W

Year 2010, Volume 5, Issue 36

avelength The CENTROFIN Newsletter

Bridge Resource
In this issue
Management pg 2

Guide
Weakness in bridge organization
Principles of Good
Management practices are:
Shared view of goals;
Anchoring
pg 4
and management has been cited Delegation of
as a major cause for marine responsibilities; Confucius
casualties worldwide. Frequently Effective organization;
accidents in operations are caused and Chinese Philosopher
by resource management errors. Sense of team

Checklist for Bridge Resource Management

reduces the risk of marine
ownership in achieving
goals.
Safety
pg 6

safety officer's casualties by helping a ship’s bridge

inspection
The following are examples of questions the
safety officer should consider.This is not inten-
ded to be an exhaustive list, and should be varied
according to the particular design or conditions
on a particular ship. Also, the Monthly Safety
Inspection by the Safety Officer (company's form
D/S-11) should always be referred to.
MEANS OF ACCESS/SAFE MOVEMENT
[
Are means of access, if any, to the area under
inspection (particularly ladders and stairs), in a
safe condition, well lit and unobstructed?
[
If any means of access is in a dangerous
condition, for instance when a ladder has been
removed, is the danger suitably blocked off
and warning notices posted?
crew anticipate and correctly respond to their ship’s changing
Management
situation.
pg 8-9
What is Bridge Resource Management?
Bridge Resource Management (BRM), or as it is also called Safety first!
Bridge Team Management (BTM), is the effective
management and utilization of all resources, human and
technical, available to the Bridge Team to ensure the safe
completion of the vessel’s voyage.
pg 1-10
BRM focuses on bridge officers’ skills such as teamwork,
teambuilding, communication, leadership, decision-making Bridge Resource
and resource management and incorporates this into the
larger picture of organizational and regulatory management.
Management Guide
BRM addresses the management of operational tasks, as well
as stress, attitudes and risk. BRM recognizes there are many pg 14
elements of job effectiveness and safety, such as individual,
organizational, and regulatory factors, and they must be
anticipated and planned for. BRM begins before the voyage Figure This!
with the passage plan and continues through the end of the
voyage with the passage debrief. cont'd on pg 10

[
Is access thorough the area of inspection both Guidance for Master / OOW
for transit and working purposes clearly
marked, well lit, unobstructed and safe?
on keeping a safe anchor watch
1. The master of every ship at an 1 maintaining a continuous state of
[
Are fixtures and fittings over which seamen unsheltered anchorage, at an open vigilance by sight and hearing as well
might trip or which project, particularly roadstead or any other virtually "at as by all other available means;
overhead, thereby causing potential hazards, sea" conditions in accordance with 2 ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore
suitably painted or marked? chapter VIII, section A-VIII/2, part 3-1, communication requirements;
paragraph 51 of the STCW Code, is 3 the prevailing weather, sea, ice and
[
Is any gear, which has to be stowed within the bound to ensure that watchkeeping current conditions;
area, suitably secured? arrangements are adequate for 4 the need to continuously monitor the
maintaining a safe watch at all times. ship’s position;
[
Are all guard-rails in place, secure and in good A deck officer shall at all times 5 the nature, size and characteristics of
condition? maintain responsibility for a safe anchorage;
anchor watch. 6 traffic conditions;
[
Are all openings through which a person could 2. In determining the watchkeeping 7 situations which might affect the
fall, suitably fenced? arrangements, and commensurate security of the ship;
with maintaining the ship’s safety and 8 loading and discharging operations;
[
If portable ladders are in use, are they properly security and the protection of the 9 the designation of stand-by crew
secured and at a safe angle? marine environment, the master shall members; and
take into account all pertinent 10 the procedure to alert the master and
circumstances and conditions such as: maintain engine readiness.
cont'd on pg 12

TO THE MASTER:
Please circulate copies of this Bulletin to the CREW.

T
o
r
ea
c
ho
ur
Se
a
fa
r
er
s
Anchoring
In the last issue of Signals a scene was set for a dilemma faced by the
master of a handy-sized bulk carrier at anchor 2.5 nautical miles off
the coast at an imaginary UK port. The forecast was for winds
between force 7 and severe gale 9. Having written his night orders the
master returned to his cabin to ponder his options. We asked you to
apply your seamanship knowledge to this problem and consider what
you would do in the same situation.
This problem is typical of those facing professional seafarers on a
daily basis. On paper it might appear that there is little information or
the situation is simple and not really a problem - but that is where
professional training makes the difference. There is a lot more than is
first apparent in the information about the anchored ship in the case
study.
Holding ground
The best design of modern anchor can provide a holding power of up
to 12 times its own weight where the holding ground is very good,
such as clay or really heavy mud. The chart shows the nature of the
sea bed to be shingle and shells which is not good holding ground. It
is quite possible that the holding power of the best anchor here may
be as little as six times its own weight, so it would be reasonable to
assume that any anchor might not be fully effective in such conditions.
A ship at anchor in strong wind tends to yaw around the anchor or
anchors, and once this happens the uneven forces on the anchor
cable can increase the likelihood of dragging. When trying to heave in
the anchor, this may also cause problems with the windlass.
Ballast condition
The ship had been de-ballasted to a minimum to maintain 50%
propeller immersion. In this condition it is highly likely that any rapid
deterioration in the weather and sea state would mean the propeller
was frequently lifting clear of the sea making it difficult for the ship to
reach or maintain steerage way and quite possibly it could cause the
engine to over speed and shut down.
Attempting to re-fill the ballast tanks under these conditions could also
be dangerous. Correct ballasting is a safety issue which should not be
influenced by commercial pressure, perceived or real.
Ballast affects manoeuvring characteristics and, over the life of the
ship, good ballast management will resist forces which weaken the
structure.
The stability booklet may also stipulate a minimum forward draft to
maintain a safe bow height and avoid wave slamming forward. This
safety requirement might get overlooked in de-ballasting purely for
propeller immersion.
Weather forecast
All mariners know that a weather-forecast only predicts the likely
weather. Another word for 'predict' is 'guess'! And surely there is a big
guess in the case study weather forecast where it says '7 to severe
gale 9'. This is telling us that the wind could be anything from 28 knots
to 47 knots which could mean wave heights from 4 metres to a
maximum of 10 metres. So from this simple phrase we know that
(Compliments NEPIA
– SIGNALS Newsletter – Issue 74)
the forecasters are very unsure about the predictability of the
approaching low pressure system.
Consequently, there is a high risk factor in waiting to find out whether
the 'guess' is good or not. Every mariner knows that the weather can
be better than predicted, but must also remember that the weather
can be worse than predicted. It would be prudent to check other
sources of weather information such as facsimile charts, VHF
broadcast weather reports, and even the television forecasts being
this close to the coast.
Some people might argue that a simple Navtex forecast such as the
one provided for this case study does not give sufficient information.
But is that really the case? It is winter and a 'low' is approaching in the
northern hemisphere. These pressure systems can move very quickly
and the wind can freshen and veer from southerly to southwesterly to
north-westerly very quickly too. An anchorage protected by land to the
south but open to the north-west can very quickly change from
sheltered to dangerous.
Risk assessment
Considering the following additional 'd' factors
distance - from the shore and other navigational dangers and
ships at anchor
depth - of water
dragging - the nature of the sea bed and the holding power of the
anchor
density - of shipping in the anchorage
daylight - makes it easier to manoeuvre the ship in difficult
conditions.
The master should conclude that the following factors are high risk
> the weather deteriorating more quickly than forecast
> the wind veering to the north-west pushing the ship onto a lee
shore
> the nature of the sea bed - the anchor dragging
> with 11 other ships in the anchorage – colliding with another ship
> with light ballast and 50% propeller immersion – the engine will
prove ineffective
> the ship will not reach or maintain steerage way – the rudder will
prove ineffective
> the distance off the coast is 2.5 miles – but there are shallow
patches and rocks closer
> the forecast deterioration in weather will take place during hours of
darkness.
Control measures – the options
More cable and/or second anchor
- if done prior to the weather deteriorating these options may provide
additional holding power but, with a seabed of shells and shingle, the
holding power of two anchors may only match the holding power of
one anchor in very good holding ground. If done after the weather
deteriorates and/or the anchor starts dragging, the chances of
preventing the ship from being blown onto a lee shore are very much

