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RIDE-SHARING, FATAL CRASHES, AND CRIME*

Angela K. Dills
Western Carolina University

Sean Mulholland
Western Carolina University

Spring 2017

Abstract:

The advent of smart-phone based, ride-sharing applications has revolutionized


the vehicle for hire market. Advocates point to the ease of use and lower wait
times compared to hailing a taxi or pre-arranging limousine service. Others
argue that proper government oversight is necessary to protect ride-share
passengers from driver error or vehicle part failure and violence from unlicensed
strangers. Using U.S. county-level data from 2007 through 2014, we investigate
whether the introduction of the ride-sharing service, Uber, is associated with
changes in fatal vehicle crashes and crime. We find that Uber’s entry lowers the
rate of DUIs and fatal accidents. For most specifications, we also find declines in
arrests for assault and disorderly conduct. Conversely, we observe an increase in
vehicle thefts.

Keywords: Ride-Sharing; Uber; Crashes; Crime; Traffic fatalities

JEL Codes: R41, K42, D45

* We would like to thank Reynaldo Hernandez-Julian, Christopher Schilling, Luke Sherry, E. Frank
Stephenson, and session participants at the 2016 Public Choice Society Meetings and the 2016 Association
for Private Enterprise Meetings for their valuable comments. Contact information: Sean Mulholland:
Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Management, and Product Management, College of
Business, Forsyth 224D, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC 28723, 828.227.3169,
seanemulholland@gmail.com. All errors are most assuredly ours alone.

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I. Introduction

The advent of smart-phone based, ride-sharing applications has revolutionized


the vehicle for hire market. An alternative to traditional taxi and limousine services,
ride-sharing applications, such as Uber and Lyft, enable potential passengers to ‘hail’
nearby private drivers via geolocation. Potential passengers and drivers both broadcast
their locations, quickly map the distance to one another, agree on a price, and estimate
the likely wait time. Although matching drivers to potential passengers in real-time
provides a greater ease of service, this innovation has encountered much scrutiny
(Rogers, 2015). Much of the scrutiny stems from the lack of state and municipal safety
regulations that are required of ride-sharing’s competitors: traditional taxis and
limousines.

We investigate whether the introduction of the ride-sharing service, Uber, is


associated with net changes in vehicular fatalities and arrest rates. Ride-sharing
passengers, drivers, and others may respond to Uber in a variety of ways. With little to
no regulation, ride-sharing passengers, as well as pedestrians and occupants in nearby
vehicles, may be subject to a greater risk of injury from driver error or part failure. The
use of smartphone applications by drivers and increases in the number of passengers
per vehicle potentially increase driver distraction. The increased interaction of non-
government certified drivers and passengers may result in greater violence. On the
other hand, these applications reduce passenger wait times and may encourage some
drowsy or intoxicated potential drivers to ride instead (Rayle, Shaheen, Chan, Dai, and
Cervero 2014). Yet, this ease of use might also increase alcohol consumption and other
risky behavior. All of these behavioral responses affect the risk of vehicular crashes and
crime.1 What is unknown is the direction and magnitude of these effects. We
empirically estimate these effects.

To do so, we first use monthly data from the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) to study whether Uber’s
entry is associated with changes in the overall rate of fatal automobile accidents. We
also examine three related measures: alcohol-related fatal crashes, night-time fatal

1
We use the terms ‘crashes’ and ‘accidents’ interchangeably, though we note that the terms have unique
connotations. For more see, Stromberg (2015).

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crashes, and the number of vehicular fatalities per 100,000. Using a differences-in-
differences specification, we find that fatal accident rates generally decline after the
introduction of Uber. Specifically, in the unweighted regressions, we find that entry is
associated with a 7 percent decline in the fatal accident rate. In both the weighted and
unweighted estimations, we also discover a continued decline in the overall fatal crash
rate and the rate of night-time fatal crashes for the months following the introduction of
Uber.

Next we use the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting


(UCR) program to explore whether the introduction of Uber is associated with changes
in arrests for particular types of crime: aggravated assaults, other assaults, motor
vehicle thefts, driving under the influence (DUI), drunkenness, and disorderly conduct.
Again employing a differences-in-differences specification, typically with county-
specific trends, we find a large and robust decline in the arrest rate for DUIs. Depending
upon the specification, DUI arrests are 6 to 27 percent lower after the entry of Uber.
Recognizing that it takes time for potential users to become aware of the service and for
current users to become more familiar with the process, we separately estimate a 2.8 to
3.4 percent decline in DUIs for each additional month Uber is available. For most
specifications, we also observe declines in the arrest rates for non-aggravated assaults.
However, the arrest rates for motor vehicle theft increase.

We expand the literature on transportation options, crime, and traffic rates by


addressing a specific, new industry attracting significant public attention and talk of
regulation. In the paper most similar to ours, Greenwood and Wattal (2015), use a
differences-in-differences approach to show that the entry of Uber into California
markets between 2009 and 2014 was associated with a significant drop in the rate of
motor vehicle homicides. We expand this analysis geographically to encompass all
entry across the United States. Further, we buttress these results with an analysis of
arrest rates, including arrests for DUIs, providing completely new evidence of reduced
drunk-driving following the introduction of ride-sharing services.

In the following section, we discuss the possible relationships between ride-


sharing, fatal traffic accidents, and a variety of crimes. In section III, we present our data
on entry, accidents, and crime. In section IV, we present our differences-in-differences

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empirical strategy. We reveal the estimation results in section V and then conclude in
section VI.

II. The interplay between transportation, traffic accidents, and crime

Much heat has been generated and ink spilled over the effects of ride-sharing.
Although ride-sharing existed long before the advent of smart-phones, ride-sharing
exploded when innovators such as Uber’s Travis Kalanick and Garrett Camp and Lyft’s
Logan Green and John Zimmer began using the geolocation function of smart-phones to
match private drivers with potential riders. These applications also enabled ride-
sharing services to instantaneously alter prices in response to changes in supply and
demand. By using geolocation, introducing more flexible pricing, and encouraging
automated payments, ride-sharing services offer greater convenience and shorter wait
times than other point-to-point transportation options. Many hail these innovations.
Others, including taxi and limousine owners and drivers, note the potential safety risks
to such unregulated ride-sharing services.

To determine whether the lack of oversight has exposed citizens to greater harm,
we investigate whether the introduction of Uber’s ride-sharing service is associated
with changes in vehicular fatality rates and arrest rates. The advent and expansion of
ride-sharing services may affect traffic accidents and crime rates through a variety of
mechanisms.

