VALDES v RTC

Case Doctrine: In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article
148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992,
Valdez filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The trial court granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null and void. It
also directed the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and
52 of the same code.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision. She asserted that the Family
Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions
without marriage.

In an Order, the trial court made the following clarification: "Consequently, following Art
147, plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that
matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of the properties owned in common by the
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply."

Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order, which was denied. Valdes appealed,
arguing that Article 147 of the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art 147 of the Family Code is the correct law governing the disposition of
property for void marriages.

HELD:
Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article
148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.

Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry
each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which has
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed in authority to
resolve incidental and consequential matters.

Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own
the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in
the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-
ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, 12
of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.

DINO v DINO

FACTS:
On January 1998 petitioner and respondent got married. On May 2001, petitioner filed an
action for Declaration of Niullity of Marriagw against respondent citing psychological incapacity
under article 36. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love
and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on
shopping sprees and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner
further alleged that respondent was not faithful, and would at times become violent and hurt him.
The trial court declared their marriage void ab initio.

The court ruled that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued
upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code. It later altered it to” A DECREE OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the
parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code

HELD:
The court erred. The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a
void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of
the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such as petitioner and
respondent in the case before the Court.

It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to
marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45
of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without
waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.

In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of
the Family Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties
owned in common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the
Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of
cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co-
ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the
Civil Code provisions on co-ownership.

BARRIDO v NONATO

FACTS:
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N.
Barrido, they were able to acquire a property situated in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a
house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-140361. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there was no
more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition,
but the latter refused. Thus, on January 29, 2003, Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City, Branch 3.

Barrido claimed, by way of affirmative defense, that the subject property had already
been sold to their children, Joseph Raymund and Joseph Leo. She likewise moved for the dismissal
of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case being an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The RTC ordered the conjugal property of the former Spouses Leonardo and Marietta
Nonato, their conjugal dwelling, adjudicated to the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is conjugal as decided by RTC.

HELD:
No. It is governed by the rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
The court ruled that this particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman,
suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.

Here, all the elements for Art 147 to apply are present. The term "capacitated" in the first
paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any
impediment to marry has not been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido.
They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their marriage was found to
be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

The former spouses both agreed that they acquired the subject property during the
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares (Art 147). Barrido,
however, claims that the ownership over the property in question is already vested on their
children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside from the title to the property still being registered
in the names of the former spouses, said document of safe does not bear a notarization of a
notary public. It must be noted that without the notarial seal, a document remains to be private
and cannot be converted into a public document, making it inadmissible in evidence unless
properly authenticated. Unfortunately, Barrido failed to prove its due execution and authenticity.
In fact, she merely annexed said Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, the subject
property remains to be owned in common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in
accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

AGAPAY v PALANG

FACTS:
Miguel Palang contracted marriage with Carlina in Pangasinan on 1949. He left to work in
Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in May 1950. The
trial court found evident that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in
Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina and stayed alone in a
house in Pangasinan.
 The 63 year old Miguel contracted a subsequent marriage with 19 year old Erlinda Agapay,
herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly purchased a parcel of riceland located at
Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the other
hand, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise agreement and
agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of 6 parcels of land to their child Herminia.

Miguel and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. In 1979, they were
convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. 2 years later, Miguel died. Carlina and her
daughter instituted this case for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot located at Binalonan
allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. The lower court dismissed
the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the riceland and the house and lot should be awarded in favor of Erlinda Agapay.

HELD:
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
However, their marriage is void because of the subsisting marriage with Carlina. Only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them
in proportion to their respective contributions. It is required that there be an actual
contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the business of buy and sell
and had a sari-sari store. However, she failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed
money to but the subjected riceland. When the land was acquired, she was only around 20 years
old compared to Miguel who was already 64 years old and a pensioner of the US
Government. Considering his youthfulness, its unrealistic how she could have contributed the
P3,750 as her share. Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the co-ownership with Miguel over
the same. Hence, the riceland should, as correctly held by CA, revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased and Carlina.

