Analecta Husserliana LXXXXI - Logos-Of-Phenomenology-And-Phenomenology-Of-The-Logos PDF

LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY
OF THE LOGOS. BOOK FOUR

A N A L E C TA H U S S E R L I A N A
THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
VOLUME LXXXXI
Founder and Editor-in-Chief:
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
Hanover, New Hampshire
For sequel volumes see the end of this volume.

LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY
AND PHENOMENOLOGY
OF THE LOGOS. BOOK FOUR
The Logos of Scientific Interrogation.
Participating in Nature-Life- Sharing in Life
Edited by
ANNA-TER ESA T YMIE NIE C KA
The World Phenomenology Institute, Hanover, NH, U.S.A.
Published under the auspices of

The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning
A-T. Tymieniecka, President
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS vii
THEMATIC INTRODUCTION
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA / Unveiling the Logos of
Scientific Interrogation xi
SECTION I
THE INTERROGATIVE LOGOS OF DISCOVERY
MARIA GOŁASZEWSKA / Scientific Knowledge and Human
Knowledge 3
LEO ZONNEVELD / Science in Mind: Exploring the Language
of the Logos 21
ARIA OMRANI / ‘‘Objective Science’’ in Husserlian Life-World
Phenomenology 39
NIKOLAY KOZHEVNIKOV / Phenomenological Aspects of the
Natural Coordinate System 45
WENDY C. HAMBLET / Alienation and Wholeness: Spinoza,
Hans Jonas, and the Human Genome Project on the ‘‘Push
and Shove’’ of Mortal Being 57
ALEXANDER KUZMIN / M. Heidegger’s Project for the
Optical Interpretation of Reflexion: The Time, the Reflexion
and the Logos 67
A. L. SAMIAN / ‘‘Phenomena’’ in Newton’s Mathematical
Experience 81
ELDON C. WAIT / What Computers Could Never Do: An
Existential Phenomenological Critique of the Program of
Artificial Intelligence 97
ARTHUR PIPER / Sensible Models in Cognitive Neuroscience 105
ROBERTO VEROLINI and FABIO PETRELLI / Philosophical
Aspects of the New Evolutionistic Paradigms 119
v
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
IGNACY S. FIUT / Phenomenology and Ecophilosophy 137

LESZEK PYRA / Men in Front of Animals 151
SECTION II
SOCIETAL SHARING-IN-LIFE
GARY BACKHAUS / Toward a Cultural Phenomenology 169
W. KIM ROGERS / Contexts: The Landscapes of Human Life 191
NATALIA M. SMIRNOVA / Schutz’s Conception of Relevances
and its Influence on Social Philosophy 203
ANJANA BHATTACHARJEE / Demonstrating Mobility 219
AMY LOUISE MILLER / The Phenomenology of Self as Non-
Local: Theoretical Considerations and Research Report 227
SECTION III
LOGOS IN EXISTENTIAL COMMUNICATION (PSYCHIATRY)
SIMON DU PLOCK / An Existential–Phenomenological
Critique of Philosophical Counselling 249
CAMILO SERRANO BÓNITTO / Logos in Psychotherapy:
The Phenomena of Encounter and Hope in the
Psychotherapeutic Relationship 259
JARLATH FINTAN McKENNA / The Meaningfulness of Mental
Health as Being Within a World of Apparently Meaningless
Being 269
OLGA LOUCHAKOVA / Ontopoiesis and Union in the Prayer
of the Heart: Contributions to Psychotherapy and Learning 289
EVA SYŘIŠŤOVÁ / Das Lachen als die Kehrseite der
Existenziellen not. Beitrag zur Phänomenologie einer
Grenzsituation des Lebens 313
INDEX OF NAMES 319
APPENDIX / The Program of the Oxford Third World

Congress 325
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are now bringing to the public the fourth volume of papers from the
Third World Congress of Phenomenology, ‘‘Phenomenology World-Wide:
Phenomenology of the Logos and the Logos of Phenomenology,’’ held
in Oxford, August 15–21, 2004.
I want to thank all those who helped to prepare and to carry out this
marvelous Conference. First of all it is the initiative of William J. Smith
who brought us to Oxford, who with his wife Jadwiga and Gary Backhaus
have also performed with expertise the task of making the local arrange-
ments: their efforts merit our appreciation. Professor Grahame Lock of
Queen’s College and Matt Landrus from Wolfson College must be
thanked for their valuable contribution to the local organization. Tadeusz
Czarnik, my personal helper, cannot be forgotten.
I wish to express special thanks to Jeff Hurlburt, our secretary, for his
assiduous and dedicated work in preparing this gathering. The enthusiasm
and expertise of the authors who joined us from the entire world – forty
countries – made this Congress an epoch-making phenomenology event.
A-T.T.
vii
A.-T . T ymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana XCI, vii.
© 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands.
Wadham College.
THEMATIC INTRODUCTION
ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
UNVEILING THE LOGOS OF SCIENTIFIC

INTERROGATION
If we consider that humanity started on her path of civilization with the

experience of marveling, its special modality, namely the marveling about
nature, the world, life, merits special attention. To observe with wonder-
ment that an apple falls off the tree, that water falls downhill and we,
living beings, walk upon the earth in an upright posture and not upon
our head, that stars in the skies seem fixated not to fall down and yet
rotate ordinately, is not like any other marveling. It excites us to question
‘‘why?’’ and ‘‘how?’’, questions which are directed to the nature of things.
It prompts the logos of interrogation to address the reality surrounding
us and within us to inquire into their hidden workings, to use Leibniz’s
expression, to inquire into the ‘‘hidden workings of nature’’. This prompt-
ing appears at its incipient stage and – contrary to the present day
pragmatic attitude – is completely disinterested from any motivation
other than this to ‘‘know’’, to ‘‘understand’’, which are the innermost
motors of the human mind. Of course, it is not to be denied that the
inquiry into the nature of nature, into the reasons of reality, carries along
with it a practical interest. We may see how the discovery of rotation not
only gave human beings an astounding insight into the stability and
motion of material objects, a crucial insight into reality, allowing us to
find ways and means to transform the givens of reality to our practical
advantage (e.g. the will). However, this ‘‘disinterestedness’’ of the initial
marveling is important to acknowledge in order to see and understand
the origin of scientific inquiry. Indeed, like other modalities of marveling
(e.g. aesthetic, moral, artistic, sacred), this one is the fruit of the creative
human mind. However, unlike the other modes, marveling about the
reality which we otherwise accept upon its surface as a matter of fact, is
followed up by questioning addressed directly at prying into its nature,
reasons, principles: a scientific interrogation.
This interrogation, issuing from the human mind, identifies its initial
marveling with the work of its intellective logos. And, the intellective
logos is subordinate to its intrinsic device aloof of ‘‘subjective’’ and other
biases, pragmatic concerns, etc.
With this statement, we enter into the heart of the present day transition
of scientific inquiry. The Cartesian ‘‘clear and distinct ideas’’ of the intellec-
xi
A.-T . T ymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana XCI, xi–xvi.
xii ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
tive logos of the mind, which have bedazzled the inquirer to the point of
giving them an absolute priority with the advantage of yielding a stable,
constant reality of Newtonian physics, dominated the view of reality in
the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet this view could not stand the challenges
of new insights and approaches of the scientific research which followed.
Incontestably, we are now witnessing a great transition in the scientific,
social and cultural spheres of our world-view. It is being called ‘‘the end
of the machine’’.1 It is, however, not only the abandonment of the
Newtonian mechanical – strictly intellective – view of nature with its far-
reaching consequences, but the concurrent new appreciation of the hith-
erto dismissed and ignored phenomena of turbulence (instead of con-
stancy), haziness (instead of clarity), fleetness (instead of fixedness),
arbitrariness (instead of order), precisely in physics, acceptance of time
in mathematics, etc., that is transforming the scientific outlook.2 One of
the major consequences is that the hitherto dominating sharp demarcation
between the so-called ‘‘hard sciences’’ that assume the priority of the
intellective logos, and the ‘‘soft sciences’’, which like the empirical sciences,
social inquiries and humanities deal with other types of rationale, fell
down. All sciences and inquiries seem to tend in their methodologies and
approaches toward a mutual interaction and participation in their search
after the ‘‘inner workings’’ of life, profiting mutually from this interaction
in their progress. I have discussed this transitory phase earlier.3 Now, I
would like to draw from this transformatory breakthrough two important
insights about the logos of scientific inquiry.
1.
As a matter of fact, we seem to find in this ever increasing emergence of

rationalities which participate in the newly devised methodologies a
revealing insight into the nature of the logos. What is it that allows the
different modalities of reason, characterizing the newly emergent scientific
inquiries, to come into cooperation? How is it that the interrogative quest
of science which spreads in fragments, with gaps between them, let them
come together while they undergo infinite transformatory moves? It seems
indeed that the logos of scientific inquiry relies upon its primordial
intrinsic sense going through all infinitely extensive transformations. I
call it a dianoia thread running through the logos of life, which being
among other modalities of the logos privy to the cognitive logoic system
of the mind projects the participatory continuity of scientific inquiries. It
is in virtue of this infinitely transformable, dianoia sense intrinsic to the
UNVEILING THE LOGOS OF SCIENTIFIC INTERROGATION xiii
logos of life, that the interrogative sense of science falls within a common
network. It is as if the logos of life which is radiating all the moves of life
(organic, physical, psychic, mental) carries in its very nature pertaining
to life this intrinsic dianoia thread which allows the infinite transformabil-
ity of the logos in its modes in their interaction, coalescence, interfusion
– a constructive cooperation without losing continuity. This thread is
also congenital with human cognitive modalities. It is this intrinsic thread
of the scientific logos which accounts for the striking move of sciences
toward cooperation. Finally, it appears that it is also in virtue of the
intrinsic dianoia sense of the logos – which present day scientific inquiry
reveals – that this very inquiry may operate the transition from the stiff
abstractness of the intellective mode toward the fulgurating rays spread
by innumerable threads of sense of the logos of life.
The dianoia thread of scientific inquiry brings about this ‘‘new alliance’’
of the sciences. It accounts also for the alliance of science and the phenom-
enology of life to which we will come in the next section when we
introduce the second recent innovation of the sciences.
2.
Scientific Inquiry in Alliance with the Phenomenology of L ife
The second most significant turn in the scientific spirit of today is the
almost unanimously accepted change in the conception of the inquiring
agent himself.4 Until recently, the scientist, that is, inquiring agent, has
been conceived in abstraction of its human characters and endowments
as an impersonal neutral observer. Its neutrality was supposed to guaran-
tee the ‘‘objectivity’’ of the scientific result to be obtained. With Kojeve
came the proposal that this view of inquiry should be abandoned; that
the inquirer is in fact a human subject, who gathers observations from
his/her position, who obtains insights according to his/her talents, disposi-
tions, preparation, etc. Instead of floating in the air, the inquirer and his
work are situated.
First of all, the inquiry itself stems from the system of the human mind.
As a matter of fact, below the abstract work of the intellective logos
common to all human endeavor as a final ordering, structurizing, synthe-
sizing factor, the inquirer as subject participates in all the modalities of
the mental logos (communicative, sharing in life, psychic, vital, modalities,
and acts) as the directing factor of the interrogating logos and its central
organizer.
xiv ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
However, the subject of inquiry, as much as it represents the living

agent’s sensitive potency, does not suffice in its vital capacities to account
for the crucial ‘‘interrogative twist’’ of discovery – the special ‘‘intuitive
move’’ to lift from observation an imaginative link of the logos to the
next step, this step which should be an attainment of the expected but
not known. Neither does it suffice to function as the ground from which
to draw imaginative hints toward extending the discovery quest. For this
‘‘novum’’ to be attained in such inquiry the specific creative role of the
logos is necessary. I have introduced this missing and, for scientific
inquiry, essential factor of creativity of the inquiring subject earlier.5
Looking now at this crucial factor of scientific inquiry, we strike out in
a twofold direction toward further clarification of the logos of science
and philosophy.
Before we enter into this argument, let us emphasize that although I
have earlier described the human mind in its origin as essentially tributary
to creative imagination and its functioning (being carried by the creative
logos hence emergent), it has to be pointed out that this creative logos
becomes also a specific instrument of the human mind. It is (as mentioned
above) accountable for the specific step of the interrogative logos to
advance towards something new, not pre-delineated by the previous steps
of the interrogation. It is with this specific creative function of the logos
of mind that we will be dealing.
First of all, to have introduced the creative logos of the mind as the
crucial factor of the scientific subject brings us to a further, most significant
insight into the logos of science. The introduction of creativity into the
inquiring logos makes indeed a radical distinction in conceiving this
inquiry. That is, should we consider only the human subject as the agent
from the inquiring point of view of science? This consideration assumes
that it lies along the cognitive line of the mind under the intellective logos
as its guide. However, as I have pointed out above, the tremendous drive
of numerous new approaches and methods of scientific inquiries seeks to
break out of its rigid frames. Where to? It is, in fact, centering upon the
creative mind that opens the inquiry towards areas not restricted by the
cognitive framework. With the creative subject, we follow its involvement
into all the spheres which make out the living agent in its existential
functioning:6 organic, vital, psychic, communicative, etc. of life’s unfolding.
The scientific inquirer is involved and lead through life’s unfolding into
the universal play of forces as the human subject situating himself with
all its functional endowment in the great turmoil of the forces of life’s
becoming.
UNVEILING THE LOGOS OF SCIENTIFIC INTERROGATION xv
This new wave of scientific developments whose methodologies

differentiate ever further and stay ever on the outlook for further and
further prying into the workings of life, breaks the strictures of the
constitutive framework of cognitive consciousness and allows us to distin-
guish clearly the ways of differentiation in the modalities of the logos
occurring within the human mind itself. As I have emphasized constantly
in my earlier writings, it is the entrance of the creative imagination into
the evolution of the living subject that, bringing in the principles of the
creative logos, accounts for the crystallization of the human mind, creative
as such. Yet, as mentioned above, the creative logos of the mind is
differentiated in various modalities. Of these, the basic are: the
cognitive/constitutive logos with the intellective logos governing its pro-
ceedings, the moral logos of sharing in life, the logos of aesthetic creativity,
and the ontopoietic logos of becoming – life.
And here we are getting at the second point announced above. Indeed,
the creative logos showing itself intermittently in the scientific inquiry is
perhaps reached in metaphysical inquiry. It is indeed instrumental in the
progressive unveiling of the ontopoietic groundwork of all-reality-in-
becoming that is the gist of the philosophy/phenomenology of life.7 Is it
not at this groundwork that scientific inquiries diversify in innumerable,
singular proceeding sectors of reality, and, seeking a common connected-
ness at the ‘‘bottom of things’’, aim?
Following the logos of becoming – of the ontopoiesis of life – scientific
inquiry of the present day breaks with the strictures of the cognitive
system dominated by intellective reason and indicates the differentiation
of the creative logos in that system and of its own, promoting life, ‘‘poiein’’
within which the individualization of life takes place.
T he interrogative scientific logos, following this last trail, gives us crucial
insights into the diversifications of the modalities of the logos of life itself.
Concurrently it yields its crowning achievements. Following the meander-
ing of the genetic unfolding of the living being in its pivotal patterning,
self-individualization to its very incipient phase of becoming, we uncover
the primogenital stage upon which the logos of life launches and conducts
its life project. There comes to life a dynamic, infinitely modulated and
transformable ontopoietic network of the logos of life with its very own
rules and regulations conjoined with the life and earth systems.
In conclusion, let us emphasize the twofold insight which we have
reached from discussing the great transformations of scientific inquiry.
First comes the clarification of the modalities of the logos, crystallizing
the functions of the human mind. Second, we have discovered that via
xvi ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA
the creative-poietic logos of the mind we may not only identify the reason
of the emergent innumerable rationale springing forth in present day
scientific inquiry – breaking the strictures of the hitherto governing intel-
lective logos – but following it in its impetus we advance toward a
common network of all the reasons for life: the ontopoietic groundwork of
life’s individualization. The logos of life, holding the secrets of its scientific
queries, offers a basis for the new alliance of the sciences and founds an
ultimate groundwork for a phenomenological mathesis universalis.
NOTES
1 Cf. introduction to: Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos. Man’s New
Dialogue with Nature, Boulder, New Science Library, New York, Random House, 1984.
2 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘‘Ontopoiesis of Life as the new Philosophical Paradigm’’,
pp. 112–116, Analecta Husserliana, Volume LIX, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1999.
3 Cf. The study cited above as well as the ‘‘Theme’’ to the above cited volume.
4 Cf. The above cited study, pp. 16–26.
5 Ibid., pp. 16–26.
6 Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘‘The Human Condition-within-the-unity-of-everything-
there-is-alive and its logoic network’’, pp. xi–xxxi, Analecta Husserliana, Volume LXXXIX,
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005.
7 Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Impetus and Equipoise in the L ife Strategies of Reason,
Book IV of the treatise: L ogos and L ife, Analecta Husserliana, Volume LXX, Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
SECTION I
THE INTERROGATIVE LOGOS OF DISCOVERY
A dinner in common in the refectory of Wadham College: At left, in front, William Melaney
and Conrad Rockstad; at right, Eldon Wait.
MARIA GOŁASZEWSKA
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN

KNOWLEDGE
INTRODUCTION
In this paper the problem of the relation of scientific objectivity to human

values will be approached on various levels: first, it is important to define
the scope and meaning of the concepts introduced here. Secondly, a
critical attitude should be assumed towards different approaches to this
problem. Thirdly, we must consider what place axiology takes in the
system of sciences. Finally we must perform a specific transfer from
abstract thinking which assumes only pure possibilities to the attitude
assuming convictions, involvement and faith.
As regards the concepts introduced here, at present I can only generally
and hypothetically describe how I understand them:
– ‘‘Objective’’ or ‘‘objectivistic’’ means the same as ‘‘being a statement
made on the basis of facts perceived through the senses, described and
verbalized in accord with the principles of logically correct, discursive
thinking’’.
– ‘‘Value’’ will be defined as a ‘‘Humanistic coefficient of knowledge’’
(scientific knowledge included), i.e., the moment which includes the
structure of a person, his/her needs and a sense of existence in human
cognition. The humanistic coefficient can be described as the moment
in which objects and phenomena are introduced into a man’s world –
giving them a sense and importance, determining the ways of behaviour
towards them and using them in action. As an example we may use
the Black Stone, the most sacred object for Moslems, situated in Mecca,
in the Maab Temple: for non-believers it is simply a stone with a
definite chemical composition and structure, while for the faithful
Moslems it is an object of devotion (F. Znaniecki).
Another question is to what extent values can be accepted as ‘‘measur-
able’’, that is, as able to be expressed in quantitative, mathematical
categories. Is it possible to measure them in any way so that the knowledge
about values would be a specific counterpart to the knowledge based on
experientially recognized, measurable facts? Radical approaches to this
problem suggest that everything that cannot be measured should be
3
A.-T . T ymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana XCI, 3–20.
4 MARIA GOŁASZEWSKA
excluded from scientific knowledge. This kind of reductionist approach

would assume that the external, physical world is measurable and can be
described with a mathematical formula; while a man’s world, for which
values are significant characteristics, is immeasurable. A closer look at
this problem, however, shows that physical measures are not as exact as
it might seem, and, at the same time, in the area of human affairs and
values we make use of certain measures (we recognize some values as
higher and others as lower; we see that values are realized to a greater
or lesser extent, etc.). This allows us to assume that apart from physical
metrum there exists a certain meta-physical ‘‘metrum’’. It is obvious that
a reductionism in science which is too far-reaching has the effect that the
phenomena characterized by the ‘‘humanistic coefficient’’ are not taken
into consideration ex definitione.
On the global scale the intellectual situation manifests itself as a great
variety of attitudes and fundamental theses which sometimes are contra-
dictory and opposing each other, and sometimes complementary. There
also occurs a tendency towards integration, and towards one, non-contra-
dictory and, at the same time, universal system of scientific knowledge.
In this universalist trend nowadays there occurs an orientation to spiritu-
ality, caused by the fact that philosophical reductionism has proved too
limited and one-sided, and incompatible with the idea of a fully human
being living with high super-vital values and accepting that life on the
earth has a meaning. This intellectual situation is also reflected in Poland
– there too are representatives of analytical philosophy, neo-positivism
as well as neo-Thomism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and recently also
post-modernism. The freedom of proclaiming one’s own views and
approach in philosophy, which prevails today, creates a vast arena for
conflicting world outlooks, religions and philosophies.
THE QUEST FOR THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE
Various branches of science have pretended to have reached the truth,

understood as what is essential, or what constitutes the basis for existence.
They include mathematics – which was once recognized as the ‘‘Queen
of all sciences’’ – logic, physics, and the humanities.
In the system of sciences mathematics performs two basic functions: it
is a specific science, an autonomous deductive system of knowledge in
itself. Besides this, it is an important element of numerous methods of
scientific research, first of all in the natural sciences; but it also appears,
though in a more limited extent, in the methodologies of the humanities
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 5
(e.g. psychology, sociology). Traditionally, mathematics is described as

the knowledge of numbers and geometrical figures – in the history of
culture the functions of mathematics or of numbers and geometrical
figures expanded and, e.g., became linked with magic, astrology and
religion; and finally they came into being in everyday life as ‘‘lucky’’ or
‘‘unlucky’’ numbers. Modern times, on the other hand, have made mathe-
matics ‘‘a strict science’’, isolated from current events, magic or religion.
In philosophy, particularly in modern philosophy, mathematical objects
became an argument in the controversy over the mode of existence of
ideas. Since ‘‘mathematical objects’’, i.e., numbers, rules and notions, are
not merely states of consciousness, we must also accept that ideas –
concepts – have their own, specific, ‘‘for-themselves’’ mode of existence
(the controversy between the phenomenologists and the neo-positivists
about psychologism).
It might seem that mathematics ex definitione is a ‘‘strict’’ science using
only univocal and well defined notions – there are, however, descriptions
of mathematics sensu largo which include the humanistic coefficient. In
the work W hat Mathematics Is by two eminent mathematicians R. Coraut
and H. Robbins, we read that mathematics as an expression of human
thought reflects free will, a contemplative mind and a striving to aesthetic
perfection. Its basic elements are: logic and intuition, analysis and con-
struction, generalization and individualization. Different traditions
emphasized some or others of those opposing powers; the fight for their
synthesis is decisive for the vitality, usefulness and great importance of
mathematics.
Mathematics in our day is characterized by the following basic tenden-
cies: the increasing role of the most universal schema and, connected with
it, the development of the methods of abstract algebra; great development
in probability calculus and statistics; the expanding range of applications
comprising mostly technical and natural sciences and technologies of
production (e.g. automatics, space engineering, computer technologies).
We must admit that the structure of mathematical science has been
impressively expanded. But it is also important that mathematics should
not be absolutized as abstract knowledge, but that critical discussions
should point at its obvious limitations and prospects of development.
From the point of view of our discussion, we are interested in logic
from four aspects: what logic is sensu largo; the absolutization of logic
according to Frege’s conception; the general sense and particular senses
of the applications of logic; classical, mathematical and alternative logics.
In ancient times logic was understood very broadly (logikos – in accord

with reasoning) and was included in philosophy. Today logic comprises
particular disciplines like logical semantics, dealing with the signifying
functions of expressions, aimed at the elimination of ambiguity and tracing
errors in reasoning; knowledge about the essence of truth and falsity;
formal logic, i.e., a theory of logical reasoning; the methodology of the
sciences; analysis and criticism of pre-scientific ways of reasoning and
conducting verbal disputes; the technique of mental work regarding its
formal correctness; the problem of the position of logic in the system of
sciences. Broadly understood in this way, logic covers an extremely vast
area of knowledge and activity. In fact, however, it does so in one aspect
only, namely in the formal and structural aspect, without getting involved
in the humanistic sense, e.g., the meanings of concepts, values, or evalua-
tions. Undoubtedly, the starting point here is so-called ‘‘formal logic’’,
i.e., logic sensu stricto, the theory of forms of correct reasoning and the
theory of the structure of deductive systems.
G. Frege constructed a strict, symbolic conceptual language, and since
then the construction of symbolic languages (they are the so-called ‘‘for-
malized languages’’) has become the job of logicians. Pursuing the idea
of formalizing all science, Frege put forward a thesis that mathematics
can be reduced to logic. To put it in another way: all scientific knowledge
is a system of formalized language.
Maybe logic transcends itself, i.e., it is really involved in any reasoning,
since it posits the postulates of ‘‘logical correctness’’, ‘‘lack of contradic-
tion’’, ‘‘univocality’’, etc. In particular, in the aspect of human behaviour
it is important that logic makes communication between people and
mutual understanding easier and, sometimes, possible. Thus, it is highly
useful or even necessary for creating a universal system of scientific
knowledge.
However, ‘‘heuristic knowledge’’, the intuitive discovering of new truths,
is also an important moment. We must also take into account the fact
that there exists more than one universal system of logic. I mean here
the moment of ‘‘logical values’’, i.e., the property of statements which
consists in their agreement or disagreement with reality. Classical logic
is bivalent: each statement is either true or false. In our day bivalent logic
has been recognized as insufficient, and ‘‘many-valued logic’’ has come
into being.
If we follow this path, we shall find traces of various ‘‘logics’’ or ‘‘para-
logics’’. For instance, logics that came into being in Asia – in China and
India – are different. We can also speak about the specific logic of mentally
disturbed persons (a paranoiac lives in two worlds and each of them has
a different way of reasoning). There exists extra-discursive and pre-reflec-
tive behaviour where, however, we can find logical structures applied
spontaneously, intuitively, sometimes even unconsciously. Finally, there
emerges the conception of ‘‘open logic’’, i.e. logic which cares not so much
for the creation of a perfect abstract system as for getting a chance to
fully explain phenomena and states of affairs that take place in the
anthroposphere and in the physical world. For instance, it would be logic
of potentialities, and its traces could be found in the art where even a
masterpiece is merely one of a number of propositions, and univocality
has the same rights as equivocality.
Physics also started as that branch of theoretical philosophy which
dealt with the general properties of material bodies and all natural phen-
omena. In this sense Democritus, the author of atomism, was a physicist.
It was as late as at the time of Galileo and Newton that physics became
a particular science, and its rapid development in the 19th and 20th
centuries has the result that nowadays it has developed into an extensive
domain of science with many branches including theoretical physics and
chemical physics.
Thus, physics obviously became knowledge about matter, but it has
also attempted to move towards a general theory of being. In this way,
as it were, it returned to the ancient understanding of its tasks. This was
how the neo-positivists’ physicalism, proclaiming the programme in which
all concepts of empirical sciences can be reduced to the language of
physics, came into being. The postulate of the unity of knowledge is
proclaimed. Finally, a thesis was put forward that all knowledge should
use terms of an empirical, intersensual and inter-subjective character.
Thus, it is the farthest-reaching programme of ‘‘objectivity’’ of cognition,
rejecting the humanistic coefficient. Only these elements of reality are
recognized as the object of science, which can be conceived as empirical
facts and explicitly defined.
The possibility of explaining all phenomena – including the anthro-
posphere – through their reduction to the structure and activity of the
primitive energy, e.g. thinking reduced to energetic transformations of
elementary particles or waves of primitive energy, became the perspective
of the universal science understood in this way, and based on physics.
Maybe, this far-reaching reductionism could find common points with
mystical pantheism – and this is that in which the paradox of physical-
ism consists.
Let us now turn to the humanities. There also the problem of ‘‘objectiv-
ism-humanism’’, i.e., respecting the humanistic coefficient in research
work, manifests itself very clearly. We shall consider the domains of
axiology and history.
Axiology has been studied in two ways: 1) as a general theory of values,
a branch of philosophy analysing the content of concepts and general
ideas connected with the domain of values, or 2) as a more particular
branch of knowledge investigating real phenomena that take place in the
anthroposphere. And so, general axiology analyses the concept of value,
attempting to define what value is (the following definitions of value are
most commonly accepted: that which is valuable, that which can satisfy
needs). Further, attempts at a classification of values have been made
(cognitive, ethical, aesthetic, vital, personal, social, and ideological values
are distinguished). Finally, axiology tries to establish a hierarchy of values
(traditionally, the following three highest values are mentioned: truth,
good, and beauty), and searches for the criteria for evaluation.
Particular axiological disciplines include, first of all, ethics and aesthet-
ics. My professional interests are the reason why I shall speak here mostly
about aesthetics. Still, these disciplines are, in a certain respect, similar
to each other. The statement that aesthetics is the study of beauty is,
perhaps, correct, but it is insufficient and may lead to hypostasis of
concepts, i.e., to recognizing them as real beings. We do not know what
beauty is, we do not know the mode of its existence, so we should state
precisely what aesthetics actually deals with. I assume that the object of
this branch of knowledge is the ‘‘aesthetic situation’’. This consists of the
following elements: the artist, the work of art, the recipient and the
aesthetic value as the supreme factor. We must also state precisely what
this ‘‘aesthetic value’’ is. I define it as the artistic ‘‘rationalization’’ of
what is illogical in the human world, so that it can function in this world
in accord with the laws of the existence and development of humanity.
This is where the controversy between the ‘‘objectivistic’’ and the
‘‘humanized’’ appears. Namely, each of the elements of an aesthetic situa-
tion may be treated as a ‘‘thing’’. It may be ‘‘reified’’, reduced to a fact
measurable in accord with a physical system, or it may be endowed with
the ‘‘humanistic coefficient’’ (values, evaluations, the moment of under-
standing, experiencing or emotional attitude, etc.). For instance, a work
of art can be described as any physical object is described, measured and
evaluated. Yet, one can also search for its aesthetic value, the beauty
which is actualized in the aesthetic experience. A question arises in what
way the cognitive attitude that allows one to reach the value of a work
of art can be achieved. Well, this requires suspending the objectivist

distance characteristic for the ‘‘aesthetics from the outside’’ and taking
the position of an ‘‘aesthetics from the inside’’, that is, inclusive of the
personal aesthetic experience aimed at the recognition of a definite aesthe-
tic value (the beauty characteristic for it – e.g. the tragic, the comic,
solemnity, poetry) in the cognitive attitude. Then, speaking of aesthetic
value and of the work of art, we can directly use the experiences necessary
in all contacts both in the aesthetic and cognitive attitude.
Aesthetics has its practical references, it helps in the formation of an
‘‘aesthetic personality’’ of the recipients of art, that is, of each of us. Ethics
goes even further in the direction of life practice. The utilitarian element
is the construction of norms of moral behaviour. Here we have to do, as
it were, with the humanistic coefficient in actu, in action, and then the
postulate of ‘‘objectivism, mathematization, the rejection of all valua-
tions,’’ loses its sense ex definitione. Although, for methodological purity
we can adopt a model of an ethically insensitive man, yet it leads to
moral numbness or even pathological ‘‘moral insanity’’, just as the lack
of aesthetic sensitivity, and particularly its introduction in the educational
processes, would lead to the formation of a one-sided, ‘‘flat’’ personality
prone to stress.
History is the study searching for the truth about the past of mankind.
But how is this ‘‘truth’’ and the ‘‘past’’ understood? Here we can distin-
guish several standpoints and several styles in which history is cultivated.
Two cognitive attitudes of historians are in opposition to each other: 1)
History is a set of documents and an archive of all source records – thus,
it is focused not so much on the truth about the past of mankind as on
the truth of the historical documents, and the ‘‘past’’ is the past of
historiography; 2) History is the search for the real factors and authors
of the transformations of mankind in its history – thus, it may be an
image, a reconstruction or historical structuring of the more or less deeply
hidden causes of changes that took place in the past and the meaning of
these changes.
Collecting materials, documents and relics as well as their analysis
appears to the ‘‘objectivistic’’ historians as the only correct way of con-
ducting research in their discipline and reaching the ‘‘historical truth’’. It
is sometimes similar in sociology. Yet, bookcases full of documents are
not enough to make a science; when the moment of the synthesis and
structuring of history comes, the objectivists are helpless facing the threat
of imagination, emotion, reinterpretation, intuition or, finally, the overall
vision of the development and striving of individuals and societies to
reach definite goals, which transcends all documentation. The ‘‘objectiv-

ists’’ also see a threat in the thesis that at some moments in history ideas
were clearly supreme to the current life of the community. Particularly
strong resistance is evoked by every attempt at searching for the sense of
history, while for a man the most important issue is the question of
meaning and purpose, and structuring of history so that both an indivi-
dual and definite communities may find their place in the historical course
of transformations.
Tackling the issue of the sense and structuring of reality, we have
reached the next problem that will now be considered: the styles of
studying philosophy in light of the controversy between knowledge under-
stood in an objectivist way and knowledge understood in a humanistic
way.
STYLES
Let us now move towards scientific or rather philosophical syntheses, to

