PEOPLE VS.

JUDGE CASTILLO
Facts: Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued a search warrant against the premises of Rabino
for violation of RA 9165. A search was conducted wherein the PDEA and PNP found 1 sachet of shabu inside the house of
Rabino in Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The case was raffled to RTC,
Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge Castillo.
Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired
Evidence, citing lack of probable cause among other grounds. Judge Castillo granted the motion to quash, holding that
because the minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of 12
years and 1 day to 20 years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of 6 years, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction
to entertain the application for and to issue the search warrant. As such, the search warrant is null and void and all
proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Issue: May a municipal trial court issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction?
Held: The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause
must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily,
a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched
or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the
issuance of the search warrant.
The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted
grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the
Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed
with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was
committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant
shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the
criminal action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the
crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority
to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a
place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found
probable cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling
reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also
have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls
here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and
not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal
action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly
committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

PEOPLE VS. CA
Search Warrant – Place to be Searched is Controlling
In December 1995, Quezon City PNP applied for a search warrant before the QC RTC against Azfar Hussain who
had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue,
Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. A warrant was issued the next day by J Bacalla not at AVS but at AVS, Apt.
1 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan – Apt 1 is immediately adjacent to AVS. The
PNP then proceeded to search the said apartment where they seized money, some clothings, 4 Pakistani nationals including
Hussain and some explosives. The Pakistanis petitioned before J Casanova that the search warrant is invalid for there is a
discrepancy in the place described and place indicated in the warrant. AVS is not in any way the same as Apt 1 for Apt 1 is
totally separate. J Casanova quashed the search warrant and ordered the return of the things seized and at the same time
ordered the seized things to be inadmissible as evidence. Prosecutor Chiong moved that the decision be reversed. The CA
affirmed the decision of J Casanova. Chiong averred that the policemen who did the search has acted on their knowledge.
The PNP actually knew that the Pakistanis are indeed residing in Apt 1 and not in the AVS.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be
amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant
to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide
the door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution
has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched may properly be done
only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN

Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip
In the morning of 13 Dec 1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named
“Benjie” that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be leaving for Baguio City on 14 Dec 1988 and would be back in the afternoon
of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; At 6:30 in the evening of 14 Dec 1988, Aruta alighted from
a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement
officers; NARCOM officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; When asked by Lt. Abello
about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; When they opened the same, they found dried marijuana
leaves; Aruta was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted search and seizure is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Aruta and has noted that some drug traffickers are being freed due to technicalities.
Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime.
Aruta was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the
NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
Aruta and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM
agents would not have apprehended Aruta were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated
by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a
crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. The SC could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of
the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance
with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests. Consequently, there was no legal basis for the
NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of Aruta’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant
not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not
be used as evidence against accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected,
pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.
When is a warrantless search allowed?
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by
prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RUBEN MONTILLA Y GATDULA

Political Law – Search and Seizure – Informer’s Tip – Warrantless Arrest
On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier
would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmariňas carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant
pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmariňas. Montilla was then
apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the
allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except
for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal
for there was no warrant and that he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if
the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops
should have ample time to secure a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal.
HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the
Constitution has its exception when it comes to warrantless searches, they are:
(1) customs searches;
(2) searches of moving vehicles,
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consented searches;
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;
(6) “stop and frisk” measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would be
delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the “early morning” of June 20, 1994. Even
assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant.
While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they
could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying
therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants,
not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially
in rural areas.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority
to validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

PEOPLE VS. RACHO

Facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend
the appellant. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m.
of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him
as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited
him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a
white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then
brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Appellant was charged in two separate informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting
or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs. During the arraignment,
appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges. On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A.
9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for the first time he
legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.
Held: The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent reason to depart from this
well-established doctrine. Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did
the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and
was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for
the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the
information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.
Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite
warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped
information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical description but
also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance
that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.

PEOPLE V. CLAUDIO
FACTS: Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang for violating Sec.
4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Prosecution’s witness Danel Obiña, a policeman, testified that while on board the
Victory Liner heading back to his home in Olongapo, Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after
placing a woven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables she was carrying at the back of Obiña’s seat. With the
feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag so when they reached San Fernando,
Pampanga, he inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. He
could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not,
however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until they reached
Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus. Obina intercepted her and showed her his ID Identifying himself as
a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag.
Claudio replied, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead
handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters
with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco,
Obiña, Claudio and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana
weighing about one kilo.
ISSUE: WON Claudio’s warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were unlawful?
RULING: NO, the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides for the in flagrante delicto arrest, that is, a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides for a warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest to be lawful. In other
words, a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
 Here, Claudio was caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need
a warrant to arrest Claudio. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful (Nolasco v. Pano,
147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.

PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN

Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from
one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the
charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted. In his
defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket,
two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he
was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches
and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time
and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest
or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To
all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana
therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT

Facts: Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM) stationed at camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and
announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC
Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused’s
passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it
was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when accused opened the same bag the officer
noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus accused
stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that the
accused finally presented his passport. The two bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained
also hashish.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Arrest without warrant; when lawful – a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporary confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another”
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was actually being committed by
the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph 1 of the foregoing provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object sought in connection with the offense are in the
placed sought to be searched.
When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying
with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO

Facts: Upon application of the prosecutors (respondents) several judges (respondents) issued on different dates a
total of 42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to search
the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize and take possession
of the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzled and proceeds of fruits of the offense, or
used or intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which is described in the application as violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and injunction
and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against the prosecutors,
their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the deportation case and that thereafter,
a decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void. For being violative of
the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases
filed against the petitioner; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and
cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.
In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with
law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are admissible regardless
of the irregularity.
The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a resolution, the writ was
partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.
Issues: 1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants issued
against the corporation of which they were officers.

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search warrants.
3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its seizure.
Held: 1.) Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of search
warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers
and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
 2.) The Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed
a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.
To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto
a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized be
particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the elimination of general warrants.
3.) Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of
trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.
The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there
is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no
justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.
The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants
for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent;
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned
residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby,
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

BACHE VS. RUIZ

Search and Seizure – Personal Examination of the Judge
 On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the issuance
of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon make and file the application
for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the
search warrant. At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of
Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the
depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked
respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis,
he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The
search was subsequently conducted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been a valid search warrant.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.
1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled
in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that
this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added
thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant
“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books,
customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory notes and
deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and business records; checks and check
stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.”
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.

DOJ SEC VICENTE ABAD SANTOS VS CFI BENGUET JUDGE PIO MARCOS
Search and Seizure
On March 31, 1971, Amansec went to Baguio and passed by a house at 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio; he was attracted
by the sight of several persons inside the house; he peeped from outside the house and when the curtain was moved he saw
a Buddha that was inside the house; he observed what was going on inside the house and he heard someone say that the
golden Buddha was actually for sale and when he observed them closer he overheard that it was being offered for sale for
100,000 pesos by Rogelio Roxas; he saw the Buddha and firearms and some bullets inside the house. By these facts, Colonel
Calano requested for a warrant from J Marcos at about 12 midnight on Apr 4, 1971. Due to the urgency he issued the
warrant. And eventually the golden Buddha and some firearms were seized from Roxas’s house. Santos assailed the warrant
averring that the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of
Central Bank rules and regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be seized; that he did not carefully
examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned were taken; and that thereafter the return
and the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date were not actually submitted to respondent Judge
until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about a week later on April 19.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Marcos is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor Judge Marcos and had basically affirmed the decision of appellate Judge Gatamaitan.
Taking into consideration to nature of “the articles so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed
description could be given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof, The
description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant
was thereby placed in a position enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which he did,’ … so that here, since
certainly, no one would be mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well known, and even the firearms and
ammunition because these were those without permit to possess, and all located at 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as
description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal defects.

CASTRO VS PABALAN
Facts: Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of Lumang or the
warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of the Judge, and to describe
with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge never refuted the assertions when required to
answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and
Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the
particular place in the Barrio. No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out
that it was in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
Issue: WON the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was tainted by illegality because it does not comply
with the constitutional requirements
Held: The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As was admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution,
there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio
Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy by saying that they were, anyway,
adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient
gravity to call for its invalidation. That requisite was not complied with in this case. That would explain why the searching
party felt it had a free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods, including personal effects, which respondent
Judge himself would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this constitutional provision,
the elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed
to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with.
Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics
and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to
applicable statutes.

ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. vs. HON. JOSE HERRERA
Facts: Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of
Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged to have
been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr.
supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed
criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co., a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Room 200 Republic
Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila.
Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the
premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company,
in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the
search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
Issue: Whether or not the search warrant is valid.
Ruling: In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2)
falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of
the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set
aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken
thereunder. Without costs.
 COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS V. VILLALUZ
FACTS:
 Petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay, a letter complaint with
respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of NIRC, Central Bank Circular 265 and RA 1937 claiming
that Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously
brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of Johny
Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. The respondent
submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles.
 Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation, and on July 6, 1971,
issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to private respondent the amount
of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one (1) box of air-conditioning evaporator only, as well
as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes and five (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch
Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).
 Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles so stated.
Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure proceedings thereon."
The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open Disobedience" under Article 231 of the
Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay City.
 Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the order dated July 6, 1971
on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal complaints directly
filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case after conducting a preliminary
investigation thereon, and is without authority to order the return of articles subject of seizure proceedings before
Customs authorities.
 In these six cases, one common legal issue is whether a Circuit Criminal Court possesses the power to conduct
preliminary investigations which is significant to determine whether items may be returned or not.
ISSUE & RATIO: WON the items seized may be returned – NO
The dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary investigation does not bar subsequent
prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the re-filing of the same becomes next to impossible. For the
enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector of Customs of the evidence indispensable to
a successful prosecution of the case against the private respondent. Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of the
customs official.
Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are actually in the
possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an appeal
only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court.

Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as the Circuit Criminal Court from
assuming cognizance of the subject matter and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject
to seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code because proceedings for the
forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of
wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty.
DECISION: Petitions dismissed. Writs lifted.
NOTES:
Fernando, J., concurring:
Constitutional law; Preliminary examination; Constitution confers of circuit criminal judge power to conduct
preliminary examination, but said judges should curb any eagerness to make use of such competence. It is my understanding
then that the decision reached is at most an affirmation that the present Constitution, as did the 1935 Constitution, confers
the power to conduct preliminary examination preparatory to issuing a warrant of arrest, to a circuit criminal court judge.
Even then, however, he should for sound policy reasons curb any eagerness or propensity to make use of such competence.
x x x As to his competence regarding a preliminary investigation, it is my understanding that the question has been left
open.
Barredo, J., concurring in result:
 Constitutional law; Preliminary examination; Congress did not intend to confer on circuit criminal courts the power
to conduct preliminary investigations. Notwithstanding the scholarly and extended main opinion, I am not persuaded that
the legislature ever intended to confer upon Circuit Criminal Courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations. Not
only the specific words of the above provision, but the development of the law on preliminary investigations and
circumstances obtaining at the time R.A. 5179 was enacted point unmistakably, in my considered opinion, to this conclusion.

VIDUYA VS. BERDIAGO

FACTS: Respondent Berdiago is the owner of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, which arrived in the Port of Manila
on January 8, 1968. However, the petitioner, Jose Viduya, then Collector of Customs of Manila, obtained reliable
intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by Berdiago in securing the release of the car from the Bureau of Customs,
making it appear therein that the car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much lower
customs duty.
There was, accordingly, a formal demand for the payment of the sum to cover the deficiency, respondent
manifesting his willingness to do so but failing to live up to his promise. As the car was kept in a dwelling house at the
Yabut Compound, two officials of the Customs Police Service as duly authorized agents of petitioner, applied to respondent
Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling house and to seize the Rolls Royce car found therein.
Berdiago filed a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court based on lack of probable cause to issue the
warrant. Collector Viduya opposed, alleging that Berdiago could not rely on the constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure because it was not shown that he owned the dwelling house which was searched. Nonetheless, respondent
Judge in the challenged order quashed such search warrant.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the warrant
HELD: The Court opined that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
There is justification then for the insistence on the part of private respondent that probable cause be shown. So respondent
Judge found in issuing the search warrant.
Apparently, he was persuaded to quash it when he noted that the warrant for seizure and detention came later than
its issuance. In thus acting, respondent Judge apparently overlooked that long before the search warrant was applied for, to
be specific on April 15, 1968, the misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and that thereafter on April 24, 1968,
private respondent himself agreed to make good the further amount due but not in the sum demanded.
As the car was kept in a dwelling house, petitioner through two of his officers in the Customs Police Service applied
for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly
enjoined on him by law assess and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds and to
enforce tariff and customs law would not have been performed.
While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and detention came later than the search warrant,
there were indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance. Certainly there was probable cause. There was
evidently need for the issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter quashed.

