ADM. CASE No.
3319 June 8, 2000 (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for
LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris
Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui,
husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady
of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1and as a result of their marital union, they
had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all
surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband. Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the
College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine
Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent.
Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988
and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that
everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then
on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would
come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then
met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with
respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail.
The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on
that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on
August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In
her Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and
had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that
Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had
long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui
formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA
in 19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui.
The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence
because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know
and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she
would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and
renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, she
was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos
Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned
only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days
after she reported to work with the law firm5 she was connected with, the
woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her
office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit
because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when respondent
discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he
resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother,
Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in
the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for
having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that
respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and
had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2)
children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant
also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of
Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S.
No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the
criminal complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the
"illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the
complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter
part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of
respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in
1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26
Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they,
admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early
(sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima
facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had
failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's
cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos
St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable
to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement
alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion
respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy,
20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in
support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster
the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant
complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause
for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the
Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together
as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant
filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she
charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She
alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her
averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11 duly certified by the State
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu,
Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985
as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason
for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the
said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. 12 It
is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles
183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the
Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her
Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her
moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member
of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent
averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate
because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed
such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the
marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone
issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the
requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal
profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was
the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui
was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no
reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of
a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was
highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to
her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated
that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage
to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that
respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent
and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988.
Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that
he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate
from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the
testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of
respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a
garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another
picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house
and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They
have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a
photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during
the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie
Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the
offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of
Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or
illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims
that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it
suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to
be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways
with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she
prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent
committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which
resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband
since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio
was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who
was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her
own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred
that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated that
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment.
Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no
showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married
man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline
submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted
by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The
Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of
contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic)
true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of
1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the
Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro
Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other
because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did
they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act
on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was
more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion
rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her
chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
 Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and
willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe
penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to
enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The
requisites for admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the
bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the
enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held —
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then
the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for
retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar
may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character.
(Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the
bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency
and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a
member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be
unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she
met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love
with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth
to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she
left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of
respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how
the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before.
This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a
compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's
suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she
knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it
appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and
this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos
Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very
open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that
her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed
was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct
to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing
herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the
law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare
assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if
she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This,
herein complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to
her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she
merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided
her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any
normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult
to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the
year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience
and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an
attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of
the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage
Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on
that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality.1avvphi1 The legal profession exacts from its members
nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free
from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L.
Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a
photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date
thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on
her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981
MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,
vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.
AQUINO, J.:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on
the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise
of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4,
1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu
City. Magdalena was then a medical technology student in the Cebu Institute of
Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos College.
They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with
Segundino in a motel in January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.
Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month.
They renewed their relationship. After they had dinner one night in March, 1971
and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding house since
the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When
Segundino asked Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have
sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she was in love with another
man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that
even if that be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much.
Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his
acquaintances that he and Magdalena were secretly married.
In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He
continued his law studies in Davao City. .Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent
to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).
When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and
Segundino went to her hometown, Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents
that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino convinced
Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had
passed the bar examinations. He secured his birth certificate preparatory to
applying for a marriage license.
Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his
love and concern for the baby in Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and
again that he would marry her once he passed the bar examinations. He was
not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in
the Cebu Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the
baptism of his child.
Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25,
1975. Several days after his oath-taking, which Magdalena also attended, he
stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was something
amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino
told her that they could not get married for lack of money. She went back to
Ivisan.
In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino
who was then in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told
that their marriage could not take place because he had married Erlinda Ang on
November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.
Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because
she had a confrontation with his wife, Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to
the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical treatment in a
hospital (Exh. I and J).
Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he
is the father of the child Michael. He also admits that he repeatedly promised to
marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of Magdalena's
shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had
already an illegitimate child before Michael was born.
The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion,
respondent's cohabitation with the complainant and his reneging on his promise
of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is
required to produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court.
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated
when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117
Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should
have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity
which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced
may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).
Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became
pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six
children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).
There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the
canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his
misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous.
It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the
question of immorality usually arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a
woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized
as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.
This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still
prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh and
the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not
well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward
whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that
the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt a
saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).
Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated in the following
cases:
(1) Where lawyer Arturo P. Lopez succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
Virginia C. Almirez, under promise of marriage, which he refused to fulfill,
although they had already a marriage license and despite the birth of a child in
consequence of their sexual intercourse; he married another woman and during
Virginia's pregnancy, Lopez urged her to take pills to hasten the flow of her
menstruation and he tried to convince her to have an abortion to which she did
not agree. (Almirez vs. Lopez, Administrative Case No. 481, February 28, 1969,
27 SCRA 169. See Sarmiento vs. Cui, 100 Phil. 1102).
(2) Where lawyer Francisco Agustin made Anita Cabrera believe that they were
married before Leoncio V. Aglubat in the City Hall of Manila, and, after such fake
marriage, they cohabited and she later give birth to their child (Cabrera vs.
Agustin, 106 Phil. 256).
(3) Where lawyer Jesus B. Toledo abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with
another women who had borne him a child (Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768. As
to disbarment for contracting a bigamous marriage, see Villasanta vs. Peralta,
101 Phil. 313).
(4) The conduct of Abelardo Simbol in making a dupe of Concepcion Bolivar by
living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other
personal necessities, while dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from the complainant, and
trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their broken relationship
after the latter's discovery of his perfidy are indicative of a character not worthy
of a member of the bar (Bolivar vs. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450).
(5) Where Flora Quingwa, a public school teacher, who was engaged to lawyer
Armando Puno, was prevailed upon by him to have sexual congress with him
inside a hotel by telling her that it was alright to have sexual intercourse
because, anyway, they were going to get married. She used to give Puno money
upon his request. After she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy,
Puno refused to marry her. (Quingwa vs. Puno, Administrative Case No. 389,
February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439).
(6) Where lawyer Anacleto Aspiras, a married man, misrepresenting that he was
single and making a promise of marriage, succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with. Josefina Mortel. Aspiras faked a marriage between Josefina
and his own son Cesar. Aspiras wrote to Josefina: "You are alone in my life till
the end of my years in this world. I will bring you along with me before the altar
of matrimony." "Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in life or in
death, my Josephine you will always be the first, middle and the last in my life."
(Mortel vs. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586).
(7) Where lawyer Ariston Oblena, who had been having adulterous relations for
fifteen years with Briccia Angeles, a married woman separated from her
husband, seduced her eighteen-year-old niece who became pregnant and begot
a child. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
The instant case can easily be differentiated from the foregoing cases. This case
is similar to the case of Soberano vs. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1206, where lawyer
Eugenio V. Villanueva had sexual relations with Mercedes H. Soberano before
his admission to the bar in 1954. They indulged in frequent sexual intercourse.
