The Facts About

“DIRTY BOMBS”
Prepared for
THE AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH

By
Kathleen Meister, M.S.
P. Andrew Karam, Ph.D., CHP

Art Director
Jennifer Lee

June 2005

AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH

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The Facts About

“DIRTY BOMBS”
01 Executive Summary
TABLE OF CONTENTS
01 Introduction

02 Radiological Dispersal Devices

03 Differences Between Radiological and Nuclear Weapons

04 History of Radiological Dispersal Devices

05 Health Effects of Radiation

06 Economic Consequences of a Radiological Attack

07 What to Do in Case of a Dirty Bomb Attack

08 Policies and Regulations

09 Summary

09 References

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Dirty bombs,” more correctly called radiological dis-
persal devices, are weapons that are designed to
spread potentially harmful radioactivity. The prin-
cipal type combines a conventional explosive with
radioactive material.
• Dirty bombs are not nuclear weapons. Unlike a
nuclear bomb, which could cause hundreds of thou-
sands of deaths and devastate an entire city, a dirty
bomb would most likely cause a few hundred
deaths at the most. Physical damage would be com-
parable to that produced by other conventional
explosions, and radioactive contamination would
probably affect an area of only a few city blocks.
• Most deaths and injuries from a dirty bomb attack
would result from the explosion itself, rather than
the radioactive material. However, the presence of
radioactive contamination could lead to panic, dis-
ruption, and the need for costly and time-consum-
ing cleanup.
INTRODUCTION
Of all the possible types of terrorist attacks, those
involving radioactivity are among the most feared.
One type of attack that involves radioactivity is the use
of a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty
bomb.” Misconceptions about dirty bombs may lead
people to be more anxious than the facts justify and
might even prompt some people to take inappropriate
actions in the event of a dirty bomb explosion.
This report by the American Council on Science and
Health summarizes the scientific facts about radiolog-
ical dispersal devices — what they are, how they might
The Facts About 1
“DIRTY BOMBS”
• The cost of recovery after a dirty bomb attack could
be reduced, without increasing risks to human
health, by modifying regulations pertaining to per-
missible levels of residual radioactivity so that they
are based on real risk rather than the ability to
detect ever-lower levels of contamination.
• In the event of an explosion, experts advise people to
move away from the immediate area (by walking at
least several blocks from the explosion), go
indoors, and turn on local radio or TV for instruc-
tions (including instructions about testing for
radioactive contamination). If it is determined that
the explosion involved radioactivity, people who
were in the immediate area should remove and save
clothing and take a shower if possible. Experts rec-
ommend that people should not handle any object
thrown off by an explosion and should not take
potassium iodide unless specifically advised to do
so. Driving away from an attack is also unwise,
since it can hamper emergency response and cause
crashes.
be made, the possible health and economic conse-
quences of an attack, the actions that citizens should
and should not take if a radiological attack occurs, and
the types of policy changes that may need to be consid-
ered to facilitate prevention of radiological attacks and
recovery from them. The principal source of informa-
tion for this booklet was a technical manuscript enti-
tled “Radiological Terrorism,” written by Dr. P.
Andrew Karam of the Rochester Institute of
Technology. Additional information sources are listed
at the end of this report.
2 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”
RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL
DEVICES
Radiological dispersal devices, also called radiologi-
cal weapons, are devices that are designed to spread
potentially harmful radioactivity as part of a hostile
act. The principal type of radiological dispersal device
combines a conventional explosive, such as dynamite,
with radioactive material. This is the type of device
that is often referred to as a “dirty bomb.” When a
dirty bomb explodes, the explosion itself can cause
considerable damage — just as any explosion can. In
addition, the area surrounding the explosion may
become contaminated by radioactive material.1
Although the exact details would vary depending
upon the type and amount of radioactive material
used, as well as the nature of the explosive device,
most deaths and injuries from a dirty bomb would
almost certainly result from the explosion itself, rather
than the radioactive material. People who were closest
to the explosion — and therefore most likely to have
been injured by it — would also be the most likely to
be exposed to dangerous amounts of radioactivity.
Some radioactive material might be spread beyond the
damaged area — perhaps to a distance of a few city
blocks — but the intensity of contamination would be
much less than that in the immediate vicinity of the
explosion. Experts expect that there would be few, if
any, deaths or serious illnesses caused by radiation in
individuals who had not been in the immediate vicin-
ity of the blast for a prolonged period of time.
Although the radioactive component of a dirty bomb
would probably cause few deaths or injuries, problems
of other kinds would result. The presence of radioac-
tivity would make the jobs of firefighters and rescue
personnel who respond to the emergency more diffi-
cult. Healthcare facilities might have to cope with
injured patients who are also contaminated with
radioactivity. Large numbers of people might seek
care out of concern over possible contamination, pos-
sibly overloading healthcare facilities. Widespread
panic could develop, and this might prompt people to
1. It is also possible to design a radiological attack that does not
involve an explosive. For example, a powerful source of radioactivity
might be hidden in a public place. Terrorists might also spread radioac-
tivity covertly or try to contaminate the food or water supply.
take unwise or even unsafe actions. (For example,
people who mistakenly believed that they would need
to get many miles away from a dirty bomb attack in
order to be safe might drive away at dangerous speeds
or crowd the roads with their cars, thus interfering
with access to the scene by emergency vehicles and
also causing a risk of death and injury from motor
vehicle crashes far greater than the risk of death or
injury from the attack itself.) Costly cleanup efforts
would almost certainly be necessary, and the buildings
and facilities in the affected neighborhood (probably
several city blocks) might be unavailable for a pro-
longed period of time. In addition, as has been seen in
incidents of accidental radioactive contamination,
anxiety and economic disruption due to stigmatization
of the affected area might continue for long periods of
time.
Dirty bombs are not classified as Weapons of Mass
Destruction because the number of deaths and injuries
they are likely to cause is relatively small. However,
they are sometimes referred to as “Weapons of Mass
Disruption” because of the many disruptive effects
that they could have on a community.
Although there have been no successful radiological
attacks, it is possible to get a rough idea of the type
and extent of problems that might result from the
radioactive component of a dirty bomb from instances
of accidental radioactive contamination.
One well-known incident that involved widespread
radioactive contamination occurred in Goiania, Brazil,
in 1987. A cancer treatment facility had closed, and its
radiation therapy source, which contained radioactive
cesium, had been left behind.2 Unsuspecting residents
found the abandoned equipment, and someone opened
the canister containing the radioactive cesium.
Fascinated by the blue powder they found, residents
played with it and spread it on their bodies, unaware
of its radioactivity. By the time the nature of the mate-
2. Obviously, this should not have happened. Regulations should be in
place in all countries to require that sources of radioactivity no longer
in use are disposed of safely. Unfortunately, the extent of control over
radioactive sources, both at the time of the Goiania incident and today,
varies greatly in different parts of the world.
 The Facts About 3
“DIRTY BOMBS”

