MONTEJO VS COMELEC GR 118702

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of Section
1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts. The 3rd district is
composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San
Isidro, Tabango and Villaba. Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of
Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the municipalities comprising the
subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the
territories comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran became a regular province.
(The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite.) As a consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new
province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined
above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the province
of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the
province and other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution
where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the municipality of
Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:

Invalid.
Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that COMELEC was denied the
major power of legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after
the enactment of the 1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative
districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution as the source of its
power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance
states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments to the
reapportionment herein made.”

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members apportioned to the province
out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples include error in the
correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in between which is still in the territory of
one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments,
section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities
from one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust
the number of members (not municipalities.)

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the
transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a
substantive one. Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The petition
praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the
province of Leyte is denied.
 SEMA VS COMELEC G.R. No. 177597

Facts:

On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Sec.19,
Art.VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the province of
Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.

The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held on October 29, 2006.

On February 6, 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting
the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of
Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.

In an answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 “maintaining the status
quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.”

However, in preparation for the May 14, 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7845
stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the
enactment of MMA Act No. 201. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsan Province with
Cotabato City”.

Sema, who was a candidate for Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City” prayed for the
nullification of Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from the canvassing of votes cast in Cotabato for that
office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Sec. 5(3),
Art. VI of the Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

Issues: 1. Whether Sec. 19, Art. VI of RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is constitutional.

2. Whether a province created under Sec. 19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

Held:

1. NO. Unconstitutional.
New legislative districts may be created only by law. Congress cannot validly delegate to ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts.

Sec.19, Art.VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces and cities,for being contrary to Sec. 5 of Art.VI and Sec.20 of Art. X of the
Constitution, as well as Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

The creation of LGUs is governed by Sec.10, Art.X of the Constitution: “No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code (LGC) and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”

Thus, the creation of any LGU must comply with 3 conditions: First, the creation of an LGU must follow the
criteria fixed in the LGC. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third,
there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional/legislative bodies the power to create LGUs. However, under its plenary powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provisions of the Constitution. In fact, the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays is constitutional, provided the criteria
established in the LGC and the plebiscite requirement in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution is complied.

Thus, only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Sec. 5, Art.VI of the
Constitution and Sec.3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

Legislative Districts are created or reapportioned only by an act of Congress. Under the Constitution, the
power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to apportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.

2. YES. However, the creation of provinces is another matter. Under the LGC, “only x x x an Act of
Congress” can create provinces, cities, or municipalities.
According to, Sec. 5 (3), Art.VI of the Constitution:

“Each City with a population of at least 250,000, or each province, shall have at least 1 representative in the
House of Representatives.”

Similarly, Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,

“Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than 250,000 shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least 1 Member”.

Sec. 5 (1), Art.VI of the Constitution vests Congress the power to increase the allowable membership in the
House of Representatives. Sec. 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law the Congress itself enacts, not through a law enacted by
regional/local legislative bodies. The “power of redistricting xxx is traditionally regarded as part of the power
(of Congress) to make laws”, and is thus vested exclusively in (it) [Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415
(1995)].

An inferior legislative body cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body which created it.
Congress is a national legislature, and any changes in its membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in national law.

The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be
exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.

The ARMM cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
every province shall have a legislative district.

But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress.

Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office because Sec. 20, Art.X of
the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited only “within
its territorial jurisdiction.” (Nothing in Sec. 20, Art.X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions to
create/apportion legislative districts for Congress.)

It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a
legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.

At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

Thus, MMA Act 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly, creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is
void.
 BAGABUYO VS COMELEC 573 SCRA 290

FACTS:

Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two
legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity of the said law and he went
immediately to the Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the upcoming elections.
Bagabuyo was contending that the 2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred was
required by the Constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.

HELD:

No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de
Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply
when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What
happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative district into two legislative districts.

Reapportionment is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in population
and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de
Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one representing 250,000 of the city’s population. This easily
means better access to their congressman since each one now services only 250,000 constituents as against
the 500,000.

Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires
thecommencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5
need not.

They are related but are different from each other. Both provisions mentioned above are within the vested
authority of the legislature. The Legislature undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment of legislative
districts, and likewise acts on local government units by setting standards for their creation, division, merger,
abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation.

Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different
although they interface and relate with one another. In the case at bar, no division of CDO city takes place or is
mandated. CDO city politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial line.
Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and
the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.

Thus, Art. X, Sec.10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly
apportion Cagayan de Oro into two districts
 MACALINTAL VS COMELEC

G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003

FACTS:

Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to
participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the
Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for
president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress
which is empowered to do so.

ISSUES:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or
permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their
intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of
the Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates
for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President
violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep.
Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence
of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

HELD:

In resolving the issues , the application of the rules in Statutory Construction must be applied

1. All laws are presumed to be constitutional

2. The constitution must be construed as a whole
3. In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, such meaning must be
deduced from the discussions of the members of the constitutional commission.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines? NO
 Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:

SEC. 4. Coverage. – All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law,
at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president,
senators and party-list representatives.

which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which
enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:

SEC. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;

b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance
to a foreign country;

c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an
offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have
committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code,
such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon
expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take
cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity
and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of
judgments;

d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless
he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later
than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also
state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of
Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent
authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign
service establishments concerned, unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such
person is no longer insane or incompetent.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in
another country implies renunciation of one’s residence in his country of origin. However, same Section
allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent
expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee
voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution? YES
 Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-
president, senators and party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. –

.........

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the
outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the
scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections
therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country
or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 4 . . .

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of
canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of
the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than
thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the
authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more
shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of
a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

...

Such provison gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates
for president and vice-president.

It was held that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-
list representatives but not the President and Vice-President.41

The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping
that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-
presidency.

clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of
every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it
or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and
vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the
Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail. –

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than
three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail
may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or
proxy voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and
other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee . . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independence of
constitutional commissions.

The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of
Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries
for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require
review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon
itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as
determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. 48
Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared
VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
 MASTURA VS COMELEC

225 SCRA 4993

FACTS:

Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were congressional candidates
for the first district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen
objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the
same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production
and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog.

In the course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Ballot Box No. 1 contained
the MTC Judge copy of the election returns, Ballot Box No. 2 the Provincial Board of Canvassers copy of the
election returns, Ballot Box No. 3 the COMELEC copy of the election returns, and Ballot Box No. 4 the
Provincial Board of Canvassers copy of the municipal Certificate of Canvass of Matanog with its supporting
Statement of Votes.

Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC,
the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog
had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29
February 1996 annulling the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog

After comparing the fifty-seven (57) election returns, Municipal Trial Court copy (Judge copy) with the
Comelec copy as to the number of votes obtained by candidates Didagen P. Dilangalen and Michael O.
Mastura, both in words and figures and the taras x x x the Second Division, finding that no inconsistencies
exist between the two (2) copies of the election returns, and finding further that the Statement of Votes
submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Matanog, Maguindanao is not reflective of the true votes
obtained in the election returns per verification, hereby annuls the canvass made by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Matanog, Maguindanao. WHEREFORE, the canvass conducted by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers for the position of Member, House of Representatives (First District) is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.

A new Municipal Board of Canvassers for the Municipality of Matanog, Maguindanao is hereby constituted x x
x to conduct a new recanvassing at the Comelec Session Hall at Intramuros, Manila, prepare a new Certificate
of Canvass using the Comelec copy of the election returns and, thereafter, to immediately submit the new
Certificate of Canvass to the new Provincial Board of Canvassers as herein constituted x x x x[1]

Meanwhile, the new Municipal Board of Canvassers convened and recanvassed the votes. During the
proceedings Mastura objected to the inclusion of fifty (50) out of the fifty-seven (57) election returns on the
ground that the COMELEC copy of the election returns was not reflective of the true results unless compared
with the copy of the original Municipal Board of Canvassers. But the new Municipal Board of Canvassers
believed otherwise; hence, it included in the canvass the fifty (50) election returns objected to by Mastura
who thereafter walked out while the new Municipal Board of Canvassers continued with the canvassing.

After the proceedings in the Municipal Board of Canvassers, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened and
prepared the Certificate of Canvass and Statement of Votes of the Municipality of Matanog. As a result, private
respondent Dilangalen was proclaimed the duly elected member of the House of Representatives, First
District of Maguindanao.

