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Google-China 2010 Dispute

Final Paper for MORS 474 Fall 2015 Course

Marek Skomorowski, Ankur Saxena

This paper chronicles Google’s presence in China during 2005-2010, analyzes Google’s
dispute with the Chinese government over China’s Internet censorship requirements in 2010
and discusses how a better outcome could have been achieved for Google.

Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
Parties Involved.......................................................................................................................... 1
Google’s Rough Journey In China During 2006-2009 ................................................................ 2
Dispute With The Chinese Government In 2010 ....................................................................... 3
Analysis Of The 2010 Dispute .................................................................................................... 4
From Dispute To Negotiation..................................................................................................... 5
What Did Google Do Well In The Dispute Resolution................................................................ 5
What Could Have Google Done Better ...................................................................................... 6
Lessons ....................................................................................................................................... 8
On 29th June 2010, Google announced that it will stop redirecting its Chinese users from
Google China website to Google Hong Kong website, which was seen as a compromise to
appease the Chinese government that was about to decide on the renewal of Google license
to operate in mainland China. Just six months earlier, Google had been subject to
sophisticated cyber attacks, allegedly coordinated by the Chinese government, in which its
information security was compromised and intellectual property was stolen. Google
threatened to exit China and started redirecting its Chinese website users to its Hong Kong
website on 22nd March 2010. This paper traces Google’s ups and downs during these six
months and discusses how Google could have achieved a better outcome.

1. Google in China
Google saw potential in the Chinese market early on - in 2000 it introduced a Chinese
translated version of the US website, which however was not very useful as the search
results appeared after a long delay. This was due to the fact that the website was not hosted
on servers inside China, which made the response time for any query very long. In 2005,
Google made a decision to launch a local version of its site. The company found the Chinese
market very interesting due to its business potential. Based on China Internet Network
Information Center1:
● There were 103 million Internet users in China (roughly 10% of the world’s users)2
● Roughly 38% used Internet for getting information
● Roughly 65% used search engines
That accounts for 25 million people potentially interested in Google’s services. Moreover,
due to the fast economical development of China, the growth rate of the Internet us age was
promising and the company could expect high initial revenues from its advertising services
as well as a dynamic growth of the business.
After agreeing to filter its Internet searches in conformity with the Chinese censorship laws,
Google acquired a license to operate Google.cn in 2006. At this time, Google operated two
domains in China: Google.com, which was subject to China’s “Great Firewall” (described
below), and Google.cn, which complied with Chinese legislation through self-censoring.
2. Chinese Government
China’s political system, built on the ideology of socialism and communism, valued the
collective interests of the entire society over the rights of individuals. 3 Thus, the authorities
strictly controlled access to information. The development of World Wide Web and Internet

1 16th Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development in China (July 2005)
2 Statista, “Number of worldwide internet users from 2000 to 2015”
3 J. Brett, L. Pilcher, L-Ch. Sell; “A New Approach to China: Google and Censorship in the Chinese Market”

services in China resulted in several initiatives to introduce means to control what
information was available to the citizens:
● The Great Firewall - a set of policies to regulate the internet in Mainland China,
including “criminalizing certain online speech and activities, blocking from view
selected websites, and filtering key words out of searches initiated from computers
located in Mainland China.”4
● Teams of internet commentators from propaganda and the police, equipped with
knowledge of communism ideology and propaganda techniques employed "strictly
to gather and analyze public opinions on micro-blog sites and compile reports for
decision-makers." In 2013, the number of such employees was around 2 million.5
The laws controlling the flow of information required any Internet Service Provider (ISP) to
obtain permission from the authorities to offer any services in Mainland China. As a result,
the ISP would have to control any information available to the Chinese citizens through its
service. Also, it was still monitored towards any attempts not to follow the law, which could
result in withdrawing the permission to offer internet services in China. The monitoring
sometimes involved breaching the security policies of the service to reveal any private
information of the users of the service.
Although the government was very strict about granting access to information for Chinese
citizens, it also had a goal of achieving technological parity with the western world. One of
the avenues to accomplish this was through allowing a major Internet company, Google, to
have a local domain name and set up a research and support facility in China. This would
give Chinese IT specialists and engineers access to Google’s proprietary research technology,
generate local jobs, and help retain Chinese technical talent in the country.
China had another option as well. It could deny Google the license and continue to rely on
local search engine alternatives to provide Chinese consumers with internet search services.
Baidu was quite similar to Google in search capability and had been steadily gaining market
share. It was a known entity and the Chinese government was already monitoring its
compliance with the Chinese law. Though failure to bring a globally renowned high-tech
company such as Google to China would damage the country’s international reputation, it
would likely produce fewer repercussions at home.


