G.R. No.

L-360 November 15, 1947

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

FACTS:

Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he
sought to accomplish the registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land
within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?

2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was already of private ownership prior to the approval
of this Constitutions is applicable at the case at bar?

RULING:

1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public
domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to
any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
This means to say that, under the provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or
residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio.

2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to
acquire private only by way of reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in this section refers to all private
lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by
any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no
private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine
Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right
to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003

FRENZEL v. CATITO

A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no
legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal
objective carried out

FACTS:

Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He was so enamored with Ederlina that he bought her
numerous properties such as house and lot in Quezon City and in Davao City. He also put up a beauty parlor business in the name of
Ederlina. Alfred was unaware that Ederlina was married until her spouse Klaus Muller wrote a letter to Alfred begging the latter to
leave her wife alone.

When Alfred and Ederlinas relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter
could charge her for bigamy and could even involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to
live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her.

On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlinas father, complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because of this, he
was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with his
own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties
acquired by him and Ederlina during their coverture.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner could recover the money used in purchasing the several properties

Ruling:

No, even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the real vendee, the said transactions are
in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and
void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The petitioner, being a party to an illegal
contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by
knowingly engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not maintain an action for his losses. To
him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY; MULLER VS. MULLER

G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting
to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The
court granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot
recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely
prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered
the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.

Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a constitutional prohibition. And to get away
with that constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.

With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity. It has been held that
equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.
Ting Ho vs Teng Gui

GR No. 130115 July 16, 2008

Facts:

Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother,
respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which should
form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the
siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an
estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of
respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then
disqualified to own public lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took
possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:
Whether the lot should be included in the estate of their father even if he is a chinese citizen?

Ruling:
No, our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain
is reserved for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is
owned by Filipinos. In the present case, the father of petitioners and respondent was a Chinese
citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning real property in
the Philippines. In fact, he was only occupying the subject lot by virtue of the permission
granted him by the then U.S. Naval Reservation Office of Olongapo, Zambales. As correctly
found by the CA, the deceased Felix Ting Ho was never the owner of the subject lot in light of
the constitutional proscription and the respondent did not at any instance act as the dummy of
his father. Regarding the issue of ownership of the properties erected on the subject lot, the
Court agrees with the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, that the series
of transactions resorted to by the deceased were simulated in order to preserve the properties in
the hands of the family. The respondent was unable to show, and the records are bereft of any
evidence, that the simulated sales of the properties were intended by the deceased to be a
donation to him. Thus, the Court holds that the two-storey residential house, two-storey
residential building and sari-sari store form part of the estate of the late spouses Felix Ting Ho
and Leonila Cabasal, entitling the petitioners to a four-fifths (4/5) share thereof.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC

GR No. 154953, June 26, 2008

Facts:

This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc. covering a
56.4007 hectares parcel of lot located in San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.

RTC adjudicated the land in favor of respondent wherein it ruled that a juridical person or a corporation could apply for
registration of land provided such entity and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the land for 30 years or more.

The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.

ISSUES:

Whether the land is alienable and disposable

RULING:

The petition has merit. Respondent failed to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

The respondent submitted two certifications issued by the DENR. The June 3, 1997 Certification by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that "lot 10705, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within
the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31 December
1925."

The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical
Director, Forest Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the subject area falls within an alienable
and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582."

The certifications are not sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20 delineated the functions and authorities of
the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status
for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.

DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares, as well as the
authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case,
respondent applied for registration of a lot over 50 . The CENRO certificate is beyond the authority of the CENRO to
certify as alienable and disposable.

The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a
memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.

Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.