MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS referred to the legislature for action.
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or
the eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the
Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares
at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the
declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid
price and sent a manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the
matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle,
such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision
which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And
when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action
may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional
right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel
has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become
the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of
the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning
the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be
allowed to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign
firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply
disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors.
But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public
scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a
foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match
the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences
to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court
would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the
government develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions
and parameters for its actions.
 2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as
well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and
to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do
such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
TANADA VS ANGARA
G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental
organizations, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
Facts:
This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the
“Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners,
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides
new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed
by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.
Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could
not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would
not conform to the WTO Agreement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of
legislative power by Congress.
4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.
5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in
the Final Act.
Discussions:
 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
controlled by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” The WTO itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing
economies, which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states
have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on
the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence,
poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through
one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form
powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. Which
is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic
principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the
Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development.”
 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to
be automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of
the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedures.
With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and
processes.
 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by
the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The
Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign
duty and power.
 Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections

Rulings:
Held: The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile”
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the reasons, one intends to return.
judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the
pass judgment on matters of this nature.” position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now
2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against
foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In establishing a new one and definite acts whichcorrespond with the purpose.
fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign
competition that is unfair. The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately
3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long,
and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances,
a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of intention to
that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act ofregistering as voter in Quezon City.
of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.” While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially
4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required
from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate
was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25,
1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic Case Digest: Pamatong vs. Comelec
minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in.

Prefatory Statement:
Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he
seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks
election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate
for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the
one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
based on his own Voter’s Registration Record and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old
Balara, Quezon City.
Last December 1 was the deadline for the filing of Certificate of Candidacies (COCs) for the 2010
Elections. In the end, a total of 99 filed their COCs for President. Among the lesser known presidentiables
include someone called "Manok" (because apparently he can mimic a cock's crow), a six-star general,
and a future "emperor of the world." Considering that we would be having automated elections next year
and the list of all candidates are to be written in the ballots while voters are supposed to shade the circles
corresponding to their choices, would all 99 candidates be included? No. Aside from disqualification
petitions filed against the aspirants, the Comelec can also motu propio deny due course to the COCs.
Aside from the qualifications set forth under the Constitution, a candidate should also have the capacity
and resources to launch a national campaign.
Under the Constitution (Article II, Section 26), "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service xxx." Would the Comelec's act of disqualifying the so-called "nuisance" candidates violate
this constitutional provision?
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC
declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a
national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC
violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all
the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a
national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the
capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a
platform of government.
ISSUE:
Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable
right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an
interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing,
and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like
the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the
provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves
much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause
as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined.
Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-
ended. Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to
countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the
framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately
unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without
discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the
burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a
certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the
limitations or the burdens which they create.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling
interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number
of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased
allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or
capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the
candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be
bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the
instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of
the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to
determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution
(Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2)
registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and
(5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended vacation until
November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But the problem
recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every
two weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would
be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being discriminated as those
similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight,
“and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of
almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of
petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his
weight did not hamper the performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he
repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was
only invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute a
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus
fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease.
That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose
weight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down
to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company
physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the
service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
“[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article
282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d).”

NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense.
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In
order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew
who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based
on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time the
ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of
the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national
and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included
among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of
the Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement in
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they
must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President
certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final
form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
 [During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization
in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold
over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in
the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also
until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent ARMM
officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This
provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. [emphases ours]
3.3.
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress,
the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view
– like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for
the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for
it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it
cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing
the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no authority to order
special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held
on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials,
except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the
execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by
ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this
call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having
been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that
the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.
3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period pursuant
to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice itself,
however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls;
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President
alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and
legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent
than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes
the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any
way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May
2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides
only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And
this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.
MR: KIDA VS SENATE (G.R. NO. 196271 FEBRUARY 28, 2012)
Kida vs Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative nature
of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory powers over
autonomous regions?
Held: YES. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national and
local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and
local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members
of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected under
this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

FACTS: We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et al. in Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall
G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.
197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno
in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. No.
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under the
197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding
heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous
Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the manifestation and
regions as one of the forms of local governments.
motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to
issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is still existing and effective.
NO. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections;11 it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of
date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054
Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were
elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No.
scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and
9054.
recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these
positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
We reiterate our previous observations:
Issues: (a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with national
and local elections? This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements? To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First Organic
Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific
date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative enactment.
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by
Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part or
provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to
submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the first
elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No.
9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite
for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections
fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the ARMM regional elections.
Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with the
amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.12 (emphases
supplied)
YES. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials; they
are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover
capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit
by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay
at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One
significant difference between the present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all
refer to electivebarangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials – the ARMM Governor, the
ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose terms fall within the
three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available option
where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary
intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants to
suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this Court has no
authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave
abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the
vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the legislature complying with the
constitutional mandate of synchronization.
NO. COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently
empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely
empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881),
has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the
specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls within the narrow
confines of the following provisions:
Section 5. Postponement of election. – When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard,
shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
Section 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the
preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election
results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the
cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. [emphases and underscoring
ours]
YES. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:
YES. We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within the
context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the
constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections.
To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it with the
problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period, between the expiration
of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21) months away –
of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the
problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office after the
expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and shorten the
terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c)
recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his power of
supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM regional
government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established the unconstitutionality of the
first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that
synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections. In other words, “given the plain unconstitutionality of providing for a
holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the
elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and specific period
as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional
or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
Facts:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief
Justice following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent
and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body
representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation
of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex
officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-
half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a
unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC.
The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted
by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners
were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one,
they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if
only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation,
defeating the principle of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of
the JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2)
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are
undeniably presidential appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for
a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for
rectification of legal blunders.
Issue:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are
members of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the
JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it
can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution that in the phrase, “a representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative
of what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only
one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the
legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by
considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to
be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a
word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may
be modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent
that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being
referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no
need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the
Court should proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is
undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only. The underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided
into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC
for that matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and
House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional
Commission, held that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one
body. While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the
Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between
the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the
House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress”
must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one
voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of
equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other
members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain
steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the
people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council IS
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that
only one ( 1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section
8( 1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that
JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be
unconstitutional
FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one
from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings
held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that
petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers
that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are
permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both
houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution
provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.
ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making
8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.
HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress”
should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both.
That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of
each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between
the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court
cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven
(7) members only.
FALLO: The motion was denied.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners
have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of
the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of
injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall”
therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process.
It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have
no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the
law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere,
as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.