
temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
Province of Batangas.
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting
or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure On the other hand, the respondent Commission
on the person named.
argues that the ruling regarding de facto officers is
Consequently, the designation of petitioner as Acting inapplicable to this case because what was extended to
City Engineering of Cabanatuan City merely imposed upon him petitioner was not an appointment but a mere designation
the additional function of the City Engineer of Cabanatuan City
on top of his regular duties as City Engineer of Palayan City. He ISSUE: WON Petitioner is entitled to the salary differential
may claim security of tenure as City Engineer of Palayan City but he and the RATA.
RULING: NO. Petitioner is not entitled to any of the Santiago vs CSC (Topic: Next in Rank Rule)
above-mentioned claims. The law applicable is Section
471(a) of the LGC which mandates that: “An assistant FACTS: Customs Commissioner Wigberto E. Tañada
treasurer may be appointed by the Secretary of Finance from a extended a permanent promotional appointment, as Customs
list of at least 3 ranking eligible recommendees of the Collector III, to petitioner SANTIAGO, Jr. Prior thereto,
governor xxx” SANTIAGO held the position of Customs Collector I.

Undoubtedly, the aforecited law do not authorize the In November 1986, respondent JOSE, a Customs Collector II,
Provincial Governor to appoint nor even designate one filed a protest with the the Board against SANTIAGO's
promotional appointment mainly on the ground that he was
temporarily in cases of temporary absence or disability or a
next-in-rank to the position of Collector of Customs III.
vacancy in a provincial office. That power resides in the
President of the Philippines or the Secretary of Finance. The Board referred the protest to Commissioner Tanada which
upheld SANTIAGO's promotional appointment on the
Necessarily, petitioners designation as Assistant grounds, among others, that: (1) the next-in-rank rule is no
Provincial Treasurer for Administration by Governor Mayo longer mandatory; (2) the protestee is competent and qualified
being defective, confers no right on the part of petitioner to for the position
claim the difference in the salaries and allowances attached
to the position occupied by him. Moreover, what was Respondent JOSE appealed to the Board which decided to
extended to petitioner by Governor Mayo was merely a revoke petitioner SANTIAGO's appointment and directed that
designation not an appointment. respondent JOSE be appointed in his stead. On appeal, the
Commission affirmed the Board. The Commission ruled that
There is a great difference between an appointment although both SANTIAGO and JOSE are qualified for the
position of Customs Collector III, respondent JOSE has far
and designation. While an appointment is the selection by the
better qualifications in terms of educational attainment, civil
proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the powers service eligibilities, relevant seminars and training courses
and functions of a given office, designation merely connotes taken, and holding as he does by permanent appointment a
an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a position which is higher in rank and salary range. Hence,
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier this certiorari Petition filed by SANTIAGO.
appointment.
ISSUE: WON it should be respondent Jose who should hold
Designation is simply the mere imposition of new or the position above-referred.
additional duties on the officer or employee to be performed
by him in a special manner. It does not entail payment of RULING: There is "no mandatory nor peremptory
additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the requirement in the Civil Service Law that persons next-in-rank
right to claim the salary attached to the position are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does
provide is that they would be among the first to be
FURTHER, we see no justifiable reason to sustain considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and if the vacancy is
not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or
petitioners argument that non-payment of his salary
other modes of appointment.
differential and RATA would be a violation of his
constitutional right against deprivation of property without due One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential
process of law. consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it
does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be
The right to the salary of an Assistant Provincial appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder
Treasurer is based on the assumption that the appointment or nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to
designation thereof was made in accordance with promote such person to the next higher position.
law. Considering that petitioner’s designation was without
color of authority, the right to the salary or an allowance due Section 4, CSC Resolution No. 83- 343 provides:
from said office never existed.
Section 4. An employee who holds a next-in- rank
Also pud, since defective man iyang appointment or position who is deemed the most competent and
designation, the rule regarding de factor officers is qualified, possesses an appropriate civil service
eligibility, and meets the other conditions for
inapplicable. Kay for you to be a de facto officer, one must
promotion shall be promoted to the higher position
derive his appointment from one having a colorable authority when it becomes vacant.
to appoint nya diri kay wala man.
However, the appointing authority may promote an
employee who is not next-in-rank but who possesses
superior qualifications and competence compared to
a next-in-rank employee who merely meets the After a careful review of the records of the
minimum requirements for the position. case, the Commission finds the appeal
meritorious. In the comparative evaluation
sheets, the parties were evaluated according to
Commissioner Tanada explained the reasons why he the following criteria, namely: eligibility;
chose SANTIAGO over JOSE, thus: education; work experience;
productivity/performance/attendance; integrity;
Suffice it to state that both Jose and the protestee are initiative/leadership; and physical
customs collectors. Jose was assigned to Panganiban, characteristics/personality traits. The results of
the evaluation are as follows:
Camarines Norte, but he never assumed that position.
For the past 5 years, there is no official record of any JUNSAY, Juanito — 79.5
activity that recommends him for promotion. VILLEGAS, Benjamin — 79
LAPINID, Renato — 75
DULFO, Antonio — 78
On the other hand, after the February revolution, the MARIANO, Eleuterio — 79
Protestee (Santiago) was immediately designated by FLORES, Nestor — 80
DE GUZMAN, Alfonso — 80
the undersigned as Chief of a task force which has
VER, Cesar — 80
been credited with the seizure of millions of pesos
worth of smuggled shipments. It is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and
Villegas (79) have an edge over that of protestees
Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).
It may likewise be mentioned that Protestee has been
the recipient of citations awarded by the Customs Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that
Commissioner for the two consecutive years, for Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be
exemplary performance of official duties, particularly appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice
protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo
investigation and prosecution.
respectively who may be considered for appointment to
any position commensurate and suitable to their
The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. To qualifications, and that the Commission be notified
apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.
formula on the appointing power contrary to the policy of the
SO ORDERED.
law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing
authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the ISSUE:
one he deems fit for appointment
WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to
True, the Commission is empowered to approve all disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter
not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification RULING:
(The commission only looks at the minimum requirements, dili
siya maka decide whether better qualified ang one individual No. We declare once again, and let us hope for the last time,
compared to others; naa ra gihapon sa appointing authority that the Civil Service Commission has no power of
ang power) appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does it
have the authority to review the appointments made by other
All told, we fail to see any reason to disturb offices except only to ascertain if the appointee possesses the
SANTIAGO's promotional appointment. The minimum required qualifications. The determination of who among
qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness have been aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be
preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil
adequately satisfied as found by the appointing authority.
Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment
Lapinid v CSC because it believes another person is better qualified and much
less can it direct the appointment of its own choice.
FACTS:
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports cannot compel. While the act of appointment may in proper
Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the
International Container Terminal. This appointment was protested by appointee — taking into account the totality of his
private respondent Juanito Junsay. He contended that he should be qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his
designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, personality — is the prerogative of the appointing authority.
in view of his preferential right thereto. On June 26, 1989, This is a matter addressed only to the discretion of the
complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to appointing authority. It is a political question that the Civil
the Civil Service Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment Service Commission has no power to review under the
In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as
Constitution and the applicable laws.
follows:
It is understandable if one is likely to be misled
by the language of Section 9(h) of Article V of RULING:
the Civil Service Decree because it says the
Commission has the power to "approve" and 1. NO. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as
"disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the
provided therein that the Commission shall appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent"
have inter alia the power to: in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33,
"9(h) Approve all dated February 18, 1983. What was temporary was
appointments, whether original or the approval of the appointment, not the appointment itself.
promotional, to positions in the civil And what made the approval temporary was the fact that it
service, except those presidential was made to depend on the condition specified therein and
appointees, members of the Armed on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to
Forces of the Philippines, police the position.
forces, firemen, and jailguards, 2. NO. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
and disapprove those where the determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended
appointees do not possess by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
appropriate eligibility or required approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the
qualifications." (Emphasis supplied) requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee
is qualified and all the other legal requirements are
However, a full reading of the provision, satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
especially of the underscored parts, will make appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
it clear that all the Commission is actually The approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is,
allowed to do is check whether or not the of the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he
appointee possesses the appropriate civil has been named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is
service eligibility or the required required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is assure compliance with Civil Service Laws.
approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other
criterion is permitted by law to be employed by Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
the Commission when it acts on — or as the performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" — lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
an appointment made by the proper authorities.
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
Luego v CSC considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.
FACTS:
[Commission on Appointment vs. Civil Service Commission]
The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the
City Mayor, Cebu City. The appointment was described as It is different where the Constitution or the law subjects the
"permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as appointment to the approval of another officer or body, like the
"temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by Commission on Appointments under 1935
Constitution. 10Appointments made by the President of the
the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there
Philippines had to be confirmed by that body and could not be issued
(was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no
or were invalidated without such confirmation. In fact, confirmation
pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by by the Commission on Appointments was then considered part of the
competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointing process, which was held complete only after such
appointment." confirmation. 11
After protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be Moreover, the Commission on Appointments could review the
decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private wisdom of the appointment and had the power to refuse to concur
respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested with it even if the President's choice possessed all the qualifications
position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed prescribed by law. No similar arrangement is provided for in the Civil
to the position of Administrative Officer II in the Administrative Service Decree. On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission is
Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining
as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked." whether or not the person appointed meets all the required conditions
laid down by the law.
ISSUE:
Borromeo vs. Mariano (Topic: Assumption and Term of
1. WON the approval of CSC of the appointment as
Office)
“temporary” makes the appointment temporary and
thus could be withdrawn at will, with or without Facts: Andres Borromeo was appointed and
cause.? commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial
2. WON the Civil Service Commission is authorized to
District. He duly qualified and took possession of the
disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground
that another person is better qualified than the
office on that date. Later, he was appointed Judge of the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was
replacement by the latter.
appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District 4) Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
(to replace him). regional elections should have been held on August 8,
2011. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
Judge Borromeo has consistently refused to accept
enacted, resetting the ARMM elections to May 2013,
appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.
to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.