She wrote to him in 1950 and 1951 several letters making reference to their
trysts in hotels.
On letter in 1951 contain expressions of such a highly sensual, tantalizing and
vulgar nature as to render them unquotable and to impart the firm conviction
that, because of the close intimacy between the complainant and the
respondent, she felt no restraint whatsoever in writing to him with impudicity.
According to the complainant, two children were born as a consequence of her
long intimacy with the respondent. In 1955, she filed a complaint for disbarment
against Villanueva.
This Court found that respondent's refusal to marry the complainant was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. (See Montana vs. Ruado,
Administrative Case No. 507, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 382; Reyes vs.
Wong, Administrative Case No. 547, January 29, 1975, 63 SCRA 667, Viojan vs.
Duran, 114 Phil. 322; Abaigar vs. Paz, Administrative Case No. 997, September
10, 1979,93 SCRA 91).
Considering the facts of this case and the aforecited precedents, the complaint
for disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007
CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against
respondent Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, charging the latter with Gross
Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek
the legal advice of the respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles
from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent Demand Letter dated
December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato,
Quezon City to discuss the possibility of filing the complaint against Queensway
Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as demanded. After
the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step
out of the car, respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and
embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met
respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the
draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered
again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way,
complainant was wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just
got up from bed a few hours ago. At along Roosevelt Avenue immediately after
corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she was
almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and
kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even
in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and
immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing
him that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to
get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired was recorded
in her cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with othercomplainant
At 5:33:46 pm
replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant
- I feel bad. I can’t expect that u will take advantage
at 6:17:59 pm the situation.
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you don’t
Sent by complainant have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - "I’m veri sri. It’s not tking advantage of the sit
At 6:32:43 pm 2 put it rightly it s an expression of feeling. S sr
very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the situa
put it rightly it is an expression of feeling)
Follow up message - I’m s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I c
by respondent show u my sincerity" (I’m so sorry. I’ll not do it
at 6:42:25 pm Will you still see me so I can show you my since
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to
complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I don’t know wat 2 do s u may 4give me.
"Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I don’t know what to do so you may forgive
me. I’m really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was
received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime
bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time behave na ko),
which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to
the complainant; that he met with complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6
March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which
complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and
Tours for collection of a sum of money; that on both occasions, complainant
rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on the lips as the
former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and
Roosevelt Avenue, where he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street
teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to commit the acts
imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal
case for Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending
before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the legal name of
lawyer is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain
Jinky Toriana because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was
archived pursuant to the Order dated 6 December 2000 issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was living with a
man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss
respondent’s fees and it was respondent who always paid for their bills every
time they
of met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26
July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa
submitted his Report and Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of
the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006,
approving and adopting, with modification, the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of
Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct required of a lawyer when
dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that
are grossly immoral or which constitute serious moral depravity that would
warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with
respondent’s actuations shall have a rippling effect on how the standard norms
of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal
society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high
degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their personal affairs
with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I – x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral
character is a continuing condition to preserve their membership in the Bar in
good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite
condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we
emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character of members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. Membership in the legal
profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is
no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only
the right but also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and
gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest
standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers
of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained
in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain
their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person
really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four
ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public
image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She
offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her
right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We said goodnight and
she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek
and I lightly kissed it and with my right hand slightly pulled her right cheek
towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force used. No
intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done.
Everything happened very spontaneously with no reaction from her except
saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona
Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City, respondent candidly recalled the following
events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met … I fetched her I should say, somewhere along
the corner of Edsa and Kamuning because it was then raining so we are texting
each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of Edsa and
Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so
I said … she opened my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like
that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes, okay. So I brought her to
Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about
her case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for
you of I (sic) order wine? She said yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine.
After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said … it’s about 9:00 or
beyond that time already, so I said okay, let’s go. So when I said let’s go so I
stood up and then I went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed
me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to? She told me just drop me
at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that
we had and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before
she went down, I told her can I kiss you goodnight? She offered her left cheek
and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say tilted
her face towards me and when she’s already facing me I lightly kissed her on
the lips. And then I said good night. She went down the car, that’s it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said let’s go because I have an appointment.
So we went out, we went inside my car and I said where to? Same place, she
said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before she opened
the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the
use of my left hand, pushed a little bit her face and then kissed her again softly
on the lips and that’s it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity
which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced
may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such
conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore, for
such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be
immoral, but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly
immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne
him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved
that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a
married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondent’s act of engaging in illicit relationships with
two different women during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant
constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of appropriate
sanctions. Complainant’s testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary
evidence, sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and
exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent,
a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as
chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said
college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under
the threat that she would flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and three children, lured an innocent woman into
marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and
then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch
pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of marriage
and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children,
for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our
communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole." As such,
"there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married
woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty years.
We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession," warranting respondent’s disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife
was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of
respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the
Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated
marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent failed to
maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is expected of
members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on
the cheeks as mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of
greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in turning the
head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful.
However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be
considered grossly immoral.
Complainant’s bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of
his position as a lawyer to lure her to agree to have sexual relations with him,
deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant, and she must
establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
proof,28 disclosing a case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by
the Court of its disciplinary power.29 Thus, the adage that "he who asserts not
he who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof
lies on the party who makes the allegations—ei incumbit probation, qui decit,
non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In
the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof
required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the
same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right
after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the
respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately
extended an apology to complainant also via cellular phone text message. The
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several
people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney
route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he
could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he
could freely accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial,
immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension. and surely needs to be corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.

The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto
lawyer found guilty of misconduct requires consideration of a number of Macabata, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is
factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must consider hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and cautious in his dealing with his
that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on
to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.34 Disciplinary
proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring SO ORDERED.
those who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and
reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.35 While it is
discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem
proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor
motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by
the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the
bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, Adm. Case No. 1392 April 2, 1984
to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
PRECIOSA R. OBUSAN, complainant,
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the vs.
preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for GENEROSO B. OBUSAN, JR., respondent.
the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should Roger Castuciano for complainant.
merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode
the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless Roemo J. Callejo for respondent.
they are of such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s
unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act
charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must
be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The
AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the
offense should also be considered.36
This is a disbarment case filed in 1974 by Preciosa Razon against her husband
Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. on the ground of adultery or grossly immoral conduct.
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a
He was admitted to the bar in 1968.
lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty
to the court or the client.37 In the Matter of Darell Adams,38 a lawyer was
publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her In 1967, when Generoso B. Obusan, Jr. was working in the Peoples Homesite
blouse which constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct and Housing Corporation, he became acquainted with Natividad Estabillo who
which adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law. represented to him that she was a widow. They had carnal relations. He begot
with her a son who was born on November 27, 1972. He was named John
Obusan (Exh. D). Generoso came to know that Natividad's marriage to Tony
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is
Garcia was subsisting or undissolved.
respondent’s first offense, reprimand would suffice.

