Language and brain: Recasting meaning

in the definition of human language

EDNA ANDREWS

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to articulate the central issues and controversies
that currently dominate the study of the relationship between language and
brain and, as a result, we will attempt to fundamentally redefine the way lan­
guage is viewed by the neurosciences by recasting traditional linguistic defini­
tions of human language. In order to achieve these goals, we will take into
account (1) important aspects of neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuro­
functionality, (2) the role of imaging technologies (especially PET and fMRI)
in formulating specific questions for testing hypotheses about language and
the brain, including what these technologies can and cannot do, and (3) a dis­
cussion of the myths about the neurological representations of human lan­
guage. Our conclusions will take into account evidence on aphasias and
­medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage that directly affects the way we under­
stand the relationship between language, brain, and memory.

Keywords: language; imaging studies; MTL (medial temporal lobe); H. M.;

neurolinguistics; cognitive linguistics

. . . there is now good evidence that the classical

speech-related regions are not anatomically or
functionally homogeneous. Furthermore, m­odern
work has identified areas outside of the classical
regions that are implicated in language processing.
— Poeppel and Hickok (2004: 5)

The time has come for the field of theoretical linguistics to reinsert itself into
the study of human language and the brain. While there are now strong voices
arguing for the importance of including linguistics into the field of brain and
language, the subfield of neurolinguistics has predominately remained a field

Semiotica 184–1/4 (2011), 11–32 0037–1998/11/0184–0011

DOI 10.1515/semi.2011.020 © Walter de Gruyter
12  E. Andrews

that studies language-based pathologies, most often forms of aphasia (Ahlsén

2006: 3–5).1 The purpose of this paper is to articulate the central issues and
controversies that currently dominate the study of the relationship between
language and brain and, as a result, we will attempt to fundamentally redefine
the way language is viewed by the neurosciences by recasting traditional lin-
guistic definitions of human language. In order to achieve these goals, we will
take into account (1) important aspects of neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and
neurofunctionality, (2) the role of imaging technologies (especially PET and
fMRI) in formulating specific questions for testing hypotheses about language
and the brain, including what these technologies can and cannot do, and (3) a
discussion of the myths about the neurological representations of human lan-
guage. Our conclusions will take into account evidence on aphasias and medial
temporal lobe (MTL) damage that directly affects the way we understand the
relationship between language, brain, and memory.

1. Fundamentals of the functioning brain

In order to begin a discussion about language and brain, it is essential to review

some of the current understanding about the functioning human brain. This
brief review includes the work of some of the most prominent neurobiologists
and neuroscientists in the field today.2 Basic knowledge of the interaction of
the neurons and glial cells3 in the context of neural morphology (anatomical
structures) of the brain, on the one hand, and with the electrical and chemical
processes that define cellular interactions on the other, are crucial to an under-
standing of the functioning brain. Estimates of the number of neurons present
at one year of age in the human brain are now 1011, or 100 billion (Dowling
2004: 141); this estimated number has consistently increased over the past
twenty years. Fundamental knowledge of neural anatomy includes the six de-
fining structures of the central nervous system (spinal cord and brain stem, the
medulla oblongata, the pons and cerebellum, the midbrain, the diencephalon
[containing the thalamus and hypothalamus], and the cerebral hemispheres,
which includes the cerebral cortex, basal ganglia, hippocampus and amygda-
loid nucleus). The cerebral cortex itself is divided into four separate lobes
(frontal, temporal, occipital, parietal) characterized by hills (gyri) and valleys
(sulci) (Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel 1991: 7–9). The importance of the fact
that the two hemispheres control opposite sides of the body and are a­symmetrical
in many functional ways is crucial to our understanding of the human brain
(Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel 1991: 7–9). Calvin and Ojemann (1994: 40), for
example, specifically identify differences in the Sylvian fissure and the planum
temporale in left and right hemispheres.
 Language and brain  13

One of the most fascinating aspects of current neurobiological research con-

cerns the important role of neural plasticity and the interaction of the princi-
ples of plasticity and specificity. This point is most strongly made when one
considers the fact that most of the human neural and glial cells are formed be-
fore birth, thus allowing for a shift in attention to the enormous growth of the
individual neurons (including cell bodies, dendrites, and synapses, but not the
actual number of neurons) without forgetting that there is significant and con-
sistent cell death throughout the lifespan of the organism. (It is useful to com-
pare the facts that while most cells are in place at birth, the weight and size of
the human brain increases until about the age of twenty, at which point both
weight and size begin to decline. This increase in size and weight is due to a
number of factors, including blood vessel growth, myelination, and cell body
growth (Dowling 2004: 10).] Dowling points out the importance of the “sub-
stantial rearrangement and pruning of synapses during brain development and
growth, so not only are many synapses added, but many others are lost” as well
as the fact that “not all parts of the nervous system mature simultaneously”
(2004: 12–13).4 We will return to this point when we consider the notion of
“critical period,” the varying definitions of the concept, and its relevance for
language acquisition, maintenance, and loss.

