THE OVERSEAS BANK OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. AMBROSIO M. GERALDEZ, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Manila, TEODOSIO VALENTON and ANDRES A. JUAN, respondents-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

The Overseas Bank of Manila appealed under Republic Act No. 5440 from the orders of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dated January 4 and February 9, 1977, dismissing, on the ground of
prescription, its complaint against Teodosio Valenton and Andres A. Juan for the recovery of the
sum of one hundred fifty thousand pesos plus twelve percent interest per annum from February 17,
1966 and ten percent of the amount due as attorney's fees (Civil Case No. 105037).

The allegations in the complaint dated October 15, 1976, which were admitted hypothetically by
Valenton and Juan, are that on February 16, 1966 they obtained from the bank a credit
accommodation of P150,000, which was secured by a chattel mortgage, and that written
extrajudicial demands dated February 9, March 1 and 27, 1968, November 13 and December 8,
1975 and February 7 and August 27, 1976 were made upon the debtors but they refused to pay on
the ground that their obligation was assumed by a third party. The bank alleged that the supposed
assumption of obligation was made without its consent.

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court reasoned out that, because the bank's cause of action
accrued on February 16, 1966 (the date of the manager's check for P150,000 issued by the plaintiff
bank to the Republic Bank) and as the complaint was filed on October 22, 1976 or more than ten
years from the accrual of the cause of action, the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations.

As to the interruption of the ten-year period by the written extrajudicial demands, the trial court held
that a demand letter tolls the prescriptive period only for the period of time indicated in the letter
within which payment should be made and prescription commences to run again after the expiration
of that period and no payment is made.

The trial court observed that, because in the demand letters no period of payment was indicated,
that would mean that payment should be made within one day and, therefore, the six demand letters
interrupted the prescriptive period for six days only. (The trial court noted that the seventh demand
letter dated August 27, 1976 was sent when the ten-year prescriptive period had allegedly expired.)

The lower court ruled that the action, which should have been filed within ten years expiring on
February 15, 1976, was extended for six days only or up to February 21, 1976, and consequently,
according to its ratiocination, the action was filed out of time on October 22, 1976.

The issue is as to the effect of the bank's demand letters on the prescriptive period or whether the
action had already prescribed.

We hold that the lower court erred in holding that each of the demand letters suspended the
prescriptive period for one day only. The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial
demand means that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is
the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling of the
prescriptive period.
An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the tune the right of action
accrues (Art. 1144[1], Civil Code). "The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any
written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor" (Art. 11 55, lbid, applied in Gonzalo Puyat &
Sons, Inc. vs. City of Manila, 117 Phil. 985, 993; Philippine National Bank vs. Fernandez, L20086,
July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 645, 648; Harden vs, Harden, L-22174, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 706, 711).

Interruption of the prescription of actions by means of a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor
is a rule of civil law origin. Article 1973 of the old Civil Code, from which article 1155 was taken,
provides that "la prescripcion de las acciones se interrumpe por su ejercicio ante los Tribunales, por
reclamacion extrajudicial del acreedor y por cualquier acto de reconocimiento de la deuda por el
deudor". Article 1155 specifies that the extrajudicial demand and the acknowledgment should be in
writing.

A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the
prescriptive period. Giorgi says: La interrupcion difiere de la suspension porque borra el tiempo
transcurrido anteriormente y obliga a la prescripcion a comenzar de nuevo" (9 Teoria de las
Obligaciones, 2nd Ed., p. 222). "La interrupcion ... quita toda eficacia al tiempo pasado y abre
camino a un computo totalmente nuevo, que parte del ultimo momento del acto interruptivo,
precisamente, como si en aquel momento y no antes hubiese nacido el credito" (8 Giorgi, Ibid, pp.
390-2).

The same view is entertained by Manresa who, in speaking of interruption of prescription by means
of a judicial action, says: La interrupcion de la prescripcion extintiva se produce eficazmente desde
luego con la presentacion o interposicion de la demanda o con cualquier otro acto en que sea
ejercitada la accion que hubiera de ser prescrita en otro caso, y en su virtud habra de empezar a
contarse de nuevo el termino cuando cesen los efectos de dicho ejercicio, ya por abandono o
desistimiento voluntario del actor, ya por caducidad de la instancia, ya por sentencia recaida en el
juicio, sin que pueda acumularse en ningun caso el tiempo anterior a la interrupcion al que
transcurriere despues de ella". (12 Codigo Civil, 5th Ed., p. 955. See 32 Codigo Civil, Quintus
Mucius Scaevola Vol. II, p. 991 re "El comienzo de un nuevo plazo".)

Under article 1973. it was held that if the action for the collection of a sum of money accrued on
August 31, 1897 and there were written extrajudicial demands by the creditor in 1906, 1907 and
1910, the fifteen-year period for enforcing that kind of personal action had not elapsed when the
action was filed on duly 18, 1913 (Marella vs. Agoncillo, 44 Phil. 844, 854-5).