the attempts at conceiving the deepest and the most general knowledge
about the world and man, which is the most difficult to conceive and
which abstracts from what is fragmentary, one-sided and too primitive
to explain the sense of scientific knowledge. This is done, first of all, in
philosophical systems.
Generally, we can say that particular sciences (or branches of science)
also adopt – more or less consciously – definite assumptions of a general
and theoretical character as regards the nature and mode of existence of
reality. Even radically ‘‘objective’’ knowledge reaches a moment in reason-
ing when it must adopt its primary assumptions ‘‘on trust’’, as obvious
without any arguments, unknowable, enveloped in mystery.
Secondly, all structuring of the world requires a decision made not so
much on the basis of logical argumentation as on the basis of the convic-
tion that, in a given issue, an intuition is right or wrong. In this sense,
for instance, the neo-positivist thesis that the only ‘‘true scientific charac-
ter’’ consists in adopting a mathematical and experimental method reveals
itself as a specific scientific fiction, as a myth operating in the same way
as the humanities which accept the thesis about the humanistic coefficient,
that is, including evaluations and specific rules of human behaviour in
their investigations, analyses and interpretation.
In order to understand and interpret particular philosophical
approaches we must recognize the tendency to absolutize one’s own
achievements which sometimes may be important, but are merely frag-
mentary. From the point of view of the humanistic coefficient it is quite

understandable, but it does not agree with the principle of consequent
objectivization. And this is the way in which the attitude of aversion to
other people’s views and the intentional ‘‘inability to understand them’’
(since they are not compatible with my own view, which is the only one
that is right) arise.
In order to understand the sense of the above-mentioned controversy
more clearly, we must accept two kinds of experience: 1) sense experience,
and 2) internal experience – the personal experience of values, needs,
religious feelings or emotions.
Finally, we must accept that we have to do with two general styles of
constructing general, philosophical theories: 1) formalized quantitative
knowledge; 2) knowledge open to cognitive pluralism, accepting sense
cognition, mathematized approaches, and formalization of language, but
transcending these and moving towards the cognition of immeasurable
phenomena of the physical world and the anthroposphere, and emphasiz-
ing qualitative approaches.
The current world outlook of a modern European reflects both the
tradition of philosophical thinking and the most popular, contemporary
currents of ‘‘public (current) philosophy’’. We can obviously also find here
traces of common-sense thinking; it also happens that definite philosophi-
cal systems, as they become commonly known, accepted and fashionable
(e.g. Sartre’s existentialism in the period of its greatest popularity), are
included in this current world outlook.
As regards world outlook, we can distinguish three types of attitudes:
– persons with a primary general education are characterized by naive

credulity;
– persons with a secondary level of general education are characterized
by naive realism as regards the mode of existence of material things,
the tendency to create hypostases of concepts, the literal interpretation
of the products of the imagination, myths and works of art, as well as
an inclination to fideism;
– the intellectuals preserve the critical distance in the sphere of cognition.
The materialistic orientation (including Marxism–Leninism–Stalinism

which still remains a vivid problem and is not merely theoretically, but
also directly, interesting for the present generations since, in some way
or another, it affected almost every European). This orientation tries to
replace all spirituality with materialism transformed from a philosophical
approach into a ‘‘scientific Weltanschauung’’. This world outlook was

then removed by a political ideology which, in turn, transformed into an
economical theory characterized by voluntarism. This changed into the
practice of power and the atrocities of totalitarianism in the ruthless and
savage struggle for power.
Undoubtedly, Marxism included a large number of attractive and
sometimes even right watchwords like equality, justice, faith in the future,
or striving to achieve universal stabilization. Yet, it is known that
abstracted fragments do not always prove to be right in the context of a
system or in confrontation with social reality. Besides, when they are
treated as clichés, they may be re-interpreted in the way opposite to the
initially accepted assumptions. The ideology of national socialism seems
to be the most dramatic example of the contradiction between watchwords
and their true meanings. And so, Alfred Rosenberg’s book Der Mythus
des 20 Jahrhundert (1st edition in 1930) is entitled Eine Wertung der
seelisch-geistigen Gestaltenkmpfe unserer Zeit [Valuation of the spiritual
wars of our times]. The contents of the book as well as the approach to
the fundamental issues of the anthroposphere can be seen even from the
titles of its Parts and Chapters: Part One ‘‘Das Ringen des Werte’’ [The
fight of values], Chapters ‘‘Rasse und Rasenseele’’ [The Race and the
soul of the race], ‘‘Liebe und Ehre’’ [Love and honour], ‘‘Mystik und
Tat’’ [Mystic and Deed]; Part Two ‘‘Das Wesen der germanischen Kunst’’
[The essence of German art], Chapters ‘‘Das rassische Schoenheitsideal’’
[The racial ideal of beauty], ‘‘Wille und Trieb’’ [Will and Instinct],
‘‘Persoenlichkeits und Sachlichkeitsstil’’ [Personal and objective style],
‘‘Der aestetische Wille’’ [Aesthetic will]. Part Three is devoted to consid-
erations upon the organization of a ‘‘German state’’.
Reductionism, started by pragmatists, is the tendency to eliminate
metaphysical problems from thinking, to avoid questions aimed at the
most general matters, to treat issues like value, sense, and the aim of
existence as ‘‘apparent’’ questions that cannot be solved and belong not
to science but to art or pure fantasy with no counterparts in reality, that
is, in empirically cognized reality. W. James, the father of pragmatism,
was a physician, a philosopher and a psychologist. His (pragmatic) philos-
ophy was, at the same time, a method and theory of truth. The method
consisted in the introduction of the concept of practical consequences
into philosophical considerations: The essential thing is what practical
consequences issue from a given theory. If there is no practical difference
even between extremely different theses, then, the whole difference is
merely verbal. Thus, there are no rigid principles, closed systems or

acceptance of the absolute.
As regards the theory of truth, the pragmatists’ fundamental thesis
claimed that the true is what is useful. The acceptance of usefulness as
the only criterion of truth signified the acceptance of the relativity of
truth. And so, for instance, the question whether God exists will be
answered by a pragmatist: the thesis of God’s existence is right if it brings
about some practical benefits. John Dewey, who proclaimed himself in
favour of instrumentalism, was one of the most radical pragmatists. He
proclaimed the following theses: 1) human representations are not cogni-
tions of being, but instruments of action; 2) the criterion of validity is
reduced to common social acceptance; 3) truth and good undergo trans-
formations depending on the situation in a given time, and the type of
society; 4) metaphysics is useless, since one cannot investigate anything
that is beyond sense experience; 5) religion is a personal matter and
cannot be considered on the level of truth–falsity. Dewey is described as
an instrumentalist, relativist and empiricist of an anti-metaphysical atti-
tude. And such an attitude unavoidably leads to spiritual impoverishment.
Reductionism includes also analytical philosophy. It raised objections
against classical philosophy, claiming that instead of searching for truth
it creates intellectual fictions, and that philosophical systems emerge in
spite of the fact that it is possible to create a system comprising all
phenomena, explaining the nature of being, cognition, and everything
that is transcendent to the world. Analytical philosophy stated that a
philosopher’s task consists merely in conducting an analysis of concepts
without considering to what extent they regard systemic solutions – be
it materialism, idealism, sensualism or agnosticism. Analytical philosophy
proclaims ‘‘logical atomism’’, which is pluralistic in character. This is
why, remaining within mathematical logic, it admitted activistic inter-
pretations accepting that elementary units of the real world include events,
conventionalist interpretations (the conventional character of scientific
knowledge), as well as materialistic and even Platonic ones. Instead of a
philosophical system there emerges a mosaic of interpretational possibilit-
ies which does not lead to cognition, but merely to a conviction that
cognition is an extremely complicated thing. Anyway, the aggressive plan
of analytical philosophy to eliminate all metaphysics and religion from
philosophical thinking proved successful to a large extent. This orientation
won great popularity, became highly influential and caused restraint in
taking up humanistic problems and essential questions regarding existence
and man. Its only merit was the severe criticism of many kinds of abortive
philosophy giving too hasty solutions and accepting a priori that which
required analyses. Sterilisation of metaphysical thinking caused the disap-
pearance of broader philosophical interests, the eager limitation to frag-
mentary and secondary problems as well as the attitude of non-creative
development of thinking and dwelling on issues that could once more be
submitted to logical analysis with no cognitive involvement.
Another of the reductionistic orientations is neo-positivism, sometimes
called ‘‘the third positivism of the Vienna Circle’’, ‘‘logical positivism’’ or
‘‘physicalist empiricism’’. It is characterized by: 1) empiricism – sense
experience is the only source of cognition; 2) positivism – only facts are
the object of cognition; neither transcendent beings nor the essence of
things are; 3) physicalism – physics is the most perfect system of concepts,
and it is what all scientific knowledge, including analyses of a philosophi-
cal nature, should be reduced to. Thus, it has been claimed that all
statements included in metaphysics are not false, uncertain and unjustified,
but simply nonsensical. Questions about the general nature of being, the
sense of existence, etc., are apparent. There was also an attempt at the
elimination of the theory of values – both ethical and aesthetic ones. They
cannot be derived from knowledge about facts, and they merely show the
human need of assuming a postulative attitude. It is only the language
of ethics and aesthetics, created in the course of the development of
culture, which can be examined.
Neo-positivism is mostly attacked for the internal contradictions inher-
ent in it, and the lack of arguments supporting its major theses. We may
also raise another objection: it is a style of thinking that leads nowhere,
enclosed in formalism and not taking into consideration the humanistic
coefficient in its attempts at a theoretical description of the anthropo-
sphere. It seems that the technical mastery in posing and solving formal
problems of knowledge, which has been achieved by many theoreticians,
may deserve admiration. Yet, for philosophy involved in values it is
insufficient. Perfection of language and linguistic analyses are not enough
to make philosophy as it is understood in the tradition and the present
of a thinking human.
For centuries philosophy has been secularized. Nowadays it is mani-
fested mainly in the two systems that are no longer reductionistic, but
maximalistic: phenomenology and existentialism. Philosophy has been
separated from theology; philosophers have simply renounced the discus-
sion of religious subjects. Neither do they proclaim, e.g., atheistic theses.
They do not tend to correct or improve theology – they have assumed
the attitude of indifference as regards faith. Maybe, this tending away
from God has its source in personal experiences: E. Husserl started to

doubt the reality of the world and God’s power and justice after World
War I, while Sartre proclaimed the senselessness of existence after World
War II. Anyway, the extensive influence exerted by these two philosophers
and the major theses of their systems upon the intellectual circles causes
the now fairly common transformation of the conception of philosophy
towards its secularization. Even a believer must accept that his faith is
merely an act of fideism (e.g., in accord with St. John’s thesis about
passive mysticism claiming that God Himself selects souls which He
intends to call to faith, while human will is helpless).
Obviously, approaches of this kind are not new – they have been taken
up anew and presented in the attractive cloak of novelty; hence their
social significance. It seems that a modern thinking man is characterized
by a high level of criticism, doubts and the desire to keep on investigating.
This phenomenon need not be basically negative, yet it leads to distrust
in accepting universalist philosophical systems and creeds. In conse-
quence, through ‘‘confessional pluralism’’, it may lead to complete
indifference towards convictions and faith, and to the disappearance of
the need for spiritual development.
THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL ‘‘I’’
I wish to complete this necessarily brief review of modern philosophical

approaches and conceptions regarding the model of science with a discus-
sion abandoning the theoretical and abstract level of generalizations and
potentialities for the area of individual experiences.
The world is the domain of scientific research, which is accessible for
many people. It is inter-subjectively given and measurable and verifiable
facts operate in it. The individual self is the opposite extreme, which is
what is given to an individual person and about which no one else can
state anything. Between these extremes there is a vast domain of knowl-
edge which is sometimes scientific and sometimes human.
Why has human knowledge been opposed to scientific knowledge?
Surely, the latter has been produced by man too. Yet, we intuitively
perceive that such an opposition is justified, for science has become
remote from the needs of the average man, giving him no answers to the
questions about the sense and value of life, which are most important to
him. Human knowledge is concerned with this very sphere – it is con-
cerned with ourselves as well as other men. The need and search for this
knowledge cause, to a certain extent, every person to be philosophically
engaged, for it is philosophy that can bring the answer to these most
important questions. It oscillates between my own self about which no
one apart from me can know or say anything, and the essence of this self
includes a relation to values.
Human knowledge is the knowledge about values, how to preserve and
multiply them. It requires definite behaviour towards the world and
demands action. It does not allow unbiased observation of facts, because
facts of human life are always ether positive or negative, either good or
evil. Human knowledge strives to multiply the good.
Value – sense – primacy of truth. The essence of values consists in a
specific ‘‘rationalization’’ of that which is illogical, that which, though it
exists in the physical world or in the anthroposphere, has not been
cognizable so far or is not knowable for a human at all. By ‘‘rationaliza-
tion’’ I mean the intellectual mastering of the situation of illogicality and
introducing it into consciousness or practical life. Thus, values are not
beings that exist in themselves. They exist in a complex situation compris-
ing the world and man, his consciousness and inclinations, contradictions
(oppositions) that occur in himself and in the world and which he tries
to overcome with his active attitude, striving for a synthesis.
One of the vital needs of a thinking man is recognizing and understand-
ing how values operate in his life. As we achieve this, the feeling that we
learn the truth – this truth which we want to learn most, and which is
most worthy of being learned as the truth of life – increases.
Can values be the object of scientific research? Are questions about
them merely apparent? Because of their objective-subjective character,
values are potentially inherent in objects, while they are actualized and
realized in acts of consciousness. Their examination assumes a possibility
of reaching the so-called internal experience, i.e., the deep structures of
personality. It also assumes that the structures of actual reality and the
structures of logical thinking are parallel.
‘‘Sense’’, in turn, is treated as a category of final thinking – ‘‘something
has a sense’’, means that the real existence of this something is included
within the most general structures of the whole, fills a definite function
there and constitutes a necessary element of that whole.
The criterion of truth is the lack of internal contradiction, i.e., the
compatibility of elements in the structure of the superior whole.
Spirituality – sanctity – the absolute are values which are among the
highest in the hierarchy and belong to the summum bonum plane. Generally
every man respects these values, reveres them and longs for them. He
would like to get closer, e.g., to spirituality, to the subordination of
instinctive life and the vital values to those highest values. Yet, he does
not always work on it.
Spirituality and sanctity are phenomena which occur only in the
anthroposphere, while the absolute transcends both the anthroposphere
and the physical world. Because of the moment of transcending, cognition
of the Absolute may be treated as a Mystery or a Being attainable only
through mystic intuition.
Hope against all hope – this metaphorical expression signifies a certain
intellectual ‘‘virtue’’ whose components are: courage in thinking (not
avoiding even the most difficult questions), fortitude of thinking (not
being discouraged by failures in the search for truth), perseverance in
thinking (systematic mental work), and responsibility of thinking (not
being satisfied with partial and uncertain results of one’s intellectual
work).
Doctrines – life – fulfilment are the three supports of private, personal
thinking, the private philosophy of a man searching for truth. Is it right
to attach much importance to philosophical systems, theories and theses?
Philosophers are often asked the question how all this becomes known
and from where are the truth-syntheses derived. It is not enough to say
that we observe facts, because facts require analyses, interpretations, and
constructing of wholes – syntheses. It is the case, however, that the
structures of reality are homologous with the structures of thinking and
that there is a specific parallel between the structures of phenomena and
the logical structures of thinking.
We have been given a definite period of time for our lives on the Earth
– among people and objects, among ideas and religious yearnings. We
have been given certain typical, cultural and individual properties. Finally,
we have been given a definite amount of energy and abilities which allow
us to use this energy in a rational way. If we are not deprived of freedom,
we make a choice about how we wish to use our life energy – what to
turn it into. It sometimes happens that people spend their energy on
doing evil or on pessimistic considerations of the transientness and trivial-
ity of the world and of themselves. To be able to use one’s life energy in
accord with the optimal plan of existence, to achieve the fulfillment of
expectations worthy of man, it is necessary to assume the attitude of
acceptance of life and respect for the supreme values, particularly for the
Summum Bonum, the Absolute, God.
When are our intellectual hopes fulfilled so that we shall personally
touch the truth and participate in it? Such fulfilment is achieved only by
few spiritual leaders. Epiphanic, transient fulfilment comes to a man as a
very intensive spiritual experience that may transform his whole life.
Finally, there is fulfilment that comes as a quiet grace of hope that,
though we may achieve little, we still participate with all our personality
in being warmed up by the warmth of the truth.
There still remains the critical and distant attitude: hope versus hope-
lessness. A man draws a picture of the world of high values and desires
to participate in it, yet he is always confronted with inhibitions, repug-
nance, fights, crimes, the triumph of evil. He asks himself why it is so.
There are several possible answers to this question: 1) satan’s intervention
is the reason for the spreading of evil; 2) like the good, evil belongs to
the natural structure of the anthroposphere, it is a specific dialectical
necessity; 3) evil, as an insufficient recognition of the good and a moment
of trial or test of man’s good will, belongs to the necessary stage of
development; 4) evil is a manifestation of human weakness, the instinct
of fight, aggression and imperfection of the species; 5) manifestations of
evil should be treated as cases of ordinary mistakes having no great
importance in the anthroposphere. Which of these options is right? Maybe
each of them is, at least to a certain extent.
To cherish hope against all hope means to hold a conviction that the
good is stronger than evil, that a man can cognize the truth within his
own personal limits and that expectations may come true. Human knowl-
edge is founded on the hope and expectation of fulfilment – scientific
knowledge is based on calculated principles and models. There is no basic
contradiction here, but a lot of intellectual effort, responsibility and
courage is required to make these two opposites meet and see the light
of truth in both of them.
Human knowledge – knowledge about oneself, about another man,
about values – is knowledge ‘‘without arguments’’, intuitive, but, at the
same time, it is connected with understanding and based on ‘‘the logic of
the heart’’, emotion, and even dreams. We know about another man not
only when we base our knowledge on empirical proofs and experience,
but also – or, maybe, first of all – when we feel his closeness, when we
love him, when we trust that, even if he is the worst, he will change and
become fully human. This is the hope against all hope applied in practice.
A mother who does not lose faith in her son though he is a rake and a
thief may serve as an example here. She is not convinced by any rational
arguments that her son should be punished, deprived of a chance to
spend his life on entertainment, etc. And it sometimes happens that the
mother’s blind love wins: the son changes and finally becomes an honest
man. Let us now compare the traits of scientific knowledge and human
knowledge:
Scientific, objective, formalized Human, humanistic knowledge

knowledge Requiring no assumed
formalization
using artificially created language using natural, simple language

which is understandable only to with which it is easy to
circles of specialists communicate
striving to achieve a fully taking into account, apart from

discursive character discoursive, intuition, visions,
presumptions
strictly limited to experimental going beyond experimental and

and logical argumentation logical argumentation (knowledge
without arguments)
striving to achieve computer-type satisfied with natural

perfection understandability and taking into
account the moment of ambiguity
scientific, objective knowledge human, humanistic knowledge

striving to cognize facts and drawing no limits to cognition
nothing but facts and relations
between them
quantitative qualitative
only that knowledge is accepted taking into account the
as scientific which is included in humanistic coefficient and
mathematical – logical – sensual axiological problems
conception
rejecting questions of a taking up metaphysical problems

metaphysical nature, i.e. those
problems going beyond the sphere
of matter
claiming primacy of striving to find an explanation of

methodological perfection over the basis phenomena of the
the issue of whether a given anthroposphere for the sake of

science serves something perfecting of humanity
accepting sense experience only accepting internal experience
Jagellonian University
LEO ZONNEVELD
SCIENCE IN MIND: EXPLORING THE LANGUAGE OF

THE LOGOS
Towards the midst of this mystic night, in which Anaximander’s problem of Becoming was
wrapped up, Heraclitus of Ephesus approached and illuminated it by a divine flash of
lightning. ‘I contemplate Becoming,’ he exclaimed, ‘and nobody has so attentively watched
this eternal wave-surging and rhythm of things. And what do I behold? Lawfulness, infallible
certainty, ever equal paths of Justice, condemning Erinyes behind all transgressions of the
laws, the whole world the spectacle of a governing justice and demoniacally omnipresent
natural forces subject to justice’s sway. I do not behold the punishment of that which has
become, but the justification of Becoming.’1
Heraclitus of Ephesus claims to announce the everlasting Word (Lege or

Logos) according to which all things are one, making it the unifying
feature of his system. It was the Logos itself that related all things,
provided them with substance and form, and held all of existence together
in cosmic freedom. Here, in Nietzsche’s handwritten notes, Heraclitus
criticizes his predecessors and contemporaries for their failure to see the
rationally structured unity of experience beyond the world of semantic
and deductive complexity, if only they could but discern its shape.
The world of organic and social evolution is one of change, adaptation
and transformation. Organisms are goal-orientated systems, and living
stuff tends to express itself towards the consummation of an innately
ordained manifestation or purpose. Organic activity seems to be guided
by the desire to avoid a condition of irrevocable physical equilibrium
with its environment. Visible evidence from plant life reassures us that
living matter continues trying to manifest itself in this way even when
seriously hampered. Once a living organism feels that its access to its
self-manifestation is hampered it will creatively attempt to reach for its
full appearance in nature by some other route. Living matter, capable of
organic growth, acquires this remarkable capacity for re-orientation and
self-complexification, by greater internal restructuring.
This all-embracing process of change and becoming, leading to ever
increasing interiorisation and individuation, extends itself also into the
life-long changes in neuron connectivity in the human brain. A most
remarkable feature of the brain is its plasticity; its ability to continuously
adapt to, and learn from, its experience throughout one’s life. The process
21
22 LEO ZONNEVELD
of learning shows measurable physiological correlates in terms of changes

at individual synapses, as well as modifications of the stimulus–response
properties of individual neurons. While involved in the process of perceiv-
ing, evaluating, validating, classifying and ordering a continuous stream
of sensory data, the human person finds ways to reorient and express
her/himself, articulating and embedding experience within the cultural
context and the scientific idiom prevalent at the time.
Nature, brain and mind, working as one, are mysteriously connected
by an all-encompassing language which invokes the physical activities of
billions of neurons to give rise to integrated subjective awareness and
impersonated self-identity. That all-encompassing language is the lan-
guage of the Logos, desiring to make itself known through science. This
process of unification of self and world, eternally at work in the universe,
is recognised in T he T ao T e Ching of Lao Tzu; in the Upanishads written
by ancient Hindu philosophers, who called it Brahman, and saw it mani-
fested in the individual as Atman. The Atman, much as the Logos,
manifests itself in the human intellect or reason. Returning to today’s
science, physicists also acknowledge a single, fundamental principle of
the universe, and seek to articulate it as a unified theory of physics.
Microbiologist Jonas Salk, founder of the Salk Institute (La Jolla) that
is recognised for its brilliant scientific work, deeply considered the emer-
gence of Mind in terms of cosmic evolution. Salk talks of internal organis-
ations, of categories, that provided for the internal changes and
accumulative ability of biological evolution. Moving beyond the design
couched in biological evolution, Salk considered those factors which spur
such. He emphasises that the evolutionary orientation of biological organ-
isms is toward change. For Salk ‘‘change’’ and ‘‘cause’’ enter into an
intimate relationship as ‘‘the intrinsic nature of the organism influences
the range and the direction of change that can occur; the change is then
added to others, all of which together seem to be ‘causes’ toward which
the developing organism is drawn.’’ 2
Metamorphosis, transformational change and becoming, is the driver
accelerating the complexity of our technological world, invigorating the
debate on moral issues of our time. Therapeutic techniques derived from
stem cells research, psycho pharmaceuticals and recreational drugs, as
well as developments in genetics, neural activity and social cognition
research are activating the human desire for transfiguration, change,
greater self-expression and greater self-improvement.
There is a delightful sense of personal exploration that accompanies
progress in science. Scientific research demands the establishment of a
EXPLORING THE LANGUAGE OF THE LOGOS 23
point of recognition and connectivity, a point of prospective validation,

still outside a given set of experiences that anticipates a hidden unity in
a wild stream of nature’s secrets. From a cognitive, experiential point of
view, this form of participation in science presents itself as an energetics
of mind: the universe is absorbed, disentangled, co-created, sustained and
brought into movement, elucidating what presents itself to be a commonly
acceptable new set of parameters that supports, underpins, and throws
new light upon established scientific fact. Science remakes, recreates
nature by the act of discovery. It enriches scientists and non-scientists
alike by rephrasing and enlarging an already sensitized, personalized,
participatory universe.
Words can conjure up associations to past experiences. Through words
we can deliberately bring the past back to mind, independently from
what is happening in the present. Let’s move back some 350 years in
time to start our tour, exploring the language of the Logos, and start our
exploration in the world of science, allowing our brain to generate mental
imagery to conquer time and distance. Meet the father of neurology,
Thomas Willis at work at Christ Church, that famous centre and cathedral
of Oxford University, whose guests we are today. He played an important
part in the history of the science of anatomy and was a co-founder of the
world’s oldest existing Academy, the Royal Society. From 1660, until his
death he was Sedleian Professor of Natural Philosophy at Oxford. Willis
was a pioneer in research into the anatomy of the brain, nervous system
and muscles. The ‘Circle of Willis,’ a part of the brain, was his discovery.
His anatomy of the brain and nerves, as described in his Cerebri
anatome: cui accessit nervorum descriptio at usus3 of 1664 is so minute
and elaborate, and abounds so much in new information, that it presents
an enormous contrast with the vague and meagre efforts of his predeces-
sors, with perhaps the sole exception of Leonardo da Vinci. Willis’ work
was not the result of his own personal and unaided exertions; he acknowl-
edged his debt to Sir Christopher Wren, the famous architect who was
to design St Paul’s Cathedral in London later, for drawing the precious
drawings which accompanied his work. Another of his large volume of
works appeared at Elzevirium in 1668, Pathologiae cerebri, et nervosi
generis specimen in quo agitur de morbis convulsivis et de scorbuto,4 in
which Willis develops a new theory of the cause of epilepsy and other
convulsive diseases, and in which he makes a number of contributions to
psychiatry.
Extending research from human anatomy to the broader concept of
mind, as Willis did, confirms that Medieval and Renaissance authors
24 LEO ZONNEVELD
were obsessed with questions on the nature of the mind, or if you wish,
the intellectual soul. Mental phenomena and physical phenomena were
mutually inclusive concepts for philosophers of the late Middle Ages and
the Renaissance: they did not treat psychology or the philosophy of mind
as separate fields of enquiry. Questions in the philosophy of mind were
approached through Aristotle’s De Anima and Parva naturalia. De Anima
is one of Aristotle’s natural books (libri naturalis) concerned with the
most precious centre of reality namely with living bodies. How senses
function was a central concern with most medieval thinkers. It continued
to be a central topic in philosophy as well as in science up to the end of
the seventeenth century.
Cognitive science today comprises the study of the higher-level mental
functions, including reasoning, intelligence and recognition. In character-
izing the origins, acquisition and processing of knowledge it tries to
understand how we develop into thinking, reasoning beings. Cognitive
science was rooted in the work of logicians, psychologists, computer
scientists, and neuroscientists. Scientists deeply engaged in the interdis-
ciplinary quest to understand the mind included great thinkers such as
Alan Turing, Kenneth Craik, Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener, Walter
Pitts and Warren McCulloch,5 Karel Lashley and John van Neumann.6
They laid the groundwork for cognitive science, each offering contribu-
tions from their own scientific background, thrilled as they were by the
prospects of blending insights in order to understand the mind.
I have mentioned Leonardo da Vinci before and I would like to go
back to him for a few seconds in connection with technological aspects
of brain science as reflected in the methodologies of neuroimaging, which
I will discuss later on. Leonardo’s pioneering research into the brain led
him to discoveries in neuroanatomy. His injection of hot wax into the
brain of an ox provided a cast of the ventricles, and represents the first
known use of a solidifying medium to define the shape and size of the
internal brain. I will quote from his writings:
Make two vent-holes in the horns of the greater ventricles, and insert melted wax with a
syringe, making a hole in the ventricle of memory; and through such a hole fill the three
ventricles of the brain. Then when the wax has set, take apart the brain, and you will see
the shape of the ventricles exactly.7,8
In T rends in Neurosciences Jonathan Pevsner asks himself ‘‘Which areas

of neuroscience would interest Leonardo today, and what meanings does
he hold for us? One imagines that he would have a particular interest in
current neuroimaging technologies, such as structural and functional
magnetic resonance imaging fMRI, that allows us to localise the sources

of behaviors to particular brain areas.’’9 The fMRI methodology, the
application of radiowaves and magnetic resonance to cross-sectional
imaging of the brain is one of today’s technologies. More than thirty
years ago, I was lucky enough to see the birth of its predecessor, the
Computerised Axial Tomography (CAT) scanner.
When in London, on a trip for the UK Government in 1972, I had the
great privilege of meeting Geoffrey Hounsfield who showed me a model
of his brain scanner, now considered to be the most important instrument
ever developed in the history of brain imaging.
Oddly enough Hounsfield, now a Nobel laureate, worked then as a
research scientist at the EMI, a record company known for its label ‘‘His
Masters’ Voice’’ and responsible for the recordings and for the early
successes of the Beatles in the 60’s. Computerised Axial Tomography, or
CAT scanning greatly enhanced the effectiveness of old two-dimensional
x-ray units. Because conventional radiographs viewed the brain from one
angle, shadows of bones and organs could be superimposed on one
another. With CAT, radiologists could view a ‘‘slice’’ of the brain. By
rotating the x-ray tubes around the brain, several sectional views could
be obtained. A computer could then reconstruct the views by using
mathematical formulas called algorithms to create a three-dimensional
image that was easier to interpret.
Cognitive neuroscience represents a major sub-component of neuro-
science focusing on the neural basis of information processing by the
brain. The discipline engages scientists who may be categorised broadly
into three sectors: first, there are experimental scientists involved in human
neuropsychology and non-invasive brain-imaging – as I described earlier
– to visualise and monitor processes in the brain; then there is the second
group involved in invasive animal experiments using single-unit recording;
the third group are computational scientists doing modelling and theoreti-
cal work. The collective aim of this enterprise is to understand the
organisational principles and associated processing activity of neurons in
perception, attention, memory, language and action, by mapping these
onto the regional and local-circuit networks of the brain.
The medical, economic, and social implications of our insights in the
functioning of the human brain are of overwhelming importance and will
be overshadowing current advances in life sciences and information tech-
nology. Breakthroughs in cognitive neuroscience will enable us to better
understand the processes and mechanisms of storing and analyzing sen-
sory information in the brain, will enable us to find cures for neurological
26 LEO ZONNEVELD
diseases, replace parts of living brains, build artificial brains and use our
brains more efficiently.
Contemporary civilisation is much more complex than before and its
scientific and technological requirements are incessantly growing.
Although scientific description is based exclusively on the physical uni-
verse, our contact with reality is entirely through our subjective experi-
ence, whose consensus of stable representations we assemble into the
physical world view. All our knowledge of the physical universe is gained
through the immediate conduit of our subjective experience and our
intentionality in turn has major impacts on the physical world around
us. Brain mapping uses the third-person perspective in describing the
subject through measurements ‘from the outside.’ Even today, the stan-
dard cognitive psychological experiment sidesteps consciousness by focus-
sing purely on objective measurements in which the subjectivity of the
subject, her or his inner life, plays no apparent role.
We are both the experience of consciousness and the neurochemical
and associated physical activities of our organism. We have difficulty in
getting past our primary sense data. In consequence, we consider that
our personal consciousness of the world is the world. The rational process
of perception invokes a picture from countless raw data. Each time our
brain contemplates producing an objective reality out there, which is
perfectly represented by access to our experience. The immediacy of the
impact of stimuli by the senses by the organic world make it difficult to
disengage and allow the thought that since Werner Karl Heisenberg
formulated his uncertainty principle in February 1927, we know we live
in a participatory universe, a world to which we lend our process of
observation to actually complete it; a quantum world, where we share
discrete, personalised conscious experiences.10
While mathematical analysis in conventional scientific disciplines is
both discrete and firmly unidirectional, the discipline of science itself is
correlative, not cause and effect. A true science of consciousness should
search to create a multi-level, transqualitative, cross-functional and inter-
dimensional substrate of reality. In order to be objective it should seek
its roots in the mystery of subjectivity. Human experience is born from
metaphysical self-transcendence – building upon the depth of being that
results from self-reflexive self-awareness and empowers critically reflective
self-integration. Subjectivity requires such direct personal experience, and
direct personal experience requires disciplined reduction of the investiga-
tor to the ultimate inclinations of the human substratum from which the
unique persona has emerged.
While looking at the very promising outcome of new technologies there

will be a growing need to emphasize the importance of the further
articulation of a science of consciousness, which is getting its deserved
scientific status and on which eminent researchers world wide, amongst
others at the Center for Consciousness Studies at the University of
Arizona in Tucson, are working.11 By validating and refining the phenom-
enology of cognitive science at the interface of allied and interdisciplinary
developments, a transformation will take place and an increased regard
for a methodological science of consciousness worldwide, will firmly
emerge.
Time is a perception of our brain used to organise sequential patterns
of detected information from our senses. How we create time would be
the key to understanding its mystery. We use time to create maps of
change and to build scientific models of the universe. Quantum cosmology
enables specialists to examine ‘time’ as a dimension. What we call the
time direction, the direction of becoming, is a quantum relation between
the registering instrument and its environment; and the statistical isotropy
of the universe guarantees that this relation is the same for all such
instruments, including human memory.
Quantum computation was proposed in the 1980’s by Feynmann,
Benioff, Deutsch and others, to take advantage of the mysterious but
well-documented phenomena of superposition and entanglement.
Research in dynamical chaos and bifurcation in neurodynamics has
yielded an increasing volume of theoretical experimental research. There
are cogent reasons for believing that quantum effects do operate in the
brain, and such suggestions have been made by theorists including neuro-
physiologist Sir John Eccles12 and mathematical physicist Sir Roger
Penrose.13 Insights in quantum-transactions, chaos and consciousness,
still virtually unused in the physical applications domain, demand a
complete reorientation of our concepts of matter and the concepts we
hold to be true about ourselves.
A turning point might be to find some quantum process playing a key
role in a neural correlate of consciousness. A number of people are
actively looking into this at the moment including the anesthesiologist
and psychologist Stuart Hameroff and the philosopher Paavo Pylkkänen
who presented papers on this topic during T owards a Science of
Consciousness at the University of Tucson in April 2004. Stuart Hameroff
is known for his idea of a quantum mind, supported on quantum coher-
ence within the microtubules of neurons. His work draws upon the
28 LEO ZONNEVELD
interesting parallels which can be drawn between quantum theory and