We first consider the potential effects of this new transportation option on traffic
accidents. Ride-sharing may affect traffic accidents through a variety of mechanisms:
changes in the number of vehicles on the road; changes in rates of distracted, drowsy, or
drunk driving; changes in the quality of drivers; and changes in the quality of vehicles.

First, ride-sharing services may change the total number of vehicles on the road.
If ride-sharing only substitutes for driving oneself, we would expect no change in
vehicles miles traveled. If ride-sharing increases travel, it leads to more congestion and
a greater probability of collisions. Those calling for increased regulation note that
county or municipal restrictions typically limit the number of taxis and limousines.

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Expanding the number of vehicles providing point-to-point transportation may increase
vehicle miles traveled and the per capita incidence of vehicular accidents.

Second, ride-sharing may change the likelihood of driving while distracted,


drowsy, or drunk. Passengers are often cited as the greatest source of distraction
(NHTSA 2014). By increasing the number of private drivers with passengers, ride-
sharing may increase the fraction of distracted drivers. In addition, using any type of
phone based application, whether hands free or not, likely increases the level of
distracted driving.2 When a potential rider electronically hails a driver, the Uber
application alerts a driver by sound, but the driver must then determine the time and
distance to the potential rider. Interacting with potential riders via the smart-phone
application is clearly driving while distracted.3 This distraction increases the probability
of a crash and lowers the safety of passengers as well as nearby drivers and pedestrians.
Drowsy and drunk-driving, however, may decrease. In many locations, ride-sharing
applications have larger geographic coverage than traditional taxis and require less
notice than traditional limousine services. These customer-friendly characteristics may
reduce the number of drivers who might otherwise drive under the influence or while
drowsy. The net effect of ride-sharing services on impaired driving is ambiguous.

Third, ride-sharing may change the composition of point-to-point drivers


through differing standards for drivers-for-hire. Ride-sharing drivers hold traditional
private driver’s licenses, whereas most taxi and limousine drivers must hold
commercial driver’s licenses. Commercially licensed taxi and limousine drivers
undergo background checks, vehicle specific tests, a thorough driver history
examination, and medical certification. This more intensive licensing process may
reduce the likelihood of driver error and accidents. Medically certified commercial
drivers may provide better medical care to passengers in the event of an accident.

2The “NHTSA (2014) reports that in 2012, 16% of all police-reported crashes involved any driver
distraction, and that 7% of crashes that involved some form of distraction (and 1.1% of all crashes)
involved distraction due to cell phone use” (Carney et al., 2015, p.45). This is especially true for younger
drivers (Doherty et al., 1998; Chen et al., 2000; Mayhew et al., 2003; Williams, 2003; Williams, Ferguson et
al., 2007). According to Carney et al. (2015), distraction was a factor in 58% of automobile accidents by 16-
19 year olds.
3 For a discussion of ride-sharing and distracted driving see: Richtel, Matt. (2014). “Distracted Driving

and the Risks of Ride-Hailing Services Like Uber” New York Times, December 21, 2014. 7:00 AM.

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Fourth, the quality of vehicles on the road may change. The number and type of
inspections differ for commercial and private passenger vehicles. For instance, New
York City taxis are inspected 3 times per year, while private vehicles are inspected at
most once a year and, in some locations, not at all (NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission
2014). Fewer vehicle inspections increase the likelihood of accidents and injuries from
parts failures, especially wear items such as tires and brakes. Those seeking more
regulation also note that if a crash does occur, safety controls, such as airbags and seat
belts, are more likely to operate properly in a well-inspected commercial vehicle. On
the other hand, ride-sharing drivers are more likely to own their vehicle. Because the
owner-driver is the residual claimant of the vehicle’s value, they are likely to be more
concerned with the vehicle’s appearance and safety equipment than a non-owner
driver. Being an owner-driver reduces many of the principal-agent problems present in
the vehicle-for-hire market, leading to safer drivers and vehicles.

The net effect of ride-sharing on accidents is ambiguous, motivating empirical


testing.

Ride -sharing may also affect crime. Ride-sharing options may affect crime rates
in a variety of ways: they may change the availability of victims, the cost of fleeing the
scene, or increase alcohol consumption.

First, ride-sharing services may change the availability of victims both by


reducing potential riders’ wait times and by increasing interaction of riders and drivers.
Because potential riders are able to electronically hail a ride through the application,
wait times are likely to be much shorter. Wait times are also likely to be lower because
ride-sharing applications can quickly adjust prices in response to changes in the number
of riders and drivers. Potential ride-share passengers do not need to physically search
for a vehicle as they do for a taxi. This reduces opportunities for them to become the
victim of a street crime. Potential passengers can also leave on short notice. This may
reduce assaults. On the other hand, ride-sharing drivers are not subject to as thorough

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of a driver history and criminal background check as are taxicab and limousine drivers.
This may increase the risk to passengers of theft, assault, and even death.4

Second, criminals also experience a greater ability to leave on short notice (“Uber
driver unwittingly becomes getaway driver,” 2015). Because this reduces the likelihood
of apprehension, it may increase crime rates. We analyze arrest rates. Greater ability to
avoid arrest would appear as a decline in arrest rates holding crime rates constant.

Third, increased transportation options may change drinkers’ behavior. Ride-


sharing services encourage drinkers to find a ride, reducing arrests for DUI and public
intoxication. However, to the extent that this lowers the cost of drinking and therefore
increases the level of drinking, violations for disorderly conduct and public
drunkenness may increase.

The net effect of ride-sharing on crime is ambiguous, motivating empirical


testing.

Previous literature suggests that transportation options affect crime rates. For
example, Philips and Sandler (2015) use closures of subway stations to estimate how the
availability of public transportation affects crime rates. They find that closing a station
reduces nearby crime, primarily in locations to which perpetrators are likely to travel to
find victims. Jackson and Owens (2011) consider the effects of changing public
transportation schedules on alcohol-related behavior. They find that the availability of
late-night public transportation likely increases alcohol consumption, leading to more
arrests for minor crimes near bars but fewer DUI arrests in those areas. In the paper
most similar to ours, Greenwood and Wattal (2015), use a differences-in-differences
approach to show that the entry of Uber into California markets between 2009 and 2014
was associated with a significant drop in the rate of motor vehicle homicides. Given the
theoretical ambiguity of many of these responses, we empirically investigate for greater
clarity.