DIZON VS. CASTRO

PEOPLE VS. VELOSO

Facts: In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an organization
known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of Representative of the
Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more than a
gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to the club and
verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of the City of Manila,
applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus provided, the police attempted
to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above- mentioned. They found the doors to
the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole,
so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed by Townsend, broke in the outer door.
 Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was the
defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant. Veloso read it
and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had no right to search the house.
Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket was bulging, as if it contained gambling
utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the game. About five minutes was consumed in
conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in
his refusal to submit to the search.
At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to meet with
his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the body, which injured the
policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker, Veloso was finally laid down on the
floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and chips were taken from his pockets.
All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused to obey and
shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to conduct him downstairs. At
the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place him in the patrol wagon.
The warrant read as follows
SEARCH WARRANT (G)
The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the
Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING:
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to believe and
does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and which is under his control,
namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain devices and effects used
in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and chairs and other utensils used in
connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe keeps and conceals said devices and effects
with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10) days on or after this date to
make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part thereof, you are
commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided or by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court

Issue: WON the search warrant and the arrest of Veloso was valid.
Ruling: Yes.
It is provided, among other things, in the Philippine Code on Criminal Procedure that “a search warrant shall not
issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person of thing to be seized.”
The name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is
unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.
A warrant for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard
Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person to be
apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in addition, contain the
best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be
sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his
personal appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of
which he can be identified.
 In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building to be
searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient
designation of the premises to be searched.
As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by
him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the
police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

ELI LUI and LEO ROJAS vs. SPOUSES EULOGIO and PAULINA MATILLANO,
FACTS: Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, his father’s older
sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur. Lariosa was employed as a laborer at
the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben
and King Kiao and was located at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to close
the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened the store in the mornings and after
lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store owned by Kiao’s son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Ben’s
nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.
On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the house of his aunt,
Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he rested until the next day, October 18,
1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was
terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for the month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the
Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiao’s house.
Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben reported the matter to NBI
Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after Lariosa’s employment was
terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit
because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.
An incident occurred wherein Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Ben’s
money. Lariosa refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face into the
toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made
a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.
Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88 dated November 6, 1988,
directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." Rojas was
directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the
mission. He then left the police station on board a police car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay and Gempesaw
Streets.

In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of a relative of the
suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they
confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They were in
possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search.
An information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging Lariosa with robbery with force upon
things. The RTC in this case acquitted Lariosa of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui
procured Lariosa’s confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.
Lariosa’s parents on the other hand, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for robbery, violation of
domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al.
RTC: ordered the dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs’ failure to prove their claims. The trial court also
dismissed the defendants’ counterclaims. The trial court gave credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that
plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the subject
items to them.
CA: Reveresed RTC.
ISSUES: (a) whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano consented to the petitioners’ entry into her house, as well
as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family; NO
(b) whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondents; YES. Moral and exemplary damages.
 HELD: The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and with the
handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the respondents. They proceeded to the
sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her vehement protests, and because of petitioner Lui’s warning that she
might be harmed, respondent Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor
of their house.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly or
impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE PRESUMED. There must be clear and convincing
evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following:
a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of said right;
c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to be valid.
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent Paulina Matillano
waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly,
respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties.
However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and
seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio
Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He
could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.
The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for damages in accordance
with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon and MHP Garments vs. CA:
"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter
for damages.
"x x x
"(9) the rights to be secure in one’s persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
"x x x
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged."
"ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
"x x x
"(6) Illegal search;
"(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
"Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled
to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may
also be awarded."
***Mission Order does not authorize an illegal search.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION VS. SAMIR FARAJALLAH

Facts: Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Sy stems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations organized and
existing under the laws of the United States. Microsoft Corporation is the owner of all rights including copyright relating
to all versions and editions of Microsoft software and the corresponding user’s manuals, and the registered owner of
the “Microsoft” “MS DOS” trademarks in the Philippines. Adobe Systems Incorporated is the owner of all rights including
copyright relating to all versions and editions of Adobe Software.
Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma. Geraldine S. Garcia are
the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office at Unit 1603,
East Tower, Philippine Stock Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing
and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support, Inc. (OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the
verification of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A. Moradoz
(Moradoz) were assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect unauthorized copies
of Adobe and Microsoft software.
 On 17 March 2010, counsel for petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief of the Philippine National Police
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The case was assigned to Police Senior Inspector Ernesto V. Padilla (Padilla).
On 26 March 2010, Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of respondents. Using a legitimate business
pretext, they were able to use two computers owned by New Fields and obtained the following information regarding the
installed Microsoft and Adobe software:
First computer
Installed Software
Product I.D./Serial Number
Microsoft Windows XP Pro V2002 SP2
55274-640-1582543-23775
Microsoft Office Word 2007 Enterprise
Edition 2007
89388-707-0358973-65509
Adobe Acrobat 8 Pro (1)
1118-1061-0904-4874-2027

Second computer
Installed Software
Product I.D./Serial Number
Microsoft Windows XP Pro V2002 SP2
55274-640-1582543-23442
Microsoft Office Word 2007 Enterprise
Edition 2007
89388-707-0358973-65709
Adobe Acrobat 8 Pro (1)
1118-1061-0904-4874-2027