That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483,
488, where it ruled that the interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial demand
means that "the full period of prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the
suspension". "When prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand the full time for the prescription
must be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption" (Spring vs. Barr, 120 So. 256 cited in 54
C.J.S. 293, note 27). That rule was followed in Nator and Talon vs. CIR, 114 Phil. 661, Sagucio vs.
Bulos, 115 Phil. 786 and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November
18, 1967, 21 SCRA 974, 981.

In the aforecited case of Spring vs. Barr which was decided under the Civil Code of Louisiana, the
one-year prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of an action in July, 1923. The action was
terminated on March 2, 1926 after the plaintiff was non-suited. On June 10, 1926, the plaintiff
renewed the action. It was held that the first case interrupted the one-year period and after its
termination, the one-year period started to run again from March 2. The second suit, filed on June
10, 1926, was filed on time.
In the Florendo case, a judgment for support against the husband and in favor of the wife was
rendered by this Court on March 4, 1935 (Organo vs. Florendo, 61 Phil. 1028, unpublished). In 1943,
in an action for divorce filed by the husband against the wife, the latter filed a counterclaim for the
payment of the unpaid installments of support decreed in the 1935 judgment. Those installments
dated as far back as February 1, 1932, having been fixed in an earlier judgment dated September 8,
1909.

It was held that each monthly installment prescribed in ten years but the prescriptive period was
interrupted by the filing of the action which culminated in the 1935 judgment already mentioned. The
ten- year period commenced to run anew from March 4, 1935 when the said judgment was rendered
on 1943, when the counterclaim for support was filed in the divorce suit, the said ten-year period had
not yet completely run out. Hence, the counterclaim for support was not barred by prescription.

Interruption of the prescriptive period as meaning renewal of the original term seems to be the basis
of the ruling in Ramos vs. Condez, L-22072, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1146, 1151. In that case the
cause of action accrued on June 25, 1952. There was a written acknowledgment by the vendors on
November 10, 1956 of the validity of the deed of sale.

It was held that the vendees' action against the vendors on the basis of the said deed of sale, which
action was filed on May 22, 1963, had not prescribed because the ten-year prescriptive period was
interrupted on November 10, 1956. (See Mina vs. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 590, 593; Herrera vs.
Auditor General, 102 Phil. 875; Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Solano, 104 Phil. 1050 and Talens
vs. M. Chuakay & Co., 104 Phil. 1047 as to renewal of obligation by means of written
acknowledgment.)

In National Marketing Corporation vs. Marquez, L-25553, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 722, it
appears that Gabino Marquez executed on June 24, 1950 a promissory note wherein he bound
himself to pay to the Namarco P12,000 in installments within the one-year period starting on June
24, 1951 and ending on June 25, 1952. After making partial payments on July 7, 1951 and February
23, 1952, Marquez defaulted.

His total obligation, including interest, as of October 31, 1964, amounted to P19,990.91. Written
demands for the payment of the obligation were made upon Marquez and his surety on March 22,
1956, February 16, 1963, June 10, September 18 and October 13, 1964. Marquez did not make any
further payment.

The Namarco sued Marquez and his surety on December 16, 1964. They contended that the action
had prescribed because the ten-year period for suing on the note expired on June 25, 1962. That
contention was not sustained. It was held that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the written
demands, copies of which were furnished the surety.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the lower court's order of dismissal is reversed and set
aside. It is directed to conduct further proceedings in the case. Costs against private respondents-
appellees.

SO ORDERED.
ELIGIO P. BUENAVENTE, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, ET AL.,
Respondents.

Gerardo Payno for petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon &
Solicitor Enrique M Reyes and Special Counsels Ernesto P. Fernandez and Luis S. Miro for
respondents.

The petitioners, numbering thirty-three (33) family-heads, with houses erected on the river bank portion
of a lot owned by the National Development Corporation (NDC for short) located at Pureza Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila, filed in the CFI of Manila on April 30, 1970, a position for Declaratory Relief and
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction against the respondents with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
imaginary injunction to prevent the demolition of their 1 houses and their relocation to Carmona,
Cavite, as was threatened to be done by respondent Sebastian Santiago, Officer-in-Charge of the
Presidential Assistant on Housing Resettlement Agency in a letter dated April 15, l970 addressed to the
petitioners. They also pray that after trial, they be declared first priority applicants of the tenement
housing unit built near their place of abode, pursuant to Republic Act No. 3469, entitled "An Act
Authorizing the Construction of the Multi-Storey Tenement Building Projects, for the Poor and
Appropriating Funds Therefor."