rial was known, nearly 250 people had been exposed to
elevated radiation levels; four died of radiation sick-
ness.
During the response to the Goiania incident, more than
3,000 cubic meters of contaminated materials were
removed for disposal and over 100,000 persons were
surveyed for contamination at the city’s soccer stadium
(of whom only a few hundred were actually contami-
nated). The recovery process was time-consuming and
expensive. However, the social impact was far greater;
even a decade later, Goiania residents were stigmatized
by their association with the region. This stigmatization
included an economic impact because sales of agricul-
tural products from Goiania declined for absolutely no
reason related to food safety or health.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

A radiological weapon (dirty bomb) is very different

from a nuclear weapon (atomic bomb). In a nuclear
weapon, energy is produced by splitting uranium or plu-
tonium atoms in such a way that enormous amounts of
energy are released in a very brief period of time. The
resulting explosion is huge and can devastate a very large
area. In a radiological weapon, the explosive itself is a
conventional one; it releases a much smaller amount of
energy and causes much less destruction. The radioactive
material present in the bomb is dispersed by the explo-
sion, but it does not cause or participate in the explosion;
the explosion in this instance is not a nuclear blast.
Nuclear bombing of Hiroshima during World War II.
To understand the difference in magnitude between con- Photo by US Army
ventional and nuclear bombs, it may be helpful to com-
pare a large conventional bombing — the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in
1995 — with the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima during
World War II. The bomb used in Oklahoma City was
equivalent to a few tons of TNT; the bomb detonated over
Hiroshima was approximately 10,000 times more power-
ful. In Oklahoma City, 168 people were killed, the target
building was destroyed, and nearby buildings were seri-
ously damaged. In Hiroshima, nearly 100,000 people
were killed, and an entire city was virtually destroyed.

An attack with a large radiological weapon might com-

bine the physical destruction and casualty level of an
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building after bombing attack.
Oklahoma City-type bombing with a small number of Photo by Oklahoma City Police Department
additional radiation-related casualties and substantial
radiation-related disruption similar to that resulting from
the Goiania incident.
4 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”
HISTORY OF RADIOLOGICAL
DISPERSAL DEVICES
The idea of radiological weapons is not new. The
possibility of using bombs that would distribute
radioactivity in enemy territory as military weapons
was considered as early as 1941. Today, radiologi-
cal weapons are no longer considered practical for
military use; instead, they are potential terrorist
weapons.
No radiological dispersal device has ever been suc-
cessfully used as a weapon. However, attempts
have been made. In 1997, Chechen terrorists set but
did not explode a device containing radioactive
cesium in a Moscow park. In 2002, an arrest was
made in the U.S. of a person involved in an alleged
dirty bomb plot. In several instances, radioactive
materials that might be suitable for use in a radio-
logical dispersal device have been stolen, and
attempts have been made to smuggle or sell such
materials. Thus, it is clear that terrorists continue to
be interested in the possibility of radiological
attacks.
Constructing and detonating a dirty bomb are not
easy tasks, however. First, radioactive materials
HEALTH EFFECTS OF
RADIATION
The health effects of radiation exposure vary,
depending upon the type of radioactive material,
the dose of radiation to which a person is exposed,
and the route of exposure (e.g., inhalation, inges-
tion, external exposure). Exposure to very high
doses of radiation can cause radiation sickness,
which is fatal at very high doses but is milder and
temporary at lower doses. Contact with radioactive
material can also cause radiation burns, which can
also range from mild to severe. In most dirty bomb
scenarios, however, radiation exposure levels
would be far lower than those shown to cause these
effects, except perhaps for individuals in immediate
proximity to the blast. Unlike the situation with a
nuclear attack, widespread radiation sickness
would not result from a dirty bomb attack.
must be obtained — most likely either by theft or
by smuggling them from countries where they are
available for legal or illegal purchase. Second, the
materials must then be incorporated into a bomb —
a difficult task, since working with radioactive
materials can be hazardous. Obviously, many ter-
rorists are not deterred by sacrificing their lives, but
a terrorist would need sufficient working time to
complete his work; it is hard to construct a device if
the terrorists working on it receive an incapacitat-
ing radiation dose within 15 minutes, for example.
Finally, once constructed, the device must be trans-
ported to the destination and detonated without
being discovered.
Each of the steps in this process suggests ways in
which radiological attacks may be prevented. For
example, increased security at facilities that use
radioactive materials, such as hospitals and
research laboratories, can help to deter theft, and
increased use of radiation detectors at border cross-
ings can make it easier to detect smuggling of
radioactive materials.
In the event of a radiological attack, people are
likely to find themselves in situations where they
have an opportunity to aid a victim of the attack,
and they may wonder whether it is safe to do this in
spite of the possibility of radioactive contamina-
tion. For example, a bystander might see an injured
person with dust on his clothing coming out of a
building where an explosion had taken place.
Would it be safe for the bystander to help the vic-
tim move to a safe place or to provide first aid?
Experts say that the answer is yes; contaminated
patients do not pose a hazard to those who are help-
ing them. Emergency responders and medical per-
sonnel can and should help these people;
bystanders can do so as well without jeopardizing
their own health.
 The Facts About 5
“DIRTY BOMBS”