Four days after the birth of the child or on December 1, 1972, Generoso, 33,
We laud complainant’s effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to
married Preciosa, 37, in a civil ceremony. The marriage was ratified in a
be an affront to her honor. Surely, it was difficult and agonizing on her part to
religious ceremony held on December 30,1972 (Exh. C and C-1)
come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct.
The couple lived with the wife's mother at 993 Sto. Cristo Street, Tondo, Manila
for more than one year. In the evening of April 13, 1974, when his wife was out
of the house, lawyer Obusan asked permission from his mother-in-law to leave
the house and take a vacation in his hometown, Daet, Camarines Norte. Since
then, he has never returned to the conjugal abode.
Preciosa immediately started looking for her husband. After much patient
investigation and surveillance, she discovered that he was living and cohabiting
with Natividad in an apartment located at 85-A Felix Manalo Street, Cubao,
Quezon City. He had brought his car to that place.
The fact that Obusan and Natividad lived as husband and wife was corroborated
by Linda Delfin, their housemaid in 1974; Remedios Bernal, a laundress, and
Ernesto Bernal, a plumber, their neighbors staying at 94 Felix Manalo Street.
The three executed the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and F, which were confirmed by
their testimonies.
Romegil Q. Magana, a pook leader, testified that Obusan introduced himself as
the head of the family (25-30 tsn Nov. 26, 1976). His name is at the head of the
barangay list (Exh. E, G and H). Nieves Cacnio the owner of the apartment,
came to know Obusan as Mr. Estabillo. She Identified five photographs, Exhibits
I to I-D where respondent Obusan appeared as the man wearing eyeglasses.
Respondent's defense was that his relationship with Natividad was terminated
when he married Preciosa. He admitted that from time to time he went to 85-A
Felix Manalo Street but only for the purpose of giving financial assistance to his
son, Jun-Jun. Lawyer Rogelio Panotes, the ninong of Jun-Jun, corroborated
respondent's testimony.
He denied the testimonies of the maid, the laundress and the plumber. He
claims that they were paid witnesses. He declared that he did not live with
Natividad. He resided with his sister at Cypress Village, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City.
On the other hand, he claimed that he was constrained to leave the conjugal
home because he could not endure the nagging of his wife, their violent
quarrels, her absences from the conjugal home (she allegedly went to Baguio,
Luneta and San Andres Street) and her interference with his professional
obligations.
The case was investigated by the Office of the Solicitor General. He filed a
complaint for disbarment against the respondent. Obusan did not answer the
complaint. He waived the presentation of additional evidence. His lawyer did not
file any memorandum.
After an examination of the record, we find that the complainant has sustained
the burden of proof. She has proven his abandonment of her and his adulterous
relations with a married woman separated from her own husband.
Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence of his wife that he was
guilty of grossly immoral conduct. Abandoning one's wife and resuming carnal
relations with a former paramour, a married woman, fails within "that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to
the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S.
959; Arciga vs. Maniwang Adm. Case No. 1608, August 14, 1981, 106 SCRA
591).
Thus, a lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited
with another woman who had borne him a child. He failed to maintain the
highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar
(Toledo vs. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768).
WHEREFORE, respondent is disbarred. His name is stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint
charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and
misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of
the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do
not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127
of the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held by the then
Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her
counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as
well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The
respondent likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with
complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the
handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned
Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging
respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and
respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the said
respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way
the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before
going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel
at R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of
the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to complainant that
they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are
getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered
by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage,
complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room
respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A.
Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant
inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone
locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and
undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest
her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to
marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant
to his overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give
up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon
respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then
placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the
bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter
had no other recourse but to submit to respondent's demand and two
(2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock
that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday
party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1,
1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but
complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were
married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and
feeling that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly
implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but
respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant
gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the
complainant through a promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and
has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows
that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and integrity
which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of
the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon,
he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took
complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage,
succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted
that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until
November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for
Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating in his answer
that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed
that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the
hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted
the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the
respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to
present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to
present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963),
the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where
respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule
139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in
the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a
number of years. She testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel
on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage.
The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that
"Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and
departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when
the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left
for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year
telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September
and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went
to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and
asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he
and complainant met in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that
complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in
respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity
and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth
certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate
of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by
the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the
complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent
whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria
Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3,
1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the
respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred
that he and complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact
that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the
testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.);
respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of
respondent's promise of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual
gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2,
Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege
to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No.
376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is
challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him.
Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had
sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to
show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil.
303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State.
If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardly
indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration
which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek
to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to
help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by
which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to
the charges of the complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall
under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar
as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already
a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to
suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers
can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon
vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs.
Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of
fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or
disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed
a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental
ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and
learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the
highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to
the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in
either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to
uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a
consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant
Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the
Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner
described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his
answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office
lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part
of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down
to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he
covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her
to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the
floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her
family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had
sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her
hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the
sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family.
She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the
house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n.,
hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard
by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because
of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the
respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was
alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for
him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of
influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia
Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,
hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that
after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office
of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative
case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the
complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents,
but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited
himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she
completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual
intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the
second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place
before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse
about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house
whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she
could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention,
'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to
marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife,
will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's
foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he
wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp.
14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
 FINDINGS AND COMMENT membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the
office of a lawyer.
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of
the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under xxx xxx xxx
circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are
convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but RECOMMENDATION
repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after
the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due
the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his
office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot
in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other
her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never
misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he
reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her
appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately
after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on
alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good
the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child,
moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time
he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her
maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of
pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was
Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe
accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises
to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render
of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to
judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office
the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have
as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From
childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata'
(uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense
mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said
difficult to see why she could not resist him. complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and
that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128
of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good
moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit
him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to
August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.." receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of
which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked
leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented
same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing
no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent
that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still
when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent
subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar
is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he
would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year
or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be
permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties
of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law
wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She
and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the
Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at
the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur
(t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24)
as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him
she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to
stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26).
Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk
about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to
Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as
'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry
him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister
Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not
go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and
went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was
already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to
go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate
husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching
Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with
her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually
agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently
living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March
6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later
date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16,
1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his
first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she
was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the
time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for
her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted
Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by
her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who
told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other
evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and
Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that
2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines)
was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away,
because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join
her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told
Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never
to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to
Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with
him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as
he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband
(Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was
already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live
with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide'
from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman'
(Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because
he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the
fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he
was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor
General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit
perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the
bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1)
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts
on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed
gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after
he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the
truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the
respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law
for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent,
through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on
April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly
filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual
relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore
him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with
Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant
Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married
woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent
has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that
the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among
those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a
lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is
not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy
members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper
administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the
power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a
fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958
ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that
the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may
provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted
doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of
creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers
of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed
for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where
from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair
private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been
admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the
statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his
professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the
decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory
grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case
at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension
that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from
having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he
himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing
her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant
was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy
over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed:
"He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering
her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant
reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction
for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has,
by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute
sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the
ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the
following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney
and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an
attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a
condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of
the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of
the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly
bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of
the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so
would be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment
from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous
relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do
not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in
effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to
the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and
character degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if
he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not
controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of
decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the
prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the
respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in
that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his
admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse
for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to
extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the
complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest
means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was
then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a
married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the
latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal
profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to
possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his
authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and
perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally
charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground
to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the
Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders
differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. —
If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with
all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court,
and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court
with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within
fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules
requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense
charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment.
Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent
he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation of
himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention
is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and
not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran
observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good
moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the
standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to
persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely
enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
[1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v.
Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral
character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous
life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have
acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character.
It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is
clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein
respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. RENATO E.
ABASTILLAS, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod
City, Respondent.
JUDGE RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ENRIQUE S.
CHUA, Respondent.
Enrique S. Chua for complainants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified complainant
dated June 8, 1992, docketed as Adm. Case No. RTJ- 863, charging respondent
Judge Renato E. Abastillas with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for soliciting a bribe in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
pending in his sala entitled "People v. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno," serious
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bench, gross ignorance
of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders and manifest partiality,
oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of justice "which may
result or has resulted in falsification of public documents or in the commission of
falsehood."cralaw virtua1aw library
In his comment dated September 28,1992, Judge Abastillas vehemently denied
the charges against him. He averred that Atty. Chua had an axe to grind against
him because of a prior incident between them. Judge Abastillas pointed out that
on September 28, 1992, Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where he
made statements which were highly contemptuous of Judge Abastillas. Hence,
according to Judge Abastillas, he issued an order on March 2, 1993 requiring
Atty. Chua to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and
recommended for suspension from the practice of law. After due proceedings,
Judge Abastillas issued an order on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of
contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine in the amount of P500.00.
Judge Abastillas then recommended Co this Court that Atty. Chua be suspended
from the practice of law. This order of March 11, 1993 became the basis of Adm.
Case No. 3815 entitled "Judge Renato Abastillas v. Enrique S. Chua."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to Associate
Justice Alfredo J. Lagamon of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated May 6, 1993.
After hearing of the two cases, Justice Lagamon submitted his report
recommending the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge
Abastillas in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and the imposition of appropriate
disciplinary measures against Atty. Enrique 5. Chua in Adm. Case No. 3815.
Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-563.
Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 sought to prove their charges of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and gross misconduct and
conduct unbecoming a magistrate against Judge Abastillas, through the
affidavits and testimonies of Johnny K.H. Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S.
Chua.
The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe money of
P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as down payment of the
consideration for the dismissal of the criminal cases against his clients, is
summarized in the report of Justice Lagamon, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as their
principal witness declared in his Affidavit that when criminal cases Nos. 10010
and 10011 were raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod City, presided by the
respondent, he was heartened because the respondent was among the few
judges he was comfortable with. Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached
the respondent in his chambers and apprised him of the background of the
cases and requested that the warrants of arrest be held in abeyance because of
the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. That the
respondent accordingly instructed the docket clerk not to release the warrants
of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent allegedly said, Ike, don’t worry toe
much, anyway, that is not your personal problem. They are just cases of your
clients. What is important is that you are assured of your attorney’s fees. Why,
how much is your fee there? P50,000.00? Make it double, so that I can have a
share there and I will take care of everything’ (Affidavit of Atty. Chua;
Exh.’H’).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened and told him
not to worry but at the same time informed him that the judge is asking for
P50,000.00 to take care of everything. Johnny K.H. Uy advised Atty. Chua that
they are willing to give P50,000.00 to the respondent because of their sad
experience with the Department of Justice and insisted that the amount be
given over the objections of Atty. Chua. That Mr. Uy sent a check in the amount
of P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in turn give to respondent
as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. Chua deposited the
check in his account.
Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket clerk of the
respondent informed Atty. Chua that the bail bond for his clients was increased
from P18,000.00 to P100,000.00 each, upon ax paste motion filed by the
private prosecutor. Aware of the adverse development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty.
Chua for not giving the money yet to the Respondent. Atty. Chua again went to
the chambers of the respondent where accordingly he was advised by the latter
to file a motion to strike out the ex-parte motion for the reduction of the bail
and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail provided it shall be in
cash. The motion was filed and the respondent granted it the following day. The
respondent instructed Atty. Chua that the bail bond should be in cash to
facilitate the collection of his attorney’s fees so that both of them can receive
their respective compensation for their efforts (Exh.’H’, par. 9).
Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about 4:00
o’clock in the afternoon he delivered P20,000.00 to the respondent and before
he left the chambers, the respondent jestingly said where will they celebrate
that evening.
Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29,1992, Johnson Lee and Atty.
Chua appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council and briefly related the
delivery of the P20,000.00 to the respondent where he was rebuked by Dean
Palma for allowing himself to be used as a conduit for illegal and immoral act.
Dean Palma asked Atty. Chua if he was not as guilty as the respondent
(Affidavit, par. 16).
During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed that his first meeting
with the respondent was between April 10 to 15, 1991 in his chambers when the
criminal docket clerk was instructed not to release the warrants of arrest (p. 52,
TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p. 41, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that it
was also at that time when the respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said,
‘why, how much is your fees there? P50,000.00? You double it.’ (p. 54, TSN,
Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was when Atty. Chua discussed the
reduction of the bail bend which he said could be on April 17, 18 and 19, 1991,
but most probably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993), and the third
meeting was when he delivered the P20,000.00 which he said was on May 2,
1991 but which he rectified during cross examination that he withdrew the
amount on May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was
on May 3, 1991 at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64, TSN, Sept.
15, 1993).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he pointed out the
following facts which were either admitted or undisputed and which he believes
established the misconduct and the impropriety of the respondent as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Respondent Judge’s admission that he met complainant Lee ahead of witness
Johnny Uy, whom he tagged as the ‘financier’ of the herein complainants on May
29, 1991; ‘while he met Uy only on October 7, 1991’ (p. 11, Comment dated
September 28, 1992 of respondent).
b) Respondent Judge’s admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, he and
complainant Lee saw each other at the Quezon City Sports Center, during the
meeting of the Philippine Judges’ Association (p. 11, Comment, supra).
c) As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that ‘it is true that respondent
met with Johnny N.H. Uy on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent at
Unit A-2, 157 Katipunan Road Quezon City . . .’ (p. 7, Comment, supra).
Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with the accused
who were charged with two (2) criminal cases before his sala will render him
liable for gross misconduct or conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge
Abastillas, the latter told him that the accused (in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010
and 10011) could see the Judge at the forthcoming convention of Philippine
Judges’ Association to be held at the Quezon City Sports Center.
Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011,
narrated on the witness stand that he received a long distance call from Atty.
Chua advising him that Judge Abastillas wanted to see him (Johnson Lee) at the
Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 where the Philippine Judges’
Association was to hold a convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said
date. Alter introducing himself to Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function
room where they had a private conversation for about twenty minutes. During
the meeting, Johnson Lee naked Judge Abastillas if he had received what they
sent to Atty. Chua. Judge Abastillas said yes, but added, "I cannot give you
what you are asking. It will take a little time to study." Johnson Lee responded
by saying, "Judge, the balance later on na lang." Judge Abastillas replied,
"Okay, okay. Anyway, I know they have no case against
you." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask Judge Abastillas
why he approved three ex-parte motions of the private prosecutor in the
criminal cases, one, for issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused and,
another, for increase of their bail bond, without giving the accused an
opportunity to oppose the same. Judge Abastillas assured Johnson Lee that
there was nothing to worry "because that is my style. I will just give them a
little favor. Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one Johnny Uy, a
brother of Ban Hun Flores, who had a hand in the filing of the criminal cases,
wanted to see the judge. Judge Abastillas said yes. "You just give him my
telephone number and call me." Judge Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee
his calling card bearing his telephone number 7222968.
The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports
Center became the basis for the charges of "gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."cralaw virtua1aw library
Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases pending
before Judge Abastillas where the accused were charged with embezzlement of
the funds of Neugene Marketing Corporation. According to Uy, he was interested
in the outcome of the cases, more particularly in the acquittal of the accused,
for the reason that the pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected
the operation of the corporation, 75% of which stocks had been assigned to
him. Uy declared that he visited Judge Abastillas at his residence in St. Ignatius
Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at about 11:30 in the morning. Before
going to Judge Abastillas’ house, Uy called him by telephone and Judge
Abastillas gave him the direction of his place. During that visit, where the
background and merits of the criminal cases were discussed, Judge Abastillas
assured Uy that he would take care of the cases. Before they parted Judge
Abastillas told Uy to ask Johnson Lee if he could help Judge Abastillas with
5,000 U.S. dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to Johnson Lee about the
matter and would inform Judge Abastillas by telephone of the result. On October
16, 1991 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Uy called up Judge Abastillas
telling him that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00)
as long as the cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas told Uy
to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al Simbulan, a lawyer, was a mutual
friend of Uy and Judge Abastillas. The telephone conversation was taped by Uy
(Exh. "B").
Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further declared that
sometime in the middle of June, 1991, Atty. Simbulan called his office and left a
note that they would have dinner with Judge Abastillas at six o’clock in the
evening at Manila Hotel. Johnson Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner,
Judge Abastillas told Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan in a low voice: "Johnson,
don’t worry," Huwag kang mag-alala. Nakatimbre na ang kaso n’yo sa
akin.chanrobles law library
After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was giving the
accused a runaround, not having done anything relative to the criminal
proceedings to indicate that he would perform his part of the bargain, Johnson
Lee appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) sometime in the middle
of 1992 to oppose Judge Abastillas’ application for transfer to Manila as RTC
Judge on the ground of his lack of good moral character. Johnson Lee saw
Justice Loreno Relova to whom he cited the incidents where the Judge allegedly
solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00 and accepted the
amount of P20,000.00 in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011.
Justice Relova advised him to come back together with Johnny Uy and bring
with them the tape containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and Judge
Abastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on January 29,
1991 Johnson Lee, together with Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua, returned to JBC’s
office where the tape was replayed before then JBC member Calcetas-Santos.
Atty. Calcetas-Santos obtained an English translation of the taped conversation
and gave it to Justice Relova and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member.
Both extensively interrogated Johnson Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua. At one
point, Dean Palma sternly reprimanded Atty. Chua for having allowed himself to
be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly reminding Chua that by delivering himself
the advance payment of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he was as guilty as the
judge.
As specifics in support of their other charges against Judge Abastillas,
complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 averred and sought to prove the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.) When complainants Filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, Judge Abastillas, instead of acting on the
same, issued an order for their arrest and confiscation of their bailbonds in view
of their failure to appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day;
2.) Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail, Judge Abastillas
still insisted that they be present at their arraignment. Judge Abastillas gave
preferential treatment to some cases, particularly Criminal Cases Nos. 8846 and
8847, entitled "People v. Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts
and for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, which were heard and
the accused acquitted in just five (5) months, and in which the accused were
not required to be present at the hearing of the Motion to Quash the
Information; whereas in connection with complainants’ Consolidated Motion to
Quash the Information, their presence was required in a "full-blown type of
hearing" and the motion was denied in open court in a "trifling manner.
3.) Complainants’ Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set Arraignment,
Pre-trial and Continuous Trial dated June 2, 1991 was arbitrarily denied, their
bonds were declared forfeited and the bondsmen were asked to show cause why
no judgment shall be rendered against them for the amount of their bonds. In
addition, Judge Abastillas issued an order for complainants’ arrest and fixed an
excessive bond of P50,000.00 each for their provisional liberty.
4.) In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order posthaste
requiring the delivery to court of the illegally possessed firearm and
ammunition, which order was not necessary because the items should have
been forfeited in favor of the Government and deposited in Camp Crame.
5.) Two of complainants’ motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 had
remained unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn Affidavit of
October 22, 1993, as well as in his testimony in his own behalf, Judge Abastillas
denied having solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Chua or having received
P20,000.00 from him as initial payment at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991.
To prove his defense, Judge Abastillas obtained a joint affidavit from the
personnel of his sala, namely, Pablo D. Juguan (Branch Clerk of Court), Estanes
A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito, Alma M. Ronato, Wilma B.
Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce (Stenographers), Diana B. Lamur (Interpreter),
Amando N. Eso (Deputy Sheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff Asst. 2) and Edwin O.
Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that during the incumbency of Judge
Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in Bacolod City, they had never seen Atty. Chua
enter the judge’s chambers.chanrobles law library
While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered the
P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas either on May 2 or May 3 of 1991, on cross-
examination Atty. Chua at one point adverted when pressed to give the exact
date that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May 2 or the
next day, you delivered P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas?
"A Yes. Correct.
"Q Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May 3?
"A Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I had then
with me my old bank passbook. I traced the deposit and withdrawal in that
passbook. There was a withdrawal on May 2, 1991 of the sum of P20,000.00. So
most probably, it’s either on that very same day or immediately the next day
that I delivered the money.
