Boston Equity v Toledo
summons upon him, precisely because he was already dead even before the
FACTS:
On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer dated
19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her husband and
co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. As a result,
petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to
disclose the heirs of Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution,
praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants. This
motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.13
On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was
cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel
for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file
a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1)
**********; (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of
Court; (3) ******
The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of
time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which Aggrieved,
respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial
court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her
motion. CA granted the petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Toledo
HELD: NO. But this is not really important.
Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid
service of summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of Manuel Toledo. In the case at bar, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of Manuel since there was no valid service of
complaint against him and his wife was filed in the trial court. The issues
presented in this case are similar to those in the case of Sarsaba v. Vda. de
Te.
However, these other factors were also present:
1. Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of
respondent. Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial
court of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a
motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates
nor finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done
by the court before a case is finally decided on the merits.
2. Even assuming that certiorari is the proper remedy, the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent’s
motion to dismiss. It, in fact, acted correctly when it issued the
questioned orders as respondent’s motion to dismiss was filed SIX
YEARS AND FIVE MONTHS AFTER SHE FILED HER AMENDED
ANSWER. This circumstance alone already warranted the outright
dismissal of the motion for having been filed in clear contravention
of the express mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules
of Court.
3. The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed
as a result of estoppel by laches is jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Here, respondent was questioning in her motion to dismiss
before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds
no application in this case.
4. Respondent cannot claim the defense since "lack of jurisdiction over
the person, being subject to waiver, is a personal defense which can
only be asserted by the party who can thereby waive it by silence.”
Clark v Secretary of Finance
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA No. 7227 which mandated the
accelerated conversion of the Clark and Subic military reservations into
special economic zones. Based on Section 12 (c) of the said law, in lieu of
national and local taxes, all businesses and enterprises operating within the
Subic Special Economic Zone shall pay a preferential gross income tax rate
of five percent (5%). In addition, Section 12 (b) also provides that such
businesses and enterprises shall be exempt from the payment of all taxes
and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital, and equipment into
the Subic Special Economic Zone. This tax and fiscal incentives under RA
No. 7227was further extended to the Clark Freeport Zone upon enactment
of RA No. 9400 on March 20, 2007. This made the businesses and
enterprises within the Clark Freeport Zone exempt from the payment of all
taxes and duties on the importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment.
On February 17, 2012, the Dept. of Finance, upon recommendation of the
BIR, issued RR 2-2012 which imposed VAT and excise tax on the importation
of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or
Economic Zones.
Herein petitioner, which represents the businesses and enterprises within
the Clark Freeport Zone, filed the instant petition alleging that respondents
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing RR 2-2012. It argues that by
imposing the VAT and excise tax on the importation of petroleum and
petroleum products from abroad and into the Freeport or Economic Zones,
RR 2-2012 unilaterally revoked the tax exemption granted by RA No. 7227
and RA No. 9400 to the businesses and enterprises operating within the
Subic Special Economic Zone and Clark Freeport Zone.
This petition for certiorari prays for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to annul and set aside RR 2-2012 issued by the
Department of Finance upon recommendation of the BIR.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Secretary of Finance acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing RR 2-2012 that imposes VAT and excise tax on the
importation of petroleum and petroleum products from abroad and into
Freeport or Economic Zones, as it is claimed to have unilaterally revoked tax
exemption granted by RA 7227 and RA 9400.
HELD: The SC denied the petition for being an improper remedy.
FIRSTLY, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, is a special civil action that may be invoked ONLY
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some
specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such
rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a
tribunal, board, or officer clothed with power and authority to determine
the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
In determining whether a Revenue Regulation is quasi-legislative in nature,
the legal basis of the Secretary of Finance in the issuance thereof must be
examined. RR 2-2012 was issued by the Secretary of Finance based on
Section 244 of the NIRC. Section 244 is an express grant of authority to the
Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the
effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. And since RR 2-2012
was issued by the Secretary of Finance based on Section 244 of the NIRC,
such administrative issuance is therefore quasi-legislative in nature which
is outside the scope of a petition for certiorari.