Issues: May the judge refuse to accept his appointment Petitioners challenge these laws passed by Congress for
to the 21st Judicial District? being unconstitutional.
Grounds:

Ruling: Yes. A Judge of First Instance may be made a Violations of the right of suffrage of the people of
Judge of another district only with his consent. ARMM;
Failure to adhere to the "elective and representative"
The effect to be given to the word "appoint" is character of the executive and legislative departments of
corroborated by the principles of the law of public the ARMM; and
officers. Appointment and qualification to office are The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs.
separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act
of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is Issues:
the sole act of the appointee.
WON the Constitution mandates Synchronized Elections
Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no WON ARMM can have Synchronized Elections
power in these Islands which can compel a man to WON Holdover Option is unconstitutional [TOPIC]
accept the office. If, therefore, anyone could refuse WON the President is empowered to appoint OICs
appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular
Ruling:
district, when once appointment to this district is
accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an 1) Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly state
appointment to another district. No other person could that Congress has to synchronize national and local
be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be
since another rule of public officers is, that an gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
appointment may not be made to an office which is not of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the
vacant. Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials,
*discussion on statutory rules omitted.
sought to attain synchronization of elections.
Abas Kida vs. Senate (Doctrine of Holdover Capacity)
Facts: 2) Yes. Although called regional elections, the ARMM
Several laws governing ARMM were passed by elections should be included among the elections to be
Congress. synchronized as it is a "local" election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
1) RA No. 9054 was passed. This law set the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the Understood in its ordinary sense, the word "local" refers
second Monday of September 2001. to something that primarily serves the needs of a
particular limited district, often a community or minor
2) Congress passed the next law affecting ARMM — political subdivision. Regional elections in the ARMM
RA No. 9140. This law reset the first regular for the positions of governor, vice-governor and regional
elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054, to assembly representatives obviously fall within this
November 26, 2001. classification, since they pertain to the elected officials
3) RA No. 9333 was subsequently passed by who will serve within the limited region of ARMM.
Congress to reset the ARMM regional elections to the From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous
2nd Monday of August 2005, and on the same date regions are considered one of the forms of local
every 3 years thereafter. governments, as evident from Article X of the
Constitution entitled "Local Government." Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can
to 21 of this Article — the article wholly devoted to only apply as an available option where no express or
Local Government. That an autonomous region is implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot
considered a form of local government is also reflected apply where such contrary intent is evident. 61
in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which
Dom: they cited many cases where holdover
provides:
capacities by certain officials were allowed. But the
SC clarified that those officials were elective officials,
whose terms of office are not explicitly provided in
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of
the Constitution. In the present case, these officials
the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
are local elective officials (ARMM Governor etc.),
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
whose terms are explicitly provided for by the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the
Constitution.
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
4) Yes. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
Thus, we find the contention — that the synchronization
provides:
mandated by the Constitution does not include the
regional elections of the ARMM — unmeritorious. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
3) Yes, unconstitutional since it would extend the terms public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed
of office of the incumbent ARMM officials. forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him
A holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other
Constitution. This provision states: officers of the Government whose appointments are
Section 8. The term of office of elective local not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
determined by law, shall be three years and no such Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
official shall serve for more than three consecutive officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the
terms. courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they
are covered and bound by the three-year term limit This provision classifies into four groups the officers
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their that the President can appoint. These are:
term through a holdover. First, the heads of the executive departments;
In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing no room officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from
for any implementing legislation with respect to the the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other
fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an officers whose appointments are vested in the
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three President in this Constitution;
years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as Second, all other officers of the government whose
fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
holdover by Congress.
Third, those whom the President may be authorized
The primacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of by law to appoint; and
the land dictates that where the Constitution has itself
made a determination or given its mandate, then the Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments
matters so determined or mandated should be respected the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
until the Constitution itself is changed by amendment or
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates
repeal through the applicable constitutional process.
from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally officials that the President can appoint pursuant to
permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
statements which have been submitted on time,
are complete, and are in proper form. In the event
Carabeo v. CA a determination is made that a statement is not so
filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform
FACTS: On 8 July 2005, the Department of Finance-Revenue the reporting individual and direct him to take the
Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS),composed of private necessary corrective action.
respondents Troy Francis Pizarro, Joel Apolonio, Reynalito L.
Lazaro, Ismael Leonor, and Melchor Piol, filed a complaint with While Section 10 of RA 6713 indeed allows for corrective
the Office of the Ombudsman against Carabeo, Officer-in-Charge measures, Carabeo is charged not only with violation of RA 6713,
(OIC) of the Office of the Treasurer of Parañaque City. but also with violation of the Revised Penal Code, RA 1379,
and RA 3019, as amended, specifically Sections 7 and 8 thereof,
ALLEGATIONS: They alleged that Carabeo is currently which read:
designated as City Treasurer. When he first started as Revenue
Collection Clerk, he earned an annual gross salary of 8,400. As of Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. — Every public officer,
now, he earns an annual gross salary of 291,036. They also alleged within thirty days after assuming office, and thereafter, on or before
that the net worth of Carabeo has ballooned, from 114,900 in 1981 the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year,
to approximately 7.5 million in 2004. He also steadily accumulated as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his
expensive properties from real properties to vehicles to club shares resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the
ownership. In the last 9 years, Carabeo was able to purchase 2 office of corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head
residential lots in Tagaytay, a townhouse in Cavite, and 3 separate Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the
parcels of land in Laguna. He was also able to purchase a Ford President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of the amounts and
F150, a Mazda Familia, a Chevrolet Cassia, a Mitsubishi Lancer, sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
and a Honda CRV. They also alleged that Carabeo did not declare expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
most of the vehicles in his SALN. Carabeo alleged that he did not calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less
own most cars, but the records of the LTO shows that he and his than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their
spouse owns at least 7 vehicles. Carabeo also did not disclose his first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the
property in Tagaytay. They further alleged that his failure to close of said calendar year.
disclose his properties amounts to a violation od Section 7 of RA
3019 and Section 8(a) of RA 6713 requiring him to file under oath Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained
the true and detailed statement of his assets. He also recently Wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
purchased a share in The Palms Country Club in Alabang, 1379, a public official has been found to have acquired during his
amounting to 745,000, in cash. While Carabeo claims to have incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an
various investments, the information gathered indicates that these amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his
investments could not possibly justify the purchases. Lastly, salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be ground for
Carabeo’s wife did not even have any tax payments with the BIR. dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and
It was also discovered that from 1996 to 2004, Carabeo went dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration,
abroad at least fifteen times. when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be
satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly
The Office of the Ombudsman directed Secretary Teves to place excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or
Carabeo under preventive suspension for a period not to exceed 6 any of their dependents including but not limited to activities in any
months without pay. The order likewise ordered Carabeo to file a club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including
counter-affidavit within 10 days. Aggrieved, Carabeo filed a frequent travel abroad of a non-official character by any public
petition for certiorari alleging GAD amounting to lack or excess of official when such activities entail expenses evidently out of
jurisdiction. CA then issued a 60-day TRO enjoining the proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into
preventive suspension. consideration in the enforcement of this Section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove
CA ruling: In dismissing the petition, the CA held that a
mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative
preventive suspension is not a penalty but only a means taken to
suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period
insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation, which
until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed.
does not require prior notice and hearing.
ISSUE: WON the CA committed GAD in not considering the In Ombudsman v. Valeroso, the Court explained fully the
complaint against Carabeo a violation of Section 10 of RA 6713 significance of these provisions, to wit:
which entitles Carabeo to be informed beforehand and to take Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful
necessary corrective action (2 other issued, unrelated) acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be
HELD: We dismiss the petition. suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which
mandates full disclosure of wealth in the
Carabeo's non-disclosure of assets in his SALN constitutes a SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and
violation of RA 3019, among others. is aimed particularly at curtailing and
Carabeo claims that the complaint against him involves a violation minimizing, the opportunities for official
of Section 10, RA 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical corruption and maintaining a standard of
Standards for Public Officials and Employees, which entitles him honesty in the public service. "Unexplained"
to be informed beforehand of his omission and to take the matter normally results from "non-disclosure"
necessary corrective action. or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all
public officials and employees are mandated to
Section 10 of RA 6713 provides: file, are the means to achieve the policy of
accountability of all public officers and
Section 10. Review of Compliance Procedure. —
employees in the government. By the SALN,
(a) The designated Committees of both Houses of
the public are able to monitor movement in the
the Congress shall establish procedures for the
fortune of a public official; it is a valid check
review of statements to determine whether said
and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed referred to are the most important and outstanding and the ones in
properties and wealth. which the fiscal usually needs aid.