The rules that Google would have to comply with in China were in contradiction to
company’s core values, famously codified by its motto “Don’t be evil,” which implied that no
political or business issues would affect the information presented by Google in its search
results. Yet, the Chinese market seemed attractive enough to justify Google compromising
with its core values in 2006. Google executives argued, “Filtering our search results clearly

4 China on Wikipedia
5 BBC, “China employs two million microblog monitors state media say,” October 4, 2013

compromises our mission. Failing to offer Google search at all to a fifth of the world’s
population, however, does so far more severely.” 6
In 2006, Google successfully applied for permission to offer the local site, which required the
company to follow the local rules. The company also established an R&D office in Beijing,
hiring roughly 700 IT specialists. 7 The company faced a backlash from the press and human
rights activists globally, pointing out that the company broke its promise to value providing
unfettered access to information above profit-making.8
Google grew its business in China to become the second largest search engine, with 36%
market share and growing faster than its main competitor, Baidu (58% market share). 9 It
was still behind Baidu, however, offering services lacking entertainment and social
components as well as being perceived as an international entity, with little Chinese
pedigree.10 Google was not able to offer e-mail (Gmail) and blogging services (Blogger) to
Chinese internet users, for fear of being asked to hand over users’ private information to the
Chinese government. Its various services were disrupted on several occasions due to
intervention by the Chinese government. The company also faced several cyber attacks that
were especially intense in 2009, a year before the initial ISP license’s renewal date (in June


On January 12th 2010, Google announced that its technology infrastructure had been the
target of a series of China-led cyber attacks and blamed the Chinese government for its role
in attempting to limit free speech on the web. On March 22nd, 2010 Google said it would
end censorship of its Chinese-language search engine, Google.cn. Users trying to access the
site were redirected to Google.com.hk (based in Hong Kong), where the company said it
would offer uncensored search results in simplified Chinese. These incidents (detailed in
Exhibit 1) led to a public conflict and private negotiations between Google and the Chinese
government that culminated with the Chinese government renewing the Google.cn license
in July 2010.
In the course of the dispute, a number of other parties were involved, including the U.S. and
Chinese public and media, the U.S. Congress and politicians, and Google’s biggest
competitor in China, Baidu. Although these parties were not present at the negotiation
table, they raised the stakes in the negotiation manifold and transformed a business
transaction in to a political dispute. This pushed the Chinese government away from making
any political concessions.

6 Kristof, N.D. “China’s Cyberdissidents and the Yahoos at Yahoo,” The New York Times, February 19, 2006
7 J. Brett, L. Pilcher, L-Ch. Sell, “A New Approach to China: Google and Censorship in the Chinese Market”
8 NBC News, “Google’s threat to China traces back to founders,” January 14, 2010
9 Ibid.
10 A. Lawrence, “Google, Inc. Figuring out how to deal with China ,” 2009
11 Google Official Blog, “A new approach to China,” January 12, 2010

The 2010 dispute can be analyzed using the Power, Rights, and Interests Dispute
Resolution Framework. Google’s interest was to display uncensored search results and
preserve the privacy of its users; the Chinese government’s interest was to prevent, what it
considered as, inflammatory political or social content from being distributed over Internet.
Google went public about the cyber attacks in a successful strategic move to bring the
Chinese government to the negotiating table in a position of weakness. The Chinese
government responded with a mix of power-based and rights-based tactics.
Power-based Struggle
Google initiated the power struggle by threatening to shut down its Chinese-based
operations (Exhibit 1) if China continued to require Google to censor its search results. This
threat was followed by a series of actions meant to convey the seriousness of the threat.
First, Google delayed the launch of its new android smartphone in the Chinese market,
arguing “launching the phones in the current climate would not be a good experience for
consumers.”12 Second, it automatically redirected visitors on its China-based search engine,
Google.cn, to its Hong Kong-based search engine, Google.com.hk, which was not self-
censored.13 Lastly, it also began incorporating real-time Twitter results in to its Hong Kong-
based search engine, in a move clearly aimed at angering the Chinese government, which
had banned Twitter in Mainland China.
The Chinese government responded with its own actions to demonstrate power – it created
pressure on Google through a series of coordinated media coverage of the conflict that
ensured that Chinese citizens were angered by Google’s actions. In response to Google’s
smartphone launch delay, a state-owned Chinese cell phone company, China Unicom, with
200 million subscribers removed Google search capabilities from its Android phones. This
was a warning to Google before the largest telecom company in the world, China Mobile,
with 500 million subscribers would remove Google’s services from its smartphones.14
Rights-based Argumentation
Upon being pressured by the Chinese media, Google made a rights-based argument that its
actions were legal. The government, in turn, made a rights-based argument that any foreign
company operating in China must abide by Chinese laws. The government promised to
assess the hacking incident in accordance with Chinese law and emphasized that Google’s
web traffic re-routing tactic was illegal.
Parties’ Interests Finally Come Out
The parties soon realized that they had a lot to lose in an impasse and it was fair to consider
the other party’s interests. For Google, the Chinese market was one of its largest target
markets; an exit could cost up to $500 million and impact other Chinese operations such as

