1.

5 Tables
Table 1.1 – Probability of Failure, Consequence, Risk and Inspection Planning Calculations (1)

Equipment Probability of Consequence Calculation Risk Inspection

Failure
Type Area Financial Calculation Planning
Calculation

Part 1, Part 3, Part 1,

Pressure Relief Part 1, Part 1,
paragraphs 7.4 paragraph 5.0 paragraphs 7.2
Devices (4) paragraph 7.6 paragraph 7.7
and 7.5 or 6.0 and 7.3
Notes:
1. All referenced paragraphs and Parts refer to API 581.
2. Shellside and Tubeside pressure boundary components.
3. Pressure boundary only.
4. Including protected equipment.

Probability of Failure Calculation

Part 1, paragraphs 7.4 and 7.5

7.4 Consequence of PRD Failure to Open

7.4.1 General
The consequence calculations for event outcomes such as fires, explosions and toxic exposure are
calculated as described in Part 3. For pressure relief devices, failures to open upon demand will likely
result in the protected equipment being exposed to significantly higher pressures than during normal
operations. The API RBI methodology calculates the consequences for each PRD failing to open at
sometimes significantly higher overpressure than the normal operating pressure of the equipment.
Table 7.13 shows the expected intermediate consequences of an overpressure event in a pressure
vessel. Table 7.13 is only provided for a qualitative discussion of the potential risks to equipment due
to overpressure and is not intended to indicate any specific event outcome. The API RBI method
accounts for the effects of overpressure on protected equipment by increasing the probability of loss
of containment. At an overpressure of 4 times the MAWP, the probability of loss of containment is
conservatively assumed to be equal to 1.0, see paragraph 7.2.4.h.

7.4.2 Damage State of the Protected Equipment

The advantage of linking the PRD consequence calculations to the protected equipment is that the
existing damage state of the protected equipment may be determined. Damage for each protected
vessel is measured by a damage factor, Df, which is calculated considering each of the damage
mechanisms (corrosion, cracking, creep, etc.) that are applicable to the protected equipment. The
higher the overall damage factor of the protected equipment, the more likely the equipment is to
experience undesirable consequences as a result of a PRD that is in a failed state (stuck) upon
demand. Part 2 of this document provides details on calculation of the damage factor and the
probability of loss of containment from fixed equipment.
A direct link to the current condition, or damage state, of the protected equipment is critical to the
evaluation of the consequence of PRD failure. Where damage assessment has not been completed in
conjunction with a RBI analysis of the PRD, then assumptions of the damage state of the protected
equipment must be made as described in paragraph 7.2.5.b.

7.4.3 Overpressure Potential for Overpressure Demand Cases

For API RBI to provide a relative ranking of risk between PRDs, the analysis must include an
assessment of the overpressure demand cases (overpressure scenarios) that are applicable to each
PRD. In other words, what process upsets is the device protecting against and how critical would the
effect on the protected equipment be if the device were to fail to open upon demand.
API RBI makes a clear distinction between criticality of the overpressure demand cases that the
device is protecting against (i.e. why the device is there). For example, a PRD that protects
equipment and piping for the blocked discharge demand case, downstream of a pump is considered
to be less critical than a device that is protecting a reactor from a runaway chemical reaction since the
amount of overpressure expected as a result of a PRD failure to open upon demand would be much
less. Likewise, a device that is only protecting piping against thermal relief is much less critical than a
device that is protecting low pressure equipment from gas breakthrough from a high pressure source
due to control valve failure.
For most of the overpressure demand cases, the potential overpressure that results when a PRD fails
to open upon demand from an overpressure event may be calculated. The logic for determining the
potential overpressure for each of the overpressure demand cases is provided in Table 7.3. In many
situations, the potential overpressure will approach the burst pressure (assumed to be 4 times the
MAWP) of the protected equipment since the overpressure demand case is not self-limiting. In other
overpressure scenarios, such as a blocked discharge downstream of a centrifugal pump, the potential
overpressure will limit itself to the dead head pressure of the pump, which is typically 1.3 times the
normal discharge pressure of the pump.
This part of the API RBI analysis requires a thorough review of the unit Pressure Relief Study and
P&IDs and should be performed by personnel qualified and experienced in the design and installation
of pressure relief systems.
In general, the determination of the potential overpressure, Po, as a result of PRD failure to open upon
demand is a function of the following:
a) Type of Upstream Overpressure Source – For example, centrifugal pumps, steam supply headers,
upstream pressure vessels, etc.
b) Upstream Source Pressures – These include the steam supply pressure, control valve upstream
pressure, pressure from the high pressure side of a heat exchanger, deadhead pressure for
centrifugal rotating equipment. Additionally, credit for pressure relief valves on upstream equipment
can be assumed to be available to limit overpressure.
c) Heat Sources, Types and Temperatures – In cases of blocking-in equipment, the heat source
supplying energy to the system has a significant impact on the potential overpressure. For example,
solar heat/energy supplied in a thermal relief scenario will typically result in flange leaks and the
overpressure ends up nominally being the normal operating pressure of the system. On the other
hand, if the heat source is a fired heater, the overpressure can build until a rupture occurs (i.e.
overpressure exceeding to four times the MAWP ). Other heat sources include steam reboilers to
towers and the hot side of heat exchangers.
d) Fluid Bubble Point Pressure – In many overpressure scenarios, the pressure build-up is limited to
the bubble point pressure of the contained fluid at the temperature of the heat/energy source being
supplied to the process.

