Presidential Decree No. 533, s.

1974
MALACAÑANG
Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 533

THE ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974

WHEREAS, large cattle are indispensable to the livelihood and

economic growth of our people, particularly the agricultural workers,
because such large cattle are the work animals of our farmers and the
source of fresh meat and dairy products for our people, and provide
raw material for our tanning and canning industries;

WHEREAS, reports from the law-enforcement agencies reveal that

there is a resurgence of thievery of large cattle, commonly known as
“cattle rustling”, especially in the rural areas, thereby directly
prejudicing the livelihood of the agricultural workers and adversely
affecting our food production program for self-sufficiency in rice, corn
and other staple crops, as well as in fresh meat;

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect large cattle raising

industry and small time large cattle owners and raisers from the
nefarious activities of lawless elements in order to encourage our
hardworking cattle raisers and farmers to raise more cattle and
concentrate in their agricultural works, thus increasing our source of
meat and dairy products as well as agricultural production and allied
industries which depend on the cattle raising industry;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamations No. 1081, dated
September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973 and
General Order No. 1 dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and
decree as part of the law of the land, the following:

Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the “Anti-Cattle

Rustling Law of 1974.”

Section 2. Definition of terms. The following terms shall mean and be

understood to be as herein defined:

a. Large cattle as herein used shall include the cow, carabao, horse,
mule, ass, or other domesticated member of the bovine family.

b. Owner/raiser shall include the herdsman, caretaker, employee or

tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or
other persons in lawful possession of such large cattle.

c. Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme,

without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the above-
mentioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether
committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or
taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser.

Section 3. Duty of owner/raiser to register. The owner/raiser shall,

before the large cattle belonging to him shall attain the age of six
months, register the same with the office of the city/municipal
treasurer where such large cattle are raised. The city/municipality
concerned may impose and collect the fees authorized by existing
laws for such registration and the issuance of a certificate of
ownership to the owner/raiser.

Section 4. Duty of city/municipal treasurers and other concerned

public officers and employees. All public officials and employees
concerned with the registration of large cattle are required to observe
strict adherence with pertinent provisions of Chapter 22, Section 511
to 534, of the Revised Administrative Code, except insofar as they may
be inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree.

Section 5. Permit to buy and sell large cattle. No person, partnership,

association, corporation or entity shall engage in the business of buy
and sell of large cattle without first securing a permit for the said
purpose from the Provincial Commander of the province where it shall
conduct such business and the city/municipal treasurer of the place of
residence of such person, partnership, association, corporation or
entity. The permit shall only be valid in such province.

Section 6. Clearance for shipment of large cattle. Any person,

partnership, association, corporation or entity desiring to ship or
transport large cattle, its hides, or meat, from one province to another
shall secure a permit for such purpose from the Provincial
Commander of the province where the large cattle is registered.
Before issuance of the permit herein prescribed, the Provincial
Commander shall require the submission of the certificate of
ownership as prescribed in Section 3 hereof, a certification from the
Provincial Veterinarian to the effect that such large cattle, hides or
meat are free from any disease; and such other documents or records
as may be necessary. Shipment of large cattle, its hides or meat from
one city/municipality to another within the same province may be
done upon securing permit from the city/municipal treasurer of the
place of origin.

Section 7. Presumption of cattle rustling. Every person having in his

possession, control or custody of large cattle shall, upon demand by
competent authorities, exhibit the documents prescribed in the
preceding sections. Failure to exhibit the required documents shall be
prima facie evidence that the large cattle in his possession, control or
custody are the fruits of the crime of cattle rustling.

Section 8. Penal provisions. Any person convicted of cattle rustling as

herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle
involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed
without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. If the offense is committed with violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the
occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed.

When the offender is a government official or employee, he shall, in

addition to the foregoing penalty, be disqualified from voting or being
voted upon in any election/referendum and from holding any public
office or employment.

When the offender is an alien, he shall be deported immediately upon

the completion of the service of his sentence without further
proceedings.

Section 9. Rules and Regulations to be promulgated by the Chief of

Constabulary. The chief of Constabulary shall promulgate the rules
and regulations for the effective implementation of this Decree.

Section 10. Repealing clause. The provisions of Articles 309 and 310
of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, all laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations
which are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Section 11. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-four.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

By the President:
(Sgd.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary

Source: Malacañang Records Office

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128517. September 10,
1998]
JOEBERT SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The prosecution has the burden of proof. It must rely on the strength
of its own evidence, not upon the weakness of the evidence submitted
by the defense. Failure of the prosecution to discharge this obligation
will result in the mandatory acquittal of the accused.
The Case

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and

set aside the September 27, 1996 Decision and the March 11, 1997
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 17646, affirming
petitioner’s conviction for cattle rustling.

Petitioner Joebert Santiago -- together with Nonilon Waquez, Roger

Lozada and John Dagohoyi[1] - was charged with violating Presidential
Decree 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. On June 24, 1991,
Provincial Prosecutor Romeo S. Fernandez filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Mambusao, Capiz the Information, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

“That in or about the evening of March 17 and early morning of

March 18, 1991 in Brgy. Maninang, Sapian, Capiz, Philippines,
in the jurisdiction of this Court, the above named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent
to gain, willfully and [feloniously] [stole] and [carried] away one
male carabao valued at [t]en [t]housand [p]esos (P10,000.00)
belonging to and without the knowledge and consent of
Rodrigo Belorioii[2] to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
amount aforementioned.”iii[3]

The petitioner, together with Waquez and Lozada, entered a plea of

not guilty when arraignediv[4] on August 6, 1991.v[5] After trial on the
merits, the trial court rendered its April 25, 1994 Decision which
disposed:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing and finding the

evidence of the prosecution to have sufficiently established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court hereby
imposes upon the accused Joebert Santiago, Nonilon Waquez
and Roger Lozada an indeterminate sentence of TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its maximum as
the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS
and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of reclusion temporal in its
medium as the maximum, and to pay the private offended party
Rodrigo Beloria the sum of P10,000.00 by way of moral
damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the
costs of the proceedings, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.
 “The case of accused John Dogohoy is hereby ordered archived
and can be revived only upon proper motion.”vi[6]

On appeal, Respondent Courtvii[7] affirmed the Decision of the lower

court thus:

“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the trial court in

Criminal Case No. 1862 is hereby AFFIRMED by this Court,
with costs against accused-appellants.”viii[8]

In its March 11, 1997 Resolution, the appellate court denied, for lack
of merit, the separate Motions for Reconsiderationix[9] filed by the
petitioner and his co-accused.x[10]

Undaunted, Joebert Santiago filed this petition before us.

Through Counsel Luis C. A. Sillano, Nonilon Waquez and Roger

Lozada belatedly filed their Petition for Review on October 1, 1997.xi
[11] On October 15, 1997, this Court issued a Resolution denying
their petition for the following reasons: (1) the prescribed legal fees
were not paid within the reglementary period; (2) the certification
against forum-shopping was signed by counsel instead of Waquez or
Lozada; (3) Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court was not
complied with; (4) the petition was filed late on October 1, 1997 the
due date being August 27, 1997; and (5) said petition was improperly
verified in violation of Section 4, Rule 7 in relation to Section 1, Rule
45 of the said Rules.xii[12]

Noting that the clerk of court erroneously accepted the deposit for
costs paid on February 11, 1998 by Atty. Sillano, the Court in a
Resolution dated April 11, 1998 directed the refund of such amount,
“considering that the petition was denied on October 15, 1997.”

In its July 1, 1998 Resolution, the Court denied with finality the
Motion for Reconsideration of Waquez and Lozada. Hence, only
Joebert Santiago’s Petition remains to be resolved.
The Facts

According to the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Pfc. Efren

Felizardo, a member of the Philippine National Police stationed in
Sapian;xiii[13] (2) Police Sergeant Sergio Urdelas, who intercepted the
jeep driven by Lozada and thereupon arrested him;xiv[14] and
November 17, 1992, pp. 2-4; records, pp. 341-344 and 400-402,
respectively.14 (3) Pat. Gualberto Salomeo, administrative officer and
police blotter clerk;xv[15] and (4) Rodrigo Veloria, the owner of the
stolen carabao.xvi[16]

Adopted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision and by the Office of

Solicitor General in its Comment was the trial court’s summary of the
above witnesses’ testimonies, which we quote:

“The evidence of the prosecution has established the fact that

on the evening of March 17, 1991, until the early morning of
 March 18, 1991, at around 2:30 in the morning, Pfc. Efren
Felizardo, Pfc. McArthur dela Cruz and Patrolman Victoriano
were on foot patrol inside the town proper of Sapian, Capiz,
because of the rampant cattle rustling in the area when they
tried to flag down a suspected passenger jeepney with Plate
No. UVH-PFH-406, owned b[y] Elizane Waquez, but instead of
st[o]pping, the driver stepped on the gas pedal where Pfc.
McArthur dela Cruz was almost hit by the accelerating jeepney;
that they radioed the Ivisan Police Station where the latter
intercepted the passenger jeepney and apprehended inside the
driver Roger Lozada, one of the herein accused, who, when
investigated, told the police that his companions were Nonilon
Waquez, John Dagohoy and Joebert Santiago; Waquez and
Santiago admitted that they were with their co-accused when
they were flagged down by the Sapian PNP[;] and when their
jeepney was intercepted by the Ivisan PNP, they e[s]caped.
“The prosecution further solidif[ied] its position when it
presented Rodrigo Veloria who reported to the Sapian Police
Station in the morning of March 18, 1991, that his male
carabao was stolen and [that] when they proceeded to the
Ivisan Police Station, he identified his male carabao and
showed his Creden[t]ial No. 836465-A, Exhibit ‘B’ signed by
Sapian Mayor Rodel Obordo, Exhibit ‘B-1’.”xvii[17]
According to the Defense