12 Digital Trends, “Google postpones android phone launches in China,” January 19, 2010
13 Google Official Blog, “A new approach to China,” January 12, 2010
14 Daily Finance, “Google’s Chinese Mobile Ambitions At Risk Amid Search Censorship Spat,” March 24, 2010

its smartphone launch.15 However, Google could not overlook the potential Chinese
government involvement in the hacking incident and was forced to respond in order to
preserve its global image and commitment to not “be evil.”
China had become more emboldened and self-confident as a result of its increasing
economic significance in the global economy, and knew that the Chinese market was too
attractive for any major international company to ignore. However, Google’s exit from China
would be detrimental for China’s image as foreign direct investment destination and might
also lead to other foreign companies fleeing China citing the difficulties of abiding with the
Chinese law. Furthermore, China wanted foreign investment in technology research and
development from Google and other technology companies. On the other hand, protecting
the collective social good was a deeply ingrained value in the Chinese culture and the
government believed that censorship was a legitimate means of building cohesion and
maintaining social order.


The parties’ vested interest brought them to the negotiation table. There were four major
issues to be negotiated: censorship of Google search results, Google’s direct presence in
China, the China-led cyber attacks on Google’s services, and privacy for Google products
such as Gmail (detailed in Exhibit 2). Google was in a weaker position than the Chinese
government because of the importance (potential size and rate of growth of Internet use) of
the Chinese market and the competition for Chinese Internet users by Baidu. Unless the
Chinese government changed its regulations prohibiting foreign companies from owning a
majority interest in some industries, Google could not acquire a controlling interest in Baidu.
It could continue to try to provide access to Chinese customers from offshore, but such
searches were slow (because they had to go through the Chinese Firewall) and filtered.
Hence, its BATNA was weak.


In the light of the aforementioned points weakening Google’s negotiating position, the
experts expected Google to lose in the dispute. Google, however, succeeded by getting its
license renewed and continued to do business in China. This enabled Google to participate
in the attractive Chinese market, if only partially, and positioned it to participate fully when
and if there is a change in Chinese policies. The company did a couple of things well
regarding the dispute resolution.
First, by going public about the cyber attacks of late 2009 and presenting its case in the
court of public opinion, Google brought the Chinese government to the negotiating table
quickly. If the company had conducted quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations with Chinese
bureaucrats it would have bargained away all its advantages before the first meeting even
started, with little hope of improving either its position in China or its tarnished image