2. Remapping language in the human brain

In addition to general information about the functioning human brain, one may
find in essentially every neuroscience book in print statements about Broca and
Wernicke areas of the brain and their importance for language production and
comprehension (cf. Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel 1991: 7–11; Dowling 2004:
59– 61; Huttenlocher 2002: 49). This continues to be true, even though many
of the leaders in the neuroscience community who specifically study language
have demonstrated that the Broca/ Wernicke areas (together with the arcuate
fasciculus, the band that connects the two regions), or what Poeppel and
Hickok refer to as the “classical model,” is clearly inadequate in explaining
how language works in the brain. As Poeppel and Hickok state: “. . . the lin-
guistic foundations of the model are impoverished and conceptually under-
specified” (2004: 4); a more biting rendition is found in Philip Lieberman’s
Towards an Evolutionary Biology of Language: “The Broca-Wernicke lan-
guage organ theory is simply wrong” (2006: 2). It is worth noting that criticism
of the inadequacy of Broca/ Wernicke areas (as representing the seat of lan-
guage in the brain) have been discussed in print for several decades.5
Rosenfield (1988: 13–25), for example, unravels the problems associated
with a misreading of Broca’s original work. We see a similar approach in
­Poeppel and Hickok where they point out misinterpretations of Wernicke’s
14  E. Andrews

Table 1.  Posited language processing areas of brain

Source Brain areas

Fabbro (1999) Basal ganglia: caudate nucleus, putamen, globus pallidus

Lieberman (2006)
Poeppel and Hickok (2004);
Hickok and Poeppel (2004);
Shalom and Poeppel (2008)
Thalamus: ventral anterior nucleus (VA), ventral lateral
nucleus (VL), Pulvinar (P) and dorsomedial nucleus (DM)
Substantia nigra
Cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical loop (inner putamen-pallidus
pathway)
Cortico-striato-subthalamo-cortical loop (outer putamen-
pallidus pathway)
Basal ganglia: caudate nucleus, putamen, globus pallidus
Cerebellum
Hippocampus
Anterior superior temporal lobe
Middle temporal gyrus
Basal ganglia
Many right-hemisphere homologues
Ventral stream: posterior middle temporal gyrus, superior
temporal gyrus ( bilaterally) from STS (superior temporal
sulcus) to pITL ( posterior inferior temporal lobe)
Dorsal stream: posterior Sylvian fissure (area Spt — Sylvian
parietal temporal) toward the parietal lobe and on to frontal
regions

work and offer a fresh take on some of Wernicke’s contributions that have
­often been ignored (2004: 2– 4). Stowe, Haverkort, and Zwarts (2004: 1003–
1006) include an excellent discussion on the problems of how production and
comprehension have been defined in the classical model.
What is perhaps more disturbing is the absence in most neuroscience texts
concerning the importance of subcortical areas of the brain in language pro-
cessing. The works of Fabbro, Lieberman, and Poeppel and Hickok represent
an important departure from the general trend. In each of these works, a num-
ber of subcortical areas and areas outside of Brodmann’s areas 45 and 22 are
identified that are important to features of language processing. Table 1 gives
some of the more salient subcortical areas for study.
Poeppel and Hickok (2004: 10) make a special point to emphasize the im-
portance of often ignored right-hemispheric areas (noting that these areas
have been treated as “the ugly step-hemisphere in brain-language models”) in
studies of language and brain, and note the general consensus concerning the
role of the right temporal lobes in speech perception.
A secondary problem related to neuroscience definitions of language arises
due to a conflation of the terms “language” and “speech.” The term “language”
is used synonymously with the term “speech,” and in some instances, the term
 Language and brain  15

“language” is used exclusively to mean “speech.” Clearly, what window we do

have in viewing the functioning human brain sheds light on certain motor-
based functions, like speech; and yet, it is essential to recognize that human
language is multi-faceted and non-monolithic, bringing together a variety of
neurological functions that include, but are not restricted, to motor speech.
The relationship of language and memory is also an important aspect of the
study of language and brain. The works of neurolinguists like Paradis (2000)
and Fabbro (1999), as well as the work of Rosenfield (1988), provide stimulat-
ing hypotheses about how language and memory are related in monolingual
and multilingual populations. Rosenfield, for example, offers an explanation of
the interrelationship between linguistic structures of phonology and speech
production and perception that allows him to make a strong argument in favor
of developing a theory of language and brain that does not divorce language
functions from neurological functions involved in various types of memory.6
We will return to the relationship of language and memory systems, along with
the question of H. M. and medial temporal lobe (MTL) damage in later sec-
tions of the discussion.

3. Electro-cortical mappings of the human brain

Ojemann’s surgical studies have produced critical and unique information for
understanding how motor speech production may occur in the human brain.
Through his extensive work with epileptics, including many who are bi- or
multilingual, neurolinguistics has provided a unique window into the function-
ing brain. Specifically, Calvin & Ojemann (1994: 39–57, 219–230) is able to
apply a handheld electrode directly to the cortical surface of conscious patients
during surgery while asking them to name the objects that are being shown to
them on slides. Since there are no nerve endings on the surface of the brain,
this procedure is not painful to the patient. If stimulation to a particular cortical
area prevents the patient from pronouncing the name of the object viewed, then
Ojemann will mark the area with a red flag so that it is not removed during the
surgery. For those areas that do not interfere with speech during stimulation,
the surgeon puts a green flag to indicate that it may be removed during surgery
without affecting motor speech production. What Ojemann’s studies show is
the variability in the organization of “language” centers from brain to brain,
including the variable structure of motor naming sites for bilinguals, where the
following occur: (1) the areas of L1 and L2 are coterminous; (2) the areas of
L1 and L2 are distinct; (3) the number of naming areas vary in size and number
and hemispheric placement (1994: 220). Furthermore, this important research
demonstrates that stimulation of cortical areas (like Broca and Wernicke areas)
does not ever cause speech to occur; rather, it is only subcortical electrical
16  E. Andrews

stimulation, specifically stimulation of the caudate head and the anterior nuclei
of the thalamus, which might induce involuntary production of speech (Fabbro
1999: 83).
This window into the brain is quite restricted and truly invasive, and is only
available for patients, very often epileptics, requiring surgical procedures to
prevent seizures. One could argue that the epileptic brain is organized in a
fundamentally distinct way from the non-epileptic brain, but it is more likely
that the evidence of motor speech production areas, which varies somewhat
from brain to brain as stated above, remains true for the population at large.