Consistent with his avowal of innocence, Petitioner Santiago in his

Petition for Reviewxviii[18] offered a different story:xix[19]

“In the early morning of March 18, 1991 at [about] 2:30 o’clock
in the morning some members of the Sapian, Capiz Police
Force were on foot patrol inside the poblacion of the said town
because of the rampant cattle rustling in the area. While
patrolling the said area the police officers composed of Pfc.
Efren Felizardo, Pfc. McArthur dela Cruz and Patrolman
Victoriano tried to flag down or stop a passenger jeepney,
suspected of transporting stolen carabaos, with Plate No. UVH-
PFH-406 owned by a certain Lizanie Waquez. But instead of
stopping, the driver of the said jeepney accelerated going to
the direction of Ivisan, Capiz. (pp. 4-5, 9, t.s.n., September 23,
1991).
“Thereafter, the police officers immediately informed the Ivisan
Police Force thru two way radio about the incident with the
request to intercept the said jeepney. At around 3:30 [a].m. of
the said morning, the Ivisan Police Force radioed back the
Sapian Police Force informing them that they ha[d] intercepted
the subject jeepney and apprehended its driver, one of the
herein accused-appellant, Roger Lozada. During that time, the
jeepney was transporting one (1) male carabao which was
found out later to be stolen. (p. 12, t.s.n., Ibid.).
“During that same morning of [March] 18, 1991, Pfc. Efren
Felizardo of the Sapian Police Department, together with
Rodrigo Veloria, the owner of the stolen carabao, proceeded to
the Ivisan Police Station. Rodrigo Veloria after identifying the
carabao, showed his proof of ownership of the same. Roger
Lozada, the jeepney and the carabao were thereafter brought
to the Sapian Police Station. Later, on the same morning, the
other occupants of the jeepney, herein other co-accused,
Nonilon Waquez and John Dagohoy surrendered to the Sapian
Police Force. (p. 5, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 6-7, t.s.n., September 24,
1991).
“During their investigation, accused-appellants Roger Lozada
and Nonilon Waquez both claimed that on the early morning of
March 18, 1991, while on board the subject jeepney going to
Bilao, Sapian, Capiz, they were stopped by petitioner Joebert
Santiago who together with a certain Ledonio offered
P1,500.00 for them to transport a carabao to Roxas City. (pp.
3-5, t.s.n., May 20, 1991).
“Petitioner Joebert Santiago testified that at around 8:00
o’clock in the morning of March 17, 1991 while he was at
Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz, Rolando Ledonio approached him and
asked him, if he was going to Roxas City. After he answered in
the affirmative, Ledonio requested him to tell Roger Lozada
that he (Ledonio) [would] load something in the latter’s
jeepney. He further testified that at about 10:00 o’clock of the
same morning, he saw Roger Lozada and Nonilon Waquez in
Roxas City and therefore told them of the request of Ledonio.
(pp. 3-4, t.s.n., July 23, 1992). Thereafter, he and his employer
went home to Sapian from Roxas City[;] after washing the car
of his employer they had an accounting because he had earlier
told his employer that he was going to Mindanao to work as a
driver for a certain Roblito Cenica. (p. 4, t.s.n., Ibid). After
their accounting at about 3:00 o’clock p.m., petitioner
proceeded to his house at Barangay Dapdapan, Sapian, Capiz.
From the time he arrived at this house up to 3:30 p.m. he
packed his clothes and other things to be brought to Mindanao.
(p. 5, t.s.n., Ibid). At about 6:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., he played
domino in his house with Santiago Andaya, Romarico Dalmacio
and Ramon Bonales. (p. 5, t.s.n., Ibid). After playing domino,
petitioner went to sleep. However, the above-mentioned co-
players of the petitioner continued playing domino. The wife of
petitioner woke him up at about 4:00 a.m. the following
morning of March 18, 1991. Thereafter, at about 4:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his cousin were able to ride a vehicle going to
Sitio Talaba, Sapian, Capiz, and eventually were able to ride a
bus from Talaba to Iloilo City. They arrived [in] Iloilo City at
about 7:30 a.m. of March 18, 1991 [from where] they
proceeded to Marbel, (Koronodal) South Cotabato (pp. 3-6,
t.s.n., Ibid.).
“Romarico Dalmacio, a co-player of petitioner in the game of
domino, attested that at about 10:00 p.m. of March 17, 1991,
he saw petitioner Santiago [go] upstairs to the second floor of
their house (his father-in-law’s) to sleep and did not leave the
said house until 4:00 a.m. of March 18, 1991 whe[n] appellant
and his cousin left the house and rode a bus to the direction of
Talaba, Sapian (pp. 3-4 and 9-10, t.s.n., September 17, 1992).
In fact, he further stated that before petitioner left, he served
 them coffee while they continued playing domino. (p. 4, t.s.n.,
Ibid.).”
The Rulings of the Trial

and the Appellate Courts

Giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the

trial court convicted petitioner, together with his co-accused, of cattle
rustling. It disbelieved his defense of alibi, as (1) he was “positively
identified,” and (2) he failed to prove that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the crime scene while the offense was being
committed. The trial court concluded:

“Accused Joebert Santiago was one of the persons inside the

jeepney with the carabao and his other co-accused when the
jeep they were riding [in] was flagged down by the Sapian
PNP[;] they continued at high speed proceeding to the
Municipality of Ivisan, Capiz, where they were intercepted by
the Ivisan PNP in the early morning of March 18, 1991.”xx[20]

Further, in ruling that petitioner acted in concert with Lozada and

Waquez, the RTC held:

“‘Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can

be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It is enough that at
the time the offense was committed participants had the same
purpose and were united in its execution as maybe [sic]
inferred from the attendant circumstances.’ (People vs.
Montealegre, G.R. 67948, 31 May 1988)”xxi[21]

In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that: first,
Santiago failed to prove with convincing evidence his defense of alibi;
second, he was positively identified by his cohorts; and last, he fled
after the incident took place.
Assignment of Errors

In his Memorandum, Santiago sets forth the following issues:

“I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals as well

as the trial court erred in declaring that Petitioner Joebert
Santiago conspired with the other accused in committing the
crime charged.
“II. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals as well
as the trial court erred in outrightly disregarding Petitioner
Joebert Santiago’s defense of alibi and denial.
“III. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals as well
as the trial court erred in considering Petitioner Joebert
Santiago’s departure [for] Mindanao an indication of
petitioner’s guilt.
“IV. Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence against
Petitioner Joebert Santiago failed to stand the crucible test of
reasonable doubt to overthrow the constitutionally guaranteed
presumption of innocence petitioner has in his favor.”xxii[22]
Briefly stated, the issue in this case is whether there is sufficient
evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

Main Issue:

Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence

Presidential Decree 533 penalizesxxiii[23]cattle rustling, which it

defines as “the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without
the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned
animalsxxiv[24] whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed
with or without violence against or intimidation of any person or force
upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its meat
or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser.”xxv[25]

Section 7 of the said law creates a prima facie presumption of cattle

rustling upon failure to exhibit documents of ownership, viz.:

“Every person having in his possession, control or custody of

large cattle shall, upon demand by competent authorities,
exhibit the documents prescribed in the preceding sections.
Failure to exhibit the required documents shall be prima facie
evidence that the large cattle in his possession, control and
custody are the fruits of the crime of cattle rustling.”

Petitioner Santiago was not caught stealing the carabao. He was not
seen by the Sapian PNP inside the jeep used in transporting the
carabao subject of the offense. He was not even seen having
possession, custody or control of the carabao. He was not in the
company of Lozada when the latter was caught by the members of the
Ivisan PNP. However, he was identified and indicted by virtue of the
declarations of Lozada and Waquez during the investigation. On the
basis of the evidence adduced, can Santiago be held guilty of cattle
rustling?

We have consistently ruled that the prosecution has the obligation of

proving beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the malefactor and
his participation in the commission of the crime or offense charged.xxvi
[26] In its discharge of such duty, the prosecution presented the
policemen as witnesses. Relying on the testimonies of the policemen
as well as those of petitioner’s co-accused, the trial court convicted
Santiago.
Testimonies of the Policemen

It is elementary that a witness may testify only on facts of which he

has personal knowledge; that is, those derived from his perception,
except in certain circumstances allowed by the Rules.xxvii[27]
Otherwise, such testimony is considered hearsay and, hence,
inadmissible in evidence.xxviii[28]

In this connection, Pfc. Efren Felizardo testified:

“Q Mr. Witness, would you please tell us where you were on March
17, 1991?

A We were on patrol at Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz together with Pfc.