mind.
But there are also others: according to Chris King, Senior Lecturer at
the Mathematics Department in the University of Auckland, transition
from chaos to order may form a key process in perception and cognition.
The quantum theory implies the presence of a new type of causal factor
at the fundamental level of the universe. There has been a continuing
interest in the possible link between quantum non-locality and conscious-
ness. The fractal link between dynamical chaos and quantum uncertainty
is thought to be made through overlapping non-linearities capable of
chaos, running from the neurosystems level down through the neuron,
synapse, to the ion channel. Chaotic systems possess sensitive dependence,
and brain states also contain features of self-organised criticality. In a
critically poised brain state representing uncertainty of outcome, sensitive
dependence may open the brain to quantum processes.14
Reality, bridging knowledge and experience, is continuously gaining
new dimensions. Through thinking we can wade through time, entertain
thoughts about the future, create worlds of our own and exercise a greater
influence over our future than any other creatures. Machine language, in
addition to our own, enables the exploration of virtual worlds, assists in
drawing architectural designs for new molecular structures, enriches sci-
ence and contributes to the human intellectual legacy. Evolutionary neural
algorithms are being developed to empower the cognitive abilities and
behaviour of artificial models of biological organisms.
Mammals exhibit the highest level of intelligence amongst biological
organisms. Cognitive scientists are increasingly using them as excellent
prototypes for the development of machines with high cognitive abilities.
Models of the mammalian central nervous system are being developed
to design intelligence in artificial systems. Vision is paramount to the
brain: there is a close link between vision and our conscious sensitivity.
The cascade of neural operations in the human visual system alone,
requires 30% of the brain capacity. Data from neuroscience are being
used to implement cortex-like maps on autonomous robots to analyse
motion in the external world through machine perception.
Living animals, including people, can make sense of the visual world
by concentrating on the salient features, ignoring the background, cutting
down the information that the brain has to process. Understanding how
the brain processes sounds in order to interpret them as speech, and then
working out what they mean, could show how artificial systems could be
more efficient. In this respect the sciences owe a lot to philosophy.
Phenomenology is a philosophical method that may be practised to gain

insight into the structure and genesis of experience. In this vein, the
discipline of phenomenology becomes a useful methodology for the full
range of philosophical areas, including aesthetics, ethics, embodiment and
language. The French existentialist phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty was
fond of language-based concepts as those of linguistic and structural
philosophies, and he cited such ideas in his critiques of Sartre and his
contemporaries for playing down the importance of language in relation
to thought.
But most of all a constructive relationship has been emerging lately
between Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of embodiment and empirical
work in the sciences, especially in linguistics, psychology, cognitive neuro-
science and evolutionary biology. Merleau-Ponty challenged the thinking
of dualisms, of subject and object, self and world, through the lived
experience of the existential body.15 His work has been perceived as most
inspirational in the modelling of reactivity and planning, incorporating
aspects of ‘mind’ in terms of beliefs, desires and intentions in cognitive
systems. Much of his philosophical methodological work has found appli-
cation in the architecture of emerging intelligence of distributed inter-
acting systems, and the way these are designed to offer artificial
intelligence, i.e. decision, reaction, inference and learning, emotion and
‘‘rational’’ reasoning in perception of changes.
Another example as to how philosophy has shaped the modern world
is in the concept of ontologies. Ontology is a discipline of philosophy
whose term dates back to 1613 and was coined independently by two
philosophers, Rudolf Goeckel, in his L exicon philosophicum and Jacob
Lorhard, in his T heatrum philosophicum. Its practice dates back to
Aristotle. It is a science of what is, the kinds and structures of objects,
properties, events processes, and relations in every area of reality. When
the knowledge of a domain is represented in a declarative formalism, the
set of objects that can be represented is called the universe of discourse.
Commitment to a common ontology is a guarantee of consistency, but
not completeness with respect to queries and assertions defined in the
ontology.
Ontological analysis clarifies the structure of knowledge and has thus
long been used in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. Given a
domain, its ontology forms the heart of any system of knowledge represen-
tation for that domain. Without ontologies, or the conceptualisation that
underlie knowledge, there cannot be a vocabulary for representing
knowledge.
30 LEO ZONNEVELD
But nowadays the term ontology is also part of the technical jargon of
artificial intelligence researchers and the formal definition of a body of
knowledge. Computer implementations of semantic networks were first
developed for artificial intelligence and machine translation. Ontologies
are often able to provide an objective specification of domain information
by representing a consensual agreement on the concepts and relations
characterising the way knowledge in that domain is expressed. Nowadays
there are unique ontological identifiers for associated sets of items in
areas of formalised knowledge such as machine-learning, molecular engi-
neering, and even quantum physics, to link and query databases.
Science has brought us in a position to investigate how the human
brain is built to process language and how it deals with the tasks of
decoding sounds, words, grammar and meaning. Scientific investigation
world-wide centres itself around the brain’s plasticity, its ability to adapt
and help in the design of new computer technologies. One of the most
intriguing questions which science is asking itself is: how do we build
systems that can dynamically and automatically self-organise and recon-
figure whilst being developed as a result of the experience of its senses?
Cognitive systems – natural and artificial, as there is more and more
congruence in how they are perceived in a technical environment – sense,
act, think, feel communicate, learn and evolve. The natural world shows
us how systems as different as a colony of ants or a human brain achieve
sophisticated adaptive behaviours. Growing understanding of natural
cognitive systems is now contributing to artificial cognitive systems. The
fascination with ourselves, with the future of our brains and the modalities
of our perception in a participating universe, require an inward reorienta-
tion towards the human phenomenon. And with it we need reorientation
on the responsibilities we have as sentient observers and autonomous
participants in world history.
We must scientifically investigate and understand how subjective con-
scious experience in the participatory universe of the acting human person
has become a necessary function embedded in nature’s overall strategy.
It is already perceived as requiring a radical investigation down to the
foundations of physics. The foundations of physics must contain a prin-
ciple of space-time anticipation, taking the subject away from immediate
sensory effectiveness that is not covered by any machine intelligence
alone, or subjectivity would become a superfluous quality and would
have never been selected for in the process of evolution. Or, reverting to
words of Jonas Salk, ‘‘The natural selective pressure will now favor one
who not only accepts change but welcomes it, and contributes to it.’’16
Louder than Anaximander, Heraclitus exclaimed: ‘I see nothing but Becoming. Be not
deceived! It is the fault of your limited sensibility and not the fault of the essence of things
if you see firm land anywhere in the ocean of Becoming and Passing. You need names for
things, just as if they had a rigid permanence, but the very river in which you bathe a
second time is no longer the same one which you entered before.’17
While the nature of subjective conscious experience remains the central

unsolved problem in science, it has now become of critical importance to
humanity’s future. The emergence of consciousness in organic evolution
paved the way towards language, ultimately culminating in the human
desire to explore and interpret the mysterious language in which the
Logos expresses Itself. The Logos and words are intimately connected
according to John, who used it in the prologue of his gospel, or Philo of
Alexandria, who referred to the Logos more than 1,300 times in his
writings. According to Philo the Logos and the Word are one: the source
of order in the universe and the source of human reason and intelligence.18
The outcome of a science of consciousness will testify whether subjective
awareness, as opposed to the merely computational capacity of the brain,
may have become elaborated by Darwinian natural selection. While the
flexibility and versatility of human thought is unparalleled, essential prop-
erties such as recognition and memory have been facilitated in systems
since the last half of the previous century. In the next ten years computers
will reach the capacity of the human brain. I welcome this development
and I recognise it to be a great privilege to be able to work within a
fascinating array of scientific disciplines that is creating a new
Renaissance, a new culture with greater powers to interface with art,
science. A huge fountain of knowledge will open up in semantic networks,
that, thanks to ontological dynamics, will become accessible through
common language.
At the beginning of the 21st century emphasis is shifting from the brain
to human consciousness. Many of the new directions and movements in
the last half of the previous century, from cybernetics on the one hand
and a science of complexity on the other, are in essence trans-disciplinary.
It is quite characteristic that they all lean strongly towards mathematical
abstraction. That is certainly not surprising in view of the fact that
mathematics is an idealised and thus an ideal connection with which to
bridge disciplines – hence in some sense, it is the ultimate consummation
of a trans-disciplinary way of thinking. It should be emphasised, however,
in some sense only; precisely of its abstract nature, mathematics actually
distances itself from natural reality, and there is the ever-present danger
of growing self-identification and comparison with robotic autonomous
32 LEO ZONNEVELD
entities, the embodied mechanical constructions to which we are now, by

virtue of our fantastic technology, lending our own organic, evolutionary
algorithms.
We thus have to find, we must find, reasons why subjectivity in our
organic consciousness, rather than the infallible linear effects of computa-
tion, is of pivotal importance to our further development as human
beings. Each of us is a subjective conscious observer, making autonomous
decisions to carry out volitional actions. Intention is the dynamic process
by which we update our perception of the world. The pressure of our
increasing knowledge about our complex cosmo-evolutionary develop-
ment also adds to our loneliness in the universe. First and foremost, we
were born from a universe that is seeking to understand itself.
Ultimately, all our experiences are subjective and conditioned – we
merely agree, and constrain, their objectivity by means of common meta-
phor and symbol systems, which are a function of our consciousness. The
many worlds of the human person converge in the brain; and its neural
plasticity will obey and command the process of new neuronal connec-
tions to be made in celebration and optimization of the worldview it has
gained. The altered, yet trusted brain will increasingly present itself with
a guidance for life. Following on from the refinement of our knowledge
of and our insights into the human phenomenon, not only the operational
functionality of the brain, but also the intrinsic nature of subjective
conscious experience are now becoming of critical importance for the
survival of the species.
The twenty-first century will continue to see the emergence and influ-
ence of at least three major technologies: the cognitive sciences, neurogen-
omics and advanced computer communication. The first, deeply rooted
in the functionality of the brain and the way it learns and processes
information, is seeking transference of intelligence to non-living systems
and ultimately seeks increased cognitive enhancement through the use of
autonomous silicon systems.
Post-genomics and particularly neurogenomics, the second, emerges
from chemistry and biology, and will be looking for the rebirth, reparation
and improvement of human tissue, in particular the vulnerable organic
substrate of the brain. The third, computer communication, will continue
to have a support function until it embarks on the autonomous design
of communication scenarios between the two and beyond. The intersec-
tion of the three, and each on its own, will have profound consequences
not just on the quality of life as we know it, but on the nature of life
itself – on its shape and form, and ultimately on what it means to

be human.
Some of the deepest implications of research work, that will more and
more centre around brain science and genomics will become relevant to
technologies that are not likely to be viable for several generations.
Developments derived from experimental cognitive sciences will create a
new cultural virtual domain, populated by bio-inspired organisms in
silicon, mimicking central nervous systems and empowering them with
cognitive abilities. Furthermore, the world of science will become especi-
ally interested in directed evolution and scenarios of the future that will
allow the progressively changing shape of society in these futures, and
hopefully recognise the essential robustness human nature must have
against technological change at the level of individuals, groups and
societies.
The isolation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells and break-
throughs in somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) in mammals have raised
the possibility of performing human SCNT to generate potentially unlim-
ited sources of undifferentiated cells for research, with potential applica-
tions in tissue repair and transplantation medicine. The next generations
will see enormous transformation in the sense that therapeutic human
cloning, such as recently achieved by W. S. Hwang and his colleagues at
Seoul National University in Korea,19 will most likely be followed by
others. Germ line genetic engineering and an array of reproductive tech-
nologies to supplement those we already know, will become feasible and
intrinsically safe.
We can reasonably expect at some early stage the processing power of
a laptop computer to exceed the collective processing power of human
brains while later in the period human silicon enhancements – in tandem
with pharmacological products specifically designed to enhance attention
or memory – will begin to emerge. There will be new approaches to the
brain, amongst which the possibility of genetic manipulation to study
genes in relation to behaviour. Amongst the promises in brain research,
there will be genetic tests for Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s and schizophrenia.
Stem cells will be used to cure neurological disease. Pharmacogenetically
tailored drugs will be created, but there will also be drugs to enhance
human performance.
We are now entering a phase in human history where developments in
molecular chemistry, biology, cognitive science and informatics will facili-
tate large-scale advances in co-ordinated methods of mind enhancement
and the manipulation of brain function. Amongst the threats that will
34 LEO ZONNEVELD
emerge at the same time, there will be drugs to control behaviour, ‘brain
fingerprinting’ to identify criminals, genetic predestination, electromag-
netic thought control by means of hypersound, and the general erosion
of the human agency. Ethicists worry that if cognitive enhancers were
used en masse, human society, and the values it cherishes, could drastically
change. If we are to substantially improve our overall cognitive function-
ing, we may also alter aspects of our identity that are fundamental to
who we are.
The greatest scientific challenges, which could enrich human life beyond
our wildest dreams are right in front of us, but they come accompanied
with ethical issues, issues that touch the core of our human body and
inner being. We don’t know where we are going, but our inquisitiveness,
our zest to understand life and the nature of the human phenomenon,
our desire to understand, will not stop. Being deeply involved in discus-
sions of this nature in my job, I anticipate that such technologies will
take hold. And once they do, human evolution is likely to proceed at a
greatly accelerated rate; human nature as we know may change markedly,
if it does not disappear altogether, and over centuries, a new intelligent
species may well be created.
Knowledge must forever change otherwise it withers and each discovery
creates in the long run more mystery than it solves. On close introspection,
we will need to state that the real meaning of the Self are voiced through
the language of the Logos upon which all our experiences and memories
have been transposed, and whose script we are reading. For language to
be meaningful and true to its creative principle, it must very carefully
sustain its intimate connection with the phenomenal universe. There is
an ethical and metaphysical discourse taking place between the word and
what it creates.
A strange singularity is apparent in language as one observes that a
limited group of phonetic elements can give birth to potentially infinite
clusters of existential and imposed meaning. Language presents itself as
selective absorber of passing streams of external and internal presence
desiring to objectify reality through the sound of the voice, to accumulate
to the majestic existence of the Word, which – as scripture would have it
– one day took the shape of Man. Language binds its user into a
metaphysical relationship to law, ethics and epistemology. Yet language,
through which all our scientific concepts find expression, can only mimic
or approximate the creative expressive principle. Ultimately, language
remains metaphysical, while all natural phenomena are forms, or reflec-
tions, of the Word, of the Logos.
The Logos keeps re-anchoring our forward-looking process of self-

metamorphosis in our tying to, evaluating and sometimes abandoning
traces of earlier meaning, and is thus guiding the dynamic process of the
Bergsonian élan in becoming a person. In the self-forwarding, self-integ-
rative dynamic flow that crystallises in consciousness to become ultimately
manifest in the encounter with action, we may find answers for today’s
great challenges, but also the problems associated with it. One of the
greatest problems of today is how to meet the present ills of our civilisa-
tion, most of which originate from the human mind.
While the science of the brain, the mind, of consciousness may bring
prospective solutions it will be important to develop scientific concepts
towards preserving, subsequently improving, human evolutionary authen-
ticity and identity. A willingness to participate in the scientific endeavour
which is about to re-create the future of the human phenomenon, while
accepting and respecting the gift of each one’s individuality and subject-
ivity as the natural growth environment of personhood, should be solidly
paired to a quality of perception which allows for the unscathed yet
unavoidable, perhaps desirable, transformation of humanity.
Science and Innovation Section, British Embassy, T he Hague
NOTES
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 14, Maximillian A.

Mügge (trans.), Charles S. Taylor (rev.) (Berlin: Colli-Montinari, 1980), p. 108. Nietzsche’s
notes on Pre-Platonic philosophy can be found in the Nachlass of Summer 1872; in April
1873, Nietzsche brought along to Bayreuth a handwritten manuscript version under the title
Philosophy in the T ragic Age of the Greeks. In the beginning of 1874, Nietzsche gave it to his
pupil Adolf Baumgartner to copy. Nietzsche’s corrections to the Baumgartner copy stop
after the initial pages.
2 Jonas Salk, Man Unfolding (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 49.
3 Studio Thomae Willis, Cerebri anatome: cui accessit nervorum descriptio at usus. Londini,
typ. J. Flesher, imp. J. Martyn & J. Allestry, 1664, 1670; Amsterdam 1664, 1665/1666, 1667,
1676, 1683, English translation by Samuel Pordage, 1681. Thomas Willis [1621–1675], T he
Anatomy of the Brain and Nerves, 2 vols., ed. W. Feindel, tercentary ed. (Montreal: McGill
University Press, 1965). Reprint of the English translation with a complete annotated bibli-
ography of the work. The work that coined the term neurology. This is one of the most
desirable collectors’ items in medical neurology and one of the classic publications of English
medicine. The illustrations are by Sir Christopher Wren, who was later to become England’s
leading architect. The most complete and accurate account of the nervous system which had
hitherto appeared. Willis’ classification of the cerebral nerves held until the time of Samuel
Thomas Soemmering [1755–1830].
4 Studio Thomae Willis, Pathologiae cerebri, et nervosi generis specimen in quo agitur de
morbis convulsivis et de scorbuto. 338 pages. 4 pl. With portrait. Amsterdam (Amstelodami),
36 LEO ZONNEVELD
apud D. Elzevirium, 1668, 1670; Leiden, 1671; Geneva, 1676; London, 1678, 1681; Lyon,
1681; Dutch translation, Middelburg, 1677; Amsterdam, 1681. Thomas Willis, An Essay on
the Pathology of the Brain and Nervous Stock; in Which Convulsive Diseases are Treated of,
English trans. Samuel Pordage (London: T. Dring, 1684), pp. 69–78.
5 Warren S. McCulloch, Embodiments of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965). A
reprint edition appeared with MIT Press on May 13, 1988. Warren McCulloch was a doctor,
a philosopher, a teacher, a mathematician, and a poet who termed his work ‘‘experimental
epistemology.’’ In his collection of 21 essays and lectures he pursues a physiological theory
of knowledge that touches on philosophy, neurology and psychology: ‘‘There is one answer,
only one, toward which I’ve groped my work for thirty years; to find out how brains work ...’’
6 John von Neumann, T he Computer and the Brain (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, June 1958 and November 2000). John von Neumann was one of the most
celebrated and prolific mathematicians of the 20th century. His ‘‘The Computer and the
Brain’’ is a record of a lecture series that Von Neumann delivered at Yale University in 1957.
In these lectures, Von Neumann set out to explore connections between computing hardware
and what he believed to be their biological counterparts: brains. Von Neumann compared
neurons with physical computing elements in terms of size, speed, heat dissipation, capacity,
in an attempt to discover what, if anything, could be said to unite them or to set them apart.
He drew from what had been learned in designing computer instructions and memories in
an attempt to glean some insight into what the brain might be doing.
7 C. D. O’Malley and J. B. de C. M. Saunders, L eonardo da V inci on the Human Body (New
York: Henry Schuman, 1952), p. 340.
8 Leonardo da Vinci, Corpus of the Anatomical Studies in the Collection of Her Majesty, the
Queen, at W indsor Castle, K. Keele and C. Pedretti (eds.), 104 recto (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1978–1980).
9 Jonathan Pevsner, Leonardo da Vinci’s contributions to neuroscience, T rends in
Neurosciences, 25:4 (April 2002): 217–220.
10 Werner Heisenberg, T he Physical Principles of the Quantum T heory, originally published
in German, 1930, re-issued 1950 (Chicago, Ill: The University of Chicago Press, 1930). This
is Heisenberg’s most important work, and contains themes of early papers amplified into a
treatise. Studying the papers of Dirac and Jordan, while in frequent correspondence with
Wolfgang Pauli, Heisenberg discovered a problem in the way one could measure basic
physical variables appearing in the equations. His analysis showed that uncertainties, or
inaccuracies, always turned up if one tried to measure the position and the momentum of a
particle at the same time. (Similar uncertainties occurred when measuring the energy and the
time variables of the particle simultaneously.) These uncertainties or inaccuracies in the
measurements were not the fault of the experimenter, said Heisenberg, they were inherent in
quantum mechanics. Heisenberg presented his discovery and its consequences in a 14-page
letter to Pauli in February 1927. The letter evolved into a published paper in which
Heisenberg presented to the world for the first time what became known as the uncertainty
principle.
11 Proceedings of the congress T owards a Science of Consciousness (Tucson, Arizona: The
University of Arizona, April 7–11, 2004). Over the last 10 years, the Center of Consciousness
Studies at the University of Arizona has been contributing extra-ordinarily to the develop-
ment of the study of human consciousness. It aims to bring together perspectives of philoso-
phy, the cognitive sciences, neuroscience, the social sciences, medicine, and the physical
sciences, the arts and humanities, to move toward an integrated understanding of human
consciousness.
12 Sir John Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain (Berlin, New York: Springer Verlag,
1994).
13 Roger Penrose, Shadow of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness
(Oxford University Press, 1994). The book was received with considerable criticism.
Penrose’s reply ‘‘Beyond the Doubting of A Shadow,’’ was published in Psyche, 2: 23
(January 1996). Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have constructed a theory of human
consciousness in which human consciousness is the result of quantum gravity effects in
microtubules, which form a structural network within a neuron’s cytoplasm.
14 Chris King, ‘‘Chaos, Quantum-transactions and Consciousness: A Byophysical Model
of the Intentional Mind’’ Neuroquantology 1(2003): 129–162.
15 M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, C. Smith (trans.) (London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1962).
16 Jonas Salk, op. cit., p. 11.
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, op. cit., p. 108.
18 Philo of Alexandria. ‘‘On the Creation’’ V; X; XLVIII; Allegorical Interpretation III
XXXI T he Works of Philo, C. D. Yonge (trans.) (Hendrickson Publishers, Peabody, MA,
1993).
19 W. S. Hwang et al., ‘‘Evidence of a Pluripotent Human Embryonic Stem Cell Line
Derived from a Cloned Blastocyst,’’ Science, vol. 303 (2004): 1669–1674.
Leo Zonneveld.
ARIA OMRANI
‘‘OBJECTIVE SCIENCE’’ IN HUSSERLIAN

LIFE-WORLD PHENOMENOLOGY
The life-world, as Husserl holds, is a realm of original self-evidences

[Edmund Husserl, T he Crisis of European Sciences and T ranscendental
Phenomenology; Northwestern University Press, 1970, p. 127]. In
Husserl’s description, that which is self-evidently given, is in perception,
experienced as ‘‘the thing itself ’’, in immediate presence, or in memory,
remembered as the thing itself and every other manner of intuition is a
prescientification of the thing itself, every mediate cognition belonging in
this sphere has the sense of an induction of something intuitable [Ibid.,
128]. All conceivable verification, leads back to these modes of self-
evidence because the ‘‘thing itself ’’ lies in these intuitions themselves as
that which is actually intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable and
is not a substructure of thought; whereas such a substructure, insofar as
it makes a claim to truth, can have actual truth only by being related
back to such self-evidence.
To Husserl, it is itself a highly important task for the scientific
opening-up of the life-world, to recognize the primal validity of these self-
evidences and indeed their higher dignity in the grounding of knowledge
compared to that of the objective-logical self -evidences.
In geometrical and natural-scientific mathematization, in the open
infinity experiences, ‘‘we measure the life-world for a well-fitting grab of
ideas, that of so-called objectively scientific truths’’ [Ibid., 51]. According
to Husserl, the belief that the natural sciences are based on the experience
of objective nature, is true only in that sense whereby experience yields
a self-evidence taking place purely in the life-world and as such is the
source of self-evidence for what is objectively established in the sciences,
the latter never themselves bringing experiences of the objective. Indeed,
the objective, as Husserl holds, is never precisely experienceable as itself,
and scientists themselves consider it in this way whenever they interpret
it as something metaphysically transcendent. From this point of view,
naturally ‘‘rendering ideas intuition’’ in the manner of mathematical or
natural-scientific ‘‘models’’ is hardly intuition of the objective itself; but
rather a matter of life-world intuitions which are suited to ease the
conception of the objective ideals in question. Husserl points out that
many conceptual intermediaries are often involved, especially since the
39
40 ARIA OMRANI
conception itself does not always occur immediately, and cannot always
be made so self-evident in its way, as is the case in conceiving of geometri-
cal straight lines on the basis of the life-world self -evidence of straight
table-edges and the like [Ibid., 129].
The bodies familiar to us in the life-world are actual bodies, but not
bodies in the sense of physics. On the basis of Husserl’s sense, the same
thing is true of causality and of spatiotemporal infinity. These categorical
features of the life-world have the same names but are not concerned
with the theoretical idealization and hypothetical substructures of the
geometrician and physicist. As Husserl maintains, ‘‘just as other projects,
practical interests, and their realizations belong to the life-world presuppose
it as ground, and enrich it with science, too as a human project and praxis.
And this includes, everything objectively a priori, with its necessary reference
back to a corresponding a priori of the life-world. T his reference-back is
one of a founding of validity’’ [Ibid., 140].
To Husserl, prescientifically, the world is already a spatiotemporal
world; in regard to this spatiotemporality, there is no question of ideal
mathematical points of ‘‘pure’’ straight lines or planes, no question at all
of mathematically infinitesimal continuity or of the ‘‘exactness’’ belonging
to the sense of the geometrical a priori.
The life-world ‘‘for us who walkingly live in it, is always already there,
existing in advance for us, the ‘ground’ of all praxis whether theoretical
or extratheoretical’’ [Ibid., 142]. The point that should be made here is,
according to Husserl, the world does not exist as an entity, as an object,
but it exists with such uniqueness that the plural make no sense when
applied to it [Ibid ].
In Husserl’s view, there is a fundamental difference between the way
we are conscious of the world and the way we are conscious of things or
objects (though together the two make up an inseparable unity), which
prescribes fundamentally different correlative types of consciousness for
them. Husserl believes that things are given as being valid for us in each
case but in principle only in such a way that we are conscious of them
as things within the world-horizon (a horizon of possible thing-experi-
ence); ‘‘each one is something, ‘something of ’ the world of which we are
constantly conscious as a horizon, on the other hand, we are conscious
of this horizon only as a horizon for existing objects; without objects of
consciousness it cannot be actual’’ [Ibid., 143]. Every plural, and every
singular drawn from it, presupposes the world-horizon. All natural ques-
tions, all theoretical and practical goals taken as themes have to do with
something or other within the world-horizon. As Husserl says, ‘‘this is
‘‘OBJECTIVE SCIENCE’’ IN HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY 41
true even of illusion, nonactualities; since everything characterized

through some modality of being is, after all related to actual being. For,
in advance, ‘‘world’’ has the meaning ‘‘the universe of the ‘actually’ existing
actualities’’; not the merely supposed, doubtful or questionable actualities
but the actual one, which as such have actuality for us only in the constant
movement of corrections and revisions of validities’’ [Ibid., 146].
One of the different manners in which we are awake to the world and
to the objects in the world, is that of straightforwardly living toward
whatever objects are given, thus toward the world-horizon, in normal,
unbroken constancy, in a synthetic coherence running through all acts.
This normal straightforward living, toward whatever objects are given,
indicates that all our interests have their goals in objects; in other words,
‘‘all our theoretical and practical themes lie always within the normal
coherence of the life-horizon world’’ [Ibid., 144]. Husserl defines the
natural life – whether it is prescientifically or scientifically, theoretically
or practically interested – as life within a universal unthematic horizon.
This horizon is, in the natural attitude, precisely the world always pregiven
as that which exists; rather, the pregiven world is the horizon which
includes all our goals, all our ends, whether fleeting or lasting, in a flowing
but constant manner, just as an intentional horizon-consciousness implic-
itly encompasses ‘‘everything in advance.’’ Husserl points out that it is
the spatiotemporal world of things as we experience them in our pre-
and extrascientific life and as we know them to be experienceable beyond
what is actually experienced. He writes:
We have a world-horizon as a horizon of possible thing-experience ... But everything here

is subjective and relative, even though normally, in our experience and in the social group
united with us in the community of life, we arrive at ‘secure’ facts; within a certain range
this occurs of its own accord, that is, undisturbed by any noticeable disagreement; sometimes,
on the other hand, when it is of practical importance, it occurs in a purposive knowing
process, i.e., with the goal of finding a truth which is secure for our purposes [Ibid., 136–138].
Husserl illustrates his point by giving an example. He states that when

we are thrown into an alien social sphere, i.e. that of Negroes in the
Congo, Chinese peasants, etc., we discover that their truths, the facts that
for them are fixed, generally verified or verifiable, are by no means the
same as ours. But if we set up the goal of a truth about the objects which
is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that on which
normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc., agree in spite of all
relativity, then we are on the way to objective science. When we set up
42 ARIA OMRANI
this objectivity as a goal (the goal of a ‘‘truth in itself ’’) we make a set of
hypotheses through which the pure life-world is surpassed.
The life-world, in Husserl’s sense, does have, in all its relative features,
a general structure. This general structure, to which everything that exists
relatively is bound, is not itself relative. We can attend to it in its generality
and with sufficient care, fix it once and for all in a way equally accessible
to all. Husserl maintains that as life-world, the world has, even prior to
science, the ‘same’ structures that the objective sciences presuppose in
their substructure of a world which exists ‘in itself ’ and is determined
through ‘‘truths in themselves’’. Indeed, these are the same structures that
they presuppose as a priori structures and systematically unfold in a priori
sciences, sciences of the logos, the universal methodical norms by which
any knowledge of the world existing ‘‘in itself, objectively’’ must be bound.
According to Husserl, the contrast between the subjectivity of the life-
world and the ‘‘objective’’, the ‘‘true’’ world, lies in the fact that the latter
is a theoretical-logical substructure, the substructure of something that is
in principle not perceivable, in principle not experienceable in its own
proper being; whereas, the subjective, in the life-world, is distinguished in
all respects precisely by its being actually experienceable. Every immediate
cognition belonging to this sphere has the sense of an induction of
something intuitable, something possibly perceivable as having-been-per-
ceived [Ibid., 128]. Husserl emphasizes that all conceivable verification
leads back to these modes of self -evidence.
The ‘‘thing self ’’ lies in these intuitions themselves as that which is,
actually intersubjectively experienceable and verifiable and is not a sub-
structure of thought; whereas such a substructure, insofar as it makes a
claim to truth, can have actual truth only by being related back to such
self-evidence. To Husserl, the knowledge of objective-scientific world is
‘‘grounded’’ in the self-evidence. He writes:
We have seen that the propositions, the whole edifice of doctrine in the objective sciences
are structures attained through certain activities of scientists bound together in their collabo-
rative work or attained through a continued building-up of activities, the later of which
always presuppose the results of the earlier ... all these theoretical results have the character
of validities for the life-world, adding themselves as such to its own composition and
belonging to it even before that as a horizon of possible accomplishments for developing
science. The concrete life-world, then, is grounding soil of the ‘‘scientifically true’’ world and
at the same time encompasses it in its own universal concreteness [Ibid., 131].
In Husserl’s thought, the paradoxical interrelationships of ‘‘objectively

true world’’ and the ‘‘life-world’’ make the manner of being both enigmatic.
‘‘OBJECTIVE SCIENCE’’ IN HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY 43
He emphasized that true world in any sense, and within our own being,
becomes an enigma in respect to the sense of this being. That scientific
discipline, required for the solution of such enigmas, is not mathematical,
nor logical at all in the historical sense, since these are themselves objective
sciences in the sense which is presently problematical and as included in
the problem, cannot be presuppositions used as premises. Indeed, as
Husserl says: ‘‘What appeared to be merely a problem of fundamental
basis of the objective sciences or a partial problem within the universal
problem of objective science has indeed proven to be the genuine and
most universal problem ...’’ [Ibid., 133–134].
According to Husserl, the problem, which first appears as the question
of the relation between objective-scientific thinking and intuition, con-
cerns therefore on the one hand, logical thinking as the thinking of logical
thought (e.g. the physicist’s thinking of physical theory, or purely mathe-
matical thinking, in which mathematics has its place as a system of
doctrine, as a theory), and on the other hand, the intuiting and the
intuited, in the life-world prior to theory. As Husserl says: ‘‘Here arises
ineradicable illusion of a pure thinking which, unconcentrated in its purity
about intuition, already has its self-evidence truth, even truth about the
world’’ [Ibid]. Here, one concentrates on the separateness of intuiting
and thinking and generally interprets the nature of the ‘‘theory of knowl-
edge’’ as theory of science, carried out in respect to two correlative sides,
i.e., the subjective and the objective. But
as soon as possible the empty and vague notion of intuition has become the problem of
the life-world, as soon as the magnitude and difficulty of this investigation take on enormous
proportions as one seriously penetrates it, the great transformation of the ‘theory of knowl-
edge’ and the ‘theory of science’ occurs, whereby in the end, science as a problem and as
an accomplishment loses its self sufficiency and becomes a mere partial problem [Ibid., 135].
Husserl maintains that the supposedly completely self-sufficient logic

which modern mathematical logicians think they are able to develop,
even calling it a truly scientific philosophy, namely, as the universal, a
priori, fundamental science for all objective sciences, is nothing but naı̈veté.
Its self-evidence lacks scientific grounding in the universal life-world a
priori, which it always presupposes in the form of things taken for granted,
which are never scientifically, universally formulated, never put in the
general form proper to a science of essence. From Husserl’s viewpoint,
only when this radical fundamental science exists can such a logic itself
become a science.
44 ARIA OMRANI
Husserl points out that things are ‘‘positional’’ in two sense (according
to spatial position and temporal position) – the spatiotemporal onta. To
Husserl, ‘‘Here would thus be found the task of a life-world ontology,
understood as a concretely general doctrine of essence for these onta’’
[Ibid., 142].
As defined by Husserl, the ‘ultimately accomplishing life’, is the life in
which the self-evident givenness of life-world forever has, has attained
and attains anew its prescientific ontic meaning [Ibid., 128].
Isfahan, Iran
N. KOZHEVNIKOV
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE NATURAL