Mastura now comes to us imputing to public respondent COMELEC Second Division grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders of 29 February 1996, 5 March 1996, 14 March 1996,
and 20 March 1996.

ISSUE:
Whetheror not Comelec acted in grave abuse of discretion?

HELD: NO.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence that
COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there exists a discrepancy between
the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns
were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board
of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should
refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself.

This was exactly what happened in the instant petition. Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate
of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog and, acting on the objection, COMELEC ordered the production and
examination of the MTC Judge copy and the COMELEC copy of the election returns. Based on the comparison,
the COMELEC Second Division found and concluded that indeed the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality
of Matanog was tampered with. Consequently, it ordered its annulment and created a new set of Municipal
and Provincial Boards of Canvassers to recanvass the votes. After the recanvassing, Dilangalen emerged as
the winner and was thereafter proclaimed the duly elected member of the House of Representatives, First
District of Maguindanao.

That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual finding of the
COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should
refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves. The COMELEC has broad
powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it
is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.

Pursuant to its administrative functions, the COMELEC exercises direct supervision and control over the
proceedings before the Board of Canvassers. In Aratuc v. Commission on Elections[6] we held -

While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of
canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court x
x x as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations
does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none
such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a
too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done
xxxx

Also in Lucman v. Dimaporo[7] we ruled -

The function of a canvassing board in the canvass of the returns is purely ministerial in nature. Equally
ministerial, therefore, is the function of the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its supervisory power
over said Board, pursuant to our Constitution and laws. So long as the election returns have been
accomplished in due form, the Board, and on appeal therefrom, the Commission on Elections must include
said returns in the canvass.

In Abes v. Commission on Elections[8] we emphasized -

x x x (T)he board of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election
returns submitted to it in due form. It has been said, and properly, that its powers are limited generally to the
mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by
adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them, and
then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained. Comelec is the constitutional body charged with the
duty to enforce all laws relative to elections, duty bound to see to it that the board of canvassers perform its
proper function.

Pertinent rulings of this Court have since defined Comelec's powers in pursuance of its supervisory or
administrative authority over officials charged with specific duties under the election code. It is within the
legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation based on incomplete returns, or on
incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting of the
board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or because the board did not meet at all. Neither
Constitution nor statute has granted Comelec or board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election
returns, to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.

The assailed Orders having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of
any finding of grave abuse of discretion, judicial interference is therefore unnecessary and uncalled for.
Consequently, the questioned Orders must perforce be upheld.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS Second Division, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Orders of 29 February 1996, 5
March 1996, 14 March 1996 and 20 March 1996 of the COMELEC Second Division are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 DOMINO VS COMELEC

GR 134015

Facts:
Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the
Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private respondents filed with the COMELEC a
petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the petitioner is neither a
resident nor a registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

The COMELEC Second Division disqualified the petitioner as candidate and ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy. The votes cast for Domino were counted and he got the highest number of votes. So,
he filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by the COMELEC en banc.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
May 1998 election

Ruling:

1. Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. It is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
to determine whether false representations as to the material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy
including the residence requirement.

2. No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to reside in a fixed place and personal presence in
that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon,
Ilucos Sur but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office,
means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. “Domicile” denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return.

Records show that petitioner’s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he
acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of
representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that
he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the
Province of Sarangani.

A person’s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it
does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. The
mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile.
Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Domino’s lack of
intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon
City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.

The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by leasing a house and lot
located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino’s
intention to reside in Sarangani, however, it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of his original domicile.
 JAPZON VS COMELEC

GR 180088

FACTS: Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Gen.
Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the elections of May 14, 2007. Japzon filed a petition to disqualify Ty on the
ground of material misrepresentation.

Japzon averred that:

1. Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, born in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern Samar
(now Gen. Macarthur, Easter Samar) to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
2. Ty migrated to the USA, became a citizen thereof, and resided therein for the last 25 years.
3. Ty falsely represented in his COC that he was a resident of Gen. Macarthur for one year prior to
elections, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
4. While Ty may have applied for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually resided
Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of 1 year immediately preceding the date of election as
required under the Local Government Code.
5. Ty continued traveling to the USA and comporting himself as a US citizen even after filing his COC
and taking his Oath of Allegiance.
6. He failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by RA No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003).
Ty responded to wit:
1. He was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized
American citizen. However, prior to filing his COC, he already filed with the Philippine Consulate
General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship.
2. He executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Vice Consul of the
Philippine Consulate
3. He applied for and was issued a Philippine passport indicating that his residence in the Philippines
was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
4. He personally secured his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) in Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
5. He was registered as a voter at Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
6. He executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.