It is often reported that the initial symptoms of Another health issue that is often misunderstood is
radiation sickness include nausea, vomiting, and the effect of radiation exposure during pregnancy.
diarrhea. This is correct, but it is important to People often believe, incorrectly, that any expo-
remember that these are nonspecific symptoms sure to radiation during pregnancy, no matter how
that can also be produced by many other causes, small, will have disastrous effects on the unborn
including stress (as millions of people who have child. Thus, women who had routine dental X-
become “sick to their stomachs” in response to rays before realizing that they were pregnant
upsetting events can attest). In the aftermath of a sometimes panic and consider abortion, even
dirty bomb incident, it is likely that many people though this is unnecessary (routine dental X-rays
would experience such symptoms. However, in all result in insignificant radiation exposure to the
or practically all cases, the symptoms would prove unborn child). Low doses of radiation pose much
not to be the result of radiation exposure. less risk to an unborn child than most people (and
even some physicians) realize. In the event of a
Exposure to radiation doses lower than those that dirty bomb attack, most pregnant women in the
cause radiation sickness, but much higher than affected area would not be exposed to amounts of
those normally found in the environment, may radiation sufficient to cause harm and would not
increase a person’s risk of developing cancer later need to consider terminating their pregnancies.
in life, especially if exposure is prolonged.
However, although radiation is known to be a car-
cinogen (cancer-causing agent), it is a weak car-
cinogen, and even radiation levels significantly in
excess of natural background levels do not signif-
icantly raise cancer risks. Just because a person is
near a source of radioactivity for a short time or
comes in contact with a small amount of dust that
contains radioactive material does not mean that
the person will develop cancer. The increase in
risk resulting from such exposures would be quite
small. In most instances, the detonation of a radi-
ological dispersal device would not lead to a sub-
stantial increase in the number of cases of cancer
in the affected population in later years.

Some recent news accounts have predicted that

exposure to even small amounts of radiation from
a radiological attack would cause some additional
cases of cancer. Such predictions are based on the
faulty assumption that effects that occur at high
doses of radiation can be directly extrapolated to
much lower doses. Increasing scientific evidence
indicates, however, that this type of extrapolation
is not valid, and that the health risks associated
with low-level radiation exposure are smaller than
such extrapolation would predict.
6 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF A RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK

Although the number of casualties from a radiolog-
ical attack would probably be relatively small (tens
to hundreds), the economic impact could be very
great. Some experts think that the cost of recovery
from a dirty bomb attack could equal or even
exceed the $30 to $40 billion cost of restoring
lower Manhattan after the September 11 attack,
despite a much smaller amount of physical damage
and fewer casualties.
The high costs would result primarily from the
need to clean up and decontaminate the affected
area. Much of this effort would consist of physical-
ly removing contaminated material (perhaps
including a layer of soil, as was done in Goiania)
and hauling it away to a low-level radioactive
waste depository. Buildings would also need to be
decontaminated — a process that is difficult and in
some instances not technically feasible with current
technology. If a structure could not be decontami-
nated successfully, it might be necessary to demol-
ish it, even if it was not physically damaged by the
attack.3
and Regulations,” could decrease the cost of recov-
ery after a radiological attack and allow normal
activities to resume more quickly.
People’s fears of radiation could add to the eco-
nomic impact of a radiological attack. The biggest
long-term economic problems faced by people in
Goiania (an agricultural region) resulted from the
refusal of people from outside the region to buy its
agricultural products, even though those products
were safe. In the case of a radiological attack on an
urban area, similar fears might lead to a reluctance
to purchase industrial products, conduct business in
the area, or visit tourist attractions, all of which
could cause lasting economic damage.

In addition to being expensive, cleaning up an area

after a radiological attack would be very time-con-
suming; it is likely that normal activities in physi-
cally undamaged areas surrounding an attack site
would not be able to resume for much longer than
in the case of a non-radiological attack. After the
September 11 attack, much of the surrounding area
was reoccupied within days or weeks; in the case of
a radiological attack, it could be months or longer
because of the need for decontamination.

It may be possible to substantially reduce the extent

of the area that would receive extensive decontam-
ination after a radiological attack without increas-
ing risks to human health by changing the regulato-
ry standards for the amount of radiation permitted
to remain after cleanup. This type of change, which
is discussed in more detail below under “Policies

3. Alternatively, a building or area could be abandoned and fenced off, but this option is unlikely to be practical in a major metropolitan area.

WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF A DIRTY BOMB ATTACK
It is important to note that radioactivity cannot be seen,
felt, or smelled. Therefore, the fact that an explosion
involved radioactivity would not be immediately obvi-
ous (unless a terrorist group announced it). In most
instances, emergency responders, who routinely have
access to radiation detectors, would be able to conduct
radiation surveys and determine fairly quickly, probably
within a half hour, that a radiological attack had taken
place. This information would then allow the authorities
to issue correct instructions to the public via the news
media.
If a dirty bomb attack occurred, people would find out
about it in two different ways. Some individuals would
be close enough to hear, see, or feel an explosion.
Others, who were farther away, would hear about the
attack through the news media or official announce-
ments.
• For those people who were not close enough to the
explosion to hear, see, or feel it, the most important
thing to do would be to turn on a local radio station
or television channel and wait for advice from emer-
gency response authorities. In all likelihood, people
in this situation would not be at any immediate risk.
However, just as with any other type of emergency,
the authorities might have important instructions for
the public to follow. For example, people might be
advised to stay away from an affected area to avoid
interference with emergency personnel and perhaps
also to avoid exposure to radioactive contamination.
• For people who heard, saw, or felt an explosion, the
situation would be different. These individuals
would know that an emergency had occurred, but
they would not know immediately whether radioac-
tivity was involved. Because these individuals were
close to an explosion and might continue to be in
danger, they would need to take some actions that
people farther away from the explosion would not.
After an explosion, experts recommend that people
should do the following:
• Move away from the immediate area — at least sev-
eral blocks from the explosion — and go indoors.
• Turn on local radio or TV channels for advisories
from emergency response and health authorities.
• If it is determined that an explosion involved radioac-
tivity and if facilities are available, people who were
The Facts About 7
“DIRTY BOMBS”
within sight of or downwind of the explosion should
consider changing clothes and showering if possible.
These actions will remove at least 90 percent of
external contamination. Contaminated clothing
should be placed in plastic bags and sealed until the
amount of contamination can be measured.
• If radioactive material was released, local news
broadcasts will advise people where to report for
radiation monitoring and blood and other tests to
determine whether they were in fact exposed and
what steps to take to protect their health.
• Because inhaling any kind of dust, and especially
dust that may be contaminated with radioactive
material, is unhealthful, some experts recommend
that people take simple precautions to avoid inhaling
contaminants during the immediate aftermath of an
explosion, such as breathing through a folded cloth if
one is readily available and going indoors and clos-
ing doors and windows as soon as possible.
• Another important precaution is to not handle or pick
up any object thrown off by an explosion. In the
event that the object was part of the radioactive
source used in a dirty bomb, it could be quite danger-
ous. Handling things without knowing what they
were is what got people into trouble in Goiania; the
same could occur after a dirty bomb explosion.
People sometimes wonder whether they should take
potassium iodide to protect their health if a radiological
attack occurs. The answer in almost all possible dirty
bomb scenarios is no. Potassium iodide protects only
against damage to the thyroid gland from radioactive
iodine; it does not protect other parts of the body, and it
is of no use against other radioactive materials. It is very
unlikely that radioactive iodine would be used in a dirty
bomb.
Another course of action that is usually unwise (unless
specifically advised by authorities) is driving away from
the area of an attack. People can move to a safe distance
from a radiological attack by walking rather than driv-
ing; staying off the roads reduces the risk of traffic con-
gestion that can hamper response to the emergency or
cause crashes. Also, an automobile that was in the imme-
diate vicinity of a dirty bomb explosion could be con-
taminated with radioactivity. People who drive away in
that automobile might expose themselves to more
radioactivity than they would if they walked to a safe
location.
8 The Facts About
“DIRTY BOMBS”
POLICIES AND REGULATIONS
As societies make efforts to prevent radiological
attacks and to ensure the most effective response if an
attack occurs, consideration may be given to modify-
ing some policies and regulations that were not
designed with radiological attacks in mind. Citizens
need to understand the rationale behind such propos-
als in order to make informed decisions about their
merits. A proposal that appears “overly restrictive” or
“insufficiently protective” on the surface might well
be found to be beneficial when all its advantages and
disadvantages are taken into consideration. The fol-
lowing examples may help to illustrate this point.
Legal purchase of radioactive materials in the U.S.
requires possession of a radioactive materials license.
These licenses are considered public documents and
therefore are available for public scrutiny. This
means that a terrorist organization may be able to
obtain copies of the documents and use these to iden-
tify likely targets for theft. Thus, it may be worth-
while to consider prohibiting public access to these
documents. The government — and by extension, the
public — would need to decide whether the potential
benefits of this regulatory change justify limiting cit-
izens’ freedom of access to this particular type of
information.
If terrorists are to construct and transport a radiolog-
ical dispersal device with reasonable safety to them-
selves, they would need to obtain large quantities of
lead to use as shielding. Accordingly, a case could be
made for requiring lead vendors to report large sales
of their products. If such a proposal is considered, its
potential benefits would have to be weighed against
the additional burdens that would be placed on the
lead industry and the likely resulting increases in the
cost of this industry’s products.
Some current regulations pertaining to permissible
levels of radioactive contamination may have been
based more on what is achievable or what is
detectable than on what is truly necessary to protect
health and the environment. In the event of an attack,
4. This proposal is recommended and discussed in detail in
Zimmerman, Peter D. with Cheryl Loeb, Dirty Bombs: The Threat
Revisited, National Defense University, January 2004. Available
online at http://hps.org/documents/RDD_report.pdf
these unnecessarily stringent regulations might ham-
per a community’s ability to recover by increasing
the amounts of time and money mandated for cleanup
without providing any benefits that would offset
these costs. Therefore, society may wish to revisit
regulatory guidance so that regulations are based on
real risk rather than the ability to detect ever-lower
levels of contamination.
It has been proposed, for example, that the standard
for the amount of added radioactivity allowed to
remain after cleanup from a radiological attack be
increased tenfold.4 This might decrease the cost of
recovery by perhaps 90 percent and somewhat
decrease the time needed for cleanup.
The current standard set by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is 25 mrem (millirems) of added
radioactivity per year5; the Environmental Protection
Agency’s standard is 15 mrem per year. For compar-
ison, it helps to know that the natural background
radiation to which people are normally exposed is
several hundred millirems per year, with substantial
variations from place to place. Residents of
Washington, D.C., for example, are exposed to 300
mrem/year, which is close to the national average.
Residents of Denver, Colorado, which is at a higher
altitude (therefore allowing more exposure to cosmic
radiation) and has underground uranium deposits, are
exposed to about 500 mrem/year.
Increasing the standard for residual radioactivity ten-
fold would mean allowing about 200 mrem/year of
added radiation to remain in the environment after
cleanup from a radiological attack; this is the same as
the additional exposure that would come from living
in Denver rather than Washington. No radiation-asso-
ciated health risks have been associated with living in
Denver; cancer rates there are similar to those in
Washington. Similarly, no adverse effects on human
health would be expected if a residual radioactivity
standard of around 200 mrem/year were adopted.
5. A rem is a unit that relates the absorbed dose of radiation in human
tissue to the effective biological damage of the radiation. Different
types of radiation have different biological effects; expressing
amounts of exposure in rems allows these different types of radiation
to be compared.
 The Facts About 9
“DIRTY BOMBS”

SUMMARY

Dirty bombs, more correctly referred to as radio-
logical dispersal devices or radiological weapons,
are conventional explosive devices with added
radioactive material. They are designed to spread
radioactive contamination — and with it, panic,
anxiety, and social and economic disruption — in
a community. To ensure appropriate responses in
the event of a radiological attack, citizens need to
understand that the principal danger from a dirty
bomb lies in the explosion itself; in most
scenarios, few if any people who were not close
enough to the blast to be injured by it would expe-
rience any adverse health effects from radiation
exposure. Citizens can help to minimize the harm-
ful impact of a radiological attack by following
the instructions of emergency response authorities
and by avoiding hasty actions prompted by panic
or unwarranted fears of even small amounts of
radioactivity.