15 Sam Gustin, “Google’s China Exit Could Cost $500 Million This Year,” Daily Finance, March 15, 2010

globally. Chinese negotiators can be masters of the "wear down" – alternating between
promises and threats to keep the other party at the table so long that sheer exhaustion
turns the tide against the other party.16 Through making a public announcement once,
Google demonstrated to the Chinese government that the company could always go public
about its dispute and ensured that the government moved forward quickly and reasonably
with the dispute resolution. Google also won back some of the credibility that it lost in the
public when it agreed to China’s censorship requirement in 2006, and had at least one
positive takeaway even before the negotiations started.
Second, Google respected the status-conscious Chinese and sent a constructive signal with
regards to the negotiations. It sent its CEO, Eric Schmidt, to key negotiation talks, thus
exhibiting the importance of its relationship with the Chinese government. Respecting the
“face” culture in China, the company also moved swiftly from using power and rights-based
tactics in the public to privately held interests-based dispute resolution to avoid
embarrassing the Chinese government further.
Third, Google did not burn the bridges with the Chinese government. It always kept the
window of negotiation open. The censorship issue was probably a face-saving cover for
hacking and security issues. The Chinese government did much the same – treating Google's
exit as a purely business decision and did not politicize the issue. This way, Google was able
to maintain some presence in China with the potential to grow further.
Lastly, the dispute between Google and the Chinese government seemed to focus on
censorship in a distributive way, which limited the potential outcomes to win/lose. The
negotiation eventually turned integrative after Google publicly accused the Chinese
government of involvement in the cyber attacks and utilized the power tactic of redirecting
its services to its Hong Kong website. However, Google failed to develop and derive valuable
takeaways from the integrative negotiation, and the next section talks about this.


There were several ways in which Google could have defended its business in China and
derived more value during the dispute resolution. First, Google acted precipitously without
giving due consideration to the impact of the public announcement of cyber attacks on its
various stakeholders, including its Chinese employees, consumers, and business partners.
The public announcement angered the Chinese citizens, including Google’s 700 employees
in China, the best of whom started preparing to leave Google immediately following the
public announcement, and most of them ended up working for Google’s competitor Baidu.
Attracting talented Chinese to work for Google also became more difficult going forward.
Google's announcement also disrupted the plans of a number of important business
partners such as Samsung and Motorola, who were all set to launch Android-platform
handsets in China. Both Google’s employees and business partners should have been

16Andrew Hupert, New York University in Shanghai, “Negotiating lessons we can learn from Google,” March
19, 2010

notified ahead of time. Their support could have been leveraged to take a more concerted
action during the dispute.
Second, Google stuck with the issue of censorship in the negotiations and did not make a
multi-issue offer to the Chinese government to help foster an integrative agreement. For
getting assurance from the Chinese government about no future cyber attacks and
maintaining the sanctity of users’ privacy, Google could have made a few proposals to the
government. Baidu and other Chinese companies were offering competent web search
services but were behind Google in the social and productivity domains, including email,
finance, maps, image storage, and blogging (Exhibit 3 lists dozens of products in Google’s
portfolio in 2010). Google could have looked to grow its non-search business in China as the
way forward. This way it would have met China’s censorship requirements, while continuing
to strengthen its presence in the attractive Chinese market and offering the users these
services not provided by the local companies. Another way was by Google signaling its long-
term commitment to China by proposing to make investments in China beyond the R&D
facility, including a structured plan for training and hiring talent from Chinese universities,
know-how and tools support for the Chinese technology and entrepreneurship ecosystem,
and co-investments in building the internet infrastructure in tier 2 and 3 cities in China.
Third, a very important Chinese business practice for Google to adopt is Guanxi – a core
concept that is rooted in thousands of years of Chinese ethics and business.17 Guanxi plays a
pivotal role in the shaping and advancement of daily business operations, and occurs
through individual interactions first before being applied on a corporate level. For example,
one member of a business may perform a favor for a member of another business or
government because they have interpersonal ties, which helps to facilitate the relationship
between the two businesses or government involved in this interaction. In the past, Google
did not allow its Chinese managers to grant personal favors to the Chinese government
officials, but this policy should have been changed going forward, and Google should have
taken the first step towards this while negotiating with the government.
Fourth, like Yahoo supplementing its direct presence in China with a 40% stake in a major
local Internet company Alibaba, Google should have increased its minority stake in Baidu (up
to the maximum allowed limit in China), instead of divesting it. By 2010, Baidu had 73%
share of the search market in China and had a market capitalization of $38 billion18, and
would have been a valuable business partner for Google. As earlier suggested, Google could
have then focused on non-search products in China.
Lastly, the dispute and subsequent negotiations were primarily conducted according to
American cultural norms, even though the dispute setting was in a culturally different
market, thereby straining the relationship between the two parties and threatening their
ability to reach an agreement. Using the American style of direct confrontation through the

17Guanxi on Wikipedia
18Greg Sterling, “How Google Could Have Bought Baidu And Other Fascinating Details About China’s Largest
Search Engine,” November 12, 2010

public announcement was effective in bringing the Chinese government to the negotiating
table faster, but Google should have switched to an indirect style appropriate for the
Chinese culture. A culturally appropriate next step would have been to utilize a mediator. By
showing the two parties’ linked BATNAs, the mediator could have brought both parties to
the negotiating table. The mediator would have helped set ground rules and flesh out
different interests in the negotiation process, and would have also helped do reality testing.