COORDINATE SYSTEM
1. Non-classical philosophy has absolutely refused the universal systems

and approaches, having preferred individual representations based on
preliminary chosen assumptions. In the second half of the last century
disintegrated tendencies intensified, and the questions on disappearance
of the Man, the person, the author-base values of the Age of the
Enlightenment were raised within the framework of separate concepts of
postmodernism. However, approximately at the same time, opposite tend-
encies focused on searching the new forms of universalism and the meth-
ods able to ensure its formation began to increase. In our opinion, the
most effective of all the methods and approaches is the development of
the conception of the natural coordinate system, which arises in the
surrounding world by means of self-organization and covers all levels of
hierarchy of this world.
In the XXIst century, mankind will have to come more closely into
contact with chaos, complexity and various forms of their organization.
Let’s choose such approaches where definitions of chaos are closely
connected with concrete equilibria types. On this basis, the conception of
the natural coordinate system arising in the surrounding world by means
of self-organization and covering all levels of hierarchy of this world, may
be advanced. There should be a naturally arising coordinate system,
within which the further development of Nature takes place. In spite of
complexity, the surrounding world is amazingly organized, reasonable,
optimal, and stable; all its levels are connected by general-cosmic rotation
of matter, energy and information. Today we know of 115 periodic system
elements underlying the World, but only 70 of them form Earth’s shells.
There are only two nucleic acids, and four fundamental interactions in
physics. Many philosophers and scientists have emphasized that linear,
simple representations of the world describe it quite authentically. Thus,
everyone knows the second Kant antinomy ‘‘Thesis – every composite
substance is made of simple parts. Antithesis – nothing is composed of
simple parts’’. E. Rutherford said ‘‘Nature is elementary. If I am an
ordinary man, I shall investigate it successfully’’. The outstanding physicist
R. Feynman often said that the World had an elementary organisation.
45
46 N. KOZHEVNIKOV
2. The natural coordinate system was felt and realized by various thinkers
throughout the history of mankind’s development. During a long period
of time, people, having the sense of such a system, looked for it in God,
metaphysical Absolute, Ideas and Spirit. Thus, they created very deep
religious, religious-philosophical and philosophical concepts and systems
which, being very divergent, nevertheless have many attributes in common
with God-Absolute as well as in the ways of the human interaction with
Him. Experience of asceticism, e.g. yoga, orthodox hesychasm and apo-
phatic divinity as well as the philosophical notions of Age are of great
importance for the development of knowledge about coordinate system.
During the New Age the accents are transferred to the theory of knowl-
edge in which the sign-symbolic systems of cognitive practice have now
been developed. Thinking implies active constructive functioning by pro-
cessing of the initial data; it is often considered to be projected.
It should be stressed that in the history of Philosophy two main
tendencies periodically changed each other: development and orientation
to equilibria. During the last two centuries there was a tendency in favor
of change, movement and development mainly due to Hegel. However, in
the 20th century thanks to the works of A. Bogdanov, L. Bertalanfy and
V. Vernadsky, organization and equilibrium became of interest.
3. The most complete definition of coordinates and system of coordinates

is given in Mathematics where coordinates are called numbers, magni-
tudes by which the position of any given member (point) in some set (set
M) can be determined. The totality of coordinates one-to-one correspond-
ing to members of set M makes up the coordinate system. In some
sciences the components, systems of marking off projections are called
coordinates. There are many different types of coordinates, such as linear,
curvilinear, excessive (in Mathematics), galactic, eclyptical, equatorial,
horizontal (in Astronomy), geographical coordinates, including the degree
net. The inertial systems in mechanics, quasistatic processes in thermo-
dynamics, etc. can be considered the coordinate systems. The coordinate
system of M. Plank is an attempt of creation of the Natural coordinate
system on the basis of the fundamental physical constants. At present the
coordinate systems are widely used in Natural Sciences and first of all in
sciences based on approaches interacting with some special methods and
trends, i.e. theory of systems, Ecology, Synergetics.
The formula of the natural coordinate system may be expressed as
follows: ‘‘The surrounding world should be considered as consisting of
two unequal parts. On the one hand, these are dynamic equilibria integ-
ASPECTS OF THE NATURAL COORDINATE SYSTEM 47
rated into some systems (chains of systems); on the other hand, they are
all the remaining nonequilibrial chaotic processes and phenomena.’’ The
chains of systems integrate the equilibria of different types: fundamental,
relative, limited, inertial, metastable, while the laws of their formation at
different levels of the world organization are the same. Every process
starts and ends at definite equilibrium states, directing its development
and formed by means of self-organization. The destiny of Man is to take
part in the process of natural coordinate system formation and provide
its stability, as only Person is able to develop the spiritual components
of a coordinate system.
4. The interaction of any natural formation with dynamic equilibrium is

based on the fact that all natural formations gravitate towards two utmost
fundamental equilibria, never reaching them. On the one hand, it is an
inner identificative dynamic equilibrium corresponding to identificative
limit; on the other hand, it is the equilibrium of the surroundings.
Any natural system of animate, inanimate or spiritual nature aims at
self-identification. Elementary particles are connected into chemical ele-
ments, gas nebulae turn into Galaxy, stars, planetary system. Animals
exist as organisms, individuals, and have considerable biological potential.
However, the overwhelming majority of concrete identification limits are
still unachievable because of the opposite tendencies providing a certain
consensus (intermediate dynamic equilibrium).
The second type of utmost equilibria is a communicative one.
Communication is a common condition: a person communicates by
means of dialogue relations, cultures – through dialogues and relations
of a higher level, etc. The communicative equilibrium of such a system
makes it possible to interact with all essence spheres: from inanimated
world to the spiritual sphere.
The coordinate system based on fundamental equilibria is created by
concrete natural systems owing to the part of energy, which can be
equilibrated. As a result, dynamic equilibrium cells common for all natural
processes and coordinate systems appear; i.e. all phenomena, processes,
substances or structures may have ‘‘intercommunication cells’’ with the
coordinate system of Nature.
5. From the aspect of ontological significance the coordinate system

ranks with the concepts God, the Absolute and the Universe. The inter-
action of the coordinate system with each of the concepts is of great
importance. During the New Age the majority of these concepts were
48 N. KOZHEVNIKOV
completely demolished, so that under the conditions of modern compre-

hensive and leveled knowledge the coordinate system, having absorbed
universalistic ideas, may take their place, providing the necessary trans-
formation of world outlook universalities.
The characteristics of the coordinate system are: spatial situation, time,
structure. However, it hasn’t any localisation or spatial limits; it is in
every part of the Universe, at all the levels of its structural organization.
Obviously, time always exists, changing its forms. The development pro-
cesses began within one period of time and continued within another
one, that’s why the coordinate system interacts with different time struc-
tures and other types of existence. The coordinate structure is pure being,
pure existence. Being a cause, it hasn’t any cause. Proceeding from pure
being, all other types of the surrounding world are being formed.
Representations of the coordinate system may well coincide with those
variants of understanding of Being which were promoted by M. Heidegger
and N. Hartmann. ‘‘Being is a special way of conversation about it.
Philosophy is nostalgia: it is an eagerness to be at home everywhere.
Such eagerness is Metaphysics. The philosophy is carried out in a certain
fundamental mood. To tell something, I should hear and listen to that
Silence in myself from which words are born’’. The aspiration to be at
home everywhere (to exist), is a fundamental mood of philosophizing
which is achieved through its relation with the natural coordinate system.
Listening to Silence in itself – is to find a stable interrelation with the
coordinate system from which the process of knowledge begins.
6. Consciousness is a specific state of Man in which the world and he

himself are equally available to him. It instantly binds, relates to what
Man has seen, heard, felt, thought and experienced. Consciousness is the
whole complex of certain dynamic equilibria. When researching the pro-
cesses of consciousness, one should base one’s considerations upon
common ideas of unequal Thermodynamics, considering chaos and order
ratio to be connected with equilibrium–nonequilibrium.
Two equilibrium conditions may replace one another by means of the
chaotic and ordered exchange of information and power. Rational think-
ing is a typical example of organized knowledge. Art or religious-mystical
perception includes much more chaos. Stability of knowledge aquisition
is provided by a combination of both types of process. The presence of
an obvious prevalence of one of these tendencies destroys all this cyclic
process: it is repeatedly proved during the history of Nature and mankind.
Due to the coordinate system the sharp opposition between scientific

and out-of-science cognition and thinking is eliminated. All those under-
standing–spiritual formations exceeding the bounds of modern knowledge
and steadily cooperating with the coordinate system may be considered
within the framework of this evolving epistemology. There are huge
opportunities for dialogue and interhuman communications: the most
regular and deepest form of dialogue is not a dialogue between individuals,
but the dialogues: a man–‘‘coordinate system’’ and ‘‘coordinate system’’–
another man. Value-cognitive installation becomes focused on stable inter-
relation with the coordinate system. Such interrelation is a necessary
condition of the further personal and human development, and only in
this case will mankind not destroy the biosphere and be able to develop
harmoniously, optimally and unlimitedly.
Consciousness conditions differ in volume of the information, their
organization and types of dynamic equilibrium. Especially obviously the
interaction of the ordered and chaotic types of cognition can be perceived
by self-cognition and its highest manifestation – reflection. Self-cognition
is an activity of a special kind, a specific type of critical creative work. It
fulfils the function of reflection including the reflection of interactions,
struggle and dialogue. According to our approach the self-cognition and
reflection are reciprocal chaotic cognitive processes which encircle the
basic ordered interaction into the united cycle that provides its stability
making the whole cognitive process balanced. Thus, if there appears a
chaotic reaction to rational thinking, the artistic or mystic perceptions
are usually supplied with the ordered response. The fact that the religious
world is to a great extent rational, can be noted as an example. The
development of mystical doctrines and creeds is being carried out on the
basis of logic as well as the development of all further religious concepts.
7. The coordinate system has a common dynamic equilibrium which is

made up of many parts. All the natural systems, which have steady
connections with it, participate in its formation. On the other hand, they
can be studied in this coordinate system. The coordinate system interacts
with the open systems tending to self-organization, self-development and
dialogue. It is the openness of these systems that allows them to be
interconnected with the coordinate system. The coordinate system creates
its own general scientific notions as ‘‘bound substance’’, ‘‘bound energy’’,
‘‘bound information’’. Formally, the division of the surrounding world
into the coordinate system and the remaining nature reminds one of the
natura naturans and natura naturata of Spinoza, but it has quite an
50 N. KOZHEVNIKOV
opposite sense. The most active part of Nature, which provides its self-
development, is distinguished there. Here is the passive part, consisting
of limits against which the processes of self-organization are carried out
in the rest of Nature.
Comprehensive study of the coordinate system suggests the use of
certain techniques taken from certain sciences (hydrodynamics,
thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, statistical physics, theories of evo-
lution, synergetics, cybernetics, ecology) in the theory of systems. Besides,
the search for the coordinate system aimed at the maintenance of stable
interconnections with it is covered by itself into the method of philosophi-
cal investigation (coordinate method). The coordinate method provides
unlimited opportunities. On the one hand – it should have a universal
flexibility allowing it to interact practically with any natural phenomenon
or processes; on the other hand – for all these processes universal criteria
and methodology appear.
8. The coordinate system makes it possible to develop the original con-

cept of interaction between being and non-being, which is still one of the
deepest and most important philosophical problems. The coordinate
system is based on the ontologic postulates of Parmenides ‘‘There is only
being; non-being does not exist’’ and Democritus ‘‘Both being, and non-
being exist’’. Besides, interactions between being and non-being are char-
acterized by other postulates and concepts developing various philosophi-
cal systems on the basis of similar interaction. The coordinate system is
like a boundary between being and non-being: one side of which deals
with being, another one with non-being. All that chaos of a certain level
of natural organization (the sum of the appropriate exchange processes),
participating in the formation of the coordinate system, remains outside
its basic representations. Finally, the coordinate system appears as a
tabula rasa, though it actually has a complex organization. One may
compare the coordinate system with a vacuum, the condition in which
particles do not exist. In some cases, for example at the spontaneous
infringement of symmetry, the vacuum condition appears not as the only
one – there is a continuous spectrum of such conditions. Another impor-
tant analogue is Void – one of the central concepts of Daoism. ‘‘The Way
is like an empty vessel that yet can be drawn from without ever needing
to be filled’’ (Dao-De Jing, chapter 4). ‘‘Thirty spokes meet at a nave;
because of the hole we may use the wheel. Clay is moulded into a vessel;
because of the hollow we may use the cup. Walls are built around a
hearth: because of the doors we may use the house. Thus tools come
from what exists, but use from what does not’’ (Dao-De Jing, chapter 11).
The experience of ascetics, to which much attention is paid in practically
all religions, also confirms the fundamental value of ‘‘void’’. We suppose
that void is pure being, in other words: the coordinate system itself as an
ideal design of all the possible limit conditions. It can’t merge with natural
systems, but optimum and steady natural processes periodically cooperate
with it incidentally or through certain time intervals, according to the
rhythms of the natural coordinate system.
9. The coordinate system must be revealed ingenuously, and it must be

accessible for everyone. Indeed, one can come to the system of interrelated
dynamic equilibria developing perceptions, by using abstract and theoreti-
cal models as well as synthetically-arranged variants. The way to the
coordinate system goes through world-outlook universalities, which are
a synthetic formation and form the universal criteria of modern
Philosophy. The world-outlook universalities accumulate historically
stored social experience: within their structure a man of a definite culture
estimates, interprets, experiences the World, and integrates all phenomena.
The correlation and interdependence of culture universalities create a
complete picture of the World, common notions about Nature, Society,
Man and Consciousness. Such a picture may be considered as a social
life genotype or basic cultural-genetic code.
The world-outlook universalities have considerable heuristic potential,
forming invariants of the further possible development of mankind; more-
over, they are more accessible for those who have no special theoretical
training. That’s why every person may find his own way to the coordinate
system, not studying the methods of handling it. Man should know and
feel that such a system exists; later it will find him living in vigil regime,
turn him into its rhythms and keep close contact with him, becoming
more and more open.
Everyone must interact with three levels of the coordinate system:
personal, on the level of his ethnos culture and planetary. Man becomes
complex, including cells of all levels. His condition may be described as
personal-continual-planetary. The steady interaction of Man and human-
ity with the natural coordinate system is a necessary condition of their
further development. Only in this case will humanity not destroy the
biosphere and be able to develop harmoniously, optimally and
unlimitedly.
52 N. KOZHEVNIKOV
10. Great possibilities for the development of ideas on the natural coordi-
nate system are provided by Silver Age Philosophy, where the Absolute
and Unity are the main subjects of research. With this developing concept
the works of S. Frank, L. Karsavin and N. Losskiy, dealing with a close
tangle of being and consciousness, correlate well. Thus, S. Frank distingu-
ishes consciousness in the narrow sense of the word (consciousness as the
stream of feeling, as self-consciousness) and consciousness in the broad
sense. Something out of consciousness does not exist. Frank considers
that consciousness in the broad sense is not consciousness ‘‘for I am a
stream of consciousness; this stream is a part of that universal Unity
which is in an absolute, primary and self-obvious form’’. But in the
developing concept consciousness intensively interacts with the coordinate
system, and being rises above object and subject opposition, keeping it
in itself.
Frank pays special attention to ‘‘incomprehensibility’’ as the synonym
for being, which we do not observe because it always exists. The same
synonym suits the natural coordinate system. We shall not be able to
cognize the natural coordinate system completely; although the fact that
it always surrounds us, it disappears at the same time. Consciousness
becomes possible due to the fact that the natural coordinate system
periodically appears, bewitching our mind and feelings. It is like a ‘‘gift’’
prepared by Nature for Man to fulfill special and unique functions in the
world around. These ideas, deeply investigated by Russian Philosophy,
have a great heuristic potential. Modern culture, education, the humani-
ties and natural sciences need them badly.
11. The existence of the natural coordinate system intensifies the ideas
of global evolutionism. Relations between the chain of dynamic equilibria,
comprising the nucleus of the coordinate system and the remaining
Nature, are the bases of Natural self-organization at the separate levels
of its existence and between them, thus providing the total evolutionism
of the Universe. More obviously the interrelation with the coordinate
system is displayed in the anorthic principle according to which the
Universe (and, hence, the basic parameters on which it depends) must be
such that the existence of observers was assumed at some stage (a powerful
anorthic principle). In other words, Man always feels the presence of
fundamental bases which are beyond the limits of everyday experience.
Man felt the world system of dynamic equilibria which consistently
changed the basic determinant parameters of the Universe and, thus,
provided the appearance of Man himself. The World evolves, forming the
coordinate system for the optimization of its development. There must

be a continuous connection with the coordinate system, and the ‘‘melody’’
of this connection in the life of contemporary Man.
The synergetic paradigm correlates with the problem of the natural
coordinate detection system in its surrounding environment. Synergy can
be considered as a scientific trend which is very close to the problem
under discussion, since the nucleus of the theory contains regulations
correlating with the main principles of the natural coordinate system.
The nucleus of synergetic ideas is frequently represented as follows: 1.
Processes of destruction and creation, degradation and evolution in the
Universe are equal. Accident appears to be somehow ‘‘built-into’’ the
evolution mechanism itself. 2. Processes of creation have a united algo-
rithm regardless of the nature of the systems in which they take place.
12. In the XXIst century, culture will take the leading place among all
the spheres of mankind’s spirit. Complex, unique, historically developing
systems, where the most important are the interrelation with environment
(openness) and self-organization, are becoming objects of cultural scien-
tific research. Among them special attention is paid to ‘‘man-dimensioned
complexes’’, natural systems where a man actively shows his worth. The
formation of such complexes furthers the integration of the humanities
and the natural sciences, mutual influence between poetry and the sci-
ences, intuition and logic, Western and Eastern thinking, rational and
irrational research methods, scientific and non-scientific approaches, cor-
relation between explanation and understanding.
According to the developing conception: in present conditions all
cultures must be in a state of stable synchronistical or diachronistical
fluctuation. Synchronistical fluctuations appear between the nuclei of
traditional cultures’ self-identification. In the case of the diachronistical
ones – between the best samples of world cultural possessions and proper
orientations of informational society. Finally, the specific dynamic equilib-
rium with possible interaction between traditional, economical, financial,
technological, informational cultures is being formed. It is especially
important because the majority of cultures in the history of mankind
were the traditional ones. Amongst these, two great mutations happened:
classical and Christian. The dynamic equilibrium described above corre-
lates with the natural coordinate system, it allows the use of all concrete
contributions (front traditional to planetary) in forming a cultural
super-system.
54 N. KOZHEVNIKOV
Culture, being adequate to modern Man’s needs, must be leveled and

integrated by some nets. Traditional cultures must be elements of systems
formed on their basis. Every modern man must actively interact with a
number of cultures, furthering their integration into a united cycle (sub-
stantial, energetic, informational). The guarantee of stability in Nature is
that the variety, humanitarian and social spheres are not excepted. The
more cultures there will be on the planet the better. Of course, all of them
must be tolerant, humanely oriented and unique. All cultures must be
aimed at the identification of its asceticism, which may become the key
element during the dialogue between cultures, furthering the establishment
of general-planetary communicative reality. Asceticism is common for all
religions; nowadays the most actual ascetic form is the cultural-temporal
one. Asceticism can be the foundation of synthetic culture, so that all
unique and specific different peoples will be superstructures.
In the modern global world all cultures undergo two basic tendencies.
On the one hand, all of them must be self-identified, i.e. reveal their
boundaries, characteristic features, and become transparent for other
culture representatives. On the other hand – they must further human
integration. Thus, the eliminating of economic, political and state bound-
aries will harmonize the existing large cultural isolation. On the basis of
the ascetic parts of traditional cultures their invariants will be formatted.
13. The system of education connected with the natural coordinate system
must be supported by two principles: self-identification of a person and
the ‘‘to be nearer’’ principle. The first aims at personal formation, which
can be achieved only in the case of personal self-organizing. The second
is the instructor’s activity to catalytic influence the pupil, as he must
coordinate the pupil’s initiative: correct, amplify, recommend the right
literature, analyze the obtained results, etc. Education must be unin-
terrupted and contain exclusive blocks (2–4 years); within each of them
the complete integral world-outlook is formed. It is based on systematic,
structural knowledge as well as on criteria allowing one to distinguish
between true, original information and false, incomplete information,
destroying the natural coordinate system.
The basic task of instructors on each of the above-mentioned blocks
of the educational process is to ensure the interaction between their pupils
and the world coordinate system, which is possible at any age and with
any quantity of information. The process of such interaction is a unique
one; it is formed for every man and is one of the most effective methods
of personal education.
14. One may distinguish several basic directions of the development of

subsequent ideas on the natural coordinate system: phenomenological,
ontological, and synergetic. Each of them is a whole direction of scientific
research.
The natural coordinate system is covered by a system of mutually-
complementary interactions within the parts of animate and inanimate
Nature, the spheres of Soul and Spirit; that is why it is able to provide
their synthesis, consensus between all the components of modern man as
well as the social, political, cultural processes directing his development.
Every nation is capable of making its unique contribution to the formation
of the natural coordinate system. The more contributions, the more stable
the natural coordinate system is. Nowadays there is no other alternative
for mankind’s development.
University of Yakutsk
Russia
BIBLIOGRAPHY
M. Heidegger, Basic Metaphysical Conceptions: T ime and Being. Moscow, 1993, pp. 331–332.
Dao-De Jing, Novosibirsk, 1995, pp. 13, 23.
S. Frank, T he Subject of Knowledge: Man Soul. St. Petersburg, 1995, pp. 156–157.
WENDY C. HAMBLET
ALIENATION AND WHOLENESS
Spinoza, Hans Jonas, and the Human Genome Project on the

‘‘Push and Shove’’ of Mortal Being
It is a curious paradox that the greatest gifts of man, the unique faculties of conceptual
thought and verbal speech which have raised him to a level high above all other creatures
and given him mastery over the globe, are not altogether blessings, or at least are blessings
that have to be paid for very dearly indeed. ... There is much truth in the parable of the
tree of knowledge and its fruit, though I want to make an addition to it to make it fit my
own picture of Adam: that apple was thoroughly unripe!1
In Greek myth and in the writings of the early Greek philosophers, we

witness that humans understood themselves as integrally a part of nature.
A common logos – inner gods – connected all things and gave an intimate
consistency of lawfulness from within to all diverse beings. Heraclitus
called it the logos, Empedocles the overriding lawfulness of time. For
Thales, the gods were ‘‘in all things’’ and spoke to humans through a
rational and ethical connection.
Resonances of this early conception of the wholeness of all things, the
inner connectedness of nature, sound through the works of Plato, especi-
ally in the mythical tales of the Timaeus and the Phaedrus. However, in
Plato, we also witness some of the first gaps in the logos, with the fissure
that opens between nomos and physis, in the Gorgias and then later in
the Republic. With Aristotle, the abyss between human ways and the
nature of things widens still more, with Aristotle’s redefinition of human-
kind as the ‘‘rational animal’’ (Nichomachean Ethics I.7. 1098a7-18). What
sets humans apart from the beast and the bird is the fact that humans
have a higher function of soul, one that ‘‘follows or implies a rational
principle’’ (N.E. I.7.1098a6-7). Since that specific ‘‘human good,’’ reason,
turns out to be ‘‘virtue’’ itself, it is convenient thereafter for human beings
to think themselves as elevated, by distinctive function of virtuous reason,
in regard to other creatures and to the whole of nature.
Christian myth continues in the way of the new truth by configuring
the earth, for all its divine createdness, as an alien home to which human-
kind is cast as punishment for their rank disobedience to the ordinance
against ‘‘eating of the tree of knowledge.’’ Clearly, a willful rationality in
57
58 WENDY C. HAMBLET
the first human beings results, not only in the loss of a primaeval inno-
cence, but in the disconnect between humans and other creatures, perma-
nently fixed in God’s pronouncement to the wayward Adam that all the
creatures of earth and sea are given over to him for his use and consump-
tion. This myth connects a human rational drive that sets itself outside
the lawfulness of the god to a transcendentally justified mastery over the
earth and all other beings. This mythologem remains in conceptual sway,
secularized but persistent, in the scientist’s non-relationship with nature
as his ‘‘object’’ of inquiry.
Despite the scientist’s belief that he is operating in a myth-free world,
post mortem dei, the scientist’s orientation toward his ‘‘object’’ demon-
strates that Christian myth still deeply infects even the allegedly ‘‘secular’’
thinking of the modern era. The scientist’s ‘‘natural attitude,’’ as it is
called by Edmund Husserl,2 assumes an absolute disconnect between
subject–observer and object–observed, an assumption that is simply false.
There is no pure, free, unprejudiced starting point from which conscious-
ness might take place in a purely ‘‘objective’’ – non-subjectively infected
– way. The scientist’s assumption, that in his investigations the object of
inquiry is cut loose from its relatedness to the subject, encapsulates the
modern Western conception of subjectivity, an understanding of the self
as free isolated being over against an alien world. If the world is ‘‘full of
gods’’ now, these are gods that can, under the rational gaze of our apple-
munching heroes, be brought to their thunderbolt-tossing, plague-infect-
ing, earth-shaking knees. Earth and its myriad creatures, objectified as
alien other, can either by subjected to the appropriative processes of
cognition, re-present-ation, and manipulation, or can be fixed at an appro-
priately safe distance to reduce its menacing otherness.
Hans Jonas, eminent phenomenologist, student of Husserl and
Heidegger and colleague and friend of Hannah Arendt at the New School
for Social Research in New York until his death in 1993, explains that
we retreat from nature because we see in its ‘‘otherness’’ the source of
our mortal fragility. Jonas explains, in Mortality and Morality: T he Search
for the Good after Auschwitz, that human beings are but a link in the
great chain of being, albeit a very special link since we live our mortal
existence in full awareness of its ambiguity. We are the one kind of being
that understands that mortal existence is itself a paradox, a ‘‘gift’’ never
truly given, borrowed time that never permits its own purchase. Not-
being borders and infects every moment of our living. Death is an inescap-
able fact of our living that cannot be confronted nor dissuaded from its
course. In our intense and anxious awareness of this fact, we project
ALIENATION AND WHOLENESS 59
outside ourselves for the causes of our fragility. We feel palpably in nature,
in other creatures, and indeed in our fellows, the threat of extinction
posed toward us at every moment.
Humans, claim Jonas, actually feel a suffocating immersion in the
natural world, rather than embraced by its orderly logic, as the early
Greeks held. Emmanuel Levinas captures this anxious connection by
referring to the real beyond our appropriative grasp as ‘‘the elemental,’’
the realm where we experience the menace of ‘‘archaic gods.’’3 With this
phrase, Levinas is marking the shift from the comfort felt in the trust in
an orderly logos to the terror experienced in the face of the unknown. In
the face of this terror, we retreat to the world of our own creation, the
world of human artifacts. Its neon blinds us to our fears, its concrete
gives solid assurance of continuance, and its manicured plasticity reminds
us of our godlike power to create and transform. We retire to a ‘‘human
world’’ and subdue the elemental forces – name them, understand them,
bend them to our will. Where they will not be ‘‘bent,’’ we build barriers
against them to hold off their destructive forces and to forget our ‘‘natural’’
– mortal – being. Jonas places humans on a great continuum of being
and, although, for Jonas, alienation from other is characteristic of every
link along the great chain, the rational superiority that gives the awareness
of vulnerability widens the gap of alienation for humans. Hence, we
position ourselves over against the chaos of things and forge our identity
as other to other beings. We aggressively pursue our differences to deny
our connectedness.
Ironically, the disconnect between the human world and nature, so felt
in the human mind, cannot be justified by reference to the latest scientific
findings. One of the most fascinating – and most humbling – revelations
of the Human Genome Project has been the discovery that, not only all
human life, but all life per se, is, beyond all doubt, connected. Encoded
in the ‘‘book of history’’ recorded in the human genome is the unequivocal
fact of the integral oneness of all being. As Mart Ridley phrases this
remarkable fact: ‘‘... seaweed is your distant cousin and anthrax one of
your advanced relatives.’’4 The fact of the unity of all life places human
being as a not-so-very-different chapter in an unbroken chain of life
co-evolving from the primaeval soup. The human species is, by no stretch
of the rationalizing, egoistic imagination, the pinnacle of evolution. In
fact, the humbling truth revealed by the ‘‘book’’ of the human genome is,
rather, that there is no such thing as ‘‘evolutionary progress.’’ Natural
selection is simply the blind process whereby life forms mutate in response
to the myriad opportunities arising in the physical environment.
60 WENDY C. HAMBLET
Certainly, this is not to imply that the human species, and every
individual member of that species, is not utterly unique. But rather the
latest genetic discoveries imply that uniqueness is a property of every
species and every member within each species. Uniqueness is a commodity
that is, if anything, in over-supply on the planet. Humans may consider
themselves an evolutionary success, the favoured creations of a god in
whose image we are carved, the pinnacle of being because the rational
masters over the planet and its myriad beings, but the stunning truth is
that we are just as much the result of a long line of evolutionary failures,
the culmination of a massive process of trial and error between trillions
of bodies constructed, tested and enabled to reproduce once they had
met ever increasingly stringent criteria for survival. Ridley concludes the
discussion of the ‘‘superiority’’ of the human by stating:
The story of a briefly abundant hairless primate originating in Africa is but a footnote in
the history of life ...5
We began at one with all things but, once we emerged onto the
savannah as stupid little grass-eaters and later transformed into the thick-
craniumed thugs (who probably ate the grass-eaters into extinction), we
became too big for our evolutionary britches. With mastery over fire
came weapons of formidable destructive potential, and our fate was cast:
we would be masters of the planet, not by evolutionary success, but,
ironically, by evolutionary failure! According to the groundbreaking work
of Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, humans from the first moments of
culture, soon, in a very important respect, fell ‘‘retarded,’’ by comparison
with other creatures. They failed in the development of natural inhibitors
to intraspecies aggression.6 Lorenz states:
A raven can peck out the eye of another with one thrust of its beak, a wolf can rip the
jugular vein of another with a single bite. There would be no more ravens and no more
wolves if reliable inhibitors did not prevent such actions ... Anthropologists ... have repeat-
edly stressed that [Australopithecus] hunting progenitors of man have left humanity with
the dangerous heritage of what they term ‘‘carnivorous mentality.’’ ... No selection pressure
arose in the prehistory of mankind to breed inhibitory mechanisms preventing the killing
of conspecifics until, all of a sudden, the invention of artificial weapons upset the equilibrium
of killing potential and social inhibitions.7
Lorenz’s argument for the evolutionary failure embodied in human

aggressive instincts ends ominously with the declaration:
One shudders at the thought of a creature as irascible as all pre-human primates are,
winging a well-sharpened hand-ax.8
And we shudder all the more when we add to this frightening image the
certain fact that the first human beings that really represented our species,
Cro-Magnon, had roughly identical instincts and natural inclinations to
our own.9
Thus we can say that the aggressiveness of the prehistoric hunter,
inherited from those first thick-craniumed carnivores, remains with the
species today, despite all our visions of grandeur built on the assumption
of superior rationality. Reason, as Lorenz also demonstrates, has no
means of persuading us against those natural inclinations. Lorenz
explains:
Reason is like a computer into which no relevant information conducive to an important

answer has been fed; logically valid though all of its operations may be, it is a wonderful
system of wheels within wheels, without a motor to make them go round. The motive power
that makes them do so stems from instinctive behavior mechanisms much older than reason
and not directly accessible to rational self-observation.10
What Ridley expresses in the language of chromosomes, Lorenz expresses