REFERENCES

Karam, P. Andrew, Radiological Terrorism. Human and Ecological Risk Assessment, in press.

Ferguson CD and Potter WC. 2004. The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Monterey Institute for
International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey CA.

Ferguson CD, Kazi T, and Perera J. 2003. Center for Nonproliferation Studies Occasional Paper #11,
Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks. Monterey Institute Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA.

NCRP (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements). 2001. Report #138.
Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Dirty bombs [fact sheet], March 2003. Available online at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Backgrounder on dirty bombs, April 2005. Available online at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-bombs.html

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Frequently asked questions about dirty bombs,
March 2005. Available online at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/dirtybombs.asp

Zimmerman, Peter D. with Cheryl Loeb, Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited, National Defense
University, January 2004. Available online at http://hps.org/documents/RDD_report.pdf
 ACSH BOARD OF DIRECTORS

John H. Moore, Ph.D., M.B.A. Christine M. Bruhn, Ph.D. A. Alan Moghissi, Ph.D. Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada
Chairman of the Board, ACSH University of California Institute for Regulatory Science Lorraine Thelian
Grove City College Ketchum Public Relations
Taiwo K. Danmola, C.P.A. Albert G. Nickel
Elissa P. Benedek, M.D. Ernst & Young Lyons Lavey Nickel Swift, inc. Kimberly M. Thompson, Sc.D.
University of Michigan Harvard School of Public Health
Thomas R. DeGregori, Ph.D. Kenneth M. Prager, M.D.
Norman E. Borlaug, Ph.D. University of Houston Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., M.P.H.
Texas A&M University American Council on Science and Health
Henry I. Miller, M.D. Stephen S. Sternberg, M.D.
Michael B. Bracken, Ph.D., M.P.H. Hoover Institution Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center Robert J. White, M.D., Ph.D.
Yale University School of Medicine Case Western Reserve University
Mark C. Taylor, M.D.
ACSH EXECUTIVE STAFF

Elizabeth M. Whelan, Sc.D., M.P.H., President

ACSH BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY ADVISORS

Ernest L. Abel, Ph.D. Ronald W. Brecher, Ph.D., C.Chem., Neville Colman, M.D., Ph.D. David F. Duncan, Dr.Ph. William H. Foege, M.D., M.P.H.
C.S. Mott Center DABT St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hospital Center Duncan & Associates Emory University
Gary R. Acuff, Ph.D. GlobalTox International Consultants, Inc. Gerald F. Combs, Jr., Ph.D. James R. Dunn, Ph.D. Ralph W. Fogleman, D.V.M.
Texas A&M University Robert L. Brent, M.D., Ph.D. Cornell University Averill Park, NY Doylestown, PA
Alwynelle S. Ahl, Ph.D., D.V.M. Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children Michael D. Corbett, Ph.D. Robert L. DuPont, M.D. Christopher H. Foreman, Jr., Ph.D.
Tuskegee University, AL Allan Brett, M.D. Omaha, NE Institute for Behavior and Health, Inc. University of Maryland
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University of Nebraska, Lincoln Kenneth G. Brown, Ph.D. John Hopkins University University of Rhode Island University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Glendon College, York University Gale A. Buchanan, Ph.D. University of Delaware State University of New York, Buffalo University of Massachusetts
Thomas S. Allems, M.D., M.P.H. University of Georgia Roger A. Coulombe, Jr., Ph.D. J. Gordon Edwards, Ph.D. Glenn W. Froning, Ph.D.
San Francisco, CA George M. Burditt, J.D. Utah State University San José State University University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Richard G. Allison, Ph.D. Bell, Boyd & Lloyd LLC H. Russell Cross, Ph.D. George E. Ehrlich, M.D., F.A.C.P., Vincent A. Fulginiti, M.D.
American Society for Nutritional Sciences Edward E. Burns, Ph.D. Future Beef Operations, L.L.C. M.A.C.R., FRCP (Edin) University of Colorado
(FASEB) Texas A&M University James W. Curran, M.D., M.P.H. Philadelphia, PA Arthur Furst, Ph.D., Sc.D.
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Ohio State University University of Minnesota Charles R. Curtis, Ph.D. Rapid City Regional Hospital Robert S. Gable, Ed.D., Ph.D., J.D.
Philip R. Alper, M.D. Elwood F. Caldwell, Ph.D., M.B.A. Ohio State University William N. Elwood, Ph.D. Claremont Graduate University