"A I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not mistaken, the
next day is either a non-working day or a Saturday and I remember that. Yes,
yes. Correct. when I placed the P20,000.00 in my attache case, I remember my
kid commenting that ‘Papa, you have so much money in your attache case.’ So
the money stayed overnight with me. Yes, Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11,
Sept. 15, 1993.)
Seizing upon Atty. Chun’s above-quoted assertion that the delivery of the
money "most probably’ was on May 3,1991, Judge Abastillas argued that he
could not have received the money in the afternoon of May 3 as he left Bacolod
City early in the morning of that day by ferry boat for Iloilo City and then
proceeded by car to Roxas City where he stayed up to the following day to
attend a testimonial in honor of Justice Bellosillo who was appointed as Court
Administrator. To prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted an affidavit of
Judge Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC, Bacolod
City) certifying that he and his wife were with Judge Abastillas in their journey
to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano, Ramon B. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of
the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit to the effect
that Judge Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991
where he stayed up to the following day.cralawnad
Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991 at the
Quezon City Sports Center during the convention of the Philippine Judges’
Association. But he denied having asked Johnson for a meeting there or having
talked to him privately regarding the criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that
RTC Judge Joselito de la Rosa of Manila, was introduced to him by Judge
Ponferrada. Judge de la Rosa, a friend of Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to
him. According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his calling card to Judge de la Rosa
who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward. This was the same calling
card that was introduced as evidence by the complainants in Adm. Case No.
RTJ-92-863.
Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson Lee at the
Manila Hotel in the evening of June 7, 1991 but that the latter was never invited
by him to be there on that occasion. This is the account of Judge Abastillas in
his sworn affidavit (Exh. "27") of the meeting:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had with my
cousin and his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila Hotel on the
evening of June 7, 1991. He was a gatecrasher on that occasion. what happened
was this: My cousin and I agreed to a foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7,
1991. When my wife and I were already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty.
Simbulan called me up and said he wanted to see me. I told him that I was
going to a dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in seeing me; and I had an
inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases, so I told him, I
was willing to see him, as long as he did not bring along either or both Lee or
Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his
partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made this condition because I did not want to meet
Lee and/or Moreno outside of the court and especially not during a social
occasion; I was willing to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of
mine, and he was counsel for one of my brothers-in law (’bilas-husband of my
wife’s sister). Atty. Simbulan agreed that he would not take with him either of
his clients, so I told him to join us at the Manila Hotel. Much to my surprise and
anger, Lee was at the Manila Hotel Lobby, when he reached the place. So, when
I saw Atty. Simbulan, I asked him: ‘Bakit ba nandito iyan?’ (Why is that person
here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: ‘Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka na; Huwag
ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya’ (I don’t know. Please be patient; don’t get
angry. Let him join us). I contained my irritation. My cousin and his wife, and
my wife were civil and hospitable. We, Filipinos, are a hospitable people. Unlike
Americans, we tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing by
Johnson Lee, who is a very pushy person, as indeed he also gatecrashed during
the Judges’ Convention. Furthermore, as indicated by their attempts to see and
talk to Justice Alfredo Lagamon, the Investigating Justice in this proceeding.
"24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to be cordial
to Lee, I showed my displeasure by not addressing him. It is not true that I told
him I will take care of the two criminal cases." (At pp. 13 and 14.)
Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, went to his residence at Quezon City on
October 7, 1991. But the visit, according to Judge Abastillas, was not at his own
initiative and the amount of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion.
This is his version of the meeting:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00 from
Johnny Uy. He did come to my residence on that date, but that was not on my
initiative. Prior to October 7, 1991, I had been getting word from our maid and
from my son, that a certain Mr. Uy had been calling up asking for me, but
refused to leave any message. And then on October 7, 1991, just as I was
preparing to go out for a luncheon meeting, our maid informed me a certain Mr.
Uy wanted to talk to me over the phone. When I answered the phone Johnny Uy
introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my house; he said
he wanted to talk to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where his sister Banhua is
opposing party. He did not say outright that he was going to discuss the
Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if he had, I would have refused to see
him, because I did not want to talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting
fed up with the pushiness and aggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to
establish a close relationship with me. Uy was very insistent that I see him, so
just to accommodate him, I agreed to see him. And he came to my house on
said date, October 7, 1991. He did talk about the S.E.C. case and also about
Commissioners. I never asked him for $5,000.00. I never asked him for money,
Philippine or American currency, on that occasion, or over the phone. Uy was
lying when he testified that when he came to see me at home, I asked for
$5,000.00 from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said that in a
telephone conversation with me on October 16, 1991, said $5,000.00 was
discussed. That is not true. It is possible I may have talked with him over the
phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we
ever discussed $5,000.00. Also, I have never consented to the taping of any
conversation, with him, or with anybody else." (Sworn Statement, Exh. "27",
pp. 14 and 15.)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Evidence in Adm. Case No. 3815
The offending statements of Atty. Chua that were the subject of the March 11,
1993 contempt order were contained in the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
dated February 21, 1992 he filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1.’And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel regrets to
say that in denying the six (6) incidents in the manner above-described, the
Court acted no better than a pre-school kid who murmurs a favorite nursery
rime (sic)’ (Page 3, par. 5 of the Motion).
2.’To put it bluntly, Accused have the feeling that these cases are being
railroaded against them’ (Page 5, 2nd par. of the Motion).
3.’Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the various palpable
erroneous actuations of the Court, which have gone so far out of hand, but also
cries for prompt extraordinary remedies or corrective disciplinary sanctions
urgently required, so as to restore order and sanity in the entangled situations
created by the series of plainly and outrageously, if not maliciously, erroneous
orders of His Honor, which are highly prejudicial to the rights of the accused and
injurious to the administration of justice and in effect, constitute a desecration
of our entire judicial system, which have therefore rendered the President Judge
RENATO E. ABASTILLAS unfit to continue wearing the judicial robe and sitting
any second longer in the Bench, a copy of this Motion is made under oath and
furnished the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andrea R. Narvasa;
Judicial and Bar Council and the Court Administrator, without prejudice to the
impending formal administrative complaint the accused will in due time institute
with the Supreme Court (Page 12, No. (7) of the Motion)."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge Abastillas
expanded his charges against Atty. Chua to include the following:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
A.) Atty Chua does not have the good moral character required of a member of
the Bar and he violated his oath of office for the reason that:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy with Lee, Moreno
and Uy, he committed the crime of bribery which is penalized in Articles 210 and
212 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document in
People of the Philippines versus Enrique B. Chua, docketed as Criminal Case No.
12036 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City;
3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm. Case No. 1425,
entitled "J. Bautista Rabago v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua;"
4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, by
testifying in the proceedings under oath that he gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to
Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991, when he knew that he never gave any bribe
money to Judge Abastillas; and that Atty. Chua also made other false
statements in the proceedings to harass Judge Abastillas.