in the language of the behaviourist. But the message is consistent through-
out. The human beast is a genetically programmed piece of historical
information encoded in materiality, riddled with barely controlled and
barely controllable extensions of self-replicating genetic configurations.
Human beings, like all beings, are material sites of selfish exploitation. If
human beings are at the ‘‘top’’ of any great chain, it is by virtue of our
superior exploitative skills. And, yes, these skills, our particular form of
‘‘rationality,’’ has served us well, and continues to serve us well, to achieve
our selfish ends.11
Despite the oneness of all beings and despite their commonality in the
pursuit of self-continuance through exploitation of others, human beings
experience nature as something altogether different from the human. This
is because nature always, to some degree, is beyond our comprehension
and cannot be contained and totalized within the cognitive grasp. As
much as we try to understand its ways, to subdue it to our rational
powers, the organization of nature has no analogy with anything in the
human world. Whatever the Greeks may have claimed about a logos
linking all beings in a common lawfulness, most humans cannot read
that law! We cannot understand nature. The realm of natural causality
lies outside of human purposes and beyond the structure of human
intelligibility. We can impose our purposes upon nature, but the result is
not a humanized nature but a denaturalized human product – a human
artifact.
62 WENDY C. HAMBLET
We cannot understand nature’s causality because we cannot compre-

hend a positive movement that is the very interplay between life and
death. The logic of deathly existence does not compute for the selfishly
exploitative, instinctively-driven rationality. A forgetting of death is how
we live our mortal existences, since its remembering is paralyzing to
human action and makes ludicrous human purposes. But death is how
nature lives, how she recycles herself, how she maintains herself in motion.
In death, nature folds back upon herself, at once midwife, mother and
newborn, giving birth to herself over and over again. Womb and grave
knotted in timeless loving embrace. Nature is mother in a sense in which
mothers are not, in the human world. Nature gives birth from out of
herself, as sacrificing medium to the newcomer, yet there is no other-ing
of baby to mother, as there is in human reproduction. In nature, the
mother is always sacrificed to the newborn, dies to give life, yet, incompre-
hensively, she remains alive to bear and die again and again. There is no
analogy in the human world to the self-sacrificing motherly midwifery of
the natural world.
Nor can the causality of nature be grasped on the model of human
making. Not on any model of techne, not the one that comprehends the
manufacturing of products nor the one that fathoms the crafting of works
of art, despite Enrico Coen’s exemplary efforts to link natural and human
making on these models.12 These patterns of human making are under-
stood either backwards from their ends in the products themselves, or
forwards from the intention in the desires of the artist. Neither craftsman-
ship nor artistry comprise a making that arises from within itself, without
desires or purposes and, indeed, without maker outside the making itself.
Nature does not operate on the motivation of creative imagination nor
according to an externally applied plan or telos. In truth, only human
making can produce ‘‘finished products.’’ Nature has no ‘‘finished pro-
ducts.’’ Nature is always already complete (hence Spinoza’s definition of
nature as the one whole substance with nothing outside itself to limit its
being or provide its telos or standards of goodness) yet always in the
process of completing itself. It is completion as incompletable incomple-
tion. Whether purposeless change (for Spinoza) or having its telos inside
itself (as sheer diversity and abundance), nature’s causality is not open to
human comprehension, because humans cannot comprehend a purpose
in deathbound existence.
Nature is not a being, not a divine craftsman nor creative artist. Nature
is a living totality that breaks free of all the scientist’s totalizing efforts
to understand it. It is a mothering from within, a self-nurturance with no
remainder, a bringing-forth through the self-differencing of death. All

beings belong within nature, but only ever provisionally. Death is the
way in which the parts belong within the whole. Nature throws its living
self always again into nothingness. It is finitude as eternity, fate as freedom,
perpetual completion as incompleteness, life as deathliness. This was the
ingenious insight of Spinoza that led him to call nature ‘‘God.’’
The modern technological world has lost the sense of the completeness
of the whole and the inner connectedness of things, lost the sense of the
harmony of nature. We retreat to the safety of the world of human
artifacts to hide from the truth of our mortality and to seek refuge from
the threatening chaos of that which we cannot understand. But, as
Hölderlin saw, we feel a longing for belonging, in our absence from
nature, a nostalgia for the wholeness of its embrace.13 We long for union
but we know not with what or whom. Modern life is distanced, anguished,
out of tune with the natural world, out of tune with the mother of whom
we are a part. Jonas explains that it is the mortal lot to be separated,
anxious, alienated. We can only endure haunted by death and projecting
our fears and anxieties onto others. The human way of being in the
technological age can only be a belonging in alienation, always distanced
in our deepest connections.
However, I want to propose another possibility than permanent alien-
ation – a way to get home to the mother, a means to return to the
absorbing embrace of the whole. The question of how to get back to the
mother is the same, I believe, as how to heal the fragmentation effected
by the objectifying techne-logos of the scientist, the craftsman and the
artist. It is the same question as how to reconnect with our fellows and
with other beings. Lorenz has pointed out that we cannot reconfigure
our natural inclinations toward aggressive encounter by simple rational
inquiry, since reason is the handmaiden of instincts and natural inclin-
ations, and not their master. However, since he also tells us that the ways
of our being are materially formed, engraved into our being by millennia
of ritualized practices, it makes sense that a transformation of our prac-
tices can also work transformations in our being. We can, with time and
practice, become less selfishly exploitative beings.
One way we might attempt to reconnect with others, shifting the
foundations of relationality beyond the technological rationality of
modernity, is to relate on the basis of our shared mortality, a shared
vulnerability in the flesh. Perhaps we can, with concrete bodily work,
close the distance between us and our human fellows, between us and
other beings, by shifting our understanding of rationality. Our ratio need
64 WENDY C. HAMBLET
not be seen as a functionality superior to, but only different from, the
kind of bodily thinking done by other creatures. If we can reconnect with
others on the basis of fragility, not mastery, we might find it possible to
heal the rift between us and other beings. Connecting with others on the
basis of fragility rather than mastery means acknowledging our kind of
ratio, not as a ruling principle, but as an instrument for alleviating
suffering, reducing fragility. We might be capable of finding ways to
employ that unique rationality that is ours to help those who live their
lives even closer to the fleshy cusp of existence than we. Once we are able
to rediscover the other as Other, then perhaps we can find ourselves once
again in the loving embrace of the m(Other).
Spinoza suggests a similar solution in his Ethics when he redefines
virtue as ‘‘like community’’ and reason as ‘‘good will’’ toward neigh-
bours.14 Spinoza sees that the best life for all is the life in which all people
‘‘desire for themselves nothing, which they do not also desire for the rest
of mankind and, consequently, [they] are just, faithful, and honorable in
their conduct’’ (PXVIIInl). However, it could be argued that Spinoza
meant ‘‘like community’’ to embrace all mortal beings, not simply human
beings (who, as we have seen, share a fundamental unity in any case),
since Spinoza concludes Book IV of his Ethics with the following call to
harmony:
... in so far as we have a right understanding of [necessity and truth], the endeavor of the
better part of ourselves is in harmony with the order of nature as a whole.15
However, in the final analysis, this ‘‘right understanding’’ remains far

removed from the rational capabilities of many human beings, so bent
upon self-serving exploitations as we are. This is why Spinoza closes the
Ethics with this pessimistic declaration:
If the way in which I have pointed out as leading to this [harmony] seems exceedingly
hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found.
How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great
labor be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are
as difficult as they are rare.16
Overcoming the push and shove of self-serving instinct and predisposition

is a matter of recognizing the ‘‘necessity and truth’’ – that human beings
are no grander than other mortal beings struggling against an inevitable
fate. Their grandeur – their ‘‘excellence’’ – resides in their ability to employ
their unique rationality to overcome their disposition toward radical

egoism.
Adelphi University
NOTES
1 Konrad Lorenz. On Aggression, p. 238.

2 Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, I.1.
3 ‘‘In the horror of the radical unknown to which death leads is evinced the limit of
negativity. This mode of negating while taking refuge in what one negates delineates the
same or the I.’’ T otality and Infinity, p. 41.
4 Genome: T he Autobiography of a Species in 23 chapters, p. 22.
5 Ibid., p. 25.
6 On Aggression, p. 240 ff.
7 Ibid., pp. 240–241.
8 Ibid., pp. 241–242.
9 Ibid., p. 250.
10 Ibid., p. 248.
11 Ironically, genetic science has made another discovery that, not only raises questions for
social science, but for ecological and social politics as well. It has been found that high rank
means low aggressiveness in our cousin monkeys. Thus, if the security afforded by high rank
means a calming of the fierce competitiveness and the inclinations for violence, a propensity
toward reconciliation and for recruiting allies rather than enemies, a calmer demeanor, less
impulsiveness, and less suspicion and misinterpretation (of play-fighting for serious aggres-
sion), then it seems that humans will have to change their ways if they wish to claim highest
rank in the great chain of being.
12 Enrico Coen, T he Art of Genes.
13 See Hyperion.
14 Ethics, IV. Appendix, VII, XXVIII.
15 R. H. M. Elwes, tr.
16 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Coen, Enrico. T he Art of Genes: How Organisms Make T hemselves. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
Jonas, Hans. Mortality and Morality: A Search for the Good After Auschwitz, Lawrence Vogel
(ed.). Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1996.
Levinas, Emmanuel. T otality and Infinity, Alfonso Lingis (trans.). Pittsburg: Duquesne
Lorenz, Konrad. On Aggression, Marjorie Kerr Wilson (ed.). New York: Harcourt, Brace &
World, 1963.
Ridley, Matt. Genome: T he Autobiography of a Species in 23 Chapters. London: Fourth
Estate, 1999.
ALEXANDER KUZMIN
M. HEIDEGGER’S PROJECT FOR THE OPTICAL

INTERPRETATION OF REFLEXION: THE TIME,
THE REFLEXION AND THE LOGOS
In 1927 M. Heidegger published his famous work Sein und Zeit. Long
before that, the classical tradition of European philosophy had expressed
its ultimate conviction that the fascination of time could be dispelled by
the evidence and truth of thought. Confer, e.g., Hegel’s principal thesis
that ‘‘philosophy, being engaged in the true, deals with what is eternally
present’’.1
When M. Heidegger correlated being, the key concept of the preceding
metaphysics, with time, he apparently thought that thus he designated
the prime cause which must inevitably bring us to the ascertainment of
the essence and nature of the ‘‘end of metaphysics’’. So, time becomes the
principal problem of philosophy.
It was the problem of overcoming metaphysics as a monistic study of
the being of all the real that incited M. Heidegger and his contemporaries
to form the time concept as the main issue for philosophical reflection.
Philosophy in the metaphysical tradition was represented by them in the
image of a demurrage fashioning the eternal for the sole purpose of
surpassing time and burden of terminal being. Plato’s doctrine of ideals,
the basis of European metaphysics, was considered by them from a
position of its aiming at the actual abolition of time and inconstancy.
Aristotelianism, which breathed the soul into medieval thought, becomes
the subject of analysis only as aiming at the predominance of the real
over the variety of forms of its manifestation assigned to the categories
of existence, space and time. Moreover, the subsequent doctrines of sub-
stance had for their basis the truth of eternal being to arrive at. Eventually,
in the spirit of the metaphysical tradition, the New Age philosophy raised
a question of attaining the manifestation of the positively existent. To
sum up the aforesaid, we could concur that the metaphysical tradition
was apprehended by M. Heidegger as emancipation of mind from the
temporal and frail.
At the same time, M. Heidegger realizes that his work belongs to
phenomenology. However, interpretation of time in E. Husserl’s phenome-
nological philosophy differs essentially from M. Heidegger’s phenomeno-
67
68 ALEXANDER KUZMIN
logico-hermeneutic studies of temporality and time. As far as we know,

E. Husserl did not enter directly into a polemic with either M. Heidegger
or other philosophers on the issue of phenomenological time. Since publi-
cation of Sein und Zeit E. Husserl perceives anthropological tendencies
in M. Heidegger’s philosophy – the tendencies which seemed to him not
strict enough for the phenomenological conception. E. Husserl insists on
the necessity of phenomenological reduction as it does not entail prere-
quisite knowledge necessary for basing philosophy on tradition. And so,
according to Husserl, before using time as a means of revising metaphysi-
cal ontology, a strict model of phenomenological time should be formed.
It means that, first of all, it is necessary to show how we can possibly
experience time. Thereby, E. Husserl and M. Heidegger advance in
different directions since the latter is convinced that the nature of time
reveals itself in the experience of man as a result of the terminal situation
of his being-in-the world.
The problem of time, the way it was raised by the philosophy of the
beginning of the XXth century, was broadly discussed in the works of
such Russian philosophers as M. M. Bakhtin, N. A. Berdyaev, L. P.
Karsavin, A. F. Losev, S. L. Frank and others. For example, M. M.
Bakhtin describes a method of experiencing time in the context of his
conception of the ‘‘other’’. M. M. Bakhtin’s approach to the concept of
time is not fortuitous. His treatment of the problem of temporality fills
up the gap made owing to the incompleteness of the experience of time
as presented by E. Husserl’s phenomenology, and owing to the pre-
experiential nature of time as presented by M. Heidegger’s fundamental
ontology.
Proceeding from the studies of psychical processes and phenomenology
of consciousness, F. Brentano, A. Bergson and, of course, E. Husserl took
the lead in comprehending the concept of time. E. Husserl, within the
bounds of his phenomenology of the inner consciousness of time, suc-
ceeded in overcoming the opposition of natural-philosophic notions of
time to psychological ones. E. Husserl views the concept of phenomeno-
logical time in the aspect of reconstitution of primary structures of con-
sciousness as semantic structures. To impart meaning and to form the
semantic horizon of the given (die Gegenstandlichkeit) is the aim of
phenomenological investigation.
The peculiarity of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is seen
in his assumption of phenomenology as a means of working out the
problem of being. At the same time, his phenomenology is ‘‘hermeneutic’’
and, being such, shows that philosophical self-consciousness comes to
HEIDEGGER’S OPTICAL INTERPRETATION OF REFLEXION 69
light only together with understanding the other, and this is the purpose
of hermeneutics. By nature, ‘‘phenomenological hermeneutics’’ is con-
cerned with revealing a distinctive feature of such types of philosophizing
which seek to exceed the bounds of classical forms of expression.
M. Heidegger put forward the problem of being as the definitive one
anew, but he did it in a nontraditional way.2
We are also indebted to M. M. Bakhtin for discovering nontraditional
forms of analysis of time. For M. M. Bakhtin, one of the main types and
levels of philosophical approach to the theme becomes considering the
problem of time in connection with analysis of artistic creativity.
Questions of interpenetrating the concepts of time and consciousness,
as described in E. Husserl’s phenomenology, do not exhaust the complete-
ness of confirmation of being apart from meaning’’.3 With the exception
of semantic functions of consciousness, ‘‘confirmation of being’’, takes
place in the creative artistic act, owing to which ‘‘naivety of available
being becomes beauty’’.4 Artistic creativity, according to M. M. Bakhtin,
exceeds the bounds of the semantic life content and it, aesthetic comple-
tion, in essence, is unattainable from within being as such. It is only
‘‘passive activity’’, ‘‘activity from the outside’’, conditioned by all forces
and energies of the world, predetermined by all givens and availability’s
of being, that comes out of the author’s artistic creativity. For all this,
such activity does not change the semantic aspect of being’’,5 by any
means.
Refusing to recognize forms of ‘‘pure self-expression’’ as the source of
artistic creativity of the author of a work, so long as they will be semantic
forms, M. M. Bakhtin takes to analyzing forms of ‘‘relation to the other
and his self-expression’’6 as time forms of the aesthetic realization of inner
life and a directly given world. All aesthetic philosophical categories, time
(temporality, rhythm) inclusive, according to M. M. Bakhtin, ‘‘shine with
the reflected value light of otherness’’.7
The idea of ‘‘other’’, ‘‘otherness’’ in the humanitarian philosophy of
M. M. Bakhtin deserves attention not only for its existential significance,
being a breaking-off from the traditional philosophy of subject–object
relations, but also for its breakthrough to an analysis of the core of time
– absolute time – the time by which and in which the other lives; thus
the problem of time, raised at the beginning of the XXth century, can be
examined from a different angle.
As is generally known, E. Husserl’s philosophy, having taken for its
theme phenomenology of the inner consciousness of time, is the philoso-
phy of phenomenological time of pure Ego. In E. Husserl’s phenomeno-
70 ALEXANDER KUZMIN
logical philosophy the theme of phenomenological time is entitled to

complete pure Ego as a stream of experiences. For E. Husserl phenomeno-
logical time, as well as pure Ego, can be perceived only in the forms of
manifestations characteristic of all experiences. In phenomenology the
title temporality of consciousness is given the meaning of ‘‘a necessary
form linking experiences with experiences’’,8 i.e. temporality expresses by
itself not only belonging of something temporal to any single experience,
but also the form of linking experiences together in one infinite stream
of experiences’’.9 With that, pure Ego never misses a possibility to fix its
gaze on the temporal being of an experience and, doing so, it will consider
‘‘the temporal modis of givenness’’10 of experiences. Of all the mode of
givenness of the temporal in an experience pure Ego chooses actual Now
as ‘‘the being form for new matter’’.11
Thus, in the universal field of phenomenological time opens simulta-
neously the whole of pure Ego’s initial horizon which we conceive as the
initial consciousness – Now. Phenomenology of the inner consciousness
of time, however, is compelled to adhere to the opposite position since
time-constituting consciousness cannot exist without being different from
the time constituted in it, i.e. phenomenologizing last, absolute time is as
if interdicted. The question how to express absolute time by means of deep
structures of consciousness remains undecided. Its decision from the phe-
nomenological position makes no sense as it leads to an infinite regress
which is overcome only by return to ‘‘unperceived consciousness’’.12
For M. Heidegger, phenomenology, so long as it becomes hermeneutic,
cannot be phenomenology of things and acts of consciousness, including
acts of the inner consciousness of time. Hermeneutic phenomenology
doubts the very possibility of correlation between noetic and noemic
moments of consciousness. Moreover, Dasein cannot participate in any
correlation at all because being is not a generic concept and cannot be
defined by means of predicating.
The hermeneutic force of M. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology is to
the effect that he transformed hermeneutics having introduced temporal
interpretation. Time is to introduce a basic principle for distinguishing
modes of being, for ‘‘interpretation of being in this or that form is
connected with time’’.13 The sense of being is caught and decentralized
in accordance with patterns of time, since ‘‘comprehension ... has already
projected being on to time’’.14 A hermeneutic situation, such as transpos-
ing (Setzen) ‘‘the thematically present whole into project’’,15 springs from
a possibility of understanding the other which had resisted recognition
as long as time has been deduced from being. Time enters the scene of
the metaphysical tradition together with the other, but it would be errone-
ous to treat it as an attribute of being. Time is a possibility of understand-
ing the other, i.e. being. ‘‘The project of the sense of being in general’’,
stresses M. Heidegger, ‘‘may be realized on the horizon of time’’.16
Thereby it is very difficult to ascend from E. Husserl’s understanding
of phenomenological time to understanding hermeneutically phenomeno-
logical temporalities in the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger. For
that it is essential to have as a medium an analysis of experience of time
of the other, which we present here thanks to M. M. Bakhtin’s humanitar-
ian philosophy.
According to M. M. Bakhtin’s philosophy of artistic creativity, the time
in which ‘‘the other’’ lives allows us to give an artistically formed idea of
completeness of time, of its absolute character. We cannot by ourselves
experience our birth anew, nor our death. They are given us as boundaries,
beyond which vagueness and absence of sense are in store for us. An
author can experience time in its complete integrity instead of a personage;
to put it more accurately, it is a personage’s life oriented to self-realization
that is the complete whole in time. ‘‘The other has a more intimate
connection with time’’, says M. M. Bakhtin, ‘‘ – he is entirely in time’’.17
Semantic unity as self-experience of my unity, is opposed by M. M.
Bakhtin to temporal unity, as the other’s experience of his unity. In my
attitude to myself semantic unity serves as an organizing principle of my
life apart from me. Brought face to face with meaning I experience
temporality as not-yet-complete, ‘‘not-yet-fulfilled’’, ‘‘not-all-yet’’.18
Semantic definiteness of an experience of temporality, thereby, will not
correspond to a self-experience ‘‘in the act embracing time’’.19 I embrace
time being a subject constituting time, and as such, I am nontemporal.
Thus, temporalization of experience of a subject constituting time is
impossible in principle, devoid of sense, and it lead to regress. Semantic
unity of my Ego excludes a possibility of constituting any temporality as
absolute time. It is obvious to M. M. Bakhtin that temporally completed
life is hopeless from the standpoint of its meaning’’.20
Only temporal unity as an organizing principle of my experiencing the
inner life of the other allows one to establish a non-semantic relation
between time and temporality. Temporality of time, according to M. M.
Bakhtin, becomes a convincing postulate of immortality, eternity, abso-
luteness, ‘‘inner definiteness of the other – his inner face (memory) – loved
besides meaning’’.21
So, we can maintain that temporality of experience about the other
must be considered a thematically indispensable aspect of constituting
72 ALEXANDER KUZMIN
the time of consciousness. Humanitarian philosophy in the person of

M. M. Bakhtin took its own way of solving the problem of absolute time,
eliminating difficulties and contradictions of phenomenological philoso-
phy drawing us nearer to the understanding of the non-experiential
temporality of hermeneutic phenomenology.
By the time of publication of M. Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit time had
become the main theme of philosophical reflection. According to
E. Husserl, a strict model of phenomenological time is to explain our
aptitude for having experience of time. M. Heidegger is convinced that
the nature of time reveals itself in the experience of man as a result of
the terminal situation of his being-in-the world. The idea of ‘‘otherness’’
in M. M. Bakhtin’s humanitarian philosophy allows us to examine the
problem of time from a different angle.
There are no blazed trails from E. Husserl’s understanding of phenome-
nological time to the understanding of hermeneutically phenomenological
temporalities in M. Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Based on M. M.
Bakhtin’s humanitarian philosophy we offer as a medium an analysis of
experience of time of the other.
Temporality of experience of the other is to be considered a thematically
indispensable aspect of constituting the time of consciousness. It adds
considerably to M. Heidegger’s thesis of time as a possibility of under-
standing the other, i.e. being. The temporalities of M. Heidegger’s herme-
neutic phenomenology become apparent as a model of phenomenological
time, functioning on the basis of the temporality of experience about
the other.
* * *
Heidegger’s thought of the Sein und Zeit period turns, among other
things, to the phenomenon of the self. For this, reflexion is chosen as a
modus of the self, the comprehension of which is noticeably linked with
the problems of the interpretation of a subject’s life.
What are the motives that induced the existential analytics of Dasein
to turn to comprehending the themes of reflexion? In the course of lectures
on the problems of phenomenology Heidegger, explaining the existence
of Dasein, emphasizes the significance of the intentionality of the percep-
tion phenomenon. It is characterized by such definitions as intentio and
intentum. Intentional relation already possesses the being’s intelligibility
of the real, just of the real which is first revealed by this relation. Having
stated the initial exposition of perception phenomenon intentionality,
Heidegger puts the question of how the being’s intelligibility of the real
combines with the intentional order. In correlation with the projected
interpretation of a subject’s being the question resounds as follows: how
is Ego determined by any intentionality? As a rule, phenomenology
designates Ego as the center or the pole of all possible outflows of
intentional acts. Yet, the question of the aspect of the Ego-pole’s being is
left open, which, in Heidegger’s opinion, is inadmissible since this is the
most important phenomenological question.
‘‘How’’, inquires Heidegger, specifying his position, ‘‘is Dasein given its
Ego, its self, i.e. how is Dasein, existentializing in the strict sense of the
word, itself proper, authentic it?’’.22 In all intentional relations the self is
always here by itself. Heidegger deliberately expands the bounds of signi-
ficance of the notion of intentionality. This notion is expanded by the
introduction of both the directness of itself to something and the being’s
intelligibility of the real, but not only these. Besides, ‘‘the self ’s self-
disclosure’’ will also be called an intentional relation since it is always in
the position of correlativity with some other.
However, the problem of the mode of the self ’s givenness is not thereby
resolved. Heidegger rejects the Kantian attitude to the problem so impor-
tant for the analytics of Dasein. Kantian transcendental unity of appercep-
tion, ‘‘cogito’’, accompanies all our notions and follows the acts which
will be directed at the existent. It will mean a reflecting act, for it represents
a cogitated connection between initial acts. Heidegger has nothing against
the formal correctness of statements about the Ego being conscious of
something and of itself as well. He also admits the correctness of the
characterisation of res cogitance as cogito me cogitare, i.e. as self-con-
sciousness. The foregoing formal definitions of Ego, in Hidegger’s opinion,
make up the framework of the dialectics of consciousness of idealism.
They are alien to the interpretation of the phenomenal existence of Dasein
and do not shake the foundations of existential analytics.
Attempting to construe intentionality Heidegger projects the horizon
for understanding Dasein. How is this real in its factual existence exposed
to him, if not confused with the epistemological notions of subject and
Ego? Heidegger compares his vision of the problem to the tenets of
phenomenology, in accordance with which the inner perception essentially
differs from the outer perception owing to the Ego’s turning on itself. By
turning on itself Ego addresses itself. Existentializing, Dasein is here for
itself. According to Heidegger, we should clearly conceive such a state of
things. ‘‘The self ’’, emphasizes Heidegger, ‘‘is Dasein here by itself, without
reflexion and without inner perception, before any reflexion’’.23
74 ALEXANDER KUZMIN
What then is the correlation between the self of the factual Dasein and
reflexion? What allows reflexion to play the role of a medium between
the self and objects? Analysing intentionality, Heidegger outlines the
semantic aspects of the distinction between reflexion as turning on itself
and as self-disclosing. According to the former, reflexion in the sense
identical with turning on itself is the modus of self-comprehension and
does not require the status or the initial mode of the self ’s self-disclosure.
Yet, he assumes that under proper conditions the mode of the self ’s self-
disclosure to the factual Dasein may be called reflexion.
As a rule, the notion of ‘‘reflexion’’ is understood as ‘‘a bent-over-Ego
self-examining’’.24 It does not coincide with its optical, primary meaning.
Therefore, Heidegger proposes to revert to the initial understanding or
reflexion as correlation. Summing up his reasoning, Heidegger says: ‘‘To
reflect means to be refracted into something, and radiated out of it, i.e.
to discover something in reflexion’’.25
The interpretation of the optical meaning of the term ‘‘reflexion’’ under-
taken in the course of his lectures Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie
essentially helped to introduce clarity into Heidegger’s conception of the
self as a structure of the self-disclosure of the factual Dasein. In Sein und
Zeit the phenomenon of the self is included in the sounder-understood
structure of care. Here the problem of the self is raised preliminarily as
the problem of a further fundamental comprehending of the integrality
of the structural whole of Dasein. Unlike Sein und Zeit, the course of
lectures aims at articulating the parent-phenomenon of the pre-ontologi-
cal comprehension of the self by means of interpreting intentionality as
having for its bases being-in-the-world.
In Sein und Zeit Heidegger gives the description of ‘‘correlation’’
between care and self,26 aiming not only at clearing up a particular
problem of Ego’s being, but also at the search for the ontological meaning
of care. And yet the meaning of ‘‘correlation’’, i.e. reflexion, remains
obscure.
How is the term ‘‘meaning’’ interpreted by Heidegger? Explicating this
term, so important for fundamental ontological analysis, the philosopher
maintains: ‘‘Meaning is a primary on-what draft from which something
as what it is can be understood in its possibility’’.27 Further specifying
the initial definition he emphasizes that the term ‘‘meaning’’ acquires its
strict sense after the primary on-what draft of the comprehension of being
has been ascertained. Then, to say that the existent has ‘‘the meaning’’
would spell out that it is understood as the meaning’s ‘‘on-what’’: i.e. the
meaning is always set by the primary draft of the comprehension of being.
In the course of lectures on the problems of phenomenology Heidegger’s

theme is the conception of reflexion on the plane of being. To describe
the being’s meanings of reflexion he again turns to the human Dasein,
which, experiencing no need to turn on itself, as if it were holding itself
behind its own back, having, before turning, fixedly directed itself towards
things, it finds itself in nothing other than things themselves (the things
that daily surround Dasein).28 Thus to understand oneself and one’s
existence, one can only do this through what one is interested in and
cares for. Dasein finds itself in things and understands itself here by
things. It is not necessary to constantly spy on and observe one’s own
Ego for acquiring the self. The genuine self of Dasein is reflected out of
things owing to the ingenious and passionate spending of oneself in this
world. As Heidegger asserts, here is neither mysticism nor supposition of
the possible animation of things. That is just the way of describing an
elementary phenomenological state of Dasein which should be taken into
account before any possible and witty opinions on the subject–object
relation.
What is this self-intelligibility the factual Dasein progresses and lives
by? Here Heidegger’s main device of interpreting is the terminological
fixation of the word ‘‘impersonal’’, which in the perspective of interpreta-
tion of the self-intelligibility of factual Dasein reveals its specific ‘‘reality’’.
Heidegger refuses point-blank to assume such ‘‘far-fetched’’ notions as
soul, individuality and Ego as a basis for his interpretation, because what
is to be perceived is the self-comprehension of the factual Dasein in its
dailiness. The self, herewith, is experienced and understood as our nearest
and primary, clear as day, acceptancy of ourselves since we do not cudgel
our brains over our destiny nor look in our soul. ‘‘Impersonal’’, as a
phenomenon, approximates to our self-loss in the dailiness of existence
of things and people. We cannot constantly comprehend ourselves from
the inmost and utmost possibilities of our existence for we are not self-
controlled. The ‘‘impersonal’’, interpreted as the impossibility of being by
oneself, comes out as self-loss which, however, has no negative meaning.
Heidegger links together the revealing of meaningfulness of the ‘‘imper-
sonal’’ and disclosure of the positive meaning of the self ’s hermeneutic
structure as ‘‘im-personal’’. The most important aspect of this structure
is impersonal self-comprehension which does not at all mean inadequate
self-comprehension. ‘‘On the contrary’’, Heidegger accentuates, ‘‘this daily
finding of oneself within the factual passionate immersion in things can
be quite adequate whereas any extravagant rummaging in one’s soul can
be most inadequate or even ecstatically pathological’’.29
76 ALEXANDER KUZMIN
So, the Dasein’s impersonal self-comprehension from things is neither

inadequate nor imaginary as though it were not the self but something
else that needed to be comprehended, the self being suppositional. Here
Heidegger links up significantly different, as they seem, themes: impersonal
self-comprehension – personal Dasein – specific ‘‘reality’’. The modus of
such correlation or even correlation itself is reflexion.
Proceeding from the hermeneutic task of the semantic approach to
phenomenological analysis Heidegger attaches the optical meaning to the
term ‘‘reflexion’’. Then, by means of a series of turns of thought he
attaches the optical vestiges of reflexive rationality to the philosophical
discourse which understands the foundation of intentionality as being-in-
the-world. And here Heidegger’s project for the optical interpretation of
reflexion finds the horizon of its comprehension in the idea of the funda-
mental correlation between self-comprehending, human Dasein and real-
ity (life).
The concept of a reflection, according to Heidegger, in metaphysical
tradition appears invariably bifocal as specifying horizon and as instru-
mentally interpreted seen in the horizon. At the same time he appeals to
logos which, being a self-illuminating tale, represents a word to life as a
primary theme of the phenomenology of presence. Heidegger’s idea laying
tracks in the direction of a definition of logos, disregards being sense of
the reflection borrowing her during work above product Sein und Zeit.
However, thematically discrete headings: ‘‘logos and reflection’’, arise by
themselves.
* * *
Perhaps, it is possible to agree with Heidegger, that Léceiu, lócoz in the

