ALCANTARA v. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR – Tayaban
It impliedly held that being already a Philippine citizen
IN RE ROBERT CU, CU v. REPUBLIC – Abueg
DOCTRINE: As to a statute adopted from another country, A rational
rule of statutory construction is that a statute adopted from another state
or country will be presumed to be adopted with the construction placed
upon it by the courts of that state or country before its adoption. Such
construction is regarded as of great weight, or at least persuasive, and
will generally be followed if found reasonable, and in harmony with
justice and public policy, and with other laws of the adopting jurisdiction
on the subject.
As to the nationality (according to the law when this petition was
filed), Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act
No. 473) provides that the petition for citizenship, must state the
following:
1. petitioner's qualifications as enumerated in the Act,
2. petition must be signed by the applicant in his own
handwriting; and
3. be supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons,
stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally
know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the
period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute
and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in
their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of the Act.
4. The petition shall also set forth the names and post office
addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to
introduce at the hearing of the case."
FACTS: Robert Cu filed a petition for naturalization. During the hearing,
he stated that he was a citizen of the Philippines. The Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal found him to be “a Filipino citizen, both by right
of birth and by right of selection," and dismissed the petition for
1
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
naturalization.
he did not have to be naturalized.
According to his testimony, he is a Filipino born of a Filipina mother.
But when his mother died when he was about 5 months old, he was
brought to China by his father. When he was 5 years old, he and his
father left China and then was given to the care of Doña Mangahas.
The counsel for the Government opposed Cu’s claim that he is a
Filipino. Cu continued with this testimony: “I consider myself a Filipino
citizen on account of the fact that my mother is (was) a Filipina and I
was born in the Philippines. My only fault was that I failed to file my
application to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am application
to elect Philippine citizenship. That is why I am now asking this Court
to make a judgment on that."
Consequently, he was asked by the court whether he knew if his
parents were legally married but he was unsure thereof.
ISSUE: WON Cu is entitled to be admitted to Philippine citizenship
under the law at the time of his application?
HELD: No, he is not entitled to be admitted Philippine Citizenship.
Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.
473) provides that the witnesses must be citizens of the Philippines and
"personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for
the period of time required by this Act. If petitioner is born in the
Philippines, time required is 5 years and if not, 10 years.
The witness provided by Cu did not meet these qualifications.
Witness Dr. Jose Ku Yeg Keng admitted that his father was a Chinese
national and his mother a Filipina but he did not actually elect
Philippine citizenship.
The other witness, Dr. Pastor Gomez, he testified that "he had known
Mr. Cu since liberation, about August, 1945." Dr. Pastor Gomez was
eventually withdrawn as witness upon the objection of the counsel for
the Government.
In United States vs. Martorana, “a petition not so verified by at least two
persons who are citizen is not merely voidable but void."
In the case of In re Kornstain, A witness who is incompetent renders an
application void. The question of a witness' qualifications in
naturalization proceedings is therefore a matter of more than usual
importance.
The above decisions are not binding upon Philippine Courts, but it is a
rational rule of statutory construction that a statute adopted from
another state or country will be presumed to be adopted with the
construction placed upon it by the courts of that state or country before
its adoption. Such construction is regarded as of great weight, or at
least persuasive, and will generally be followed if found reasonable, and
in harmony with justice and public policy, and with other laws of the
adopting jurisdiction on the subject. The Supreme Court finds the
United States courts' reasoning to be sound and reasonable and we
make it our own.
LAO CHAY v. GALANG – Bacani
FACTS:
 Ng Siu Luan and her three children, who are all of minor age,
came to the Philippines on January 19, 1960 as temporary
visitors, having been allowed to stay in this country until
January 26, 1961.
 Instead of departing on that date, however, appellees asked the
Bureau of Immigration for the cancellation of their alien
certificates of registration as well as those of their children on
the basis of Lao Chay's admission to Philippine citizenship on
December 12, 1960.
 On January 20, 1961, appellant Commissioner of Immigration
granted the petition as far as Lao Chay and the three children
2
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
were concerned, but denied the same with respect to Ng Siu
Luan on the ground that "she is not qualified to acquire
Philippine citizenship of her husband under the provision of
paragraph 1, Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as she
lacks the requirements provided for under paragraph 2 of the
same Act." He therefore asked her to leave the country on
January 26, 1961.