4The high profile case of Uber driver Jason Dalton, who shot and killed six people while driving in
Kalamazoo Michigan, has increased the level of scrutiny over passenger and pedestrian safety. For more
on this case see: Kiplinger (2016). The website ‘Who’s Driving You?’ keeps a comprehensive list of
incidents at http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents.

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III. Data

When investigating the effects of ride-sharing on fatal vehicle crashes and crime,
we chose to focus on Uber. We chose Uber for two reasons. First, Uber is the oldest and
largest of the ride-sharing applications.5 In 2014, Uber performed over 10 million rides
per month, while Lyft garnered second place in market share with an average of only
2.2 million per month (Miller 2015). According to MIT Technology Review, Lyft
revealed in 2015 that the company provided only “7 percent of rides summoned over
the Internet in [New York City], compared with Uber’s 90 percent” (Bradley 2015). Uber
has eight times the funding of Lyft and several times Lyft’s roughly 100,000 active
drivers (Bradley 2015). Second, Uber’s website provides the day and month Uber began
service in a city, county, or region (Uber 2015). This enables us to easily merge monthly
accident and crime data with entry dates from Uber.

Although Uber’s pilot program included a small number of trial runs in both
New York and San Francisco in early 2010, Uber officially began service on May 31,
2010 in San Francisco (Uber 2015). Figure 1 shows the number of areas in the United
States served by Uber by month and year. By the end of 2011, Uber was serving 11 cities
or counties; by the end of 2012, the number was up to 20. By the end of 2014, Uber was
serving 155 counties throughout the United States.6

To investigate whether Uber’s entrance is associated with changes in the rate of


fatal crashes, we use the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA)
Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). The NHTSA’s FARS data reports fatal
automobile accident rates, whether a fatal crash is classified as alcohol-related, the time
of the crash, and the total number of vehicular fatalities.7 As reported in Table 1, there
are 4.15 fatal vehicular crashes per 100,000 people. There are 0.50 fatal alcohol-related
crashes per 100,000 and 5.12 vehicular fatalities per 100,000. Given our investigation of

5 Lyft and Sidecar were second and third in market share of ride-sharing services nationwide during the
period we examine. In December 2015, Sidecar ceased operations.
6 Table A1 in the appendix lists, by FIPS code, all areas served between 2010 and 2014.

7 Night time accidents are frequently used as a proxy for alcohol-related accidents as most alcohol-related

accidents occur during this time; time of accident may be more accurately coded than alcohol
involvement.

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whether Uber’s entry is associated with crash rates, we also report rates for areas
without Uber and areas where Uber is available for at least one month. Areas where
Uber is never present have higher fatal accident rates overall and for each type.
Therefore, it does not appear that Uber enters areas with higher accident rates. If
anything, this may suggest that Uber enters areas where accident rates are lower and
thus any endogeneity may cause an upward bias of the estimates.

For our measures of crime rates, we use the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports
Statistics from 2007 through 2014 (United States Department of Justice, various years).
We report the arrest rate summary statistics in the top portion of Table 2.8 There are 29.0
arrests for aggravated assaults and 114.6 arrests for other types of assaults per 100,000.
There are 5.4 arrests for vehicle thefts and 121.0 for DUIs per 100,000. In the bottom
portion of Table 2 we investigate whether the arrest rates in areas that never have access
to Uber are different than those where Uber is or becomes available. Looking at
assaults, we find that areas where Uber is never present witness half as many assault
arrests per person as places that have access to Uber. Moreover, places that are
ultimately home to Uber have a higher assault rate (314.6 per 100,000) before the
introduction of Uber than after (282.4). Areas without Uber have much lower DUI rates.
For areas that witness the entry of Uber between 2010 and the end of 2014, the DUI rate
is higher (301) before the ride-sharing service is available than after (266). This is true
for most other types of crime as well and thus suggests that Uber’s entry may be
correlated with arrest rates. To help mitigate concerns about endogeneity, the empirical
method described in the next section includes county fixed effects and county-specific
linear trends. To further address endogeneity concerns, we supplement the estimates
using the full sample with estimates using only the sample of counties that will witness
Uber entry.

IV. Empirical Methods

To determine whether the changes in fatal accidents and crime are associated
with Uber’s entry, we estimate for county i in month m and year t the following:

8We drop Carroll County, IN (FIPS = 18015) from the crime data analysis because the values reported do
not appear to be reliable.

9
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝛽𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝑋 ′ 𝛾 + 𝜏𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡

The equation is a standard differences-in-differences specification. The monthly


outcomes include per capita arrests for a variety of potentially related crimes as well as
fatal vehicle accidents per capita. The variable of interest, uber, indicates whether the
ride sharing service UberX was available to individuals located in the county in that
month and year.

We control for other factors including demographic variables, a variety of


alcohol and driving-related laws, real per capita income, the maximum welfare benefit
for a family of three, and the legal status of marijuana. The specification includes
month-by-year fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. Standard errors are
clustered by county. Some specifications are weighted by county population.

A typical concern with differences-in-differences estimation is the possibility of


endogenous entry. If, for example, Uber enters areas with differing trends in the
propensities to go out, to drive drunk, or to commit crimes, the estimated effect of entry
also captures these differing propensities. The county-specific linear time trends capture
much of this possibility by controlling for trends in the outcome variables specific to the
geographic area. In addition, we separately estimate the results on the sample of
counties who will witness Uber entry. This sample identifies the effect of Uber on
differential timing of its entry into the county.

One concern with including county-specific trends is that the time trend in the
outcome may be confounded with the effect of the policy change of interest. For
example, if the effect of Uber increases over time as more residents, visitors, and drivers
become aware of the possibility of using or driving for the service then this effect will be
picked up in the county-specific trend. Wolfers (2006) points out that fitted county-
specific linear trends capture both the pre-existing trend and the policy response. To
account for this possibility, we estimate specifications that allow the effect of Uber to
grow (or shrink) the longer Uber exists in a county. We estimate specifications that
allow entry to affect both the mean and the post-entry trend:

𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝛼1 𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝛼2 𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑡 ∗ 𝑡 + 𝑋 ′ 𝛾 + 𝜏𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑚𝑡

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We explore a variety of fatal crash rates, the number of vehicular fatalities per
100,000, and arrest rates for a variety of crimes. The predicted effect of Uber on fatal
accident rates is ambiguous; increased transportation options have ambiguous effects
on the number of vehicles on the road, driver conditions, vehicle ownership, and
vehicle quality. The predicted effect of Uber on arrest rates is crime-specific. Increased
alcohol-consumption may increase crimes such as assaults, DUIs, drunk, and disorderly
conduct. Ability to leave a tense situation or to not linger outside waiting for a cab
likely reduces crimes such as assaults. Greater ability to find alternate transportation
likely reduces DUIs, drunkenness, and disorderly conduct violations. Increased
interaction with strangers via ride-sharing potentially increases assaults or thefts.