Significantly, Carabeo failed to show any requirement There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints,
under RA 3019 that prior notice of the non-completion of the making of investigations and conducting of prosecutions that only
SALN and its correction precede the filing of charges for an officer appointed by the President or one expressly empowered
violation of its provisions. Neither are these measures needed for by law may be permitted to assume these functions. Certainly a
the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct, which Carabeo lawyer who is invested with the same authority as might be
presently faces. exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General is presumed
to be competent to be entrusted with any of the duties, without
Lo Cham v. Ocampo exception, devolving on a prosecuting attorney. That the person
FACTS: The sole question presented in the three above entitled designated in a particular instance does not measure up to the
cases has to do with the authority of Gregorio T. Lantin to sign educational specifications imposed by law is beside the point. It
information as assistant city fiscal of Manila. Two judges have does not detract from the conclusion that, in the light of the high
rendered two divergent views on the matter. Judge Fernando Jugo, standard of training and experience required, there is no anomaly
in cases Nos. L-831 and L-876, upheld the affirmative theory while and no injustice is committed in lodging on the person designated
Judge Rafael Dinglasan, in case No. L-878, sustained the by the Secretary of Justice those powers of the prosecuting
defendant's contention in an elaborate rulling. attorney which we have named.
Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for
It appears that Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and
which they were enacted. The duties of a public office include all
lawyer, Acting Chief, Medico-Legal Section, Division of
those which truly lie within its scope, those which are essential to
Investigation, Department of Justice, was given an assignment by
the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was
Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Quisumbing in a letter dated
created, and those which, although incidental and collateral, are
October 8, 1945, which reads:
germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the
"Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of principal purposes. The authority to sign informations make
manila and in accordance with the provision of investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the inferences to
section 1686 of the Revised Administrative be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the passage of
Code, you are hereby temporarily detailed to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144 and it predecessors.
this office effective today, to assist him in the
The historical background of section 1686 of the
discharge of his duties with the same powers
Revised Administrative Code as amended and the construction
and functions of an assistant city fiscal."
placed on its precursors confirm our opinion.
Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed informations
The initial legislation on assistance to provincial fiscals is to be
in the aforesaid cases after, presumably, conducting preliminary
found in section 45 of Act No. 136, paragraph (e) of which
investigations. Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed
provides that "he (Attorney General) shall, when required by the
motions to quash on the ground already stated. When two of these
public service, or when directed by the Chief Executive, repair to
motions were denied and one was sustained, the losing parties
any province in the Islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in
instituted the instant proceedings for certiorari.
the discharge of his duties, and shall assist the provincial fiscal in
ISSUE: WON Gregorio Lantin, being assigned to temporarily any prosecution against an officer of the Government." This
assist in the discharge of the duties of an assistant city fiscal, had provision was amended by Act No. 300, section 1, by adding at the
the authority to sign informations as assistant city fiscal of Manila end thereof the following words:
HELD: Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as "But, whenever it is impracticable for either
amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 14, provides: the Attorney General or Solicitor General
personally to repair to any province in the
"SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal.
Islands and assist the provincial fiscal there in
— The Secretary of Justice may appoint any
the discharge of his duties, or in any
lawyer, being either a subordinate from his
prosecution against an officer of any branch of
office or a competent person not in the public
the Government, in accordance with the
service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or
provisions of subsection (e) section forty-five,
prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his
it shall be lawful for the Attorney General,
duties, and with the same authority therein as
with the prior approval of the Civil Governor,
might be exercised by the Attorney General or
to appoint some person who may be eligible to
Solicitor General."
the office of Attorney General temporarily to
It will be noted that the law uses general terms. It is a general rule represent him in such prosecution. The person
of statutory interpretation that provisions should not be given a so appointed shall have all the power of the
restricted meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the Attorney General or Solicitor General in
express enumerate of persons, objects, situations, etc., is construed conducting the prosecution for which he may
to exclude those not mentioned, according to a well-known maxim, have been especially appointed as in this
so no distinction should be made none appears to be intended. This section provided. The compensation of the
is not an arbitrary rule but one founded on logic. Was it the person so appointed shall be fifteen dollars per
purpose of the legislature to confine the work to be performed by day for the time necessarily employed in the
the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal to certain duties in the service of the Government, and actual
fiscal's office and deny him others? If it was, the law does not say traveling expenses necessarily incurred in
so, and one would be at a loss to know what duties were conferred performance of the duties."
and what were not. It is fair to presume that if the legislature had
Act No. 325, section 1, amending section 47 of Act No. 136,
wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal, to sign
created the position of supervisor of provincial fiscals, whose duty
informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions, it
it was "to assist the Attorney General and under his direction to
would have said so or indicated its intention by clear implication.
prepare rules for the guidance of all provincial fiscals, and when
We need to be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those
required by the public service or directed by the Attorney General, Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions in cases Nos. L-
he shall repair to any province in the Islands and assist the 831 and L-876 are denied and dismissed, and the petition in case
provincial fiscal there in the discharge of this duties." No. L-878 is sustained. Without costs.
The last measure passed on this subject was section 17 of Act No. APRUEBA v GANZON
867 which reads:
"SEC. 17. Fiscals may be aided by FACTS: On October 24, 1960, petitioners
lawyers appointed by Attorney General; duties Salvador Aprueba and Asuncion Modoc filed with the
of such appointees; compensation. — It shall
be lawful for the Attorney General to appoint CFI of Iloilo a petition for a mandamus against
any lawyer, either a subordinate from his respondent City Mayor of Iloilo City, alleging among
office, or with the approval of the Secretary of others, that they are owners and operators of a cafeteria
Finance and Justice, a competent person not in located in Stall 17-C of the city market since 1950 to
the public service, temporarily to assist the
fiscal of a province or district in the discharge
1960 when respondent city mayor ordered his policemen
of his duties and to represent the Attorney to close it for alleged violation of city ordinance as they
General in such matters. The person so did on same date despite their protest;
appointed shall have all the powers of the
Attorney General or Solicitor General in the When petitioner Aprueba saw respondent, he was
conduct of causes 'in which the Government is informed by the latter that the store could only be
interested and to which he may be assigned. . . reopened if petitioners paid all their back accounts, that
."
after paying the back accounts, respondent still refused
to allow reopening of the store and instead chided him
As contemporaneous construction this practice should carry great for working against respondent's candidacy in the last
weight in the operation of the enactment in question. The fact that elections; that respondent told petitioner Aprueba to
it was the chief law officer and legal adviser of the government
comply with health rules and regulations which he did;
who put it into effect and that he did it in the discharge of his
duties lends added force to the interpretation. As has been well that respondent told him later that the store space would
said, "interpretations by the Attorney General and the legal be used as an extension (bodega) of the city health
department of a state have important bearing upon statutory office; that petitioners have no delinquency in rentals
meaning, since the Attorney General and his office are required by and have complied with health rules and regulations and
law to issue opinions for the assistance of the various departments
of the government administrative the law." it is the ministerial duty of respondent to allow them to
operate the cafeteria and refreshment parlor business;
It is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has
now the power to sign informations. Granting that he does not
that in refusing them to reopen their business,
retain such power, a question which we do not decide, this respondent unlawfully excluded them from the use and
circumstance nevertheless does not alter the result at which we enjoyment of a right they are entitled to, or unlawfully
have arrived. The reason is that the power to sign informations, neglected performance of an act which the law
make investigations and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
power "to assist" a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in
the Administrative Code. It does not emanate from the powers of trust or station; that respondent's acts were motivated by
the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred upon the personal and selfish considerations and intended to
officer designated by the Secretary of Justice; it is ingrained in the persecute, harass, and ridicule his political enemies; that
office or designation itself. The powers of the Solicitor General petitioners as a result suffered moral damages and
bestowed on the appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as
cumulative or an addition to the authority to sign informations,
incurred attorneys fees in the sum of P5,500.00,
which is inherent in his appointment. In other words, the clause Petitioners prayed that a preliminary mandatory
"with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the injunction issue commanding respondent to order the
Attorney General or Solicitor General" does not exclude the latter reopening of the cafeteria and allow petitioners to
authority. The former practice of the Attorney General to which we operate their business.
have alluded portrays a distinction between and separation of the
two powers or sets of powers. The power of the Attorney General To this complaint respondent filed an answer with
to sign information, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to
the powers legitimately pertaining to his office as Attorney counterclaim (P5,500 Moral Damages) denying the
General but to the special provision authorizing him to assist material allegations of said complaint and alleging as
fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know that when the Attorney defense that the remedy of mandamus cannot be resorted
General's power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he stopped to for the purpose of compelling him to reopen the stall,
signing informations. The phraseology of section 17 of Act No.
867 before cited also affords an illustration of the idea that the
as petitioners' privilege to remain therein rests on an
authority to assist is separate and apart from the general powers of implied contract of lease and that obligations that rest
the Attorney General. In the language of this section, the person solely on contract cannot be enforced by mandamus
appointed was (1) to assist the fiscal in the discharge of his duties where there is no question of trust or official duty; that
and (2) to represent the Attorney General in such matters. If the even if mandamus may be the proper remedy, petitioners
two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be
superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the have no cause of action against respondent, because
other was a surplusage. petitioner Aprueba, who is lessee of stall 17-C, allowed
his co-petitioner Modoc to conduct business therein, in
gross violation of Ordinance No. 93, s. 1947 which
prohibits a person other than the lessee of a market stall FACTS: In a civil case pending before the
from conducting business therein. respondent Sandiganbayan, the PCGG prays for the
return, reconveyance, accounting and restitution — with
ISSUE: Whether the Mayor be compelled by mandamus damages — of certain funds and properties which were
to reopen the cafeteria. allegedly acquired by private respondents through
RULING: No. "abuse of right and power and through unjust
enrichment". The herein petition states that part of these
In refusing to grant mandamus, the trial court premised funds and properties are some 6,299,177 sequestered
its action on the fact that petitioners occupancy of Stall shares of stock in the PCIBank which were allegedly
17-C in question in Iloilo City market "is but a privilege acquired by the respondent spouses Benjamin (Kokoy)
which the respondent mayor may or may not grant, but Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, in violation
not a duty enjoined upon him by law, by reason of his of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and
position". Note also that the refusal of respondent to therefore subject to forfeiture in favor of the Republic
allow reopening of the cafeteria is predicated on the for being "unexplained wealth". Said shares were
provision of Section 10 (m) of the City Charter which allegedly purchased from petitioner by respondent
states that the Mayor has the power to: xxx Romualdez using respondents Equities and Narciso as
"(m) To grant and refuse municipal "his dummy buyers", with "no or negligible 'cash out' ".
licenses and to revolve the same for Petitioner filed its own "Motion for Leave to Intervene
violation of the conditions upon which and to Admit Complaint in Intervention" in said Civil
they were granted..” Case No. 0035 pending before respondent Court,
alleging that the PCIBank shares were "obtained . . . by
Moreover, the privilege of petitioners to obtain a renewal means of fraud and acts contrary to law, morals, good
of the permit (after the implied lease contract expired) customs and public policy, as well as in breach of
rested on the sound discretion of respondent and fiduciary duty" and thus their acquisition thru a deed of
refusal on his part to grant the continuance of the "Sale of Stocks and Escrow Agreement" is either
privilege (especially after petitioner Aprueba's alleged voidable or void or unenforceable on any of said
violation of city ordinance by allowing co-petitioner grounds. Petitioner also alleged that the purchase price
Modoc to operate business in stall 17-C) cannot be the was extravagantly low as the book value at the time of
subject of an action for mandamus. In a long line of sale was at P16.63 per share. To pay this P47 million,
decisions, the Court had held that mandamus will not Equities borrowed the exact same amount from
issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a SOLOIL, alleged to be another Romualdez front, which
public officer where the law imposes on him the right or in turn borrowed the same, using the facilities of
duty to exercise judgment in reference to any matter in PCIBank itself. Petitioner therefore asked in its proposed
which he is required to act. Complaint in Intervention that said shares be returned to
it.
And where the legal rights of petitioners, as in the
The respondent Court denied petitioner's motion for
present case, are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the
intervention.
petition for mandamus must be dismissed. The privilege In his Comment, respondent Narciso manifested that he
of operating a market stall under license is always
"has no personal claim or interest to any and all (of) the
subject to the police power of the city government and shares of PCIBank subject of the Complaint in
may be refused or granted for reasons of public policy
Intervention . . . (nor) . . . on the unpaid price for these
and sound public administration. Such privilege is not
shares. . ." He affirmed that respondent Romualdez is
absolute but revocable under an implied lease contract
the owner of Equities, Inc., which in turn owns the
subject to the general welfare clause. Another rule is
disputed shares.
that a contractual obligation, as the lease to Respondent Equities alleged in its comment that the
petitioner Aprueba of the stall in question, is not a duty
Sandiganbayan committed no abuse of discretion. It
specifically enjoined by law resulting from office, trust, added that petitioner is not a registered owner of the
or station, and the rule universally accepted is
PCIBank shares and "will become its (sic) owner only if
that mandamus never lies to enforce the performance the sales document of the shares in favor of its present
of contractual obligations.
owners is annulled." Hence, it has no "legal interest".
As the trial court correctly observed, petitioners' remedy ISSUES: Whether petitioner has legal interest thus
is an action for specific performance, if proper, based on allowed to intervene and whether mandamus may be
a contractual obligation and not mandamus. issued to compel SB to grant such motion.