7.4.4 Multiple Relief Device Installations

When the relief requirements for the process are such that multiple PRDs are needed to handle the
required relief capacity, there is a reduction of risk, since the probability that all of the PRDs are in a
failed state upon demand will be reduced. The protected equipment will have a higher probability that
some of the PRD capacity is available on demand to minimize the amount of overpressure during an
overpressure demand case.
When a piece of equipment is protected by multiple PRDs, the calculated probability of failure on
demand for any one specific PRD in the multiple device installation will remain the same. However, an
adjustment is made to the potential overpressure as a result of the PRD failing to open on demand.
This multiple valve installation adjustment, Fa, takes into consideration common cause failures and
also considers the likelihood that other PRDs of the multiple valve installation will be available to
minimize the potential overpressure.
(1.39)
This multiple valve installation factor reduces the potential overpressure that is likely to occur by
assuming that some of the installed PRD relief area will be available if the PRD under consideration
fails to open upon demand. The presence of the square root takes into consideration that the PRDs in
a multiple valve installation may have common failure modes. The reduction in overpressure as a
result of multiple PRDs is in accordance with Equation
(1.40)
For a multiple valve installation, the probability of leakage for any one specific PRD does not increase.
However, since the number of valves increases, the probability of a leak and its associated
consequences does increase in proportion to the number of valves protecting the system.

7.4.5 Calculation of Consequence of Failure to Open

Consequence calculations are performed for each overpressure demand case that is applicable to the
PRD. These consequence calculations are performed as described in Part 3 of this document for
each piece of equipment that is protected by the PRD being evaluated and are performed at higher
potential overpressures as described in paragraph 7.4.1.
The overpressure for each demand case that may result from a failure of a PRD to open upon
demand has two effects. The probability of loss of containment from the protected equipment can go
up significantly as discussed in paragraph 7.2.5. Secondly, the consequences of failure as a result of
the higher overpressures increase also. The magnitude of the release increases in proportion to the
overpressure, thus increasing the consequences of events such as jet fires, pool fires and vapor cloud
explosions. Additionally, the amount of explosive energy released as a result of a vessel rupture
increases in proportion to the amount of overpressure. Part 3 provides detail for the consequences
associated with loss of containment from equipment components.
The consequence calculations should be performed in accordance with Part 3 for each of the
overpressure demand cases applicable to the PRD and for each piece of equipment that is protected
by the PRD. The resultant consequence is Cprdf. j.

7.4.6 Calculation Procedure

The following calculation procedure may be used to determine the consequence of a PRD failure to
open.
a) STEP 1 – Determine the list of overpressure scenarios applicable to the piece of equipment being
protected by the PRD under evaluation. Table 7.2 provides a list of overpressure demand cases
specifically covered in API RBI. Additional guidance on overpressure demand cases and pressure
relieving system design is provided in API 521 [11].
b) STEP 2 – For each overpressure demand case, estimate the amount of overpressure, Po, j, likely to
occur during the overpressure event if the PRD were to fail to open. Paragraph 7.4.3 and Table 7.3
provide guidance in this area.
c) STEP 3 – For installations that have multiple pressure relief devices, determine the total amount of
installed PRD orifice area, Aprdtotal, including the area of the PRD being evaluated. Calculate the
overpressure adjustment factor, Fa, in accordance with Equation (1.39).
d) STEP 4 – Reduce the overpressures determined in STEP 3 by the overpressure adjustment factor
in accordance with Equation (1.40).
e) STEP 5 – For each overpressure demand case, calculate the financial consequences, Cprdf. j, of loss
of containment from the protected equipment using procedures developed in Part 3. Use the
overpressures for the demand cases as determined in STEP 4 in lieu of the operating pressure, Ps.