V. Results

a. Traffic fatalities

Table 3 presents results examining whether the entry of Uber into a county is
associated with any change in fatal crashes. We consider four measures of fatal traffic
accidents per capita: total, alcohol-related, night time, and the number of fatalities.
Panel A presents results using the differences-in-differences specification with county-
specific linear trends. In the unweighted regressions, entry of the ride-sharing service
reduces accidents. Specifically, entry corresponds to a 0.28 reduction in fatal crashes per
capita, a 7 percent decline at the mean. Night time accidents experience a decline of
0.09, a 9 percent decrease, and vehicular fatalities fall by 4 percent at the mean, although
these estimates are not statistically different from zero. Our findings are similar to those
estimated by Greenwood and Wattal (2015) who find that vehicle homicides fall by
about 3.6% in locations treated by Uber X in the state of California. The estimated effects
on alcohol-involved crashes is negative, but not statistically significant. Weighting the
results by county population, leads to estimates that are mostly negative, smaller, and
statistically insignificant.

At first glance these magnitudes may seem large. Eisenberg (2003) considers a
range of drunk-driving related policies and estimates effects from 4 percent to 9.4
percent on drunk-driving fatalities. Dills (2010) finds a 9 percent decline in drunk-
driving fatalities due to social host laws. Thus, our estimates are not far off from the
effects of changes in drunk-driving policies and social host laws. Yet, Uber is, in many

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ways, different from these legal restrictions. Unlike most policy changes, the adoption
and use of Uber is voluntary. That is, potential drivers voluntarily choose to ride-share
because they view it as the best alternative and not because there is a threat of
punishment. Moreover, those most likely to adopt and use Uber are exactly the groups
mostly likely to be involved in collisions: traffic fatality rates are higher among younger
drivers and fall by age until 65 (Chang 2008). Smartphone owners are more likely to be
aged 18 to 35 (Smith 2012). And most importantly, forty percent of Uber’s users are
aged 25 to34 and another 28 percent are 35 to44.9 Providing what customers believe to
be a superior point-to-point transportation alternative for those most likely to be in a
collision is likely to have larger effects than those found in broad, punishment based
policies.

Recognizing that it takes time for potential users to become aware of the service
and for current users to become more familiar with the process, Panel B of Table 3
allows the effect of entry to differ as time passes. Our unweighted estimates are
consistent with Uber leading to larger declines in fatal accidents the longer the service is
available. Fatal crashes decline by 0.5 percent for each additional month or 1.5 percent
for each additional quarter Uber is available. Night-time fatal crashes decline by 0.9
percent for each additional month or 2.7 percent per quarter. The number of fatalities
decline by 0.37 percent for each additional month or 1.1 percent for each additional
quarter Uber is available. Our estimates are a third of the size as those in Greenwood
and Wattal (2015) who find a “3.6% – 5.6% decrease in the rate of motor vehicle
homicides per quarter [or 0.9% - 1.4% per month] in the state of California.” In the
weighted regressions, the estimated effect over time tends to be smaller and statistically
significant. We observe statistically significant and economically meaningful declines in
fatal accidents, fatal night time accidents, and the number of fatalities the longer Uber is
available.

Our results in Table 3 may be biased if Uber enters areas that differ from the rest
of the country. To alleviate this concern, we restrict the sample to only those areas that
witness the entry of Uber. In this restricted sample, any variation between the control
and treatment groups for the differences-in-differences specifications must come from
differences in the timing of Uber’s entry into an area. The much smaller sample yields

9
http://www.businessofapps.com/uber-usage-statistics-and-revenue/

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less precise estimates. Estimates in panel A of Table 4 are mostly positive and
statistically insignificant. Allowing for the change in slope suggests that declines in
accidents may occur several months to a year post-entry. Coefficients in the unweighted
sample are statistically insignificant. In the population-weighted regressions, we
observe statistically significant declines in the rates of fatal crashes, night-time fatal
crashes, and traffic fatalities that occur within four to eight months post-entry. The
magnitudes of these results are, at the ever-Uber means, 0.6 percent per month for fatal
crashes, 0.5 percent per month for fatal night-time crashes, and 0.8 percent per month
for traffic fatalities; these are roughly similar to the monthly declines in the full sample.

Overall, our findings suggest that Uber does not increase overall fatal crash rates
and, for some specifications, is associated with a decline in fatal crash rates.

b. Arrests

Many articles have been written about assaults and homicides at the hands of
ride-share drivers (Kiplinger, 2016). Citing these incidents, some people seeking
government regulation note that commercial drivers are subject to more thorough
driver history audits and criminal background checks than ride-sharing drivers. These
requirements may reduce the risk of driver-on-passenger violence. Therefore, ride-
sharing passengers may be more at risk of driver-on-passenger violence. Commercial
drivers also receive training on how to handle unruly passengers. Without proper
training, the risk to ride-sharing drivers may be higher as well.

To investigate whether ride-sharing is associated with changes in crime, we


consider the effect of Uber’s entrance on arrests per 100,000 for a variety of crimes.
Many of these crimes are likely to be affected by additional transportation options: DUI,
drunkenness, and disorderly conduct. Another group of crimes may be affected by the
increased interaction of strangers: aggravated assault and other assaults. Because ride-
sharing offers a new point-to-point transportation option, we also include motor vehicle
thefts.

Table 5 presents estimates for all counties. Panels A and B contain the
differences-in-differences estimates without and with population weights, respectively.
The results are similar with and without weights: counties with Uber experience
statistically significant declines in arrests for other assaults and DUIs. The magnitudes
are economically important and typically larger for the weighted estimates. For other

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assaults, the entrance of Uber is associated with a 11 to 18 percent decline. The
availability of Uber is associated with a 6 to 27 percent decline in DUIs. Counties
experience a 55 to 157 percent increases in arrests for motor vehicle thefts after the
introduction of Uber. This may come from an increased propensity for Uber passengers
to leave personal vehicles parked in public locations.