luck or
judgment?
reduced. Combined with effective use of ship's engine it may slow
the dragging enough to regain control of the situation.
Ship's engine
- in the light ballast condition, the likelihood of the propeller breaking
clear of the water and causing the engine to shut down is very high.
Even if the engine does not shut down it is unlikely to be effective
with 50% propeller immersion in the forecast waves that could
potentially be up to 10m high in open sea, remembering that waves
breaking in shallow water will add to the difficult conditions.
Weigh anchor and leave
- by a process of elimination (called risk assessment!) there is only
one remaining control measure on the list. The panel of experts
agree that the only effective measure to control the risk of this
situation is to weigh anchor immediately – without delaying to ballast
– and proceed to sea to ride out the bad weather.
Once out at sea the master can write his night orders and go to his
cabin for the evening, happy in the knowledge that he has taken all
reasonable steps that will prove he is a prudent mariner and not a
casualty statistic. He may even get a good night's sleep!
The Association received an excellent response to the case study
and would like to thank everyone who submitted an answer. The
answers show a keen interest in issues of professional judgement
and ample evidence of the practice of ordinary good navigation and
seamanship. Because of the large number of replies we have
decided to draw three prize winners
Captain Canuto Caballes Jr, MV Iron Kalypso, Maryville Maritime
Inc, Captain Mendoza Jovito ,MV Angelica An, Ancora Investment
Trust Inc, Captain Vireus Libron, MV Shorthorn Express, Vroon BV
Look out for another chance to test your judgement
against the experts with the next case study prize
draw in a future issue of Signals.
Readers may wish to refer to the report into the
grounding of the MV Pasha Bulker by
NSW Maritime, Australia.
Website:
www.maritime.nsw.gov.au/docs/
ministerialnews/
pasha_bulker_final_report.pdf
- pg 3 -
Safety Culture
An organization with a "safety culture" is one that gives appropriate
priority to safety and realises that safety has to be managed like other
areas of the business. For the shipping industry, it is in the
professionalism of seafarers and shore staff that the safety culture must
take root.
That culture is more than merely avoiding accidents or even reducing the
number of accidents, although these are likely to be the most apparent
measures of success. In terms of shipboard operations, it is to do the right
thing at the right time in response to normal and emergency situations.
The quality and effectiveness of that training will play a significant part in
determining the attitude and performance - the professionalism - the
seafarer will subsequently demonstrate in his, or her, work. And the
attitude adopted will, in turn, be shaped to a large degree by the 'culture'
of the shipping company.
The key to achieving that safety culture is in:
> recognising that accidents are preventable through following
correct procedures and established best practice;
> constantly thinking safety; and
> seeking a continuous improvement.
> inspiring a no-blame culture so that near misses are reported and
lessons are learned
It is relatively unusual for new types of accidents to occur on board and
many of those that continue to occur are due to unsafe acts by seafarers.
These errors, or more often violations of good practice or established
rules, can be readily avoided. Those who make them are often well
aware of the errors of their ways. They may have taken short-cuts they
should not have taken. Most will have received training aimed at
preventing them but, through a culture that is tolerant to the 'calculated
risk', they still occur.
The challenge for trainers and training, and managers ashore and afloat,
is how to minimise these unsafe acts, how to instill not only the skills but
also the attitudes necessary to ensure safety objectives are met. The
aim should be to inspire seafarers towards firm and effective self-
regulation and to encourage personal ownership of established best
practice. Internationally recognized safety principles and the safeguards
of best industry practice have to become an integral part of an individual's
own standards.
Maritime accidents of all kinds — great and small — occur in a wide range
of circumstances and conditions. The common thread that is usually
found in the proper investigation and analysis of these accidents is not a
sudden or mysterious failure of a system or item of equipment. Nor is it
the lack of a properly functioning system or item of equipment. The
common cause of most maritime accidents are aspects of human
error judgment and human factors.
How does such causation occur? The operation environments require
the successful performance of many related visual performance tasks.
The most crucial of these are:
! maintaining a proper lookout,
! observing a safe speed,
! preserving night vision,
! following the maritime Rules of the Road,
! adhering to proper right-of-way rules,
! the timely interpretation of aural and visual data, and
! maintaining a situational awareness.
In order for a vessel operator to successfully and safely perform such
vessel operation tasks, he / she must possess and use normal aspects of
memory, visual acuity, aural function, and human cognition. These
are the most basic and important requirements of human performance
in the various maritime operating environments.
Ship safety and
efficiency with
proactive use of
Voyage Data
Recorders (VDR)
The safe operation of commercial ships is most important to ship
operators, regulators and the private sector. Just as in other industries,
the prudent operator strives for a high degree of safety in its
transportation operations. Operating safely and efficiently is a basic
business requirement, which must be met just to stay in
business. Today's legal liabilities make it non-profitable to operate
unsafely, and can soon put sub-standard operators out of business.
The risk of fighting law suits and paying judgments and fine for loss of
life, injuries, damage to property, and damage to the environment make
it impractical and foolish to operate un-safely.
scenarios. Incident data could be used as a training tool to make
operators aware of potential hazards and assist in the avoidance of
incidents. Data could also be used in the evaluation of certain critical
equipment, to ensure proper maintenance and operation or to install
added redundancy to further improve safety.
Furthermore, in the real-time mode and without affecting the recording
function of the VDR, data can be made available for viewing by the
operator to prevent accidents. The following are a few examples of the
real-time use of VDR data:

Heavy Weather Damage Avoidance

Tools that encourage and ensure that shipping operations are
conducted safely must be a priority. The VDR and its potential for
improving marine transportation safety are far reaching. The extensive
recording of ship navigation equipment, propulsion system
and bridge command as well as alarm status provides a comprehensive
analysis database. The data could be used to aid investigators in
identifying causes of the accident. More important, it can also be used
to study trends and precursor events, which lead to an incident, thereby
assist in formulating proper procedures to avoid future similar
Ships are damaged in severe sea states. Monitoring of vessel motion
and hull stress can alert the operator when the safe operating threshold
is about to be exceeded. The real-time display and analysis coupled
with analytical prediction of motion and sea load with observed or
forecast sea and swell condition can reduce the risk of heavy weather
damage. Using these tools, the operator will be able to answer many
"what if" questions on changing ship speed and heading to reduce
motion and stress before it is carried out. The sensors will further
confirm the operator's actions.

Confucius Ch
I

I
Men's natures are alike; it is their habits
that carry them far apart.
Our greatest glory is not in ever falling,
I

but in getting up every time we do.
IRespect yourself and others will respect
you.
IThe superior man, when resting in
safety, does not forget that danger may
come. When in a state of security he
does not forget the possibility of ruin.
When all is orderly, he does not forget
that disorder may come. Thus his
person is not endangered, and his
States and all their clans are preserved.
ITo be able under all circumstances to
practice five things constitutes perfect
virtue; these five things are: gravity,
generosity of soul, sincerity,
earnestness and kindness.
IHold faithfulness and sincerity as first
principles
I
Learning without thought is labour lost;
thought without learning is perilous
The cautious seldom err
IThe determined scholar and the man of
virtue will not seek to live at the
expense of injuring their virtue. They
will even sacrifice their lives to
preserve their virtue complete.
IThe firm, the enduring, the simple, and
the modest are near to virtue.
IThe man who in view of gain thinks of
righteousness; who in the view of
danger is prepared to give up his life;
and who does not forget an old
agreement however far back it extends -
such a man may be reckoned a
complete man.
IThe people may be made to follow a
path of action, but they may not be
made to understand it.
IThe scholar who cherishes the love of
 - pg 5 -

Directional Stability
A large vessel with blunt hull form can sometimes exhibit directional
instability in slow forward speeds. When ship's turning is not responding to
the rudder action, it can lead to collision in congested waters and grounding
in narrow waterways. Real time display of turn rate, rudder angle and other
factors influencing the ship's manoeuvre can alert the operator of potential
dangers.

