Gulf officials declared on April 17, 2014, the end of what they described as a mere

misunderstanding among “brothers of the same family”, and the relations among members
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had returned to their normal “purity and clarity”. This
came after the break-up of relations with Qatar when other GCC countries withdrew their
ambassadors from Doha, accusing it of interfering in their internal affairs. The reasons for
the current crisis with Qatar are not much different. But it seems the three GCC countries
(Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain) limited their action to withdrawing ambassadors from
Doha rather than apply a total blockade (it’s currently only a boycott), to give the newly-
bestowed Emir, Shaikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, who assumed office merely nine
months earlier, time to settle into his new position.

The current crisis that has blown up in an unprecedented way reflects a new reality in inter-
Arab relations. It is traditionally typical that Arabs tend to sort out their problems, no matter
how acute they are, by simply avoiding to implement the agreements they sign on. This is
unfortunately entrenched, for one reason or another, in our culture, not as a recent
phenomenon, but it goes back centuries in Arab history. This method takes many different
forms between countries in the modern Arab world and that would probably explain why
Arabs are continuously unable to solve their many problems, big or small.

Has the reality changed in view of the current Qatar crisis? It seems it has and very rapidly
indeed, but it won’t be clear how far and deep and whether it is sufficiently effective unless
we see how the crisis ends.

What are the possible solutions? It seems there are three:

The first is that Qatar accepts soon the list of demands presented by the three GCC
countries and Egypt. So far, judging by their reaction to the demands, the Qatari
government is clearly stalling and is denying all the accusations. It is obvious now that the
so-called solution of 2014 failed to end the crisis with Qatar. At the time, the ambassadors
were pulled out of Doha because the emir dishonoured an agreement, known as the
‘Riyadh Agreement, that he had signed in November 2014.

Secondly, a military action against Qatar to force it to change course. Clearly, none of the
GCC countries or Egypt is talking about this option since it is not in the interest of the
parties involved. Therefore, it is difficult to understand why Doha has unwisely turned to
Turkey to send troops to Qatar since the two countries are already tied up by a joint defence
agreement signed two years ago. Why has Doha asked the adventurist President of Turkey,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, to beef up his country’s troops in Qatar? Is it to make a complicated
situation worse, or is it because it doesn’t trust the Americans enough, with their 11,000
personnel already stationed at Al Udaid airbase that cost the Qataris $1 billion (Dh3.67
billion) to build? Or is it both? Here, Qatar’s huge dilemma, as a tiny state, seems clearly
obvious as it tries to play a role bigger than its size and even bigger than its diplomatic and
financial capacities. The military option cannot be an option and Turkey is unlikely to risk a
confrontation with Saudi Arabia. But it seems that Qatar has never been serious about
building solid neighbourly relations with its Gulf Arab partners in the most significant
regional institution in the Middle East — the GCC.

The third possible solution is to prolong the crisis as long as possible without an end in the
foreseeable future, like many other problems in the region. This is totally out of tune with the
philosophy of the GCC, of which Qatar is a founding member.

What’s clear so far is that Qatar wants to avoid the military option and prefers the first option
with a bit of the third. It claims that to change its political path undermines its sovereignty
and its right to choose its own foreign policy. This has been the country’s position as
repeated by its Foreign Minister, Shaikh Mohammad Bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani. It is well
established that political disputes are normally sorted out by negotiation, which requires in
many cases mutual concessions, but also requires sometimes concessions by one party in
the interests of the whole. We regularly find this practice followed by the European Union
(EU) countries and Nato states.

Furthermore, it is ironic to see a tiny country in the GCC stabbing in the back other member-
states of the same culture and historic background.

“Qatar could learn some useful lessons from the European integration
process.””-Mustapha KarkoutiShare on facebookTweet this
The EU has managed to succeed over the last 43 years despite the different cultures,
languages and historical animosity among its 28 member-states. Europeans have set an
example in taking political and economic integration further when the EU opened the doors
of its membership for the former Communist countries in Europe, following the demise of
the Soviet Union. GCC countries, particularly Qatar, could learn some useful lessons from
the European integration process that began in 1956 with only six countries: France,
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.

The GCC is facing its first serious crisis for survival and the time has come for Qatar to take
decisive action. Whether it wishes to remain within the GCC or decides to break out, Doha
must respect the stability and security of its immediate Arab neighbours. It should start
listening to reason.