MANILA SURETY & FIDELITY CO v TEODORO

FACTS:
The case for herein petitioner rests on the proposition that the said properties, claimed by
respondent Teodoro to be hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established between her
and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and consequently may be
levied upon on execution for the satisfaction of the latter's judgment debt. The facts relied upon
in support of this theory of co-ownership are stated in the decision of the court a quo and quoted
by the Court of Appeals, as follows:

Jose Corominas, Jr. and Sonia Lizares were married in Iloilo on January 5, 1935. On
November 29,1954, a decree of divorce was granted by the Court of the State of Nevada dissolving
the bonds of matrimony between Sonia Lizares and Jose Corominas, Jr.

Trinidad Teodoro met Jose Corominas, Jr. in Hongkong on October 30, 1955. On March
26,1956, they went through a Buddhist wedding ceremony in Hongkong. Upon their return to the
Philippines they took up residence in a rented house at No. 2305 Agno Street, Manila. On
September 5, 1961, plaintiff and Jose Corominas, Jr. were married for a second time on Washoe
County, Nevada. U.S.A.
 Additional Pertinent facts, also mentioned in the decision under review and controverted
by the parties, are that Sonia Lizares is still living and that the conjugal partnership formed by her
marriage to Corominas was dissolved by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila upon
their joint petition, the decree of dissolution having been issued on October 21, 1957.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art 144 of the Civil Code (now Art 147) is applicable

HELD:
No. In the present case, we find no need to pass on this question. The particular properties
involved here which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be deemed to
belong to such co-ownership because, as found by the trial court and confirmed by the Court of
Appeals, the funds used in acquiring said properties were fruits of respondent's paraphernal
investments which accrued before her "marriage" to Corominas. In other words, they were not
acquired by either or both of the partners in the void marriage through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144.
They remain respondent's exclusive properties, beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the
judgment debt of Corominas.

FRANCISCO v MASTER IRON WORKS

FACTS:
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on
January 15, 1983. Eduardo was then employed as the vice president in a private corporation. In
1984, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina
Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco, covering two parcels of residential land with a
house thereon. The Register of Deeds annotated at the dorsal portion of the said titles an Affidavit
of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter
purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings,
and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property.

In 1990, Eduardo, who was then the General Manager and President of Reach Out Trading
International, bought 7,500 bags of cement from Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation
(MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. The latter filed a complaint for recovery and trial court
rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sherrif
issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the
balance of the amount due under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party
claim over the 2 parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.

Josefina filed a complaint for damages against MIWCC and the sheriff. Before she could
commence presenting her evidence, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo in
the RTC of Parañaque on the ground that when they were married on January 15, 1983, Eduardo
was already married to one Carmelita Carpio. The RTC declared the marriage null and void for
being bigamous.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and cannot
be held liable for the Eduardo’s personal obligations.

HELD:
No. The petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property with her personal funds
before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she is the sole owner of the property. The evidence
on record shows that the Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property to the
petitioner and titles over the property were, thereafter, issued to the latter as vendee after her
marriage to Eduardo.

It is to be noted that plaintiff-appellee got married at the age of 23. At that age, it is
doubtful if she had enough funds of her own to purchase the subject properties as she claimed in
her Affidavit of Third Party Claim. Confronted with this reality, she later claimed that the funds
were provided by her mother and sister, clearly an afterthought in a desperate effort to shield the
subject properties from appellant Master Iron as judgment creditor.

Their case falls under Article 148 and since they got married before the Family Code, the
provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested rights.

Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such
marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually
contributed money, property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the
presumption of co-ownership will not arise.

ATIENZA v DE CASTRO

FACTS:
Lupo Atienza hired Yolanda De Castro as accountant for his two corporations (Enrico
Shipping Corporation and Eurasian Maritime Corporation) in 1983. Then their relationship became
intimate despite Lupo being a married man. They lived together in the later part of 1983. They
had 2 children, after the second child they parted ways. Then Lupo filed a complaint against
Yolanda for a judicial partition of a land between them in the Bel-Air subdivision. Lupo said
Yolanda bought the said property with his own funds Yolanda on the other hand said she bought it
with her own funds. Trial Court said that the contested property is owned common by him and
Yolanda and ordered the partition into two equal parts. CA reversed the TC, saying that it was the
exclusive property of Yolanda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the disputed property is the exclusive property of Yolanda

HELD:
Yes. Since they are not capacitated to marry each other in their cohabitation, Art 148 of
the FC applies. Under this regime only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in proportion to their contributions. Absent of
proof of contribution, it shall be presumed to be equal.