The specifications in Panels C and D allow Uber’s entry to also affect the post-
entry trend. For DUIs, we witness a 2.8 to 3.4 percent decline for each additional month
of Uber service. We continue to observe declines in arrests for assault; each additional
month of Uber availability is associated with a 2.4 percent decline in assaults in the
unweighted estimate. The results for motor vehicle thefts are also consistent across
specifications with some evidence of increasing thefts over time.

Because we are concerned that Uber may enter areas with characteristics that are
correlated with crime rates, we restrict the sample to only those areas where Uber
services have been offered. We then repeat the same analysis as in Table 5. As shown in
Panel B of Table 6, arrests for DUI decline by 17 percent with the entry of Uber.
Including both the entry and trend effects, the Panel C and D estimates reveal a 2.7 to
3.9 percent decline in DUIs for each additional month Uber service is available. Motor
vehicle thefts increase following the entry of the ride-sharing service. The results for
assaults, however, become statistically insignificant.

To investigate whether any findings may be spurious, we analyze a number of


crimes that are unlikely to be associated with ride-sharing: liquor law violations, fraud,
and embezzlement.10 Table 7 presents these estimates for the specifications and samples
in Tables 5 and 6. As expected, we find no relationship between Uber on the arrest rates
for liquor law violations, fraud, or embezzlement.

10Liquor law violations are “The violation of state or local laws or ordinances prohibiting the
manufacture, sale, purchase, transportation, possession, or use of alcoholic beverages, not including
driving under the influence and drunkenness. Federal violations are excluded.” (US DoJ September 2010
“Offense Definitions” accessed Feb. 1, 2016
https://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/about/offense_definitions.html). In results not reported here, we
examine effects on arrests for family violations and curfew/loitering violations. These two crimes may be
less clearly counterfactuals as family violations may be correlated with alcohol consumption and
curfew/loitering may be affected by availability of transportation. Nonetheless, we estimate no effects of
Uber on these arrest rates.

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Our estimates reveal that the introduction of Uber lowers arrests due to DUIs
and may lower assaults. Overall, this suggests that the introduction of Uber increases
the safety of citizens. We also witness little to no change in liquor law violations, fraud,
or embezzlement. This suggests that our findings are not due to overall declines in
crime rates. We do, however, witness an increase in the theft of vehicles.

VI. Conclusion

Claiming consumer protection, some community’s leaders have sought greater


government oversight and limits on the entry of ride-sharing services (for example
Moore 2016 and O’Sullivan 2016). Articles often cite concerns about the safety of riders
and drivers in this comparatively unregulated service (whosdrivingyou.org, 2016).

We investigate and find that many of these concerns are, at least on net,
unwarranted. Using a differences-in-differences specification and controlling for
county-specific linear trends, we find that the entry of ride-sharing tends to decrease fatal
vehicular crashes. Our (unweighted) estimated 1.1 percent decline in vehicle fatalities
for each additional quarter are smaller than those found by Greenwood and Wattal
(2015).

We also observe declines in arrests for assault and DUI. Specifically, we find that
Uber’s entry lowers DUIs rates by 6 to 27 percent. The magnitude of our findings are
smaller than those found by Jackson and Owens (2011) who show that DUIs decreased
by 40% when the Washington DC Transit Authority expanded late night Metro
transportation services. In many cases, these declines become larger the longer the
service is available in an area. These beneficial declines are somewhat offset by
increases in arrests for motor vehicle thefts.

15
Works Cited

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Review. October 13, 2015. Available on February 22, 2016 at
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541791/lyfts-search-for-a-new-mode-of-
transport/).

Chang, Dow (2008) Comparison of Crash Fatalities by Sex and Age Group. Traffic Safety
Facts Research Note, July, DOT HS 810 853 available at http://www-
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Chen, L. H., Baker, S. P., Braver, E. R., & Li, G. (2000). Carrying passengers as a risk
factor for crashes fatal to 16-and 17-year-old drivers. JAMA, 283(12), 1578-1582.

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Eisenberg, Daniel. (2003). “Evaluating the Effectiveness of Policies Related to Drunk


Driving.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 22(2): 249-274.

Greenwood, Brad N. and Wattal, Sunil, Show Me the Way to Go Home: An Empirical
Investigation of Ride Sharing and Alcohol Related Motor Vehicle Homicide
(January 29, 2015). Fox School of Business Research Paper No. 15-054. Available
at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2557612 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2557612

Jackson and Owens. (2011). One for the road: public transportation, alcohol
consumption, and intoxicated driving. Journal of Public Economics 95:106-121.

16
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TODAY 7:55 a.m. EST February 22, 2016.
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Miller, Dennis. (2015). Lyft vs. Uber: Just How Dominant Is Uber in the Ridesharing
Business? (http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/05/24/lyft-vs-uber-just-
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Moore, Daniel. (2016). Lobbying efforts intensify as ride-sharing bill enters final stretch
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would-face-new-rules-under-state-bill/VyS7ciSX6pDmN9ldSll0HO/story.html
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17
Rayle, Lisa, Shaheen, Susan, Chan, Nelson, Dai, Danielle, and Cervero, Robert. (2014).
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18
United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime in the
United States, 2007-2014. https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr. (Viewed 1/8/16).

Uber (2015). Uber.com (Viewed 2/2/15).

“Uber driver unwittingly becomes getaway driver in Parkville armed robbery.” (2015,
October 9). WBAL. http://www.wbaltv.com/news/uber-driver-unwittingly-
becomes-getaway-driver-in-parkville-armed-robbery/35746542. (Viewed
5/24/2016).

19
Figure 1: Number of Areas Served by Uber, By Month and Year

200
150
Number of Locations

100
50
0

Jul 2010 Jul 2011 Jul 2012 Jul 2013 Jul 2014
Date

20
Table 1: Summary Statistics: FARS
data
Standard Minimu Maximu
Mean Deviation m m
Fatal Crashes per 100,000 (N=285,780)
Total 4.18 17.19 0 1674.64
Alcohol-involved 0.50 3.76 0 952.381
Night-time 1.01 7.80 0 1108.647
Motor Vehicle Fatalities per 100,000 5.16 31.26 0 4701.554

Never
Uber Ever Uber (N=15,204)
N=270,57
6 All Uber = 0 Uber = 1
Fatal Crashes per 100,000
Total 4.31 1.82 1.87 1.49
Alcohol-involved 0.52 0.21 0.22 0.15
Night-time 1.04 0.60 0.61 0.51
Motor Vehicle Fatalities per 100,000 5.33 2.11 2.17 1.69