McArthur de la Cruz and Pat. Victoriano Homer.

Q Why were you on patrol on that evening of March 17, 1991?

A We were on preventive patrol and to monitor persons like

robbers and suspected vehicle[s] wherein stolen carab[a]os were
loaded because at that time cattle rustling was rampant

Q And in the early morning of March 18, 1991 where were you
then?

A We were at Poblacion, Sapian, Capiz at around 2:30 in the

morning, March 18, 1991 [when] we spotted [the] suspected jeep.

Q And what did you do when you spotted [the] spotted suspected
vehicle?

A We flagged down the suspected vehicle [but] it did not stop.

[T]he driver even made it r[u]n faster and Pfc. de la Cruz [was] nearly
hit.

COURT:

Q Were you then [in] uniform when you [stopped] the jeep?

A Pfc. McArthur de la Cruz and Pat. Victoriano were [i]n police

uniform and I was [i]n civilian because I am the head of the
Intelligence and Investigation Section.

Q You said that you saw [the] suspected jeep to be used in

gathering the lost carabao. Why did you suspect?

A It was because we ha[d] received reports that [the] jeep was

being used as a vehicle [for] transporting stolen carabao. [S]o for
several months that jeep was on surveillance.

Q How many reports did you receive before March 17, 1991 about
carabao[s] that [were] being stolen?

A In my personnel report, I ha[d] already received [reported] ten

(10) lost carabaos.

Q And the report include[d] the jeep which [was] being used?

A It [was] included but we [did] not officially enter the jeep in the
blotter book.

COURT: Proceed.

PROSECUTOR VARON
Q What was the Plate Number of the jeep that you tried to flag in
the morning of March 18, 1991?

A UVH-PFH-406.

COURT

Q When you flagged down the jeep and [it] did not stop, did you
not fire [a shot] ?

A We did not do it because we were afraid that there [would] be a

commotion or when somebody [would] hear [he or she] might have [a]
heart attack since we were in the Poblacion and it [would] cause
anxiety to the people.

COURT: Proceed.

PROSECUTOR VARON

Q So, what did you do instead?

A We ran towards the Sapian Police Station and radioed the Ivisan
Police Station telling them to intercept the said vehicle.

Q And what happened after that?

A At around 3:30 in the morning, [the] Ivisan Police Station

radioed us telling [us] that they had intercepted said vehicle carrying
[a] male carabao.

Q What did you do after that?

A The following morning, we went to the Ivisan Police Station and

we saw Roger Lozada who was the driver of the jeep and during that
time Rodrigo Veloria was with us and [he reported] to us that the
night before, he had lost a carabao.

Q And what did you do next?

A We investigated Roger Lozada and he told us that his

companions [who escaped] were Nonilon Waquez, Joebert Santiago
and Jhon Daguhoy and according to him, it was Joebert Santiago who
rented said jeep and they were planning to bring the carabao to Roxas
City but unfortunately, they were caught.

COURT

Q [Were] these accuseds [sic] Nonilon Waquez, Joebert Santiago

and Jhon Daguhoy xxx also apprehended during that evening?

A No, [we] were not able to apprehend these three (3) persons but
the following morning, Nonilon Waquez and Joebert Santiago,
surrendered to the Sapian Police Station and told me that it was
Joebert Santiago who rented the jeep.
Q Why did you not ask, why did they rent?

A I have asked them that, your Honor, and [they] told me that it
was not Roger Lozada who [drove] the jeep but it was Joebert
Santiago.

Q The Court wanted to know why they ran when they were
intercepted by the Police[, w]hy Roger Lozada was caught and the
other was not.

ATTY. POTATO: The jeep was taken by Joebert Santiago so, only
Roger Lozada was left in Ivisan.

A During the time when we flagged down the jeep at Sapian, it

was Jobert Santiago who was the driver and along the way these
Nonilon Waquez and Jhon Daguhoy escaped.

Q And when the vehicle was intercepted in Ivisan it was Roger

Lozada who remained in the jeep[;] did you ask Jhon Daguhoy and
Nonilon Waquez why did they leave the jeep?

A During the course of my investigation with Nonilon Waquez and

Jhon Daguhoy, they told me that they escaped because [of] the fact
that the carabao which was loaded in the jeep was a stolen carabao. I
was not able to investigate Joebert Santiago because he did not
surrender in the Police Station.

Q You said that you were able to meet Roger Lozada at Ivisan
because he was being apprehended by the Police of Ivisan[;] if this
Roger Lozada is inside the courtroom could you point to him?

(Witness pointed to a person and when asked his name answered that
he is Roger Lozada.)

xxx xxx xxx

Q When it passed by the three of you, you said that it did not stop.
Did you see who was driving?

A No.

Q Why not[?]

A Because it was running so fast.

Q When you say it was running fast [do you mean] that you did not
see who was driving?

A Yes, Sir. I did not recognize the driver.

Q It was running so fast that you did not even see the Plate No.?

A The Plate No. could not be seen.

Q Why not?
A The Plate No. was scraped off.

Q But can you recognize the jeep?

A Yes.

Q Because almost everyday you saw that jeep? Yes.

Did you recognize the persons on board the jeep when it passed
by you?

A On that night, I only recognize[d] Nonilon Waquez who was

hanging at the back of the jeep.

Q And why only Nonilon Waquez?

A Because the rest were inside.

Q You also stated that when you investigated Nonilon Waquez and
John Daguhoy after they surrendered, they informed you that they
escaped because they did not want to be involved in the matter of
[the] stolen carabao.

Q They did not want to be implicated?

A They did not say that, they only told me that the carabao which
was inside the jeep was a stolen carabao.

Q They informed you that it was Joebert Santiago who rented the
jeep for the purpose of loading the carabao?

A Yes.

Q Did they inform you where Joebert Santiago, in what place he

rented the jeep of Lizanie Waquez?

A They did not say that, they only told me that Joebert Santiago
rented the jeep.

Q Did they tell you how much Joebert Santiago rented the jeep?

A What was necessary on my part was to apprehend the robber.

Q Yes, but you were conducting [an] investigation and you were
ascertaining the fact[;] why did you not ask them how much did they
rent the jeep?

A That I did not think necessary, what [was] important was to

apprehend criminals and to put them in prison.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you not call for Joebert Santiago to find out from him x x x if
it [was] really true that it was he who hired the jeep?
A Joebert Santiago could no longer be found, in fact, he was
apprehended in Mindanao.

Q So, the moment you were investigating the case, this Joebert
Santiago was not given a chance to explain if it [was] true that he was
the one who hired the jeep?

A He was not given a chance because he could not be found

anymore.

Q But notwithstanding that fact that his name was only mentioned
by two suspects, you filed a case including him?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You also stated here that during their trip from the place where
they came from down to Sapian where you flagged them to stop, it
was Joebert Santiago who was driving the jeep?

A According to Roger Lozada it was Joebert Santiago who was

driving the jeep.

Q Roger Lozada is another suspect in this case am I right?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And you included accused, Roger Lozada (Joebert Santiago) on

the basis of the declaration of his co-accused and one of the suspects
in this case?

A Yes.

Q You don’t have personal knowledge of the fact regarding [the]

accused, Joebert Santiago?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And when you reached there you inquired who was driving the
people at that time?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did they tell you?

A The jeep was apprehended in Ivisan, it was Roger Lozada who

was the driver of that jeep.

Q As a matter of fact, Roger Lozada was alone in the jeep when he

was apprehended?

A Yes, Sir.

Q You also stated that you have received reports of cattle rustling
and that you were suspected that the rustlers are one of them, Joebert
Santiago? [sic]
A The reports stated that the jeep owned by Lizanie Waquez was
being hired to transport stolen cattle.

Q But you do not as yet received from any particular persons who
was pinpointed to you as cattle rustlers, Am I correct? [sic]

A In my own personal knowledge, it was Pepito Flores whom I

suspected and I was even surprised why this Joebert Santiago was
involved.

Q You were surprised [when] this incident happened that this

Joebert Santiago was not reported as involved in cattle rustling, am I
right?

A Yes.”xxix[29]

Police Sergeant Sergio Urdelas likewise narrated in court:

“Q And you said you apprehended the jeep[;] who was there in that
jeep you apprehended?

A I apprehended Roger Lozada who was the driver.

Q And what was inside that jeep then?

A There was one carabao inside the jeep.

COURT

Q How did you apprehend the jeep?

A We [had] a checkpoint and we spotted an approaching vehicle

which was about 200 meters away from us and xxx later we saw that
the jeepney moved backward and we ran after [it] with our patrol car.

Q When you saw that the jeep was turned about what did you do?

A The jeep did not turn back but it just moved backward.

Q So, what did you see when the jeep moved backward?

A When the jeep made a final stop we saw that there was a
carabao inside.

Q You said that you were able to apprehend this Roger Lozada[;]
what happened?

A We introduced ourselves as policemen and asked for the person

inside the jeep to come down and it was Roger Lozada who alighted.

Q And who was with him at that time?

A I do not know.

Q But he ha[d a] companion?

A According to him he had a companion.

Q Did you not inquire where was his companion?

A I asked him who were his companion[s] but he told us that they
had already escaped.