As we see it, petitioner’s claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis
because not only did he fail to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but
likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to
the benefit of the respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of
bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his
burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not evidence.

In contrast to petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to
present preponderant evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership
when, as here, the respondent sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase
the property from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in
foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her clientele and the
promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients. She also presented her bank
account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that she had the financial capacity to
pay the purchase price of the subject property.

MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ

FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of
land. Daniel executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3
lots bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the
estate), and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died.

Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father on September 1996
where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and was also issued to
them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila for the
annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding him
to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses
to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the
barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position
paper of the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same
proved futile.

ISSUE:
Whether or not spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family
Code

HELD:
Yes. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the
same have failed.

Lucila Martinez, the respondent’s sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at
bar. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. Her relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article
150. It should also be noted that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of
Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against
the respondent for unlawful detainer in the Katarungang Pambarangay in compliance with PD 1508
and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay
chairman’s issuance of a certificate to file action.

GAYON v GAYON

FACTS:
Appeal by plaintiff from CFI Iloilo dismissal of his case. On July 31, 1967, Pedro
complained against defendant spouses Silvestre and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging that on October
1, 1952, spouses sold to Pedro Gelera, for P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land in Guimbal,
Iloilo, including improvements thereon, subject to redemption within 5years or not later 1957;
that said right not exercised by them, or any of their heirs or successors, despite period
expiration; that Gelera sold the land on March 21, 1961, to Pedro. Pedro had, since 1961,
introduced thereon improvements; that he had fully paid taxes on said property up to 1967;
 NCC Arts 1606 and 1616 require a judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and
to a land acquired through a conditional sale, and, accordingly, praying that an order be issued in
plaintiff's favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property.
Genoveva said her husband died on January 6, 1954, long before the institution of the case, that
the deed where they sold property to Gelera was fake, her signature forged, and they never
executed such document, and that complaint is malicious and embarrassed her and her children,
for they had to employ counsel. And that being brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff
"did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint. She
prayed, therefore, that the same be dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages. On
September 19, 1967, dismissed for Silvestre was dead (absolute owner, wife nothing to do with it).

ISSUE:
Whether or not such dismissal was valid.

HELD:
No. Wife has something to do with property, being widow, she is a compulsory heir,
interested, and her motion was necessary so that other successors in interest instead of deceased
could be made parties to the case. If heirs included as defendants, they cannot be sued as
representatives of decedent, but rather as owners an aliquot interest in the property in question,
even if the precise extent of their interest may still be undetermined and they have derived it
from the decent.

Hence, they may be sued without a previous declaration of heirship, provided there is no
pending special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. Concerning Art 151
of FC (compromise efforts) applies to suits "filed or maintained between members of the same
family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of
Art. 217 of the same Code, pursuant to which: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parent
and child; (3) Among other ascendants and their descendants; (4) Among brothers and sisters.
Genoveva is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, not part of enumeration, so failure to seek compromise
before filing of complaint does not bar. Remanded to lower court of administrator as defendant,
or heirs if in absence.

MANACOP v COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a
deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF
Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore
exempt from attachment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred
debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt
form attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC.

TANEO, JR. v COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case for recovery of property in favor of private
respondent Abdon Gilig, two properties of the petitioner were levied to satisfy the judgment
amount. One was a parcel of land and the other was the family home. The subject properties
were sold at public auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the highest
bidder. Consequently, after petitioners’ failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyance
was executed on February 9, 1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties
to the private respondent.

To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on November 5, 1985 to declare

the deed of conveyance void. The petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo and
Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon
their death, they left the subject property and that said property has been acquired through free
patent, therefore inalienable and not subject to any encumbrance for the payment of debt.

Private respondent refuted petitioners alleging that he lawfully acquired the subject
property which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriff’s Sale. Said sale has become final as no
redemption was made within one year from the registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale is prohibited; and
whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

HELD:
The conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale was not violative of the law. The
judgment obligation of the petitioners against Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties
were levied and sold at public auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder on February 12,
1966. On February 9, 1968, the final deed of conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon
Gilig was issued after the petitioners failed to redeem the property after the reglementary period.