FIRST PHILIPPINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION RULING: YES TO ALL.


v SANDIGANBAYAN
Under the rules of court, intervention shall be allowed and damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at
when a person has a legal interest in the matter in General Manager) against GM Reyes and the rest of the
litigation; or in the success of any of the parties; or an CMWD Board of Directors (Board). The dishonesty charge, in
interest against the parties; or when he is so situated as turn, stemmed from the respondents act of claiming overtime
pay despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized
to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition
daily time record for three working days.
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer
thereof. Respondent was preventively suspended. However, before the
We have no doubt that petitioner has a legal interest in expiration of the preventive suspension, GM Reyes found him
the shares which are the subject of the controversy. At guilty of the two charges and dismissed him. Respondent
the very least, it is "so situated as to be adversely elevated the case to the CSC.
affected by a distribution or disposition of the
(sequestered shares) in the custody of the court." CSC RULING: To the CSC, it was a mere expression of
disgust over the management style of the GM and the Board of
(On SB jurisdiction) The jurisdiction of the Directors, especially when due notice is taken of the fact that
the latter officials were charged with the Ombudsman for
Sandiganbayan has been clarified in the case of PCGG
various anomalous transactions. As to the dishonesty charge,
vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Peña., thus: CSC ruled that it had no factual basis since he showed
"Under Sec 2 of the President's EO No. 14, all evidence that he actually worked on those days. But still, CSC
cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds ruled that he violated rules and regulations for mere failure to
and Assets Illegally Acquired or log-in and log-out. Hence, he was REPRIMANDED but did
Misappropriated by Ferdinand Marcos and their not order payment of back salaries. Hence, both CMWD and
xxx Dummies, xxx" whether civil or criminal, the respondent raised the matters to the CA.
are within the "exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" and all CA RULING: CA found merit in the respondents appeal and
incidents arising from, incidental to, or related awarded him back salaries from the time he was dismissed up
to his actual reinstatement. The CA reasoned out that the CSC
to, such xxx”
Resolution totally exonerated the respondent from the charges
(TOPIC) In resolving to deny petitioner's motion for laid against him.
intervention, respondent Court abused its discretion
because, clearly, the question of ownership of the shares ISSUE: WON the respondent is entitled to back salaries?
under sequestration is within its jurisdiction, being an
incident arising from or in connection with the case RULING: YES. He is entitled to back salaries from the time
under its exclusive and original jurisdiction. With the he was dismissed until his reinstatement. However, he is not
denial of its intervention, petitioner is deprived of a entitled to back salaries during preventive suspension pending
remedy in law to recover its property alleged to have investigation.
been taken illegally from it. The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of
suspension pending appeal, of a government employee who
As provided under Rule 12, Sec. 2 (b), intervention shall had been dismissed but was subsequently exonerated is settled
be allowed "in the exercise of discretion" by a court. in the Court jurisdiction. The Court starting point for this
Ordinarily, mandamus will not prosper to compel a outcome is the "no work-no pay" principle public officials are
discretionary act. But where there is "gross abuse of only entitled to compensation if they render service. However,
discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of an exception is when back salaries are paid even for unworked
authority" equivalent to denial of a settled right to days when employees are illegally dismissed or unjustly
suspended based on the constitutional provision that "no
which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain,
officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
speedy and adequate remedy, the writ shall issue. These suspended except for causes provided by law".
exceptions were recognized by this Court in Kant
Kwong vs. PCGG, et al. The Court crafted two conditions (in Gonzales vs Hon.
Hernandez) before an employee may be entitled to back
In Antiquera vs. Baluyot, et al., such exceptions were salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the
allowed, "because the discretion must be exercised under charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified.
the law, and not contrary to law."
However, the black and white observance of the requisites of
Gonzales is not required at all times. If there is complete
CSC VS RICHARD CRUZ exoneration of the administrative charge against him (i.e., the
employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or the
FACTS: The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of employees acquittal of the criminal charge based on his
Malolos Water District (CMWD), was charged with (1) grave innocence, the requirement that the suspension must be
misconduct and (2) dishonesty by CMWD General Manager unjustified is “automatically subsumed” in the other
(GM) Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious requirement of exoneration.
However, in Bangalisan vs CA, the Court clearly laid down preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee
the principle that if the exoneration of the employee is relative be ultimately exonerated.
(meaning relative in a sense that the factual basis of the
charges is still present but only imposed with lower penalty, as BONUS-THE CASE OF BANGALISAN, JACINTO AND
distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into the DELA CRUZ:
factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense
committed must be made. (Three different cases) Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all
stemmed from the illegal mass actions of public school
If the administrative offense found to have been actually teachers in Metro Manila in 1990. The teachers were charged
committed is of lesser gravity than the offense charged, the with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross
employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual violation of civil service law and its regulations. The Secretary
premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains the of Education found them guilty and dismissed them. The CSC,
same. The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only on appeal, ordered the teachers reinstated, but withheld the
be entitled to back salaries when the offense actually grant of their back salaries. It reached SC. The Court ruled
committed does not carry the penalty of more than one in this manner:
month suspension or dismissal.
With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal
(My analysis: General rule, no-work no pay. Exception: mass actions, we ruled that they were not entitled to back
Where the officer was innocent and suspension was salaries since they were not exonerated. We ruled that their
unjustified. There are two scenarios where this applies: (1) the suspension is not unjustified since they have given a
officer is completely exonerated/acquitted, hence the second ground for their suspension i.e., the unjustified
requisite is “automatically subsumed” hence he is entitled to abandonment of their classes to the prejudice of their
back wages. (2) He is also entitled to back wages where students, the very factual premise of the administrative
exoneration is relative in the sense that he is still found liable charges against them for which they were suspended.
for a lesser offense than that charged, but such offense does
not carry a penalty of suspension (1 month) or dismissal.) With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes
but did not participate in the illegal strike, the Court
IN THE PRESENT CASE: awarded them back salaries, considering that: first, they did
not commit the act for which they were dismissed and
We are fully in accord with the CAs conclusion that the two suspended; and second, they were found guilty of another
conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist in the offense, i.e.,violation of reasonable office rules and
present case. regulations which is not penalized with suspension or
dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally
1.) Innocent of the Charges: The first condition was met exonerated of the charge, and found their dismissal and
since the offense which the respondent was found guilty of suspension likewise unjustified since the offense they were
(violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed found to have committed only merited the imposition of the
from an act (failure to log in and log out) different from the penalty of reprimand.
act of dishonesty that he was charged with (claiming
overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work). SOLIVEN VS MAKASIAR (Resolution napud whew)