4. Imaging technologies and their role in studying language and brain

It would be impossible to do justice to the important and broad topic of imag-

ing technologies and their application in language and brain research in a short
article; however, it is possible to outline the defining principles of these tech-
nologies in order to not only demonstrate the importance of imaging technolo-
gies to the study of language and brain, but also provide a basis for determining
how best they might be applied. Below is a list of the more important tech-
nologies for monitoring the functioning brain, including a short definition and
whether the procedure is invasive or not. (For detailed description of these
technologies, see Huettel, Song, and McCarthy 2004; Kandel, Schwartz, and
Jessel 1991; Cabeza and Kingstone 2001.)
– EEG (electroencephalography): electrodes are placed on the scalp to mon-
itor changes in electrical activity of large groupings (called ensembles) of
neurons (can be invasive). Significant electrical stimulus responses called
ERPs (event related potentials) are electrical changes in the brain that are
associated with sensory or cognitive events.
– PET (Positron Emission Tomography): invasive insertion of radioactive
tracer into the bloodstream to monitor neurological processes.
– fMRI (functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging): noninvasive m­easurement
consisting of anatomical and functional measurements; very noisy with
horizontal placement of subject from head to lower body into the scanner
tube; any movements can create artifacts in the resulting scans, which may
hinder analysis.
– MEG (magnetoencephalography): noninvasive measurement of small
changes in magnetic fields related to neuronal electrical activity, little to no
noise, subject is in upright sitting position; spatial and temporal resolution
are generally good.
– TMS (Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation): causes temporary localized in-
terruption of neurological function by placing a electromagnetic coil near
different points of the scalp.
 Language and brain  17

Different technologies provide different strengths and reliability of results and,

thus, it is often a good idea to combine where possible more than one technol-
ogy to improve the reliability of the results. To give a case in point, let us
consider some of the strengths and limitations of fMRI technology. First of all,
BOLD fMRI technology ( blood-oxygenation-level dependent contrast) is be-
lieved to be correlated with neuronal firings, but this is not a proven fact. The
central idea is based on the notion that when a region of the brain becomes ac-
tive, that region will require more oxygen and glucose in the blood flow, and
the blood flow itself will increase. As Huettel, Song, and McCarthy state:
“Most fMRI studies measure changes in blood oxygenation over time. Because
blood oxygenation levels change rapidly following activity of neurons in a
brain region, fMRI allows researchers to localize brain activity on a second-
by-second basis and within millimeters of its origin” (2004: 4). The resulting
correlations are not with individual neurons, but with assemblies. As Raichle
notes: “. . . it is impossible to distinguish inhibitory from excitatory cellular
activity on the basis of changes in either blood flow or metabolism. Thus, on
this view a local increase in inhibitory activity would be as likely to increase
blood flow and the fMRI BOLD signal as would a local increase in excitatory
activity” (2001: 12).
Huettel, Song, and McCarthy (2004: 127–8) clearly sum up the situation:
“How does fMRI create images of neuronal activity? The short answer is that
it does not! Instead, fMRI creates images of physiological activity that is cor­
related with neuronal activity.”
Second, subtractive methods are often applied in fMRI experiments (for ex-
ample, subtraction of the image where no action is occurring from the image
where a cognitive task is being performed) and may lead to confusion in under-
standing the results (Huettel, Song, and McCarthy 2004: 290). Most recently,
Raichle (2006: 1249) has turned his attention to an unexpected outcome result-
ing from PET and fMRI experiments, namely, accounting for the significant
amount of energy (which he calls dark energy) “that the brain normally and con-
tinuously expends” that is not connected to the additional energy required for
the specific cognitive tasks being studied in the individual imaging experiments.
When comparing the data collected by PET and fMRI, several observations
come to the fore that characterize the inherent limitations, including:

– as mentioned above, neither PET nor fMRI provide information on whether

neuronal changes are inhibitory or excitatory or a combination of the two
(Raichle 2001: 12; Buckner and Logan 2001: 29);
– hemodynamic responses connected to neuronal events are played out in a
longer time frame than the actual neuronal event, and thus “. . . temporal
blurring of the signal is an acknowledged limitation for fMRI studies”
(Buckner and Logan 2001: 30);
18  E. Andrews

– EEG and/or MEG yield better temporal resolutions, being “techniques

more directly coupled to neuronal activity” (Buckner and Logan 2001: 30),
than fMRI or PET;
– while fMRI is easier and cheaper than PET, it is also more sensitive to
“artifacts” that may obscure the function under study, i.e., any kind of mo-
tion that occurs during the scan (including head movement, eye movement,
even breathing). (This point becomes especially relevant for any sort of
fMRI study of human speech; see Buckner and Logan 2001: 30.);
– the images generated are not as useful as the scanner approaches the front
of the head/eye area or the back of the head area/ base of skull;
– a smoothing process is often applied in fMRI analysis (the application of
spatial filters are often introduced into the experiment, sometimes as a pre-
processing step [e.g. Gaussian filter]) (Huettel, Song, McCarthy 2004: 196,
277–279). Different smoothing procedures may yield different results.
The point of this discussion is not to discourage the use of PET and fMRI, but
rather to strengthen the appropriate usage of these technologies in language-
based experiments. Unless the limitations of the technology are clearly articu-
lated, it becomes impossible to develop more robust experimental design,
which will directly impact the validity and broad applicability of the experi-
mental results achieved. One of the most serious issues in using imaging tech-
nologies for language study is the design of the experiments and the repeat-
ability of the results. Poeppel (1996: 317–351) brilliantly demonstrates the
contradictions and complications that arise when comparing the results of
PET-based research for phonological analysis by focusing on a set of studies
that target the left perisylvian cortex. His conclusions call for more restraint in
claiming a strong relationship between language function and a specific brain
region. Ultimately, many of the existing language studies using PET and fMRI
reveal a lack of understanding of fundamental linguistic principles and are
o­ften disconnected from mainstream linguistic theory. In the following section,
we will review some of the major assumptions often behind hypotheses driving
imaging-based experiments and cognitive research on human language.