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Karl E. Anderson, M.D. Novato, CA Research Gad Consulting Services
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University of Texas, Medical Branch Texas A&M University System Ernst M. Davis, Ph.D. James E. Enstrom, Ph.D., M.P.H. William G. Gaines, Jr., M.D., M.P.H.
Dennis T. Avery University of Texas, Houston University of California, Los Angeles Scott & White Clinic
Robert G. Cassens, Ph.D.
Hudson Institute University of Wisconsin, Madison Harry G. Day, Sc.D. Stephen K. Epstein, M.D., M.P.P., Charles O. Gallina, Ph.D.
Ronald Bachman, M.D. Ercole L. Cavalieri, D.Sc. Indiana University FACEP Professional Nuclear Associates
Kaiser-Permanente Medical Center University of Nebraska Medical Center Robert M. Devlin, Ph.D. Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center Raymond Gambino, M.D.
Robert S. Baratz, D.D.S., Ph.D., M.D. Russell N. A. Cecil, M.D., Ph.D. University of Massachusetts Myron E. Essex, D.V.M., Ph.D. Quest Diagnostics Incorporated
International Medical Consultation Services Albany Medical College Seymour Diamond, M.D. Harvard School of Public Health Randy R. Gaugler, Ph.D.
Nigel M. Bark, M.D. Diamond Headache Clinic Terry D. Etherton, Ph.D. Rutgers University
Rino Cerio, M.D.
Albert Einstein College of Medicine Barts and The London Hospital Institute of Donald C. Dickson, M.S.E.E. Pennsylvania State University
Pathology
J. Bernard L. Gee, M.D.
Stephen Barrett, M.D. Gilbert, AZ R. Gregory Evans, Ph.D., M.P.H. Yale University School of Medicine
Allentown, PA Morris E. Chafetz, M.D. John Diebold St. Louis University Center for the Study of
Bioterrorism and Emerging Infections K. H. Ginzel, M.D.
Thomas G. Baumgartner, Pharm.D., Health Education Foundation The Diebold Institute for Public Policy University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences
Studies William Evans, Ph.D.
M.Ed. Bruce M. Chassy, Ph.D. William Paul Glezen, M.D.
University of Florida University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Ralph Dittman, M.D., M.P.H. University of Alabama Baylor College of Medicine
Houston, TX Daniel F. Farkas, Ph.D., M.S., P.E.
W. Lawrence Beeson, Dr.P.H. Dale J. Chodos, M.D. Jay A. Gold, M.D., J.D., M.P.H.
Loma Linda University School of Public Kalamazoo, MI John E. Dodes, D.D.S. Oregon State University
Medical College of Wisconsin
Health National Council Against Health Fraud Richard S. Fawcett, Ph.D.
Martha A. Churchill, Esq. Roger E. Gold, Ph.D.
Barry L. Beyerstein, Ph.D. Milan, MI Sir Richard Doll, M.D., D.Sc., D.M. Huxley, IA
Texas A&M University
Simon Fraser University University of Oxford John B. Fenger, M.D.
Emil William Chynn, M.D. Reneé M. Goodrich, Ph.D.
Steven Black, M.D. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hospital John Doull, M.D., Ph.D. Phoenix, AZ
University of Florida
Kaiser-Permanente Vaccine Study Center University of Kansas Owen R. Fennema, Ph.D.
Dean O. Cliver, Ph.D. Frederick K. Goodwin, M.D.
Blaine L. Blad, Ph.D. University of California, Davis Theron W. Downes, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, Madison
The George Washington University Medical
University of Nebraska, Lincoln Michigan State University Frederick L. Ferris, III, M.D.
F. M. Clydesdale, Ph.D. Center
Hinrich L. Bohn, Ph.D. University of Massachusetts Michael Patrick Doyle, Ph.D. National Eye Institute
Timothy N. Gorski, M.D., F.A.C.O.G.
University of Arizona University of Georgia David N. Ferro, Ph.D.
Donald G. Cochran, Ph.D. Arlington, TX
Ben Bolch, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Adam Drewnowski, Ph.D. University of Massachusetts
Ronald E. Gots, M.D., Ph.D.
Rhodes College University University of Washington Madelon L. Finkel, Ph.D. International Center for Toxicology and
Joseph F. Borzelleca, Ph.D. W. Ronnie Coffman, Ph.D. Michael A. Dubick, Ph.D. Cornell University Medical College Medicine
Medical College of Virginia Cornell University U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research Jack C. Fisher, M.D. Henry G. Grabowski, Ph.D.
Michael K. Botts, Esq. Bernard L. Cohen, D.Sc. Greg Dubord, M.D., M.P.H. University of California, San Diego Duke University
Ames, IA University of Pittsburgh RAM Institute Kenneth D. Fisher, Ph.D. James Ian Gray, Ph.D.
George A. Bray, M.D. John J. Cohrssen, Esq. Edward R. Duffie, Jr., M.D. Washington, DC Michigan State University
Pennington Biomedical Research Center Public Health Policy Advisory Board Savannah, GA Leonard T. Flynn, Ph.D., M.B.A. William W. Greaves, M.D., M.S.P.H.
Morganville, NJ Medical College of Wisconsin