This cross-cultural negotiation involving a multinational and a national government has
several lessons for corporate managers.
First, a company should not sacrifice its core values for empty promises. Compromising a
company policy or methodology for huge profits is one thing, but abandoning its vision for a
vague promise of possible profits at some undetermined later date is quite another. For a
lot of multinational corporations managers, this means that you have to do your most
serious negotiating within your own company. You cannot negotiate with your Chinese
counter-parties and your own HQ at the same time. Get it right with your own organization
first (which Google should have done in 2006), and then be ready to walk away if you cannot
meet your minimum requirements.
Second, establishing and cultivating relationships in emerging markets is critical to the
success of any dispute. By having well connected friends at both the local and national level,
companies are better positioned to establish relationships with politicians who may be able
to assist them in understanding the government’s interests and positions. This is particularly
important while negotiating with a government given that a government’s interests are
typically complex and varied. Investigating and uncovering those underlying interests will
require a skilled insider. As such, local relationships can also assist businesses with the
often-tricky task of navigating the intricacies of a national bureaucracy.
Third, one has to establish an internal timetable and bottom line for negotiating with the
government and stick to it. As discussed earlier in this paper, government negotiators can
be masters of the "wear down" – alternating between promises and threats to keep you at
the table so long that sheer exhaustion turns the tide against you. Furthermore, companies
are answerable to capital markets, employees, and other stakeholders more frequently than
governments are to their stakeholders, so companies have to move faster.
Lastly, negotiations with a government are typically never conclusive, and as Google
successfully did, a company should walk away from a dispute slowly (by moving services
from Google.cn to Google.com.hk) and leave the door open to come back later. Additionally,
government policies change over time, and this might mean that an economic climate of a
country might become attractive in the future. So, a company should try to never burn the
bridges with a government.

Exhibit 1: Timeline of Google's dispute with China in 2010
Source: Daily Finance
The Threat
Jan. 12, 2010 -- Google threatened to close its operations in China, home to the world's largest Internet user base, after disclosing details of a
massive cyber attack that "resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google." The Web giant also vowed to end its C hinese language
search censorship, in a defiant rebuke aimed at China's communist regime.
Jan. 13, 2010 -- Chinese officials offered their first reaction to Google's decision to reject Chinese censorship -- and potentially quit the country
altogether -- declaring, "China's Internet is open and the Chinese government encourages development of the Internet." An official added:
"Chinese law proscribes any form of hacking activity."
Jan. 15, 2010 -- The White House offered its support for Google's position, as new details emerged about the cyber-attack that prompted
Google to threaten to quit the world's largest country. Cyber-security experts at Verisign iDefense labs said their analysis showed that "the
attack is the work of actors operating on behalf of or in the direct employ of official intelligence entities of the People's Republic of China."
Jan. 16, 2010 -- Yahoo was drawn into the growing international dispute between Google and the Chinese government after it said it was
"aligned with Google." Yahoo said it, too, had been targeted by hackers and condemned "any attempts to infiltrate company networks to
obtain user information."
Jan. 18, 2010 -- Foreign reporters based in China were targeted by hackers who infiltrated their Google email accounts, a Chinese-based
journalism group said, as Google explored the possibility that "one or more" of its own employees helped carry out the attack.
Jan. 19, 2010 -- Google postponed the launch of its first mobile phones in China, a further sign of the widening consequences of its decision to
challenge the Chinese government over cyber-attacks, cyber-security and Internet freedom. Google said it would be "irresponsible" to launch
the phones given the controversy.