A restraining order was issued on April 25, 1970, by Judge Jose G. Bautista as prayed for by petitioners.
On May 5, 1970, respondents filed i their answer with an opposition to the issuance of a Writ Of
Preliminary injunction, alleging that petitioners are mere squatters on the lot in question and are,
therefore, without any legal right to be protected either by declaratory relief or by a writ of prohibition;
that while a building intended for tenement purposes had been constructed, it was only partially
completed as such because the purpose for which it was constructed was abandoned for the reason that
the entire site with the uncompleted building has been alloted as school site and classrooms by the
Office of the President for the use of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC). The Answer also
questions the propriety of the remedy availed of because declaratory relief is proper only when the
petition therefor is brought before, not after, a breach of the contract or statute has been committed,
and prohibition being an extraordinary remedy, is available only if there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, but which is not so because they could, and
should have, exhausted administrative remedies by seeking a reconsideration of the letter-order of the
President dated March 3, 1969 for the occupancy by the PCC of the uncompleted Tenement Building at
the NDC compound.

On September 14, 1970, Hon. Serafin Cuevas, who took the place of Hon. Jose G. Bautista. after hearing
the parties in argument, amplified by their respective memorandum, (pp. 6274; pp. 75-79, Rollo), issued
an order dismissing the petition, and dissolving the restraining order issued on April 25, 1970. (pp. 80-
89, Rollo). A motion for reconsideration was filed supported by a Memorandum (pp. 90-96; 97-100,
Rollo), but opposed by the respondents (pp. 104-106, Rollo). On January 18, 1971, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal from the order of the court a quo (p. 114, Rollo), and the Record on Appeal was
approved on February 8, 1971 (p. 115, Rollo). However, on March 19, 1971, petitioners filed the present
petition for certiorari which was given due course on March 24, 1971 (p. 136,

Respondents' Answer was filed on May 14, 1971 and the issues as joined are those which have been
assigned as errors of the court a quo by the petitioners to wit: (1) whether the court a quo erred in
holding that petitioners are squatters; (2) whether court a quo erred in holding that petitioners have no
right to be protected under Republic Act No. 3469 and Rules and Regulations promulgated to implement
it; (3) whether the court a quo erred in dissolving the restraining order earlier issued by Judge Jose G.
Bautista; and (4) whether the court a quo erred in holding that the PCC being a government operated
entity is of preferred category.

(1) In denying that they are "squatters" on the NDC lot, as they were so held by the court a quo,
petitioners rely on the following definition of a squatter, "one who settles on the land of another
without any legal authority. This term is applied particularly to person who settle on the public land." (3
Mart. La. U.S. 293; 5 Bles. U.S. 530). Cyclopedic Law Dictionary by Shumaker and Longsdorf From this
definition, petitioners can derive no comfort from the fact that they built their houses allegedly with the
knowledge and consent of the NDC, and that the lot is not a public land.

What the above definition contemplates is a right that owes its source from the law, and which,
accordingly may be protected by and under the law. Having built their houses with the knowledge and
consent of the NDC which is a government owned corporation, is not sufficient to vest in them any right
which they can assert against the lot-owner when the latter demands that they vacate the premises on
legal and justifiable grounds. (John O. Yu vs. Maximo de Lara, L-16084, November 30, 1962, 62 O.G. No.
2, p. 6226; City of Manila vs. Garcia, L-26053, February 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 413). When their continued
occupation of the lot becomes one against the will of the owner, even if the latter had allowed their
occupation at the beginning without even collecting rentals, the owner is certainly not barred, under
any known principle of law, either by estopped or waiver, to demand that the lot be vacated so that he
may himself enjoy his dominical and possessory rights thereto.

In any case, petitioners have no right to continue in occupation of the land, whether, as legally defined,
they are squatters or not. Their occupation by mere tolerance can by no means given rise to a right that
the law should protect in their favor as against the true legal owners. That the land is a public land can
neither be denied as to give any semblance of plausibility to petitioners' contention that they are not
squatters under the definition they have invoked because the land is not a public land. It is owned by
the NDC hence a "public land" in the broad acceptation of these words.

(2) The law they invoke, Republic Act No. 3469, as giving them the right to occupy units in the still
uncompleted tenement building which has been abandoned for the purpose of its construction as
originally intended, for a more overriding necessity Identified with a greater public interest, neither
confers upon them the right they claim to be entitled to, and to be respected by the government itself.
There is, as the Solicitor General correctly observes, no conflict between Republic Act No. 3469 and the
presidential directive embodied in the letter of March 3, 1969. This letter, which petitioners prefer to
call executive order," allows only the temporary use of the tenement building by the PCC. It did not
direct a permanent use of the building that would totally and permanently deprive appellants of their
expected enjoyment thereof under the tenement housing statute. It is merely a temporary expedient
impelled by an urgent public necessity which plainly assumes higher priority over what petitioners
would want to enjoy for their own personal benefit. And even if the project were entirely abandoned for
tenement housing purposes, as so alleged in the Answer, the Government would not run afoul of the
law, as it could very well erect tenement buildings elsewhere it may deem more useful and
advantageous to the intended beneficiaries, in pursuance of the purpose of the law. The Government is
certainly not precluded from abandoning a project it has started upon a reaction of either a mistake in
the choice of the site for such project, or that the site first chosen could more usefully be devoted to
another public purpose. The petitioners herein may not claim any vested right by the mere fact that the
NDC lot was chosen for a tenement housing project site, but upon consideration of a more pressing
public necessity, the project had to be abandoned, either temporarily or permanently. The same project
can be transferred elsewhere with a view to pursuing the objective of Republic Act No. 3469.