Kenneth Green, D.Env.
Reason Public Policy Institute
Laura C. Green, Ph.D., D.A.B.T.
Cambridge Environmental, Inc.
Saul Green, Ph.D.
Zol Consultants
Richard A. Greenberg, Ph.D.
Hinsdale, IL
Sander Greenland, Dr.P.H., M.A.
UCLA School of Public Health
Gordon W. Gribble, Ph.D.
Dartmouth College
William Grierson, Ph.D.
University of Florida
Lester Grinspoon, M.D.
Harvard Medical School
F. Peter Guengerich, Ph.D.
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine
Caryl J. Guth, M.D.
Hillsborough, CA
Philip S. Guzelian, M.D.
University of Colorado
Alfred E. Harper, Ph.D.
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Terryl J. Hartman, Ph.D., M.P.H.,
R.D.
The Pennsylvania State University
Clare M. Hasler, Ph.D.
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Robert D. Havener, M.P.A.
Sacramento, CA
Virgil W. Hays, Ph.D.
University of Kentucky
Cheryl G. Healton, Dr.PH.
Columbia University
Clark W. Heath, Jr., M.D.
American Cancer Society
Dwight B. Heath, Ph.D.
Brown University
Robert Heimer, Ph.D.
Yale School of Public Health
Robert B. Helms, Ph.D.
American Enterprise Institute
Zane R. Helsel, Ph.D.
Rutgers University, Cook College
Donald A. Henderson, M.D., M.P.H.
Johns Hopkins University
James D. Herbert, Ph.D.
MCP Hahnemann University
Gene M. Heyman, Ph.D.
McLean Hospital/Harvard Medical School
Richard M. Hoar, Ph.D.
Williamstown, MA
Theodore R. Holford, Ph.D.
Yale University School of Medicine
Robert M. Hollingworth, Ph.D.
Michigan State University
Edward S. Horton, M.D.
Joslin Diabetes Center
Joseph H. Hotchkiss, Ph.D.
Cornell University
Steve E. Hrudey, Ph.D.
University of Alberta
Susanne L. Huttner, Ph.D.
University of California, Berkeley
Robert H. Imrie, D.V.M.
Seattle, WA
Lucien R. Jacobs, M.D.
University of California, Los Angeles
ACSH BOARD
Alejandro R. Jadad, M.D., D.Phil.,
F.R.C.P.C.
University of Toronto, Canada
Rudolph J. Jaeger, Ph.D.
Environmental Medicine, Inc.
William T. Jarvis, Ph.D.
Loma Linda University
Michael Kamrin, Ph.D.
Michigan State University
John B. Kaneene,Ph.D., M.P.H.,
D.V.M.
Michigan State University
P. Andrew Karam, Ph.D., CHP
University of Rochester
Philip G. Keeney, Ph.D.
Pennsylvania State University
John G. Keller, Ph.D.
Olney, MD
Kathryn E. Kelly, Dr.P.H.
Delta Toxicology
George R. Kerr, M.D.
University of Texas, Houston
George A. Keyworth II, Ph.D.
Progress and Freedom Foundation
Michael Kirsch, M.D.
Highland Heights, OH
John C. Kirschman, Ph.D.
Emmaus, PA
Ronald E. Kleinman, M.D.
Massachusetts General Hospital
Leslie M. Klevay, M.D., S.D.in Hyg.
University of North Dakota School of
Medicine
David M. Klurfeld, Ph.D.
Wayne State University
Kathryn M. Kolasa, Ph.D., R.D.
East Carolina University
James S. Koopman, M.D, M.P.H.
University of Michigan
Alan R. Kristal, Dr.P.H.
Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center
David Kritchevsky, Ph.D.
The Wistar Institute
Stephen B. Kritchevsky, Ph.D.
Wake Forest University Health Sciences
Mitzi R. Krockover, M.D.
Humana, Inc.
Manfred Kroger, Ph.D.
Pennsylvania State University
Laurence J. Kulp, Ph.D.
University of Washington
Sandford F. Kuvin, M.D.
University of Miami
Carolyn J. Lackey, Ph.D., R.D.
North Carolina State University
Pagona Lagiou, M.D., DrMedSci
University of Athens Medical School
J. Clayburn LaForce, Ph.D.
University of California, Los Angeles
James C. Lamb, IV, Ph.D., J.D.
Blasland, Bouck & Lee
Lawrence E. Lamb, M.D.
San Antonio, TX
William E. M. Lands, Ph.D.
College Park, MD
Lillian Langseth, Dr.P.H.
Lyda Associates, Inc.
Brian A. Larkins, Ph.D.
University of Arizona
OF SCIENTIFIC AND POLICY
Larry Laudan, Ph.D.
National Autonomous University of Mexico
Tom B. Leamon, Ph.D.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Jay H. Lehr, Ph.D.
Environmental Education Enterprises, Inc.
Brian C. Lentle, M.D., FRCPC, DMRD
University of British Columbia
Floy Lilley, J.D.
Amelia Island, FlF
Paul J. Lioy, Ph.D.
UMDNJ-Robert Wood Johnson Medical
School
William M. London, Ed.D., M.P.H.
Walden University
Frank C. Lu, M.D., BCFE
Miami, FL
William M. Lunch, Ph.D.
Oregon State University
Daryl Lund, Ph.D.
University of Wisconsin
George D. Lundberg, M.D.
Medscape
Howard D. Maccabee, Ph.D., M.D.
Radiation Oncology Center
Janet E. Macheledt, M.D., M.S.,
M.P.H.
Houston, TX
Roger P. Maickel, Ph.D.
Purdue University
Henry G. Manne, J.S.D.
George Mason University Law School
Karl Maramorosch, Ph.D.
Rutgers University, Cook College
Judith A. Marlett, Ph.D., R.D.
University of Wisconsin, Madison
James R. Marshall, Ph.D.
Roswell Park Cancer Institute
Mary H. McGrath, M.D., M.P.H.
Loyola University Medical Center
Alan G. McHughen, D.Phil.
University of California, Riverside
James D. McKean, D.V.M., J.D.
Iowa State University
John J. McKetta, Ph.D.
University of Texas at Austin
Donald J. McNamara, Ph.D.
Egg Nutrition Center
Michael H. Merson, M.D.
Yale University School of Medicine
Patrick J. Michaels, Ph.D.
University of Virginia
Thomas H. Milby, M.D., M.P.H.
Walnut Creek, CA
Joseph M. Miller, M.D., M.P.H.
University of New Hampshire
William J. Miller, Ph.D.
University of Georgia
Dade W. Moeller, Ph.D.
Harvard University
Grace P. Monaco, J.D.
Medical Care Management Corp.
Brian E. Mondell, M.D.
Baltimore Headache Institute
Eric W. Mood, LL.D., M.P.H.
Yale University School of Medicine
John W. Morgan, Dr.P.H.
California Cancer Registry
ADVISORS
W. K. C. Morgan, M.D.
University of Western Ontario
Stephen J. Moss, D.D.S., M.S.
Health Education Enterprises, Inc.
Brooke T. Mossman, Ph.D.
University of Vermont College of Medicine
Allison A. Muller, Pharm.D
The Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia
Ian C. Munro, F.A.T.S., Ph.D.,
FRCPath
Cantox Health Sciences International
Kevin B. Murphy
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
Harris M. Nagler, M.D.
Beth Israel Medical Center
Daniel J. Ncayiyana, M.D.
University of Cape Town
Philip E. Nelson, Ph.D.
Purdue University
Malden C. Nesheim, Ph.D.
Cornell University
Joyce A. Nettleton, D.Sc., R.D.
Aurora, Co
John S. Neuberger, Dr.P.H.
University of Kansas School of Medicine
Gordon W. Newell, Ph.D., M.S.,F.-
A.T.S.
Palo Alto, CA
Thomas J. Nicholson, Ph.D., M.P.H.
Western Kentucky University
Steven P. Novella, M.D.
Yale University School of Medicine
James L. Oblinger, Ph.D.
North Carolina State University
Deborah L. O’Connor, Ph.D.
