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Aerospace Chemical Industries v.

CA – delay on the part of the buyer, liable for damages

KEY: Sulfuric Acid Tilted


1. Aerospace purchased 500 mt of sulfuric acid from PHILPOS

2. They agreed that Aerospace will be the one who will secure the transportation in picking
up the sulfuric acid from PHIPOS’ loadports in Basay Negros, and in Sangi, Cebu
3. Aerospace paid the amount for the purchase of sulfuric acid
4. However, Aerospace was not able to pick-up the sulfuric acid on the specified date
5. Demand was made by PHILPOS because they had been paying rentals everyday on the
port because of the delay
6. Aerospace chartered MT Kayumanggi to pick up the sulfuric acid, but not all were
delivered as the containers tilted while it was being loaded and eventually the latter sank
7. Aerospace demanded PHILPOS to again supply them the remaining metric tons of
sulfuric acid contending that it was a fortuitous event (storm, which was an alibi), thus,
Aerospace should not be liable
8. PHILPOS refused


1. WON PHILPOS can be liable for the damages arising from the tilting of the containers


1. NO
2. In fact, Aerospace should be held liable for the rentals paid by PHILPOS to the load port,
for the delayed pick-up
3. Delay began at the time a demand was made by PHILPOS (with 3 days extension for
travel time of the boat)
4. On the other hand, the boat was unseaworthy and not at the proper condition, and
Aerospace, as the buyer, was obligated under the contract to undertake the shipping
requirements of the cargo from PHILPOS’ loadports to the petitioner's designated
warehouse. It was petitioner which chartered M/T Sultan Kayumanggi. The vessel was
petitioner's agent. When it failed to comply with the necessary loading conditions of
sulfuric acid, it was incumbent upon petitioner to immediately replace M/T Sultan
Kayumanggi with another seaworthy vessel.
Far East Bank v. CA – no fraud (no deliberate intent)
KEY: Lost Card, despidida


1. Luis Luna applied for, and was accorded FAREAST CARD by the petitioner
2. He was also accorded with a supplemental card (credit card) upon request
3. He lost his supplemental card. Upon filing an affidavit of lost, the bank’s internal security
procedures and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along
with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.
4. The Bank failed to inform Luna about this security police
5. He hosted a despidida party for his friend, however upon presenting his FAREAST card,
it was not honored.

WON Luna can claim damages, and if he can, what are the damages that he can claim

1. YES
2. Only nominal
3. No moral and exemplary as there was no deliberate intent on the part of the bank.
4. Moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of the contract
5. Nothing in the findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently
indicate any deliberate intent on the part of FEBTC to cause harm to private
Southeastern College v. CA, Dimaanos – from what date should interest run

1. That on October 11, 1989, a powerful typhoon (Saling) hit Metro Manila.
2. Due to very strong winds, the roof of the petitioner’s building was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of Dimaano’s house.
3. When the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed building was
conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official. In their report, they
imputed negligence to the petitioner for the structural defect of the building and improper
anchorage of trusses to the roof beams to cause for the roof be ripped off the building,
thereby causing damage to the property of respondent.
4. Petitioner interposed denial of negligence and claimed that the typhoon as an Act of God
is the sole cause of the damage.

WON Southeastern College can be held liable for negligence.

1. NO
2. petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and
maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling was the
proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.
3. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably creates
undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, or the omission to do
something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do.
4. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence of fortuitous
events, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In
other words; the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of
Dioquino v. Laureano – no negligence, fortuitous event

KEY: Child threw stones at the car


1. Attorney Dioquino, a practicing lawyer of Masbate, is the owner of a car.

2. He went to the office of the MVO, Masbate, to register the same.
3. Dioquino requested the defendant Federico Laureano to introduce him to one of the
clerks in the MVO Office, who could facilitate the registrationof his car and the request
was graciously attended to.
4. Defendant Laureano rode on the car of Atty. Dioquino on his way to the P.C. Barracks at
5. While about to reach their destination, the car driven by Dioquino’s driver and with
Laureano as the sole passenger was stoned by some 'mischievous boys,'and its
windshield was broken.
6. Dioquino filed a complaint seeking to make Laureano liable for damages of the
windshield (he included the wife and the father in the suit

WON Laureano can be held liable for the broken windshield

1. NO
2. It was a fortuitous event, and the borrowing of car by Laureano was not the proximate
cause of the broken windshield
3. said defendant should not be liable for such damages for what happened was clearly
unforeseen. It was fortuitous event resulting in a loss which must be borne by the owner
of the car. An element of reasonableness in the law would be manifestly lacking if, on
the circumstances as thus disclosed, legal responsibility could be imputed to an
individual in the situation of defendant Laureano.
La Mallorca vs. CA – negligence of agent, owner is liable
KEY: Bus hit child, father went to get bayong

1. Beltran family boarded a owned and operated by La Mallorca
2. At the time, they were carrying with them four pieces of baggages containing their
personal belonging.
3. Upon reaching their destination, Beltran’s family got off, Mariano Beltran went back to
the bus to get the baggage he had left under one of the seats, he did not notice that
Raquel was following him.
4. The bus, whose motor was not shut off while unloading, suddenly started moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip, notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not
given the driver the customary signal to start.
5. Raquel was run over by the bus

Whether or not La Mallorca is liable for the negligence of its driver and for the death of
Beltran’s daughter.