Q They have escaped right and when you apprehended the jeep?
[sic]

A When we apprehended the jeep they were no longer there.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When this Roger Lozada informed you, [what] were the names
of his companions who escaped?

A They only informed me, Nonilon Waquez, Godo Santiago and

alias Jojo Waquez.

Q Did he not inform you that Jojo Santiago was with him?

A He only mentioned Godo Santiago.”xxx[30]

He further admitted that he did not see the petitioner during the
encounter, as this portion of his testimony shows:

“Q Did you recognize those persons who were running away?

A No sir.

Q You could not recognize those persons who were running away
because it was dark?

A Yes.

Q Did you see how many persons were running?

A No.

Q You could not say whether there were five persons who were
running because it was dark?

A Yes.”xxxi[31]

Clearly, the testimonies of Pfc. Felizardo and Police Sergeant Urdelas,

linking Santiago to the crime, are inadmissible in evidence for being
unabashedly hearsay. Neither one of them saw Santiago having
possession, custody or control of the carabao. They had no personal
knowledge that Santiago participated in the commission of the crime.
Petitioner was implicated solely and purely on the policemen’s
recollection of statements given by Lozada and Waquez while under
interrogation.
We also agree with petitioner that the entries in the police
blotterxxxii[32] should not be given significance or probative value, as
they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof.xxxiii[33]
These entries are usually incomplete and inaccurate, as “[s]ometimes
they are taken from either partial suggestion or inaccurate reporting
and are hearsay, untested in the crucible of a trial on the
merits.”xxxiv[34]
Testimonies of Co-Accused

During their custodial investigation, Lozada and Waquez both

implicated Santiago as the person who allegedly rented the jeep.
They said he was with them when they transported the carabao.
However, such declarations, being extrajudicial, are inadmissible in
evidence against Santiago. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as may be
allowed by the Rules of Court.xxxv[35] Verily, the admission of such
declarations will violate the right of the petitioner to due process,
specifically his right to confront and cross-examine his co-accused.xxxvi
[36]

A different rule applies with respect to testimonies given during the

trial. In a number of instances, we have held that the testimonies of
particeps criminis may be admissible against the person
incriminated.xxxvii[37] But such rule is not without qualification. We
always advise caution in according probative value to the testimony of
an alleged co-conspirator, as the latter is deemed a polluted source.
His or her declaration must be scrutinized with care and subjected to
grave suspicion.xxxviii[38] True, such testimony, even if uncorroborated,
may be sufficient to convict a co-accused, provided it is shown to be
sincere, unhesitating, straightforward and detailed that it could not
have been the result of deliberate afterthought.xxxix[39] Otherwise, his
testimony would require corroborative evidencexl[40] which, if strong
and convincing, may be given its due weight and force. xli[41]

After a careful and meticulous review of the records, we find the

testimonies of Lozada and Waquez insufficient to convict Santiago of
cattle rustling.

First, the trial court did not find the testimonies of said witnesses
“frank, candid and straightforward,” or their testimonies worthy of
any credit. And our own reading of the transcripts does not lead us to
conclude otherwise. In fact, the solicitor general himself submits that
“the testimonies of co-accused Lozada and Waquez are insufficient to
justify petitioner’s conviction.”xlii[42]

Second, both Lozada and Waquez deny any participation in cattle

rustling. In fact, they claim to have no knowledge that the carabao
was indeed stolen. Being of human nature, culprits are likely to pin
the blame on others rather than on themselves.xliii[43] There is
therefore no guarantee that petitioner’s co-accused had testified
truthfully.xliv[44]

Third, the identification of the petitioner as the malefactor was not

sufficiently established. Lozada did not identify the petitioner in open
court, but merely mentioned his name. True, Waquez pointed to
Santiago, but the probative weight of his identification of the latter as
the culprit is attenuated by his admission that, on the night of the
incident, he “could not really determine that he is Joebert” and that he
“did not recognize him.”xlv[45]

Lastly, the testimonies of Waquez and Lozada were not corroborated.

There are no other pieces of evidence that support their testimonies
and that tend to show or establish the guilt of the petitioner.xlvi[46] Of
the four original accused, only Waquez was positively identified by
Prosecution Witness Felizardo as the one who was “hanging at the
back of the jeep.” Urdelas, who apprehended Lozada, did not see
anybody except the latter. Only Lozada and Waquez testified that
Santiago rented the jeep they were plying and was with them while
they were transporting the carabao.

We agree with the solicitor general’s recommendation to acquit

Santiago:

“x x x the facts obtaining in the case engender reasonable

doubt on petitioner’s complicity which, should, therefore, tilt
the scale of justice in his favor. x x x ‘where the people’s
evidence fails to meet the quantum required to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence, the accused is
entitled to acquittal regardless of the weakness of his defense
of denial and uncorroborated alibi.’”xlvii[47]

For insufficiency of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, this

Court is constrained to acquit the petitioner. It is axiomatic that the
accused is entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.xlviii[48] The prosecution evidence must stand or fall
on its own merit; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.xlix[49]

To summarize, the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to convict

Santiago. First, the testimonies of the policemen, being hearsay, are
inadmissible in evidence. Second, the declarations of Lozada and
Waquez during the investigation are inadmissible under Section 28,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and for being violative of petitioner’s
right to due process. Third, the testimonies of Lozada and Waquez, as
borne out by the stenographic notes, are not worthy of credence.
Lastly, there is no other clear, convincing and corroborative evidence
that shows the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the
offense.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Joebert

Santiago is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

i[1] Sometimes spelled as “Jhon Daguhoy,” “John Daguhoy” or “John Dogohoy.”
ii[2] Sometimes spelled as “Beloria” or “Veloria.”
iii[3] CA rollo, p. 34.
iv[4] They were assisted by Atty. Rito A. Biñas. (See Certificate of Arraignment
and Order of the Court dated August 6, 1991; records, pp. 155 and 160,
respectively.)
v[5] Accused Dagohoy was at large.
vi[6] RTC Decision, p. 15; CA rollo, p. 50. This was penned by Judge Ramon B.
Benjamin.
vii[7] Eighth Division composed of JJ. Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros, ponente; with the
concurrence of both Jaime M. Lantin, chairman, and B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz,
member.
viii[8] CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 14 .
ix[9]Motion for Reconsideration for Petitioner Santiago, filed by Counsel Maria Editha A. Go-
Biñas; Motion for Reconsideration for Waquez and Lozada, submitted by Atty. Rogelio F. Vista.

x[10] Rollo, p. 16.

xi[11] See rollo, p. 185.0
xii[12] Rollo, pp. 195-196.
xiii[13] TSN, September 23, 1991, pp. 3-11; records, pp. 333-341.
xiv[14] Ibid., pp. 11-
xv[15] TSN, September 24, 1991, pp. 2-4; records, pp. 346-348.
xvi[16] Ibid., pp. 5-7; records, pp. 349-351.
xvii[17] RTC Decision, pp. 11-12; CA rollo, pp. 46-47.
xviii[18] Through his counsel, Maria Editha A. Go-Biñas.
xix[19] Petition for Review, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 37-38.
xx[20] RTC Decision, p. 13; CA rollo, p. 48.

xxi[21] Ibid., p. 15; CA rollo, p. 50.

xxii[22] Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 257-258. The same
grounds were raised in his Petition for Review (p. 6; rollo, p. 40).

xxiii[23] § 8 of PD 533 states:

“SEC. 8. Penal Provisions. -- Any person convicted of cattle rustling as

herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be
punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period if the offense is committed without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the occasion
of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed.

“When the offender is a government official or employee, he shall, in

addition to the foregoing penalty, be disqualified from voting or being voted upon
in any election/referendum and from holding any public office or employment.

“When the offender is an alien, he shall be deported immediately upon the

completion of the service of his sentence without further proceedings.”

xxiv[24] § 2 (a) of PD 533 states that “[l]arge cattle as herein used shall include the cow, carabao,
horse, mule, ass or other domesticated member of the bovine family.”

xxv[25] §2 (c), PD 533.

xxvi[26] People v. Galera, GR No. 115938, October 10, 1997; People v. Abellanosa, 264 SCRA 722,
735, November 27, 1996; and People v. Esmale 243 SCRA 578, 592, April 21, 1995, citing Alvin
Tuason y Ochoa v. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, 241 SCRA 695, February 23,
1995.

xxvii[27] § 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

xxviii[28] People v. Parungao, 265 SCRA 140, 147-148, November 28, 1996.

xxix[29]TSN, September 23, 1991, pp. 4-11; records, pp. 334-341.

xxx[30] Ibid., pp. 12-13; records, pp. 342-343.

xxxi[31] TSN, November 17, 1992, p. 4; records, p. 402.

xxxii[32] Evidence for the Prosecution marked as Exhibits “A” to “A3.” (Records,
pp. 204-209).

xxxiii[33] People v. Ledesma, 250 SCRA 166, 170-171, November 20, 1995 and
People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675, 683, January 27, 1993.

xxxiv[34] People v. Paragua, 257 SCRA 118, 124, May 24, 1996, per Hermosisima,
J.

xxxv[35] § 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

xxxvi[36] Taer v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 598, 605, June 18, 1990.

xxxvii[37] US v. Macamay, 36 Phil. 893, 897, September 25, 1917; People v.