Central Alarm Management
With the proliferation of alarm signals on each piece of equipment and
sensors on a modern ship, the sound and light signals quickly become
confusing and unmanageable. The crew may take days to become familiar
with the alarms and how to turn them off. Since the VDR is already
monitoring all the major alarms, a Central Alarm Management System can
automatically monitor, record and display ship's alarm at a central location
so that the crew can easily identify the alarm and manage
the condition in a timely manner. The entire system is designed to assist the
mariner in overcoming the uncontrolled proliferation of alarms and warning
sounds on modern ships by displaying the alarm status so that:
· Alarms are easily distinguishable
· Alerts or informs which important actions are to be taken
· Non-important action can be postponed or transferred
· Responsibilities, procedures, and routines are easily understood through
the use of check lists and graphic display including video
· Records are kept for later investigation and training
Incident Investigation
As in other transportation incident investigations, the marine incident
requires accurate data records in order to gauge system and personnel
performance as well as operating status prior to an incident. In maritime
industry, most of these incidents are not fatal, the actions taken by the crew
after the incident is also important. The VDR can record and save the data so
that analysis can be made when the ship arrives next
port. The determination of factors, which caused, or contributed, to an
incident is most important in the prevention of similar future incidents.
Perhaps the most notable are maritime investigation involve passenger
vessels and the loss of human life. It is critical to determine which
regulations, equipment, and operational procedures require modification to
prevent these incidents. Also incidents which damage the environment have
a "high profile" with a lot of public demand to find ways to prevent future
incidents. For the operator, all ship incidents are important if
lessons can be learned to avert damage in a potentially dangerous situation.
The second by second replay of important ship data recorded by the VDR
could be a critical tool for the marine accident investigator in the
determination of specific precursor events, sources causing incidents, and
subsequent actions taken to avert the incident.
Bridge Team Training
Shipping companies spend a great deal of effort in bridge team resource
management training to ensure safe operation. Playback of VDR recording
of actual operation data can provide realistic scenario to improve bridge
team effectiveness and evaluate procedures for accident prevention.
Corrective measures can then be reinforced via training.

hinese Philosopher
I
comfort is not fit to be deemed a
scholar.
The superior man cannot be known in
I

little matters, but he may be entrusted
with great concerns. The small man
may not be entrusted with great
concerns, but he may be known in little
matters
IThe superior man is modest in his
speech, but exceeds in his actions.
IThe superior man is satisfied and
composed; the mean man is always full
of distress.
IThe superior man...does not set his
mind either for anything, or against
anything; what is right he will follow.
IThings that are done, it is needless to
speak about...things that are past, it is
needless to blame.
ITo go beyond is as wrong as to fall
short.
I
What you do not want done to yourself,
do not do to others.
When we see men of worth, we should
think of equaling them; when we see
men of a contrary character, we should
turn inwards and examine ourselves.
IWith coarse rice to eat, with water to
drink, and my bended arm for a pillow -
I have still joy in the midst of these
things. Riches and honours acquired by
unrighteousness are to me as a floating
cloud
Wise men talk because they have
something to say; fools, because they have
to say something.
Plato
Greek author & philosopher in Athens
(427 BC - 347 BC)
 Safety Management
Commercial Issues and Safety Management –
are they incompatible goals?
A practice has become apparent, both from the
legal cases we are involved with, as well as
reports and feedback being received from
Vetting Inspectors, Ship’s Masters and others,
which is of great concern.
Some tanker operators appear to be
experiencing considerable difficulty satisfying
the requirements of Vetting Inspectors acting on
behalf of Oil Majors. They appear to be ‘fire-
fighting’ in their attempts to deal with the various
problems and deficiencies being identified by
the Vetting Inspectors. Sometimes they can do
just enough to resolve the specific issues and
manage to scrape through – until the next
Inspection when a whole range of new
deficiencies are identified.
This in spite of the ship operators supposedly
applying the principles set out in the Tanker
Management Self Assessment (TMSA)
program.
When this situation is analysed closely it
becomes clear that what the tanker operator is
doing is dealing with symptoms and not
addressing the underlying cause.
The analogy of a Physician is useful and
illustrative to help understand the problem.
When a patient consults the Physician he may
describe one or more symptoms which are
affecting his general health and well being.
He may, for example, complain of headaches.
The Physician may not go into any detail with a
diagnosis but simply prescribe Aspirin – which
may help to relieve the symptom – the
headache – for a short time. However, a week
later the patient is back to see the physician
complaining of dizzy spells. On this occasion
the Physician conducts a more detailed
questioning of the patient and discovers that the
patient has also been vomiting and has
experienced blurred vision – more symptoms of
an underlying problem.
Using this information and a detailed physical
examination followed by blood tests and x-rays
– the underlying cause is discovered – the
actual illness / disease is diagnosed and the
appropriate cure properly prescribed. Only once
the underlying causes have been dealt with will
the symptoms stop appearing and a cure
properly achieved.
Returning to the situation which exists in some
tanker operating companies and on board their
ships – there are a number of warning signs to
look for which should alert you to a serious
underlying problem:
• Numerous deficiencies and problems being
identified during vetting inspections;
• Numerous deficiencies and problems being
identified during Port State Control
inspections;
• Zero observations or nonconformities being
identified during internal audits.
Such a situation would be indicative of a
Company in self denial with a seriously
defective safety management system. Such a
Company could continue trying to fix the
deficiencies – i.e. the symptoms – but will never
solve its problems until they properly develop
and implement their SMS.
The reality is that the ‘fire-fighting’, whilst trying
to provide the short term fixes to the immediate
problems identified by the Vetting Inspector or
Port State Control, will be an enormous drain on
resources of all types. This situation also puts
the Company in a poor light with the potential
customer – the Oil Major. Deficiencies being
raised by Port State Control may lead to
detentions with the consequences which may
flow from that and in any event will attract the
attention of PSC in other ports visited – which in
turn will result in additional visits and the
potential for more deficiencies being identified.
Such problems may also come to the attention
of the P&I Club or Hull Underwriter who may
decide that they should have a look at the vessel
and how the SMS is working – and no-doubt
they will compile their own list of deficiencies
and problems.
The Master, Officers and Crew onboard such a
ship will make their own judgement on the
situation and the top quality staff will look
towards other Companies for their future
careers. Of course the most important point is
that such a situation has a very high potential for
accidents – and consequently claims – to arise.
Inevitably, the Company which is trapped in the
‘treating symptoms’ syndrome, doing just
enough to get the ship through the latest Vetting
Inspection, will find that almost all its resources
are being directed to that activity. The Company
adopts the position that if the ships do not get
through the Vetting Inspections then they will
not be taken on Charter and if they are not on
charter they are not earning money – and so all
priorities are spent on getting the ship through
the Vetting Inspection.

HUMOUR :)
How old is Grandpa?
(Compliments BOW WAVE)
One evening a grandson was
talking to his grandfather about
current events.
The grandson asked his
grandfather what he thought
about the shootings at schools,
the computer age, and just
things in general.
The Grandfather replied, "Well, let
me think a minute.
I was born before television,
penicillin, polio shots, frozen
foods, Xerox, contact lenses,
frisbees and the pill. There were
no credit cards, laser beams or
ball-point pens.
Man had not invented pantyhose,
air conditioners, dishwashers,
clothes dryers, and the clothes
were hung out to dry in the fresh
air and man hadn't yet walked on
the moon "Your Grandmother and
I got married first, and then lived
together. Every family had a
father and a mother. Until I was
25, I called every man older than
me, "Sir". And after I turned 25, I
still called every man older than
me, "Sir". We were before gay-
rights, computer-dating, dual
careers, day-care centres, and
group therapy.
Our lives were governed by the
Ten Commandments, good
judgment, and common sense.
"We were taught to know the
difference between right and
wrong and to stand up and take
responsibility for our actions.
Serving your country was a
privilege; living in this country was
a bigger privilege. We thought
fast food was what people ate
during Lent. Having a meaningful
relationship meant getting along
with your cousins. Draft dodgers
were people who closed their
front doors when the evening
breeze started.
 - pg 7 -

Provide your officers recurrent training in the principles of Bridge Resource

HUMOUR :)
Management that encourage and emphasize Correct and Unambiguous
Communication, Information Management, Role Responsibility, and
Contingency Planning.