21
Table 2: Summary Statistics: UCR arrest data
Standard
Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
UCR data: Arrests per 100,000 (N = 237,852)
Aggravated Assault 28.2 63.2 0 6452
Other Assaults 114.3 499.4 0 158465
Motor vehicle thefts 5.3 22.2 0 6452
DUI 121.0 1184.1 0 474715
Drunkenness 56.1 2367.1 0 837170
Disorderly 64.4 987.9 0 474763
Liquor law violations 56.9 2345.4 0 1107611
Forgery 6.7 31.5 0 6452
Embezzlement 1.5 11.0 0 3226

Never
Uber Ever Uber (N=13,316)
N=224,536 All Uber = 0 Uber = 1
Aggravated Assault 24.4 91.0 88.6 109.7
Other Assaults 102.2 317.0 321.0 286.4
Motor vehicle thefts 4.9 13.0 12.7 14.8
DUI 110.1 303.5 308.6 264.1
Drunkenness 52.9 110.0 110.6 105.4
Disorderly 58.5 162.4 167.8 120.6
Liquor law violations 53.6 113.0 118.1 73.8
Forgery 6.3 14.6 15.1 11.0
Embezzlement 1.4 3.3 3.4 2.6

22
Table 3: Uber entry and fatal traffic crashes per 100,000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alcohol- Night- Alcohol- Night-
involved time involved time
Fatal fatal fatal Vehicular Fatal fatal fatal Vehicular
Crashes crashes crashes Fatalities Crashes crashes crashes Fatalities
unweighted population weighted
Panel A: Differences-in-differences with linear county trends
Uber -0.279** -0.0231 -0.0876 -0.224 -0.0523 -0.000651 0.00183 -0.0234
(0.119) (0.0260) (0.0583) (0.191) (0.0441) (0.00714) (0.0208) (0.0892)
R-squared 0.080 0.033 0.038 0.056 0.127 0.073 0.061 0.071
Panel B: Differences-in-differences with linear county trends, post-entry trend
Uber -0.163 -0.00607 -0.0392 -0.126 -0.00235 0.000765 0.0140 0.0526
(0.106) (0.0222) (0.0506) (0.155) (0.0434) (0.00657) (0.0193) (0.0753)
Uber*trend -0.0226** -0.00332 -0.00942* -0.0191 -0.0116*** -0.000330 -0.00283* -0.0177***
(0.0115) (0.00215) (0.00497) (0.0186) (0.00344) (0.000490) (0.00150) (0.00680)
R-squared 0.080 0.033 0.038 0.056 0.127 0.073 0.061 0.071
There are 285,780 observations. All specifications include month-by-year fixed effects, county fixed effects,
and county-specific linear trends. We also control for whether marijuana is decriminalized, medicalized, or
legalized; the percent of the population who are black, aged 20 to 24, aged 25to 34, aged 35 to 54, and aged
55 and over; indicators for whether the state has a graduated drivers licensing law, zero tolerance law,
maximum legal blood alcohol concentration of 0.08; state real per capita personal income, and the state
maximum welfare benefit for a family of three. Standard errors are clustered by county. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1

23
Table 4: Uber entry and fatal traffic crashes per 100,000, sample of counties ever hosting Uber
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Night- Night-
Alcohol- time Alcohol- time
Fatal involved fatal Vehicular Fatal involved fatal Vehicular
Crashes fatal crashes crashes Fatalities Crashes fatal crashes crashes Fatalities
unweighted population weighted
Panel A: Differences-in-differences with linear county trends
Uber 0.00536 0.00748 -0.0337 0.0889 0.0271 0.00763 0.0135 0.0921
(0.0751) (0.0179) (0.0516) (0.122) (0.0461) (0.00710) (0.0204) (0.0844)
R-squared 0.290 0.148 0.136 0.177 0.359 0.262 0.219 0.149
Panel B: Differences-in-differences with linear county trends, post-entry trend
Uber 0.0219 0.00977 -0.0271 0.107 0.0340 0.00753 0.0159 0.102
(0.0772) (0.0179) (0.0506) (0.119) (0.0457) (0.00697) (0.0200) (0.0821)
Uber*trend -0.0134 -0.00185 -0.00528 -0.0147 -0.00968** 0.000148 -0.00340* -0.0144*
(0.00994) (0.00155) (0.00364) (0.0145) (0.00409) (0.000609) (0.00190) (0.00845)
R-squared 0.290 0.148 0.136 0.177 0.359 0.262 0.219 0.149

There are 15,204 observations. All specifications include month-by-year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and
county-specific linear trends. We also control for whether marijuana is decriminalized, medicalized, or legalized;
the percent of the population who are black, aged 20 to 24, aged 25to 34, aged 35 to 54, and aged 55 and over;
indicators for whether the state has a graduated drivers licensing law, zero tolerance law, maximum legal blood
alcohol concentration of 0.08; state real per capita personal income, and the state maximum welfare benefit for a
family of three. Standard errors are clustered by county. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

24
Table 5: Uber entry and Arrests per 100,000: Differences-in-differences estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Motor
Aggravated Other vehicle Disorderly
Assault Assaults thefts DUI Drunk conduct
Panel A: with linear county trends (unweighted)
Uber -1.184 -12.53* 2.945*** -7.525 7.066 -3.612
(2.398) (6.512) (0.889) (10.21) (15.15) (11.79)
R-squared 0.688 0.167 0.155 0.068 0.053 0.048
Panel B: with linear county trends (weighted)
Uber -14.77 -20.58** 8.393** -32.16*** -10.36 4.554
(12.96) (8.954) (4.009) (11.56) (9.830) (6.518)
R-squared 0.974 0.710 0.894 0.501 0.150 0.489
Panel C: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (unweighted)
Uber 1.211 2.014 0.861 10.22 13.54 6.644
(3.250) (7.446) (0.863) (10.27) (16.60) (12.52)
Uber*trend -0.451 -2.740*** 0.393* -3.344*** -1.220 -1.933*
(0.373) (0.914) (0.207) (1.152) (0.789) (1.079)
R-squared 0.688 0.167 0.155 0.068 0.053 0.048
Panel D: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (weighted)
Uber -16.03 -13.38 0.493 -11.42 -1.721 12.05*
(16.68) (10.81) (1.663) (9.040) (14.16) (6.882)
Uber*trend 0.253 -1.447 1.588 -4.171*** -1.736 -1.508
(0.846) (1.080) (1.000) (1.231) (1.580) (1.070)
R-squared 0.974 0.710 0.897 0.501 0.150 0.489
There are 237,852 observations. All specifications include month-by-year fixed
effects, county fixed effects, and county-specific linear trends. We also control for
whether marijuana is decriminalized, medicalized, or legalized; the percent of the
population who are black, aged 20 to 24, aged 25to 34, aged 35 to 54, and aged 55
and over; indicators for whether the state has a graduated drivers licensing law,
zero tolerance law, maximum legal blood alcohol concentration of 0.08; state real
per capita personal income, and the state maximum welfare benefit for a family of
three. Standard errors are clustered by county. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