5. Major trends in the study of language and brain

If one were to summarize the ideological assumptions behind a large portion of

the research on brain and language conducted in the past fifty years, the list
would include at least three major questions:
1. the role of innateness and learning in human language;
2. the degree of autonomy of language centers in the brain;
3. the definition and importance of critical periods.
 Language and brain  19

6. Defining critical periods

Let us begin with the last question, that of critical periods. Marcel Danesi
(2003: 20, 43– 44) gives an excellent review of (1) Lenneberg’s 1967 claim
that the critical period for language acquisition was birth to puberty, a claim
made without any significant empirical analysis, and (2) the resistance to such
a claim made not by the linguistic community as a whole, but by a group of
linguists working in the field of second language acquisition, especially
Krashen, Gass, and Madden. Danesi’s work is a refreshing exception to what
is still a common assumption within many linguistic circles concerning a rigid
notion of critical period for language acquisition, an assumption that remains
for them unanalyzed and unchallenged.
However, the notion of critical periods for neuroscientists is much more
complex and nuanced than the primitive rendition we often see through the
prism of linguistics. In fact, any neuroscientist recognizes that different c­ortical
areas may be defined by different kinds of critical periods. For example, the
visual cortex has a very well-defined critical period as seen in studies of the cat
eye and light deprivation, but even in visual cortices, the environment can
modify the critical period itself (Dowling 2004: 46 –51). In contrast, there are
other cortical areas that do not demonstrate any clear beginning or end of what
Dowling calls “periods of more susceptibility” (2004: 51).
As Dowling states:

The general notion of critical periods in cortical development has been questioned, be-
cause often there is neither a sharp start nor a sharp end of such sensitive periods. Some
investigators believe, rather, that cortical modifiability is a continuum, with, at most,
periods of more susceptibility . . . In addition, critical periods can be modified by envi-
ronment. (Dowling 2004: 50 –51)
. . . it is clear that a variety of mechanisms can alter synaptic strength and circuitry in
the adult brain — from simple synaptic excitation and inhibition, to strengthening or
weakening of synaptic strengths by neuromodulatory mechanisms, to neurons sprout-
ing new branches and forming new synapses by mechanisms such as L-LTP. (Dowling
2004: 106)

If we attempt to recast this debate in terms of the fundamentals of synaptogen-

esis and dendritic growth in the human brain, which are processes that occur
throughout the life cycle, it becomes clear that, as linguists, we cannot continue
to repeat poorly articulated generalizations about the brain’s inability to ac-
quire one or more languages after a certain age. The neurological evidence
does not support the Lenneberg hypothesis on critical periods for language.
The field of linguistics must follow Danesi’s lead and pursue more empirically
valid means of constructing hypotheses upon which future experimental
s­tudies of language and brain are based.
20  E. Andrews

7. How do humans learn language?

The linguistic community has been very active in the controversy of viewing
human language, at one extreme, as a hard-wired, innate instinct or as some-
thing that is acquired in the cultural context, on the other. It is not my purpose
to review the enormous literature on this question, but it is important to note
that while the tension of innateness and learning is a problem that is well-
known in the linguistic community, the details of this debate are not as well-
known within the neuroscience community. Many neuroscientists refer to lin-
guistic research that may or may not be controversial within mainstream
linguistics; for the most part, the neuroscience community would not be in-
vested in one side or the other. Kandel, Song, and McCarthy (1991: 842–845)
and Dowling (2004: 57– 66) are good examples of this phenomenon, where
they basically restate what they believe to be the “standard” theory, which is in
favor of significant innateness components to human language. As we come to
better understand how neurons communicate with one another as individual
cells and as neuronal ensembles, we move farther away from hypotheses that
support a strong innateness component for human language. Since language is
not the focal point of most neuroscience research, the degree of neurological
proclivity facilitating language in humans is not a major concern. Rather, it is
the issue concerning the existence of autonomous language centers in the brain
that continues to be the most problematic for neuroscientists.

8. How localized are language functions in the brain?

The predisposition for theories of localization of function is so strong in neu-

roscience that localization hypotheses are easily and frequently mapped di-
rectly onto descriptions of language function and dysfunction. Even when their
own evidence calls for a different interpretation (cf. Calvin and Ojemann
1994), one often encounters a “default” point of view that assumes the notion
of autonomous language centers in the brain. In the case of Calvin and Oje-
mann, as one example, it is the use of the term “language cortex” (1994: 40,
187) that belies an assumption of localization.
Rosenfield attempts to explain how theories (actually hypotheses) of local-
ization of neurological function became mainstream:

Not only may the doctrine of localization of function be misleading, but the fundamen-
tal assumption that memories exist in our brains as fixed traces, carefully filed and
stored, may be wrong. Indeed, without the belief in permanent memories there would
have been no doctrine of localization of function . . . (Rosenfield 1988: 5)
 Language and brain  21

What looks like localizations are different ways of grouping stimuli — parts of a pro-
cess of creating possible appropriate combinations and orderings of stimuli. The envi-
ronment doesn’t teach the organism what it should know; the organism must make its
own sense of the environment, and there is no specific way in which this can be done.
The “specialized centers” are just part of the larger combinatory tactic (the procedures)
of the brain. (Rosenfield 1988: 10)