Furthermore, Section 3 of the aforecited Act provides that after the completion of the tenement
buildings, the same shall be turned over to the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC)
which shall allocate the rooms by lottery. If at all it is therefore only after the tenement building has
been fully completed that petitioners may apply for occupancy of the rooms, which have to be allocated
by lottery, but not till then. That the building has not been completed, for a cause, not involving a
violation of Republic Act No. 3469 cannot be discounted, such as lack of funds which dictates perhaps
the temporary abandonment of the project. Petitioners miserably failed to show that such a possibility
should be ruled out as giving justification for the non-prosecution of the tenement housing project to
completion, instead of diverting it to another pur pose. What the President did in the premises could
involve, as it apparently does, a mere question of policy into which the courts cannot inquire (Palanan
Lumber and Plywood Co. vs. Arrange, et al., L-27106, March 20,1968, 22 SCRA 1186)

(3) Petitioners' claim of the court a quo having unceremoniously and thus erroneously, dissolved
the restraining order issued on April 25, 1971, on September 14, 1971 hardly merits any consideration.
The dissolution of the restraining order was but a necessary and logical consequence of the dismissal of
the petition as ordained by the court a quo in its Order issued on September 14, 1971, as the said Order
itself so states.

(4) Finally, petitioners except to what the court a quo said "that the uncompleted tenement
housing building was assigned not to a private individual of the less preferred category as ordained by
the pertinent rules and regulations, but to an educational institution, the Philippine College of
Commerce which is owned, managed and operated by the Government. While it is true that petitioners
may be preferred as against any other group of eligible applicants, such priority must be understood as
subservient to a need of public purpose - the use thereof for school purposes by the PCC which is
immediate and imperative." Petitioners argue that as the legislative body has laid down the policy in
enacting Republic Act No. 3469, any act of the executive department not conducive to that policy must
be held to be illegal, such as the directive of the President assigning to the tenement building
constructed pursuant to Republic Act No. 3469, a purpose alien to that as expressly stated in the law,
which, according to petitioner, would then amount to repealing the law by executive action, not by
legislation, as it should be.

The directive contained in the letter of the office of the President dated March 3, 1968, is not in any
sense a violation of Republic Act No. 3469, or in disregard of its propose. The law merely authorizes the
construction of tenement buildings for housing purposes, appropriating funds therefor. The law does
not prohibit the use of a tenement building before the building has been completed and the rooms
thereof have been allocated to eligible occupants, for another public purpose, specially when the use is
only temporary and is of an urgent character. The President is vested with authority to approve the rules
and regulations to be promulgated for the implementation of Republic Act No. 3469. This authority, at
least, implies a discretion on his part to order the use of the building, before its completion, for other
than tenement housing purposes. In its uncompleted condition, the building may not be turned over yet
to the PHHC, as ordained by Section 3 of R. A. No. 3469. If in the meantime, the President, finds it
necessary to use the building, while still in a condition not quite ready for dwelling purposes, for an
imperative public purpose, We perceive no reason or cause to hold his action repugnant or contrary to
R.A. No. 3469. The application of the priorities as established in the Rules and Regulations upon which
petitioners as established in the Rules and Regulations upon which petitioners predicate their claims to
be allocated the rooms of the uncompleted building has not yet arisen. As already stated, they have not
acquired any right entitled to legal protection, and without being possessed of such right, they have no
cause of action, a ground fully justifying the order brought to Us for review, dismissing their petition for
declaratory relief and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, without special pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.
JAIME LEDESMA, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RCBC

Petitioner has filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution of March 24, 1993 which
denied his petition for review on certiorari for failure to sufficiently show that respondent Court of
Appeals had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.

On August 21, 1980, private respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation filed Case No.
38287 in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal against petitioner to enforce the terms of Trust
Receipt Agreement No. 7389 executed by them on April 1, 1974 but which petitioner had failed to
comply with. As summons could not be served on the latter, said case was dismissed without
prejudice on March 3, 1981. On December 2, 1988, private respondent bank instituted Civil Case
No. 88-2572 in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 133, against petitioner on
the same cause of action and subject matter.