SECONDLY, Supreme Court explained that it could not be denied that even if
the petition is filed as a certiorari, in real essence, it seeks the declaration
by the High Court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of the
questioned rule, thus partaking the nature, in reality, of one for
declaratory relief over which the SC has only appellate, not original,
jurisdiction.
LASTLY, although the SC, the CA and the RTC have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum, as hierarchy of courts must
be respected. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an]
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands
upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-
crowding of the Court's docket.
GSIS Board vs. Velasco and Molina
FACTS:
Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct
and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days, for their alleged
participation in a demonstration held by GSIS employees. In a letter,
respondent Molina requested the GSIS Senior Vice President for the
implementation of his step increment. The SVP denied the request citing
GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by petitioner GSIS Board which
approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and
regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step
increment and promotion.
Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee
privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 approving Christmas raffle
benefits for all GSIS officials and employees. Respondents’ request was
again denied because of their pending administrative case.
Later, petitioner GSIS Board issued Resolution No. 197 approving the
following policy recommendations:
B. On the disqualification from promotion of an employee with a pending
administrative case
To adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case shall
be disqualified from the following during the pendency of the case:
a) Promotion;
b) Step Increment;
xx
Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 03-108389).
Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS
employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also
sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution
Nos. 197 and 372.
The trial court granted respondents’ petition for prohibition. Petitioners
filed an MR. The trial court denied petitioners’ motion, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board
or its President and General Manager exercising quasi-legislative and
administrative functions in Pasay City is outside the jurisdiction of RTC-
Manila, Branch 19.
HELD: NO
Petitioners argue that the CSC, not the trial court, has jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 03-108389 because it involves claims of employee benefits.
Petitioners point out that the trial court should have dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be
assailed in the SC or, if it related to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area as defined by the SC. It may also be filed in the CA
whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law
or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the CA.
Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the
trial court declare all acts emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and
306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said
resolutions. Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over
respondents’ petition for prohibition.
Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong
territorial jurisdiction because the acts sought to be prohibited are the acts
of petitioners who hold their principal office in Pasay City, while the petition
for prohibition was filed in Manila.
Section 18 of BP 129 provides:
SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. – The
Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the RTC
shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be
the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the
venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well
as determining the MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs over which the said branch
may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be
exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people
of the different parts of the region and making attendance of litigants and
witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
In line with this, the SC issued Administrative Order No. 3 defining the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs in the National Capital Judicial Region, as
follows:
a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila – over the City of
Manila only.
b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City – over
Quezon City only.
c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City – over Pasay City
only.
xx
The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action
which may be filed in the SC, the CA, the Sandiganbayan or the RTC, as the
case may be. It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title
to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be
commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before
the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could
properly be filed in the City of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – RTCs shall exercise original
jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, which may be enforced in any part
of their respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig,
Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the
municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of
prohibition issued by the RTC sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in
Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of
respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the
action and the venue was properly laid before it.
Benguet Management Corp v CA
FACTS:
Benguet Management Corporation (BMC) and Keppel Bank Philippines Inc.
(KBPI) entered into a Loan Agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture. For
the consideration of Php 190M, BMC mortgaged its properties located in
Alaminos, Laguna and Iba, Zambales.
BMC defaulted so KBPI filed an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage first with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court in Iba and later with the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the Regional Trial Court in San Pablo City.
SAN PABLO:
BMC filed with the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of San Pablo City a Request Not To Give Due Course To The Application for
Extra-Judicial Foreclosure. BMC claimed that the application should be
denied because it is insufficient in form and substance and there is no need
to proceed with the foreclosure of its properties situated in Laguna because
it was willing to execute a dacion en pago in place of the mortgaged
properties. Subsequently, BMC contended that the application for
foreclosure should be denied because KBPI included unauthorized penalties
in the statement of accounts and it did not comply with its obligation to give
BMC a 60-day grace period. BMC further claimed that the MTI securing the
principal loan of P190 Million cannot be foreclosed because it was not
registered with the Register of Deeds.
KBPI opposed the letter-request of BMC on the ground, inter alia, of wrong
remedy and forum shopping.
