ROXAS v.
CA RTC that Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud and
FACTS: Maguesun Corporation filed an Application for
Registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in
Tagaytay. In support of its application for registration they
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed
by Zenaida Melliza as vendor who bought the property from
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months earlier, as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated March 26, 1990 and an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.
Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration
Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna while Trinidad
de Leon vda. de Roxas was not notified because she was not
named as an adjoining owner, occupant or adverse claimant.
Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record
Newsweekly. After an Order of general default was issued, the
trial court proceeded to hear the land registration case.
On October 4, 1990, LRA reported that the subject parcels of land
had previously been applied for registration at the CFI of Cavite
by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decision has
been made.
February 13, 1991 the RTC granted Maguesun Corporation's
application for registration. Consequently RTC issued the Order
for Issuance of the Decree on March 14, 1991, after it ordered the
application of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon dismissed.
It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked
to vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas
learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun
Corporation's name. Hence, she filed a petition for review before
the RTC to set aside the decree of registration on the ground that
Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud, alleging that her
signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication; that Maguesun Corporation intentionally
omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining
owner in the application for registration submitted to the LRA,
such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing
dismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April
15, 1992. CA affirmed the findings of RTC, ruling that Roxasí
failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic
fraud, not merely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite
for purposes of annuling a judgment or reviewing a decree of
registration. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was actual fraud on the part of Maguesun
Corporation to warrant the reopening and the setting aside of
the registration decree?
HELD: The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of
registration sought to be reviewed by Roxas.
Actual Fraud; Defined.
Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive
fraud proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by
means of the misrepresentation or concealment of a material
fact. Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of its
detrimental effect upon public interests and public or private
confidence, even though the act is not done or committed with an
actual design to commit positive fraud or injury upon other
persons.
Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded
as intrinsic where the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue
involved in the original action, or where the acts constituting the
fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded
as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from
presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner
in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submission of
the controversy. Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral
to the transaction sued upon.
The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or
extrinsic fraud has been accepted as grounds for a judgment to
be annulled or, as in this case, a decree of registration reopened
and reviewed. The "fraud" contemplated by the law in this case
(Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual and extrinsic, which includes
an intentional omission of fact required by law.
Intentional Omission of Name
In the corporation's application for registration filed with the
RTC only the following names appeared: Hilario Luna, Jose Gil,
Leon Luna, Provincial Road. The court found that the some
words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first five
letters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid.
However, Maguesun Corporation, annexed a differently-worded
application for the petition to review the application of the
Roxasí where in instead of PROVINCIAL ROAD, the name ROXAS
appeared.The discrepancy which is unexplained appears
intentional.
It is reasonable to assume that the reason is to mislead the court
into thinking that "Roxas" was placed in the original application
as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant or claimant, the
same application which formed the basis for the LRA in sending
out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the
full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of
adjoining owners, if known and if not known, the extent of the
search made to find them. Maguesun Corporation failed to
comply with this requirement.
Possession in OCENO
The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the
property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.
Maguesun Corporation also that the subject land was unoccupied
when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in
the subject property. Maguesun Corporation is likewise charged
with the knowledge of such possession and occupancy, for its
President, who signed the Deed of Sale over the property, knew
fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas
owned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to
have inspected the property prior to the sale such that the
ascertainment of the current possessors or occupants could have
been made facilely.
Maguesun Corporation intentional concealment and
representation of Roxasí interest in the subject lots as possessor,
occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the
reopening and review of the decree of registration.
Concealment of the Existence of Trinidad Roxas
Mention of the late President's name as well as that of Trinidad
was made principally in the Formal Offer of Exhibits for
Maguesun Corporations tax declarations and as predecessor-in-
interest. However, this is not sufficient compliance with what the
law requires to be stated in the application for registration.
Disclosure of petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and
possession should be made at the appropriate time, i.e., at the
time of the application for registration, otherwise, the persons
concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will,
therefore, miss the opportunity to present their opposition or
claims.
Publication of Notice of Initial Hearing
While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper
of general circulation remains an indispensable procedural
requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a component of
procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity as
possible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in the
land subject of the registration proceedings may be notified
thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact
that publication was not made in a newspaper of general
circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's
right or title to the land.
Forgery and Discrepancies
A close scrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the
irresistible conclusion that forgery was indeed attendant in the
case at bar. Although there is no proof of respondent Maguesun
Corporation's direct participation in the execution and
preparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia
which proves that Maguesun Corporation is not the "innocent
purchaser for value" who merits the protection of the law.
The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the
sample signatures in several documents executed by Trinidad.
The questioned signatures are smooth and rounded and have
none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signatures
characteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.
The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the
general public, as well as the demise of the late President on
April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech at Clark Field,
Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to
have been ignored. If Tinidad did in fact execute said Affidavit,
there is no reason why she should state facts other than the
unadulterated truth concerning herself and her family.
ADEZ REALTY v. CA
FACTS:In a resolution of the Supreme Court, Atty Dacanay was r
equired to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt wi
th by intercalating a material fact in the quoted judgment of the C
ourt of Appeals, inserting “without notice to the actual occupants
of the property, Adez Realty” when in fact it did not make such fi
nding.