Pablo Taneo’s application for free patent was approved only on October 19, 1973.
Therefore, even before the application for homestead had been approved, Pablo Taneo was no
longer the owner of the land.

The house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one
Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law that the “family home is the dwelling house
where a person and his family resides and the land on which it is situated,” it is understood that
the house should be constructed on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution
of a family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order to escape
execution of their property.
MODEQUILLO v BREVA

FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del
Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land
located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name. A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family
home is built since 1969 prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in
Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not
one of those enumerated.

With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and
the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural
minority. The residential house in the present case became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it
was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken.

Article 162 of the Family Code, provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article
152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before
the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing family residences at
the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability which was
the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall
under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC. As to the agricultural land, trial court
correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on
the land. Petition was dismissed.

PATRICIO v DARIO III

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner
Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G.
Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-
school building.

Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their
intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent
refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
 Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary
is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-
beneficiary is still residing therein.

HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of
Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the
obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed
first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to
the next nearer relatives and so on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and
who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being
of legal age.

DE JESUS v ESTATE OF JUAN DIZON

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married in August 1964. It was during
this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born. In a notarized document, dated June 7, 1991, Juan G. Dizonacknowledged Jacqueline and
Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan died
intestate in March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporationsand some real property. It was on the strength of his notarized
acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint for “Partition with Inventory and Accounting”
of the Dizon estate with the RTC.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate childrenof the decedent, including
the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would
nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses Danilo and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus
and deceased Juan Dizon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are illegitimate children of decedent Juan Dizon entitled to
inherit from him

HELD:
No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the valid
marriage of their parents Danilo and Carolina. The certificates of birth also identified Danilo de
Jesus as their father. There is a presumption in law that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living separately in
such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods
set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171,of the Family Code (which took effect on
August 3, 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan, petitioners,

in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo and Carolinade Jesus.
This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption
of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or
in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM v AGUAS

FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, SSS pensioner, died on December 8, 1996. His surviving spouse Rosanna Aguas
filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. In her claim, Rosanna indicated that Pablo was
survived by his minor child Jeylnn. Her claim was approved on February 13, 1997.

In April 1997, deceased sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac contested Rosanna’s claim, saying
that Rosanna abandoned the family abode about 6 years earlier and that she was living with
another man. Leticia further alleged that Pablo did not have any children with Rosanna but
Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo dela Pena. SSS suspended the payment of the
pension and conducted an investigation. The investigation confirmed that Pablo did not have any
children with Rosanna and that Pablo was incapable of having children based on the certification
of Dr. Manuel Macapinlac that Pablo was infertile.

It was on this ground that the SSS denied Rosanna’s request to resume payment and
ordered Rosanna to refund to SSS the Php 10,350.00 death benefits already released to her and
Jeylnn.

When Rosanna filed a petition with the Social Security Commission, Janet H. Aguas also
claiming to be a child of the deceased, joined Rosanna and Jeylnn as claimants. As proof, the
petition included a photocopy of Jeylnn and Janet’s certificates of live birth. SSS denied their
claims but decided to conduct hearings. During the hearings, the SSC found sufficient proof that
Rosanna contracted marriage with Romeo dela Pena while still being married to Pablo; that
Rosanna had a child with Romeo dela Pena while still married to Pablo (as evidenced by the
baptismal certificate presented to the court for Jenelyn H. dela Pena showing that the showing
that she was the child of Rosanna Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena)

The SSC ruled that because of her adultery, Rosanna was no longer entitled to support
from Pablo. As for Jeylnn, the SCC ruled that Jeylnn was not Pablo’s legitimate child, even if
her birth certificatewas signed by Pablo. The SSC deduced from the records that Jeylnn and
Jenelyn was one and the same person. Janet on the other hand was only adopted by Pablo and
Rosanna but with no legal papers. The CA reversed the ruling based on the birth certificates of
Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were children of the deceased.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners may be considered primary beneficiaries of the deceased
for his SSS pension and therefore entitled to the SSS death benefits.
HELD:
Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a monthly pension. Jeylnn’s claim is
justified by the photocopy of her birth certificateshowing the signature of Pablo as her father
authenticating that Jeylnn was born on October 29, 1991. Records show that Rosanna and Pablo
were married on December 4, 1977 which continued, as far as the records are concerned, until
the death of Pablo on December 8, 1996. Based on the records, Jeylnn was born during the
marriage of Rosanna and Pablo. Since Jeylnn was conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents, she is considered legitimate.