 The Immigration Commissioner denied a subsequent motion
for reconsideration, although he gave Ng Siu Luan a five-day
extension within which to arrange for her departure.
 To stop the threatened deportation of Ng Siu Luan appellees
filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of
First Instance of Manila and secured from it a writ of
preliminary injunction.
 After trial, the court granted the petition, and held that the law
does not require that an alien wife should have the same
qualifications as those required of applicants for
naturalization, it being enough that she is not otherwise
disqualified.
 From this decision, the Commissioner of Immigration appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the wife of a Chinese who obtained papers of
Philippine citizenship, automatically follows the citizenship of her
husband if not otherwise disqualified under the Naturalization Law.
HELD: YES.
Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended) provides in part as.
Effect of the naturalization on wife and Any woman who is now or may
here-after be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines.
It is now settled that under this provision, an alien woman, who is
married to a citizen of the Philippines acquires the citizenship of her
husband only if he has all the qualifications prescribed in Section 2 and
none of the disqualifications provided in Section 4 of the law.
Since Ng Siu Luan admittedly does not possess the qualifications for
naturalization, her marriage to Lao Chay be deemed as automatically
vesting in her Filipino citizenship.
LIM YAO v. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION – Baldonado
DOCTRINE: “An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen,
becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto, provided that she does not
possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473.”
FACTS: On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport
visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. During the interview,
she stated that she was a Chinese citizen living in Hong Kong and
desired to have a pleasure trip in the Philippines to visit her great
grand uncle Lau Ching Pin for one month. Immigration allowed her to
stay from March 13, 1991 to April 13 of the same year. On the date of
her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period provided.
The date of visit was extended till February 13, 1962. On January 25,
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim a Filipino Citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction
with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a
half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few
words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She
did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
3
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino
citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD: YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien
woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law which states.
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. —
Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of
the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will
continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his
parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one year
after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a
Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where he
resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and
then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
 Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether
the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings,
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the
proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings,
in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow
that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our
country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such
procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own
citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be called
upon to prove it every time she has to perform an act or enter into a
transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),
but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be,
for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata, hence it has
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau
Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and
by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
NGO BURCA v. REPUBLIC – Carloman
FACTS: On petition to declare Zita Ngo — also known as Zita Ngo Burca
— "as possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for
4
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of
cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration".1 She
avers that she is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino
citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her marriage,
she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China; that she was
born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao.
By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a
Filipino citizen, does not — by the mere fact of marriage -
automatically become a Filipino citizen.
Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen
of the Philippines, Congress — in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law legislated the following:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino citizen in
accordance to the provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis-à-
vis the Constitution of the Philippines?
HELD: No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements specified in
the Revised Naturalization Law. The petition is fatally defective for
failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, such as, among others, petitioner's
former places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at least
two supporting witnesses.
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino
who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by
filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the
disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised
Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First
Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other
office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other
than the judgment of a competent court of justice — certifying or
declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino
citizen, is hereby declared null and void.
We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit,
Surigao that her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that
presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she
testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a
course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization
Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's
"present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all
places where petitioner actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu, where
she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The
reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places
of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to
his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical
surrounding". And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make
inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of
residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a
former place of residence is fatal.
We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that
they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner
to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by
this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and
5
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary
to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth
the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner
may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". 16
The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It
is important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be
denied the opportunity to check on their background to ascertain
whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may
be taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the
worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should indeed prove in
court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short
of this, the petition must fail.
VELLILLA v. POSADAS – Custodio
DOCTRINE: To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual
residence in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it
should be one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
FACTS:
 This case arose from the death of one Arthur Graydon Moody,
who died in Calacutta, India on February 18, 1931.
 He executed in the Philippines a will where he bequeathed all
his property to his only sister, Ida M. Palmer (Palmer), who is a
citizen and resident of New York, USA.
 On July 14, 1931, Palmer was declared to be the sole and only
heiress of Moody.
 Moody’s estate consisted of bonds and shares of stock
corporations organized under the laws of the Philippines, bank
deposits, and other personal properties shown in the
inventory.
 BIR prepared an inheritance tax return and income tax return
for the estate of Moody.
 The estate of Moody paid under protest.
 Both parties introduced evidence which appears that Moody,  On November 26, 1930, the latter date when he wrote a letter
an American citizen came to the Philippines and engaged in to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to sell him his interest in the
business here up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India. Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in which
 That he had no business elsewhere, and all of said property at Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares.
the time of his death was located and had its situs within the  He stated in the letter: “Certainly I'll never return there to live
Philippines. or enter business again…”
 Plaintiff now contends that that there is no valid law or  Defendant answered that Moody, was and prior to the date of
regulation of the Government of the Philippine Islands under his death, was a resident in the Manila, Philippines where he
or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied, was engaged actively in business.
assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of
intangible personal properties of a person not domiciled in the
Philippine Islands, and the levy and collection by defendant of ISSUE: Whether or not Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippines
inheritance tax computed upon the value of said stocks, bonds, on the day of his death?
credits and other intangible properties as aforesaid constituted
and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property without
due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic
law of the Philippine Islands… HELD: YES, Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands
 Plaintiff alleged that Moody, at the time of his death, was a non- on the day of his death.
resident of the Philippine Islands under the following
 As Moody died of leprosy less than two months after the letters
circumstances:
were written, there can be no doubt that he would have been
 Moody was never married and was in the Philippine Islands
immediately segregated in the Culion Leper Colony had he
from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he accumulated
returned to the Philippine Islands.
a fortune from his business here.
 Therefore, he was a fugitive from confinement in the Culion
 He lived in the Elks' Club in Manila for many years and was
Leper Colony in accordance with the law of the Philippine
living there up to the date he left Manila the latter part of
Islands, not from justice.
February, 1928.
 There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record
 Moody was afflicted with leprosy in an advanced stage and had
that he had adopted a new domicile while he was absent from
been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be reported to the
Manila.
Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper
Colony as required by the law.  Though he was physically present for some months in Calcutta
prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not
 He promised Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion.
claim that Moody had domicile there although it was precisely
from Calcutta that he wrote and cabled that he wished to sell
 But distressed at the thought of being segregated, he left the
his business in Manila and that he had no intention to live there
Philippines under cover of night, on a freighter, without ticket,
again.
passport or tax clearance certificate.
 Thus, the claim that he established a legal domicile in Paris in
February 1929 is much less plausible.
 In March and April of 1929, he lived with a friend in Paris,
 The record contains no writing whatever of Moody from Paris.
France where he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the
Pasteur Institute.

6
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
 There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any fixed
abode that he intended to be his permanent home; no evidence
that he acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any
settled business on his own account there.
 There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the
establishment of a legal domicile there; the negative evidence
that he told Cooley that he did not intend to return to Manila
does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris.
 His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent
with the view that he was a transient in Paris for the purpose
of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute.
 The evidence indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence
from his legal domicile in the Philippines was due to evade
confinement in the Culion Leper Colony; for he doubtless knew
that on his return he would be immediately confined, because
his affliction became graver while he was absent than it was on
the day of his precipitous departure.
 And also, he could not conceal himself in the Philippines where
he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.
 Our [then] Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural
persons as "the place of their usual residence".
 The record leaves no doubt that the "usual residence" of
Moody, who was described as a "fugitive" and "outcast", was in
Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter
of a century, rather than in any foreign country he visited
during his wanderings up to the date of his death in Calcutta.
 To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a
deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with
actual residence in the place chosen, with a declared or
provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent
place of abode, one's home.
 There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record that
Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.
7
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
VILLAHERMOSA V. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION – Cristobal
DOCTRINE: Mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino
mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that Jus
Sanguinis instead of Jus Soli is the predominating factor on questions of
citizenship.
Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not provide that upon
repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine citizenship
FACTS:
 Florentina Villahermosa married a Chinese National
named Co Suy. They had a child named Delfin who was
born in Paniqui, Tarlac.
 In 1946, Delfin left the Philippines for China on board
S/S Cushman as a Chinese repatriate, in company with
his relative.
 Due to financial difficulties in China, Delfin took steps
to return to the Philippines. He met a Chinese who
informed him of a plan to smuggle their compatriots
into this country, thus, he agreed to lead the party (69
Chinese) to Ilocos Sur where his mother had relatives
who could render valuable assistance.
 The immigrants were discovered and apprehended
immediately after arrival.
 Delfin Co was examined by the Commissioner of
Immigration and recommended that said Delfin Co be
deported to China as a Chinese citizen. They rendered
a decision ordering the deportation of Delfin Co.
