The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings
SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C.
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao
del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts
committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy,
which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between
Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27,
1994.Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the
respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge
avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used by
someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both
as judge and as a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter
No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his
act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated
from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued
by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and
his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the second
charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,
he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. [2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant
have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The acts complained of and
respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by
themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this declaration, the
wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to
before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. [3] The
affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely
acknowledged before him.In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after
thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is
sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him to proceed
with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall
be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is
danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the
Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the
law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement
which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a
missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions
of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the
declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he
remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error
on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be
void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article
41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the
court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open
court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or
vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of
this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be
held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at
the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the
written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party,
Gemma del Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority
of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the
"authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by,
among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided
in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful,
is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the
law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage,
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. [5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica
and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for
the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of
understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the
law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary
and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is
due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least,
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should
be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they
be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. [6] It is not
too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. [7] Otherwise, the system
of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
those not learned in the law.While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary
provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and
void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the
Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary
authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is
advised to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper
understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK
A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision [1] and the March 24, 1999 Order [2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026AF. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties. [3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen,
in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage,
was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a
Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government. [6] Petitioner -- a
Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual
Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior
subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she
learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained
in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit
for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that
it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.
[15]
The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. [16] After they
submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued
in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended,
but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on
the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
4 with their respective national laws.[27]
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5 courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the
respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing
a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate
on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of
the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed
marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 [25] of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. [26] A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are
concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must
first comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the
applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required
in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial
decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity
of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document -- a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in
evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the
best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. [31] The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested [33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.
[36]
The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.
[37]
Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992.[39]Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. [40] Naturalized
citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the
Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He
contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was
cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that
country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. [41] In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. [42] Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating
it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and
every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent
was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage
was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of
different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [45] There is no showing in the case at
bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes
and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute
(unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy. [48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according
to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity
to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the
Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage
license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity
to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the
national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family
Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly
presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. [50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal
capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the
following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A
Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d) Exhibit
D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records; [54] and (e)
Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio; [55] (2) for respondent:
(a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer; [56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; [57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio
since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he
was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy,
there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the
other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs.
NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death
on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof,
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After
their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second
marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons
who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in
asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing
of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of
the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death. [1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47
of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could initiate an
action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court
grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of
petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was thus
treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of
the 1997 Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
dismissal and reinstated the petition for review. [4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. [5] A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, [6] the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested. [9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State
recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic
"autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an
"inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected
by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of
permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime
commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76, [14] referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other
as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the
parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants
name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage
such persons from legitimizing their status. [15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising
from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and
exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating
that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation
is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license. Should it be
a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year
continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully
married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during
the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no
third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage
license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be
noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to
be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any
impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar. [17] The
Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having
knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil
registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the
marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the
local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any
marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and
void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time
when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with
each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with
any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to
file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article
47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage
that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place [21] and cannot be the
source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either
party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not
after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid. [22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to
a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual
joint contribution,[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided
in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family
Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup
rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from
a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the two. It
should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. [24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct
or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage [27] and
such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. [28] For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential
to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the
case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if
the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris
Pardo, J., on official business abroad.
IRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
R ES OLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both
bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant complaint
against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan.
For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross
ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having
been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue,
Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage. [2] On 22 March 1993,
however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought
to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that
both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated
the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally
married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.
[4]
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have
advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with
bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be
ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus
filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the
dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the
attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which
were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits,
both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to
Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective
marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges
that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to
marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall
also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present
at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for
at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other];
and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal
impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note
that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before
respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the
fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that
both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a
diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. [7] In fact,
in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581
have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot PHILIPPINES,
deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was Petitioner,
clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
- versus -
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses
for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses JOSE A. DAYOT,
who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in Respondent.
such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does x------------------x
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, G.R. No. 179474
the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Petitioner,
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano Present:
and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for
seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital Acting Chairperson,
cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally TINGA,*
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage - versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent VELASCO,** and
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. REYES, JJ.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he

solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no Promulgated:
one has special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial JOSE A. DAYOT,
Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is Respondent. March 28, 2008
highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. [9] And
when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
THIRD DIVISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474
are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the
Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at
the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. [2] In lieu of a
marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also dated 24 November
1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being
unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He
contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was
celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he
and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the
marriage was secured through fraud.
In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he
came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks
later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she
could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City
Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper
approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package
could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and
told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had
contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of
the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was
a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned
ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the
validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man
and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her pre-trial brief,
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted
marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993,
Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative
complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman
found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to
him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.[7]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing the Complaint. It
disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the
evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the
[C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly,
the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs
against [Jose].[9]
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage
celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses
version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any
attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could
have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were
at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was
made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said
package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard
was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her
brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took
him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper that
he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not
seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a
ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied
by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he
wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the
marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again,
in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the
only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because
he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he
really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written
instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath,
she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the
marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on
November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if
indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother
she answered yes.The testimony of his sister all the more belied his
claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had
prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for
annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the
discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent
was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he
could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the
earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged
 sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void
the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of
Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be
without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and
Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court
observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage
under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties.Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud
was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck
down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was
employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for
the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of
the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the
ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time
the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February,
1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However,
it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment
of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to
Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was
solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the
parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that
the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage,
seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this
manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing
officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal
side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed
Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas
V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code
did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the
solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the
exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully
attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and
the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation
executed by him and Felisa was false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself.
Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11,
2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring
the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay
City.[19]
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court
in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that
they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had
lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry
each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation
period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage,
should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction
as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them
on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such
and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on
the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not
be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
 nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a
marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony
and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage
solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional
character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage
between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because
of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The
appellate court rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying
that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set
aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid
and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court
resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings
in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the
allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION
OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM
HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals
misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the
parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their
marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against
him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their
marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To
reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented
by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the
presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa
echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage
by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its assertion,
the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which
they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the
statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and
formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to
investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that
as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a
fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least
five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that
their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the
signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1)
Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote
Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2
May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect
of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in
order.
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24
November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code
governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of
marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are
complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized
by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. [28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code
makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is
void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that
the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This is in stark contrast to the old
Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage
void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the
proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. [32]
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter
2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages
inarticulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote
places, (2) consular marriages, [33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed
marriages.[34]
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76
of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the
publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a
state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]
It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed
without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they
have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to
marry each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the
falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of
the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license.
We answer in the affirmative.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on
the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but reasonably
construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. [40] Where a
general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former
or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine
qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and
that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other
expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license
under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms,
places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of
the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a
mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the
contracting parties shall state the requisite facts [42] in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who
solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five
years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The
Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely
five months before the celebration of their marriage. [43] The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel,
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. [44] The appellate court
also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
live in her house.[45]
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the
minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a
need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under Rule 45, factual
findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
 The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the
Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative
body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not
apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of
Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported
by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose
and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements
in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and
formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it
cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the
formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that
the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a
presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special
to the case, to be in fact married. [50] The present case does not involve an apparent
marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose
and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence,
compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that every intendment of
law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and
extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa
was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a
marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was
one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for
a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the
defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [53] To
permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage,
we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our
laws.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a
marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties
have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The
former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence
of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would
have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and
effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based
on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot
thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that
equity finds no room for application where there is a law. [54] There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the
parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed
estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is
claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses
subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven
years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [56] Jose and
Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be
reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage
does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year
common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed
back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it
not been for the absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the
day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at
any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court
of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of
Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to
their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-9005 June 20, 1958
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the central issue of the validity of
the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and Felipe Apelan Felix.
It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these two persons lived
together as wife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They acquired properties but
had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory,
Matea be came seriously ill. Knowing her critical condition, two young ladies of legal age
dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra 1 visited and
persuaded her to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish
priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living with Felipe
Apelan Felix without benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according
to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon the priest heard the confession of the
bed-ridden old woman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of
Extreme Unction and then solemnized her marriage with Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo
mortis,2 Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsors or witnesses. It was then
January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered from her sickness; but death was not to be denied,
and in January 1946, she was interred in Pasay, the same Fr. Bautista performing the burial
ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel
defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by the deceased. They are
grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving
forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as
widower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the
Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here was given due course principally to consider the legal
question-which they amply discussed in their petition and printed brief — whether the
events which took place in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law, a valid and
binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista,
solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan Felix and Matea
de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the
reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a respectable old priest of Pasay City
then, had no reason to side one or the other. . . . Notwithstanding this positive
evidence on the celebration or performance of the marriage in question,
Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same was not in articulo mortis, because
Matea de la Cruz was not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified,