The attempt to fit human language into localized neurological areas is one of
the most controversial aspects of the study of language and brain today. It is
also the one, as we have seen in the list of imaging technologies above, in
which the most headway is being made in terms of redirecting the discourse
away from the traditional areas in the frontal and temporal lobes toward sub-
cortical regions (cf. Poeppel and Hickok 2004; Hickok and Poeppel 2004;
­Lieberman 2006: 130 –213; Shalom and Poeppel 2008).
A corollary of the predilection for localization hypotheses is seen in those
analyses that use a modularity approach to the study of language and the brain.
Such modularity-based approaches attempt to model language function in the
brain into separate and autonomous regions such as phonology, morphology,
syntax, semantics, etc. The cognitive linguistics movement, as we will discuss
below, has been opposed to such characterizations of human language in the
brain and has argued strongly in favor of a connectionist approach to the study
of language and brain.7

9. Exploring the boundaries of cognitive linguistics and neurolinguistics

The past thirty years have shown a significant shift in subdisciplines within the
field of linguistic theory, and one of the more interesting groups to emerge is
the cognitive linguistics group. Cognitive Linguistics (CL) is a very broadly-
based international group of scholars who generally avoid making strong
claims about what the brain is actually doing; rather, they focus on developing
cognitive representations for linguistic facts that are the most relevant for
h­uman language; that is, CL is interested in developing robust explanatory
models of cognition and language. These models, as metasystems, come in
several varieties, including Lakoff’s Idealized Cognitive Models (ICMs), sche­
mas (including image- and event-schemas), basic categories, prototypes, and
many others (Palmer 1996: 55–79).
As is evident from the discussion above, CL, unlike contemporary neuro­
linguistics, is not predominately a medical field that is preoccupied with under-
standing and analyzing language-based pathologies (including language
­impairment in disease, trauma, brain lesions, and dementia, communication
disorders, aphasia, recovery from aphasia, etc.). The linguists who affiliate
22  E. Andrews

themselves with CL (or who are perceived to be affiliated) to one degree or

another include some of the more interesting theoretical linguists in the field
today (such as Langacker, Wierzbicka, Searle, Lakoff, Johnson, Rosch, Fill-
more, Palmer, Gibbs, etc). In comparison, the field of neurolinguistics gener-
ally does not include researchers who are primarily affiliated with the field of
linguistics. An example of the status quo in the field of neurolinguistics can be
found in considering the disciplinary affiliations of the authors of Handbook of
Neurolinguistics (Stemmer and Whitaker [eds.] 1999); of a list of seventy-two
scholars, only two of them (Paradis and Jarema) are in departments of linguis-
tics. As is immediately apparent, the scholarly make-up and the goals of the
two fields are extraordinarily different. Perhaps it is the applied aspects of neu-
rolinguistics that have made it seem less interesting to theoretical linguists in
the past. However, with the growing importance of imaging technologies in the
study of language and brain, it becomes imperative that there is more direct
input from linguists.
One of the important contributions of cognitive linguistics to the study of
language and brain is its emphasis on combining cognitive theory-based
m­odels with reliable data sets of linguistic forms; these data sets are both prag-
matically and semantically viable within their corresponding languages, speech
communities, and communities of practice. CL is interested in the study of not
only imagery, but also perception (visual and nonvisual) and, as a result, posits
forms of functional equivalence between imagery and perception in some
cases (Palmer 1996: 49). Such a position is complementary to research in the
neurosciences on mental imagery, where distinctions such as viewer-oriented
and object-oriented mental representations are important (especially in K­osslyn
1980, 1994) and add clarity to CL research on imagery and perception.

10. Medial temporal lobe damage and language acquisition,

maintenance and loss

The case of H. M. changed the way neuroscientists talked about memory. After
his surgery at the age of twenty-seven in 1953, which was to free him from his
grand mal epileptic seizures that began after a head injury as a teenager, it be-
came clear that medial temporal lobe (MTL) structures, including the hippo-
campus, are important for the making of memory. There is hardly a textbook
on memory that does not touch on this important moment in the history of
understanding the anatomy of human memory. Given H. M.’s severe antero-
grade amnesia following surgery, one of the many questions that arose i­ncluded
how the surgery might affect his language abilities. Corkin’s research on H. M.
over the past four decades (1965, 1973, 1984, 2002; Corkin et al., 1997) has
made a tremendous contribution to the study of human memory. In 2001, I was
 Language and brain  23

fortunate to be part of a team analyzing H. M.’s general language abilities in

situ over a two-day period. Prior to that time, H. M. had been evaluated and
tested on multiple occasions in a laboratory setting over a period of forty-eight
years. Testing instruments have included the Wechsler subtests in vocabulary,
comprehension, similarities, and information (Corkin 2002: 154). The longitu-
dinal data did not show that H. M., who had a technical high school education,
demonstrated diminished language abilities.
In the literature on H. M., it was widely written that he was unable to form
any new memories other than some basic procedural (non-declarative) ones
(Squire 1998: 56 –58 as one example), and there were some researchers not
affiliated with Corkin who predicted that H. M.’s language skills would dete-
riorate over time. However, H. M. has been an avid crossword puzzle lover all
of his life, and Corkin’s lab began to study these puzzles in the 1990s. The re-
sult is a fascinating article by Skotko et al. (2004: 756 –769) that demonstrates
that H. M. had seemed to have learned new lexical items (which they call
­“semantic information”) since his 1953 surgery. The conclusion was that
H. M. can, indeed, learn new factual information.
Our analysis from 2001 demonstrates that “in spite of his profound antero-
grade amnesia, H. M. displays dynamic language skills” (Skotko, Andrews,
and Einstein 2005: 409). In our sessions with H. M. in February, 2001, it was
clear that he had most certainly learned new lexical items (cf. “Jackie O­nassis”).
The post-1953 vocabulary included proper names, common nouns, c­ompounds,
and in some instances contextual information (cf. use of the word “astronaut”
when describing the Challenger disaster).8 Furthermore, when his spoken dis-
course was analyzed using four different quantitative measures (mean length
of utterance [MLU], mean clauses per utterance [MCU], type token ratio
[TTR] and left-branching clauses [LBC]) and compared with healthy volun­
teers (with their MTL intact), it turned out that H. M. was only slightly lower
in MLU and MCU scores, had a significantly higher TTR, and was comparable
in terms of LBC (Skotko, Andrews, and Einstein 2005: 403).
Another interesting finding concerns the length of H. M.’s short-term mem-
ory window. Following our analysis of his extended narratives, we discovered
that H. M. was able to return to topics mentioned more than three minutes
earlier, and not only did he return to the topics, but he provided additional de-
tails (Skotko, Andrews, and Einstein 2005: 403). Merlin Donald has argued
that “the immediate time frame within which most conscious human action
takes place . . . is a much larger window of experience than short-term mem-
ory” (2001: 47).9 Donald makes the point that many laboratory protocols are
much shorter in their design and often to not take into account this more critical
and larger time frame (2001: 47). Poeppel and Hickok also mention the impor-
tance of ecological validity in the interpretation of experimental results (2004:
9). Using combinations of laboratory-based and in situ experimentation and
24  E. Andrews