7.5 Consequence of Leakage

7.5.1 General
Even though the consequences of PRD leakage are typically much less severe than that of a loss of
containment from the protected equipment as a result of a PRD failure to open, the frequency of
leakage may be high enough that the PRD may be ranked as a high priority on a leakage risk basis.
The calculation of the consequence of leakage from PRDs, Cprdl, is estimated by summing the costs of
several items. The cost of the lost inventory is based on the cost of fluid multiplied by the leakage rate
(see paragraph 7.5.5.) and the number of days to discover the leak (see Table 7.14). Regulatory and
environmental costs associated with leakage should be considered as well. Next, the cost of
downtime to repair or replace the device is estimated if it is determined that continuous operation of
the unit with a leaking or stuck open PRD cannot be tolerated. If a shutdown is required to repair the
leaking PRD, then the cost associated with lost production will also be added.
The consequence of leakage, Cprdl, is calculated using the following equation:
(1.41)

7.5.2 Estimation of PRD Leakage Rate

An analysis of industry bench test data shows that approximately 8.4% of the PRVs tested had some
leakage on the bench stand between 70 and 90% of their set pressure. An additional 6.6% of the
PRVs tested leaked at pressures below 70% of their set pressure. An additional 2.4% of the tested
PRVs leaked significantly below 70% of their set pressure. The basis for the estimated leakage rates
used for the consequence calculation in API RBI is provided in Table 7.15.
As shown in Table 7.15, a leakage rate of 1% of the PRD capacity (calculated at normal operating
conditions) is used in API RBI for mild and moderate leaks. For a stuck open PRD, the leakage rate is
assumed to be 25% of the PRD capacity, as given in Equation (1.43).
In API RBI, two leak cases are evaluated. The first case handles minor or moderate leakage, Cmildl,
and represents 90% of all of the potential leakage cases, per Table 7.15. A stuck open case results in
a leakage consequence, Csol, and makes up 10% of all possible leakage cases.
For mild and moderate leaks, 1% of the rated capacity of the PRD, Wprdc, is the basis for the leakage
rate, see Equation (1.42).
(1.42)
For the stuck open or spurious open case, the leakage rate is estimated per Equation (1.43).
(1.43)
The rated capacity of the PRD, Wprdc, can usually be found on the PRD datasheet. It can also be
calculated using the methods presented in API 520 Part 1 [12].

7.5.3 Estimation of Leakage Duration

The leakage duration, Dmild , is estimated for the mild to moderate leakage case as shown in Table
7.14. The durations shown make the assumption that moderate leakage from large PRDs will be
discovered sooner than leakage from smaller PRDs. The stuck open category is handled differently.
For the stuck open case, it is assumed that immediate repair to the PRD is required and that the time
to isolate the PRD will be within 30 minutes. Therefore,
(1.44)

7.5.4 Credit for Recovery of Leaking Fluid

API RBI recognizes that the cost of lost inventory is not as severe when the unit has a flare recovery
system installed or the discharge from the relief devices is to a closed system. A recovery factor, F, is
applied to the leakage consequence as defined by Equations (1.45), (1.46), or (1.47).
Fr = 0.5 if the PRD discharges to flare and a flare recovery system is installed (1.45)
Fr = 0.0 if the PRD discharges to a closed system (1.46)
Fr = 1.0 for all other cases (1.47)

7.5.5 Cost of Lost Inventory

The cost of lost fluid inventory, Costinv, can be calculated using Equation (1.48) or (1.49). Note that
when determining the consequence of leakage, the fluid costs, Costflu, in Equation (1.48) should be
based on the fluid that exists in the protected equipment where the PRD is physically located.
(1.48)
(1.49)

7.5.6 Environmental Costs

The environmental costs, Costenv, are added when leakage through a PRD either to atmosphere or to
a flare system could possibly result in cleanup costs or regulatory fines.