25
Table 6: Uber entry and Arrests per 100,000, sample of counties ever hosting Uber:
Differences in differences estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Motor
Aggravated Other vehicle Disorderly
Assault Assaults thefts DUI Drunk conduct
Panel A: with linear county trends (unweighted)
Uber -2.570 0.170 1.403 -4.570 0.0274 -1.299
(4.075) (6.227) (1.133) (7.727) (3.386) (11.81)
R-squared 0.765 0.850 0.148 0.898 0.939 0.697
Panel B: with linear county trends (weighted)
Uber -24.69 -10.58 5.128*** -20.71* 3.271 5.020
(21.36) (10.26) (1.825) (11.17) (9.709) (5.168)
R-squared 0.980 0.852 0.935 0.957 0.952 0.887
Panel C: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (unweighted)
Uber -2.084 2.424 0.811 1.045 0.999 1.792
(4.369) (6.553) (1.061) (6.835) (3.799) (11.59)
Uber*trend -0.279 -1.295 0.340 -3.226** -0.558 -1.776
(0.374) (1.033) (0.217) (1.404) (0.766) (1.122)
R-squared 0.765 0.850 0.148 0.898 0.939 0.697
Panel D: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (weighted)
Uber -24.16 -9.860 2.714*** -14.09 5.414 7.813
(21.71) (10.62) (0.973) (10.10) (11.37) (5.485)
Uber*trend -0.371 -0.511 1.702 -4.666*** -1.511 -1.969*
(0.473) (1.138) (1.030) (1.523) (1.888) (1.110)
R-squared 0.980 0.852 0.937 0.957 0.952 0.887
There are 13,316 observations. All specifications include month-by-year fixed effects,
county fixed effects, and county-specific linear trends. We also control for whether
marijuana is decriminalized, medicalized, or legalized; the percent of the population
who are black, aged 20 to 24, aged 25to 34, aged 35 to 54, and aged 55 and over;
indicators for whether the state has a graduated drivers licensing law, zero tolerance
law, maximum legal blood alcohol concentration of 0.08; state real per capita personal
income, and the state maximum welfare benefit for a family of three. Standard errors
are clustered by county. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

26
Table 7: Uber entry and Arrests per 100,000, counter-factual crimes: Differences-in-differences
estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full sample Ever Uber sample
Liquor Liquor
law Embezzlemen law Embezzlemen
violations Forgery t violations Forgery t
Panel A: with linear county trends (unweighted)
Uber 11.22 -4.693 -0.660 8.505 -2.487 -1.249
(14.73) (4.423) (1.094) (7.505) (3.302) (1.104)
R-squared 0.039 0.167 0.085 0.441 0.108 0.041
Panel B: with linear county trends (weighted)
Uber -2.020 0.141 0.385 6.658 -0.353 0.0985
(7.378) (1.157) (0.350) (6.066) (1.511) (0.328)
R-squared 0.064 0.686 0.239 0.455 0.838 0.227
Panel C: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (unweighted)
Uber 24.59 -4.629 -0.671 11.35 -2.560 -1.124
(16.75) (4.650) (1.148) (8.029) (3.374) (1.081)
Uber*trend -2.518 -0.0120 0.00207 -1.635 0.0422 -0.0719**
(1.580) (0.0905) (0.0245) (1.530) (0.108) (0.0354)
R-squared 0.039 0.167 0.085 0.441 0.108 0.041
Panel D: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (weighted)
Uber 3.635 -0.252 0.398 7.623 -0.425 0.153
(6.740) (1.345) (0.369) (5.994) (1.561) (0.344)
Uber*trend -1.137 0.0791 -0.00248 -0.680 0.0508 -0.0381
(1.731) (0.109) (0.0217) (1.750) (0.104) (0.0290)
R-squared 0.064 0.686 0.239 0.455 0.838 0.227
There are 237,852 observations in the full sample and 12,680 in the ever-Uber sample. There are 13,316
observations in the ever-Uber sample. All specifications include month-by-year fixed effects, county fixed
effects, and county-specific linear trends. We also control for whether marijuana is decriminalized,
medicalized, or legalized; the percent of the population who are black, aged 20 to 24, aged 25to 34, aged
35 to 54, and aged 55 and over; indicators for whether the state has a graduated drivers licensing law,
zero tolerance law, maximum legal blood alcohol concentration of 0.08; state real per capita personal
income, and the state maximum welfare benefit for a family of three. Standard errors are clustered by
county. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