The French train was quite crowded,

This whole attitude is short sighted, misguided
and seriously mistaken.
Indeed the Master, Officers and Crew on board
are frequently the ones who suffer most from
this situation. They are often torn between trying
to implement an ineffective SMS which is
probably well past its sell-by date and
abandoned by the Company and, on the other
hand, trying to provide the quick fixes to
whatever is picked up by the Vetting Inspector.
The result is confusion and demotivation
amongst the sea staff.
As this demotivation sets in and the
experienced sea staff make their exit the result
is that less experienced and competent officers
move in to take their place. Vetting steps up a
notch to address the issues arising from the
reduced experience and competence of the
officers and the spiral downwards seems to be
increasing without any solutions being
proposed.
The short term fix is nothing more than that – the
deficiencies and problems will continue to arise
and a serious accident is likely to arise at any
time. The only way to solve the problem is to dig
deep and identify the root cause problem and
then do what is necessary to cure that disease.
Invariably, the problem is an ineffective SMS
which has not been either adequately
developed and / or implemented.
Clearly there must be a SMS in place – and, at
some point, a Flag State Administration /
Recognised Organisation must have
considered the SMS adequate since,
presumably, the Company was issued with a
Document of Compliance (DOC) and the ship a
Safety Management Certificate (SMC).
Unfortunately, this does not necessarily mean
that the SMS is either effective or efficient.
The reality is that a Company is expending
considerable sums of money, and other
resources, ‘fire-fighting’ trying to get its ships
through Vetting Inspections and will also incur
not inconsiderable sums doing just enough to
maintain its DOC and SMCs. Whilst an initial
outlay, and other commitments, may be
necessary to deal with the underlying root cause
problem this will be the greatest investment a
tanker operator could possibly make and would
be quickly recovered in the medium term. Once
that investment is made the symptoms will
cease to appear and all the costs and drain on
resources ‘firefighting’ simply will not be
necessary in the future.
The reputation with the customer – the Oil Major
– will grow. The record with Port State Control
will improve – resulting in fewer visits. The
Company will become an attractive career
option to the top quality Masters, Officers and
Crew - motivation will be increased and through
strong leadership the people at the sharp end
will make the SMS efficient and effective. Most
important of all, the chance of an accident
happening will have been reduced to a
minimum. Everyone is a winner – including the
customer – the Oil Major.
Every tanker operator should take a long, hard
and honest look at itself and reflect upon
whether its focus is on getting its ships through
Vetting Inspections or on managing safety.
These should not be seen as conflicting goals or
competing for resources. The reality is that if a
tanker operator gets its management of safety
properly sorted then it will, quite naturally, take
Vetting Inspections and Port State Control
inspections in its stride.
so a Marine soldier walked the entire
length looking for a seat, but the only
seat left was taken by a well dressed,
middle-aged woman's poodle. The
war weary Marine asked, "Ma'am,
may I have that seat?" The woman
just sniffed and said to no one in
particular "Americans are so rude.
My little Fifi is using that seat."
The Marine walked the entire train
again, but the only seat left was
under that dog. "Please, ma'am.
May I sit down? I'm very tired."
She snorted, "Not only are you
Americans rude, you are also
arrogant!" This time the Marine didn't
say a word; he just picked up the
little dog, tossed it out the train
window, and sat down.
The woman shrieked, "Someone
must defend my honour! This
American should be put in his place!"
An English gentleman sitting nearby
spoke up, "Sir, you Americans often
seem to have a penchant for doing
the wrong thing. You hold the fork in
the wrong hand.
You drive your cars on the wrong side
of the road. And now, sir, you seem
to have thrown the wrong bitch out
of the window!"

Compliments ReportISM-16

"Time-sharing meant time the
family spent together in the
evenings and weekends-not
buying condominiums. We had
never heard of FM radios, tape
decks, CDs, electric typewriters,
yogurt, or men wearing earrings.
We listened to the Big Bands,
Jack Benny, and the president's
speeches on our radios. And I
don't ever remember any kid
blowing his brains out listening to
Tommy Dorsey.
"If you saw anything with 'Made in
Japan' on it, it was junk. The term
'making out' referred to how you
did on your school exam. Pizza
Hut, McDonald's, and instant
coffee were unheard of. We had
5&10-cent stores where you
could actually buy things for 5
and 10 cents. Ice-cream cones,
phone calls, rides on a streetcar,
and a Pepsi were all a nickel. And
if you didn't want to splurge, you
could spend your nickel on
enough stamps to mail 1 letter
and 2 postcards.
"You could buy a new Chevy
Coupe for $600. But who could
afford one? Too bad, because
gas was 11 cents a gallon. In my
day, "grass" was mowed, "coke" have a baby. No wonder people
was a cold drink, "pot" was call us "old and confused" and
something your mother cooked in say there is a generation gap.
and "rock music" was your And how old do you think I am?"
grandmother's lullaby.
"Aids" were helpers in the The man was 59 years old.
principal's office, "chip"
meant a piece of wood,
"hardware" was found in a
hardware store and
"software" wasn't even
a word.
"And we were the last
generation to actually
believe that a woman
needed a husband to
Safety First !!
Message from the DPA:
Dear seafarers,
One of the major goals in our industry is to reduce incidents, and
as we all know, most incidents are attributed to human error
either directly or indirectly. One of the major contributing
factors is fatigue. This has been recognized relatively recently
in our industry with the adoption of the relevant conventions by
IMO and ILO. Fatigue affects our ability to do our job properly in
many ways. We usually think of fatigue as being responsible for
an inability to handle equipment or machinery, to do a manual
job, or to stay alert (or even awake) on watch. Nevertheless, the
really dangerous effect of fatigue is something much more
difficult to diagnose: fatigue clouds one's judgment and leads
to poor decision making. It is a common finding that tiredness
results in the seafarers taking excessive risks - in a very similar
fashion as if the seafarer was intoxicated. The added problem
with how fatigue impairs one's judgment is, of course, that it is
very difficult to diagnose in advance. It is therefore extremely
important that you:
- Strictly follow the work/rest periods as defined in your manuals (FIM
Chapter B 'Safety and Health', Section 8),
- Record meticulously and report any deviations,
- Use correctly the relevant software (ISF Watchkeeper), always
properly maintained and updated.
- Ensure that any seafarer found or believed to be suffering from
excessive fatigue is relieved from duty immediately.
Always remember that fatigue is an unknown risk – a risk which is
unacceptable for sake of our seafarers, the environment and our
vessel.
Safe seas to all!
Anthony Lambros / Q&S Manager DPA
I welcome your comments, suggestions or feedback on the contents of this
column (Safety First!) at q&s@centrofin.gr

Case Study: Hand injury during works in the Engine Room

Vessel: Tanker – applicable to all vessels TRUST (Ten Really Usef
Source: Company's records