Petitioner Rosanna married Romeo dela Pena during her marriage to Pablo. A wife who is
already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be “dependent from support” upon
the husband. Even if the records show that the spouses adopted Janet, there were no legal papers
to prove it. She therefore does not qualify as a primary beneficiary.

CONCEPCION v CA

FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almontewere
married in 1989. Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991,
however, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before he married private respondent, the latter had married one
Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s
marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage
to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result.

The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa

while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversedthe decision and held
that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first
marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child
of Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.

HELD:
Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage
between Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma.
Theresa was still subsisting at the time Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes
that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of private respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardocannot
impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right is strictly personal to the husband or, in
exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the
very beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn
the legitimacy of her child.

ESTATE OF ONG v DIAZ

FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin
Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly
rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died
during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with
the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute."

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.

RULING:
Yes. The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows
the conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material originating from the
person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic materials-
that is susceptible to DNA testing.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would

be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

BENITEZ-BADUA v CA

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located
in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicente’s sister and nephew filed a
complaint for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of the nephew,
herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the
deceased spouses since childhood, though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The
latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as
her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She even
testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate
hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner
as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.

HELD:
The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or
her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not
confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to
simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public
document.

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that
they were the sole heirs of the deceased because “she died without descendants and
ascendants”. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth
of the petitioner where it appeared that he was the petitioner’s father.
EUGENIO GERONIMO v KAREN SANTOS

DOCTRINE:
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child
of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of
an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is
well settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested
parties.

FACTS:
Rufino and Claridad died intestate leaving a property consisting of one half of the parcel of
land. Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers of Rufino executed a document
entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of the spouses
and adjudicating to themselves the property. They took possession and were able to transfer the
tax declaration of the property to their names. Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of
deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for annulment of document and recovery
of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo. Eugenio and Emiliano denied
the allegation that plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They disclosed that
the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff
who was in truth, the child of Caridad’s sister. They claimed that the birth certificate of the
plaintiff was a simulated document. According to Eugenio, when Rufino’s wife could not bear a
child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad’s niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos
Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when Karen joined her adoptive parents’
household.

Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiff’s alleged birth certificate. It had
irregular features, such as that it was written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was
erased and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma Daño was superimposed
on the entry in the box intended for the informant’s signature. Basing on the secondary evidence
of Karen’s open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, both the RTC and CA
ruled in favor of respondent Karen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of
the supposed parents, even if she is not a natural child of the latter, is a valid adoption.

HELD:
No. A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would show that it was
tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth of respondent and the name of
the informant. Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent – April 6, 1972 – and the name of
the informant – Emma Daño – were both superimposed on the document. The appellate court itself
ruled that the irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the
name of the informant made the document questionable. The corroborating testimony of Arturo
Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and
the signature of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the
document questionable. To be sure, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to
explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and the totality of the
following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow
the presumption of regularity attached to respondent’s birth certificate.
 Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both
courts a quo does not sufficiently establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is
indeed a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that respondent is a
legitimate child of her putative parents because she was allowed to bear their family name
"Geronimo", they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits
of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for and was appointed as her legal guardian in
relation to the estate left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.

SALAS v MATUSALEM

FACTS:
Respondent Annabelle Matusalem filed a complaint for Support/Damages against petitioner
Narciso Salas. Respondent Matusalem claimed that petitioner is the father of her son. Petitioner
Salas, however, denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. The RTC rendered its decision in
favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent
satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo. Respondent
presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner
appears as his father but which is not signed by him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondent’s evidence
sufficiently proved that her son is the illegitimate son of petitioner.

HELD:
Yes. A certificate of Live Birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of
his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.
Neither can such birth certificate be taken as recognition in a public instrument and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.