Borromeo, 60 Phil. 691, 695, October 1, 1934; People v. Gumaling, 61 Phil. 165,
February 2, 1935; and People v. Encipido, 146 SCRA 478, 494, December 29,
1986.

xxxviii[38] People v. Canete, 43 SCRA 14, 26, January 21, 1972; People v. Aquino,
27 SCRA 43, 48, May 21, 1974.

xxxix[39] People v. Ponce, 197 SCRA 746, 755, May 31, 1991 and People v. Cuya,
Jr., 141 SCRA 351, 354, February 18, 1986.

xl[40] People v. Victor, 181 SCRA 818, 830, February 6, 1990; People v.
Tabayoyong, 104 SCRA 724, 740, May 29, 1981; and US v. Shoup, 35 Phil. 56, 60,
October 14, 1916.

xli[41] US v. Remigio, et al., 37 Phil. 599, 610-611, February 11, 1918.

xlii[42] Comment of the solicitor general, p. 9; rollo, p. 206.

xliii[43] People v. Sarmiento, 69 Phil. 740, 742, June 17, 1940 and People v.
Madangan, 52 Phil. 62, September 12, 1928.

xliv[44] People v. Ponce, 197 SCRA 746, 755, May 31, 1991 and Lugtu v. Court of
Appeals, 183 SCRA 388, 395, March 21, 1990.

xlv[45] TSN, May 20, 1992, pp. 369 and 371.

xlvi[46] People v. Riparip, 86 Phil. 526, 531, May 31, 1950 and People v. Asinas,
53 Phil. 59, 67, March 25, 1929.

xlvii[47] Comment of the solicitor general, p. 17; rollo, p. 214.

xlviii[48] People v. Abellanosa, 264 SCRA 722, 747, November 27, 1996.

xlix[49] People v. Obar, Jr., 253 SCRA 288, 302, February 7, 1996.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120548. October 26, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE
VILLACASTIN JR., HERNANI ALEGRE, and
RODOLFO CAÑEDO, accused.
JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., accused-
appellant.
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

On appeal is the decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court
of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, finding accused Joselito
Escarda and Jose Villacastin Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law. In its decision, the trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds both

accused JOSELITO ESCARDA and JOSE VILLACASTIN, JR., guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of “Viol. of P.D. 533” (Anti-Cattle Rustling Law),
and there being the presence of three generic aggravating circumstances of
[r]ecidivism, nighttime and unlawful entry, with no mitigating circumstances to
offset the same, as such, the accused are each sentenced to suffer, considering
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imprisonment of EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as the minimum to RECLUSION
PERPETUA as the maximum, together with all the accessory penalties imposed
by law and to indemnify the offended party, Joel Barrieses, in the amount of
P5,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused being detained, are hereby entitled to the full credit of their
preventive imprisonment as provided for under R.A. 6127.

Costs against both accused.

SO ORDERED.[1]

In an information dated April 18, 1988, Provincial Fiscal Othello Villanueva

charged accused with violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise known
as Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses JOSELITO ESCARDA, JOSE

VILLACASTIN, JR., HERNANI ALEGRE (at-large) and RODOLFO CAÑEDO (at-
large) of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 533, (Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974), committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of July, 1987, in the Municipality of Sagay,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the first two (2) above-named accused, in company of their two
(2) other co-accused, namely: Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo, who are both
still-at-large, conspiring, confederating and mutually help[ing] one another, with
intent of gain, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal
and carry away two (2) female carabaos, valued in the total amount of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to JOEL
BARIESES, without the consent of the latter, to the damage and prejudice of the
said owner in the aforestated amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

Upon arraignment, accused Escarda and Villacastin, assisted by counsel, entered

a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The facts as presented by the prosecution and summarized by the trial court are
as follows:

[Dionesio Himaya] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 o’clock in the
morning in [Hacienda] Ricky, Jose Villacastin, Jr. and his group passed by his
house. [He] was still awake at that time because he was watching over his
cornfield and while doing so, he saw the two accused remove the cyclone wire
which was used as the corral for the two (2) carabaos of Rosalina Plaza. He was
able to see Jose Villacastin, Jr. cut the cyclone wire because he was just four (4)
arms length away from them and after Jose Villacastin cut the wire, they swept it
aside and untied the two (2) carabaos. After untying the carabaos, they rode on
it and proceeded to the canefields. [He] saw two (2) persons riding on the
carabao whom he identified as Jose Villacastin, Jr. together with Joselito Escarda.
He awakened Rosalina Plaza who thereafter went to Joel Barrieses, owner of the
carabaos, to inform the latter that his carabaos were stolen.

[Rosalina Plaza] testified that on July 29, 1987 at about 2:00 o’clock in the
morning, in the residence of Joel Barrieses, Dionesio Himaya called her and
informed her that the carabaos were stolen and when asked who stole the
carabaos, Dionesio Himaya only mentioned Jose Villacastin, Jr. Before the
incident of July 29, 1987, she already knew the person of Jose Villacastin, Jr.,
because the latter always passed by their house. After she was informed of the
stealing of the carabaos, she went to the corral to check whether the carabaos
were there but discovered that the beasts were no longer there and the cyclone
wire was destroyed. She informed Joel Barrieses, that Jose Villacastin, Jr., stole
the carabaos and she went to the 334th PC Company and reported the incident.
[3]

In their defense, Escarda and Villacastin denied the charges. Escarda claimed
that he was sleeping in the house of Gilda Labrador during the incident while
Villacastin declared that he too was sleeping in his house at that time.[4] The
defense version of the incident was summarized by the trial court as follows:

…Joselito Escarda testified that he did not know his co-accused in this case,
specifically, Jose Villacastin, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo. Neither did he
know of somebody by the name of Dionesio Himaya although he knew somebody
by the name of Gilda Labrador. In the early morning of July 29, 1987, he was
working as cane cutter and hauler in the hacienda of Javelosa located in Barrio
Malubon, Sagay, Negros Occidental which is fifteen (15) kilometers away from
the house of his mother where he was residing. On July 29, 1987, he started
working at 8:00 o’clock in the morning and ended at 11:00. After he finished
working in the field, he went to the house of his mother where he ate lunch and
rested until 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon. In the evening of July 29, 1987, he
slept at the house of Gilda Labrador starting at 7:00 o’clock in the evening and
woke up at 6:00 o’clock in the morning of July 30, 1987. Sometime on August
29, 1987, he left alone for the dance hall located at Hda. Ricky to attend a dance
held there because there was a fiesta at that time. While he was at the dance
hall, he was arrested by the PC elements and brought to the 334th PC Company
where he was maltreated. He was asked whether or not he stole the carabaos at
Hda. Ricky but he denied the commission of the crime and again, he was
maltreated. He suffered injuries when they maltreated him so he made a
confession before them but did not sign the same. His injuries were not treated
by a physician because the PC would not let him go out of the jail, so, his injuries
healed while he was in jail. He did not know the names of the PC who
maltreated him and forced him to admit the loss of the carabaos at Hda. Ricky
because the maltreatment happened in the evening. Furthermore, he did not
know the complainant in this case, i.e. Joel Barrieses.

xxx

[Jose Villacastin, Jr. testified] that on or before July 29, 1987, he did not know the
accused Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo because in the
early morning of July 29, 1987, at more or less 2:00 o’clock to 3:00 o’clock, he
had not gone with Joselito Escarda, Hernani Alegre and Rodolfo Cañedo because
he was sleeping in his house which is located in Sitio Candiis. He started
sleeping at 8:00 o’clock in the evening of July 28, 1987 and woke up the next day,
July 29, 1987 at 7:00 in the morning. On August 29, 1987 at 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, he was attending a dance at Hda. Ricky and while watching the dance,
he was arrested and brought to the 334th PC Headquarters in Tan-ao, Sagay,
Negros Occidental. When they arrived at the PC Headquarters, they were
investigated about the stealing of the carabaos and the PC elements wanted
them to admit it. He denied what they were accusing him of because he has not
committed the crime. He does not know of anybody by the name of Joel
Barrieses. When he denied the commission of the crime, he was maltreated and
was forced to admit it and to make a confession. They were detained for about a
month at the 334th PC Headquarters and they were transferred to the Municipal
Jail of Sagay, Negros Occidental and there was no lawyer present during his
refusal to admit the stealing of the carabaos.[5]

The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible, while
it disbelieved the defense of denial and alibi of accused Escarda and Villacastin.
They were found guilty as charged. However, the charge against accused
Rodolfo Cañedo was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Earlier, the charge
against co-accused Hernani Alegre was dismissed on motion by the prosecution,
for lack of evidence.