1. YES
2. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not put off the
engine. Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the
signal to go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the
passengers Mariano Beltran and family.
3. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable and they are,
therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection
under their contract of carriage.
4. The driver did not exercise utmost diligence required of him; hence, petitioner must be
adjudged peculiarly liable for the death of the child Raquel Beltran.
FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. v. CA – financial crisis not a fortuitous event

KEY: financial crisis, undeveloped condo


1. On December 29, 1995, petitioner Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (Fil-Estate) entered into a
contract to sell a condominium unit to respondent spouses Go
2. Fil-Estate failed to develop the condominium project.
3. On August 4, 1999, the spouses demanded the refund of the amount they paid, plus
4. When Fil-Estate did not refund the spouses, the latter filed a complaint against petitioner
for reimbursement plus interest
5. In answer, Fil-Estate claimed that respondents had no cause of action since the delay in
the construction of the condominium was caused by the financial crisis that hit the Asian
region, a fortuitous event over which petitioner had no control.


Whether or not the Asian financial crisis could be considered a fortuitous event.


1. NO
2. Asian financial crisis cannot be generalized as unforeseeable and beyond the control of
the business corporation.
3. A real estate enterprise engaged in the pre-selling of condominium units is concededly a
master in projections on commodities and currency movements and business risks. The
fluctuating movement of the Philippine peso in the foreign exchange market is an
everyday occurrence, and fluctuations in currency exchange rates happen every day,
thus, not an instance of caso fortuito.
ACE-AGRO DEVT. CORP. v. CA – fortuitous event does not automatically extend the contract
subject to resolutory period.

KEY: softdrink bottle cleaners lost job after fire


1. Ace-Agro had been cleaning soft drink bottles and repairing wooden shells for Cosmos
within its company premises in San Fernando, Pampanga.
2. Contract was renewed on a yearly basis (Jan-Dec)
3. On the month of April, A fire broke out in the Cosmos plant. As a result, Ace-Agro’s work
4. Ace-Agro requested Cosmos to resume its services but they were advised that on
account of the fire destroying nearly all the bottles and shells, Cosmos was terminating
their contract.
5. Ace-Agro requested Cosmos to reconsider its decision but upon receiving no reply, they
informed the employees of the termination of their employment, which led the employees
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter against both Ace-Agro
6. Ace-Agro sent another letter for reconsideration to Cosmos to which they replied that
they could resume work but outside company premises.
7. Ace-Agro refused the offer, claiming that to work outside would incur additional
transportation costs.
8. osmos then advised Ace-Agro that they could resume work inside the company
premises but then Ace-Agro unjustifiably refused because it wanted and extension of
the contract to make up for the period of inactivity.


WON a fortuitious event which resulted to a suspension of work under the contract justify
an extension of the term of contract.


1. No.
2. The suspension of work due to fire does not merit an automatic extension.
3. The stipulation that in the event of a fortuitous event or force majeure the contract shall
be deemed suspended during the said period does not mean that it stops the running
of the period the contract has been agreed upon to run.
4. The fact that the contract is subject to a resolutory period, which relieves the parties of
their respective obligations, does not stop the running of the period of their contract.
LIAM LAW v. OLYMPIC SAWMILL CO. – usury legally non-existent

KEY: 6K additional


1. Olympic Sawmill Co, and Chi as managing partner borrowed money from Liam Law
amounting to 10K without interest.
2. The loan became ultimately due on January 31, 1960, but was not paid on that date
3. Sawmill asked for an extension of three months
4. The parties executed another loan document, agreeing that the loan will be extended but
the obligation was increased by 6K
5. Sawmill again failed to pay their obligation by April 30, 1960
6. Liam Law instituted a collection case.
7. Sawmill admitted the P10,000.00 principal obligation, but claimed that the additional
constituted usurious interest.


WON the additional 6k constituted usurious interest


1. NO.
2. Agreement presumed lawful in the absence of proof to the contrary.
3. Usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and
borrower may agree upon (Central Bank Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, 78 Off. Gaz.
4. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural innature, should be
considered repealed with retroactive effect
LEDESMA v. REALUBIN – presumptions Art 1176 cannot prevail over proven fact

Key: Caltex credits


1. Alberto Realubin owned the Baguio Caltex service station where Salud Ledesma
purchased on credit, on different dates, through her drivers, gasoline and motor oil, from
June to September, 1956.
2. Realubin followed this business practice where each invoice is done in triplicate — the
original, in white paper; the two others, in blue and pink paper, respectively. For
purchases in cash, the original or white invoice is issued, the station proprietor retaining
the pink and blue copies. For purchases on credit, the pink copy is issued, the station
proprietor retaining the original and blue copies. When payment is made on credit
purchases, the white or original copy is then released to the customer.
3. At the time of the trial, Realubin was in possession of the original or white copies of the
invoices for purchases made in the months stated, all of which were signed by the
petitioner's truck drivers.
4. Even after repeated verbal demands, Ledesma still failed to pay her obligation. She
claimed that she already paid for her October purchases so it should be presumed that
her prior purchases were already paid applying the presumption of payment under
Article 1176 of the Civil Code because her account with Realubin was a running


Whether or not Ledesma was correct in invoking the presumption of payment under Article
1176 of the Civil Code.


1. No.
2. Realubin proved as a fact that the prior purchases were not paid, and that the October
purchases were for cash.
3. Therefore, the presumption of payment of prior obligations cannot prevail.
4. Between a proven fact and a presumption pro tanto, the former stands, and the latter