27
Table A1: Areas Served from 2010 through 2014
Area Fips Code Area Fips Code Area Fips Code
Auburn, AL 1081 Flint 26049 Eugene 41039
Tuscaloosa 1125 Lansing 26065 Salem 41047
Anchorage 2020 Kalamazoo 26077 Oregon Metro 41051
Flagstaff 4005 Grand Rapids 26081 Salem 41053
Phoenix 4013 Ann Arbor 26161 Oregon Metro 41067
Tucson 4019 Detroit 26163 Pittsburgh 42003
Little Rock 5119 Minneapolis 27053 Philadelphia 42101
Fayetteville, AR 5143 St. Paul 27123 Providence 44007
Oakland 6001 Oxford 28071 Charleston, SC 45019
Fresno 6019 Columbia, MO 29019 Greenville, SC 45045
Bakersfield 6029 Kansas City, MO 29165 Myrtle Beach 45051
Los Angeles 6037 St Louis 29510 Columbia, SC 45063
Monterrey 6053 Omaha 31055 Columbia, SC 45079
Orange County 6059 Lincoln 31109 Nashville 47037
Palm Springs 6065 Las Vegas 32003 Chattanooga 47065
Sacramento 6067 Reno 32031 Knoxville 47093
San Bernardino 6071 Manchester, NH 33011 Memphis 47157
San Diego 6073 Atlantic County, NJ 34001 Austin 48015
San Francisco 6075 Bergen County, NJ 34003 San Antonio 48029
San Luis Obispo 6079 Burlington County, NJ 34005 College Station 48041
Santa Barbara 6083 Camden County, NJ 34007 Dallas 48085
Palo Alto 6085 Cape May County, BJ 34009 Dallas 48113
Modesto 6099 Essex County, NJ 34013 Dallas 48121
Ventura 6111 Gloucester County, NJ 34015 El Paso 48141
Boulder 8013 Hudson County, NJ 34017 Houston 48201
Denver 8031 Middlesex County, NJ 34023 Dallas 48257
Eagle 8037 Monmouth County, NJ 34025 Lubbock 48303
Fort Collins 8069 Morris County, NJ 34027 Waco 48309
Pitkin 8097 Ocean County, NJ 34029 Corpus Christi 48355
Summit 8117 Union County, NJ 34039 Amarillo 48381
Connecticut 9001 Albuquerque 35001 Dallas 48397
Connecticut 9009 Santa Fe 35049 Austin 48453
Athens 13059 Brooklyn 36009 Austin 48491
Atlanta 13121 Brooklyn 36025 Salt Lake City 49035
Honolulu 15003 Asheville, NC 37021 Burlington 50007
Boise 16001 Fayetteville, NC 37051 Blacksburg 51121
Chicago 17031 Raleigh-Durham 37063 Charlottesville, VA 51540
Indianapolis 18097 Winston-Salem 37067 Chesapeake, VA 36103
Bloomington 18105 Greensboro, NC 37081 Hampton, VA 51650
South Bend 18141 Charlotte 37119 Newport News, VA 51700
West Lafayette 18157 Wilmington, NC 37129 Norfolk, VA 51710
Des Moines 19153 Raleigh-Durham 37135 Richmond, VA 51760
Wichita 20173 Raleigh-Durham 37183 Roanoke 51770
Kansas City, KS 20209 Cleveland 39035 Virginia Beach 51810
Lexington 21067 Columbus 39049 Vancouver, WA 53011
Louisville 21111 Cincinnati 39061 Seattle 53033
Baton Rouge 22033 Toledo 39095 Tacoma 53053
Portland, ME 23005 Dayton 39113 Spokane 53063
Annapolis 24003 Akron 39153 Green Bay 55009
Baltimore 24510 Norman 40027 Madison 55025
Boston 25025 Oklahoma City 40109 Milwaukee 55131
Worcester 25027 Tulsa 40113

28
Table A2: Uber entry and fatal traffic crashes per 100,000, sub-sample of Non-California counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Alcohol- Alcohol-
involved Night- involved Night-
Fatal fatal time fatal Vehicular Fatal fatal time fatal Vehicular
Crashes crashes crashes Fatalities Crashes crashes crashes Fatalities
unweighted population weighted
Panel A: Differences-in-differences with linear county trends
Uber -0.305** -0.0285 -0.100* -0.257 -0.0697 -0.00821 -0.0105 -0.0468
(0.119) (0.0263) (0.0598) (0.193) (0.0511) (0.00796) (0.0233) (0.103)
R-squared 0.080 0.033 0.038 0.056 0.125 0.072 0.060 0.070
Panel B: Differences-in-differences with linear county trends, post-entry trend
Uber -0.181 -0.0109 -0.0477 -0.149 -0.0108 -0.00626 0.00320 0.0371
(0.111) (0.0234) (0.0539) (0.162) (0.0488) (0.00692) (0.0213) (0.0832)
Uber*trend -0.0248** -0.00350 -0.0104** -0.0215 -0.0133*** -0.000442 -0.00309* -0.0190**
(0.0119) (0.00214) (0.00491) (0.0189) (0.00380) (0.000531) (0.00176) (0.00805)
R-squared 0.080 0.033 0.038 0.056 0.125 0.072 0.060 0.070
There are 284,648 observations. All specifications include month-by-year fixed effects, county fixed effects, and
county-specific linear trends. We also control for whether marijuana is decriminalized, medicalized, or
legalized; the percent of the population who are black, aged 20 to 24, aged 25to 34, aged 35 to 54, and aged 55
and over; indicators for whether the state has a graduated drivers licensing law, zero tolerance law, maximum
legal blood alcohol concentration of 0.08; state real per capita personal income, and the state maximum welfare
benefit for a family of three. Standard errors are clustered by county. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

29
Table A3: Uber entry and Arrests per 100,000: Differences-in-differences estimates
in non-California counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Motor
Aggravated Other vehicle Disorderly
Assault Assaults thefts DUI Drunk conduct
Panel A: with linear county trends (unweighted)
Uber -1.957 -14.14** 1.677*** -5.629 6.536 -4.467
(2.303) (7.024) (0.640) (10.78) (15.98) (12.84)
R-squared 0.565 0.166 0.113 0.067 0.053 0.048
Panel B: with linear county trends (weighted)
Uber -2.714 -24.52** 2.991** -20.98** -17.69 5.050
(4.245) (10.46) (1.389) (9.729) (11.79) (8.248)
R-squared 0.833 0.687 0.525 0.379 0.133 0.485
Panel C: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (unweighted)
Uber 2.280 4.245 0.736 13.93 15.21 8.756
(3.246) (8.202) (0.817) (11.15) (17.93) (13.93)
Uber*trend -0.812* -3.523*** 0.180 -3.747*** -1.663* -2.534*
(0.435) (1.081) (0.114) (1.383) (0.855) (1.352)
R-squared 0.565 0.166 0.113 0.067 0.053 0.048
Panel D: with linear county trends, post-entry trend (weighted)
Uber 3.710 -6.130 1.285 3.685 -9.267 20.94**
(4.550) (11.75) (0.815) (7.870) (13.58) (9.090)
Uber*trend -1.230** -3.521** 0.327** -4.723*** -1.613 -3.043*
(0.536) (1.536) (0.152) (1.567) (1.527) (1.664)
R-squared 0.833 0.687 0.525 0.379 0.133 0.486
There are 236,700 observations. All specifications include month-by-year fixed
effects, county fixed effects, and county-specific linear trends. We also control for
whether marijuana is decriminalized, medicalized, or legalized; the percent of the
population who are black, aged 20 to 24, aged 25to 34, aged 35 to 54, and aged 55
and over; indicators for whether the state has a graduated drivers licensing law,
zero tolerance law, maximum legal blood alcohol concentration of 0.08; state real
per capita personal income, and the state maximum welfare benefit for a family of
three. Standard errors are clustered by county. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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