I. Details of incident and
course of events
During drydock the Ch.
Engineer, 2nd Engineer, 3rd
Engineer and Engine Cadet
were lowering the reducing
valve of the main cargo
heating system from the
boiler platform to the
workshop platform to take it
for overhauling. The valve
had been tied by two ropes
on either side to lower the
same. While lowering the
same the valve slipped at
the boiler platform and the
2nd Engineer tried to guide
the same by holding the
valve wheel by his hand.
The valve was very heavy
and slipped and 2nd
Engineer's middle and ring
fingers got stuck between
the valve and the boiler
platform gratings. Because
of the weight of the valve
both his fingers were cut
approx 1cm each from the
ends. The yards medical
team was informed
immediately and they
boarded within 5 minutes.
The second engineer was
given some first aid on
board by the yards medical
team. He was then taken on
a stretcher to a hospital
using the yards ambulance.
He was given medical
treatment at the hospital
and then boarded the vessel
after 6 hrs. He was required
to go again to the hospital
after 5 days for further
treatment. Finally he was
repatriated and continued to
receive medical attention.
II. Incident Investigation
Additional on site
investigation was carried
o u t b y t h e Te c h n i c a l
m a n a g e r. A p i c t o r i a l
description was drafted.
The scene of the accident
was reconstructed and the
outcome was consistent to
Master's investigation and
description of the case as
described above.
III. Root cause of the
incident
The root cause of this case
was correctly identified by
the Master as "Failure to
follow procedures"
regarding safety. In addition
after investigation the
following should also be
added:
1) No proper planning of the
task
2) Poor decision making on
the method to be used
3) No risk assessment
carried out to identify
possible dangers
4) No proper use of PPE
In simple terms they tried to
finish the job in a shorter
time by using ropes
m a n u a l l y, i n s t e a d o f
following the more time
consuming proper
procedure i.e. to lower the
valve by slings and chain
blocks.
IV. Corrective & Preventive
actions
The corrective & preventive
actions decided for this case
were the following:
- Instructions related to PPE
& lifting, were forwarded
onboard as guidance for
discussion and training.
- The accident has been
discussed onboard during a
safety meeting, in order for
the crew to become aware
how a similar situation can
be avoided.
- A Training Session on
lifting appliances and PPE
was carried out onboard.
- Moreover, during the
Officers Forum that was
carried out in Manila on
October 2009 a relevant
presentation was carried
out in order to demonstrate
measures for prevention of
such injuries.
A copy of the full reports can
be obtained by contacting
the company's Q&S
department.
LIFEBOATS: PREVENTION OF FALL
In 1986, with an amendment to SOLAS, the
fitting of on-load release hooks to lifeboats
and rescue boats of vessels was made
mandatory. Today, there are more than 80
different types of on-load release
mechanisms from the poor design of
which, their bad maintenance or the
insufficient familiarization of seafarers,
many accidents have been caused due to
the premature opening of the hook
mechanism.
In the 86th session of the IMO Maritime
Safety Committee, held between 27/5 and
5/6/2009, a circular was approved
providing guidelines for the fitting and use
of fall preventer devices (FPDs).
These guidelines should be considered as
an interim safety measure to prevent new
accidents during the launching and
recovering of lifeboats until new SOLAS
regulations require the replacement of
release hooks which are considered of “an
inadequate and unstable design”.
These devices might be locking pins or
synthetic slings that provide a secondary
alternate load path in case of failure or
premature opening of the on-load release
mechanism.
Some of the points that must be taken into
account when fitting a locking pin are the
following:
　
o
Any existing hooks must not be drilled
to fit the locking pin as this may reduce the
strength of the hook, unless an approval is

Summary of EMSA report of maritime accidents in 2008
Source: HELMEPA NAVIGATOR, Technical Bulletin, Issue 50.
The European Maritime Safety Agency
(EMSA) published June 2009 a report
reviewing the maritime accidents that occurred
in the European waters in 2008.
The report includes only serious accidents
caused to commercial and fishing vessels in
the waters of jurisdiction of the E.U. member
states as well as those of Norway and Iceland.
The main conclusions of the report are as
follows:
A number of 670 accidents (40 less than in
>
2007) were recorded, in which 82 seafarers lost
their lives, the same figure as in 2007.
ful Safety Tips)
given by the Administration of the flag of the
vessel ,
o 　Post clear instructions close to the
release handle
o 　Ensure that during the lifeboat launching,
the locking pin is removed before the
activation of the release mechanism.
o 　 Respectively, during the lifeboat
recovery it must be ensured that once the
hooks have been connected, the locking pins
are reinserted before the boat is hoisted from
the water.
o 　Do not use wire ropes or chains as fall
preventer devices as they do not absorb
shock loads.
o 　In case synthetic slings are fitted, testing
must be carried out to demonstrate that there
are not any problems during launching and
the strength and the suitability of the
materials in shipboard operational
conditions must be certified.
o 　The Master or the officer in charge of the
lifesaving equipment should ensure that the
crew is familiar with the use of these devices
o The relevant procedures / instructions
must be incorporated in the SOLAS training
manual of the vessel.
o 　The SOLAS training manual should
always be ship specific with a schematic
description relevant to the vessel's lifeboat
release mechanism
o 　When drills are carried out, NO ONE
FROM THE CREW NOR ANY OTHER
PERSON should be inside the lifeboat while
testing the on-load release mechanism.
Source: HELMEPA NAVIGATOR, Technical
Bulletin, Issue 50.
The slump of the maritime activity since last
December due to the economic downturn
seems to have contributed to the slight
reduction of accidents.
>　The total number of accidents in tankers
increased from 63 in 2007 to 76 last year. Since
2002, there were no major oil spills in the
European waters.
Oil tankers accounted for around 72% of the
accidents in this category, gas carriers for
around 10% and chemical and other tankers for
around 18%.
The worst collision involving a tanker occurred
when the 79,000 grt unloaded crude oil tanker
Edgeless tore away from its moorings in over
110 km/hour winds and its bow crashed into an
adjacent quay causing a several meters crack
to her hull at the port of Marseilles last January:
>　There were 89 fire incidents representing
almost 12% of the total. Most of these
accidents occurred in general cargo ships (22),
in Ro-Ro passenger ships (14), in fishing
vessels (14) and tankers (11).
The worst explosion and fire accident occurred
during welding works onboard the LPG carrier
Friendshipgas at the Perama shipyard near
Athens, Greece last July at which 8 people lost
their lives and 4 other were injured in the blast.
>　From the explosion of oxygen and acetylene
bottles in a cargo hold of the 25,700 grt
container ship Maersk Newport while she was
berthed at the port of Algeciras last November,
a fire broke out trapping temporarily the
stevedores who were working near to the bow
of the vessel.
>　A number of 61 commercial ships including
29 fishing vessels were reported to have sunk
in 2008 in European waters. One of the most
significant sinkings was that of the 4,000 grt,
general cargo ship Tolstoy in the Black Sea off
pg 99 -
--pg
the coast of Bulgaria last September.
>The vessel loaded with iron scrap sailing in
strong winds disappeared from the radars of
other nearby vessels without transmitting a
distress signal and eventually 3 of her 11 crew
members were rescued.
>　The quantity of oil spilled accidentally in the
European waters last year was estimated to be
2,000 - 3,000 tons in comparison to the
estimated 7,000 – 8,000 tons in 2007.
>The oil spill detection system CleanSeaNet of
EMSA that makes use of satellite images is
progressively providing a better picture on both
accidental and illegal pollution.
From the grounding of the 36,000 grt bulk
carrier Fedra in Gibraltar last October, a
quantity of about 300 tons of fuel oil escaped
into the sea, part of which was recovered from
the EMSA contracted specialized spill
response vessel.
>　The survey records 217 groundings that
accounted for about 40% of the total.
The biggest vessel to run aground was the
90,000 grt container ship LT Cortesia in the
Dover Strait last January loaded with 43,000
tons of cargo:
The vessel was normally approaching the
Strait before making an alteration to her route
and running aground on a well known
hazardous area to the navigation which is
clearly marked on the maritime charts:
...from pg 1
Bridge Resource
Management Guide
What Are My Available Resources To Manage?
A mariner has many resources available to him/her for safe passage
planning and execution. Some examples include:
• Electronic equipment (i.e. radar, depth sounder, GPS/DGPS, ARPA,
gyro compass)
• Charts and publications, including electronic publications
• Environmental factors (i.e. tide, wind, currents)
• Electronic Charting and Display Information Systems (ECDIS)
• Vessel Traffic Services (VTS)
• Passage plan
• Internal and external communication equipment
• NAVTEX
• Automatic Identification System (AIS)
• Persons with local knowledge (i.e. Pilot)
• Bridge Personnel (i.e. Master, Officer On Watch (OOW), helmsman,
lookout)
What are the objectives of Bridge Resource
Management?
• Share a common view of the intended passage and the agreed
procedures to transit the passage with all members of the Bridge
Team.
• Develop and use a detailed passage plan to anticipate and manage
workload demands and risks.
• Set appropriate manning levels and make contingency plans based on
anticipated workload and risks.
• Make roles and responsibilities clear to Bridge Team members.
• Involve all team members in problem solving.
• Acquire all relevant information early and anticipate dangerous
situations.
• Team members clearly understand the chain of command including the
way decisions and instructions are made, responded to, and
challenged.
NOTE: “OTHER DUTIES” may include logbook keeping, equipment checks, and tending the engine order telegraph and thruster control. Overlap
among bridge team members indicates duties that may be shared. Cadets, when onboard, may be used to supplement and complement other members
of the team. *The charts on this page were adapted from the MITAGS “Bridge Resource Management Course,” see reference below.
How do I implement Bridge Resource Management
on my vessel?
The Master can implement BRM by considering and addressing the
following:
! Passage Planning – covering ocean, coastal and pilotage waters.
Particular attention is paid to high traffic areas, shallow waters, or
pilotage waters where the plan incorporates appropriate margins of
safety and contingency plans for unexpected incidents.
! Passage Plan Briefing - all bridge team members are briefed on
the passage plan and understand the intended route and
procedures to transit the route.
! Bridge Manning – Master uses passage plan to anticipate areas of
high workload and risk and sets manning levels appropriately.
! Bridge Team Training (ashore and on-the-job) - is given all bridge
crew members and they are sure of their roles and responsibilities,
both for their routine duties and their duties in the event of an
incident/emergency.
! Master’s Standing Orders – are read and signed before the
commencement of the voyage. Orders are clear on the chain of
command, how decision and instructions are given on the bridge
and responded to, and how bridge team members bring safety
concerns to the notice of the Master.
! Master/Pilot Exchange – the passage plan is discussed by the
Master and the pilot and changes made as necessary. Any new
information is communicated to the rest of the bridge team. When
the pilot is onboard he/she should be supported as a temporary
bridge team member.
! End of Voyage Debriefing – provides the opportunity for the bridge
team to review the passage plan’s strengths and weaknesses, make
suggestions for improved safety or communications, and improve
team problem solving skills.
 - pg 11 -

What are the benefits of BRM when correctly Communication Procedures

practiced on my vessel? • The Master should advise the pilot, upon boarding, which members of
When BRM is practiced correctly onboard the result should be a the bridge team speak English, and discuss how communications
Bridge Team that: between the pilot and the bridge team will be handled.
• maintains its situational awareness; • The Master should discuss the voyage plan with the pilot, and inform
• continually monitors the progress of the vessel making appropriate bridge team members of the pilot’s intentions and special concerns.
adjustments and corrections as necessary to maintain a safe passage; • The Master or OOW should immediately advise the pilot when, at any
• acquires relevant information early; point in the transit,
• appropriately delegates workload and authority; >The maneuverability of the vessel has been adversely affected,
• anticipates dangerous situations; >When he or she has information necessary for the safety of the
• avoids becoming pre-occupied with minor technical problems and ship’s transit,
losing sight of the big picture; >Or when he or she is uncertain of the pilot’s intentions regarding the
• undertakes appropriate contingency plans when called for; ship’s movements.
• recognizes the development of an error chain; and
• takes appropriate action to break the error-chain sequence.
Some examples of incorporating BRM:
BTM is required by While operating in International Waters
U.S. 33 CFR 157.415 vessel owners, operators, and Masters Example of setting Watch Condition
and is recommended are expected to ensure that bridge A watch condition structures the bridge team based on the environment
by Section B-VIII/2 watchstanders: in which the ship is operating. The environment consists of both internal
• Are properly trained in BTM in and external factors affecting the vessel. These factors include the
of the STCW95 Code
accordance with the 1995 Standards for mechanical condition of the vessel, weather, traffic, location and sea
Training, Certification, and state.
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW);
• Practice effective BRM; Example of setting Bridge Team Duties BRM may
• Prepare a comprehensive voyage plan for transiting from entry into
local waters to their final berth or anchorage (and for the outbound
group bridge duties into three general areas:
• Collision Avoidance – Detecting and avoiding other craft and objects.
transit);
• Navigation – Keeping the vessel safely clear of shoal water, close to her
• Have on the bridge at all times an OOW capable of effectively
intended track, and on schedule.
communicating in English; and
• Administration – Routine watch duties such as communications, log
• Follow the communication procedures below.
keeping, and supervising watch personnel.

For more information on Bridge Resource Management

NOTE: There are many combinations of the above environmental and
other factors for setting different watch conditions. These should be set
by company policy and supplemented by the master’s orders.
Bridge Procedures Guide.
International Chamber of Shipping, Third Edition, 1998.
Bridge Resource Management Course.
Maritime Institute of Technology & Graduate Studies (MITAGS)
(www.mitags.org)/Pacific Maritime Institute (PMI) (www.mates.org), 2002.
Guidelines for Developing Bridge Management Teams.
American Petroleum Institute, 1991.
Meurn, R.J. Watch Standing Guide for the Merchant Officer.
Cornell Maritime Press, 1990.
Swift, A.J. Bridge Team Management, A Practical Guide.
The Nautical Institute, 1993.

4.3) It is important for the master to consider

...from pg 16
Draft Guidelines
for Voyage Planning
3.2.2.9) contingency plans for alternative
action to place the vessel in deep water or
proceed to a port of refuge or safe
anchorage in the event of any emergency
necessitating abandonment of the plan,
taking into account existing shore-based
emergency response arrangements and
equipment and the nature of the cargo
and of the emergency itself.
3.3) The details of the voyage or passage
plan should be clearly marked and
recorded, as appropriate, on charts and
in a voyage plan notebook or computer
disk.
3.4) Each voyage or passage plan as well
as the details of the plan, should be
approved by the ships' master prior to the
commencement of the voyage or
passage.
4.) Execution
4.1) Having finalized the voyage or passage
plan, as soon as time of departure and
estimated time of arrival can be determined with
reasonable accuracy, the voyage or passage
should be executed in accordance with the plan
or any changes made thereto.
4.2) Factors which should be taken into
account when executing the plan, or deciding
on any departure therefrom include:
4.2.1) the reliability and condition of the
vessel's navigational equipment;
4.2.2) estimated times of arrival at critical points
for tide heights and flow;
4.2.3) meteorological conditions, (particularly
in areas known to be affected by frequent
periods of low visibility) as well as weather
routeing information;
4.2.4) daytime versus night-time passing of
danger points, and any effect this may have on
position fixing accuracy; and
4.2.5) traffic conditions, especially at
navigational focal points.
whether any particular circumstance, such as the
forecast of restricted visibility in an area where
position fixing by visual means at a critical point is
an essential feature of the voyage or passage plan,
introduces an unacceptable hazard to the safe
conduct of the passage; and thus whether that
section of the passage should be attempted under
the conditions prevailing or likely to prevail. The
master should also consider at which specific
points of the voyage or passage there may be a
need to utilize additional deck or engine room
personnel.
5.) Monitoring
5.1) The plan should be available at all times on the
bridge to allow officers of the navigational watch
immediate access and reference to the details of
the plan.
5.2) The progress of the vessel in accordance with
the voyage and passage plan should be closely
and continuously monitored. Any changes made
to the plan should be made consistent with these
Guidelines and clearly marked and recorded.
 Checklist
...from pg 1
for safety officer's
[
[
inspection
WORKING ENVIRONMENT
[Is the area safe to enter?
Are lighting levels adequate?
Is the area clear of rubbish,
material, spilled oil etc?
[
Is ventilation adequate?
combustible
[
Are members of the crew adequately
protected from exposure to noise where
necessary?
[
Are dangerous goods and substances left
unnecessarily in the area or stored in a
dangerous manner?
[
Are loose tools, stores and similar items left
lying around unnecessarily?
WORKING CONDITIONS
[
Is machinery adequately guarded where
necessary?
[Are any necessary safe operating instructions
clearly displayed?
[Are any necessary safety signs clearly
displayed?
[Are permits-to-work used when necessary?
[Are crew working in the area wearing any
necessary protective clothing and equipment?
[Is that protective clothing and equipment in
good condition and being correctly used?
[Is there any evidence of defective plant or
equipment and if so what is being done about
it?
[Is the level of supervision adequate,
particularly for inexperienced crew?
[What practicable safety improvements could
be made?
GENERAL
[
Are all statutory regulations and company
safety procedures being complied with?
[ Is the safety advice of the SMS and other
publications being followed where possible?
[Have the crew in the area any safety
suggestions to make?
[Have any faults identified in previous
inspections been rectified?
PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Seafarers must wear the protective equipment
or clothing supplied when they are carrying out a
task for which it is provided, and follow
appropriate instructions for use.
Personal protective equipment should always be
checked by the wearer each time before use.
Workers should comply with the training they
have received in the use of protective items, and
follow the manufacturer's instructions for use.
Types of equipment
Overalls, gloves and suitable footwear are the
proper working dress for most work about ship
but these may not give adequate protection
against particular hazards in particular jobs.
Specific recommendations for the use of special
personal protective equipment will be identified
by the risk assessment carried out by the officer
in charge at that particular time.
Personal protective equipment must always be
selected according to the hazard being faced
and the kind of work being undertaken, in
accordance with the findings of the risk
assessment.
Personal protective equipment can be classified
as follows:
Type Examples
Head protection:
Safety helmets, bump caps, hair protection
Hearing protection:
Ear muffs, ear plugs
Face and eye protection:
Goggles and spectacles, facial shields
Respiratory protective:
Dust masks, respirators, breathing equipment
apparatus
Hand and foot protection
Gloves, safety boots and shoes
Body protection:
Safety suits, safety belts, harnesses, aprons,
high visibility clothing.
Protection against drowning
Lifejackets, buoyancy aids and lifebuoys
Protection against hypothermia
Immersion suits and anti-exposure suits
Head protection
Safety helmets are most commonly provided as
protection against falling objects. They can also
protect against crushing or a sideways blow, and
chemical splashes.
Since the hazards may vary, it will be
appreciated that no one type of helmet would be
ideal as protection in every case. Design details
are normally decided by the manufacturer whose
primary consideration will be compliance with an
appropriate standard. The standard selected
should reflect the findings of the risk
assessment.
The shell of a helmet should be of one piece
seamless construction designed to resist impact.
The harness or suspension when properly
adjusted forms a cradle for supporting the
protector on the wearers' head. The crown straps
help absorb the force of impact. They are
designed to permit a clearance of approximately
25mm between the shell and the skull of the
wearer. The harness or suspension should be
properly adjusted before a helmet is worn. Safety
equipment should be used in accordance with
manufacturers' instructions.
A bump cap is simply an ordinary cap with a hard
penetration-resistant shell. They are useful as
protection against bruising and abrasion when
working in confined spaces such as a main
engine crankcase or a double bottom tank. They
do not, however, afford the same protection as
safety helmets and are intended only to protect
against minor knocks.
Personnel working on or near to moving
machinery have always to be on their guard
against the possibility of their hair becoming

entangled in the machinery. Long hair should
always be covered by a hair net or safety cap
when working with or near moving machinery.
Hearing protection
All persons exposed to high levels of noise, eg in
machinery spaces, should wear ear protection of
a type recommended as suitable for the
particular circumstances. Protectors are of three
types - ear plugs, disposable or permanent, and
ear muffs. The simplest form of ear protection is
the ear plug. This type however has the
disadvantage of limited capability of noise level
reduction. Ear plugs of rubber or plastic also
have only limited effect, in that extremes of high
or low frequency cause the plug to vibrate in the
ear canal causing a consequential loss in
protection. It may be difficult to keep re-useable
ear plugs clean on a ship, and disposable ear
plugs are recommended. Ear-plugs should
never be used by anyone with ear-trouble,
without medical advice.
Face and eye protection
The main causes of eye injury are:
(a) infra-red rays - gas welding;
(b) ultra-violet rays - electric welding;
(c) exposure to chemicals;
(d) exposure to particles and foreign bodies.
Protectors are available in a wide variety,
designed to international standard specificati-
ons, to protect against these different types of
hazard.
Ordinary prescription (corrective) spectacles,
unless manufactured to a safety standard, do not
afford protection. Certain box-type goggles are
designed so that they can be worn over ordinary
spectacles.
Respiratory protective equipment
Respiratory protective equipment is essential for
protection when work has to be done in
conditions of irritating, dangerous or poisonous
dust, fumes or gases. There are two main types
of equipment which perform different functions:
(a) a respirator filters the air before it is inhaled;
(b) breathing apparatus supplies air or oxygen
from an uncontaminated source.
Advice on selection, use and maintenance of the
equipment is contained in the relevant
instructions. This should be available to all those
concerned with the use of respiratory protective
equipment on board ship.
It is most important that the face-piece of
respirators and breathing apparatus is fitted
correctly to avoid leakage. The wearing of
spectacles, unless adequately designed for that
purpose, or of beards is likely to adversely affect
the face seal. This is a particularly important
consideration in emergency situations.
The respirator selected must be of a type
designed to protect against the hazards being
met.
(a) The dust respirator gives protection against
dusts and aerosol sprays but not against gases.
There are many types of dust respirator available
but they are generally of the ori-nasal type, i.e.
half-masks covering the nose and mouth. Many
types of light, simple face masks are also
available and are extremely useful for protecting
against dust nuisance and non-toxic sprays but
should never be used in place of proper
protection against harmful dusts or sprays.
(b) The positive pressure powered dust
respirator incorporates a battery-powered
blower unit, connected by a tube to the face-
mask to create a positive pressure in the face-
piece. This makes breathing easier and reduces
face-seal leakage.
(c) The cartridge-type of respirator consists of a
full face-piece or half mask connected to a
replaceable cartridge containing absorbent or
adsorbent material and a particulate filter. It is
designed to provide protection against low
concentrations of certain relatively non-toxic
gases and vapours.
(d) The canister-type of respirator incorporates a
full face-piece connected to an absorbent or
adsorbent material contained in a replaceable
canister carried in a sling on the back or side of
the wearer. This type gives considerably more
protection than the cartridge type.
The filters, canisters and cartridges incorporated
in respirators are designed to provide protection
against certain specified dusts or gases.
Different types are available to provide
protection against different hazards and it is
therefore important that the appropriate type is
selected for the particular circumstances or
conditions being encountered. It must be
remembered, however, that they have a limited
effective life and must be replaced or renewed at
intervals in accordance with manufacturers'
instructions.
RESPIRATORS PROVIDE NO PROTECTION
AGAINST OXYGEN DEFICIENT
ATMOSPHERE. They should never be used to
provide protection in confined spaces such as
tanks, cofferdams, double bottoms or other
similar spaces against dangerous fumes, gases
or vapours.
Only breathing apparatus (self-contained or
airline) is capable of giving protection in such
circumstances.
Breathing apparatus should not be used
underwater unless the equipment is suitable for
the purpose, and then only in an emergency.
It is recommended that resuscitators of an
appropriate kind should be provided when any
person may be required to enter a dangerous
space.
- pg 13 -
Hand and foot protection
Gloves
The exact type of glove selected will depend on
the kind of work being undertaken or the
particular substance being handled, and in these
cases expert advice should be followed. The
following are general rules:
(a) Leather gloves should generally be used
when handling rough or sharp objects.
(b) Heat-resistant gloves should be used when
handling hot objects.
(c) Rubber, synthetic or PVC gloves are
generally best for handling acids, alkalis, various
types of oils, solvents and chemicals in general.
Footwear
Foot injuries most often result from the wearing
of unsuitable footwear (e.g. sandals, plimsolls
and flip-flops) rather than from failure to wear
safety shoes and boots. It is nevertheless
strongly advisable that all
personnel whilst at work on board ship wear
appropriate safety footwear.
Injuries are commonly caused by impact,
penetration through the sole, slipping, heat and
crushing. Safety footwear is available which is
designed to protect against these or other
specific hazards identified in the risk
assessment, manufactured to various standards
appropriate to the particular danger involved.
Protection from falls
All personnel who are working aloft, outboard or
below decks or in any other area where there is a
risk of falling more than two metres, should wear
a safety harness (or belt with shock absorber)
attached to a lifeline. If a vessel is shipping
frequent seas, nobody should be required to
work on deck unless absolutely necessary.
However, where this is unavoidable, persons on
deck should wear a harness and, where
practicable, should be secured by lifeline as a
protection from falls and from being washed
overboard or against the ship's structure.
Inertial clamp devices allow more freedom in
movement.
Body protection
Special outer clothing may be needed for
protection when personnel are exposed to
particular contaminating or corrosive
substances.
This clothing should be kept for the particular
purpose and dealt with as directed.
High visibility clothing should be worn when it is
important to be seen to be safe - for example,
during loading and unloading operations.
Protection against drowning
Where work is being carried out overside or in an
exposed position where there is a reasonably
foreseeable risk of falling or being washed
overboard or where work is being carried out in
or from a ship's boat a lifebuoy with sufficient line
should be provided. In addition and as
appropriate a lifejacket or buoyancy aid should
be provided. Where necessary, personnel
should be provided with thermal protective
clothing to reduce the risks of cold shock.
Answer:
9 tables.
 NTROF
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- pg 15-