data collection will only serve to make the analyses and conclusions stemming
from neurolinguistic research more robust.
When one combines all of the longitudinal research done on H. M.’s lan-
guage ability, it is not possible to claim that MTL structures are vital for main-
tenance of language comprehension and production, even when the period of
time is as significant as fifty years. The degree to which MTL structures may
or may not play a role in language acquisition is not addressed by research on
H. M. and remains unrevealed. Clearly, H. M. does not exhibit normal acquisi-
tion patterns post-surgery. The fact that he has any lexical acquisition at all is
what was unexpected. In short, the evidence from H. M. does not argue for or
against localization of language function in the brain. Rather, this case study
demonstrates that removal of MTL structures did not cause deterioration of
language ability.

11.  Redefining human language

It is probably no exaggeration to claim that Saussure’s doctrine of the arbi­

trariness of the binary sign (signifié [concept]/signifiant [acoustic image]) and
his distinction between langue and parole have impacted modern linguistic
thought more than any other notions carried over from the nineteenth century.
One might a­rgue that it was a tacit belief in the arbitrariness of the linguistic
sign that led to the generative movement’s preoccupation with the distinction
between surface and deep structures. And it was most certainly a rejection of
this doctrine that brought together various groups of semioticians, semanti-
cists, scholars of cross-cultural pragmatics, and, most recently, cognitive lin-
guists. One of the major ways that the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign has
been challenged is through the study of metaphor and metonymy, and iconicity
in morphology and syntax.
Binary relations (not only binary signs) dominated a number of linguistic
theoretical paradigms, whether they be pairs like langue and parole, compe­
tence and performance, or even the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes. Ulti-
mately, it turns out that the notion of binarism is too weak to explain these
broad linguistic phenomena, regardless of the names attributed to them.10 But
Saussure was more nuanced that he is often remembered for. In fact, his con-
tribution of the importance of viewpoint in creating the linguistic object is po-
tentially profound, especially when the linguistic object is defined as a relation
(and not as a thing; Saussure 1959: 67, 111–113).
In order for the field of neurolinguistics to move forward in a robust way, it
is necessary to revisit the fundamental assumptions behind our definitions of
human language. I would begin this reevaluation of the field by suggesting the
principles below be included in any linguistic definition of human language.
 Language and brain  25

(This articulation of the defining principles of human language is a first step in

the process and is not meant to be exhaustive.)

  1. language is not a neurological monolith11; rather, it “piggybacks” on other

perceptual systems in the brain;
  2. language is an acquired dynamic system that is imbued with meaning at all
levels, bearing the potential to signify and to communicate, potentials that
may be realized to varying degrees;
  3. while the phoneme may be the minimal distinctive unit of speech sound,
the minimal unit of language is probably not the phoneme, but the speech
act;
  4. while human language utilizes hierarchical and embedded structures (cf.
distinctive feature, phoneme, morphophoneme, morpheme, lexeme, etc.),
it is important to emphasize the inherent continuity between these struc-
tures, the different degrees of freedom between levels, and how they inter-
act in actual usage;
  5. human language does not develop in a single individual, but rather re-
quires a collective of individuals as a prerequisite for development;
  6. linguistic signs are NOT binary and they generate meaning based on rela­
tive degrees of nonarbitrariness and arbitrariness;
  7. all changes in the linguistic sign change meaning (or: all translations
change meaning), and these changes can add or subtract meaning;
  8. any language can say anything, but some languages oblige its speakers to
say certain things (this is a paraphrase of Jakobson 1985 [1967]: 110);
  9. there is a strong relationship between language and culture such that it is
impossible to remove language from its cultural context;
10. miscommunications and ill-formed utterances are always present in
l­anguage;
11. all meaning in language is negotiated within a multifaceted speech act;
12. it is counterproductive to conflate linguistic meaning with reference;
13. language acquisition is a life-long process with periods of greater or lesser
intensity that do not necessarily correspond to biologically-determined
­periods of greater susceptibility (Dowling’s term);
14. language acquisition often occurs through language itself, i.e., requires a
metalingual functionality;
15. speaker knowledge of one or more languages may be uncritical and
n­onarticulated;12
16. there may be a neurological predisposition to perceive and generate mean-
ings that is enhanced through languaging;
17. it is important to study human language from a perspective that includes
both “other aspects of human behavior” and “the behavior of other spe-
cies” (Lieberman 2006: 16 –17)13;
26  E. Andrews

18. since multilingualism is more common than monolingualism across the

world’s languages, it is important to conduct research that includes both
types of language users (and bi- and multilingual speakers are not consid-
ered to be non-normative);
19. different stages of language acquisition, maintenance and loss occur both
concurrently and discretely throughout the life of individual speakers.

12.  Myths about human language

There are no symbols in the brain; there are pat-

terns of activity, fragments, which acquire differ-
ent meanings in different contexts.
— Rosenfield (1988: 170)

In order to fully expose the assumptions given in our proposal outlined above
for redefining human language, it may be useful to revisit some of the common
beliefs about language that are probably not accurate based on what we now
know of the functioning human brain. First of all, we can no longer treat the
various forms of language (speech, comprehension, reading, writing, creating
meaning for self and others) as if they are represented in the same way neuro-
logically. Clearly, the term language refers to a variety of neurological func-
tions that serve as the basis for a wide range of actions and behaviors; it is the
cultural context that serves to categorize these activities as appropriate and
v­iable.
Second, the hypothesis of the poverty of stimulus is as underspecified and
impoverished as the classical (Broca/Wernicke) model of brain and lan-
guage. The hypothesis itself is based on the fallacy that there are ideal native
speakers of a language; in fact, there are no ideal speakers, only better and
worse speakers, and cultural institutions, including formal education, play a
major role in setting baselines and goals for pronunciation norms, grammar,
lexicon, literacy, and appropriate discourse. Once we abandon the false notion
of the ideal native speaker, we are obliged to be more empirically rigorous in
identifying the proficiency levels of subjects used in our linguistic studies, in-
cluding, but not restricted to, imaging studies. One of the reasons that most of
the studies done on multilinguals produce results that are difficult or impossi-
ble to repeat is due to the lack of information about the level of language ability
of the participating subjects. This is a problem that can be easily solved and
should become part of the baseline requirements in future studies. Paradis’
work (Paradis and Libben 1987; Paradis 2004) is a wonderful (and unique)
example of strides that are being made in this area for aphasics; the same
 Language and brain  27

a­ pproach needs to be applied to the study of controls and normal subjects for
all studies looking at language.
It is probably a good idea to stop looking for actual words in individual
h­uman brains. This is common practice in many studies, and includes looking
for not only individual lexemes, but also lexemes specified by part of speech.
(This is especially true for English, where there are very few formal morpho-
logical markers distinguishing parts of speech.) Once again, Ojemann’s work
is a wonderful touchstone that can facilitate good experimental design and help
researchers identify the kinds of questions that can currently be addressed by
existing technologies and surgical techniques.
In this vein, I would also suggest that it is time to shift attention away from
the search for a language cortex on par with the visual cortex or somatosensory
cortex. Imaging technologies may have reinforced old assumptions about
­localization for some researchers, but these technologies have much more to
contribute to neurolinguistic research when the experiments are not focused on
localization as such, and instead are designed to be more comprehensive and
include a larger range of neuroanatomical regions.
There is now sufficient evidence about the language of bi- and multi­
lingual speakers that merits the linguist’s attention. According to Fabbro, there
is little or no recovery of the first language in “almost one third of bilingual
aphasics” (1999: 117). In fact, the permutations and combinations of re­
covery in multilingual aphasics do not follow any particular pattern and can
present the full range of possible outcomes. Note the following passage from
Fabbro:

With the exclusion of cases of individuals bilingual since infancy, the mother tongue is
often the most familiar and the most automatized language preferred for . . . By analyz-
ing all clinical cases of bilingual and polyglot aphasics published so far, I have calcu-
lated that around 40% of patients present parallel recovery of all languages, 32% p­resent
a better recovery of the mother tongue, and the remaining 28% present a better recovery
of the second language. (Fabbro 1999: 115)

While we recognize that the published data on aphasics is only a subset of the
entire group of cases and thus, by definition, incomplete, Fabbro’s observa-
tions are still significant and perhaps set a new beginning point from which to
begin positing hypotheses about the relationship between one or more lan-
guages in the individual human brain, which would include high d­egrees
of  variability in those relationships (see also Ojemann and Whitaker 1978;
Ojemann 1989, 1991; Calvin and Ojemann 1994; Creutzfeldt, Ojemann, and
Lettich 1989; Fabbro 1999: 111–187). While many of these case studies in-
clude descriptive information about the languages of each patient, they do
not  include any empirically-verifiable information on actual proficiency. As
28  E. Andrews

­ entioned above, this information needs to become part of the baseline

m
i­nformation for future studies for both pathological and non-pathological lan-
guage abilities.
These data as presented by Fabbro would not surprise scholars like Rosen-
field, who claim that not only are there “no fixed symbols anywhere in the
brain” (1988: 128), but who also argues that perception, recognition, and mem-
ory “are not separate processes . . . but an integral procedure” (1988: 135–136).
In his discussion covering a large cross-section of case studies of aphasia, in-
cluding components of agraphia and anomia, Rosenfield suggests the follow-
ing explanations:

It is the idea of catalogued information that is a mistake, however. It fails to relate the
derived image to the environmental sources of that image and hence to its context; and
it fails to take account of the fact that naming, too, is context-sensitive. It is the inability
to establish contexts, not the loss of any memory images or words, that is the reason
patients have difficulties naming things . . . It is not different representations but differ-
ent procedures that incorporate our varied experiences . . . (Rosenfield 1988: 142–143,
my emphasis)
. . . memory is not an exact repetition of an image in one’s brain, but a recategorization.
Recategorizations occur when the connections between the neuronal groups in different
maps are temporarily strengthened. Recategorization of objects or events depends on
motion as well as sensation . . . (Rosenfield 1988: 196)

I have attempted in this article to bring to the fore the central issues involved
in developing a robust neurolinguistic research agenda that can benefit from
the significant contributions available through the discipline of linguistics. In
strengthening the intellectual ties between theoretical linguistics and neuro­
linguistics, both disciplines will achieve richer insights into more sophisticated
approaches to developing robust hypotheses and empirical, testable models of
the acquisition, maintenance and loss of language in the functioning brain.