ZAMBALES:
BMC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 70, a
complaint for damages, accounting and nullification of foreclosure of its
properties in Zambales, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the sale at public auction of BMCs properties in Zambales.
KBPIs application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage was found to be
sufficient in form and substance, and was granted. (Zambales)
The trial court granted the foreclosure proceedings.
BMC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order to
enjoin the scheduled sale of its properties in Laguna. Since no injunction or
restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, the auction sale
proceeded as scheduled with KBPI as the highest bidder.
BMC filed a Supplemental Petition which was favorably acted upon by the
Court of Appeals. The certificate was late, and therefore, the certificate of
sale was issued. BMC filed with the appellate court an Amended
Supplemental Petition, followed by an Urgent Manifestation praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order to enjoin the consolidation of titles over the foreclosed properties in
the name of respondent banks. This was denied.
ISSUES: Whether or not BMC violated the rule against forum-shopping in
filing applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage with
both the RTCs in Iba and San Pablo City
HELD:
Under the Procedure for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, an extra-
judicial foreclosure covering several properties located in different
provinces but covering only one indebtedness requires the applicant to pay
only one filing fee. This is regardless of the number of properties to be
foreclosed. However, the venue of the extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings is the place where each of the mortgaged property is located.
The rationale of this rule is that an injunction order of the court is
enforceable only within its territorial limits. Therefore, those properties
subject to the same mortgage but are located in different provinces are
outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The remedy of the law is to allow
the applicant to file separate injunction suits with another court which has
jurisdiction over the latter properties.

BMC is not guilty of forum-shopping because the remedy provided by law is

precisely to file separate injunction suits. It is mandated to file only one case
for a single cause of action, e.g., breach of mortgage contract, yet, it cannot
enforce any injunctive writ issued by the court to protect its properties
situated outside the jurisdiction of said court.
Dolot vs. Paje, etc., et al.,
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution dated
October 18, 2011 issued by RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 on Continuing
Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Environment Protection Order (TEPO).
Petitioner Maricris Dolot, et al, filed the aforesaid petition with the RTC of
Sorsogon alleging that mining operations conducted by Antones Enterprises,
Global Summit Mines Development Corporation and TR Ore puts the
municipality of Matnog in environmental dangers and despite this fact,
Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to the
operators a small-scale mining permit. Similarly, it was alleged that
representatives of PMS and DENR did nothing to protect the interest of the
people in same community, thus, respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or
the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. Dolot,
et al primarily prayed for the shutdown of said mining operations through
issuance of TEPO as well as the rehabilitation of the mining sites and the
return of the iron ore mined in the area.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon,
Branch 53 being the designated environmental court. However, the case
was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC averred that SC
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 limit the
power of such court to try and hear the case as its territorial jurisdiction was
limited to violations of environmental laws within the boundaries of
Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla,
Casiguran and Juban.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil Case No.
2011-8338.
HELD: YES.
The SC held that such reasoning is plainly erroneous and that RTC cannot
solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine
itself within its four corners in determining whether it had jurisdiction over
the action filed by the petitioners. As reiterated by the SC, jurisdiction is the
power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred
by law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject
matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues framed in the
pleadings. BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 also states
that jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is vested in the RTC, hence, original jurisdiction shall be
exercised by the RTCs. Both the SC AO and AC merely provide for the venue
where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the power to confer
jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged
solely in Congress and the same cannot be delegated to another office or
agency of the Government.
The high court further emphasized that venue relates only to the place of
trial or the geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be
brought and does not equate to the jurisdiction of the court as it is aimed to
accord convenience to the parties, as it relates to the place of trial, and does
not restrict their access to the courts. Therefore, RTC’s motu proprio
dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is incorrect. While
it appears that the alleged actionable neglect or omission occurred in the
Municipality of Matnog and as such, the petition should have been filed in
the RTC of Irosin, it does not warrant the outright dismissal of the petition
by the RTC as venue may be waived. Moreover, the action filed by the
petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element of
jurisdiction. With these, the SC granted the petition and directed the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon to transfer the case
to the RTC of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch.