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YA UNA TAYLOR,
Appellant,
v. MAY 19 2009
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA,
UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, and " - - - - - -__ iik~"{:
TANANA V ALLEY CAMPUS,
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Page 1 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
5. Whether the University failed to consider Taylor' s arguments when he
of the University.
6. Whether the University failed to comply with their own policies and
7. Whether the University has failed to comply with the Merit System
8. Whether the Superior Court should issue injunctive relief: barring the
University from using non-retention in order to deprive past, present and future
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The University has admitted that Taylor's hearing did NOT meet due process
I The requirements of the Alaska Constitution's due process clause app ly in an administrative setting. Cons!.
Art. I, § 7 . State. Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Valley Hasp. Ass'n, Inc. (2005) Alaska, 116 P.3d 580 .
Administrative proceedings must comply with due process. State, Depl. of Natural Resources v. Greenpeace,
Inc. 96 P.3d 1056 (Alaska 2004), rehearing denied.
Page 20f36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
When an administrative proceeding fail s to conform to
the minimum requirements of procedural due process,
the superior court may not revi ew the case on the
agency record, but must instead remand for a new
agency hearing or grant a trial de novo as needed to
cure the procedural defect.
April 17, 2008. R. 267 - 272. Taylor's grievance was regarding the University's
refusal to give her any reason, or afford her with due process or any meaningful
to Taylor on April 3,2008 and was effective May 1,2008. R. 244 - 245.
The University strongly argued against Taylor being able to grIeve her
constitutional claims in the administrative process, R. 47, no. 4, para. 2, and the
On September 21, 2008, the hearing officer, William Cotton, cancelled the
hearing and submitted his Recommended Decision to the Chancellor, Brian Rogers.
R. 260 - 261 (Recommended Decision). The hearing officer recommended that the
University uphold their decision to non-retain Taylor. R. 261 , para. 2, In. 8-9. He
Page 3 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
based his decision solely on the notice requirements set out in the non-retention
regulation and the fact that Taylor did not di spute that the notice given to her was
regarding the intent of the non-retention regulation and the University's legal ability
to terminate her employment without cause or due process. On December 19, 2008,
Action. Oral argument was held on January 31, 2009. Judge Wood granted the
University's motion but assured Taylor that all of her arguments would be preserved
and heard individually. He gave Taylor 30 days to supplement her Complaint with her
points on appeal.
ARGUMENT
Page 4 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
TAYLOR WAS A "FOR CAUSE" ,E MPLOYEE
ON E MAIN ISSU E
Both Taylor and the University agree that Taylor's employment status is the
Taylor contends that she was a "for cause" employee. The University has made
status and have never actually stated what they assert her employment status to be.
Taylor's "for cause" status comes from multipl e sources, each of which would
Page 5 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
The State enacted AS 39.25. State Personnel Act, in order to comply with this
requirement.
Although, all University of Alaska employees are exempt from the provisions
of and the rules promulgated under the State Personnel Act, AS 39.25.110(5), the
University is not exempt from the requirement of AK Const. Art. 12, § 6. A merit
Const. Art. 7, § 3, and as the appointing authority for employment into state service
for the University under AS 39.25.020(a)(4), must adopt policy that is similar to and
provides the at least substantially equivalent rights as those provided by the State
Personnel Act.
(11-19-99)
Page 7 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
Taylor was a "regular" employee of the University of Alaska. Taylor was
employed in a budgeted (or state appropriated) position, and had held this position for
TAYLOR ' S "FOR CAUSE" EMPLOYMENT STATUS ACCORDING TO BOARD or REGENTS '
POLICY AND U NIVERSITY REG ULATIONS
A. At-Will Employment
Taylor's employment did not fall under any of those designated in policy or
regulation, nor was she at-will according to her contract. The University agrees. R.
277, para. 2.
In other words, if your employment is designated as "at-will", then you are "at-
will". Otherwise, all other employees are "for cause". Taylor was not designated as
Page 8 of36
Opening Brief of Appellant
"at-will" accordin g to any policy, regulation or contract. Therefore, she was " for
cause".
The University says that the nonretention regulation does not state a
requirement other than 4-weeks notice. R04.01.050 clearly establishes those positions
who are at-will and those who are for cause; yet the University demands that it be
interpreted to mean anything other than that Taylor was a for cause employee, even if
employee and a "for cause" termination. Anyone may be terminated under a "for
cause" termination, if the University chooses to do so. The University's "for cause"
termination regulations is not what provides Taylor her protection, it is her status as a
2Policy and Regulation must be strictly construed against the employer because of the unequal bargaining
power against the employee who must accept the personnel rul es as offered. Zuelsdor/ v. University of Aloska,
Fairbanks, 794 P.2d 932, 934 (A laska, 1990).
Page 9 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
CONCLUSION: All employees not defined as "at-will" are considered to be "for
cause". Taylor' s employment was not designated as "at-will " ever anywhere in Board
policy she was required to use. R04.08.070. This method expressly excludes the
R04.08.060. Either Taylor was a "for cause" employee, despite the University's
of employee that the University could just pick and choose what rules they wanted to
apply in her situation at their whim. Either one does not work out in their favor.
evaluation at least two-weeks prior to their leave accrual date. P04.07.030 and
Page 10 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
employee. The University does not know what their position IS on Taylor's
employment status, but they do know that Taylor's employment status is such that it
From the start, Taylor wanted to establi sh the University' s position on this
questions because she knew that this had a huge impact on her case.
On or around July 14, 2008, Taylor had stopped by the Mr. Schendel's office
to drop off some documents. At that time, she had asked him if the University's
position was that she was an "at-will" employee. Mr. Schendel asked her to speak
about the case only through email, as he was more comfortable with that. Taylor did
On July 16, 2008, Taylor requested that the University answer this question
prior to moving forward. R. 69. The response given to Taylor was not regarding the
University's position on Taylor's employment status, but rather their position on the
due process issue. R. 72. They referred her to the previous email from regarding their
3 When an employee is required to be evaluated on an objective basis, they cannot be terminated because of the
general dissatisfaction of their employer. Cassel v. State, Dept. ojAdmin,. 14 P.3d 278 (Alaska 2000), University
oj Alaska v. Tovsen, 835 P.2d 445 (Alaska 1992).
Page 11 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
Taylor argued her "for cause" status in every pleading throughout the
grievance process. Even though this was a major issue in Taylor' s grievance and it
was never actually denied by the University,4 the hearing officer never addressed this
issue and did not even state it as a fact in his recommended decision, R. 250.
and chose to adopt the hearing officers recommendation as his own decision to uphold
The University also tries to avoid the issue by claiming that Taylor assumes
that "at-will" and "for cause" are the only two types of employment. However, they
do not even attempt to provide any other "types" of employment that there may be, or
employment under these two tenns, they are the only types of employment. No matter
how you label it, whether it is employment that serves at the pleasure of an authority,
and held that 'the University was entitled to terminate Ms. Taylor'S employment by
4 Me. Brunner's prior statement regarding Taylor's lack of propeny interest in her employment, was not an
assenion that the University held Taylor' s employment to be "at-will", as they have made statements showing
Page 12 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
providing her with a written four-week notice of nonretention ... '" This is absolutely
not true. The University has never distinguished Taylor's employment from being
"for cause". They have not provided a single regulation, policy, statute, case, law, or
any other authority that shows that Taylor was anything but a "for cause" employee.
Taylor has repeatedly distinguished her employment from "at-will" and referred to
Even when making this statement, the University does not even refer to where
this alleged distinguishing had been made. Their reference to the hearing officer's
decision regarding the 4-week notice, has nothing to do with Taylor's "for cause"
status, as this statement is based solely on the hearing officer's opinion that the
University did not violate any of the requirements notice requirements stated in the
regulation only required 4-weeks notice. The oral statements of the University made
after the fact does not provide them with an opportunity to supplement or amend their
The University's refusal to admit that they are wrong by continuously making
arguments in which they state their opposition to Taylor' s claims and use completely
the sole reason that this matter has had to come as far as it has. The Court should
that they interpret the nonretention regulation on its own, to be proof of Taylor' s lack of property interest in her
Page 13 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
recognize that University is making "fruitless" and arbitrarily expensive attempt to
defend their egregious employment practices which they have foisted on countl ess
unsuspecting employees.
As Taylor has shown, th ere are no assumptions or implied rules that create her
"for cause" status. Taylor has shown three sources that create her "for cause" status,
including one directly from the University that explicitly states her "for cause" status
The University can continue to deny Taylor's "for cause" employment status
as much as they want. The fact is, with or without the University own policies and
regulations, there is absolutely nothing that can show otherwise. The University could
not convert a "for cause" employment into one that can be tenninated "at-will"
The University has stated numerous times during the course of the grievance
process and thereafter, that Taylor did not have a property interest in her employment.
Their statements made in response to Taylor's claim do not suddenly make this true.
this section by replacing all references to Taylor's for cause status with a reference
Page 15 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
The State of Alaska has also recogni zes that:
Even if it could not be so plainly seen that Taylor was specifically labeled a
"for cause" employee, the court must see and the University must clearly admit that
"resistance to correction action." R. 124, para. 2. The University had to give her the
reason and afford her an opportunity to defend herself against any alleged "colTection
action.,,5 No fonnal cOlTection action ever took place during Taylor's employment.
Taylor was a "for cause" employee from the day that she completed her
employment to become "for cause". The fact that the University had a reason and has
provided it only shows a violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing7 by
tenninating her in a way that tbey deprived her of her contractual and constitutional
right to notice of the allegations and "for cause" termination procedures when being
, Due process requires that a PaJty receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before being deprived
oflife, liberty, or property by adjudication. In re £Stale ofBlodgelt, 147 P.3d 702 (Alaska 2006).
Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to deprivation of a property interest protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Const. art. J, § 7. Johnson v. Johnson, 1975, 544 P.2d 65.
6 P04.01.055(B) Temporary, extended temporary, adjunct, student, casual labar, regular new hire probationary
employees and those positions designated by the president as officers and senior administrators of the university
are employed at-will. A new employee in a regular position, including an individual with a break in university
service greater than 10 business days, is also considered at-will for the duration of the probationary status.
7 Like all contracts, an employment contract includes an implied covenant of good fai th and fair dealing. This
covenant has both subjective aJld objective elements. The sUbjective aspect prohibits an employer from
terminating an employee for the purpose of depriving the employee of a contract benefit, and the objective
aspect requires an employer to act in a manner that a reasonable person would regard as fair. See Zabek.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing also requires the parties to act in a manner which a reasonable
person would regard as fair. Luedtke. Thus, an employer's discretion must be "exercised reasonably and in good
faith" and his decisions must be made "fairly and in good faith." Areo Alaska Inc. v. Akers, 735 P.2d 1150, 1156
(A laska 1988).
Page 17 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
8
terminated for cause It also deprived her of the right to defend herself against
allegations made in order to terminate her employment and required that, in order for
her to pursue any complaint regarding her termination, she was required to bear the
burden of proof.
The supporting documents that the University used to support their request to
tenninate Taylor has never been supplied to Taylor. However, the only incidents in
which she received any type of corrective action, she also was not allowed an
opportunity to dispute them, even though the University requires this. Regents' Policy
Chapter 04.07.
decision was ever even made to tenninate her employment, it would have been found
that the allegations could not be substantiated and would not have been sufficient to
support a request for her tennination. 9 Because no due process hearing was afforded,
the University never had to bear any burden of proving that these allegations were in
fact true.
If the courts worked the same way, this countly would be a mess. Imagine that
any random person could allege that a person committed a crime; and that, without
'One of the chief purposes of the due process clause is to ensure that individuals who have property rights are
not subjected to arbitrary governmental deprivation of those rights. Palm er v. Municipality of Anchorage,
Police and Fire Retirement Bd., 65 P.3d 832 (Alaska 2003).
Page 18 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
any proof, they could be indicted for that crime. Then, they are found to be guilty of
the crime without a trial. Imagine that this person does not even know that any of this
has happened until the police call him one day and ask him to come in because they
want to have a discussion with him. They don't give him any details, just ask him to
show up. When he does, they tell him he is going to jail, but that they will not arrest
him for another 4-weeks. They refuse to tell him why any of this is happening. Then,
they tell him that the only way that he can make a complaint about it is ifhe can show
that they didn't follow their rules in how they arrested him and that he could not base
anything on the law. Then, upon him filing a complaint, he is told that, regardless of
what the law says, their rules said they could arrest someone without telling them why
or having to prove that reason was even true. Their only requirement is that they give
him 4-weeks notice before they actually make the arrest and because they followed
that requirement, that was all they had to do. So he appeals to the next person up. That
person says the same thing. He says that they applied the 4-week notice requirement
case. The University, acting under the color of the state, accepted an unfounded
allegation, then indicted, prosecuted and with 4-weeks notice, incarcerated Taylor, a
9 When agency decision is purportedly based upon record, agency reliance on evidence not on the record is a
fundamental defect amountin g to a failure of due process. Olson v. State, Dept. ~f Natural Resources, 1990, 799
P.2d 289, rehearing denied.
Page 19 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
permanent public employee,10 without telling her the reason or allowing her to dispute
the allegations.
LEGITIMATE PURPOSE
JO Due process of law guaranteed by United States and Alaska Constitu tions req uires pretermination hearing
prior to termination of public employee. Odum v. University q( Alaska, Anchorage, 845 P.2d 432 (Alaska 1993).
Page 20 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
History shows that the University' s nonretention regulation was never meant to
be used in the manner that it is being used today. It was originally adopted for the
University may adopt emergency regulations which override the normal practices of
the University. This was not a violation of employees' rights because during financial
implement these regulations, the University had to declare and prove and state of
These regulations have never changed. In 2000, the University made major
adjustments to their Policies and Regulations in order to remove details from the
policies and place them into the regulations. The University re-adopted it, but there
was never any changes made to it other than placing a p0I1ion of it into the
II C. Tennination or nonretention of a member ... by the University shall be based on just cause.
The arbitrator decided that "the University has the right to nonretain employees because of terrnination of the
underlying grant, without providing layoff rights. Such nonretentions are clearly distingui shable from layoffs or
reductions in force, which alone invo lve layoff rights." He indicated that decisions fTom other jurisdictions are
"uniformly clear that layoffs are intended to be temporary only .... (A) termination ofa particular grant does not
imply such a temporary slJspension of employment lIDless otherwise stated." The arbitrator therefore ruled in
favor of the Un ivers ity and against Masden. Masden v. University of Alaska, 633 P.2d 1374, Alaska, 198 1
(Brief of Appellee).
Page 21 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
regulations. No changes were made to the meaning of the policy. Eventually, the
University then "re-numbered" the nonretention policy and regulation and placed
04 .07.1 00. This placed into a completely different chapter which actually makes it
looks as though it is just part of a list of terminations for the University to choose
from. However, they removed it from the chapter title Financial Exigency and
Now that the nonretention regulation had been placed in another chapter
outside of the financial exigency policies and regulations, the University could claim
that it was only another method of terminating any employee and that it did not
12 "Regents Policy 04.07.100 makes clear that the University may discontinue employment through
nonretention. The accompanying University Regulation 04.07.100 specifies that nonretention is one of a
number of options the Uni versity has to terminate employment. Termination through nonretention is separate
and distinct ITom termination for cause, and does not require cause." [footnote omitted] R. 223, para. I.
Page 22 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
Since that time, nonretention has become an accepted and standard method of
termination. It has only recently become clearly realized by the employees of the
In the President's fi nal decision, he states that under the regulations for "for
cause" employment, there are two sections . that are each for a different type of
termination type of employment. The first section being "for cause" termination,
which requires all of the processes Taylor should have received regardless of
tennination type, the second section being layoff, nonretention, or financial exigency.
All of which are due to budget restricting reasons as Taylor stated early on, and all
which are considered 'just cause" under those circumstances, and all which still
provide du e process procedures. That is until the University comes up with their new
meaning and use for nonretention which sets it apart from every other termination
listed because it is arbitrary and sets out no reason for it to be used, how it is to be
used, who it can be used for, or any meaningful process for an employee to defend
J3 Substantive due process requires less of a nex us between th e challenged regulation and its objective than does
equal protection ; substantive due process is denied when a legislative enactment has no reasonable relationship
to a legitimate governm ental purpose. Const. Art. I, §§ I, 7. Wilkerson v. State, Dept. of Health and Social Ser-
vices, Div. of Family and Youth Services (1999) Alaska, 993 P.2d J0 18.
Page 23 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
Of course, the University decides to fall back on their constitutional authority.
Under AS l4.40.170(b)( I). R. 224, para. 4. However, their authority does not provide
providing due process procedures to an employee who has been accused of any
alleged wrongdoings, is so obviously wrong that it is appalling to see how open the
Universi ty is about doing this, to the extent that they admit their pretext for the
nonretention is for allegations made against an employee, they admit their reason for
expensive for the University and their decision might be reversed, they admit that
even though the regulation claims to not discredit the employee, that the employee is
still flagged internally in the University system so that, in the event they apply for a
position later on, the hiring authority must confer with HR before hiring them, and
last, they even admit that they use nonretention without cause to terminate pennanent
employees on a regular basis. The University almost seems to flaunt their illegal acts.
The University claims that any process due does not depend on the type of
Page 24 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
employment an empl oyee has, but rather the type of termination that the Un iversity
chooses to use. R. 287, 2, In. 12 - 16. In Zabek, the employer tried to come to the
same conclusion. However, the court found that none of the cases cited supported the
conclusion that Zabek should receive less due process protection than any other
governmental employee fired for misconduct. In all three cases that had been cited,
the court held or implied the right to present testimony and cross-examine to be a
14
cases or any other cases could be cited which allow denial of these rights on the
theory of their opinion, which is that the scope of due process protection for
shall make or enforce any law which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. This is exactly what the University is using
nonretention to do.
During the grIevance process, Taylor pointed out that her contract did not
expressly allow nonretention without cause at any time during her employment, as the
University was claiming. R. 166, para. 3 and R. 225, para. 3. The paragraph which
" Nichols v. Eckert, 504 P.2d 1359 (Alaska 1973); Kenai Peninsula Borough Boord of Education v. Brown, 691
P.2d 1034 (Alaska 1984); and McMillan v. Anchorage Community Hospital, 646 P.2d 857 (Alaska 1982).
Page 25 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
referred to nonretention was discussing temlination during the employee's
The University's had provided Taylor with a form entitled Request for Reasons
for Temlination of Employment, R. 182, full copy at ER 280, which she could fill out
and request the reasons for her nonretention. Taylor did not submit this fonn because
of the waiver attached to it. Taylor claims that this form shows their intent that
cause. If it did intend to use it in such a way, then it only proves that the University
uses nonretention to treat a "for cause" employee as nothing more than one that is "at-
will" by refusing them due process rights. R. 168, para. 3. However, if nonretention
was meant for a more legitimate purpose such as when informing a probationary
employee that they would not be continuing, such as the definition in 2 AAC
15
07.999 , then this fonn would make more sense and be serving a more legitimate
21. "nonrelention" means separation of a probationary employee fTOm a position due to failure to complete the
probationary period; ...
Page 26 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
avoided. [citation omitted]. If the University can
exercise its right to terminate probationary
employment without providing any notice (or pay in
lieu of notice), as it undoubtedly can, why would a
financially prudent University supervisor choose to use
the nonretention tool and thereby incur either the
additional four weeks' pay (in lieu of notice) or the
additional four weeks' work from an unsatisfactory
probationary employee? Reading the final sentence of
the employment letter the way that Taylor proposes
would make nonretention a superfluous HR tool.
Adjudicators should avoid constructions that result in
superfluity. [citation omitted]. Nonretention has its
only value in the post-probationary context. Taylor's
reading would deny the University the tool when it
most needs it. R. 223, no. 4.
They say this as though that is the only proof they need showing they are
allowed to do this. They also ,act as though it is absurd that Taylor would be pursuing
this considering no one else has ever challenged this. This is exactly why Taylor is
here and why the University is still doing this today, because no one else has
challenged it.
"for cause" employee without any rights to due process, then why wouldn't the
University just nonretain everyone they terminate so they do not have go through the
which could take time and money, and could also cause the university's decision to be
Page 27 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ani
reversed, not to mention possihl y subj ect the University Lo further litigation?
Additionally, what makes the University so keenl y aware of this apparent loophole
that the state has yet to figure out? After all, Taylor's "absurd and superfluous"
assumption which "defies common sense" comes directly from the Alaska's definition
in 2 AAC 07.999.
admitted that this is exactly what they are using nonretention for. In Taylor's
complaint she claims that the University has a long history of this practice,
Complaint, no. 19. The University denies this claim in their Reply to Taylor' s
Complaint. Reply, no. 19. However, see, University's Reply to Taylor's Opposition to
Page 28 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
the long-standing practice of the University
administration. (emphasis added).
Taylor assumes that "nonretention" has a fixed meaning ... In fact, the University has
224, para. 3-4. However, when Taylor requested that the University provide their
definition of nonretention and the location of this definition, the University replied
states:
This is not a special definition that would afford it any type of special
consideration. This could define every single type of termination that the University
Page 29 af36
Opening Brief of Appellant
The University may elect to discontinue an eXlstmg
employment rel ationship through layoff. Layoff does
not reflect discredit on the employee's performance ...
Although Taylor has not had the opportunity to review the "Dictionary of
substantially equivalent wording), or (2) the decision not to continue the employment
wording).
workforces. Almost immediately after Taylor was terminated, she discovered that this
was a widely used practice within the University and was occurring constantly.16 Past
University governance committees had reviewed and approved of these policies and
entirely different from how they were intended to be used. Prior to the University
using nonretention for these purposes, their "for cause" regulation read differently. It
stated:
Page 30 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
B. For Cause Employment
There was no doubt regarding their employment status and rights. Since then,
The University employees have since started to fight nonretention within the
T6 This practice is so often used in fact, that the nonretention letter as well as th e follow up letter, is a form letter
that the University uses when nonretaining employees.
Page 31 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
Whereas Regents policy 04.07.100 Non-retention states:
"Non-retention does not rellect discredit 011 an employee,
Taylor urges the court to allow this section to be heard de novo in order for the
Page 32 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
THE HEARING OFFICER FAILED TO CONSIDER TAYLOR'S
ARGUMENTS WHEN HE SUBMITTED HIS RECOMMENDATION TO
UPHOLD TAYLOR'S ARGUMENT, TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE
UNIVERSITY
The hearing officer's decision was that the University did not violate their
policies because they only required 4-weeks notice for nonretention notice was
provided. It was mentioned many times by Taylor and almost every person who
reviewed Taylor's grievance at a point, that Taylor did not dispute that the
nonretention regulation said what it said, nor did she dispute that she was given the
The University's arguments and the hearing officers decision has been based
Regulations are to be read as whole so that they read hannoniously and one
To view the nonretention regulation with the regulations around it, it cannot be
contract term, without the University having to give a reason or any way to dispute it,
regulation.
The hearing officer did not consider this, which IS the proper method of
Taylor understands that the record may not provide the court enough
infonnation in order to make a decision on this section. However, Taylor has shown
University's nonretention regulation. At that time, more evidence and testimony can
Page 34 of 36
Opening Brief of Appellant
CONCLUSION
Not only does the University refuse to make a consistent argument, but they
refuse to provide any docum entation, references, etc. , that are even remotely
attempted to show that of the proof or authorities that support Taylor' s argument to be
otherwise. Instead, they rely on P04.07. I 00 and R04.0 7.J 00 and insist that the
University is the controlling authority. The court should not allow the University to
continue to operate with the assumption that they are a Supreme Being. Neither their
constitutional status nor any authority granted to them has given granted them the
Alaska, is bound by the U.S. Constitution and the Alaska Constitution, and cannot use
the people. Therefore, they cannot terminate or otherwise negatively affect the
regular course of business, without just cause and providing at least the minimum
" Under rational basis standard, if age ncy decision fails to consider an important factor, it will be regarded as
arbitrary. State v. Alaska State Employees Association/AFSCME Local 52, 1996,923 P.2d 18.
Page 35 of 36
Opening Brief of Appel/ant
In the interest of the reputations of both the State of Alaska and the Un iversity
of Alaska, as well as in the interest of the citizens of Alaska who expect our
government to protect them and their rights without such blatant disregard and lack of
respect, responsibility and/or accountability, Taylor requests that the court holds the
University responsible for their actions and ensures their future accountability by
injunctive relief barring the University from applying personnel practices that violate
and/or circumvent their past, present and future employees fundamental rights.
Additionally, for the egregious acts against committed by the University against
Taylor, she requests that the court grants her relief in the fonn of back pay for wages,
and benefits lost, beginning from April 4, 2008, including any raises she was entitled
to and COLA, legal fees and costs, and any other relief the court finds appropriate.
Alaska.
Page 36 of 361
Opening Brief of Appel/ant