Petitioner's motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription was denied and judgment was rendered
in favor of private respondent by the court a quo ordering petitioner to pay private respondent
P168,00.00 with interest thereon of 12% per annum from December 2, 1988 until full payment of the
obligation, P16,800.00 as attorney's fees, and costs of suit. Said judgment was affirmed by
respondent Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29406 in its decision promulgated on January 7, 1992,1 and
petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution dated August 6, 1992.2

Petitioner's petition for review on certiorari of the said judgment was denied in our aforesaid
resolution, hence its present motion for reconsideration, dated May 5, 1993. Contending that the
second action filed by private respondent bank had already prescribed, petitioner invokes the rulings
in Vda. de Nator, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.3 and Fulton Insurance Co. vs. Manila
Railroad Co., et al.4 and invites us "to give a second look at the apparently conflicting or divergent
jurisprudence."

Article 1155 of the Civil. Code provides that the prescription of an action, involving in the present
case the 10-year prescriptive period for filing an action on a written contract under Article 1144(1) of
the Code, is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. The effects of the last two
instances have already been decided by this Court, the rationale wherein should necessarily apply to
the first.

The matter of the interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written extrajudicial demand
by the creditor was decided in Overseas Bank of Manila vs. Geraldez, et al.5 in this wise:

. . . The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means

that the said period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. That is
the correct meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere suspension or tolling
of the prescriptive period.

xxx xxx xxx

A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and
starts anew the prescriptive period. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

 That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in Florendo vs.
Organo, 90 Phil 483, 488, where it was ruled that the interruption of the ten-year
prescriptive period through a judicial demand means that "the full period of
prescription commenced to run anew upon the cessation of the suspension." When
prescription is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the prescription must
be reckoned from the cessation of the interruption. . . .

The interruption of the prescriptive period by reason of a written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor was dealt with in Philippine National Railways vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et
al.,6 thus:

Article 1155 of the Civil Code provides that the "prescription of actions is
interrupted" inter alia, "when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor." This simply means that the period of prescription, when interrupted by such
a written acknowledgment, begins to run anew; and whatever time of limitation might
have already elapsed from the accrual of the cause of action is thereby negated and
rendered inefficacious. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The effect of the interruption spoken of in Article 1155 is to renew the obligation,
to make prescription run again from the date of the interruption . . .

Based on the aforecited cases, Article 1155 has twice been interpreted to mean that upon the
cessation of the suspension of the prescriptive period, the full period of prescription commences to
run anew. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that in case of the filing of an action, the prescriptive
period is merely tolled and continues to run again, with only the balance of the remaining period
available for the filing of another action. This postulation of petitioner, if we are to adopt it, would
result in an absurdity wherein Article 1155 would be interpreted in two different ways, i.e., the
prescriptive period is interrupted in case of an extrajudicial demand and a written acknowledgment of
a debt, but it is merely tolled where an action is filed in court.

In Vda. de Nator, it was held that:

. . . The filing of the case with the CFI arrested the period of prescription (Art. 1155
NCC), and the interruption of said period lasted until the time that the dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction became final. "When prescription is interrupted by a judicial
demand, the full time for the prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the
interruption". . . . The whole period during which the case had been pending cannot
be counted for arriving at the prescriptive period. In other words, the running of the
period of prescription in this particular case was interrupted on August 6, 1953, when
the case in the CFI was filed and began to run again on August 30, 1958, when the
same Court had dismissed the case. As the complaint was filed with the CIR on
December 5, 1958, the action has not yet prescribed.

This case obviously appears to have made conflicting statements since it proceeds upon a certain
premise but arrives at a different conclusion. Hence, we cannot agree that the statements therein
sufficiently support the thesis of petitioner.

The case of Fulton Insurance Company is not clear either on the matter of the interruption of the
prescriptive period where an action is filed in court. It was there held that:
 There are two school(s) of thought as to the legal effect of the cessation of the
interruption by an intervening action upon the period of prescription. There is the
view expressed and perhaps, not without reasons, that the full period of prescription
should start to run anew, reckoned from the date of the cessation of the interruption.
The contrary view is, that the cessation of the interruption merely tolls the running of
the remaining period of prescription, deducting from the full period thereof the time
that has already elapsed prior to the filing of the intervening action. Nevertheless, all
discussion on this point is academic; considered in the light of either view, We find
that the second action is not barred.

In the aforesaid case, the defendant therein moved for the dismissal of the second case alleging that
the filing of the first case neither tolled nor interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. This
Court ruled that the filing of the first action interrupted the running of the period, and then declared
that at any rate, the second action was filed within the balance of the period remaining. It concluded
that the issue of whether the filing of the action merely tolled or it actually interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period was moot and academic because, in either case, the second action was still
filed within the prescriptive period. Consequently, the Fulton case cannot also sustain the thesis of
petitioner.

On the foregoing considerations, we are convinced and so hold that the correct interpretations of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code are reflected in and furnished by the doctrinal pronouncements
in Overseas Bank of Manila and Philippine National Railways Company, not only because they are
later in point of time but because the issue is squarely resolved in a decisive and logical manner
therein. Petitioner's submission would result in a bifurcated interpretation of Article 1155, aside from
the irrational conclusion that a judicial action itself cannot produce the same result on the
prescriptive period as a mere extrajudicial demand or an acknowledgment of the debt.