however, that her condition at the time was bad; she was bed-ridden; and
according to his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so
apprehensive was he about her condition that he decided in administering to her
the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest
objection of the Appellees and the trial court against the validity of the marriage
under consideration, is the admitted fact that it was not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613)
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936) specially sections 1, 3, 20 and
21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is
also no question that the parties had legal capacity to contract marriage, and that both
declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they took each
other as husband and wife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a) There was no "marriage contract" signed by the wedded couple the witnesses and the
priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage with the local civil registry.
The factual basis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The
Court of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything, its decision impliedly held
such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis
was a fact", and the only question at issue was whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send
copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the Local Civil Registrar and to register
the said marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the
said marriage invalid." And such was the only issue tendered in the court of first instance.
(See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)
However, we may as well face this second issue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage
certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law
which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is
required, but the parties with legal capacity to contract marriage must declare, in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal
age, that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be set
forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the
 contracting parties and said two witnesses and attested by the person solemnizing
the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes
for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essential requisites for marriage are the legal
capacity of the contracting parties and their consent" (section 1), the latter being
manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing
the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and
wife" — which in this case actually occurred. 3 We think the signing of the marriage
contract or certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the
act.4 No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it an essential requisite
— not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, which we believe it is. The fact of
marriage is one thing; the proof by which it may be established is quite another.
Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage
usually provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and for the
registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or
recording of a marriage is not essential to its validity, the statute being addressed
to the officials issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper
return and registration or recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage"
p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. — . . . The general rule, however, is that statutes which direct
that a license must be issued and procured, that only certain persons shall perform
the ceremony, that a certain number of witnesses shall be present, that a
certificate of the marriage shall be signed, returned, and recorded, and that
persons violating the conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are
addressed to persons in authority to secure publicity and to require a record to be
made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do not void common-law marriages
unless they do so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into without
obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of these statutes to
discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of
matrimony, and relieve from doubt the status of parties who live together as man
and wife, by providing competent evidence of the marriage. . . . (Section 15
American Jurisprudence "Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also
Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or
several formal requirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law, imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies
of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for its omission (section 41)
implies his obligation to see that such "certificate" is executed accordingly. Hence, it
would not be fair to visit upon the wedded couple in the form of annulment, Father
Bautista's omission, if any, which apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder
during the liberation of Manila and its environs.
Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by
sections 20 and 21. It was the priest's obligation; non-compliance with it, should bring no
serious consequences to the married pair, specially where as in this case, it was caused by
the emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and
mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage,
since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity
were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being
one of the requisites. (Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs.
De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the
priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the data usually required for
the issuance of a marriage license. The firstpractically substitutes the latter. Now then, if a
marriage celebrated without the license is not voidable (under Act 3613), 5 this marriage
should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and women who
have lived publicly in a state of concubinage 6, (section 22), we must hold this marriage to
be valid.
The widower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the
plaintiffs who are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the absence of brothers or
sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased. (Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998]
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD
(deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and
filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging
the Court of Appeals[1] Decision promulgated on December 1, 1994 [2] and Resolution
promulgated on February 8, 1995[3] in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision
of the trial court and dismissed petitioners action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint [4] for partition and
damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed Trinidad, before
the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I.[5] On October 28, 1982, Felix died without
issue, so he was not substituted as a party.[6]
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision [7] in favor of the
petitioner, in which it ruled:[8]
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the
legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property
left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of
this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his]
share from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence
introduced as to what year he stopped receiving his share and for how
much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground
that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents were legally
married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed
Decision disposed:[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioners] complaint and the
counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: [10]
The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated December 15,
1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters raised in the motion that
merit the modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition.[11]
The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:[12]
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First
Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of
land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original
owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4)
parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970,
plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal
shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but
the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff
was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes
was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied
that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land described
in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in
1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children,
namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940, survived by
the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio
Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three
(23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that
the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares
and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but
defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court
hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial courts decision:[13]
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she
testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, since
1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of
barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of
the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff
because they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the
father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were
already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness
recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At
the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away
from plaintiffs parents[] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she
knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of
the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she
also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was
Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4
parcels subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they
are located in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness
answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she knew these 4 parcels
belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio
Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3
children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned
or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a
woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat holding a baby
was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was
pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio
Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the
same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case,
witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She
testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said picture, Lourdes Trinidad
was holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by
the court when xxx the picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in
1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had
gone to the house of his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked
as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked
as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of
Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as
she used to pass by it always. It was located just near her house but she cannot exactly tell
the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took
the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was
not present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture
as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his
only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a
widow. She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio Trinidad
and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was
Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and
Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New
Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she
knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also
owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during
planting and harvesting season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the
three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they
inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad
was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the
produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the
one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness
testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he
was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while
Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being
taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio
Trinidad wanted to get his fathers share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that
defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being the brother and
sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad
and Anastacia Briones. That both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad
Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his
mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a
certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That his birth
certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by the
Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their
nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiffs mother died when he was 13 years
old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5
years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got
married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live
with them. So he and his wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and
his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he
presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes
Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs daughter, his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture
according to him. Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle,
defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs son. According to him, these 2 pictures were
taken when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few years
after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested
for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle
his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an
upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is
100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each. The boundaries are :
East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-
Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1
bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining owners are : East-
Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio
Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the
deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two
times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones; West-Bulalio Briones;
South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area
of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310
with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia
Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No.
863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio Trinidad married
to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2
is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones and another Tax
Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is
covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were
getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and corn. Plaintiff further
testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They
were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this
Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he
does not know because he was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death
certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime. That after the death of
his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and
uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother
receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and
Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioners]
highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old,
unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known
the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins because
the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father
are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of
Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes
Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not
married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes
Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, Nanay Taya, referring to Anastacia
Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as
Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad,
according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with
his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes
Trinidad cohabited with anybody before his death, he answered, That I do not
know, neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad
Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of
Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad
had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could
not recall because he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had
gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always
visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody
who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes
Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: I do not know about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property
of their father was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of
land which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered
that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio
Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in
1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was
around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was
already dead before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew where
Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he
was buried in their own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around
the place.When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of
the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the
picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and the
man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix
Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he
said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES
TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She testified
that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and he died in
1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to
Tigayon in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his
brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his
brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married
anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get
married. When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness
answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in
Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother,
Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When
asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, Yes, but she denied
that Arturio Trinidad had lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio
Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by
the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died
already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff
had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When further
asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, He did
not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified
that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children,
namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix
and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the
spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones.Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad,
testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the
same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and
children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for
she has [no] husband or children. According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad
[died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody
will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was
occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could
not be true that Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke
out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could
not answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the
alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio
Trinidad, she answered; Yes. and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad,
child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her, she was only requested to hold this
child to be brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the
baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a
party, she answered; Maybe there was. When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which
is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness identified herself and
explained that she was requested to bring the child to the church and that the
picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latters child
was taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in
court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as
Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being carried by her
brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she
does not know because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to
identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her
brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad,
as his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor
eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another
child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff
if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio
Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness
testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who
testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in
Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and
Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they were her
cousins. She testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes
Trinidad died in their lolas house whose names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She
further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in
Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because
he was already sick. That according to her, about 1 months after his arrival from
Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad
Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes
Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad
died.According to her she was born in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14 years
old when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in
the early months of the year 1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said
she [was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in
their private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and
nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76
years old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that xxx she knew
both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her
house is only around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that
according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in
1941 and he lived only for 15 days and died, witness testified that he did not die
in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived
with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from
her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes
Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato
whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan. That she knew
this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by
Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad
arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition. That she knew both
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to
her, their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of
the sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad
Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he
was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a
certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting
to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of
New Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time.
Respondent Courts Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late
Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled:[14]
We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient
evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action
to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the
late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child.
 Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the
defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One
witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes
Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the
wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant
evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes acknowledgment of plaintiff as his
son, who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil.
23). Where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936,
January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p.
497). Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land
involved in the concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if
possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority,
still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring
ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of
the Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:[15]
1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant
evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence
to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of private
respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision
of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989, after the
Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be attacked
collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired
ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage and of his
filiation?
2. Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the
action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?
The Courts Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties
requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of the decedents estate.
[16]
His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the
existence of a valid and subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his
putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged
by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence presented
by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts.But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts,
such rule does not apply here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the
evidence adduced in this case.[17]
Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were
validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their marriage. This,
according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias[18] ruled that when the question of whether a
marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent
evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public and open
cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in
subsequent documents.[19]
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification [20] from the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were either lost, burned
or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is
not fatal to petitioners case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary
evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage
took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.[21]
In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel
Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad and Inocentes on
May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple
deported themselves as husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old
barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers
association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she
lived only thirty meters away. [22]On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes house
when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioners baptismal party held
at the same house.[23] Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting
marriage.[24] It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
[25]
Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and
Felicidad were named as the childs father and mother.[26]
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the
filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate
child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final
judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[27]
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification [28] that records relative to his birth
were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old town hall was
razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two
family pictures, his baptismal certificate and Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his
second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad (Exhibit
A-2) carrying petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is
another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child
(Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do
not directly prove petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted
by the private respondents as Inocentes legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that
Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners daughter, she demurred that
she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized.
[29]
When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife
and the couples children -- slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an
alleged eye defect.[30]
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one
of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws to show pedigree, as
this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31]
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is
that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, according to the Civil
Code, or by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her father,
according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code
of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family
by either consanguinity or affinity, [32] her testimony does not constitute family reputation
regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioners legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates
over private respondents self-serving negations. In sum, private respondents thesis is that
Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents witness,
Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the
Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which
was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible
because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and his answers on direct
examination were noncommittal and evasive:[33]
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was
married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia
Trinidad and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know
if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of
anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt
Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has
stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the
Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to Tigayon
because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and
died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a half months after his return to
Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that
Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.[34]
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the
bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that Inocentes died
in March 1941.[35] The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; [36] thus,
it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local
residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the
Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area.[37]
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without
objection from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his status as Inocentes
legitimate child.[38]
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side
outweighs that of the adverse party. [39] Compared to the detailed (even if awkwardly
written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that petitioner failed to prove
his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the
preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, including the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts,
the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their
personal credibility.[40] Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly
held that the weight of evidence was in petitioners favor. It declared:
xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying
the status of being their nephew xxx before plaintiff [had] gotten married and
had a family of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of
the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the
defendants xxx is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These
family pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of
getting his fathers share. xxxx His demand for the partition of the share of his
father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their
nephew. xxxx In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a
status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants
themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for the
partition xxx as he was already having a family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes
Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the
preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita
Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the
time she testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been
a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has
nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who
are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case
for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor
children.[41]
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. [42] Rather than rely on this
axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his parents
marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to
petitioners cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the
interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-
ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession -- in the concept of
owners -- of the parcels of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired
ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the
property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of one benefits
all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. [43] Thus, no
prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-
heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner,
in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents his share of the
produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private
respondents was beyond question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any,
of the co-ownership of petitioners father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these
pieces of land were still in their fathers name. Although private respondents had possessed
these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the land
during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-
ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held:[44]
x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose
benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not
lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del
Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs.
Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and
cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the
other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118
[1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding
that petitioners claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision dated July 4, 1989 is Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
REINSTATED. No costs. ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
SO ORDERED.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated May
FIRST DIVISION 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380 its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
Petitioner,
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of
Present: Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained
against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to
remarry under the Philippine Law.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]
- versus - (Chairman),

Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

Carpio, and
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Azcuna, JJ. Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.

Respondent. Promulgated: Orbecido.

October 5, 2005 In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
x--------------------------------------------------x
American citizen.

DECISION Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
QUISUMBING, J.:
him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking

naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in

to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER
ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation. [5] Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by
a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any
question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a
divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also
adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the
Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now
provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
 except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
38.
married to the Filipino spouse.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
supplied)
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation remarry under Philippine law.
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizenship by naturalization?
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
citizen while residing in the U.S.A. [11]
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings [9] on the Family Code, the
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
can thus remarry.
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those
whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These
spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign
spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
be deleted and made into law only after more widespread
consultation. (Emphasis supplied.) were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would
be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its
exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose
Legislative Intent
of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent. [12]
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
 If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26. not evidence.[13]

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [14] Such foreign law must

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
capacitating him or her to remarry. fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. [15] Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
enter into another marriage.
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare,
capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2
based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American
of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse,
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
should be allowed to remarry.
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
No pronouncement as to costs.
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
SO ORDERED.
 secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
SECOND DIVISION (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166676 her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she
has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized,
Petitioner, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
Present: alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her
gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to
Jeff.
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES, The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
- versus - consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The
TINGA, Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
VELASCO, JR., and Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

BRION, JJ.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the PhilippinesPhilippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate
Promulgated: stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN, respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did
not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this
Respondent. condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of
September 12, 2008 female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents
condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has
made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x advantageous to her.