B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under oath that he gave
P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991;
2. Canon 8, Rule 8.01 for using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings
and memoranda against Undersecretary Bello of the Department of Justice;
3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by perjuring himself in
declaring that be gave P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas, but also by
offering false evidence in the form of a taped conversation, indicating lack of
candor, fairness and good faith with the Court, and which acts of Atty. Chua
violate his duties not to do any falsehood to mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice; and
4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his client — the two (2) accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 — not to attend the scheduled
arraignment.

Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the proceedings
before Justice Lagamon that he gave P20,000.00 as bribe to Judge Abastillas.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by Judge
Abastillas, what was your advise to your clients?
"A I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are intrinsically
meritorious. So I do not see any reason giving money or bribing any Judge. And
that I am not in the habit doing that.
"Q Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe?
"A That is what I told them.
"Q What did your clients tell you?
"A They are so insistent and finally they prevailed upon me. Because their
reason is the sad experience they had undergone with the Dept. of Justice. And
according to Mr. Uy he told me, he said you just cannot underestimate my sister
Banua and perhaps you do not know her. And he said giving of money is not in
reality a bribe because we are in effect buying justice. And he told me I have to
be practical about the whole thing.
"Q So you were convinced by your clients that this was not really a bribe but
you were only ‘buying justice’?
"Q I still have reservation. Actually, up to this date I do not as a way of life
approach such practice but I really do not know why I gave in to their constant
persistent pleadings.
"Q Was it because as you said you emotionally identified yourself to your
clients?
"A Partly maybe.
"Q So you agreed that you are going to give what Judge Abastillas was allegedly
asking from you?
"A That was the effect because finally I delivered P20,000.00 to him." (TSN.,
Oct. 27, 1993, pp. 7-8.)
Findings in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863
We find no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge Abastillas accepted
the amount of P20,000.00 in view of Atty. Chua’s uncertainty as to the date he
delivered the money. His final estimate of the date on cross-examination — May
3, 1993 — had afforded Judge Abastillas a credible defense of alibi.
However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge Abastillas had
willingly and knowingly discussed with interested parties with whom he met at
least three (3) times, the possible dismissal of the criminal cases for a certain
consideration.
Judge Abastillas made no denial that he met and talked with Johnson Lee, one
of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 on May 29, 1991 at the
Philippine Judges’ convention at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991
and at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. Also, he did not deny that he accepted
as visitor in his house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991
Johnny K.H. Uy, a party interested in the outcome of the criminal cases. This
meeting was followed by a telephone call made by Uy to Judge Abastillas on
October 16, 1991 wherein the former informed the latter that there will be no
problem about the 5T (meaning US$5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson
Lee would be cleared first, to which Judge Abastillas suggested to Uy to take up
the matter with Al Simbulan, a mutual friend to both.
Judge Abastillas cleverly hedged in answering whether or not he talked to
Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991, except to say, "It is possible I
may have talked with him over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have
never mentioned, nor have we even discussed $5,000.00’, (p. 16, Sworn
Statement, Em. "27"). Judge Abastillas also declared on cross-examination that
"it is possible (that Johnny Uy talked to him over the phone on October 16) but
I cannot remember exactly the caller, maybe one of the callers might be a
certain Uy but I cannot recognize because I have never heard his voice." (TSN,
p. 25, November 11, 1993.) Yet, in his verified comment dated September 28,
1992 (Exh. 4), Judge Abastillas declared he had telephone conversation with
Johnny Uy just before Uy went to his house on October 7, 1991.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid Beth informed
me that Mr. Johnny Uy wanted to talk to me. When respondent answered the
phone, Mr. Uy introduced himself and asked that he be allowed to see
respondent in his house. Respondent demurred because he was in a hurry
because he had a 2 p.m. appointment in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very
insistent, so, just to get rid of him, respondent agreed to see Uy for a few
minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latter’s house. After introducing
himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases against complainants herein.
"What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on the counsel
of Lee and Moreno to do all that need to be done in the case." (pp. 6-7.)
Since Judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uy’s voice on the phone and in
fact they had a face-to-face conversation on October 7, 1991 in the Judge’s
house, it is highly unbelievable that Judge Abastillas could not say definitely
whether he had a talk with Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991. His
lame and shallow stance only serves to emphasize the obvious.
There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the telephone
conversation as recorded in the tape by Johnny Uy on October 16, 1991 were
those of Uy and Abastillas. The taped conversation was replayed at the hearing
before Justice Lagamon with the consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified
and recognized the voices in tape as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas.
In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge Abastillas
that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as
the (criminal) cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas’
response was to advise Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan.
It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas solicited
US$5,000.00. However, the taped conversation as the evidence of the
complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-93-863 would show, was just a sequel of a
series of interlinked events that had earlier taken place, starting with the
solicitation by Judge Abastillas of P50,000.00 of which he received P20,000.00
as initial payment, followed by the meeting between Judge Abastillas and
Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila Hotel, and the
meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latter’s house at St.
Ignatius Village, Quezon City where the judge asked for US $5,000.00. All the
interrelated events ineluctably point to the conclusion that Judge Abastillas
knew that the "5T" meant $5,000.00 he tried to solicit.
Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had no idea at all
about the "5T" mentioned by Johnny Uy, he should have expressed surprise and
inquired from Uy what he meant by it. He did not, which goes to show he filly
understood what the "5T" stood for.cralawnad
It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to Judge
Abastillas, the latter’s reply did not appear to be responsive because he
mentioned something like ‘Take up the matter with Al Simbulan." The theory is
advanced that it would be illogical for a person who is soliciting a bribe to
involve a third party and a lawyer at that referring to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do
not agree. Atty. Simbulan is a mutual friend of Judge Abastillas and Johnny Uy.
He could serve as a convenient conduit between the two, thus avoiding the
direct personal involvement of the taker in the payoff.
In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the admissibility of the
taped conversation (Exh. 13) as evidence. He offered no objection to its replay
at the hearing before Justice Lagamon.
We do not believe that Judge Abastillas’ meeting with Johnson Lee at the
Quezon City Sports Center was not pre-arranged. Neither do we accept his
explanation that Johnson Lee was a "gate crasher" at the judge’s party at Manila
Hotel. On this point, we find the discussion in complainants’ memorandum in
Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 dated December 3, 1993 convincing. We
quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which he first
met complainant Lee by way of his justification in meeting the said
Complainant, should he taken with a grain of salt, so to speak. Respondent
Judge seems to heap the blame on his fellow Judges Ponferrada and de la Rosa,
as being instrumental in paving the way for his meeting complainant Lee, but
neither of these two judges was presented by him to substantiate his version.