Accordingly, petitioner having failed to adduce any cogent reason or substantial argument to warrant
a reconsideration of our resolution of March 24, 1993, the present motion is hereby DENIED with
FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO SOLIS and ANGELA SOLIS CALIMLIM, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE SOLIS and FLORENCIA DIOQUINO respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners Antonio
Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim seek the review of the decision (pp 81-88, Rollo) of the Honorable
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 45505-R and 45506R dated May 12, 1977 which set aside the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. D-2039 declaring petitioner
Antonio Solis the exclusive owner of an unregistered parcel of land consisting of an area of five
hundred thirty-six (536) square meters.

In a complaint (pp. 1-8, Record on Appeal) dated May 30, 1967, plaintiffs Antonio Solis and Angela
Solis Calimlim alleged that they are co-owners of a parcel of residential land situated at Barrio Bued,
Calasiao, Pangasinan, with an area of 1,073 square meters more or less; that this parcel of land was
inherited from their parents, Simeon Solis and Petronila Bauzon; that in 1939, they allowed
defendants Jose Solis and his wife Florencia Dioquino to construct a house on the eastern portion of
plaintiffs' parcel of land (consisting of 536 square meters) with the understanding that they
(defendants) should vacate the premises as soon as their financial conditions would permit them. In
1965, plaintiffs demanded that the defendants vacate the premises but the latter refused.

The answer (pp. 8-10, Record on Appeal) of defendants raised as affirmative defense the fact of
their ownership of the property in question having acquired the same by way of donacion proper
nuptias from spouses Tomas Solis and Hermenegilda Jimenez, way back in 1931. They also alleged
that since 1931, they were in possession of said property openly, continuously and adversely, to the
exclusion of all others, and in the concept of owners and that since 1931 they have paid the taxes
due on the property.

On November 21, 1968, plaintiffs filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction (pp. 11 -12, Record on Appeal) praying that the defendants or their agents be enjoined
from commencing and continuing the construction of a residential house on the land in question. The
motion was granted in an order dated December 11, 1968.

On February 17, 1969, plaintiffs and defendants, thru their respective counsel, filed the following
partial stipulation of facts:

COMES NOW the plaintiffs thru their undersigned counsel, and the defendants thru their counsel,
respectfully submit the following partial stipulation of facts;

1. Parties know the Identity of the land in litigation as described under paragraph 11
of the complaint;

2. That the subject matter of the litigation refers to the eastern side of the property
described in par. 11 of the complaint consisting of about 526 square meters;

3. That the defendants has (sic) a house in the said eastern portion of the said
property;
 4. That the whole property was previously owned by Simeon Solis;

5. That there exist an alleged donation proper nuptias executed by deceased Tomas
Solis in favor of Jose Solis, the defendant over the eastern half of the said property
described in par. 11 of the complaint;

6. That Tomas Solis, father of defendant Jose Solis was the nephew of Simeon Solis;
that Tomas Solis was the son of Domingo Solis; brother of Simeon Solis;

7. That the land in question has been declared for taxation purposes as follows:

a. Before 1918-T.D. 7659 in the name of Simeon Solis.

b. 1918-T.D. 21465 revised T.D. 7659 also in the name of Simeon

Solis.

c. 1920-T.D. 37709 revised T.D. 21465 also in the name of Simeon

Solis.

d. 1951-T.D. 11144 revised T.D. 37709 also in the name of Simeon

Solis.

e. 1965-T.D. 27385 revised T.D. 11144 now in the name of Antonio

Solis.

f. 1966-T.D. 16147 revised T.D. 27385 also in the name of Antonio

Solis.

g. 1967-T.D. 20097 cancels T.D. 16147 in the name of Jose Solis.

... (pp. 15-17, Record on Appeal).

The healing of the case was conducted on a single setting on June 25, 1969 where both parties
were allowed to present their evidence.

After presentation of evidence, oral and documentary, the trial court found that indeed, herein private
respondents spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino were in possession of the eastern half
portion of the property described in the complaint for more than thirty years. However, it ruled that
such possession cannot be held adversely against the plaintiffs who had shown a better title thereto.
The pertinent portion of the decision of the trial court dated July 17, 1969 reads:

The court rules that while the defendants had possessed the eastern portion of the
land in question for more than 30 years, such possession cannot be held adversely
against the plaintiffs who had shown a better title thereof. Hence, prescription does
not lie in this case.

From the partial stipulation submitted by the parties, it was shown that the whole
property was previously owned by Simeon Solis, father of herein plaintiffs, and that
the same land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Simeon Solis
from 1918 to 1951.
 While the defendants exhibited the deed donation proper nuptias (Exh. 1) executed
in their favor by Tomas Solis and Hermenegilda Jimenez, they have however, failed
to present proof that Simeon Solis who previously owned the whole land in question
had conveyed the eastern portion thereof consisting of 536 square meters to his
brother Tomas Solis. The situation shows in effect, that Tomas Solis had no title to
the property he donated to his children, the defendants, and therefore the latter
acquired no right over the subject property.