2.) Unjustified Suspension: The second condition was met FACTS: President Corazon Aquino filed libel charges against
as the respondents committed offense merits neither Luis Beltran, et al who wrote in a newspaper column that the
dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one president hid under her bed at the height of a coup’ de etat
month), but only reprimand. (He was dismissed though his against her. For this statement he was sued by the President
offense merits only reprimand) for libel. Aquino went so far as to show journalists that she
could not fit under her bed. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot
Hence, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time file a complaint affidavit because this would defeat her
he was dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to his immunity from suit. He grounded his contention on the
former position - i.e., for the period of his preventive principle that a president cannot be sued. However, if a
suspension pending appeal. For the period of his preventive president would sue then the president would allow herself to
suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not be placed under the court’s jurisdiction and conversely she
entitled to any back salaries.[67] would be consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the
functions of a president, the president may not be able to
BONUS - AS TO PAYMENT OF WAGES DURING appear in court to be a witness for herself thus she may be
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION: liable for contempt.
In Honorable Gloria vs CA, the Court ruled that there are two CONTENTION OF BELTRAN: President cannot sue him
kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who since (1) it would indirectly violate the president’s immunity
are charged with offenses punishable by removal or from suit, (2) the matter is privileged in character. As to
suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending criminal procedure, he said that the judge did not personally
investigation[62] and (ii) preventive suspension pending determine the probable cause for warrant of arrest.
appeal;[63] compensation is due only for the period of
ISSUE: WON the defendants may invoke the president’s prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
immunity from suit as a defence? WON the other contentions supporting affidavits of witnesses.
of the defendant hold water?
(Note: The resolution did not state the facts. It merely
RULING: NO. Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons discussed the rulings and principles. The facts was gathered
which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a by the author in various digests and transcripts especially
correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal from Criminal Procedure)
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her
complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a RAMON FAROLAN as ACTING COMMISSIONER OF
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's CUSTOMS, and GUILLERMO PARAYNO, as CHIEF OF
jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way CUSTOMS INTELLIGENCE and INVESTIGATION
DIVISION , petitioners, vs. SOLMAC MARKETING
defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on CORPORATION, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury. FACTS:
Petitioners Farolan and Parayno, in their official capacities,
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of were charged by Respondent Solmac for recovery of damages. They
immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential were then adjudged guilty for irregular detention of the goods of
duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, Solmac coz it was devoid of legal basis.
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government
is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's (take note just in case ipangutana: in the dispositive portion of the
time, also demands undivided attention. lower court, the one held personally liable is a DAMIAN
FAROLAN, NOT RAMON FAROLAN – but SC ignored the error)
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
Si Solmac was the assignee, transferee, and owner of an
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by importation of Clojus Recycling Plastic Products of 202,204 kgs of
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Polypropylene film, a material for making fibers, films. It declared
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in that the shipment was OPP film waste/scrap. 17 containers arrived
which the President is complainant cannot raise the in Dec. 1981. Solmac presented a Board of Investment Authority to
presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from claim the shipment. But upon examination of the shipment by
proceeding against such accused. National Institute of Science and Technology, it turned out that the
fibers of the importation were oriented in such a way that the
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent materials were stronger than OPP film scrap. So, the shipment was
the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded actually oriented polypropylene, the importation of which is
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege restricted.
and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to So, petitioners withheld the release of the containers. Then
exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's Parayno asked the BOI if it should be released. BOI said it may be
prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and released on the condition that holes should be drilled on the shipment
imposed by any other person. (wa gibutang unsay purpose ngano busluton). So now, Solmac filed
with the RTC for the unconditional release of the importation, with
BONUS – AS TO PRIVELEGED INFORMATION prayer for damages. RTC ordered the unconditional release, but
without awarding damages.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could
not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character On CA, Solmac appealed the non-awarding of damages coz
or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier they ought to pay damages in their personal and private capacities.
of facts and that such a defense is best left to the trial court to Petitioners did not appeal coz they already complied with RTC order
to release without drilling holes. So CA modified the RTC judgment
appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
ordering petitioners solidarily, in ther personal capacity to pay
damages (attorney’s fees 100k, expenses in litigation 50k, temperate
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to damages 100k) . On motion for recon, CA only lowered the amount
proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom, on attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation to half, but not temperate
the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point. damages. Hence, the petition.

The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through ISSUE:


their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to WON petitioners are liable for damages in their personal
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and private capacities despite acting in good faith (defense nila sa
and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. RTC nga gi.acknowledge mao nga way damages nga gi award) in
not immediately releasing the questioned importation.
BONUS – AS TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
RULING: PETITIONERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH - GOOD
The Court explained that this constitutional provision does not FAITH IS ALWAYS PRESUMED AND IT IS UPON HIM
WHO ALLEGES THE CONTRARY THAT THE BURDEN OF
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
PROOF LIES.
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to
personally evaluate the report and supporting documents Good faith – a state of mind which is manifested by the acts
submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the of the individual concerned. It consists of the honest intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage
of another. It is the opposite of fraud, and its absence should be WON petitioners can be held personally liable in damages
established by convincing evidence. for acting in bad faith.

IN THIS CASE:
Withholding was proper because the shipment was not
what Solmac declared. It was not scrap polypropylene but was RULING: PETITIONERS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH
actually oriented polypropylene, whose importation is restricted, if JURADO’S CONTENTION: the signing of the pro-forma agreement
not prohibited. was not a condition sine qua non, hence the petitioners should have
not refused granting him a permit and license. The resolution also
Then on many occasions, petitioners sought the advice of violates the limitations on the taxing powers of the LGU. So, he
BOI on whether the subject should be released. Also, there was no claims then that the is entitled to actual and moral damages, as well
clear-cut policy on the part of BOI regarding the entry of oriented as attorney’s fees.
polypropylene into the country coz of conflicting recommendations
of the heads on how to handle it. Hence, leading to the delay in the SA VALIDITY OF THE RESOLUTION:
release. Thus, the RTC’s finding that petitioners acted in good faith SC could not resolve it yet – coz Jurado did not raise it as
in not immediately releasing the shipment pending a definitive policy an issue before the SC. He only assailed its validity in the comment
of the BOI on the matter is correct. for purposes of supporting his claim for damages. So in effect,
finding of CA declaring it valid is final and binding.
When a public officer takes his oath of office, he binds
himself to perform the duties of his office faithfully and to use But SC made a discussion that it should not have been valid
reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the coz while it is couched as a solicit (which an LGU can do) through a
benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of his duties, he is to use donation, it runs counter as being a donation coz the implementing