ISSUE:W/N Atty Dacanay, by inserting phrase which is in fact n
ot true, should be disbarred.
RULING:YES. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that the
inserted phase “without notice to the actual occupants of the pro
perty, Adez Realty,” was just the right phrase intercalated at the r
ight place, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally, ma
king it appear that respondent Court of Appeals found that no no
tice was given to the occupants of subject property ––
when in fact it did not make such a finding ––
is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portio
n of the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue a
dvantage in the sporting arena of fairplay and, more importantly,
to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of li
tigations.
He then violated Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which directs that “[a] lawyer shall n
ot knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, th
e language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a d
ecision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision alread
y rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fa
ct that which has not been proved”
Assuming it was the carelessness of his secretary,it is the duty of
lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegation in their plea
dings, more particularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the
statements therein are accurate and the reproductions faithful, d
own to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profe
ssion demands that lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motio
ns and other documents dictated or prepared by them, type or tr
anscribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with t
he court. If a client is bound by the acts of his counsel, with more
reason should counsel be bound the acts of his secretary who me
rely follow his orders.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. CA
FACTS: Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration
of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. The land registration court in its decision
dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition “for want of
jurisdiction”, in compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation. The case was elevated to
respondent Court of Appeals which, set aside the decision of the
trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of
Teodoro Abistado. The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely
procedural and that the failure to cause such publication did not
deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor
General thus elevated this recourse to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the Director of Lands is correct that newspaper
publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land
registration case is mandatory.
HELD: YES. The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 requires publication of the notice of initial
hearing. It should be noted further that land registration is a
proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such proceeding requires
constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including
the state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied
with.
The Supreme Court has no authority to dispense with such
mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its
rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is
no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is
room only for application. There is no alternative. Thus, the
application for land registration filed by private respondents
must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the
future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied
with.
REPUBLIC v. CA
FACTS:
This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares
of public forestal land aka Lot 1 located in Mulanay, Quezon.
On March 21, 1961 In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the CFI
at Quezon ordered the registration of said land, Lot 1, in the
names of the spouses Maxino. The decision became final and
executory. On June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed
an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on
the ground that they are void because the land in question was
still a part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the
possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses
covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares.
Judge Agana denied the petition and was served upon the
assistant provincial fiscal and on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo
of the Bureau of Forestry. A copy of the order was transmitted
by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's Office only on September 2,
1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the order. The
Solicitor General appealed from that order, and was given due
course.
In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court
dismissed the petition because the 1970 order had allegedly long
become final and unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed
to this Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the appeal of the State from the trial court's 1970
order of denial was seasonably made.

2. Whether Spouses Maxino have a right of ownership over the
disputed land
HELD:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the reglementary thirty-day
period for appeal should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor
General's Office was apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not
from the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with
that order. These representatives of the Solicitor General had no
power to decide whether an appeal should be made. They should
have referred the matter to the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General's Office should be served with the final
order disposing of the petition and should not be bound by the
service on his surrogates, the special counsel and the fiscal.
In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void
allegedly because public forestal land was registered and the
State sought to declare the decision void, the Government should
not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.
2. No.
It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by
the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and
disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion
in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry on July
6, 1940. The certification was reiterated by the Director of
Forestry on May 20, 1948.
The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, a
gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30,
1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of
December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de
animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio
Creeks.
The composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The
unreliability or dubiousness of the composition title is evident
from the sale executed by the heirs of Prudencio Tesalona in
favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino. That curious document is not
a sale at all. It is a "quit-claim".
It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its
inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish
regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title.
Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership.
Spanish titles are not indefeasible. The instant case bears
similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of
Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an adjustment title issued in 1896
was held to be void because it was fraudulent and it covered
public forestal land not subject to registration.
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No.
892 effective February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-
175880 is dismissed.
GOMEZ v. CA
A court ruling (Philippine Islands vs Abran) settled that 12
parcels of land belonged to one Consolacion Gomez. Consolacion
later died and the 12 parcels of land were inherited by Jose
Gomez et al – her heirs. The heirs agreed to divide the property
among them.
After notice and publication, and there being no opposition to the
application, the trial court issued an order of general default. On
August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decision adjudicating the
subject lots in Gomez et al’s favor. The decision became final and
executory hence the court directed the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office (GLRO) to issue the corresponding decrees of
registration over the lots adjudicated.
GLRO Chief Silverio Perez opposed the adjudication and
petitioned for its setting aside. He discovered that the 12 parcels
of land were formerly part of a titled land which was already
granted by homestead patent in 1929. Under the law, land
already granted by homestead patent can no longer be the
subject of another registration. The lower court granted
Silverio’s recommendation.
Gomez et al invoked Sec. 30 and 32 of PD 1529 (Land
Registration Act) which provides that after judgment has
become final and executory, the court shall forthwith issue an
order to the Commissioner of Land Registration for the issuance
of the decree of registration and certificate of title. That once the
judgment becomes final and executory under Sec 30, the decree
of registration must issue as a matter of course.
ISSUE: Whether or not to set aside the lower court’s initial ruling
on approving the adjudication even after it had became final and
executory.
HELD: Yes. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land
in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration
of one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of
registration. The Supreme Court has held that as long as a final
decree has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has
not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.