There is evidence of the plaintiffs to the effect that Angela Solis Calimlim had already
renounced her right and interest over the land in question in favor of Antonio Solis.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court hereby renders

judgment 1) declaring the plaintiff Antonio Solis the exclusive owner of the land in
question; 2) ordering the defendants to vacate the eastern portion of the land in
question; 3) ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P800.00 for
attorney's fees; and 4) to pay the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 27-29, Record on Appeal)

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino appealed
to the Court of Appeals. In a decision (pp. 81-88, Rollo) dated May 12, 1977, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the appellants the lawful owners of the eastern
half of the parcel of land described in the complaint.

The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

In the present case, there is no question that the actual possession by the appellants
of the disputed portion of the land dates back to 1933 and since then appellants have
been in the adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and interrupted possession
of the disputed property in the concept of an owner until this case was filed in court
on May 30, 1967.

x x x.

.....If we have said it before, we repeat it here for emphasis that the appellants took
possession of the disputed eastern portion of the land as owners by virtue of a
donation executed in their favor in 1933. Since then, they have exercised various
acts of dominion over the disputed property such as constructing their house thereon
enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others and paying realty taxes corresponding
to the disputed one-half portion of the land. Even the plaintiffs acknowledge this fact
by their own evidence that they, for their own part, also paid half of the realty taxes
for the western portion of the land (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-6; tsn., June 25, 1969, p.
39).lâwphî1.ñèt

x x x.

... By the plaintiffs' own evidence, they paid realty taxes only for the other half of the
property (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-6; tsn., June 25, 1969, p. 39). This is strongly
indicative of the fact that the defendants are the owners of the eastern half of the
land over which they, in turn, paid the corresponding half of the realty taxes from
1934 (Exhibits 2, 2-A to 2-S). Further, the circumstance that neither the appellants
nor their donors have declared the disputed portion in their names prior to 1967 is
 not sufficient to overcome the undisputed possession for more than 30 years of the
property in question by the appellants. (See Vigor vs. Director of Lands, CA 57 O.G.
5888).

WHEREFORE, finding the Appeal to be meritorious, the judgment appealed from is

hereby set aside, and another one entered dismissing the complaint and declaring
the appellants as the lawful owners of the eastern half of the parcel of land described
in the complaint without costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 84-88, Rollo)

The Motion for Reconsideration filed thereat was denied on August 3, 1977.

Aggrieved, Antonio Solis and Angela Solis Calimlim filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari on September 19, 1977. The herein petitioners manifested in their petition that they
admit the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals as embodied in its decision, but they take
exception to the conclusions drawn by the appellate court from the undisputed findings (p. 17, Rollo).
The following arguments (pp. 23-24, Rollo) were presented in support of their petition:

1. The Court of Appeals was not justified in concluding that the possession by private
respondents over the disputed property was adverse and in the concept of owner,
because such possession was merely tolerated by the petitioners.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in recognizing the validity and effect of the donation
proper nuptias as sufficient to create or establish the just title of private respondents,
as donees in said donation, although the alleged donor or grantor Tomas Solis, had
no right or title whatsoever over the property in question.

3. The Court of Appeals, in deciding that petitioner's cause of action had prescribed,
overlooked the importance of determining when such cause of action accrued.

On November 3, 1977, We required the respondents to comment on the petition (p. 106, Rollo).
After private respondents' comment and petitioners' reply were submitted, We gave due course to
the petition on November 27, 1978 (p. 152, Rollo). Petitioners filed their brief on November 21, 1979
(p. 164, Rollo). Private respondents failed to file their brief within the required period. On March 12,
1980, We resolved to consider the petition submitted for decision without respondents' brief (p.
169, Rollo).

The land in question is not registered under the Torrens System. It consists of an area of 536 square
meters and is located at the eastern portion of the land described under paragraph 11 of the
complaint. It is admitted that the land described in paragraph 11 was originally owned by Simeon
Solis, father of petitioner Antonio Solis.

It is the contention of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents'
possession of the land was adverse and in the concept of an owner because such possession was
merely tolerated by petitioners.

The trial court found that indeed, private respondents were in possession of the property for more
than thirty (30) years. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that it did not state that such possession was
merely tolerated by petitioners. It only held that such possession cannot be held adversely against
petitioners who had shown a better title thereto, in view of private respondent's failure to present any
evidence showing how title passed from Simeon Solis, petitioners' father, to Tomas Solis, private
respondents' father.