Worse, if respondent was able to secure the affidavit of Judge Ponferrada
(Annex ‘4’ of his sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support the fact
that on May 3, 1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is no reason why he
cannot at least secure a similar affidavit from Judge Ponferrada to bolster the
circumstances under which he met complainant Lee."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, that respondent Judge and complainant Lee met under mutually
conducive and cordial circumstances which subsequently led to the latters (sic)
solicitation of bribe from witness Uy, is very probable.
3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after that meeting of
May 29, 1991 with complainant Lee at the Judges’ convention, he ‘did not give
him the opportunity to see respondent again’ and that ‘he took all steps
necessary so that he could not have to talk again to Lee’, is a pure lie, and thus
cannot be believed, because when respondent Judge, without his slightest
expectation, was confronted with a calling card (EXH.’D’) of his own cousin Mr.
Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sons to complainant Lee, in the presence of
respondent Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991
or barely a weck after respondent Judge, realizing that he could no longer
pretend to be that ‘resolute’ in avoiding complainant Lee, vainly set up the
pretext that complaint (sic) Lee ‘was a gatecrasher on that occasion’. This, by
itself is extremely difficult to believe.
Even respondent Judge’s explanation about the presence of complainant Lee at
that Manila Hotel dinner is silly, if not childish and ridiculous. According to
respondent Judge, he already ‘had an inkling’ on what was in Arty. Simbulan’s
mind when the latter ‘insisted in seeing him’ at the time he and his wife were
already on their way to the Manila Hotel for a ‘foursome’ dinner. That ‘inkling’
according to respondent Judge, are the two criminal cases where complainant
Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge nonetheless willingly allowed
Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner, notwithstanding the fact that, in his
own words, ‘prior to this, he (Atty. Simbulan) informed me that Lee and Moreno
were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda’. Thus if indeed respondent Judge is so
determined in not seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in avoiding at
all costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress upon the Investigating
Justice, then, he could have easily set up an alibi to mislead Atty.
Simbulan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, there was indeed a prior understanding on where and when to meet Lee
again after their meeting at the Judge’s convention.
Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sons to prove that
complainant Lee was really a ‘gatecrasher’ or request Atty. Simbulan to
substantiate his version that Lee was the most unwanted guest during that
Manila Hotel dinner. Worse, respondent Judge did not offer an explanation
regarding Lee’s having his calling card (EXH.’C’), which witness Uy subsequently
used in calling him up by telephone prior to their seeing each other on October
7, 1991 at the residence of respondent Judge."cralaw virtua1aw library
The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties who had a
stake in the outcome of Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 100~I and the recorded
telephone conversation where said cases were discussed manifested Judge
Abastillas’ willingness, nay, propensity to ester into deals with motivations
incongruous to the merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas
committed serious misconduct no less.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence (Rule 1.01). He should administer
justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.02). He should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary (Rule 2.01).
It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice
be developed to a high degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of
the public in the integrity and impartiality of its administration, because
appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesar’s
wife, must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge
Abastillas transgressed against the high standard of moral ethics required of
judges.cralawnad
We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm. Case No.
RTJ-92-863 against Judge Abastillas without merit. We quote with approval the
pertinent portions of Justice Lagamon’s report relative to said
accusations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an Order of
Arrest when the accused Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno failed to appear during
the scheduled arraignment on Sept. 26,1991. Atty. manifested that he
instructed his clients not to appear in Court because a day before the date set
for arraignment he allegedly filed a consolidated motion to quash which he
requested that the same be heard on Oct. 11, 1991. Both accused and counsel
were duly notified of the arraignment. They should have displayed their respect
for the Court by appearing personally and prayed for the deferment of the
arraignment. There was nothing that could have prevented the Court from orally
denying the motion to quash and proceeding with the arraignment. It appears
that the motion which was filed only one day before the scheduled date of
hearing was intended to delay and derail the speedy trial of the case, taking into
account that the Sept. 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in
open court in the presence of Atty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991 and set for
Sept. 3, 1991 but reset to Sept. 26.
The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of People v. Espinos
(Crim. Cases 8846 and 8847) where the respondent ordered that the firearms
involved in the case be delivered to the custody of the Court for proper
disposition.
The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in a favored
manner just because counsel for the accused Atty. Roger Z. Reyes is close to
him. Accordingly, a ‘full-blown trial type hearing’ was conducted in a motion to
quash and, eventually, the case was dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of the
complainants the accused were ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on
Sept. 26, 1991 arraignment notwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash.
It is our observation that the two cases cannot be equated because in the first
place the complainants failed or refused to appear in court notwithstanding
notice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the accused consistently
appeared in court. Moreover, the Order of the Court directing the delivery of the
firearms in the custody of the police is properly and in order. We are fully aware
of the evil practice of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of
the firearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an Order
for the delivery of the firearms for proper disposal. In fact, Atty. Chua is guilty
of deliberately misquoting the Order of the Court changing the phrase ‘to this
Court’ to ‘to him’, thereby creating an implication that the respondent
entertained personal interest in the firearms.
The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the firearm in
question be delivered to the court and after an Order of Forfeiture be forwarded
and deposited with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC Headquarters, Bacolod
City (Exh.’15’, p. 143, records).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423 (Susana Lim
v. Lim) within 90 days cannot be given much consideration taking into account
the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the branch to the effect that the
case was partially tried by the respondent and that the stenographer who took
down the stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the
same. There is. therefore, a need for the retaking of the testimonies of the
witnesses.
The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify private
prosecutor dated April 20, 1991 as well as the motion for reinvestigation dated
July 3, 1991 which were resolved in open court only on February 5, 1992 is
rather a minor violation in the face of the series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique similar act or acts or violation committed by him in the future will be dealt with
S. Chua. Respondent lost track of what motions are due for resolution until he more severely.
was reminded on January 20, 1992 through a supplemental motion filed by
Arty. Chua, however, sixteen days thereafter the pending motions were all SO ORDERED.
resolved."cralaw virtua1aw library

Findings in Adm. Case No. 3815

Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in view of his admission that he allegedly delivered
P20,000.00 as bribe money to Judge Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be
used as a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice
Lagamon humbly expressed his genuine regrets for having acted the way he
did. He said: "I considered that particular moment of my life as one of the
human weaknesses." He felt sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong
enough to resist," he added (TSN, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 11-12).

Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients’ case was meritorious,
his clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as the practical way to
obtain justice.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chua’s profound expression of

remorse, we do not find it difficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his
willingness to come forward, at the risk of being administratively penalized
himself, to expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by
the very ones tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense
justice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional Trial Court,

Branch 50 Bacolod City, is hereby found GUILTY of serious misconduct in Adm.
Matter No. RTJ-92863 for having met with persons involved and/or interested in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People v. Johnson Lees and
Sonny Moreno" of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose of
discussing or soliciting bribe in connection said cases and is hereby DISMISSED
from office, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits
and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government owned or controlled corporations.

This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No.
3815 for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for
allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas.

Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a