 In 1947, Florentina Villahermosa after knowing the
apprehension of her son Delfin, filed in the civil
registry of Tarlac under Commonwealth Act No. 63 an
oath of allegiance for the purpose of resuming her
Philippine Citizenship which she had lost upon her
marriage to Co Suy.
 On the strength of such reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship by Florentina, it was contended before the
 Immigration authorities that Delfin, being a minor,
followed the citizenship of his mother, and was a
national NOT subject to deportation.
 These contentions were overruled.
ISSUEs: Whether the reacquisition of Villahermosa’s Philippine
citizenship affects Delfin’s citizenship as a minor, therefore, not subject
for deportation?
Will we consider Delfin as Filipino citizen because his mother
reacquired Philippine Citizenship?
HELD: No. Delfin is not a Filipino citizen. Even granting that he is, at the
time he entered this (Phils.) country from China he was a Chinese
subject to deportation, and any subsequent change in his status cannot
erase the taint of his unlawful, surreptitious entry.
Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those
who are citizens of the Philippines, as follows:
1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before adopstion of this Constitution,
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands;
3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship;
5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Delfin Co’s claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all, on Par. 4
of the above section. But, being a minor, he has not had the opportunity
8
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
to elect Philippine citizenship, and therefore he is yet an alien, his
father being a Chinese.
The Court therefore held that, after the Constitution, mere birth in the
Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino mother does not ipso facto
confer Philippine citizenship and that Jus Sanguinis instead of Jus Soli is
the predominating factor on questions of citizenship.
It is contended that Florentina Villahermosa being a Filipina,
Delfin CO, should likewise be a Filipino. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does
not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire
Philippine citizenship. It would be illogical to consider Delfin as
repatriated like his mother, because he never was a Filipino citizen and
could not have reacquired such citizenship.
While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His
mother was not a Filipina; she was Chinese. After death of such father,
Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until she reacquired her
Filipino citizenship in April 1947. After that reacquisition Delfin could
claim that his mother was a Filipina within the meaning of Par. 4, Sec.1,
Art. IV of the Constitution; but according to the same organic act, he had
to elect Philippine citizenship upon attaining his age of majority. Until
he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that
he was at the time his father’s demise. Hence, he is subject to
deportation.
NOTTEBOHM – Castillo
Doctrine: Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments,
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said
to constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon
whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act of
the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of
the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.
Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis-
à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of
the individual's connection with the State which has made him its
national.
Facts. Nottebohm, a German by birth, lived in Guatemala for 34 years,
retaining his German citizenship and family and business ties with it.
He however applied for Liechtenstein citizenship a month after the
outbreak of World War II. Nottebohm had no ties with Liechtenstein
but intended to remain in Guatemala. The naturalization application
was approved by Liechtenstein after submitting all the requirements
uder the law and impliedly waived its three-year residency
requirement. After this approval, Nottebohm travelled to Liechtenstein
and upon his return to Guatemala, he was refused entry because he was
deemed to be a German citizen. His Liechtenstein citizenship was not
honored. Liechtenstein thereby filed a suit before the International
Court to compel Guatemala to recognize him as one of its national.
Guatemala challenged the validity of Nottebohm’s citizenship, the right
of Liechtenstein to bring the action and alleged its belief that
Nottebohm remained a German national.
Issue: Whether Nottebohm, having acquired the nationality of
Liechtenstein may compel other State (Guatemala) to recognize it?
Held: NO.
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted by
Liechtenstein. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its
protection to Nottebohm vis-à-vis Guatemala and its claim must, for
this reason, be held to be inadmissaible.
As general general rule, issues relating to citizenship are solely the
concern of the granting nation.
But it does not mean that other states will automatically accept the
conferring state’s designation unless it has acted in conformity with the
general aim of forging a genuine bond between it and its national aim.
In this case, the naturalization of Nottelbohm was an act performed by
Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. Moreover,
9
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
there was no relationship between Liechtenstein and Nottebohm. The
change of nationality was merely a subterfuge mandated by the war
and as such, Guatemala was not forced to recognize it.
Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment,
a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to
constitute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon
whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as the result of an act
of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population
of the State conferring nationality than with that of any other State.
Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection
vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms
of the individual's connection with the State which has made him its
national.