Padilla was trained to distinguish original from counterfeit software, and he saw the screens of the computers used
by the OSI staff, including the product I.D. Nos. of the installed software. In their Joint Affidavit, Serrano and Moradoz
stated that:
There are at least two (2) computers using common product identification and/or serial numbers of MICROSOFT
and ADOBE software. This is one indication that the software being used is unlicensed or was illegally reproduced or
copied. Based on the training we attended, all ADOBE and MICROSOFT software should only be installed in one computer,
unless they avail of an Open License Agreement from the software developer, which is not the case in NEW FIELDS. In
this case,
the first three sets of numbers of the Product I.D. Nos. of the MICROSOFT Windows XP Pro operating System
software program installed in the two (2) computer units we used, i.e., “55274-640-1582543-xxxxx”, were the same. We
also observed that the first three sets of numbers of the Product I.D Nos. of the MICROSOFT Office 2007(Word) software
in the two (2) computers we used, i.e., “89388-707-0358973-xxxxx”, were also the same. Ostensibly, this means that NEW
FIELDS only used one (1) installer of the MICROSOFT Windows XP operating system software and one (1) installer of
the MICROSOFT Office software program on two (2) computers.
They also observed that New Fields had 90 computers in their office with Microsoft software, none of which had
the Certificate of Authenticity issued by Microsoft. After being informed of the results of the investigation, petitioners then
issued certifications that they have not authorized New Fields to “copy, print, reproduce and/or publish unauthorized copies
of Microsoft and Adobe software products.”
An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before Judge Amor Reyes in her capacity
as Executive Judge of the RTC. Search Warrant Nos. 10-15912 and 10-15913 were issued on the same date.

The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields employees witnessed the search conducted
by the authorities. Several items were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized copies
of Microsoft and/or Adobe software. On 6 June 2010, New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two warrants
served (Search Warrant No. 10-15912).
 On 29 June 2010, the RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that “all the items seized from the
respondents be returned.
According to the RTC, petitioners should have identified which specific computer had the pirated software.
The RTC added that no criminal charge has been filed yet, despite the fact that the seized items have been in
petitioners’ possession for several weeks since the warrants were issued. Lastly, the RTC dismissed the petitioners’
contention that the three-day notice rule was not complied with because petitioners were already notified of the motion
personally.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010 before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Quash despite: (1)
respondents’ failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement; and (2) the existence of probable cause, and personal
knowledge of the warrant applicant.
The CA denied the petition for certiorari.
The Issue: The instant petition raised only one issue, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Amor Reyes of Branch 21, Regional Trial Court of
Manila did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders dated 29
June 2010 and 27 August 2010, quashing Search Warrant Nos. 10-[1]5912 and 10-[1]5913 and directing the immediate
release of the items seized pursuant to the said warrants, despite the pendency of appellate proceedings.
The Ruling : We rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case. However,
we sustain petitioners’ contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should have
upheld the validity of both warrants.
Compliance with the three-day notice rule.
In Anama v. Court of Appeals we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the rule is to
safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study
the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be dispensed with.
As correctly pointed out by the CA: In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their
comment on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice
rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion
giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.
Existence of probable cause
Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitions for review by certiorari “shall raise only questions of
law.” A question of fact exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it can only be resolved through a
reexamination of the body of evidence.
In this case, we find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA, since there was grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts. The CA sustained the quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had “no personal knowledge
of the facts upon which the issuance of the warrants may be justified,” and the applicants and the witnesses merely relied
on the screen shots acquired from the confidential informant.
We disagree with the conclusions of the CA. Looking at the records, it is clear that Padilla and his companions
were able to personally verify the tip of their informant. In his Affidavit submitted to Judge Amor Reyes prior to the issuance
of the warrant, Padilla stated that: “At the time that I was inside the office premises of the NEW FIELDS, I saw the Product
Keys or Product Identification Numbers of the ADOBE and MICROSOFT computer software programs installed in some
of the computer units. Ms. Serrano and Mr. Moradoz were able to pull up these data since they were allowed to use some
of the computers of the target companies in line with the pretext that we used to gain entry into NEW FIELDS. I actively
read and attentively observed the information reflected from the monitor display unit of the computers that Ms. Serrano and
Mr. Moradoz were able to use. x x x.
As mentioned earlier, Padilla has been trained to distinguish illegally reproduced Adobe and Microsoft software
The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses were able to verify the information obtained
from their confidential source. The evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant. Thus, the requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant and witnesses was clearly satisfied in this case.