Ty won the elections and was proclaimed Mayor of Gen Macarthur by the BOC in the interim.

The COMELEC found that Ty complied with all the requirements of RA 9225 and dismissed the petition.
Evidence revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance in the USA and a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007, in compliance with R.A. No. 9225. There was no material misrepresentation
in his COC. Although Ty has lost his domicile when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen, the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts proved that he has been a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least 1 year prior to elections as stated in his COC.

COMELEC went on to explain that the term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence or the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).

Japzon’s motion for reconsideration was denied, in the same manner as his petition with the COMELEC En
Banc failed.
The COMELEC En Banc held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and subsequently
renounces the same, constitutes acts of repatriation and hence becomes qualified to run as a candidate for
any local post.

ISSUE:
Did the COMELEC err in its ruling by disregarding the parameters for the acquisition of a new domicile of
choice and residence? Did the COMELEC err in refusing to cancel Ty’s COC and to declare Japzon as the duly
elected Mayor?

HELD:
No

Japzon’s arguments:
1. When Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin.
2. Ty did not establish his residence in Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, just because he reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. He failed to prove that he established a new domicile of choice.
3. Ty did not become a resident of Gen. Macarthur by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance under
Republic Act No. 9225.
4. Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as mayor.
5. Japzon is the only placer in the elections and should be declared as the duly elected mayor.
Ty’s arguments:

1. COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Gen
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, 1 year prior to the local elections. Findings of fact of the COMELEC are
binding on the Court.
2. Even if Ty is indeed disqualified from running, Japzon as the second placer cannot take his place.

OSG’s position:

Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. He was unable to prove that he intended to remain in
the Philippines for good and make it his new domicile. The OSG still prays for the dismissal of the petition
considering that Japzon cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor even if Ty is found to be disqualified.

RATIO: Ty was a natural-born Filipino. Even if he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American
citizen, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic before the
Vice Consul in Los Angeles, California in accordance with RA No. 9225. He then, became a dual citizen. It was
only on March 19, 2007 that he renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and became a pure
Philippine citizen again.

RA No 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship;
nor does it mention any effect of reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence
of the natural-born Filipino. Citizenship and residence are independently treated in RA No 9225. Residency
only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship runs for public office. He must:
(1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Ty complied with the second requirement when he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
on March 19, 2007 before a notary public. By the time he filed his COC on March 28, 2007, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship.
Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code (RA No 7160), it is required that an elective official
be a resident of the independent component cities, component cities, or municipalites where he
intends to be elected for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Ty admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, which meant he must have abandoned Gen
Macarthur, Eastern Samar as his domicile of origin and transferred to the USA as his domicile of choice. His
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship had no impact on his residence/domicile. He did not necessarily regain
his domicile in Gen. Macarthur, but merely had the option to establish his domicile of choice therein. The
length of his residence shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice and shall not
retroact to the time of his birth.

Under Papandayan Jr., vs COMELEC, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor. The principle
of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the place
where he seeks to be elected. Thus, it is important to determine whether there has been an abandonment of
his former residence. Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice his profession does not constitute
loss of residence.

In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The COMELEC found that Ty had been a resident of Gen Macarthur 1 year prior to the elections. Factual
findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, are binding and conclusive on the SC, most
especially since the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC on a level higher that other administrative
organs.

Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship on October 2, 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating his address at A.
Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar. He paid his community tax, securing CTCs
and stating his address in Gen Macarthur. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on July 17,
2006 in the same town. He has also been bodily present in the municipality since his arrival on May 4,
2006. His trips abroad are further manifestations of his animus manendi and animus revertendi. Even with his
trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in Gen Macarthur, for at least 9 of the 12 months preceding
the local elections.