Insisting on their innocence, Escarda and Villacastin filed their notice of appeal.
In their assignment of error, they alleged that the trial court erred in convicting
them of the crime charged.[6]

On November 27, 1995, we
Escarda and Villacastin to
penal institution. However,
commitment to the Bureau
the other criminal case[7]
required the trial court to order the commitment of
the Bureau of Corrections or the nearest national
Executive Judge Renato Muñez requested that their
of Corrections be deferred until the termination of
against them pending before the said trial court.
Further, Captain Eduardo Legaspi, Acting Provincial Warden of Negros
Occidental, also requested to hold in abeyance the commitment of Escarda and
Villacastin in view of their pending criminal cases before the Regional Trial Court
of Cadiz City.[8] Accordingly, we granted the aforesaid request for deferment.[9]
On August 12, 1998, they were eventually committed to the New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City.[10]

On October 12, 1998, Escarda sought the approval of this Court to withdraw his
appeal.[11] We required the Director of the New Bilibid Prison to confirm the
voluntariness of said withdrawal.[12] In his certification dated July 15, 1999,
Atty. Roberto Sangalang, who personally examined Escarda, attested that
Escarda executed his urgent motion to withdraw appeal on his own free will and
fully understood the consequences of the same. On August 9, 1999, we granted
Escarda’s motion to withdraw appeal.[13]

Accordingly, we are now concerned only with the appeal of the remaining
appellant, Jose Villacastin, Jr. In his brief, he assigns only one error:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE

CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant contends that the element of “taking away of carabaos by any means,
method or scheme without the consent of the owner” was not proven by the
prosecution. He also alleges that his identity was not established beyond
reasonable doubt, thus, he should be acquitted. He adds that the prosecution
failed to prove ownership of the stolen carabaos by presenting the certificate of
ownership,[14] as required by the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law.

Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the
consent of the owner or raiser of cow, carabao, horse, mule, ass, or other
domesticated member of the bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things. Cattle rustling includes the killing of large cattle,
or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser.[15]

In this case, the overt act which gives rise to the crime of cattle rustling is the
taking away of the carabaos by the accused without the consent of the caretaker.
Dionisio Himaya testified that he saw appellant cut the cyclone wire used as
corral for the carabaos. Afterwards, appellant untied the two carabaos. Then,
appellant rode on one carabao while co-accused Escarda rode on the other and
immediately proceeded to the canefield.[16] The taking was confirmed by
Rosalina Plaza, the caretaker of the carabaos, who declared that after she was
informed by Himaya about the incident, she went right away to the corral and
discovered that indeed the two carabaos were missing.

Appellant’s assertion that his identity was not positively established deserves no
serious consideration. Prosecution witness Dionisio Himaya identified appellant
and Escarda as the rustlers. In his testimony, Himaya said he was awake at that
time as he was watching over his cornfield nearby, and there was enough
illumination from the moon.[17] He was just four arm’s length away. He saw
appellant and Escarda unleash the two carabaos. He stated that appellant rode
on one carabao while Escarda rode on the other, and both immediately went
away. He said he easily recognized appellant as he knew him long before the
incident. According to the witness, appellant was the nephew of his wife and
used to visit them before. During the trial, the witness positively identified
appellant as the same person who stole the carabaos. Appellant’s contention
concerning lack of proper identification is, in our view, baseless and
unmeritorious.

Similarly, appellant’s assertion, that the prosecution should have first presented
the certificate of ownership of the stolen carabaos to warrant his conviction, is
untenable. It is to be noted that the gravamen in the crime of cattle-rustling is
the “taking” or “killing” of large cattle or “taking” its meat or hide without the
consent of the owner. The “owner” includes the herdsman, caretaker, employee
or tenant of any firm or entity engaged in the raising of large cattle or other
persons in lawful possession of such large cattle. In this case Rosalina Plaza, the
caretaker of the carabaos, did not consent to the taking away of the carabaos.
She immediately informed Joel Barrieses, the owner, that the carabaos were
stolen and reported the incident to the police. Note that the carabaos’
ownership was never put in issue during the trial in the lower court and is now
raised belatedly. It is settled that, generally, questions not raised in the trial
court will not be considered on appeal.[18]

Appellant’s alibi must likewise fail. He insists that he was sleeping in his house
at the time the crime occurred. He slept at 8:00 P.M., July 28, 1987 and woke up
the next day, July 29, 1987 at 7:00 A.M. As the trial court noted, it is difficult to
believe appellant’s claim that he slept for eleven hours straight just like Escarda.
Besides, the rule is settled that alibi cannot prosper unless it is proven that
during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime was
committed.[19] In this case, appellant failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that it
was physically impossible for him to be in the crime scene at the time of the
incident. Admittedly, the scene of the crime was only a fifteen-minute walk from
appellant’s house.

We note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of

nighttime, unlawful entry and recidivism, without any mitigating circumstance.
The prosecution, however, failed to specify these circumstances in the charge
filed before the trial court, as now required expressly by the Code of Criminal
Procedure effective December 1, 2000 but applicable retroactively for being
procedural and pro reo.[20]

Moreover, we find that the trial court also erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for
one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime embraced in the same title of the Code. In its decision, the trial court
merely mentioned that appellant was convicted for cattle rustling under Criminal
Case No. 627-S on February 8, 1993, at the time when the case at bar was being
tried. It did not state that said conviction was already final. Even the records
did not show that appellant admitted his previous conviction. As we had held
before, there can be no recidivism without final judgment.[21] The best evidence
of a prior conviction is a certified copy of the original judgment of conviction, and
such evidence is always admissible and conclusive unless the accused himself
denies his identity with the person convicted at the former trial.[22]

P.D. 533 does not supersede the crime of qualified theft of large cattle under
Articles 309[23] and 310[24] under the Revised Penal Code. It merely modified
the penalties provided for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 by
imposing stiffer penalties thereon under special circumstances.[25] Under
Section 8[26] of P.D. 533, any person convicted of cattle rustling shall,
irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the
offense is committed without violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.

In the instant case, the offense was committed with force upon things as the
perpetrators had to cut through the cyclone wire fence to gain entrance into the
corral and take away the two carabaos therefrom. Accordingly, the penalty to be
imposed shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable on
appellant is only prision mayor in its maximum period as minimum, to reclusion
temporal in its medium period as maximum. Thus, it is proper to impose on
appellant only the indefinite prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-
one (21) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated September 21, 1994, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. 586-S, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Appellant Jose Villacastin, Jr., is declared guilty of
violating the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D. 533) and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum; to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of
reclusion temporal as maximum; and to indemnify offended party Joel Barrieses
the amount of P5,000, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

ERNESTO PIL-EY,[1]
Petitioner,

- versus -
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 154941

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
NACHURA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 9, 2007
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:
 Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 assailing the November 29, 2001 Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 19810, which affirmed the ruling of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), First Judicial Region, Branch 36,
Bontoc, Mountain Province.

On May 27, 1994, an Information was filed with the RTC

charging petitioner Ernesto Pil-ey and his two co-accused, Constancio
Manochon and Waclet Anamot, with violation of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 533, or the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law, committed as follows:

That on or before April 15, 1994, in the evening thereof at

[S]itio Ta-ed, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping one another and with intent to gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
load on a Ford Fierra one (1) male cow, and thereafter butchered the
same, against and without the consent of the owner, Rita Khayad,
resulting to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00), Philippine
currency.

That the use of a motor vehicle attended and facilitated the

commission of the crime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

On arraignment, the three pleaded not guilty to the crime

charged.[4] Thereafter, the RTC proceeded to try the case.

From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the facts are

as follows.
 On April 16, 1994, private complainant Rita Khayad of Bontoc,
Mt. Province discovered that her 3-year-old white and black-spotted
cow,[5] which was grazing at Sitio Taed with her 4 other bovines, was
missing.[6] She and her children searched for it but to no avail. She
was later informed by her grandson, Ronnie Faluyan, that in the
afternoon of April 15, 1994, while the latter was with his friends at
the 156 Store at the back of the market, he saw a cow similar to that
of his grandmother’s[7] loaded in a blue Ford Fiera driven along the
national highway by accused Manochon.[8] With Manochon in the
Fiera was his helper, petitioner Pil-ey.[9] Manochon was a butcher
and meat vendor.[10]

After having ascertained from people in the market that the cow
was already slaughtered,[11] Rita reported the matter to the police.
[12] Tagged as the primary suspects were petitioner Pil-ey, his co-
accused, Manochon and Anamot. The 3 accused were invited by the
authorities to the Bontoc Municipal Police Station for questioning.
[13] On April 17, 1994, Rita, Annie and Ronnie went to the station to
file their respective affidavits.[14] During the confrontation between
the parties, petitioner Pil-ey admitted that they were the ones who
took the cow. Since they were relatives, Pil-ey asked for a settlement
of the case.[15] Rita, however, rebuffed the request.[16] On separate
occasions, Anamot and Manochon went to the house of Rita,[17] to
offer a compromise, but again, Rita refused. [18]

Traversing the prosecution evidence, accused Manochon and

Pil-ey testified that on April 12, 1994, Anamot went to Manochon’s
house and offered his cow for sale and butchering[19] for P7,000.00.
Manochon agreed and gave him P1,000.00 as advance payment; the
balance of P6,000.00 shall be paid after the cow’s meat had been
sold.[20] At 7:00 a.m. of April 15, 1994, Anamot went to the market
and requested Pil-ey to ask Manochon, who was then busy chopping
meat for sale, if his cow could be scheduled for butchering on the
following day.[21] Manochon consented so Anamot described the
white and black-spotted cow and instructed Pil-ey to get the same
above the road at Sitio Taed.[22]