The Build-Up
Jan. 21, 2010 -- U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton condemned Web censorship and cyber-attacks and offered her support for Google in its
row with China over cyber-security and online censorship. "American companies need to take a proactive role in challenging censorship,"
Clinton said. "They need to consider what's right, not simply what makes a quick profit."
Jan. 23, 2010 -- China said it "doesn't need any lessons from the United States on what to do or how" on the Internet. A government
spokesperson called Clinton "disrespectful" and said Internet companies like Google have to follow the law if they want to do business in
March 10, 2010 -- Google said its dispute with China over censorship will be resolved "soon" -- one way or another -- with Nicole Wong, the
company's vice president and deputy general counsel, saying "Google is firm in its decision that it will stop censoring our search results for
March 13, 2010 -- Google was reported to be "99.9% certain" to shutter Google.cn, in light of the Chinese government's refusal to relax its
Web filtering, two months after challenging China over Web censorship. The two sides appeared to have reached a stalemate.
March 15, 2010 -- Banking giant UBS said Google could lose $500 million this year if it closes its China-based search engine. Analysts pointed
out that this only amounts to slightly over 2% of Google's annual revenue. Meanwhile, the Chinese government tried with some success to
censor news about its censorship dispute with Google.
March 19, 2010 -- Google was said to be readying an announcement shutting its Chinese language search engine, according to Chinese media
reports. Sources said the company would issue a statement Monday, March 22.
March 20, 2010 -- Chinese media organs lashed out at Google in an apparently coordinated assault, with one paper suggesting Google is li nked
to the U.S. intelligence agencies. "It is ridiculous and arrogant for an American company to attempt to change China's laws. The country
doesn't need a politicized Google or Google's politics," one outlet said.

The Event
March 22, 2010 -- Google said it would end its censorship of its Chinese-language search engine, Google.cn. Users trying to access that site
were redirected to Google.com.hk, where the company said it would offer uncensored search results in simplified Chinese.
March 22, 2010 -- Google drew praise from human rights activists for its decision to shutter its China-based search engine and redirect users to
its Hong Kong-based site, but China almost immediately began blocking politically sensitive searches on the Hong Kong site, one expert said.

Exhibit 2: Positions and Interests of Google and the Chinese government during the dispute in 2010
ISSUE Google Chinese Government
Censorship of Operate without censorship restrictions Have Google comply with the Chinese self-censor
Google’s legislation
services in 1  Stay true to its mission of providing access to 3  Demonstrate China’s power and sovereignty to
China “the world’s information” by giving Chinese other governments and international Internet
citizens the same access to information as companies
everyone else in the world  Keep control over Internet content available in
 Comply with its motto of “don’t be evil” in its China
code of conduct
Google’s direct Get Google.cn license renewed and stay in China Keep Google in China
presence in
China 2  The Chinese internet market is poised to 1  Benefit Chinese citizens from Google’s globally
become one of the largest and most lucrative renowned search and other internet services
markets for Google’s overall growth and it technologies
needs to keep a foot in the market  Fear of job losses (Google employed 700
 A slow Google.com service in China would lead people in China)
to Google losing market share, revenue and  International image of China as foreign direct
staff to its strongest local competitor Baidu investment destination
Cyber attacks Get assurance from Chinese government about no China- Stop negative press, reject any blame regarding China-led
led cyber attacks on Google service in the future cyber attacks on Google

3  Prevent loss of reputation and thus customers 2  Prevent tarnishing of China’s image in the eyes
worldwide due to lack of security; security of of potential foreign direct investors due to lack
user information is of utmost importance to of safety and transparency in China
win and retain customer trust and loyalty  At the same time, prevent human rights
 Be a secular platform, offering the value of activists from becoming active over the
“free speech,” and protect users’ data on Internet by using Google’s unrestricted/ “free
Google services speech” services
User privacy for Preserve privacy at all costs Restrict privacy if it threatens state order
Gmail and other
Google services 4  Failure by Google to protect users’ privacy 4  China’s political system, built on the ideology of
in China could result in a loss of user confidence and socialism and communism, values the collective
trust in services and ultimately a loss of users interests of the entire society over the rights of
 Maintain state order through controlled
surveillance while not scaring off international
Retain or expand ownership stake in Baidu and continue to Prevent Google from obtaining the Google.cn license and
BATNA push Chinese users to the slower and less reliable continue to rely on local and other search engines to
Google.com site provide Chinese consumers with Internet services
Reservation Offer services to Chinese users through Google.com Google self-censors its searches and also takes back its
Price public allegations of government-led cyber attacks
Get a Google.cn license with: Get Google to stay in China with:
 No censorship restrictions and privacy of users  Google complying with all censorship restrictions
preserved for Gmail and other services  Google withdrawing cyber attacks allegations
 Assurance of no China-led cyber attacks

Exhibt 3: Google’s list of products in 2010
Source: http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/ (accessed in 2010)