People vs. Fajardo [G.R. No.

L-12172, August 29, 1958]

Facts:

During the incumbency of defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 which any person or
persons who will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a
written permit from the Municipal Mayor. The ordinance further includes that if said building
destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the
expense of the owner of the building or house.

Four years later after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law,
appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building on their land. However, their request was denied, for the reason among others
that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. The defendants
reiterated their request but to no avail. Appellants then proceeded with the construction of the
building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house
having been destroyed by a typhoon and they had been living on leased property.

Appellants were charged for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the
Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.

2. Whether or not the ordinance amounts to taking of property?

Held:

1. No. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive
appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power,
and amounts to a taking of appellants property without just compensation. The State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property
and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would be constrained
to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being
urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just
compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
2. Yes. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is
that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright
confiscation would relieve him of that burden.