Hence, at 2:00 p.m. on that day, while Manochon was in Sagada

buying pigs,[23] Pil-ey went to Sitio Taed, found the subject cow, tied
it to a tree within the area, and then went home to wait for
Manochon.[24] When the latter came back from Sagada, they
proceeded back to Sitio Taed at around 4:00 p.m. to load the cow in
the blue Ford Fiera.[25] Passing along the national road,[26] they
then went back to Manochon’s house in Caluttit.[27] At 11:00 p.m.,
they butchered the cow at Manochon’s house and readied it for sale.
[28]

In the afternoon of April 16, 1994, they were surprised when

they were invited by the Bontoc Police for investigation in view of the
complaint of Rita Khayad who claimed to be the owner of the cow.
[29] Manochon further stated that only Pil-ey and Anamot answered
the questions of the police officers and the private complainant, and
that he was not able to explain his side as they were forced and sent
immediately to jail.[30] He denied offering a settlement and
explained that he went to Rita Khayad’s house to deliver the
P6,000.00.[31] Petitioner Pil-ey denied asking forgiveness from
private complainant and insisted that the cow they took was
Anamot’s.[32]
 For his part, Anamot denied having conspired with his co-
accused in taking the subject cow.[33] He testified that in 1993, he
and Rita co-owned a white female cow, which was hacked and sold
for butchering to Manochon.[34] On April 12, 1994, he went to see
Manochon at his house in order to collect his share of the payment.
[35] He further claimed that, aside from the cow he co-owned with
Rita, he had three other cows grazing near the road going to Guina-
ang but he had nothing at Sitio Taed;[36] hence, he denied seeing
and talking to Manochon and Pil-ey on April 15, 1994 and instructing
them to get a cow at Sitio Taed. He stated that after the meeting on
April 12, 1994, he saw his co-accused again when they were already
behind bars.[37] He further alleged that he went to Rita’s place not
to ask for a settlement but only to ask from the latter why he was
included in her complaint.[38]

On March 22, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision[39] finding

the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating P.D.
No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
The fallo of the RTC’s decision reads:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered, applying the

Indeterminate Sentence Law in the process, sentencing each of the
above-named accused to indeterminate imprisonment of ten (10)
years, and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to twelve (12)
years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal as
maximum – the statute violated being a special law; ordering the said
accused to pay jointly and severally the sum of P10,000.00 to the
offended party; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[40]

Individual notices of appeal[41] were, then, filed by the accused.

On November 29, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the
RTC and disposed of the case as follows:
 WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment of
conviction dated March 22, 1996, rendered by Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Bontoc, Mountain
Province, in Criminal Case No. 1025 entitled “People of the
Philippines versus Constancio Manochon, Waclet Anamot and
Ernesto Pil-ey,” the same is AFFIRMED in toto.

With costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.[42]

The separate motions for reconsideration[43] were denied; thus,

the three accused interposed their respective but separate appeals
before this Court.

On November 11, 2002, Constancio Manochon’s petition for

review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 155234 was denied by the
Court for failure to submit a certified true copy of the assailed
decision; and for raising factual issues.[44] Likewise, on December
16, 2002, the Court denied Waclet Anamot’s petition for review on
certiorari (UDK-13174) for failure to pay the docket fees.[45]

Thus, only the instant petition for review on certiorari[46] filed

by Ernesto Pil-ey is left for resolution.

In this petition, Pil-ey reiterates his and Manochon’s narration of

the incident,[47] and raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN HOLDING THAT THE OFFER OF COMPROMISE ON THE PART
 OF THE PETITIONER IS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT [IN
SPITE] OF THE FACT THAT IT WAS MADE DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION WHERE THE PETITIONER’S [RIGHTS] WERE NOT
OBSERVED, HENCE, THE SAME IS INADMISSIBLE.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN APPLYING IN THIS CASE THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION OF GUILT
UNDER SECTION 7 IN RELATION TO SECTION 5 OF PD NO. 533,
THE ANTI-CATTLE RUSTLING LAW OF 1974.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED

IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT [IN SPITE]
OF THE FACT THAT EVIDENCE ON RECORD COULD NOT
SUPPORT A CONVICTION.[48]

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not, based on the

evidence on record, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating the provisions of P.D. No. 533 or the Anti-Cattle Rustling
Law of 1974.

We rule in the affirmative.

Cattle-rustling is the taking away by any means, method or

scheme, without the consent of the owner or raiser, of any cow,
carabao, horse, mule, ass or other domesticated member of the
bovine family, whether or not for profit or gain, or whether
committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things; and it includes the killing of large cattle,
or taking its meat or hide without the consent of the owner or raiser.
[49]

Conviction for cattle-rustling necessitates the concurrence of

the following elements: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner or
raiser; (4) the taking is done by any means, method or scheme; (5)
the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is
accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.[50] Considering that the gravamen of
the crime is the taking or killing of large cattle or taking its meat or
hide without the consent of the owner or raiser,[51] conviction for the
same need only be supported by the fact of taking without the cattle
owner’s consent.

In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable

doubt that Rita Khayad’s white and black-spotted cow was taken from
Sitio Taed where it was grazing; that its taking was without Rita’s
consent; and that the said cattle was later seen in the possession of
the petitioner and his co-accused. Thus, the foregoing elements of the
crime of cattle-rustling are present.

Its takers have not offered a satisfactory explanation for their

possession of the missing bovine. It is the rule that when stolen
property is found in the possession of one, not the owner, and without
a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he is presumed to be the
thief.[52] This is in consonance with the disputable presumption that
a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.[53]

Indeed, petitioner’s defense of mistake of fact, i.e., he and his

employer Manochon were of the erroneous belief that the cow was
owned or raised by Anamot, is unacceptable. This defense crumbles
in the light of Anamot’s testimony that his purpose in going to
Manochon’s house on April 12, 1994 was to exact payment of a white
female cow sold for butchering in 1993, and not to sell the white and
black-spotted cow subject of this case. He further stated that he did
not have cows grazing at Sitio Taed.

Petitioner’s admission in the course of the trial that he and his

co-accused took the cow is buttressed by the testimony of
prosecution witness Ronnie Faluyan that he saw Manochon and Pil-ey
with the subject cow in a blue Ford Fiera. This judicial admission,
which binds the declarant and which does not need any further
presentation of evidence,[54] reinforces petitioner’s conviction.

Thus, petitioner’s argument that his alleged offer of settlement

during the informal confrontation at the police station is inadmissible
in evidence because it was made without the presence of counsel, is
no longer material. After all, the crime of cattle-rustling and the fact
that petitioners and his co-accused are the perpetrators thereof had
been established by ample evidence other than the alleged
inadmissible extrajudicial confession. The same holds true even if we
do not apply the presumption of guilt under Section 7[55] of P.D. No.
533.

All told, we hold that the evidence on record sufficiently prove

the unanimous findings of the RTC and the CA that the petitioner and
his co-accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the
provisions of P.D. No. 533. There is no cogent reason to reverse the
said rulings.
 Be that as it may, we, however, find that the penalty imposed by
the trial court is erroneous. While it correctly imposed reclusion
temporal in its minimum period as the maximum penalty, it erred in
imposing prision mayor in its maximum period as the minimum
penalty. As in Canta v. People,[56] the RTC in this case considered
P.D. No. 533 as a special law and applied the latter portion of Section
1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.[57] However, as we have
declared in Canta, the computation of the penalty should be in
accordance with our discussion in People v. Macatanda,[58] which
we quote herein for emphasis, thus:

We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. No. 533 is
a special law, entirely distinct from and unrelated to the Revised
Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in
terms of the classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in
the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily
imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be
deemed as an amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to
the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or otherwise to be
subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the
Revised Penal Code on civil liability of the offender, a provision which
is not found in the decree, but which could not have been intended to
be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same
Code should, likewise, be applicable x x x.[59]

Hence, in the instant case, considering that neither

aggravating[60] nor mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime, the penalty to be imposed should be within
the range of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, as maximum. We, thus, modify the minimum penalty
imposed by the trial court to be four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional.
 Furthermore, we note that the separate appeals interposed by
Manochon and Anamot were denied by this Court on November 11
and December 16, 2002, respectively. As their convictions were
affirmed earlier, they were already made to suffer the erroneous
penalty imposed by the trial court. Nevertheless, they shall benefit
from the favorable modification of the minimum penalty made herein.
Section 11, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that “an appeal taken by one or more of several accused
shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the
latter.”[61]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, the

Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that petitioner Ernesto Pil-ey and his co-accused Constancio
Manochon and Waclet Anamot are hereby SENTENCED to suffer a
prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal
in its minimum period, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate JusticeMINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 85204 June 18, 1990
JORGE TAER, petitioner,
-versus-
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Lord M. Marapao for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the

Court of Appeals in "People v. Jorge Taer," CA-G.R. CR No. 01213, 1 dated
May 26, 1988, which affirmed in toto the conviction of Jorge Taer for the
crime of cattle rustling by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol in Criminal
Case No. 3104, 2 and the resolution of the same court denying the
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

After the required preliminary investigation in the 11th Municipal Circuit

Court at Valencia-Dimiao, in the province of Bohol, the following
information was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Bohol, 14th
Judicial District, Branch IV, at Tagbilaran City:

The undersigned, Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal, hereby

accuses Emilio Namocatcat alias Milio, Mario Cago, Jorge Taer
and Cerilo Saludes for the crime of Theft of Large Cattle,
 committed as follows:

That on or about the 5th day of December, 1981, in barangay

Lantang, municipality of Valencia, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping with each other, with the intent
of gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
lead away two (2) male carabaos with the total value of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), Philippine Currency,
belonging to and owned by Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca; to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in the
aforestated amount.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Articles 308, 309

and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken
advantage by the accused to facilitate the commission of the
crime.