There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long
as he is able to prove that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period
required by law. Ty has proven that he had established residence/domicile a little over a year prior to the
local elections, in which he ran for Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
 LEWIS VS COMELEC

GR 162759

Facts:

Nicolas-Lewis and the other petitioners were dual citizens who re-acquired their Philippine citizenship under
RA 9225, the Citizens Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. They filed a petition to the COMELEC praying
to avail themselves the right of suffrage under RA 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 before the
May 2004 elections.

The COMELEC rejected their petition arguing that upon acquisition by the petitioners of their foreign
citizenship, they have renounced their Philippine citizenship and have abandoned their domicile. The
COMELEC further stated that before they could exercise the right of suffrage, they had to meet the residency
requirement among others provided in Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution by first establishing their
domicile in the Phillipines.

Issue: WON the dual citizens who have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can

exercise their right of suffrage under RA 9189?

Held:

Yes. Section 5 of RA 9225 states that those who retained or reacquired their citizenship under this act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights, subject to certain conditions including the fulfillment of the requirements
under Section 1 Article 5 of the Constitution and RA 9189. The phrase “all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise authorized by law” served as the guide to Congress in establishing a system for absentee voting.
Applying the doctrine of necessary implication, the strategic location of Section 2 Article 5 of the Constitution
indicates that it provides for an exception to the residency requirement in Section 1 which is the affidavit to
express the intention to reacquire the domicile in the Philippines without the requirement to physically stay
in the Philippines.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of RA 9189 become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath. There is no provision in RA 9225
requiring dual citizens to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they
can exercise their right to vote. With the passage of RA 9225 , the scope of overseas absentee voting has been
consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of their countries, subject, however, to
the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with
the passage of RA 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage
thru the absentee voting scheme.
 CABALLERO VS COMELEC

GR 209835

Political Law; Qualifications of an elective local official : SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district
where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

FACTS:

Rogelio Batin Caballero, the petitioner and Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr., the respondent were both
candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013
elections. The private respondent filed a petition for the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy
claiming that he was not eligible eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.

However, the petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on
September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No.
9225.Furthermore, he asserted that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite
becoming a Canadian citizen.

On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution that the Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent Caballero was cancelled. Petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes, on May 14, 2013.
On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc but the same was
denied. Thus, on December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution and
private respondent took his Oath of Office on December 20, 2013. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.

HELD: NO.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc canceling the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.

Upon the numerous claims of the petitioner, the court was not persuaded. It is true that the
petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus he had his domicile
of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Nevertheless, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. It is
settled ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. In the case at bar, the petitioner permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Therefore, he had in effect abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. Furthermore, the court held that the frequent visits of the
petitioner visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver
of such abandonment.

More so, in this case, the records showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as required under Section
39 of the Local Government Code.
 The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 or RA No. 9225 , declares that natural-born
citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the
law.
However, it does not mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the
current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. The petitioner's retention of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes.

“xxx petitioner’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him
regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on
September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is
reckoned from the time he made it as such.
 ATIENZA ET ALL VS COMELEC

GR 188920

Facts:
Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s
withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But Jose L. Atienza, Jr.
(Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilon’s move, claiming that he made the
announcement without consulting his party.

Thereafter, Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party
matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant
and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC
to nullify the elections. He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National
Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon
also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term
that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

On the other hand, Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO and NAPOLCO attended the
assembly. The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to "people power," wherein the LP
majority removed Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments to the original
LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not been properly
ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended.

The COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting respondent Drilon’s petition. It annulled the
elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of
Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with
the Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly
ratified, Drilon’s term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover
capacity until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. A divided Court
issued a resolution, granting Drilon’s petition and denying that of Atienza. The Court held, through the
majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga
Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, Drilon’s term as LP president was
to end only on November 30, 2007.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before Drilon’s term expired.
Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election,
however, several persons associated with Atienza sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues
regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the
new LP president.

Atienza and company filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction before the COMELEC
against Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin
Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was
invalidly convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought
to have been based on a list appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and
Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the NECO had 103
members.

Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the
NECO meeting and that some members, like Defensor, were given the status of "guests" during the meeting.
Atienza’s allies allegedly raised these issues but Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and "railroaded" the
proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without
notice to Atienza’s allies.

On the other hand, Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas’ election as LP president faithfully complied with
the provisions of the amended LP Constitution. The party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be
used for determining the NECO members because supervening events changed the body’s number and
composition. Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting
positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections,
making them ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public office also became
part of the NECO. Certain persons of national stature also became NECO members upon Drilon’s nomination,
a privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP Constitution. In other words, the NECO
membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances.

Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned
for holding the illegal election of LP officers. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that
NECO subsequently ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited
their party membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They
were dropped from the roster of LP members.

Thereafter, the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying Atienza, et al.’s petition.
As for the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a
membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an
internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, Atienza, et al. filed this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership
that elected respondent Roxas as LP president;
2. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning
the validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al.
from the party; and
3. Whether or not Roxas, et al. violated Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to due process by the
latter’s expulsion from the party.

Ruling:
One. Nothing in the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should
be pegged to the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no basis for such a
position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the NECO membership to be permanent.

The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Roxas, et al.
explained in details how they arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party
leaders. The explanation is logical and consistent with party rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP president.
Atienza claims that the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman
with a term, like Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that
position violated the Court’s resolution. But the Court’s resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the
party from disciplining Atienza under the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or
any officer for cause as it saw fit.

Second. Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled
on the composition of the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the party. The
two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings
of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over intra-party leadership
disputes.

But, as Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of
Atienza, et al. from the party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected Roxas as LP
president. Given the COMELEC’s finding as upheld by this Court that the membership of the NECO in
question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party
validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held.

Consequently, Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the party
leadership issue or on the election of Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to
adjudicate such claim. Under the circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion was
purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It is an internal party matter over which
the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

What is more, some of Atienza’s allies raised objections before the NECO assembly regarding the
status of members from their faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the election, implying that its
membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those objections.

The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may
intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional
functions.
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the
Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw vs. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and functions
under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another
case that the COMELEC’s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of
the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership
dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties.

The validity of Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle.
Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of
party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP
officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP
president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.
 The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the
benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political parties that have to
be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant in
ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections.

Three. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of
political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the
state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or
instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the
performance of a state function." The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the
state’s powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary
between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The
discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within
the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be
accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may
have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among
themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights
under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights,
but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in
membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its
internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca vs.
Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by
allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the
state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas’ election as LP
president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the party. While the question of
party leadership has implications on the COMELEC’s performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C
of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP.
Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC
cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.
 BANAT VS COMELEC

GR 179271

Facts:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed a Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution before the NBC. BANAT filed its
petition because the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have announced in the national papers that
the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall iomplement the Veterans Ruling, applying the Panganiban formula in
allocating party-list seats. NBC denied the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic. BANAT did
not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC resolution instead it filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
assailing the ruling in NBC resolution.

Moreover, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision
to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of R.A. No. 7941. On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the
proceedings of the NBC.

Issues:

1. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

2. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not,
can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?

Ruling:
1. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:

· The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.

· The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

· Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

· Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
 In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.

2. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended
the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote
of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
 ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC

GR 203766

FACTS:

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an
effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the
May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December
of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector,
and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to represent
in Congress.

Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for participating in
the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD:

No.

The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now
provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated
cases.

Political Law- Party-list system

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For
as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in
this Constitution."

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition of
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they
are separate and distinct from each other.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy
these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as
political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented."

Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified,
although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have
been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the
youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging
in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial
power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be
remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

Petitions Granted
 LLAMANZARES VS COMELEC

Facts:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen
and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months
counted from 24 May 2005.

May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good. Before that
however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in
1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was
naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine
passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among
others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her
biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the
ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate for
Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates (Read Dissent)

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC, and
deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction over the
election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over the President and
Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of candidates for such
positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility
of candidates before elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the
COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of
procedures would be contrary to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace
as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen

Held:

Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of the
constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are typical of
Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the
Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance that a child born in
such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her parents’ nationality. That probability and
the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. This is
based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the
framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude
foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings,
the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by treaties and
the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these
treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:

Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a
new domicile.

Grace Poe’s domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006 when her
application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELEC’s reliance on cases which decree that an
alien’s stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or reacquires her
Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different from the circumstances in this case, in which
Grace Poe presented an overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her
domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s
actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May 24,
2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poe’s candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC

Held:

No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her citizenship
and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction
to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is suffering from a
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her
candidacy on ground of false representations regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a candidate for the
presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and
residency.