On the other hand, the appellate court, on the basis of the records of this case found that private
respondents' possession of the premises way back in 1933 was adverse, continuous, open, public,
peaceful and uninterrupted in the concept of an owner until tills case was filed on May 30, 1967. It
pointed out that private respondents exercised various acts of dominion over the disputed property,
such as constructing their house thereon, enjoying its fruits to the exclusion of all others, and paying
realty taxes corresponding to the disputed one-half portion of the land. It likewise gave due
significance to the fact that petitioners acknowledged the ownership of the private respondents of
one-half portion of the land when they also paid half of the realty taxes for the western portion of the
land.

It is firmly settled that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and binding upon this Court, if
borne out by the evidence on record. There are of course certain recognized exceptions none of
which, however, find any application here (Tan v. CA, et al., L-48619, June 20, 1988). In fact, in the
lâwphî1.ñèt

preliminary statement of their petition (p. 17, Rollo), petitioners manifested their admission of the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioners also contend that since no competent proof was adduced by private respondents to show
how Simeon Solis, the previous owner, transferred ownership of the disputed premises to Tomas
Solis, father of Jose Solis, the donacion proper nuptias executed by Tomas is not sufficient to create
or establish the just title of private respondents as donees.

This contention of petitioners is not meritorious. Suffice it to state that even a void donation may be
the basis of claim of ownership which may ripen into title by prescription (Pensador vs. Pensador 47
Phil. 959, 961). It is the essence of the statute of limitations that, whether the party had a right to the
possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right and remained in possession for the
period (ten years) named in the statute of limitations, the right of action of the plaintiff who had the
better title is barred by that adverse possession. The right given by the statute of limitations does not
depend upon, and has no necessary connection, (with) the validity of the claim under which the
possession is held. ..." (Vda. de Lima vs. Tio, L-27181, April 30, 1970, citing Conspecto v. Fruto, 129
US 182 [1889]). The "just title" required for acquisitive prescription to set in is not "titulo verdadero y
valid"-or such title which by itself is sufficient to transfer ownership Without necessity of letting the
prescriptive period elapse but only "titulo colorador" — such title where, although there was a mode
of transferring ownership, still something is wrong because the grantor is not the owner (See
Doliendo vs. Biamesa, 7 Phil. 132).

The donacion was made in 1931 and spouses Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino took possession of
the land in 1933 by virtue of the donacion. It was the Code of Civil Procedure which was then in
force. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, ten years of adverse possession by a person claiming to
be the owner, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced shall vest in every actual
possessor of such land a full complete title. In Ongsiaco vs. Dallo (27 SCRA 161) the Supreme
Court said: 'Under the Code of Civil Procedure formerly in force, good or bad faith was immaterial for
purposes of acquisitive prescription. Adverse possession in either character ripened into ownership
after the lapse of ten years (Miraflor vs. CA, L-40151-52, April 8, 1986, 142 SCRA 18, 29).

Finally, petitioners assail respondent appellate court's holding that their cause of action had
prescribed, overlooking the importance of determining when such cause of action accrued. In its
findings of fact, the appellate court said that the record shows that Tomas Solis (private respondent's
predecessor) was already in possession of the eastern portion in question before 1927 (t.s.n., June
25, 1969, pp. 41, 42, 47; p. 2, CA decision). However, no evidence was presented to show that
lâwphî1.ñèt
Tomas Solis' possession thereof was adverse, exclusive or in the concept of an owner. Thus, the
appellate court concluded that private respondents possession have been actual, adverse,
continuous, open, public, notorious, peaceful and uninterrupted only in 1933, when they took
possession of the property by virtue of the donacion proper nuptias. The respondent court, therefore,
found and We agree that it was in 1933 when petitioner's cause of action accrued.

Even if we were to admit, as contended by petitioners, that their cause of action accrued only in
1941 (p. 3 of Reply; p. 148, Rollo), the first time that private respondents can be considered as
having repudiated petitioners' ownership of the premises by paying the tax on the property in the
name of respondent Jose Solis, the same conclusion would be obtained. The lapse of more than
twenty (20) years of adverse possession by private respondents is sufficient to confer ownership on
them of the disputed portion under the Old Civil Code which requires only ten (10) years of adverse
possession. Article 41 of the Old Civil Code provides:

Sec. 41. Title to land by prescription. — Ten years of adverse possession by any
person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly, continuously for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants or
otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued,
shall vest in every actual possessor of such land a full complete title, saving to the
person under disabilities the rights, secured by the next Section.

Although petitioners' action for quieting of title was filed in May 30, 1967 when the New Civil Code
was already in effect, Article 1116 of the New Civil Code provides that "prescription already running
before the effectivity of this Code (August 30, 1950) shall be governed by laws previously in force;
..." which in this case is the aforequoted Section 41 of the Old Civil Code.

Therefore, whatever claim petitioners had over the disputed property had prescribed in view of
private 'respondents' open, actual, peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the same
property for more than thirty years or at the least, for more than twenty (20) years.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 12,1977 of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint and declaring private respondents Jose Solis and Florencia Dioquino Solis
the lawful owners of the eastern portion of the lot described under paragraph 11 of the complaint is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.