University of Toronto/The Hospital for Sick
Children
John Patrick O’Grady, M.D.
Tufts University School of Medicine
James E. Oldfield, Ph.D.
Oregon State University
Stanley T. Omaye, Ph.D., F.-A.T.S.,
F.ACN, C.N.S.
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Michael T. Osterholm, Ph.D., M.P.H.
University of Minnesota
M. Alice Ottoboni, Ph.D.
Sparks, NV
Michael W. Pariza, Ph.D.
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Stuart Patton, Ph.D.
University of California, San Diego
James Marc Perrin, M.D.
Mass General Hospital for Children
Timothy Dukes Phillips, Ph.D.
Texas A&M University
Mary Frances Picciano, Ph.D.
National Institutes of Health
David R. Pike, Ph.D.
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
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Cornell University
Charles Poole, M.P.H., Sc.D
University of North Carolina School of
Public Health
Gary P. Posner, M.D.
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John J. Powers, Ph.D.
University of Georgia
William D. Powrie, Ph.D.
University of British Columbia
C.S. Prakash, Ph.D.
Tuskegee University
Kary D. Presten
U.S. Trust Co.
Marvin P. Pritts, Ph.D.
Cornell University
Daniel J. Raiten, Ph.D.
National Institute of Health
David W. Ramey, D.V.M.
Ramey Equine Group
R.T. Ravenholt, M.D., M.P.H.
Population Health Imperatives
Russel J. Reiter, Ph.D.
University of Texas, San Antonio
William O. Robertson, M.D.
University of Washington School of
Medicine
J. D. Robinson, M.D.
Georgetown University School of Medicine
Bill D. Roebuck, Ph.D., D.A.B.T.
Dartmouth Medical School
David B. Roll, Ph.D.
University of Utah
Dale R. Romsos, Ph.D.
Michigan State University
Joseph D. Rosen, Ph.D.
Cook College, Rutgers University
Steven T. Rosen, M.D.
Northwestern University Medical School
Kenneth J. Rothman, Dr.P.H.
Boston University
Stanley Rothman, Ph.D.
Smith College
Edward C. A. Runge, Ph.D.
Texas A&M University
Stephen H. Safe, D.Phil.
Texas A&M University
Wallace I. Sampson, M.D.
Stanford University School of Medicine
Harold H. Sandstead, M.D.
University of Texas Medical Branch
Charles R. Santerre, Ph.D.
Purdue University
Herbert P. Sarett, Ph.D.
Sarasota, FL
Sally L. Satel, M.D.
American Enterprise Institute
Lowell D. Satterlee, Ph.D.
Oklahoma State University
Jeffrey Wyatt Savell
Texas A&M University
Marvin J. Schissel, D.D.S.
Roslyn Heights, NY
Lawrence J. Schneiderman, M.D.
University of California, San Diego
Edgar J. Schoen, M.D.
Kaiser Permanente Medical Center
David Schottenfeld, M.D., M.Sc.
University of Michigan
Joel M. Schwartz, M.S.
American Enterprise Institute
David E. Seidemann, Ph.D.
Brooklyn College/Yale University
Patrick J. Shea, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Michael B. Shermer, Ph.D.
Skeptic Magazine
Sidney Shindell, M.D., LL.B.
Medical College of Wisconsin
Sarah Short, Ph.D., Ed.D., R.D.
Syracuse University
A. J. Siedler, Ph.D.
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Lee M. Silver, Ph.D.
Princeton University
Michael S. Simon, M.D., M.P.H.
Wayne State University
S. Fred Singer, Ph.D.
Science & Environmental Policy Project
Robert B. Sklaroff, M.D.
Elkins Park, PA
Anne M. Smith, Ph.D., R.D., L.D.
The Ohio State University
Gary C. Smith, Ph.D.
Colorado State University
John N. Sofos, Ph.D.
Colorado State University
Roy F. Spalding, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Leonard T. Sperry, M.D., Ph.D.
Barry University
Robert A. Squire, D.V.M., Ph.D.
Johns Hopkins University
The opinions expressed in ACSH publications do not necessarily represent the views of all ACSH Directors and Advisors. ACSH Directors and Advisors serve without compensation.
Ronald T. Stanko, M.D.
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
James H. Steele, D.V.M., M.P.H.
University of Texas, Houston
Robert D. Steele, Ph.D.
Pennsylvania State University
Judith S. Stern, Sc.D., R.D.
University of California, Davis
Ronald D. Stewart, O.C., M.D.,
FRCPC
Dalhousie University
Martha Barnes Stone, Ph.D.
Colorado State University
Jon A. Story, Ph.D.
Purdue University
Michael M. Sveda, Ph.D.
Gaithersburg, MD
Glenn Swogger, Jr., M.D.
Topeka, KS
Sita R. Tatini, Ph.D.
University of Minnesota
Steve L. Taylor, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
James W. Tillotson, Ph.D., M.B.A.
Tufts University
Dimitrios Trichopoulos, M.D.
Harvard School of Public Health
Murray M. Tuckerman, Ph.D.
Winchendon, MA
Robert P. Upchurch, Ph.D.
University of Arizona
Mark J. Utell, M.D.
University of Rochester Medical Center
Shashi B. Verma, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Willard J. Visek, M.D., Ph.D.
University of Illinois College of Medicine
Donald M. Watkin, M.D., M.P.H.,
F.A.C.P.
George Washington University
Miles Weinberger, M.D.
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics
Lynn Waishwell, Ph.D., CHES
University of Medicine and Dentistry of
New Jersey
Janet S. Weiss, M.D.
University of California at San-Francisco
Simon Wessley, M.D., FRCP
King’s College London and Institute of
Psychiatry
Steven D. Wexner, M.D.
Cleveland Clinic Florida
Joel Elliot White, M.D., F.A.C.R.
John Muir Comprehensive Cancer Center
Carol Whitlock, Ph.D., R.D.
Rochester Institute of Technology
Christopher F. Wilkinson, Ph.D.
Burke, VA
Mark L. Willenbring, M.D.
Veterans Affairs Medical Center
Carl K. Winter, Ph.D.
University of California, Davis
Lloyd D. Witter, Ph.D.
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
James J. Worman, Ph.D.
Rochester Institute of Technology
Russell S. Worrall, O.D.
University of California, Berkeley
Panayiotis M. Zavos, Ph.D., Ed.S.
University of Kentucky
Steven H. Zeisel, M.D., Ph.D.
The University of North Carolina
Michael B. Zemel, Ph.D.
Nutrition Institute, University of Tennessee
Ekhard E. Ziegler, M.D.
University of Iowaa
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What Modern Science Has Learned about The Role of Milk in Your Diet __
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Making Sense of Over-the-Counter Pain Relievers __ MMT’s __
Marketing Cigarettes to Kids __ Pressure-Treated Wood __
Moderate Alcohol Consumption and Health __
Much Ado About Milk __ Qty X $1.00 = $
Nutrition Accuracy in Popular Magazines 1997–1999 __
Nutrition Accuracy in Popular Magazines 1995–1996 __
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