that prudence, caution, and attention which careful men use in the agreement seems to make it obligatory and a condition precedent to
management of their affairs. In the case at bar, prudence dictated that the issuance of the mayor’s permit. Being a donation, it should not be
petitioners first obtain from the BOI the latter's definite guidelines obligatory being an act of liberality.
regarding the disposition of the various importations of oriented
polypropylene (OPP) and polypropylene (PP) then being withheld at ON THE GRANT OF DAMAGES:
the Bureau of Customs.
Jurado anchors his claim in this article.
But even assuming that they erroneously withheld the
shipment, their act is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss
Mistakes concededly committed by public officers are not because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
actionable absent any clear showing that they were motivated by without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, "even action for damages and other relief against the latter,
under the law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action
protected by the presumption of good faith." (All things are presumed that may
to be correctly and solemnly done.) It was
private respondent's burden to overcome this juris tantum PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE: To end the "bribery system, where
presumption. the public official, for some flimsy excuse, delays or refuses the
performance of his duty until he gets some kind of pabagsak." The
GRANTED. provision presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official
to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or inexcusable
negligence.
DOMINGO A. TUZON and LOPE C. MAPAGU, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SATURNINO T. IN THIS CASE:
JURADO, respondents. It was not alleged that the refusal of Tuzon to act on
Jurado’s application was an attempt to compel him to resort to
FACTS: bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either
A resolution was adopted by SB of Calamaniugan, that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by
Cagayan to construct the Sports and Nutrition Center Building. To personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to issue the
help finance this project, the SB will solicit 1% donation from the permit and license to Jurado.
thresher operators who will apply for a permit to thresh within
the municipality. So a pro-forma agreement was made upon which Then no evidence was also presented that petitioners
the operator will sign, thereby agreeing to donate 1% upon singled out Jurado. Petitioners did not likewise gain personally in
application of mayor’s permit. refusing to issue the permit. The Resolution was uniformly applied to
all threshers.
Respondent Jurado wanted to apply for a permit. Petitioner
Tuzon, mayor, required him to sign the agreement, but refused. He RESOLUTION WAS NOT DECLARED INVALID, hence
instead sent the P285 license fee to the municipal treasurer Mapagu , petitioners had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been
but returned the said amount. So Jurado filed an action for mandamus repealed by the SB or annulled by the courts, its legality being
with damages in the CFI, and another petition to declare the presumed.
resolution as an illegal tax measure.
. As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial
CFI upheld the challenged measure, and dismissed the or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of
claims for damages. Jurado appealed to CA. CA affirmed the validity an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line
of the resolution but declared Tuzon and Mapagu to have acted of his official duty. It has been held that an erroneous interpretation
maliciously and in bad faith. Hence, the petition. of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith
that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages
ISSUE:
GRANTED.
The noticeable change introduced by Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807
Taduran vs CSC GR No. l-52051 lies in that a qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to
appeal an appointment in favor of one who is appointed by transfer
Facts: Petitioner was the supervising dentist of the Ministry of and not next-in-rank if the employee making the appeal is not
Health Regional office in Zamboanga city while respondent satisfied with the written special reason or reasons given by the
Godinez was the Senior dentist in the Ministry of Health Manila appointing authority for such appointment. In other words, "special
reason or reasons" are now required to be given even in case of
City(Supervising dentist was a higher position than Senior dentist). an appointment by transfer and not next-in-rank. However, the
right of appeal granted to the next-in-rank who has not been
A vacancy for the position of supervising dentist in the office in promoted, cannot be construed as indicative of a legislative intent
Manila city occurred and the Minister of Health appointed petitioner to give priority to promotion over transfer as a means of filling
Taduran for the position in a “transfer for a similar position without vacant positions. Such restrictive interpretation would unjustifiably
alteration in pay”. imply that nextin-ranks are more fit and meritorious for appointment
than those of higher rank moved by transfer.
Respondent Godinez opposed the appointment arguing that the
position is hers by right since she is the one next in rank to We thus see no reason for disturbing the Minister of Health's
appointment of TADURAN in the exercise of his administrative or
supervising dentist in such office.
executive judgment.
It was established that respondent Godinez had a more favourable Santiago vs COA, GR No. 92284
education attainment than petitioner Taduran since Godinez had a Facts: Petitioner was an employee of the Commission on Audit
certificate in public health to which Taduran does not have. With this, having a rank of State Auditor IV who had a salary of P7,219. He
the Civil service commission affirmed the decision of the merit was assigned in 1988 at the COA auditing unit at the Department of
systems board declaring that there was no justification for the Transportation and communication and was stationed in the Manila
appointment of Taduran since there was an available next in rank International Airport. This was backed up by a resolution issued by
MIAA:
employee who was respondent. The appointment was thus declared RESOLUTION NO. 88-70
null and void. RESOLVED, that, as recommended by Management, the
designation of Mr. Teodoro J. Santiago, Jr., as Assistant General
Issue: WON the appointment of petitioner was null and void for the Manager for Finance and Administration, effective 15 August
1988, be approved, as it is hereby approved, subject to the
reason that respondent was a preferred officer than him. following conditions:
1. He will retain his plantilla position in COA;
Held: No, the appointment was valid and proper and petitioner 2. His compensation from MIAA, shall be the difference between
should be the one gets the position. the salary of AGM for Finance and Administration (MIAA) and
that of State Auditor IV (COA); and
3. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.
We are constrained to reverse.
This resolution was duly communicated to the COA on July 11,
The pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 807 read:
1988, with a request for the petitioner's inde􀁌nite detail to the
"Sec. 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. —
xxx xxx xxx MIAA. In reply, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo wrote MIAA on
(3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second level of the July 14, 1988, as follows:
Career Service as defined in Section 7, the employees in the . . . please be informed that we are authorizing such detail through
government service who occupy the next lower positions in the appropriate office order up to February 15, 1989. The order
occupational group under which the vacant position is classified includes authority to collect representation and transportation
and in other functionally related occupational groups and who are allowances (RATA) of P1,200.00 each month and other
competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service allowances attendant to the position chargeable against the funds
eligibility shall be considered for promotion. of the NAIAA.
xxx xxx xxx As regards your proposal that Mr. Santiago be allowed to collect
(5) If the vacancy is not filled by promotion as provided herein the the difference in salary of his position in the COA as State Auditor
same shall be filled by transfer of present employees in the IV and his designated position as Assistant General Manager
government service, by reinstatement, by re-employment of thereat, likewise chargeable against the funds of that office, this
persons separated through reduction in force, or by appointment of Commission interposes no objection to the proposal to pay him the
persons with the civil service eligibility appropriate to the difference between his present monthly salary of P7,219.00 and
positions. that of Assistant General Manager which reportedly amounts to
xxx xxx xxx P13,068.00 a month or a monthly difference of P5,819.00,
(6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to provided that he is formally designated (not appointed)
appeal initially to the department head and finally to the Office of Assistant General Manager by the Board of Directors, NAIAA and
the President an appointment made (1) in favor of another next-in- that payment of his salary differential is approved by the same
rank employee who is not qualified, or (2) in favor of one who is office.
not next-in-rank, or (3) in favor of one who is appointed by xxx xxx xxx
transfer and not next-in-rank, or by reinstatement, or by original The detail to MIAA entailed an increase in salary of Petitioner but
appointment if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied there was an agreement as is shown in the resolution and reply above
with the written special reason or reasons given by the appointing that it was MIAA who will pay for the difference of his compensation
authority for such appointment: . . . (Emphasis ours) of P5,819.