Greek intrinsic definition of the person understands that attitude on the
basis of which it is present as such for the first time and collects itself
around the person and for him. And only as the person is, so far as it
concerns reality as such, opening and hiding it, the person can and should
have the ‘‘word’’, i.e. speak about real life. A word which uses speech,
essentially only throws out from this word, from which the person will
never find ways back to reality for it is possible only on the basis of
léceiu. In itself léceiu has generally little to do with statement and
speech. If the Greeks understood the statement as léceiu, the unique
interpretation of the essence of a word and the statement of which it here
consists, then there are unapproachable chasms with any late ‘‘philosophy
of language’’. Extremely here, and namely towards us, speech is reduced
to the means of the message and its organization. This impression, as if

the thinking which is starting with speech is only ‘‘philosophy of a word’’
and no longer reaching ‘‘the vital validity,’’ is created. However such
judgement is only a recognition that there is already no more forcing one
to rely on a word as the certain, intrinsic, essential principle of any
communication with the real.30 The modern idea, figuratively speaking,
is the captivated topology of the archaic space of a word where the optical
metaphoricalness of the expression ‘‘reflection’’ can hardly help us with
something which has already found a way to our conscious life. Lekton
is an ancient Greek word which derives from the verb ‘‘legain’’.31 Lekton,
being verbal concreteness, designates the statement which already always
means something. Whereas ‘‘language to some extent designates noth-
ing’’.32 ‘‘Language is only language’’33 which acts for us as ‘‘the archaic
fact’’, i.e. the fact which ‘‘we can learn positively only by way of knowledge
because the understanding here is impossible’’.34 Such facts ‘‘call us to
understanding, instead of to conceptual knowledge. However, not know-
ing it, we try to learn them again, instead of to understand. And their
representation as knowledge makes them simply unreal’’.35 In a similar
situation we find ‘‘language of a reflection’’ operating, which, perhaps, in
an even greater degree hides from us those senses that form a skeleton
of the optical metaphoricalness of reflective rationality. As noticed by
M. K. Mamardashvili and A. M. Pjatigorsky, ‘‘we are convinced of the
unpredictability of thinking, unpredictability of the fact that there will be
this or that idea, this or that conscious experience’’.36 If the similar
unpredictability of idea is possible, then a reflection tied to statements of
the Logos, will be a symbol. Being senses of a reflection forms that
transversal of a modality of the logos which in lekton symbolizes newly
built life. ‘‘The symbol – as is emphasized by M. K. Mamardashvili and
A. M. Pjatigorsky – (unlike a sign generally) cannot rely at all on having
any distinct form designated’’.37
The starting point to render the theme is a thesis that under the
conditions of working out the intellectual ‘‘modern project’’ the image of
reflective rationality is characterized as having two incompatible and, yet,
mutually presupposing lines of the historical development of Western
philosophy: the unreduced pluralism of the transversal structures of
reflexion, and the theoretical integrity of reflectiveness indifferent, in
principle, to the plurality of forms of reason. We distinguish three levels
of the retransversal structures of reflexion: initially or simply reflective,
metareflective and self-reflective. The reflective level of epistemological
rationality will be determined in opposition to the unreflective one since
78 ALEXANDER KUZMIN
the latter identifies structures of knowledge and objective structures of

reality. And the reflective level of rationality relates, as a rule, to singling
the subject out of the system of cognitive relations and converting it to
the comprehending of its own actions and their reasons.
The metareflective level of rationality deals with the nature of the
cognitive relation of man to the world, determining his place and signifi-
cance among other kinds and forms of activity and world-relations, and
explains the principles, ways, means and methods of research in cognition
processes, revealing the nature, origin and essence of objectivized knowl-
edge and extra-scientific forms of cognition. At this level of reflective
rationality much consideration is given to the problems of forming the
subjects of cognitive activity in the light of the socio-cultural medium,
and ascertaining the subjects’ historical nature.
The self-reflective level of rationality will relate to the reconstruction
and transformation of knowledge about reflexion itself. Transversal struc-
tures of reflexion, regardless of the particularity of reflective rationality,
permeate all formations of reason both in the diachronic and the
synchronous planes. In other words, under the influence of numerous
facts of a cognitive nature, philosophy, since Descartes, has renounced
the idea of ultimate reason. Conformably, the integrity of reason, in such
an epistemological situation, can solely be maintained by transversal
structures of reflexion, the description of which, being independent of the
typical peculiarities of objective fields of knowledge, is conducive to the
rehabilitation of the idea of the whole, the idea resting at present upon
diversification, versatility and polysemy.
For this reason the transversal structures of reflection do not assume
the bases designated for themselves. They are initially symbolical and can
express themselves, being senses, though in themselves they cannot be
objective as are signs or things. The groundlessness of transversal struc-
tures of a reflection has already been noticed by the ancient stoics,38 the
truth being, with that restriction, that they have paid steadfast attention
to it. At the same time, the subsequent transversal structures of a reflection
were found out only up to a level of a metareflection. And in the diachro-
nological plan of the history of philosophy they came to light down to a
self-reflection – however, with some clauses attributed to logical rational-
ity. That logic, ratio and logos, lekton, are the peak-a-boo formations,
an appreciable image that began to challenge philosophers only in the
20th century. And now we can assert that the self-reflective level transver-
sal structures of a reflection without any restrictions and absorption
symbolizes the life of the logos, not being any thing and not assuming
something designated for itself.
Most likely, with what ease the philosophy of the new time has deprived
reflection of its ontological status, it is hardly possible to expect con-
sidering the radical return to a recognition behind it of a similar status.
To tell the truth, the hope dies hard.
Yaroslav W ise Novgorod State University

Novgorod the Great
NOTES
1 G. V. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte. Saint Petersburg, 1993,
p. 125.
2 See O. Poggeler, ‘‘Zeit und Hermeneutik’’ in Krisis der Metaphysik. Berlin, N.Y., 1989,
pp. 364–388.
3 M. M. Bakhtin, Aesthetics of L iterary Art. Moscow, 1986, p. 127.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., p. 28.
6 Ibid., p. 25.
7 Ibid.
8 E. Husserl, ‘‘Ideen zu einer reinen phänomenologie und phänomenologischen
Philosophie’’. Buch 1. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Neue, auf Grund
der handschriftlichen Zusatze des Verfassers erw. Aufl. Hrsg. Von Walter Biemel. Bd. 3, The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1950, p. 198.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 See R. Bernet, ‘‘Einleitung’’ in E. Husserl, Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917), herausgegeben und eingeleitet von R. Bernet, Hamburg, Felix
Meiner, 1985, pp. XI–LXVII.
13 M. Heidegger, ‘‘Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie’’ in Gesamtausgabe. Abt 2.
Vorlesungen 1923–1944. Bd. 24. Frankfurt am M.: Klostermann, 1975, p. 430.
14 Ibid.
15 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, in Gesamtausgabe. Abt.1. Veröffenlichte Schriften
1914–1970. Bd.2.- Frankfurt am M.: Klostermann, 1975, p. 308.
16 Ibid, p. 312.
17 Bakhtin, op. cit., p. 103.
18 Ibid., p. 3.
19 Ibid., p. 3.
20 Ibid., p. 9.
21 Ibid., p. 4.
22 Heidegger, op. cit., Bd. 24, p. 225.
23 Ibid., p. 226.
24 Ibid.
80 ALEXANDER KUZMIN
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 324.
29 Ibid., p. 228.
30 M. Heidegger, On the Essence and Concept in Aristotle’s ‘‘Physics’’ B,1. Moscow, 1995,
p. 81.
31 See: A. F. Losev, T he History of an Antique Aesthetics: T he Early Hellenism. Moscow,
1979, p. 90.
32 M. K. Mamardashvili, A. M. Pyatigorsky, T he Symbol and Consciousness: Metaphysical
Reasonings on Consciousness, Symbolics and L anguage. Moscow, 1997, p. 104.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 113.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 104.
37 Ibid., p. 130.
38 See A. F. Losev, op. cit., pp. 90–178.
A. L. SAMIAN
‘‘PHENOMENA’’ IN NEWTON’S MATHEMATICAL

EXPERIENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
Investigations in the foundation of mathematics, particularly with regard

to mathematical experience, are based on the assumption that learning
mathematics has its own mode of reasoning which is defined, inter alia,
by intuition, emotion and motivation.1 There are also those who subscribe
to the view that as far as mathematical experience is concerned, a person’s
cognition about cognition is important. The assumption of this approach
is that mathematicians form conceptions of the manner the mind works,
‘‘about their own mental states and processes’’.2 Yet, in none of these
analyses are the role of the internal senses, the involvement of the soul
and God as subscribed by Isaac Newton (1642–1727) considered.
‘‘The whole burden of philosophy’’, says Newton, ‘‘seems to consist in
this: from the phenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature,
and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena’’.3
Accordingly mathematical problems, from Newton’s view, are problems
in natural philosophy about phenomena.
That God is central in his natural philosophy is also clear. His discus-
sion about God’s Names and Attributes lead him to conclude: ‘‘And thus
much concerning God, to discourse of whom from the appearances of
things does certainly belong to natural philosophy’’.4 To give another
example, he writes the following passage in his study of optics:
And these things being rightly dispatch’d, does it not appear from Phenomena that there
is a Being, incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent ... And though every true Step made
in this Philosophy brings us not immediately to the Knowledge of the first Cause, yet it
brings us nearer to it, and on that account is to be highly valued.5
As a matter of fact, God is so crucial to his philosophy of mathematics

that he declares ‘‘When I wrote my treatise about our system (that is the
Principia), I had an eye upon such principles as might work with con-
sidering men for the belief of a deity’’.6 He even told Conduitt that the
Principia was written ‘‘to enforce and demonstrate the power and superin-
tendency of a supreme being’’.7 If his mathematical enterprise is overshad-
81
82 A. L. SAMIAN
owed with discussions about God to the extent that theology and his
‘natural philosophy’ are amalgamated together, what more of his mathe-
matical experience!
2. MATHEMATIZATION OF THE PHENOMENA OF NATURE
Newton states that mathematization of nature is not a new form of

scientific inquiry. The idea of mathematization can be traced back to
antiquity whereby the flowering of mathematics was closely related to
the development of mechanics. He claims that mathematics evolved as a
reaction to the intrusion of ‘‘substantial forms and accult qualities’’. Thus:
Since the ancients (as we are told by Pappus) esteemed the science of mechanics of greatest
importance in the investigation of natural things, and the moderns, rejecting substantial
forms and occult qualities, have endeavoured to subject the phaenomena of nature to the
law of mathematics.8
In so far as dealing with quantities, Newton maintains that mathematics

is that branch of knowledge with which the mathematician ‘‘investigates
the quantities of forces with their proportions consequent upon any
conditions supposed’’.9 In mentioning ‘‘quantities’’, Newton does not give
any philosophical treatment on numbers as the foundation of mathemat-
ics. Yet in his letter containing suggestions as how to improve the curricu-
lum of Christ’s Hospital, he accepts arithmetic as the foundation of
mathematics. Writes Newton,
Arithematicks is set down preposterously in the 12th Article after almost all the rest of
Mathematicks. For a man may understand and teach Arithmetick without any other skill
in Mathematicks, as writing Masters usually doe, but without Arithmetick he can be skilled
in non other parte of Mathematicks, & therefore Arithematick ought to have been set
downe in the very first place as the foundation of all the rest.10
Newton further claims that both geometry and mechanics are equally
important. He reminds Hawes of their significance: ‘‘If you admit this
learning, your school will certainly grow into greater reputation, ... for
the scheme of learning ... is an entire thing which cannot well want any
of it’s members, for ‘its nothing but a combination of Arithmetick,
Geometry, Perspective and Mechanicks, ...’ ’’11
NEWTON’S MATHEMATICAL EXPERIENCE 83
Mechanics is an important part of geometry. He draws the conclusion

that mechanics is that part of geometry which is less ‘‘perfectly accurate’’
by furnishing the following argument:
The ancients considered mechanics in a twofold respect: as rational, which proceeds accu-
rately by demonstration, and practical. To practical mechanics all manual arts belong, from
which mechanics took its name. But as artificers do not work with perfect accuracy, it
comes to pass that mechanics is so distinguished from geometry that what is perfectly
accurate is called geometrical; what is less so is called mechanical.12
Newton argues that geometry is the foundation of mechanics. In order

for a mathematician to be a mechanic par excellence, he should master
geometry. In the mathematician’s quest for studying nature, he should
work like a mechanic by uniting both his head and hand and not simply
deducing ‘using his head’. Says Newton concerning the significance of
mechanics and geometry:
He that works with less accuracy is an imperfect mechanic; and if any could work with
perfect accuracy, he would be the most perfect mechanic of all; for the description of right
lines and circles upon which geometry is founded, belongs to mechanics.13
According to Newton, geometry includes the art of inferring from hypoth-

eses, that is, from proven phaenomena. The root of mechanical practise
lies in geometry. Mechanics is that subject of geometry concerning the
art of measuring. For example. Newton claims that describing ‘figures’
are not geometrical problems but mechanical. He writes:
Geometry does not teach us to draw these lines, but requires them to be drawn; for it
requires that the learners should first be taught to describe these accurately before he enters
upon geometry, then it shows how by these operations problems may be solved. To describe
right lines and circles are problems, but not geometrical problems. The solution of these
problems is required from mechanics, and by geometry the use of them, when so solved, is
shown; and it is the glory of geometry that from those few principles, brought from without,
it is able to produce so many things. Therefore geometry is founded in mechanical practice
and is nothing but that part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes and demon-
strates the art of measuring.14
From the above passage, we can trace the general schema of Newton’s
conception of reducing ‘‘the phaenomena of nature to the laws of mathe-
matics’’. Beginning with phaenomena, the mathematician applies geomet-
rical principles to the phaenomena, yielding some axioms. Mechanical
principles are then applied to these axioms in order to explain other
phaenomena. If the resulting mathematical formulae are successful in
84 A. L. SAMIAN
explaining and predicting those phaenomena, they are elevated to the

status of mathematical laws. Thus:
Phaenomena of nature geometrical principles mechanical
Principles other phaenomena mathematical laws
Dia. 5.2. Newton’s conception of the importance of mechanics and geometry in mathematics.
So far we have not discussed Newton’s conception of the place of numbers

in his mathematics. Newton does not treat numbers per se in any compre-
hensive or very qualitative way. When he mentions numbers in the
Principia, it is usually in terms of ‘‘geometric measures’’ in the sense that
everything in the external world is theoretically measurable. Yet to
undermine the importance of numbers in his philosophy of mathematics
would be misleading because he believes that it his through ‘‘sensible
measures’’ that we can study extra sensible objects. For example, his
discussion on space leads him to write: ‘‘But because the parts of space
cannot be seen or distinguished from one another by our senses, therefore
in their stead we use sensible measures of them’’,15 and elsewhere; ‘‘And
if the meaning of words is to be determined by their use, then by the
names ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘place’, and ‘motion’, their [sensible] measures are
properly understood ...’’16
The significance of geometry and mechanics in shaping Newton’s phi-
losophy of mathematics is also evident from his comments concerning
the conventional use of those terms. Newton argues that although geome-
try is ‘‘that part of universal mechanics which accurately proposes and
demonstrates the art of measuring’’, geometry is not customarily perceived
that way. He writes:
But since the manual arts are chiefly employed in the moving of bodies, it happens that
geometry is commonly referred to their magnitude, and mechanics to their motion.17
Bearing in mind the ‘‘vulgar’’ aspect in the usage of the words ‘‘geometry’’
and ‘‘mechanics’’, he gives a definition for his ‘‘rational mechanics’’:
In this sense rational mechanics will be the science of motions resulting from any forces
whatsoever and of the forces required to produce any motions, accurately proposed and
demonstrated.18
In view of the above passage, Newton’s ‘‘rational mechanics’’ includes

geometry and arithmetic as well because it is evident that the study of
both ‘‘motions’’ and ‘‘forces’’ definitely involves ‘‘measures’’. As a matter
of fact in his letter to Hawes, he states:
Geometry is the foundation of Mechanicks, & Mechanicks the accomplishment & Crown
of Geometry, & both are assisted by Arithmetick for computing and perspective for drawing
figures: So that any part of this Systeme being taken away the rest remaines imperfect.’19
Since arithmetic, geometry and mechanics or to use his terms ‘‘rational

mechanics’’, is fundamental to his mathematical experience, accordingly
in Newton’s view the foundation of his program of mathematization is
his ‘‘rational mechanics’’. We come to this conclusion because in his
discussion on ‘‘rational mechanics,’’ he states:
This part of mechanics, as far as it extended to the five powers which relates to manual
arts, was cultivated by the ancients, who considered gravity (it not being a manual power)
not otherwise than in moving weights by those powers. But I consider philosophy rather
than arts, and write not concerning manual but natural powers, and consider chiefly those
things which relate to gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance of fluids, and the like forces,
whether attractive or impulsive; and therefore I offer this work as the mathematical principles
of philosophy, for the whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in this: from the
phaenomena of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces to
demonstrate the other phaenomena ...20
That the foundation of his programme of mathematization rests upon

‘‘rational mechanics’’ can also be discerned from the continuation of the
above passage found in the third section of the Principia wherein Newton
describes the ‘‘geometrical aspects’’ in order to derive other mathematical
laws. Newton writes:
In the Third Book, I give an example of this in the explication of the System of the World;
for by the propositions mathematically demonstrated in the former books, in the third I
derive from the celestial phaenomena the forces of gravity with which bodies tend to the
sun and the several planets. Then from these forces, by other propositions which are also
mathematical, I deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon and the sea. I
wish we could derive the rest of the phaenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning
from mechanical principles.21’
If we take into account what Newton meant by ‘‘rational mechanics’’,

mathematics that is built upon it is surely axiomatic but not purely
theoretical. It is mathematics resulting from the unity of hand and head,
a marriage between the world of sensibles and to some aspects related to
the world of intelligibles.
3. GOD: THE PHENOMENON
In this section, we will examine in greater detail the place of God in

Newton’s scheme of reducing the phaenomena of nature to that of mathe-
86 A. L. SAMIAN
matics since God is so central in his mathematical experience. Newton

says:
Is not the Sensory of Animals that place to which the sensitive Substance is present, and
into which the sensible Species of Things are carried through the Nerves and Brain, that
there may be perceived by their immediate presence to that Substance? And these things
being rightly dispatch’d, does it not appear from the Penomena that there is a Being
incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory,
sees the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends
them wholly by their immediate presence to himself; ... 22
We claim that it is this concept of God, as a geometer and a mechanic

par excellence, who is the sole creator of this world which functions as
the underlying raison d’être for Newton to reduce the phaenomena of
nature to mathematical laws.23 In order to arrive at this conclusion, we
will elaborate on Newton’s position towards idolatry and consequently
his attempt to de-deify nature by mathematizing it.
Newton views idolatry as the greatest evil of mankind. Idolatry to him
is the manifestation of Atheism. Idolatry, says Newton, is ‘‘against the
principal part of religion, is in scripture condemned and detested above
all other crimes.24 It is the greatest evil for no other reason but because
of what is brought forth; mediators between men and God. The major
problem with idolatry is that it is diametrically opposed to the Qualities
of God. In Newton’s terminology, God ‘‘forms and reforms’’ exclusively
by Himself. There is no other being besides Him who shares His power.
The idolaters, however, ascribe powers to other than God. In his discus-
sion concerning the sin of idolatry, Newton writes:
... in serving false or feigned Gods, that is, Ghosts or Spirits of dead men, or such like
beings which you make your Gods, by feigning that they can hear your prayers, do you
good or hurt, and praying to them for protection and blessings and trust in them for the
same, and which are false gods because they have not the powers which you ascribe to
them, and on which you trust.25
From Newton’s perspective in studying nature, ‘‘forces’’ are merely mathe-

matical notions irrespective of the powers associated with it. ‘‘Forces’’ are
‘‘God’s instruments’’, and as ‘‘God’s instruments,’’ they are not equivalent
to God; anymore than a mechanic’s instrument is equivalent to the
mechanic himself. Whatever power these instruments may have, they are
incomparable to that of God. Newton drives home the point not to
ascribe equal powers to them. In his scheme of mathematizing nature,
forces could never end up as idols bearing in mind that idols can subsume
different names. The only mechanic and geometer ‘‘forming and reform-
ing’’ the universe is God and not ‘‘forces’’.
An example that we have in mind is his concept of gravity. Although
Newton uses the phrase ‘‘the power of gravity’’, it is not the case that
power is inherent in gravity such that gravity has an equal power to God.
He even insists that gravity is not ‘‘essential and inherent to matter’’.26
To believe that it is so is ‘‘so great an absurdity that I believe no man
who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can
ever fall into it’’,27 according to Newton.
Newton ventures on explaining the operation of gravity. Like any other
hypotheses on natural causes, gravity has to be understood mathemati-
cally and used ‘‘in so far as they may furnish experiments’’.28 This is
Newton’s position with respect to the natural causes in his scheme of
reducing natural phaenomena to mathematical laws. More than anything
else, gravity is a mathematical notion, a mathematical entity which can
be ‘‘deduced from the phaenomena’’ and ‘‘rendered general by induction’’.
It is sufficient for Newton that a mathematical entity such as gravity
‘‘does really exist and act according to the laws ... and abundantly serves
to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea’’.29
Just as ‘‘force’’ should never be perceived as God or His equal, so gravity.
Gravity is merely a mathematical notion used to describe the mathemati-
cal relationship between mathematical objects in nature.
In addition to his concept of gravity, Newton’s distinction between
what counts as relative and absolute, apparent and true, common and
mathematical, likewise reflects his position on the need for the
de-deification of nature. It is worth noting that, by and large, Newton
equates that which is absolute to that which is true and mathematical;
and that which is apparent as equal to that which is relative and common.
The mathematical experience of the mathematician is a passage to under-
standing some aspects of the world of intelligibles.
Newton’s concept of time is an example to illustrate the distinction
between the sensibles and the intelligibles and his belief that mathematics
function as a bridge connecting them.
Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, flows equably
without relation of anything external, and by another name is called ‘duration’; relative,
apparent, and common time is some sensible and external (whether accurate or equable)
measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time,
such as an hour, a day, a month, a year.30
The de-deification of nature in Newton’s mathematical experience, which

is achieved by minimizing any powers associated with natural causes,
88 A. L. SAMIAN
ends up with its mathematization. It is a consequence of his staunch belief

that God is the geometer and mechanic who keeps on ‘‘forming and
reforming’’ the world. That God is the mechanic and geometer is a fact
and not an opinion for Newton whereas the amount of power His
creations have is of the status of opinion, and hypothesis and by his
account of it can only be included cautiously in his philosophy of mathe-
matics. Thus:
It is not the Business of Experimental Philosophy to teach the causes of things further than
they can be proven by Experiments. We are not to fill this Philosophy with Opinions which
cannot be proved by Phaenomena.31
The mathematization of nature should result in greater knowledge about

God and his glorification. ‘‘And though every true Step made in this
Philosophy brings us not immediately to the Knowledge of the First
Cause’’, says Newton, ‘‘yet it brings us nearer to it, and on that account
is to be highly valued’’.32 Thus the de-deification of nature by mathemati-
zation and the total internalization of God who is the perfect mechanic
and geometer, the sole creator and the only Lord of the Worlds33 in his
mathematical experience.
4. STAGES OF MATHEMATIZATION
In this section we want to study the process of abstraction imbedded in

his method of reducing natural phaenomena into mathematical laws.
Phaenomena is the most basic concept forming his mathematical
experience. In a nutshell, Newton states that ‘‘Experimental philosophy
proceeds only upon Phaenomena and deduces general propositions from
them only by Induction’’.34 We have explicated Newton’s conception of
phaenomena in the previous section. We wish only to mention here that
by ‘‘phaenomena’’ Newton includes ‘‘whatever things are perceived,
whether they be external things which become known to us through the
five senses, or internal which we contemplate in our minds when think-
ing’’.35 Therefore, mathematical objects of the external world and their
corresponding mathematical images form parts of phaenomena. What
remains to be studied are the detailed processes that link phaenomena
to the mathematical laws, the so called ‘‘general proposition’’.
From our point of view, one of Newton’s most important passages
concerning his mode of mathematization could be found in one of his
MSS. He writes:
As Mathematicians have two Methods of doing things which they call Composition and
Resolution and in all difficulties have recourse to their method of resolution before they
compound so in explaining the Phaenomena of nature the like methods are to be used and
he that expects success must resolve before he compounds, for the explications of
Phaenomena are Problems much harder than those in Mathematics. The method of reso-
lution consists in trying experiments and considering all the Phaenomena of nature relating
to the subject in hand and drawing conclusions from them and examining the truth of those
conclusions from those experiments and so proceeding from experiments to conclusions
and from conclusions to experiments until you come to the general properties of things.
Then assuming those properties as Principles of Philosophy you may by them explain the
causes of those Phaenomena as follow from them which is the method of Composition ...36
On reading the above passage, one is tempted to conclude that experi-

ments are central to Newton’s method of Composition and Resolution.
While performing experiments is definitely an important ‘external’ aspect
of his pattern of mathematical inquiry, there is yet another more funda-
mental aspect than experimentation in so far as mathematical experience
is concerned. It is none other than observation. In both experiments and
observations he believes that the senses play an integral role. ‘‘We in no
other way know the extension of bodies than by our senses’’, says
Newton.37
According to Newton, there are two aspects of observation: the external
and the internal. The external aspect is that carried out by the five external
senses.38 Their main purpose is to convey raw data of the phenomena to
the sensorium. Speaking of the external senses, Newton writes: ‘‘The
organs of senses are not for enabling the soul to perceive the species of
things in it sensorium, but only for conveying them thither’’.39
The internal aspect of observation concerns the soul, the sensorium
and the mind. His discussion about the divisibility of particles leads him
to write:
Moreover, that the divided but contiguous particles of bodies may be separated from one
another is a matter of observation; and, in the particles that remain undivided, our minds
[not our external senses] are able to distinguish yet lesser parts, as is mathematically
demonstrated.40
According to Newton, the sensorium is the place into which data of the
phenomena passes. It is the place of sensation. ‘‘The right side of the
sensorium come from the right side of both eyes ... the left side of the
sensorium come in like manner from the left side ...’’41 claims Newton.
In his discussion of God, Newton hints that images of the phenomena,
are transferred into the sensorium by means of the organs of sense, ‘‘... of
which things the images only carried through the organs of sense into
90 A. L. SAMIAN
our little sensorium are these seen and beheld by that which in us perceives
and thinks ...’’42 As important as the sensorium and the external senses
may be, it is not from them that the mathematician perceives. Rather it
is the soul that perceives the mathematical meanings of the mathematical
images. We posit that Newton also expounds on the perceptive aspect of
the soul when he states that: ‘‘Every soul that has perception is, though
in different times and in different organs of sense and motion, still the
same indivisible person.’’43 As a point of fact, Newton alludes that it is
the soul which holds the place of primacy in the act of perception,
mathematical or otherwise; for that matter in the existence of man. Let
us consider the following statement with respect to the preceding quota-
tion which is given almost as its continuation in the same scholium.
‘‘Every man, so far as he is a thing that has perception, is one and the
same man during his whole life, in all and each of his organs of sense’’.44
We can still investigate Newton’s mathematical experience even further
by questioning the way of the arrival of mathematical meaning at the
soul from God.
That God who is the creator of every phenomena has all mathematical
knowledge is clear to Newton. In Art. 4 of the Twelve Articles, Newton
states: ‘‘The Father is omniscient, and hath all knowledge originally in
his own breast, ...’’45 and elsewhere, God ‘‘governs all things and knows
all things that are or can be done’’.46 In other words, mathematical
knowledge originates from Him.
Moreover Newton believes that the external world which is the world
of phenomena is not a result of ‘‘unguided’’ necessity. ‘‘Blind metaphysical
necessity, which is certainly the same always and everywhere, could
produce no variety of things’’47 says Newton. According to Newton, the
world of phenomena come into being only through God. God creates
phenomena from His divine Ideas and Will. It is worth re-emphasizing
that Newton states: ‘‘All that diversity of natural thing which we find
suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas
and will of a Being necessarily existing’’.48 In light of this statement, from
Newton’s point of view God is pure existence because only He is necessar-
ily existing.
Following Newton, what sense are we to make of God’s existence and
the mathematician’s perception of phenomena? Newton gives an enlight-
ening remark with respect to this question. In his discussion of God and
motion, he tells us:
He is omnipresent not virtually but also substantially; for virtue cannot subsist without
substance. In him are all things contained and moved, yet neither affects the other; God
suffers nothing from the motion of bodies, bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence
of God.49
By the phrase ‘‘In him are all things contained and moved’’, we maintain
that what is meant by Newton is the knowledge of the pervasive Divine
Immanence and Divine Transcendence. It also points to his admission
that mathematical perception and consequently the attainment of mathe-
matical knowledge is only possible in so much as it is sanctioned by God;
God grants mathematical knowledge particularly by means of His Divine
Presence. Also, if we were to take into account his position on God’s
Essence, His Qualities and that God ‘‘may give his angles charge over
us’’,50 as well as the subtility of gravity and the world of phenomena, the
phrase ‘‘In him all things contained and moved’’ bears a hierarchy of
reality with Divine Essence at the outermost layer. The next inner layer
will be Divine Qualities, followed consequently by ‘‘angelic,’’ ‘‘subtle,’’
and the innermost layer, the world of phenomena.
God maintains phenomena like the mechanic who plays a very creative
role only in the first act of invention (creation). Elsewhere Newton refers
to the initial creative role of God in his discussion about ether whereby
he says that: ‘‘... and after condensation wrought into various forms, at
first by the immediate hand of the Creator, and ever since by the power
of nature, ...’’51
Once mathematical images of phenomena are sent to the brain, the
memory of the perceiver which is the retentive faculty retain the images
in the absence of the mathematical objects from any of the external senses.
The mathematical images also function as mathematical symbols. The
imaginative faculty, which is yet another kind of internal sense, manages
the mathematical symbols and formulates them for the soul. This is the
level whereby mathematical symbols are stripped from their correspond-
ing phenomena, and the process of mathematical reasoning which at this
stage consists of ‘‘resolving’’, is carried out.52 There are extensive use of
geometric figures which are consonant with his belief that God is the
perfect geometer. At this level, the mathematician intermittently checks
the conclusion of the interpolation by conducting experiments,53 that is
by ‘‘proceeding alternately from experiments to conclusions from conclu-
sions to experiments’’.
So far we have addressed the process of mathematical observation
understood within the schema of Newton’s mathematical experience. In
sum, mathematical images from the phenomena are sent via the senses
into the brain when sensation is excited, and thereafter is analysed and
92 A. L. SAMIAN
synthesized by way of the imaginative faculty and the retentive faculty,

and judged by the soul who attains mathematical knowledge which
ultimately issued forth from God who is the source of all knowledge.
5. CONCLUSION
Newton begins his mathematical experience by contemplating the phen-

omena. Mathematics according to Newton is an essential tool in deci-
phering nature and in solving problems manifested in the phenomena.
Man can unravel the abstract aspect of the phenomena and thereafter
knows more about himself, nature and God by way of mathematics.
More than anything else, mathematics according to Newton provides a
valuable linkage between the study of phenomena and God.
Fundamental to Newton’s conception of mathematical experience is
his understanding of the ontological status of mathematical objects. At
the level of sense experience, they are said to be relative, apparent and
common. These features correspond to the outward aspect of nature.
From the inner aspect of nature in the dimension of the abstract world,
mathematical objects are associated with the concepts of truth and the
absolute. In the ultimate analysis, mathematical objects are manifestations
of some aspects of Being.
The arrival at mathematical knowledge by the soul in Newton’s mathe-
matical experience is an offshoot of his cosmology. In retrospect, we can
name the outermost layer of his cosmology ‘World 1’. World 1 is the
world of metamathematics. It contains the metaphysical principles deter-
mining the nature of the mathematics produced. These metaphysical
principles are not assumptions or axioms or conventionalists’ claims.
They function as the foundations of mathematics and its overall guiding
principle. Circumscribed and underdetermined by World 1 is World 2. It
consists of assumptions, premises and axioms. World 3 is the world of
mathematical models. It is a world overshadowed by both World 1 and
World 2. The contents of World 3, are results from Newton’s mathematiza-
tion of the phenomena of nature. In conclusion, in Newton’s mathematical
experience of phenomena, World 1 provides the overriding regulative
principles for the other Worlds, based upon his staunch belief that all
there is has its roots in the Divine; with God as The Phenomenon.
National University of Malaysia