DECISION The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12,
QUISUMBING, J.: 2005 which reads:

The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision [1] dated January 12, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan and ordered the
following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer
Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately
presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting
of his petition. It was medically proven that petitioners body produces
male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and feelings are
that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and
wants to be acknowledged and identified as a male.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of

The facts are as follows. Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in the
birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for prescribed fees:
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan
to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
 It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby
amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal
of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES
OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE,
WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL
ADRENAL HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction
of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to
male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer
to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Section 3,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo did not
implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province
where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as
mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [6] The OSG argues that Rule
108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of
Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth
Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the
Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the
course of the proceedings, [8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth
certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true sex/gender, [9] change of sex or gender is
allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent substantially complied with the requirements
of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present
the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in which he
resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be
signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed, or some
other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the
province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is
sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and
substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the petition,
shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a
copy of the order be published before the hearing at least once a week
for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general circulation
published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for
the hearing shall not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor
within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and
oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the proper provincial or
city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date
fixed in the order that such order has been published as directed and that
the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and
reasonable cause appears for changing the name of the petitioner,
adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer of the
petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of the
municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who
shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and
valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization;
(k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m)
judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did not
implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party
in a proceeding for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. [12] Unless all possible
indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered
as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. [13] The corresponding petition
should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have
or may claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. [14] Respondent, however,
invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which states that courts shall construe
the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial
compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local
civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil
Code provides:

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
without a judicial order.
proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court
shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from
the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also
grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the
parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The
correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now
applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. [18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this
condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX
chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2)
normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and
fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such as
deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000
to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions [21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of widespread
use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of
a gonochoristicspecies whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism
with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female
gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies,
some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically
modified to resemble either male or female genitals. [24] More commonly,
an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime medication in
order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or
female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It
has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land
for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female. [25] The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on
medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has
female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and
the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases
of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already
ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken
steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a
female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much
less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to
CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo
treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs
the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a
male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the
law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2)
how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect
respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already
difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with
his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. [28] The trial courts grant
of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name
to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name
merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from
female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January
12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them
male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us
out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the
bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and
the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law
recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with
regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex
appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27,
2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery 2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight,
a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies
of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar
of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his
American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision 4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant
portions read:
 Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a
man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. 6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals 7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic.
It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the
change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment
through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republic’s petition, set aside the
decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is
allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name
and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became
entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right. 12 Petitions for change of name
are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change
of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. 14 It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of
first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The
intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently denied. 15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change
of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by
the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in
the community; or
 (3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself
into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or
civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex
reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public
interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. 19 In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. 20 In this case, he failed to show,
or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official
name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s
first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been
filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an
improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided
under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had
no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all
these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as the
change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the
Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and
the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court the correction of such errors. 22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as
misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or
changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided,
however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality,
age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision
can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while
to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute." 26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no
error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such
as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial
decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of
marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial
decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and
nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it
recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his
own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.
The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end
of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a
person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code
provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the
physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the
declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from
documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than
thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth
or by either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and
(f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done
by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of
a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, 30 is
immutable.31
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and
"female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and
even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage,
there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the
sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female" 32 or
"the distinction between male and female." 33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears
young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include
persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in
a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in
that sense unless the context compels to the contrary." 36 Since the statutory language of the
Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be
argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or
something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the
category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on
the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or
prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public
policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but
petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage,
one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by
petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws
which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women
which could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However,
it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to
apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.

In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to

determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this
case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for
correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds
may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If
the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may
be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no
authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law
where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch
of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life
is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public
policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.