International practice provides many examples of acts performed by
States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction which do not
necessarily or automatically have international effect, which are not
necessarily and automatically binding on other States or which are
binding on them only subject to certain conditions.
NAZARETH CANDY CO, LTD v. SHERWOOD GROUP, INC. – Dino
DOCTRINE: The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present
in this case. Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): "(1) to give protection
to foreigners under treaties that states may fail to recognize; and (2) to
prevent entanglements with other sovereigns that might ensue from
failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national level."
FACTS: On November 4, 1987, Nazareth Candy Company, Ltd.
(Nazareth) filed this complaint against the defendants Sherwood
Group, Inc. (Sherwood Group), Sherwood Foods, Inc. (Sherwood
Foods), and Uziel Frydman alleging that the defendants failed to pay for
chocolate and candies ordered from Nazareth. Defendants moved to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1987).
Nazareth is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of
Israel, with its principal place of business in Nazareth, Israel. Nazareth
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of "Elite" Israel Chocolate & Sweets
Manufacturing Company, Ltd., which is also a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of Israel. Defendants Sherwood Group and
Sherwood Foods are North Carolina corporations whose principal place
of business is in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Defendant Frydman is
president of Sherwood Group and Sherwood Foods. He resides in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Frydman was born in Israel, and he
became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 1977. He claims
both American and Israeli citizenship, and he travels to Israel on an
Israeli passport.
A dispute arose between the parties regarding the purchase of
chocolates and candies that plaintiff sold defendants. On 1982, the
parties entered into an agreement giving the defendants the exclusive
right to market, sell, and distribute plaintiff's goods. Sherwood Foods
assumed all liabilities of Sherwood Group on July 28, 1983. Plaintiff
claims that from February 1984 to the present, the defendants have
repeatedly ordered chocolate from the plaintiff and that the defendants
have repeatedly failed or refused to pay the plaintiff pursuant to the
October agreement.
Courts and commentators refer to these sections of the statutes as
alienage jurisdiction.
Plaintiff alleges that it falls within 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because it is an
alien corporation suing Frydman, an American citizen. It contends that
the cases indicate this court should ignore Frydman's dual citizenship
and find that complete diversity exists in this fact situation.
Defendants filed this motion alleging that this court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction since Frydman's dual citizenship defeats diversity.
10
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301
ISSUE: Whether or not a citizen with dual citizenship (Frydman), could
be sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)?
HELD: In its discussion of dual citizenship, the Sadat court, like the
Raphael court, determined that for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),
it would only recognize the American citizenship of the party claiming
dual citizenship. That court only recognized the American citizenship
for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction since the rationale behind
alienage jurisdiction was not present in Sadat.
First, the Sadat court applied the dominant nationality theory where
courts analyze the citizen's conduct, residence, and his relationship in
the countries in which he claims dual citizenship. Although, it found
that Egypt still recognized the plaintiff as an Egyptian citizen, it held
that his American citizenship defeated diversity jurisdiction since:
(1) He retained his American passport, and he manifested his intent to
return to the United States even though he worked in the Middle East.
(2) He registered at the United States embassy in Cairo as a United
States citizen.
(3) He voted in the 1976 presidential election.
This court agrees with the reasoning in Sadat and Raphael. Under the
dominant nationality theory, Frydman would be an American citizen
for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Although he travels to Israel
on an Israeli passport, he has purchased a home in Winston-Salem,
North Carolina where his family resides, and he operates his business
in that city.
Second, the court agrees with the Raphael court noting that he took an
oath renouncing his allegiance to foreign states or sovereignties when
he became an American citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1987). Thus, his Israeli
citizenship is irrelevant for the purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction.
The paramount reasons for alienage jurisdiction are present in this
case. Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a): "(1) to give protection to
foreigners under treaties that states may fail to recognize; and (2) to
prevent entanglements with other sovereigns that might ensue from
failure to treat the legal controversies of aliens on a national level."
Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1182. Nazareth may face severe prejudice in state
court as a result of the violent events taking place on the West Bank
between the Palestinians and the Israeli government.

The court disfavors Frydman's argument to defeat jurisdiction since

that result would allow American citizens with dual citizenship to
control subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts. Congress did
not intend for citizens with dual citizenship to have the power to defeat
or to gain access to the federal courts based upon their selection of
nationality.

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.

11
CONFLICT OF LAWS – FEU JD4301