We find no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Issue came when his retirement came because there then a problem
foregoing provision that persons next-in-rank are entitled to on what salary his retirement pay should be based since the law says:
preference in appointment. What it does provide is that they
would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy if Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. — The compensation of salary
qualified, and if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same or pay which may be used in computing the retirement benefits
shall be filled by transfer or other modes of appointment. shall be limited to the highest salary rate actually received by an
official/employee as filed by law and/or indicated in his duly
approved appointment. This shall include salary adjustments duly We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as
authorized and implemented by the presidential issuance(s) and something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for
budget circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary
services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services
indicated in an appointment duly approved as an exception to the
prohibition on additional or double compensation, merit increases, which admit of no compensation in money The additional
and compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature of a salary
capacity. For this purpose, all other compensation and or fringe because it was received by him as a matter of right in recompense
benefits such as per diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay, for services rendered by him as Acting Assistant General Manager
honoraria hazard pay, flying time fees, consultancy or contractual for Finance and Administration. In fact, even Chairman Domingo
fees, or fees in correcting and/or releasing examination papers shall referred to it in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's
not be considered in the computation of the retirement benefits of "salary” differential.
an official/employee.

COA only wanted to base it on the 7,219 but petitioner insists that the 2. Petitioner can invoke sec. 9 because the word “appointment” in
basis should be the 13,068. the law was used in a general sense to include “designation”.

Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between


The solicitor general argues that the additional compensation of 5,819
appointment and designation. While appointment is the selection
was merely an honorarium and hence would not fall under Sec. 9.
by the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office, designation, on the other hand, connotes
The Solicitor general also argues that petitioner cannot invoke Sec.9
merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a
because petitioner was not appointed to the position but was only
person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
designated thereto. Respondent argues that there is no substantial
appointment (or election). Thus, the appointed Secretary of Trade and
distinction between appointment and designation in that the word
Industry is, by statutory designation, a member of the National
appoint is applied to nomination or designation of an individual.
Economic and Development Authority. A person may also be
designated in an acting capacity, as when he is called upon to fill a
Issue: Which salary base should be used as basis in computing the
vacancy pending the selection of a permanent appointee thereto or,
retirement pay.
more usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the absence of
WON petitioner can invoke sec. 9 on the basis that there is no
the permanent Secretary, for example, an undersecretary is
difference between designation and appointment.
designated acting head of the department.
Held: 1. The basis should be 13,068.
As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho: 14
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority
We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the legality of vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
the petitioner's occupying the second position in the MIAA and functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
receiving additional compensation for his services therein. As the confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the
Solicitor General observed. "What the petitioner was receiving from person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the
the MIAA was the additional compensation allowed under Section 17 nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes
of Act No. 4187 which, in turn, is allowed under Section 8, Paragraph merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent
B, Article IX of the Constitution." official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is
designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices
In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 7 this Court held that double appointments are of the Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in
not prohibited as long as the positions involved are not incompatible, the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
except that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive
additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by while designation is legislative in nature.
law. The additional compensation received by the petitioner is not an
issue in the case at bar because of its express approval by the COA Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in
and the admission of the Solicitor General that it is allowed under the question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to
cited provision. include the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was
intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No.
More specifically, Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides: 966. We think this to be the more reasonable interpretation,
Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no especially considering that the provision includes in the highest
full time officer or employee of the government shall hereafter salary rate "compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting
receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra capacity." This need not always be conferred by a permanent
compensation or salary including per diems and bonuses from any
appointment. A contrary reading would, in our view, militate against
fund of the government, its dependencies, and semigovernment
entities or boards created by law except: the letter of the law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That
(1) Officers serving as chairman or members of entities and spin it seeks to extend the maximum benefits to the retiree as an
enterprise organized, operated, owned or controlled by the additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and
government, who may be paid per diem for each meeting actually efficient service in the
attended or when on official travel; government.
(2) Auditors and accountants; L
(3) Provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees; Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the
(4) Employees serving as observers of the Weather Bureau; and
retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and
(5) Those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation
by virtue of the provision of this Act. (Emphasis supplied). hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to
continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his
The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful
additional compensation received by the petitioner was merely an government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement
honorarium and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That
under the provision of Section 9 and so should not be added to his generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and
salary in computing his retirement benefits. his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and
glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able
to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded have the Commission on Races which is charged with the duty
for it. to supervise their action and the performance of their duties in
connection with the races.
Phil Racing Club V. Bonifacio
Facts: In a race held at the Sta. Ana Hippodrome belonging to They are clearly delimited in the rules and regulations adopted
the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. on July 23, 1950, the for the purpose. As we have seen, the board of judges was
competing horses went off to a faulty start. When the barrier created to decide the race and its decision is final and
was lifted, one of the horses turned around and blocked the unappealable. This means that the public has no other recourse
three horses at its left thus enabling the three horses on the than to abide by it even if it believes it to be erroneous. No
right side to run ahead and gain a good lead. The official other authority can change or reverse its decision.
starter signaled the stewards of the races who were then on the
judges' stand indicating that the race should be cancelled. The HOWEVER, respondent could not be liable for damages
two stewards on duty who were also acting as judges were considering that respondents have acted in their official
Carlos Coscolluela and Melquiades Parungao. As his signal capacity in the honest belief that they had such power as in
went unheeded, the official starter proceeded to the stand fact they acted on the matter only after an on the spot
where the stewards were seated to inform them that the start investigation, we hold that they cannot be held liable for
was bad and in his opinion, the race should be cancelled. damages.
Coscolluela, however, told him to "shut up" and allowed the
race to go on until its termination. Acts in Line of Duty or under Color of Authority. — As a rule, a public
officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally liable
to one injured as a consequence of an act performed within the scope of his
When the winning horses as well as the corresponding official authority, and in the line of his official duty. In order that acts may
dividends were announced, the betting public showed its be done within the scope of official authority, it is not necessary that they
disapproval of the result. A commotion resulted which reached be prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or requested
the knowledge of the members of the Commission on Races by a superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are done by an officer in
relation to matters committed by law to his control or supervision, or that
who were then seated in the dining room of the club. The they have more or less connection with such matters, or that they have
Commission was composed of Arsenio Bonifacio, Jesus more or less connection with such matters, or that they are governed by a
Cacho, Tomas Sunico, and Victor Buencamino, all of whom, lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the officer
except the last, were present at the time. When they noticed is acting.
the uproar and were informed of its cause, they sent for the Error or Mistake in Exercise of Authority. — Where an officer is invested
stewards and made an on the spot investigation. Convinced with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought
that the start of the race was faulty, they decided to cancel it before him, he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so
and had their decision announced to the public. In the acting he is actually given immunity from liability to persons who may be
injured as the result of an erroneous or mistaken decision, however
meantime, while the investigation was going on, the holders of erroneous judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are done within
the winning the tickets were able to cash the same at the ticket the scope of the officer's authority, and without wilfulness, malice, or
windows. The result was that while the club paid the dividends corruption.
on the winning tickets it had to refund to the holders of the
losing ones the sum of P5,032.00. This prompted petitioner
San Luis V. CA
to file a case against respondent for damages. Respondent
Facts: Respondent had been the quarry superintendent in the
contended that they are not liable for damages as they were
Province of Laguna since his appointment as such on May 31,
only acting within the scope of authority.
1959. In April and May of 1973, petitioner-appellant
denounced graft and corrupt practices by employees of the
Issue: WON respondents acted in excess or lack of authority provincial government of Laguna. Petitioner herein, the
when they declared the race cancelled? provincial governor, issued an order transferring respondent to
Provincial Engineer. Respondent challenged the said order in
Ruling: Respondents had no authority to declare the race which the Civil Service Commission granted thus ordering
cancelled. The law governing horse race is RA 309. Under respondent’s reinstatement. Subsequently, instead of
the said law, it mandates that in every horse race the rule complying with the CSC’s order, Petitioner herein ordered the
requires that there be a board of judges who should determine suspension of respondent for alleged gross discourtesy,
the result of the race and whose decisions are final and inefficiency and insubordination however, when it reached the
unappealable. In addition, the rule requires that there be a office of the President, it declared the suspension improper.
board of stewards which among others, is given the power to
"annul any race before the horses reach their destination if in CSC issued a directive for the reinstatement of respondent but
their opinion there is a bad start or any other incident takes petitioner instead dismissed for alleged neglect of duty,
place that makes such action necessary" frequent unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of duty and abandonment of office.
Hence, there are two groups of officials who act in every race
whose functions are different from the other: the board of Respondent filed a case for mandamus against petitioner to
judges and the board of stewards. The judges determine who compel him for reinstatement with back wages and damages
the winners are, their decision being final and irrevocable; the against herein Petitioner.
stewards, on the other hand, are given the power to annul
any race if in their opinion there is a bad start or some The trial court upheld the actions of the petitioner and held
good reasons exist justifying it. And over these officials we that petitioner is not liable for damages on the ground “that
none of the respondents should be held personally liable in for mandamus. Where, as in this case, the provincial
their private capacity to the petitioner because their actuations governor obstinately refused to reinstate the
are not at all tainted with malice and bad faith" petitioner, in defiance of the orders of the Office of
the President and the Ministry of Local Government
The CA upon appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and in palpable disregard of the opinion of the Civil
and ordered the reinstatement and back wages as well as Service Commission, the appellate court's finding of
payment of MORAL DAMAGES and ATTORNEY’S bad faith cannot be faulted and accordingly, will not
FEES be disturbed by this Tribunal.
Issue: WON CA was correct issuing the said order?
It is well-settled that when a public officer goes beyond the
Ruling: YES. COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT scope of his duty, particularly when acting tortiously, he is
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION. not entitled to protection on account of his office, but is
liable for his acts like any private individual. Nor are
officers or agents of the Government charged with the
1. The suspension was unjustified. After carefully performance of governmental duties which are in their nature
perusing the records of this case, this board is legislative or quasi-judicial liable for the consequences of their
convinced that there is no strong evidence of guilt official acts, unless it be shown that they act wilfully and
against Berroya. In fact, there is not even sufficient maliciously and with the express purpose of inflicting injury
evidence to maintain the charges against him. Hence, upon the plaintiff
the same does not fall within the scope of Section 40,
Presidential Decree No. 807. The record does not
show that Berroya is notoriously undesirable. On the Accordingly, applying the principle that a public officer, by
contrary, his performance ratings from the period virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his
ending December 31, 1969 to the period ending June personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith,
30, 1973 are all very satisfactory. the Court holds that petitioner Felicisimo T. San Luis, the
Provincial Governor of Laguna who has been sued both in his
The test of being notoriously undesirable is two-fold: official and private capacities, must be held personally liable
whether it is common knowledge or generally to Berroya for the consequences of his illegal and wrongful
known as universally believed to be true or acts.
manifest to the world that petitioner committed
the acts imputed against him, and whether he had Respondent is entitled for payment of backwages and
contracted the habit for any of the enumerated damages. Since respondent already reached the mandatory
misdemeanors". The same are not present in the case retirement age, respondent is not entitled for reinstatement but
of Berroya. On the contrary he should be given for retirement pay.
recognition for his efforts in exposing the
irregularities allegedly committed by some
authorities of the Laguna Provincial Government
which led to the filing of criminal as well as
administrative cases against such officials.

2. The established rule is that a writ of mandamus lies


to enforce a ministerial duty or "the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from office, trust or station". In this case,
the appropriate administrative agencies having
determined with finality that Berroya's suspension
and dismissal were without just cause, his
reinstatement becomes a plain ministerial duty of the
petitioner Provincial Governor, a duty whose
performance may be controlled and enjoined by
mandamus

3. (Main topic: liability for damages) Petitioner


provincial governor who was found by the appellate
court to have acted in bad faith as manifested by his
contumacious refusal to comply with the decisions of
the two administrative agencies, thus prompting
respondent Berroya to secure an indorsement from
the Minister of Local Government and Community
Development dated November 15, 1979 for his
reinstatement. he Minister's directive having been
ignored, Berroya was compelled to bring an action