NOTES
1 For example, see Philip J. Davis, Reuben Hersh, Elena Anne Marchisotto. T he
Mathematical Experience (New Jersey: Birkhauser, 1995), Jean-Pierre Changeux and Alain
Connes, Conversations on Mind, Matter, and Mathematics, M. B. DeBevoise (ed. and trans.)
(New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1955), Mathematics and Mind, Alexander George (ed.)
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).
2 See H. Wellman, ‘‘The Origins of Metacognition’’, in Metacognition, Cognition, and
Human Performance, D. L. Forrest-Pressley, G. E. MacKinnon and T. G. Wailer (eds.)
(London: Academic Press, 1985).
3 See Newton’s preface to the first edition of the Principia, 8th May 1686, Principia, Motte-
Cajori, pp. xvii–xviii.
4 See his General Scholium in Principia, Motte-Cajori.
5 See Opticks, p. 370.
6 See the first paragraph in his first letter to Richard Bentley in Opera Omnia IV, p. 429.
7 Keynes MS. 130 (6). University of Cambridge, King’s College Library.
8 See his preface to the first edition of the Principia. Principia, Motto-Cajori, p. xvii.
9 See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 192.
10 See Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes, L. L. Laudan and J.
Edleston (eds.) (London; Frank Cass Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 280.
11 Ibid., p. 286.
12 See Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. xvii.
13 Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. xvii.
15 See Newton’s Philosophy of Nature: Selections from his writings, H. S. Thayer (ed.), J. H.
Randall (intr.) (New York, 1951), p. 20.
16 Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. 11.
17 Ibid., p. xvii.
18 Ibid., p. xvii.
19 See J. Eddleston, op. cit., p. 286.
21 See ibid., p. xviii.
23 It is worth noting that in Bentley’s lecture sanctioned by Newton, the former states:
Now that all this Distances and Motions and Quantities of Matter should be so accurately
and harmoniusly adjusted in this great Variety of our System, is above the fortuitous Hits
of Blind Material Causes, and must certainly flow from that eternal Fountain of Wisdom,
the Creator of Heaven and Earth, who always acts Geometrically, by just and adequate
numbers and weights and measures.
See R. Bentley, ‘‘A Confutation of Atheism (III),’’ in Isaac Newton’s Papers and L etters on
Natural Philosophy and Related Documents, I. Bernard Cohen and Robert F. Schofield (eds.)
(Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 364.
24 Ibid., p. 49.
25 Ibid.
26 See Newton’s second letter to Bentley. See also Correspondence III, p. 240.
27 See Newton’s third letter to R. Bentley.
28 See Newton’s letter to Oldenburg in Opera Omnia, IV, p. 314.
94 A. L. SAMIAN
30 Ibid., p. 6.
31 See Sir Isaac Newton: T he Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton. A Selection
from the Portsmouth Collection in the University L ibrary, A. R. Hall and M. B. Hall (eds.)
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962), p. 312.
32 Opticks, p. 370.
33 That Newton believes in the plurality of the world, see Brewster, Memoirs, ... Vol. II,
p. 353. Concerning the glorification of God as the desired product of Newton’s natural
philosophy, it is interesting to note that in Roger Cotes’ introduction to the Principia which
received Newton’s commendation, he writes:
Therefore we may now more nearly behold the beauties of Nature and entertain ourselves
with the delightflul contemplation, and which is the best and most valuable fruit of
philosophy, be thence incited the more profoundly to reverence and adore the great Maker
and Lord of all. He must be blind who, from the most wise and excellent contrivances of
things, cannot see the infinite wisdom and goodness of their Almighty Creator, and he
must be mad and senseless who refuses to acknowledge them. [underlined mine] (See
Principia, Motte-Cajori, pp. xxxii–xxxiii).
34 See Isaac Newton’s letter dated 31 March 1713 to Roger Cotes in Correspondence of Sir
Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes, L. L. Laudan and J. Edleston (eds.) (London; Frank Cass
Co. Ltd., 1969), p. 156.
35 Quoted in I. B. Cohen, Introduction to Newton’s Principia, op. cit., p. 30. See also ibid.,
Issac Newton, T he Creative Scientific Mind at Work; W iles L ecture (Belfast; 1966), p. 128.
36 Ibid., pp. 98–99.
38 Newton also uses the phrase ‘‘five powers’’ to denote the five external senses. For example
in commenting on mechanics, he says: ‘‘This part of mechanics, as far as it extended to the
five powers which relate to manual arts, was cultivated by the ancients, ...’’. (See Principia,
Motte-Cajori, p. xvii).
40 Ibid., p. 399.
41 See Query 15 in Opticks, p. 346.
44 Ibid., p. 545.
45 See T heological Manuscripts, p. 56.
47 Ibid., p. 546.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 545.
50 See T heological Manuscripts, p. 51.
51 See Brewster, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 390–393.
52 An example of Newton’s mathematical reasoning is given by Roger Cotes in his preface
to the second edition of Principia. Writes Cotes:
Now it is evident from mathematical reasoning, and rigorously demonstrated, that all
bodies that move in any curved line described in a plane and which, by a radius drawn to
any point, whether at rest or moved in any manner, describe areas about that point
proportional to the times are urged by forces directed toward that point. (See Principia,
Motte-Cajori, p. xxii).
53 For some examples on the variety of experiments performed in the Principia, see
Principia, Motte-Cajori, pp. 22–5 wherein he describes experiments with pendulums to verify
the conservation of momentum; ibid., pp. 316–26 (to detect ‘the resistance of mediums by
pendulums oscillating therein’); and ibid., pp. 337–45 (‘to find the motion of water running
out of cyclindrical vessel through a hole’). For other experiments, see ibid., pp. 353–5, 355–66
and 382–4.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brewster, David. Memoirs of the L ife, W ritings, and Discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton, 2 vols.
Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co., 1855.
Cohen, I. Bernard. Introduction to Newton’s ‘Principia’. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1971.
Manuel, Frank. E. A Portrait of Isaac Newton. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1968.
Newton, Isaac. T he Correspondence of Isaac Newton, H. W. Turnbull, J. F. Scott, A. R. Hall
and Laura Tilling (eds.), 5 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959–1975.
——. ‘‘Four letters from Sir Isaac Newton to Doctor Bentley: containing some arguments in
proof of a deity’’, in T he Works of Richard Bentley, Rev. Alexander Dyce (ed.). London,
1838.
——. Sir Isaac Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the
World. Translated into English by Andrew Matte in 1729. The translations revised, and
supplied with an historical appendix, by Florian Cajori. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1934.
——. Sir Isaac Newton’s T heological Manuscripts, selected and edited with an introduction
by H. McLachlan. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1950.
——. Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, A. R. Hall and M. B. Hall (eds.).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.
——. Correspondence of Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes with an appendix containing other
unpublished letters and papers by Newton, L. L. Laudan and J. Edleston (eds.). London:
Frank Cass Co. Ltd., 1969.
——. Isaac Newton’s Papers and L etters on Natural Philosophy and Related Documents, I.
Bernard Cohen and Robert E. Schofield (eds.). Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958.
——. Newton’s Philosophy of Natural Selection from His W ritings, H. S. Thayer (ed.), John
Herman Randall (intr.). New York, 1951.
——. Opticks, or a T reatise of the Reflections, Inflections and Colours of L ight. Albert Einstein
(Foreword), Sir Edmund Whittaker (Introduction), I. Bernard Cohen (Preface), Duane
H. D. Roller (Analytical table). New York: Dover Publications, 1952.
——. Isaac Newtoni Opera quae Exstant Omnia, Samuel Horsley (ed.), 5 vols. London,
1779–85.
ELDON C. WAIT
WHAT COMPUTERS COULD NEVER DO
An Existential Phenomenological Critique of the Program of

Artificial Intelligence
Searle’s ‘Chinese Room Experiment’ has attracted considerable attention,

as an important argument against the claims of Strong Artificial
Intelligence. In Searle’s thought experiment I am required to imagine
being in a room where the only contact I have with the outside world is
through a window which allows me to receive and send sheets of paper
on which are scribbled Chinese characters. I have no idea what these
characters mean, but I do have a book of rules. For each set of characters
I receive, the rules prescribe which set of characters I must return. From
the outside it may look as if I understand the notes given to me, because
my ‘responses’ are appropriate. The truth is however that I have no idea
what I am reading or what I am writing. If in my responses I have, for
example, conveyed to my reader my warmest greetings, I have not done
so ‘intentionally’. Searle’s point is that all that computers can do is carry
out instructions or follow rules, and understanding and speaking a lan-
guage is more than just following rules, because it involves, expressing
ideas ‘intentionally’. From a phenomenological perspective Searle has
asked the right question, namely, ‘‘What is it like to speak a language
and what is it like to follow rules?’’. However, his ‘Chinese room experi-
ment’ has been rejected by various authors who have claimed that he
relies too heavily on intuitions. In his argument against the ‘Chinese
Room Experiment’, Ned Block for example, suggests that the impression
we have of being intentional as opposed to following rules, is merely an
intuition which like the intuition that the stars move around the earth
needs to be scrapped in the face of counter evidence (Searle; 1980: 425).
In order to meet this challenge I have chosen to reflect on another
experience, this time the experience of deducing a conclusion from its
premises. The question I will ask is, ‘‘What is it like to deduce a conclusion
from premises?’’, and ‘‘What is it like, to be caused to believe that a
certain statement is the conclusion of certain premises?’’. Like Searle, I
will argue that there is nothing in my experience which suggests that my
cognitions or my beliefs have been caused. I will argue however that the
experience of drawing a conclusion from its premises is one of those
97
98 ELDON C. WAIT
experiences which I cannot consider to be a mere intuition without placing

myself in a vicious circle.
The central claim of Strong Artificial Intelligence is that the brain is,
to all intents and purposes, a complex computer which would imply that
all my thoughts are ultimately the effects of causes. This would mean that
when I am given the premises, ‘‘All men are rational’’ and ‘‘Socrates is a
man’’ I do not ‘draw’ the conclusion ‘‘Socrates is rational’’ from the
premises, I do not ‘discover’ in the premises that which is implied, but
rather, as I think about the premises, I am caused to think about the
conclusion, by a set of largely unconscious contingent neurological or
psychological events. I do not believe that ‘‘Socrates is rational’’ because
I have found it to be necessarily implied by premises which I do believe,
my belief, and my assurance have been caused by the contingent properties
of my neuro-psychological make up.
There is however nothing in my experience of ‘drawing’ the conclusion
which would corroborate the thesis of Strong A.I. It is not as if under
certain conditions, for example, that of thinking about the premises, that
the conclusion simply ‘comes to mind’, leaving me wondering why this
‘conclusion’ came to mind and not another, leaving me wondering whether
the neuro-psychological events have, this time, brought about in me a
belief in a conclusion which corresponds to ‘the’ actual conclusion of the
premises (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 15). I do not appear to myself to be a
passive recipient of conclusions ‘ushered’ into consciousness through
unconscious causal processes. On the contrary, when I draw a conclusion,
I actively and self-consciously pursue ‘the’ conclusion, I direct myself to
that which is actually implied by the premises. Rather than being passive
to whatever ‘conclusion’ my neuropsychological make up ‘brings to mind’,
I seem to be able to prevail over any tendency or habit of thinking one
way or another, in order to direct myself to ‘the’ conclusion, that conclu-
sion actually implied by the premises quite independently of any contribu-
tion from me.
There is nothing in the experience of inferring a conclusion which
leaves me having to hope that my neuro-psychological make up will lead
to a valid conclusion, because it is an experience of self-consciously
directing myself to the conclusion of the premises, an experience of
overcoming any neuro-psychological makeup.
I have no impression of being limited to discovering ‘my’ conclusion
of the premises, the conclusion in accordance with ‘my’ ideas, images or
knowledge. In my pursuit of the conclusion I am not guided by an image
or representation of the goal. Since invoking or recalling images could
WHAT COMPUTERS COULD NEVER DO 99
not be a random act, it would be as difficult to explain how I invoke ‘the’

appropriate images, as it would be to explain how I pursue ‘the’ conclu-
sion. Nor of course could my thought be guided by my knowledge. I do
not think ‘Socrates is rational’ because I know that given the premises,
Socrates must be rational. I think in order to know. My knowledge of the
conclusion cannot play any role in my thinking because although in
actual fact the conclusion is implied by the premises it is not yet the
conclusion of these premises for me.
Nor is my pursuit of the conclusion for me, reducible to following rules
such as the rules of logic. If I am caused to follow rules, how would I
know that I have been caused to follow the correct rules and caused to
follow them correctly? If on the other hand I self consciously choose the
appropriate rules, the question will be how do I ‘bring to mind’ or
‘visualize’ the correct rules? Do I need rules for visualizing rules, and
rules for visualizing the visualizing rules? Clearly we would have an
infinite regress.1 To avoid the infinite regress it will have to be possible
to pursue the conclusion of the premises without images, rules, or repre-
sentations, and in those instances where I do follow rules it will have to
be possible to follow rules without rules for following rules. It will have
to be possible to strive to accomplish an act of following rules without
images, rules, or representations.
My experience therefore is not merely one of being able to ‘‘prevail
over’’ my own neuro-psychological make up, but it is an experience of
being able to direct myself to the ‘actual’ conclusion of the premises.
From my perspective, I am not limited to directing myself to something
determined by my knowledge, or my ideas, nor am I limited to following
rules. The act in which I recognize that given the premises, ‘‘Socrates
must be rational’’, does not appear to be explicable in terms of any
conscious or unconscious causes, in terms of any ‘contents’ of conscious-
ness, or the effect of applying rules, but, appears to be explicable in terms
of the ‘fact’ that given the premises, Socrates would necessarily be rational,
and by the power of this act to be ‘open’ to this ‘fact’, in order to represent
it to myself in an act of recognition. Although it is I who think, my
thoughts are experienced as being under the constraints of that which I
am trying to deduce, namely ‘the’ actual conclusion of the premises.
Whatever thinking is necessary for ‘the’ conclusion to become an object
of thought for me, will be ‘elicited’ by ‘the’ conclusion. Thought is experi-
enced as intentional because it is experienced as being ‘elicited’ by its
goal, rather than being determined by its neuro-psychological substrate
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 212).
100 ELDON C. WAIT
Everything about my experience, obliges me to give up any ‘representa-

tive’ idea of consciousness, because in my ‘pursuit’ of the conclusion I
direct myself to that which is not present to me in any form, which I do
not represent to myself. At the moment that I understand the premises,
the conclusion, as ‘that which actually follows’, is no more than something
‘to be grasped in thought’, ‘to be represented’, or something ‘to become
conscious of ’.2 Unless I could be directed towards something, which I do
not yet represent to myself, how could I ever strive to prevail over my
subjectivity, how could I ever get beyond a mere internal consistency, or
a mere truth ‘for me’?3
This intentionality of thought, and the unmediated contact which I
have with it is taken for granted by many thinkers who have tried to
reflect on their own thinking. In his Meditations, Descartes, for example,
accepts that his thinking is intentional without subjecting his experience
of his thinking to methodic doubt. When he arrives at his Cogito Ergo
Sum, he never considers the possibility that he has done no more than
reveal some peculiarity of his mind, some subjective tendency of his
thinking, such that whenever he thinks about the fact that he is thinking,
the thought that he exists always ‘comes to mind’. He never considers
the possibility that even though his thought ‘‘Sum’’ always follows his
thought ‘‘Cogito’’, the fact that he thinks, might not actually imply that
he exists. Nor does he claim that ‘‘Sum’’ always follows ‘‘Cogito’’ according
to the rules of thought, for then he would have to concede that ‘‘Cogito
Ergo Sum’’ would be true only if the rules of thought were reliable. If for
Descartes, his own thinking could be non-random only if it were guided
by rules, he would not have claimed that the cogito was indubitable and
could serve as his Archimedean point. The truth of the cogito would itself
depend on the reliability of the rules for thinking, and his assurance of
the reliability of the rules, would in turn rest on an assurance that his
thinking was reliable and so on ad infinitum. Descartes is never troubled
by the fear of an infinite regress, because it is for him beyond question
that his thinking is, as he experiences it, non-random because it is inten-
tional. He has no hesitation in accepting that he is able to conclude
‘‘Sum’’ without being caused to do so or without following rules or being
guided by images. For Descartes there could be no other explanation for
his concluding ‘‘Sum’’ than the fact that his existence is actually implied
by the fact that he thinks, and that he is directly ‘open’ to this implication.
In T he Critique of Pure Reason Kant asks whether the a priori categories
could have been implanted in us by our Creator. He considers the
possibility that they are so ordered by our Creator that their employment
is in complete harmony with the laws of nature ... (1964: 174). But he
immediately points out that if this were the case, the categories would be
no more than subjective dispositions of thought and their necessity would
have been sacrificed.
The concept of cause, for instance, which expresses the necessity of an event under a
presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity,
implanted in us, of connecting certain empirical representations according to the rule of
causal relation. I would not then be able to say that the effect is connected with the cause
in the object, that is to say necessarily, but only that I am so constituted that I cannot
think this representation otherwise than as thus connected. (1964:175)
There are passages in Frege in which he appears to recognise the paradox

in the fact that a psychological entity, the mind, can grasp a thought,
without the thought having to be duplicated or represented as an idea.
[The grasping of a thought] cannot be completely understood from a purely psychological

standpoint. For in grasping [the thought] something comes into view whose nature is no
longer mental in the proper sense, namely the thought; and this process is perhaps the most
mysterious of all (Frege, 1979: 145).
Computers are not able to prevail over their hardware or their program-
ming, they cannot be directed to something which lies beyond them or
to something which is not represented in their system in any way. If I
am to think of myself as a computer I would have to accept that the
experience I have of my own thinking whenever I deduce a conclusion
from its premises, is an illusory experience, that what my thinking is for
me is numerically distinct from what it is in itself, that although I may
have the impression of pursuing ‘the’ conclusion of the syllogism, I am
actually doing nothing of the sort, that I am actually passive to a causal
process, which triggers beliefs in me. This would mean that any assurance
I may have that a conclusion follows its premises is based on an illusory
experience. What reasons can there be to reject as illusory my experience
of thinking whenever I deduce a conclusion from its premises?
Perhaps the most obvious argument would be the argument from past
irrational behaviour. I have at times been assured that I pursued ‘the’
conclusion and prevailed over my subjectivity, only to find that the
conclusion I drew was not ‘the’ conclusion of the premises, that I had
not prevailed over my neuro-psychological make up, but rather, that the
conclusion I ended up with was explicable as an effect of that neuro-
psychological make-up, and that the experience of being intentional was
an illusion. This means that we have to introduce a numerical distinction
102 ELDON C. WAIT
between what my thinking is in itself and what it is for me. Once that
distinction has been established, I will be free to ignore my experience
and then I will be open to the argument that all my cognitions could be
the effects of causes.
But this argument from past irrational behaviour is itself an argument,
and I can be assured of its validity only if I can be assured that its
conclusion is actually implied by its premises. If the argument from my
irrational behaviour in the past could force me to draw a distinction
between what my thinking is for me and what it is in itself, it would place
me in a vicious circle. If there were such a distinction how could I ever
establish that the experience I have of pursuing in thought the conclusion
of the syllogism, provides me with a reliable representation of what I am
actually doing? I would have to test my representation and I could only
have confidence in the reliability of my test, if I knew that my actual
thinking was, during these tests, as I experience it to be, namely ‘inten-
tional’. I could never prove to myself that my experience of thinking
provides me with a reliable representation of what I was doing, since
every proof that I could carry out could only be accepted by me as
compelling in itself, if I already knew without any tests, that my act of
proving was intentional. To accept the argument would be to accept that
I could never ‘know’ whether it was valid or not. I would be able to
accept the argument only in an act of blind faith.4
Perhaps the reply will be that although I could never know whether
the argument was valid or not, I could still have good reasons for trusting
the conclusions which my neuro-psychological substrate ‘brings to mind’,
because if it did not ‘bring to mind’ the correct conclusions I would not
have survived. But the argument from survival is itself an argument,
which I should accept only if I can recognize that its conclusion is implied
by its premises. Once I accept that there is a numerical distinction between
what my thinking is for me and what it is in itself, I can have no assurance
that the argument from survival is valid. Nor can I take comfort in the
knowledge that my thinking is like that of everyone else, for here too,
this knowledge can only be based on my interpretation of empirical
evidence, and without the assurance that I am rational, I could never
trust my powers of interpretation.
If I reflect on the experience of drawing a conclusion from its premises,
I find that my thoughts, rather than being the effects of causes, prevail
over their neuropsychological substrate such that through these thoughts
I can direct myself to the goal of my thinking. Any argument which
dispels my naive assurance that in my thinking I am able to prevail over
my neuro-psychological substrate, would at the same time undermine

any assurance I may have that the argument is valid, that its conclusion
is actually implied by its premises. At the very moment that A.I. puts
forward its argument that we are all computers, and that every act of
thought can be explained in terms of its neuro-psychological substrate,
A.I. requires of its audience certain powers which its thesis holds are
merely illusory powers.
University of Zululand
NOTES
1 ‘‘But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had
first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for
anyone ever to break into the circle’’ (Ryle, 1962: 31).
2 ‘‘Whoever tries to limit the spiritual light to what is at present before the mind always
runs up against the Socratic problem. How will you set about looking for that thing, the
nature of which is totally unknown to you? Which, among the things you do not know, is
the one which you propose to look for? And if by chance you should stumble upon it, how
will you know that it is indeed that thing, since you are in ignorance of it? (Meno, 80D) ...
We must define thought in terms of that strange power which it possesses of being ahead of
itself ...’’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 371).
3 ‘‘My awareness of constructing an objective truth would never provide me with anything
more than an objective truth for me, and my greatest attempt at impartiality would never
enable me to prevail over my subjectivity (as Descartes so well expresses it by the hypothesis
of the malignant demon), if I had not, underlying my judgements, the primordial certainty of
being in contact with being itself [if, before any voluntary adoption of a position I were not
already in an intersubjective world, and if science too were not upheld by this basic doxa]’’
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 355).
4 There will have to be other ways of accounting for the fact that I have often been mistaken
about drawing ‘the’ conclusion from its premises, ways which do not introduce a numerical
distinction between what my thinking is for me and what it is in itself.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Frege, G. Posthumous W ritings, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel and F. Kaulback (eds.), P. Long

and R. White (trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. Quotation taken from ‘‘The
Metaphysic of Concepts’’ by Christopher Peacock, Mind, vol. c, 4 October 1991.
Hume, D. A T reatise of Human Nature. London: Everyman, 1911.
Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason, N. K. Smith (trans.). London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1964.
Merleau-Ponty, M. Phenomenology of Perception, C. Smith (trans.). London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1962.
——. T he Structure of Behaviour, A. L. Fisher (trans.). Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.
Ryle, G. T he Concept of Mind. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970.
104 ELDON C. WAIT
Searle, J. R. ‘‘Minds, Brains and Progams’’. T he Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980):
417–457.
Wait, E. C. ‘‘A Phenomenological Rejection of the Empiricist Argument from Illusions’’. T he
South African Journal of Philosophy, May, 14(3) (1995): 83–89.
––. ‘‘Dissipating Illusions’’. Human Studies, April, 20(2): 221–242.
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SENSIBLE MODELS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
The artwork has often been treated as a privileged object in phenomenol-

ogy because of its special place in human endeavour as a truth-giving
cultural accomplishment with pleasurable and aesthetic facets. Yet while
the paintings of Van Gogh, Cézanne and even abstract artists have
inspired some of the finest essays in the tradition, images comprising
graphs, charts, diagrams, autoradiographs and brain scans have largely
passed without comment. Even though these poor cousins comprise by
far the greater proportion of images produced today, particularly given
the profusion of images in mass media outlets, they are barely touched
upon in phenomenology outside of the narrow confines of the philosophy
of technology. But if they too are products of cultural accomplishment,
if they illicit aesthetic and emotional responses, why privilege the tradi-
tional artwork as a research topic over these other forms of image? After
all, those of us who live in Western culture engage daily with a wide
range of digitally constructed and produced images that have their origins
in art and science constantly conflated and recontextualized. Is it enough
simply to consider the essence of such images as arising out of the fixed
context of the gallery or the science laboratory to which they originally
belonged, or do we also need new ways of thinking about them when
they are set loose from those settings? In short, how might we begin to
think differently about those non-art images that have traditionally been
accorded such low status in phenomenological research?
To begin answering this question, it may be helpful to focus primarily
on an image set that crosses both the technical and public domains.
While I will not discuss specific images in this paper, most readers will
be aware of the images arising out of cognitive neuroscience, within which
brain scanning pictures have become a central tool for speculating on
the assumed correlation between mind and brain. Since these images
straddle the scientific and public domains, they touch on the two problem
areas that I intend to discuss in this essay: how scientists come to under-
stand various charts, and brain scans in an apparently transparent
manner; and, how science images get to mean at all outside of the research
context when this transparent way of looking is not available. My central
assumption is that if we can see how supposedly simple images acquire
meaning in complex ways, we might begin to think about them differently.
105
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In addition, my second question should help us consider how far those

outside of science research might be able to appropriate science images
for their own ends, particularly in light of recent attempts to discuss them
using art historical methods by the Chicago art theorists James Elkins1
and Barbara Maria Stafford.2 We might even begin to think with such
images, using them as sensible tools, in ways that do not need to be
reduced to a logos that is defined solely in terms of language.
Edmund Husserl’s analyses of images in science and art offer one way
of addressing these issues. His first analysis attempts to give an account
of the scientific image in its research context and looks at how the ‘‘life-
world’’, or ‘‘external horizon’’3 of the science enterprise – comprising the
laboratory with its equipment and practices, and the institution and
culture within which it operates – helps constitute meaning. Yet while
this approach has been mirrored by recent work in science studies, it also
leaves the question of the non-expert engagement with such images largely
unresolved. An understanding of this issue is important in explaining how
the scientist achieves her right of passage to expert viewer and how images
mean outside of the scientific context. Husserl’s account of image-con-
sciousness, which he reserved for the discussion of art images, is a useful
way of negotiating those difficulties and enriching the phenomenological
understanding of science images.
Sensible Models
Given Husserl’s lifelong interest and intellectual engagement in developing

phenomenology as a critique of natural science, it is perhaps not surprising
that he had devoted some thought to the issue of its images. In particular,
in his discussion of geometry in T he Crisis of European Sciences and
T ranscendental Phenomenology (1970) he introduces the idea of geometry
as being an ‘‘ideal praxis of ‘pure thinking’ ’’.4 This thinking is externalized
onto paper and into books in the form of images and equations that
become objectively available for further communal activity. During this
practice new forms and shapes are produced by geometers using methods
that have been handed down historically to those who are now engaged
in developing this branch of science. In other words, the thinking embod-
ied in geometry has become a technique, or a technology, which is taken
up unreflectively by those engaged in the production of new ideas in this
field. It is worth quoting Husserl’s short analysis at length:
SENSIBLE MODELS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 107
Like all cultural acquisitions which arise out of human accomplishment, they [the existing
images, shapes and methods] remain objectively knowable and available without requiring
that the formulation of their meaning be repeatedly and explicitly renewed. On the basis of
sensible embodiment, e.g., in speech and writing, they are simply apperceptively grasped
and dealt with in our operations. Sensible ‘models’ function in a similar way, including
especially the drawings on paper which are constantly used during work, printed drawings
in textbooks for those who learn by reading, and the like. It is similar to the way in which
certain cultural objects (tongs, drills, etc.) are understood, simply ‘seen’, with their specifically
cultural properties, without any renewed process of making intuitive what gave such
properties their true meaning. Serving in the methodological praxis of mathematicians, in
this form of long-understood acquisitions, are significations which are, so to speak, sedi-
mented in their embodiments.5
Part of Husserl’s project in the Crisis was to recover the original meaning
of geometry as a human accomplishment by peeling away the layers of
sedimentation that had accrued over time and that had served to fossilize
living ideas into physical facts that took on the quality of objects –
‘‘sensible models’’. For Husserl, the scientists in their everyday dealing
with such models are very much like the carpenter in Heidegger’s work-
shop.6 They simply use the tools that are ‘‘ready-to-hand’’ in their con-
cerned theoretical activity without having to reappropriate them through
intellectual intuition. This is normal praxis in the science setting. But in
doing so, however, they fail to grasp the truth that geometry, which is
taken by Husserl as exemplary of science in general, when properly
understood, contains within itself a possibility and a way of understanding
the world. Therefore the meaning of natural science for Husserl, like all
meaning, is a human accomplishment and is discoverable through tran-
scendental analysis.
In Husserl’s view, then, ‘‘sensible models’’ such as graphs, charts and
brain scans embody the network of presuppositions (or thinking that has
become objectified during historical praxis) underlying the scientific enter-
prise. When the natural attitude of the scientist is bracketed off by the
phenomenological reduction, the models can be seen for what they are:
‘‘purely subjective phenomena throughout, but not merely facts involving
psychological processes of sense-data; rather, they are mental [geistige]
processes which, as such, exercise with essential necessity the function of
constituting forms of meaning’’.7 But the scientist, in the heat of everyday
laboratory work, misses the significance of the tools she is using. She sees
them perceptually as things, which is why they are classified by Husserl
as ‘‘sensible’’ and, for the purposes of our interpretation, she passes over
their imagistic properties in favour of the practical business of working
with handed-down thinking. The images are only meaningful in relation
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to the physical world wherever they represent its mathematical properties.

In other words, they are subsumed by numbers within the general icono-
phobic attitude of the scientists. However, the sensible aspect of these
models has another unattended ‘‘internal’’ dimension to which I shall
return shortly.
Husserl’s account of the communal, institutional, historical and prac-
tice-driven nature of scientific enterprise could be read as an early precur-
sor to the approach taken to natural science in the more recent academic
field of science studies. Science studies, which is heavily influenced by
ethnographic and sociological accounts of science practice, has sought to
challenge the supposedly logical basis of the meaning of science research
by focusing on just the sort of life-world issues that Husserl incorporates
into his phenomenology. For example, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar,8
Karin Knorr-Cetina,9 and Michael Lynch10 each conducted fieldwork
studies of science laboratories in the late 1970s, much of which focused
on what scientists said and did during their everyday research activities.
Research in science studies can shed light upon our first question: how
do scientists come to read images in such a transparent manner that they
take on tool-like qualities? Or more fundamentally, is Husserl’s assump-
tion that scientists engage with their image domain in the laboratory as
though they were ready-made and pre-understood tools a valid analysis?
It is an insight that has been repeated in ethnographic research conducted
in science studies. For example, Michael Lynch in his study of a cognitive
neuroscience laboratory notes:
Photographs which are ‘used’ in lab research, provide materials which members explore,
and ‘work with’ in delimiting neural events. The documentary character of such photographs
is not that of illustrating an already completed text, but is itself a ‘text’ which is used as
discriminable grounds for claims, arguments, measurement, and statistical accounting work
by the parties to the lab’s research.11
Or, to put it differently, it is treated as another piece of equipment at the

scientists’ disposal, but one that is, if anything, text-based – although in
an essentially mathematical manner – and not image-based. It is ‘‘read’’
transparently, rather than as requiring specific visual interpretation.
While Husserl focuses his account on the fully trained scientist, the
Canadian cognitive scientist Wolff-Michael Roth has recently attempted
to investigate how scientists come to be so skilled that they can perform
the ideal praxis demanded of them in science research. His work, which
is heavily informed by phenomenology, has focused on the practice of
reading graphs and how that changes in and between groups with different
levels of reading ability. In their paper ‘From Thing to Sign and ‘‘Natural
Object’’: Toward a Genetic Phenomenology of Graph Interpretation’
(2002), Roth, G. Michael Bowen and Domenico Masciotra start with the
assumption that cognitive neuroscientists and others presuppose that the
graphs already say something about the natural world. The authors’
method of understanding how graphs are read is essentially semiotic,
within which the process of reading has two distinct phases. The first is
‘‘structuring’’,12 where things become signs; the second is ‘‘grounding’’,13
where signs refer to world. During their fieldwork, they noted that with
experienced scientists ‘‘reading leapt beyond the material aspects of the
text to the natural objects it is said to be about. Map (text) and territory
(nature, world) are no longer separate but become fused in the process
of transparent reading’’.14 The same could not be said of inexperienced
readers, or for those scientists who were unfamiliar with the data sets
and pictures with which they were confronted. Those readers often strug-
gled to form signs from the material, or to relate their unstable signs to
the world. This suggests that the ‘‘sensible’’ aspect of the model has
become opaque and problematic. It had ceased simply to be the necessary
background material of the tool and had erupted as an unstable visual
element into consciousness. That should alert us to the fact that more
needs to be said about the sensible nature of the science image if we are
to achieve a richer understanding of how they come to mean what they
do to scientists and non-scientists.
Image-Consciousness
It would seem that the transparent reading ability associated with this
tool-use aspect of science images breaks down as soon as the object is
dislodged from its original context. Does it then become an image pure
and simple, or is it a thing, but just not the type of thing that can be
used as a tool? Is it during the scientist’s training that the object ceases
to be either a thing or an image and becomes a tool, as Husserl implies?
Husserl’s concept of image-consciousness from his writings on art can
shed light on these questions. For this purpose, I draw on recent work
by John Brough,15 who has looked at Husserl’s understanding of image-
consciousness in Husserliana 23 from an art historical perspective, but I
modify his account slightly so that we can deal with issues posed by Roth
and his colleagues about how non-art images become transparent to
scientists.
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Husserl describes the pictorial image as having three component layers

to its structure: the physical base, the image-object and the image-subject.
First, the material substructure of the image comprises physical material
that exists in space and time. For example, digital display consoles with
their back-lit interfaces, printed matter of paper and ink and holographic
plates and films with their highly distributed recorded information. The
picture has a fundamentally thingly nature. Husserl refers to this substruc-
ture as the ‘‘physical image’’, although ‘‘strictly speaking, it is not an
image at all but founds and supports an image, exciting it and offering it
to image consciousness’’.16 Because this material substructure in science
is itself already the product of a wide variety of often complex technologi-
cal skills and representational techniques, in another context it could be
treated as the finished product of scientific activity and subject to the
sort of phenomenological investigation that Don Ihde and others are
attempting in the philosophy of technology.17 However, for the purposes
of this article, I will treat it naively as the primary ground on which the
image structure rests.
In fact, Husserl treats both the actual markings on the paper, screen,
or display that eventually cohere into an overall image as being part of
the physical aspect of the structure of art images. But with science images,
at least, I believe a further distinction is needed at this stage of analysis.
Such marks are also conceivable as unstable semiotic marks, the cultural
units that lend themselves to interpretation within image-consciousness.
It is only during the perceptual investigation of these elements that the
overall image is construed – what Husserl refers to as an ‘‘image-object’’,
or ‘‘image’’18 – at which stage the image takes on the form of an overall
gestalt and appears to consciousness as a definite sort of object. This
gestalt, or overall effect of the image, is the third element of the structure.
The benefit of making a distinction between the marks and the image-
object is that it enables us to suggest a dynamic relation between the
elements of the image and its overall gestalt. We can ask questions such
as, what happens when an image fails to mean anything, or appears to
mean in a way that is purely random? How do viewers attempt to work
out the overall image when the semiotic elements do not cohere into a
whole? Husserl, on the other hand, is more concerned with explaining
how the physical basis of the image disappears as soon as the image-
object is discernible. He has, as it were, his eye on the finished art image
and its ability to function representationally, when clearly the image is
not what it represents. Brough sums up Husserl’s distinction succinctly:
Pigment and canvas, as actually existing material things, simply are; they do not represent.
An actual person, the subject of a portrait, does not represent or depict either; it simply is
what it is. But the image in its nullity, in its interplay and conflict with its physical support
and its subject, is what it is not and is not what it is, to borrow a formulation from Jean-
Paul Sartre. And thus it can represent without being what it depicts.19
The forth aspect, in our revised account of Husserl, is the ‘‘image-subject’’,