CE

IN
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C.
QUOTATIONS

=
A wise man will make more opportunities
than he finds.
=
At times one remains faithful to a cause only
because its opponents do not cease to be
insipid.
=
A happy life consists in tranquility of mind.
=
A life of peace, purity, and refinement leads
to a calm and untroubled old age.
=
A mind without instruction can no more bear
fruit than can a field, however fertile, without
cultivation.
=
Advice is judged by results, not by intentions.
=
All action is of the mind and the mirror of the
mind is the face, its index the eyes.
=
Art is born of the observation and
investigation of nature.
=
Men decide far more problems by hate, love,
lust, rage, sorrow, joy, hope, fear, illusion, or
some other inward emotion, than by reality,
authority, any legal standard, judicial
precedent, or statute.
=
No one can speak well, unless he thoroughly
understands his subject.
=
Not to know what has been transacted in
former times is to be always a child. If no use
is made of the labors of past ages, the world
must remain always in the infancy of
knowledge.
=
Our span of life is brief, but is long enough
for us to live well and honestly.
=
Our thoughts are free.
=
Reason should direct and appetite obey.
=
The strictest law often causes the most
serious wrong.
=
The wise are instructed by reason; ordinary
minds by experience; the stupid, by
necessity; and brutes by instinct.
=
There are some duties we owe even to those
who have wronged us. There is, after all, a
limit to retribution and punishment.
=
There is no duty more obligatory than the
repayment of kindness.
=
To each his own.
( To be continued on the next issue W35)
 SOLAS Ch V
IMO Resolution A.893(21)ANNEX 25

Draft Guidelines For

Voyage Planning
1.) Objectives
1.1) The development of
a plan for voyage or
passage, as well as the
close and continuous
monitoring of the vessel's
progress and position
during the execution of
such a plan, are of essential importance for
safety of life at sea, safety and efficiency of
navigation and protection of the marine
environment.
1.2) The need for voyage and passage
planning applies to all vessels. There are
several factors that may impede the safe
navigation of all vessels and additional factors
that may impede the navigation of large
vessels or vessels carrying hazardous
cargoes. These factors will need to be taken
into account in the preparation of the plan and
in the subsequent monitoring of the execution
of the plan.
1.3) Voyage and passage planning includes
appraisal, i.e. gathering all information
relevant to the contemplated voyage or
passage; detailed planning of the whole
voyage or passage from berth to berth,
including those areas necessitating the
presence of a pilot; execution of the plan; and
the monitoring of the progress of the vessel in
the implementation of the plan. These
components of voyage/passage planning are
analysed below.
2.) Appraisal
2.1) All information relevant to the
contemplated voyage or passage should be
considered. The following items should be
taken into account in voyage and passage
planning:
2.1.1) the condition and state of the vessel, its
stability, and its equipment; any operational
limitations; its permissible draught at sea in
fairways and in ports; its manoeuvring data,
including any restrictions;
2.1.2) any special characteristics of the cargo
(especially if hazardous), and its distribution,
stowage and securing on board the vessel;
2.1.3) the provision of a competent and well-
rested crew to undertake the voyage or
passage;
2.1.4) requirements for up-to-date certificates
and documents concerning the vessel, its
equipment, crew, passengers or cargo;
2.1.5) appropriate scale, accurate and up-to-
date charts to be used for the intended voyage
or passage, as well as any relevant permanent
or temporary notices to mariners and existing
radio navigational warnings;
2.1.6) accurate and up-to-date sailing
directions, lists of lights and lists of radio aids
to navigation; and
2.1.7) any relevant up-to-date additional
information, including:
2.1.7.1) mariners' routeing guides and
passage planning charts, published by
competent authorities;
2.1.7.2) current and tidal atlases and tide
tables;
2.1.7.3) climatological, hydrographical, and
oceanographic data as well as other
appropriate meteorological information;
2.1.7.4) availability of services for weather
routeing (such as that contained in Volume D
of the World Meteorological Organization's
Publication No. 9);
2.1.7.5) existing ships' routeing and reporting
systems, vessel traffic services, and marine
environmental protection measures;
2.1.7.6) volume of traffic likely to be
encountered throughout the voyage or
passage;
2.1.7.7) if a pilot is to be used, information
relating to pilotage and embarkation and
disembarkation including the exchange of
information between master and pilot;
2.1.7.8) available port information, including
information pertaining to the availability of
shore-based emergency response
arrangements and equipment; and
2.1.7.9) any additional items pertinent to the
type of the vessel or its cargo, the particular
areas the vessel will traverse, and the type of
voyage or passage to be undertaken.
2.2) On the basis of the above information, an
overall appraisal of the intended voyage or
passage should be made. This appraisal
should provide a clear indication of all areas of
danger; those areas where it will be possible
to navigate safely, including any existing
routeing or reporting systems and vessel
traffic services; and any areas where marine
environmental protection considerations
apply.
3.) Planning
3.1) On the basis of the fullest possible
appraisal, a detailed voyage or passage plan
should be prepared which should cover the
entire voyage or passage from berth to berth,
including those areas where the services of a
pilot will be used.
3.2) The detailed voyage or passage plan
should include the following factors:
3.2.1) the plotting of the intended route or
track of the voyage or passage on appropriate
scale charts: the true direction of the planned
route or track should be indicated, as well as
all areas of danger, existing ships' routeing
and reporting systems, vessel traffic services,
and any areas where marine environmental
protection considerations apply;
3.2.2) the main elements to ensure safety of
life at sea, safety and efficiency of navigation,
and protection of the marine environment
during the intended voyage or passage; such
elements should include, but not be limited to:
3.2.2.1) safe speed, having regard to the
proximity of navigational hazards along the
intended route or track, the manoeuvring
characteristics of the vessel and its draught in
relation to the available water depth;
3.2.2.2) necessary speed alterations en route,
e.g.., where there may be limitations because
of night passage, tidal restrictions, or
allowance for the increase of draught due to
squat and heel effect when turning;
3.2.2.3) minimum clearance required under
the keel in critical areas with restricted water
depth;
3.2.2.4) positions where a change in
machinery status is required;
3.2.2.5) course alteration points, taking into
account the vessel's turning circle at
the planned speed and any expected
effect of tidal streams and currents;
3.2.2.6) the method and frequency of
position fixing, including primary and
secondary options, and the
indication of areas where accuracy
of position fixing is critical
and where maximum
reliability must be obtained;
3.2.2.7) use of ships' routeing
and reporting systems
and vessel traffic services;
3.2.2.8) considerations
relating to the protection
of the marine
environment; and
cont'd on pg 11

W
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NTROF
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avelength
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Disclaimer. The contents provided herewith are for general information
purposes only; not intended to replace or otherwise contradict the detailed
instructions/procedures issued by the owners/managers, flag etc.
Editor: Cmdr Nicholas A. ILIOPOULOS - Master Mariner - Human Resources
Tel. +30.6944.941 333. Email: ilioship@yahoo.com.sg
CENTRO-NEWS
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