City of Tagbilaran, June 1, 1982. 3

After proper proceedings and trial, Saludes and Cago were acquitted but
Taer and Namocatcat were convicted. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the trial court, dated July 6, 1984, reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Emilio Namocatcat and

Jorge Taer GUILTY beyond doubt of the theft of large cattle
and appreciating against them the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 533
each is hereby sentenced to undergo the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE DAY
TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY
ONE (21) DAYS, together with the accessory penalties, and to
pay the costs; they are entitled to credit for their preventive
imprisonment. Accused Mario Cago and Cirilo Saludes are
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. 4

Only Jorge Taer appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
finding the evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed
between Emilio Namocatcat and Jorge Taer, affirmed in toto the decision
appealed from. But the affirmance did not affect Emilio Namocatcat
because, as adverted to earlier, he did not appeal his conviction by the
Regional Trial Court.

Hence, this petition for review was filed by Taer alone.

In sum, Taer interposed these twin arguments:

1. That the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation
of the original defendants Cirilo Saludes and Mario Cago. Therefore, he
submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial court should also lead
to his acquittal; 5

2. That the only evidence proving the alleged conspiracy between him
and Emilio Namocatcat was the confession of his co-accused Emilio
Namocatcat. However this should not be considered as admissible
because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios
acta. 6

The undisputed facts as found by the trial court show that:

In the evening of December 5, 1981, accused Cirilo Saludes slept in the

house of his compadre accused Jorge Taer at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez,
Bohol, whereat he was benighted. At about 2:00 o'clock dawn, December
6, 1981, accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's
house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat
wanted Taer to tend. The said carabaos were left at Taer's place.

Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca of Lantang, Valencia Bohol discovered in

the morning of December 6, 1981 that their respective male carabaos, 3
to 4 years old, were missing at the different grazing grounds whereat
they tied the same the afternoon preceding.

After searching in vain for the carabaos at the vicinity, Dalde and Palaca
reported the matter to the police. On December 15, 1981, one Felipe
Reyes of Hinopolan, Valencia, Bohol, informed Dalde that he saw the
latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez. Forthwith Dalde and
Palaca went on that day to Datag and there they found their missing
carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the house accused Taer who was
then not in the house as he was in Napo, Garcia-Hernandez, attending
the fiesta where he cooked for the accused Saludes. Upon query by Dalde
and Palaca why their carabaos were found at his place, accused Taer,
according to Dalde and Palaca replied that the carabaos reached his
place tied together without any person in company. According to accused
Taer, what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought
to his place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody
looking for them that they just strayed thereat.

The 2 carabaos were taken by Dalde and Palaca from accused Taer's
possession on that day, December 15. 7

xxx xxx xxx

The Court of Appeals would consider these as proof of the existence of

conspiracy:

Altho (sic) accused Taer admitted that before December 6,

1981, he had not met accused Namocatcat since 1975 and had
not previously tended any carabao belonging to Namocatcat, it
is unbelievable that Taer was not suspicious of the origin of
the 2 male carabaos which to say the least were delivered to
him to be tended under strange circumstances, to wit, at the
unholy hour of 2:00 o'clock dawn after a travel of 14
kilometers' in the dead of the night. He unreservedly accepted
the charge of tending them with the agreement as to the
sharing of the produce out of said carabaos (sic) use. If, as he
asserted, Namocatcat left the carabaos with him with the word
that if anybody would look for them he was to tell that the
carabaos just strayed into his other carabaos (sic), the more
Taer ought to be more suspicious as to the origin of said
carabaos, yet, since that dawn delivery on December 6, 1981,
until they were retrieved from his possession, he never
 apprised the barangay captain, living just 2 kilometers away
from his house, about the matter. He continued to hold on to
the stolen carabaos until they were recovered 10 days later.

Ordinarily, one would not hold on to a thing he suspects to be

stolen to obviate any criminal responsibility or implication.
But accused Taer did the opposite-a clear indication that he
and accused Namocatcat did have some kind of an unlawful
agreement regarding the stolen carabaos. He did not even
reveal immediately to the authorities that the carabaos
delivered to him by Namocatcat were stolen and he tried his
best to keep under cover Namocatcat's Identity.

The Court, therefore, finds that conspiracy between accused

Namocatcat and Taer in the theft of the carabaos has been
established beyond doubt. 8

xxx xxx xxx

We disagree with the findings of the respondent court; they are mere
suspicions and speculations. The circumstances adverted to above do not
establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement

regarding the commission of an offense and decide to commit it.
Although the facts may show a unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective, essential however is an agreement to
commit the crime and a decision to commit it. 9

Only recently we emphasized the rule that:

Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by

positive and conclusive evidence. The same degree of proof
necessary to establish the crime is required to support a
finding of the presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof
beyond reasonable doubt. 10

Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without

cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.

At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet
without having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for
he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part
subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by
its effects. Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact.

Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the

commission of the crime, and without having participated
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime; 11

xxx xxx xxx

person who received any property from another, and used it, knowing
that the same property had been stolen is guilty as an accessory because
he is profiting by the effects of the crime." By employing the two
carabaos in his farm, Taer was profiting by the objects of the theft. 12

On the conspiracy charge, the most cogent proof that the prosecution
could ever raise was the implication made by the accused Namocatcat (he
did not appeal his conviction to the Court of Appeals) in his affidavit of
confession. 13

However, the settled rule is that the rights of a party can not be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. 14

The testimony, being res inter alios acta, can not affect another except as
provided in the Rules of Court. This rule on res inter alios acta
specifically applies when the evidence consists of an admission in an
extrajudicial confession or declaration of another because the defendant
has no opportunity to cross-examine the co-conspirator testifying against
him. 15

Since this is the only evidence of the prosecution to prove the conspiracy
with Namocatcat, this uncorroborated testimony can not be sufficient to
convict Taer.

The offense for which Taer is accused is covered by Articles 308, 309, and
310, as amended by "Me Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. 1116 The
penalty imposed on the principal for the crime of cattle rustling is:

Sec. 8. Penal provisions. — Any person convicted of cattle

rustling as herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the
large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its
maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if
the offense is committed without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is
committed with violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a
person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the
occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. 17

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Taer's culpability is only that of an accessory after the fact,

under Art. 53 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be
imposed.

The penalty two degrees lower than that imposed under the first sentence
of Section 8 of PD No. 533 is arresto mayor maximum or 4 months and
one day to 6 months to prision correccional medium or 2 years 4 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In addition, the Revised Penal Code
provides that when the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, the courts shag observe the rule that when there are neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty
prescribed by law in its medium period. 18 Hence the imposable penalty
would be prision correccional minimum or 6 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months imprisonment.

Since the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds one year, we apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. 19

This law provides that the maximum term of imprisonment shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said code which is prision correccional minimum
or 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months. And the minimum shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be in the range of
destierro maximum or 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years to arresto
mayor medium or 2 months and 1 day to 4 months.

WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of

Tagbilaran and affirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as an accessory of
the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533
amending Arts. 308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will
serve the minimum penalty within the range of arresto mayor medium,
which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the maximum penalty of
prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Endnotes

1 Imperial, Jorge S., J., ponente; Melo, Jose A-R. and Herrera,
Manuel C., JJ., concurring; Third Division.

2 Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, presiding judge.

3 "The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Emilio

Namocatcat alias Milio, Mario Cago, Jorge Taer, and Cirilo
Saludes, Accused," Crim. Case No. 3104, For: Theft of Large
Cattle, Original Record, 80.

4 Original Record, 236.

5 Rollo, 3.

6 Id., 3, 4.

7 Original Record, supra, note 1 at 9.

 8 People v. Namocatcat, et al., RTC (Tagbilaran, Br. M, Crim.
Case No. 3104, July 6, 1984 quoted in People v. Taer, CA-G.R.
No. 01213, May 26, 1988.

9 Antonio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 57937, October 21, 1989.

10 Orodio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 57519, September 13,

1989.

11 People v. Tanchoco, 76 Phil. 467.

12 T.S.N., December 8, 1983, 11.

13 T.S.N., April 28, 1983, 6.

14 RULES OF COURT, Section 25, Rule 130. Accord, Belvis III

v. Court of Appeals, Nos.
L-38907-09, November 14, 1988,167 SCRA 333.

15 People v. Bazar, No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 618.

16 Pres. Decree No. 533 (1974); People v. Macatanda, No.

51368, November 6, 1981, 109 SCRA 40.

17 Pres. Decree No. 533 provides:

c. Cattle rustling is the taking away by any means, methods or

scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of any of the
abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence against or
intimidation of any person or force upon things ...

18 REV. PEN. CODE, Art. 64.

19 Act No. 4103 (1933) as amended by Act No. 4225 (1935),

Section 1.

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