Notes

1. We are treating the field of neurolinguistics as distinct from the larger field of cognitive neu-
roscience. Both fields are interested in the question of language and brain, but neurolinguis-
tics (a term that took root in the 1960s according to Ahlsén [2006: 3]) has been focused on
language breakdown that occurs due to brain damage or pathology. Stowe et al. (2004: 998)
note that the first imaging studies of “normal healthy volunteers” was published in 1989.
2. Principles of Neuroscience by Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel (1991) is an excellent and thor-
ough medically-oriented course on the brain. A shorter, but excellent introduction to the
brain, The Great Brain Debate: Nature or Nurture?, by J. E. Dowling (2004) is very acces-
sible for linguists with less of a science background. Essentially all of George Ojemann’s
work is very important, especially for linguists interested in multilinguals and m­ultilingualism
 Language and brain  29

(see, e.g., Corina et al., 2010). Also Fabbro’s The Neurolinguistics of Bilingualism (1999) is
an important book for anyone interested in neurolinguistics.
3. In most works, neurobiologists will characterize different types of cortical cells based on
their cell body shape, namely, (1) pyramidal (neurons) and (2) nonpyramidal (which includes
glial cells). Neurons may also be called neural cells or pyramidal cells, and they exist in a
number of varieties, including unipolar, pseudo-unipolar, bipolar, and three types of multi­
polar cells. Neurons may also be classified based on function: afferent/sensory neurons,
m­otor neurons, and interneurons. The four morphological regions of the neuron are: (1) the
cell body, (2) dendrites, (3) the axon and (4) presynaptic terminals (Kandel, Schwartz, and
Jessel 1991: 19–22). Glial cells, which surround the neurons and outnumber them up be-
tween ten to fifty times, are divided into two major subtypes (macroglia and microglia) and
include a variety of classes within these subtypes (Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessel 1991: 22–
23).
4. The struggle to understand the interaction of plasticity and specificity in the human brain,
especially as it is realized through synaptic connections has resulted in very different opin-
ions throughout the neuroscience community. For some examples of varying viewpoints, see
Dowling (2004), Huttenlocher (2002), Gazzaniga (1998), and Shepherd (2004). Since the
late 1990s, the neuroscience community has recognized that there is modest generation of
new neurons in the human brain, especially in hippocampal regions, but the amount of new
neuronal generation is thought to be quite restricted, especially when compared to normal
rates of cell apoptosis (cell death) that occurs throughout the life cycle. For an example of an
early study on neuronal genesis in the adult brain, see Gould et al. (1999: 548–552).
5. While Calvin and Ojemann (1994) introduce Broca and Wernicke as important language
a­reas, they also note that damage only to the traditional Broca’s area is not sufficient to pro-
duce Broca’s aphasia (1994: 44, 54). See also Grodzinsky and Amunts recent book devoted
to a history of study of Broca’s area (2006).
6. It is important to note that there are neurolinguists who are attempting to reconcile the data
of aphasia recovery of multilinguals with the standard theories of memory. In particular,
Paradis and Fabbro have used Squire’s distinctions of different types of memory to explain
recovery patterns of aphasics such that the recovery is not based on neuroanatomical expla-
nations, but neurofunctional models (Paradis 2004: 119–151; Fabbro 1999: 75–76, 120).
7. Cognitive linguistics was not the first movement to view linguistic levels in a less modular
way. Jakobson (1985 [1956], 1987 [1957], 1985 [1967], 1985 [1969], 1971) and contempo-
rary semiotic theorists have always been strong supporters of a view of linguistic levels
( phonology, morphophonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, etc.) as relatively autono­
mous categories with fluid and permeable boundaries.
8. When H. M. began talking about the Challenger space craft, he called it “a big submarine”
(Skotko, Andrews, Einstein 2005: 410). While his narrative seemed to be about the Titanic,
he unexpectedly made reference to “astronaut” and when asked about gender, stated that she
was a woman.
9. References to H. M. are abundant in published research on memory; not all of them are
completely accurate. Dowling (2004: 94 –95) talks about H. M.’s short-term memory win-
dow, which he claims is only between twenty and thirty seconds long. In fact, our evaluation
of H. M.’s discourse shows that the window is significantly longer, even in instances where
we changed the topic of the conversation.
10. Given the significant role that binary relations has played in linguistic thought, the movement
away from binary signs to more complex sign units is a complicated one that requires a fun-
damental reevaluation of how meaning is realized in the functioning linguistic sign. This
problem has been central in much of my own work (cf. Andrews 1990, 1994, 1996a, 1996b,
2003; Andrews and Krenmayr 2007).
30  E. Andrews

11. I have used the expression “language is not a neurological monolith” in my courses for many
years. However, it has recently come to my attention that Poeppel and Hickok also use a
similar formulation: “. . . linguistic domains are themselves not monolith, but have rich inter-
nal structure with numerous subcomponents and computational requirements” (2004: 5).
12. The use of these terms comes from David Savan’s definition of C. S. Peirce’s immediate
object (1980: 257; see also Andrews 1994: 16).
13. Lieberman (2006: 8) makes the point that some forms of lexical, syntactic, and vocal ability
were probably features already present in the common ancestors of humans and c­himpanzees.

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Edna Andrews ( b. 1958) is a professor at Duke University <eda@duke.edu>. Her research inter-
ests include neurolinguistics and the semiotics of culture. Her publications include Markedness
theory: The union of asymmetry and semiosis in language (1990); The semantics of suffixation in
Russian (1996); Russian: A grammar of contemporary Russian (2001); and Conversations with
Lotman: Cultural semiotics in language, literature, and cognition (2003).