7.5.7 Costs of Shutdown to Repair PRD

API RBI adds the cost associated with repair and maintenance to a PRD, Costsd, if a leaking valve
cannot be tolerated. API recommends using actual Owner-User work order costs associated with the
maintenance, testing, inspection and repair of the PRD. However, the values provided in Equations
(1.50) or (1.51) can be used.
Costsd = $1,000 for PRDs < NPS 6 inlet size (1.50)
Costsd = $2,000 for PRDs ≥ NPS 6 inlet size (1.51)

7.5.8 Cost of Lost Production

The cost of lost production to repair a leaking PRD, Costprod, can be calculated using Equations (1.52)
or (1.53). Where spare PRDs are installed in parallel or in cases where isolation valves underneath
the PRD offer flexibility to repair without shutting down, production losses need not be considered. For
the stuck open case, it is assumed that prolonged operation cannot be tolerated, in which case
Equation (1.54) should be used.
Cost = 0.0
mild
prod if a leaking PRD can be tolerated or if the PRD can be isolated
and repaired without requiring a shutdown (1.52)
Cost mild
prod =Unit prod ⋅D
sd if a leaking PRD cannot be tolerated (1.53)
C prod
so =Unit ⋅D
prod sd for a stuck open PRD (1.54)

7.5.9 Calculation of Leakage Consequence

The consequence of leakage is calculated for two leaks cases.
a) Mild to Moderate Leakage
The first case handles minor or moderate leakage, Cprdl,leak, and is used to represent 90% of all of the
potential leakage cases, per Table 7.15. In this case, the leakage rate is 1% of the PRD capacity and
the duration (or time to discover the leak) is a function of PRD inlet size and discharge location as
shown in Table 7.14.
(1.55)

b) Stuck Open Leakage

The second case handles the spurious or stuck open leak case, Cprdl,so, and is assumed to have a
duration of 30 minutes. In this case, to determine the cost of lost fluid, 25% of the full capacity of the
PRD (calculated at normal operating conditions) is used for the leakage rate and it is assumed that
the PRD will be repaired immediately (within 30 minutes).
(1.56)
c) Final Leakage Consequence
The final leakage consequence is calculated using Equation (1.57) and is weighted based on the how
likely each of the cases are to occur as follows:
(1.57)

7.5.10 Calculation Procedure

The following calculation procedure may be used to determine the consequence of leakage from a
PRD.
a) STEP 1 – Determine the flow capacity of the PRD, Wprdc. This can either be taken from the PRD
datasheet or calculated using the methods presented in API 520 Part 1 [12].
b) STEP 2 – Calculate the leakage rate for the mild to moderate leak case, lratemild, using Equation
(1.42) and the rated capacity of the PRD obtained in STEP 1.
c) STEP 3 – Calculate the leakage rate for the stuck open case, lrateso, using Equation (1.43) and the
rated capacity of the PRD obtained in STEP 1.
d) STEP 4 – Estimate the leakage duration, Dleak, using Table 7.14 and the stuck open duration, Dso,
using Equation (1.44).
e) STEP 5 – Calculate the consequence of lost inventory, Cmildflu and Csoflu, using Equation (1.48) or
(1.49) for the two leak cases. The recovery factor, Fr, can be obtained from Equations (1.45), (1.46),
or (1.47), based on the PRD discharge location and the presence of a flare recovery unit.
f) STEP 6 – Determine the environmental consequences associated with PRD leakage, Cenv.
g) STEP 7 – Determine the consequences associated with repair and maintenance of the PRD, Csd.
Default values based on PRD size are given in Equations (1.50) or (1.51).
h) STEP 8 – Calculate the consequences of lost production for mild leaks, Cmildprod, using Equations
(1.52) or (1.53) based on whether or not PRD leakage can be tolerated and the ability to isolate and
repair a leaking PRD without shutting the unit down. Calculate the consequences of lost production
for the stuck open case, Csoprod, using Equation (1.54).
i) STEP 9 – Calculate the consequence associated with mild leakage, Cmildl, and the consequence of
stuck open PRDs, Csol, using Equations (1.55) and (1.56), respectively.
j) STEP 10 – Calculate the final leakage consequence, Cprdl, using Equation (1.57).