or that which is represented in the image itself. Given the complex
relationships in science imaging between the imaged and its representa-
tion, particularly since much of it is non-isomorphic – or is constructed
by the imaging technology – we will set this issue aside for the purposes
of this article. This completes our analysis of the ‘‘internal horizon’’ of
the science image.
If we now return to Roth’s model of ‘‘structuring’’ and ‘‘grounding’’ we
can see that scientists trained in their specific fields have no problem
jumping to stages three and four in our account of image-consciousness.
Questions that they may have relate to the interplay between image-
object and image-subject, to issues of representation and reality. This
suggests that the nature of the image as an image has not become a
perceptual problem because it does not stand out from the background
in which it appears. Just like the chairs and tables, brain scanning equip-
ment and the electric lighting in the neuroscience lab, the images are
available as equipment for use. If the image is judged to be poor it is
generally because it fails to function well enough within that context. By
contrast, the inexperienced reader can get confused about the image at
any stage. As well as being perplexed by the issues that confront the
practiced reader, further questions may arise about what kind of sign it
is that is being viewed and about whether the individual elements of the
sign amount to an overall image-object. Are the signs themselves meaning-
ful, or as the authors suggest, quoting Umberto Eco, ‘‘extremely ambigu-
ous texts akin to aesthetic ones’’.20 For the novice viewer, the image has
emerged as a thing, unruly and resistant to interpretation. In fact, as far
as she is concerned, it is precisely an object in need of interpretation
because its elements constantly fall back into its unstable semiotic marks
and, therefore, fails to function transparently as a tool.
By combining Husserl’s two accounts of understanding images, we can
see that the ‘‘sensible’’ aspect of the science image is, therefore, twofold.
Viewed within its context – or from the perspective of its ‘‘external
horizon’’, comprising the life-world of the science enterprise – it is seen
as a tool. This horizon dominates during everyday practice where the
image is transparent and is, often quite literally, seen through. But it can
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become opaquely sensible when the visualization practices are not avail-
able to the viewer because he or she is a novice in science, or a scientist
presented with unknown imagery. In this case the image is seen perceptu-
ally – or from the perspective of the ‘‘internal horizon’’21 of the observer.
Both accounts of the image are needed if we are to understand how this
difference arises. Perhaps the former perspective provides us with the
basis for an analysis for understanding images ‘‘in’’ science, and the latter
with a basis for understanding images ‘‘of ’’ science.
Seeing in Practice
Roth and his colleagues have emphasized, in agreement with Husserl,

that the reading of sensible models by experienced scientists is not a
purely cognitive achievement, but relies on ‘‘conventionalization prac-
tices’’.22 In the article that we discussed earlier, he and his colleagues
conclude: ‘‘Transparency is something that is achieved through specific
forms of participation and experience both within the community and
with its epistemological objects’’.23 Scientists are trained to ‘‘see’’ tools
and not pictures. In fact, this observation has been supported by science
studies research on the public use of science images, which should help
us deepen our discussion of how images acquire meaning for scientists at
the same time as beginning to explore how people understand images
outside of science at all.
Earlier in the essay, we saw how Lynch described cognitive neuroscien-
tists as ‘‘users’’ of lab photography depicting the cellular structure of
brain regions in their everyday work. However, Lynch also detected a
more aesthetic attitude among the scientists making images for publica-
tion in peer-reviewed journals, or for wider public consumption, which
led them to regard the pictorial facets of the artefacts as having greater
significance. Lynch says:
The documentary use of a photograph in a research article differs considerably from that
of a photograph used by lab members as the material visibility of topical events and
structures ... In those instances in which photographs were presented in research publica-
tions, however, it was not simply the case that they illustrated the naturalistic account made
in the papers. They were also available as exhibits of a lab’s practical competence with
electron microscopy ... The extreme concern with finding ‘‘perfect’’ pictures free of exhibits
of artefact (however incidental they might be to a paper’s claims) addressed the availability
of the photographs to a ‘‘practitioner’s reading’’ that could assess the competence of the
lab’s program in the ‘‘aesthetics’’ of its photography.24
Lynch’s subjects remark on the ‘‘beauty’’25 of the pictures that are free
from error and joke among themselves about being able to capture the
type of high-quality images that they find in certain journal articles. In
fact, I will return to this process of image-making for public consumption
later, but note that in as much as such images are manipulated by digital
image-processing tools in the work of perfecting them for display, the
scientists are engaged on an aesthetic enterprise that is almost indistin-
guishable from the artist’s.26 This activity suggests that they are looking
at the ‘‘image-object’’ and its constituent semiotic elements as an image
apart from whatever use it may serve in the laboratory. It appears that
the scientist is capable of becoming aware of these pictorial elements, but
suppresses this awareness in favour of the underlying model. So we can
perhaps conclude that as the context of use for the scientist changes, so
too does the type of seeing associated with the image, which suggests
further that defining the essence of the science image solely with regard
to its properties as a sensible model in tool use is too restrictive if we are
to understand such images in the full range of contexts within which
they arise.
Among those who do not have access to the highly technical way of
seeing science images that prevails in the science laboratory, the aesthetic
aspect of the sensible model comes to the fore and dominates understand-
ing. In her study of public ways of perceiving images created by electron
micrographs, Emily Martin says: ‘‘As well as a sense of drama, there is
certainly a lively aesthetic involved when scientists produce, choose and
display these images. After many a lecture, I heard people commenting
to each other about the ‘beautiful’, ‘incredible’, ‘stunning’, ‘technically
perfect’ micrographs that were shown’’.27 Electron micrographs are used
primarily to image microscopic elements in nature, such as brain cells,
usually prepared for the purpose by staining techniques. Martin argues
that the primary purpose in deploying these pictures in teaching is to
‘‘clinch an argument by revealing visual evidence of what one is claim-
ing’’.28 For Martin, this method of teaching prevents students from devel-
oping anything other than the standard interpretation of the significance
of the image-set held by science practitioners and those who lecture on
the subject. In the study, however, not all of the students accepted the
standard interpretations presented to them in the lectures where the
images were displayed, which is perhaps not too surprising given their
range of backgrounds and ability level. What is more remarkable is that
when she presented similar images to people with non-science back-
grounds, they related to them in a wide variety of emotional and concep-
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tual ways. Often an image received multiple interpretations from the same
viewer. As Martin says: ‘‘Taken as a whole, the things people said can
only be described as a profusion, an extravagance, an excess of images.
Sometimes they tumble out one on top of another’’.29 Electron micro-
graphs depicting immune cells became space satellites, deep sea scenes,
food stuffs, strange deserts, populated cities and alien beings. Images
constantly made and unmade themselves, jumping to a sudden gestalt
and then falling back into their unstable semiotic elements as viewers
grappled to make the images signify. As far as they pointed to a world,
it was not the world of mathematical, natural science, but the world of
nature understood through cultural acquisition; through the TV docu-
mentary, the news programme and the blockbuster film.
Images L et L oose
In our everyday lives, science images acquire significance for us. When
there is no specific context for understanding, when there are no special-
ised visualization practices, the personal domain steps in via everyday
ways of seeing image-objects. They become pretty pictures, objects of
reverie, more like art objects than scientific evidence. It would appear
that the meaning of these images only becomes narrower and specific to
the scientific enterprise during training – a process that helps develop the
necessary visualization techniques. Yet as the scientist’s knowledge
increases, so the meaning of the image is reduced to the model upon
which it is based. Its sensible aspect, while still objectively available,
recedes into the background of the laboratory. Those elements only tend
to take on aesthetic qualities when the context alters, for example, when
the images are produced with public or peer display in mind. A different
way of seeing them, essentially aesthetic in nature, comes to the fore.
The scientific training that produces ‘‘sensible models’’ seen one-sidedly
as tools denigrates the status of images as images among many science
practitioners. But why might this be the case? Anne Beaulieu, who has
conducted anthropological work on scientists’ attitudes to imaging work
in cognitive neuroscience, has concluded that ‘‘researchers reject the visual
yet maintain its use in their work’’30 for largely professional reasons. In
fact, it would be a fair assumption that most would disagree with my
application of Husserl’s notion of image-consciousness to the perception
of their technological products. Brain scans are not images and any
definition of them as visual is seen as a ‘‘sort of radiological misnomer’’.31
Yet while the tools that brain imagers use – Positron Emission
Tomography in this study – provide a quantitative measurement of the

brain, it is based on spatial differentials and, therefore, needs to be
represented pictorially. Those pictorial elements are an important part of
how the meaning of the image comes about. In her insightful study,
Beaulieu writes that the image makers maintain an ‘‘iconoclastic stance’’32
to their representations, while at the same time relying on the representa-
tional qualities of their artefacts to both engage with the public and
enable the use of the images by clinicians working in brain surgery and
related fields. They fear that the images, once let loose out of the confines
of the laboratory, will be randomly interpreted as images rather than as
mathematical 4-D geometrical constructs. This fear takes us right back
to the iconophobic tendencies inherent in Plato’s description of the view-
ers trapped in the cave of false images. In fact, the neuroscientists believe
that should a non-mathematical interpretation of their studies become
predominant, they would not be considered scientists by their peers. But
if, as Beaulieu notes, the ‘‘insistence on the quantitative is one of the
strategies that prevents the ‘proliferation of meaning’ prized by artists
and not by scientists’’,33 the scientists appear to be attributing their own
fears about the misrepresentation of meaning to the to power of images
themselves – without understanding that taming images through ‘‘proper’’
reading is not primarily a cognitive ability, but rests on the practical
achievement of specific visualizing skills. The denigration of images occurs
because they cannot be tamed in the way that scientists would prefer.
Their sensible, physical and semiotic qualities constantly threaten to
overwhelm the models upon which they are based. They can simply be
images, as much as they can simply be tools. Each way of seeing is a
reduction of one facet of the sensible model, just as much as it is an
extension of the other. A full understanding of science images in their
various contexts requires that both aspects of the sensible model be fully
understood.
Perhaps from this perspective, Husserl’s account of the sensible model
as a tool shares too much in common with the iconoclastic science view
of images to stand on its own in accounting for the nature of the science
image. Even as a pure descriptive analysis, it requires the supplementation
of a phenomenological account of image-consciousness to do full justice
to the dual nature of the sensible element of those models. In fact, if brain
images are constructed using traditions of representation, as Beaulieu
suggests, then art historical ways of seeing from which these traditions
are derived – again arising out of a set of technical practices – should
not simply be possible, but perhaps positively required. That would make
116 ARTHUR PIPER
sense of calls from visual theorists such as Stafford and Elkins to apply
art historical practices to science images, both as a way of investigating
how far the theoretical concerns and confusions of scientists are embodied
in the pictorial representation of those artefacts and as a way of under-
standing the traditions to which they belong and to which they might
come to belong in the future. That would be one way of beginning to
think differently about these images.
James Elkins has argued that the cleaning and manipulating of images
that have been photographed for scientific research is a form of aesthetics
that lends itself to art historical traditions of analysis. In fact, he notes
that this type of care with pictures ‘‘is the original, pre-Kantian sense of
aesthetics as the ‘perfecting of reality’ – the very doctrine that governed
Renaissance painting ... What happens in non-art images can be just as
full of aesthetic choices, just as deeply engaged with the visual, and just
as resourceful and visually reflective as in painting’’.34 Notions of perspec-
tive and the translation of 3-D reality onto two dimensional surfaces have
been among the stock-in-trade themes of art theory since it began. An
informed appreciation of the particular representational strategies
deployed in cognitive neuroscience in depicting the brain would enable
scientists to improve on the representational aspects of their work. In
addition, art theorists can offer valuable insights into how well images of
mixed representational styles point to the intended model beneath. For
example, cognitive neuroscience deals with the marriage of cognitive
psychology and neurobiology. Its textbook images are sometimes com-
posed of apparently realistic elements of anatomy drawn from biological
studies and flow diagrams representing neural networks drawn from
theories of mind in psychology. The connections and dissonances between
the two fields that make up the inter-discipline of cognitive neuroscience
are embodied within such images. Art theoretical analysis can serve to
make them visible.
In fact, phenomenology itself is well equipped for the task of deciphering
the complexity of non-art images – whether they arise within a science
context, or within the context of more mundane life. It may be that the
status of the artwork over more prosaic images has to be re-examined
and seen in its broader historical context. It may even be that new forms
of sensible models become available to phenomenologists as these bound-
aries are challenged in ways that enable us to think with images as well
as about them. The intelligence and thoughtfulness of images could be
allowed to co-exist within a conception of the logos that is not construed
in a predominantly linguistic way.
Acknowledgements
I thank Sujatha Raman for introducing me to science studies work in
this area and Jon Simons and Andy Hamilton for reading an earlier draft
of this essay. I also thank the Arts and Humanities Research Council
(AHRC) in the UK for their continuing financial support.
Department of Critical T heory and Cultural Studies

University of Nottingham, UK
NOTES
1 James Elkins, T he Domain of Images (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999)
and V isual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction (New York and London: Routledge, 2003).
2 Barbara Maria Stafford, Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Art and
Medicine (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1993) and Good L ooking: Essays on
the V irtue of Images (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 1996).
3 Edmund Husserl, T he Crisis of European Sciences and T ranscendental Phenomenology,
David Carr (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 162.
4 Ibid., p. 26.
5 Ibid., pp. 26–27.
6 Martin Heidegger, Being and T ime, John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (trans.)
(Oxford, UK and Cambridge, US: Blackwell, 1962), pp. 95–102.
7 Husserl, op. cit., p. 112.
8 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, L aboratory L ife: T he Social Construction of Scientific
Facts (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979).
9 Karin Knorr-Cetina, T he Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and
Contextual Nature of Science (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981).
10 Michael Lynch, Art and Artefact in L aboratory Science: A Study of Shop Work and Shop
T alk in a Research L aboratory (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985)
11 Lynch, op. cit., p. 95.
12 Wolff-Michael Roth, G. Michael Bowen and Domenico Masciotra, ‘‘From Thing to Sign
and ‘Natural Object’: Toward a Genetic Phenomenology of Graph Interpretation,’’ in
Science, T echnology and Human Values 27: 3 (Summer 2002): 333.
13 Roth et al., op. cit., p. 333.
15 John Brough, ‘‘Art and Non-art: A Millennial Puzzle’’, in T he Reach of Reflection: Issues
for Phenomenology’s Second Century, Steven Crowell, Lester Embree and Samuel J. Julian
(eds.). Electronically published by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology Inc
at www.electronpress.com, 2001, pp. 1–16.
16 Ibid., p. 9.
17 See, for example, Don Ihde, Expanding Hermeneutics: V isualism in Science (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1998).
18 Brough, op. cit., p. 9.
19 Ibid., p. 10.
118 ARTHUR PIPER
20 Roth et al., op. cit., p. 334, quoting Umberto Eco, A T heory of Semiotics (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 176.
21 Husserl, op. cit., p. 162, what Brough calls the ‘‘internal structure’’, op. cit., p. 9.
23 Ibid.
24 Lynch, op. cit., pp. 95–96.
25 Ibid., p. 94.
26 See Elkins, op. cit., 1999, pp. 10–12.
27 Emily Martin, ‘‘Interpreting Electron Micrographs’’, in T he Future of Anthropological
Knowledge, Henrietta L. Moore (ed.) (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 18.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 23.
30 Anne Beaulieu, ‘‘Images are Not the (Only) Truth: Brain Mapping, Visual Knowledge,
and Iconoclasm’’, in Science, T echnology & Human Values 27: 1 (Winter 2002): 56.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 78.
33 Beaulieu, op. cit., p. 61.
34 Elkins, op. cit., 1999, p. 11.
ROBERTO VEROLINI and FABIO PETRELLI
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW

EVOLUTIONISTIC PARADIGMS
In the 150 years which separate us from Darwin, the evolutionistic para-
digm has had a strong extension and improvement, becoming the concep-
tual frame of reference of modern biology and other subjects such as
geology, paleontology, ecology, neurosciences and last but not least
modern cosmology.
The peculiarity of the evolutionistic idea is given by the evident indeter-
mination1 of the evolutive processes – a character that comes out especi-
ally from a ‘‘coarse grained’’ analysis of such phenomena. This
indeterminateness is due to the chaos and the intrinsic complexity of the
‘‘subtle’’,2 very detailed, chemical biological phenomena, which originate
from subatomic ones where quantum indeterminateness3 is in force.
To this basic indetermination is added, in higher levels, a further source
of chaos due to the non-linear and stochastic nature of the biological
processes as for example the genetic, ethologic and ecologic transmission
modalities in living beings. The experimental data concerning the complex
systems dynamics, known as ‘‘sensible to the initial conditions’’, all convey
towards this universal quality of human nature, living and inorganic. In
particular the bio-evolutive processes are related to such a wide number
of factors that they show complex and univocal dynamics intrinsically
unforeseeable a priori and irreproducible.
This intrinsic indetermination leads to the theme of the feasible ‘‘teleol-
ogy’’ of the evolutive dynamics, that is to the eventuality that evolutive
processes let naturally develop can tend more or less to the realization
of a well defined natural reality, a foreseeable a priori last goal. It must
be said that the analysis of the available data and theoretic basis of the
evolutive mechanism don’t permit any teleonomy, that is no finalism
similar to the one invoked by the most part of philosophical analyses so
far carried out, especially those connected with important theological
ideas.
These facts have concurred to increase the philosophical diatribe
between the upholders of evolutionistic thought and those who, on the
contrary, have vigorously opposed the evolutive paradigms in favour of
cosmological visions where a firm natural finalism is asserted. A necessary
reference must be made to the contrast faith/science developed decades
119
120 ROBERTO VEROLINI and FABIO PETRELLI
ago between the advocates of cosmological religious concepts (creation-

ism) and those, usually from a laical background, who assert the natural
evolution.
The analysis of this last aspect is of great importance to us and to the
philosophical themes that are the object of our interests. We are proposing
a merely philosophic interpretation of the theme assuming an ‘‘agnostic’’
position.
We will try to demonstrate how it is possible to arrive at new conclu-
sions avoiding, first of all, to put the evolutionistic paradigm inside pre-
existent and inadequate metaphysical ideas; after that, new metaphysical
models will be developed, urged on us by some important aspects of the
evolutive paradigm. In fact we can conceive the evolutive processes inside
a logic and a finality completely different from those sustained by the
classic philosophical positions, particularly those which have fought
against the establishment of evolutionistic thought.
First of all we will avoid relying on the casuality of the evolutive
process and its inability to sustain certain finalistic needs; it is a dangerous
and unacceptable hypothesis compared to philosophical models already
implicitly assumed. We in fact think it wiser and more rational to abandon
‘‘our’’ philosophical assumptions to test the existence of different inter-
pretations where this finalistic thesis is compromised, re-seen or substi-
tuted by a completely different model, without abandoning all the
‘‘metaphysical frame’’ in which the same is usually inscribed and
conceived.
It should be noticed that such goals, in spite of being legitimate and
correct from a philosophical point of view, meet resistance. This is easily
explicable if we consider that certain preconceptions come from the habits
of an inadequate philosophical tradition. Such attempts have only
reaffirmed worn-out schemes and answers more and more incompatible
with the interpretations proper to science, which results in a deeper
discrepancy between the two different ideas.
Let’s consider as an example the evolutionistic theory of knowledge
(hence indicated by ‘‘ETK’’), derived directly from the evolutionistic
paradigm. The ETK represents one of the most interesting theories about
the origin and nature of man and his awareness.
In these last years the ETK has corroborated many studies and
researches by neurosciences that thanks to refined investigation tech-
niques have taken us to an unprecedented level of knowledge about the
functioning and qualities of the human brain, of its origin and its phyloge-
netic and ontogenetic emergence.
ASPECTS OF EVOLUTIONISTIC PARADIGMS 121
The ETK’s object is the origin and nature of the ontological, biological
and physical being: the modern man, the Homo sapiens sapiens. Still it
refers also, and above all, to the origin and nature of the philosophical
agent’s rational/logical capabilities par excellence: the Self, the sentient
subject, the ontological fundament of the res cogitans.
From that theory some considerations emerge inherent to the theme
of conscience and the ‘‘conflict about world existence’’, deeply intercon-
nected subjects, proper to an ancient philosophical research still actual
as shown by the in fieri skirmishes between the advocates of realism and
idealism. Phenomenology also develops an analysis concerning this sub-
ject: it seems to be detached from the other currents of thought proposing,
above all, an atypical approach based on a suspended judgement about
world existence (epoché). However, as shown by the studies of Husserl,
Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology also tends to
direct one, after a wide parabola, to the same ontological themes as
shown by Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Which new
developments can derive from the ETK, as regards these philosophical
currents?
A first and most important ETK consequence is represented by the
solution it provides to the a priori and the ‘‘transcendental idealism’’
of Kant.4
The analysis of these problems is not our aim but it represents an
important basis to move our reasoning from. The ETK answers Kant’s
problem intrinsic to our potential knowledge of the ‘‘noumenal’’ world,
of the ‘‘world out-there’’ as regards the sentient Self and connected with
the noumenal correspondence of ‘‘phenomenal’’ perceptions.
The logical and ontogenetic definition of the Self by ETK involves the
necessity of a strong correspondence between noumenal reality and phe-
nomenal perception which are necessarily consistent one with the other.
This conclusion implies a classification of the meaning of our percep-
tions different from what Kant postulated and from what has been
considered by all the philosophical currents that followed him.
To put it briefly, the ‘‘grades of freedom’’ (that is the possible ‘‘non-
correspondence’’ between two beings or realities) between the phenomenal
reality perceived by us and the noumenal subjacent one must be necessar-
ily very tiny. It is impossible to conceive the first as ontologically distinct
and logically incoherent from the second unless we want to incur phen-
omena never seen before. Phenomenal reality has to express a consider-
able ‘‘clue’’ to the content of noumenal reality. This content must be
understood as ‘‘probative’’ of the intrinsic ontological characteristics of
the former. In other words whatever will be the ‘‘comprehensive’’ ontologi-

cal reality of the noumenal’s sphere, it must express complex and deep
connections with the phenomenal one.
For example, our ‘‘phenomenal’’ perceptions – direct or indirect ones
(mediated by scientifical instruments) – of the Sun (position, mass, temper-
ature, etc.) give a phenomenal complex frame of reference that, thanks to
this complexity, cannot be meaningfully different from the authentic
intrinsic noumenal reality. Every important variation would imply the
immediate realization of very evident and imposing phenomena, often
fatal phenomena ... actually inexplicable and never seen before.
It should in fact be explained how the phenomenal reality, as complex
as it is, could emerge and exist without any causality or relation with the
noumenal reality, a fact that is not seriously philosophically proposable
without the introduction of redundant and self-proclaimed metaphysical
conjecture.
This conclusion doesn’t emerge from a speculative aspect but from the
scientific evidence that all the cerebral sensory modules at the base of
our phenomenal perceptions (origin and basis of the a priori representa-
tions) are in fact originated by intrinsic ontological characteristics of the
noumenal reality. The characteristics which have emerged have been
expressed and fixed in an ‘‘impersonal way’’, ‘‘not subjective’’ in the course
of a ‘‘pre-conscious’’ evolutive process preceding the presence of the
sentient subject itself: man, our Self. An important aspect proposed by
the ETK in the discussion about the philosophical aspects of the being
concerns the sentient being’s ‘‘ontological origin’’, a theme that past
philosophy has always read on the basis of metaphysical assumptions,
contrasting today with modern epistemology, as well as firmly confirmed
in various contemporary philosophical considerations.
Philosophical speculation normally considers the sentient being
through his intellective characteristics, his perceptions, his ontological
condition, assuming it as ‘‘pre-existing’’ or anyway not investigating his
nature and ontogenesis but by so doing, any analysis implicit in his
ontological, real, biological ‘‘genesis’’ is ignored, taking into account only
the ‘‘ontogenesis’’, the ‘‘autopoiesis’’ of his philosophical requests, of his
role as a philosophical agent.
The EKT remedies this serious error directing modern scientific knowl-
edge towards philosophical themes in order to connect the two analytic
phases, the philosophical and the scientific naturalistic. From here comes
out a new ‘‘operative and interpretative’’ framework where both the maker
– the conscious Self – and the philosophical interpretation of the fact
itself can be caught. For example, the study of the brain’s nature and
origin, of its activities and intellectual potentialities, demonstrates how
all this is a ‘‘direct and active’’ expression of an evolutive genesis carried
out by the natural noumenal reality over a million years. As Konrad
Lorenz demonstrated, such an organ is a real ‘‘cast’’ of the ‘‘external’’
reality, of its intrinsic and objective qualities that through the same
perceptive modalities arrive in the end at our conscience and awareness.5
During the millennia, the evolutive process has led to a severe selection
of the bio-evolutive structures that continuously emerged, rewarding the
perceptive modalities (and the subsequent phenomenal compositions)
intrinsically coherent with the noumenal reality with a bigger
survival/reproduction level and cancelling all the perceptive modalities
incoherent with such reality, through the physical elimination of the
organisms which manifested them.
From this incessant and repeated process emerges the significant episte-
mic overlapping of the phenomenological perception that we bring about
with the authentic noumenal reality whatever it is. Obviously, this episte-
mic overlapping is not absolute and perfect as is clearly shown when
considering, for example, Einstein’s relativity.
The noumenal reality of gravitational and space-time status different
from those of our planet, is basically incompatible with that which we
perceive on the Earth’s surface. (N.B. a similar example is given by
quantum mechanics which has shown us the logic and ontological oddity
underway at an atomic phenomena level). In spite of everything, our
epistemic overlapping is ‘‘evolutively adaptive’’, so ‘‘necessarily’’ and
essentially efficacious, and gives us at a logical and perceptive level,
objective ‘‘evolutive noumenal signs’’. Furthermore it constitutes an
‘‘extended epistemic overlapping’’ in the sense that being epistemologically
present in the logic of modern scientific method, it historically results as
a continuously explicative extension of the ‘‘last noumenal essence’’ pre-
cisely thanks to such cognitive means.
To be sure, we can turn to the common philosophical themes from a
new perspective from where it is possible to perceive an important ‘‘indica-
tive’’ validity of the ‘‘noumenally connected’’ reality where we are placed
and where we express our intellectual abilities: in other words our being
‘‘philosophers who philosophize’’.
An important request for our discourse is the following: taken for
granted that evolutive dynamics cannot be intended as expressions of the
universal finalism concerning fixed cosmologic philosophic positions, shall
we deny ‘‘any teleology’’ in the evolutive phenomena? Can we analyse it
using new interpretative means? Why not formalize a new teleology

revaluating, differently, the assumptions that we usually set in the teleolog-
ical idea in itself ?
Some authors, for example, have tried to see a basic teleology in the
cosmological evolutive dynamics recurring to ideas such as an ‘‘Anthropic
Principle’’, analysing the fundamental constants of nature etc. in order to
find signs that could endorse teleologic concepts more adherent to the
interpretative results of modern science.6
For example, the concept of ‘‘intelligent design’’ has been enhanced in
face of the complexity and structure of living beings, or when considering
the continuous altering of geometrical structural schemes, growing pro-
cesses and spontaneous organization between the biological and inorganic
world. According to us, these authors have only reformulated the same
finalistic ideas, using new words, and a genuine analysis of the possible
prospects of the evolutive paradigm as first conceived is lacking. It can
suggest to us very simply a series of assumptions from which to extrapo-
late an alternative teleologic value.7 The aspects to cover are various and
meaningful, and it is interesting to observe how they all converge in a
univocal conceptual scene previously ignored.
For example, we can examine the genomes’ peculiar architecture and
functional complexity, the long DNA chains, carriers of the genetic infor-
mation of any living species. These genomes present a structure and a
functionality which is completely irrational and not optimized, instead of
how a project, intended to develop products or efficacious functions,
should be.
Or we can also emphasise the recurrent presence of real ‘‘planning
imperfections’’ and proper ‘‘faults’’ that thwart any attempt to see nature
as a ‘‘creative instrument’’ in the context of a predetermined project
fulfilled with competence and foresight. On the contrary, it is evident that
the pedantic recurrence to the ‘‘trial and error’’ mechanism of ‘‘blind’’
evolutive logic, a character that completely explains the singular indeter-
minateness and contingency of the evolutive courses and forms which
can be observed in nature. An undeniable and irreducible value exemplify-
ing the logic set out by nature in opposition to our reductive and anthro-
pomorphic teleological suppositions.
Humiliating though our inability to comprehend and understand these
phenomena may be, this contingency increases and efficaciously organises,
though with logic and time unusual to our human reference, the evolutive
progress of the living species along the so-called ‘‘fitness surfaces’’. The
latter are real virtual mathematical ‘‘landscapes’’ with ‘‘ravines’’, ‘‘valleys’’,
‘‘tablelands and mountains’’ which would represent the blind alleys, the
links, the ways and the balances of the evolutive processes. They describe
the structures and the functions of the feasible ‘‘building and functioning
levels’’ of living forms’ organs and bodies as for example the sensorial
apparatus in the anthropoids, the mammal’s ear, the chordate ‘‘sagittal’’
body’s structure or the plane morphology of Ediacara’s fauna etc.
Through the ‘‘topology’’ of these landscapes we can follow the evolution
that the morphologic phenotypic structures of living forms have
undergone for millions of years: these would represent the status of major
functional efficaciousness and structural complexity accessible to the evo-
lutive dynamics.
This imponderability, this deep indeterminateness is then expressed at
meta-individual and interspecies level when defining the complex
ecologic/biochemical equilibrium among the forms of life on the Earth –
a phenomenon that we can imagine taking place in planetary systems
similar to our solar one. The dynamic unity and the natural phenomena
of the recurrent realization modalities are so understood up to the widest
cosmological context and this gives an overall account of the ‘‘noumenal
reality’’, expressed in our ‘‘extensive epistemic overlapping’’, completely
alien to the traditional goals of teleologies.
Now, refused every reference to any intentional planning towards the
biological context where well-defined forms of life emerged and where it
was impossible to predetermine single historical/evolutive facts, what
could we conclude? Which contents could we turn to if we wanted to
outline the features of the authentic teleology of nature?
The answer could be an original inversion of perspective. Let’s try to
define in a ‘‘complementary’’ way the same idea of teleology.
The traditional teleologies turn, without relevant exceptions, to the
realization of specific ontological realities of particular historical facts
that, through their manifestation, would represent the last goal of the
natural being. For an example of a typical teleologic finality, take the
emergence of the human species on the face of the Earth after events such
as the extinction that 65 million years ago allowed mammals to take the
place of dinosaurs.
Moreover we could mention the adaptive developments that led to
Homo erectus and then Homo sapiens and so on.
More specifically such facts and events would theologically connect
the appearance and destiny of humanity to the creative plan ascribed to
the God of the biblical tradition. In the cosmology and eschatology of
this theological tradition, the appearance of the human species on the
Earth, the events that mark the plot of the biblical narration, from
the Genesis to the Gospels, would represent facts and historical events
to be intended as phases and fundamental moments of the entire divine
plan.
It is obvious that these facts, these ontological contexts are not able to
represent finalities accessible to a bio-evolutive one, so much so that in
the attempt to relate the evolutive processes interpretation to these goals,
it has been postulated, with no exception, that there is direct though
improbable ‘‘guide and supervision’’ of the natural phenomena on the
part of divinity.
As already shown,8 these in itinere supervision interventions, necessarily
circumscribed, can’t overcome the theoretical and interpretative difficul-
ties raised by the ideas and theories of modern physics to be finally
accepted in natural dynamics. The natural reality, as pervaded as it is by
‘‘non-linear’’ influences, by the becoming of intrinsically chaotic phen-
omena and dynamics ‘‘sensible to the initial conditions’’, can in no way
be canalized and guided by isolated interventions with the efficaciousness
implicitly attributed to them in those ideas. And apart from any other
considerations such purposes are inadequate at an epistemological level.
So how can we do this? We can overcome this empasse by changing
our perspective.
Instead of looking for more improbable methods to force evolutive
processes into the ‘‘already known teleological framework’’, try to consider
as the ‘‘consistent teleological framework’’ the evolutive dynamics them-
selves, taken as they are: indeterministic and historic, contingent, casual,
‘‘blind’’. Without any other strained interpretation, especially of a meta-
physical nature.
What changes can we expect? First of all a new teleological scene,
absolutely legitimate, appears where all the previous epistemological
difficulties are avoided. The evolutive dynamics are not forced or chan-
nelled inside artificial banks, in unnatural beds imposed by metaphysical
interference.
As a result, the natural evolutive processes, as shown by the evolution-
ary theories, can be interpreted without restriction or exception as having
completely new contents. If we observe the development of the cerebral
modules and neural anatomic definition during the learning process, the
affective and cultural experiences of a subject, we can find that the
histological configuration on which their cognitive and perceptive cogni-
tions will be based, emerges very unexpectedly.
We do not observe a new formation of the perceptive system that is

previous to the experienced moment as the result of genetic instructions,
coming from an inner constituting plan and very genetically defined.
The sensorial and cerebral system that governs sight, for example, is
anatomically structured as a synchronised and comprehensive expression
(gestalt) of genetic instructions that work only at vast cellular population
level, while the connections among the single neurons are determined by
the visual and kinaesthetic experiences of the individual during their life.
The ‘‘fine’’ definition of these modules is due to the subjective experiences
of the individual since the genetic material is inadequate, as regards
quantity, to give all the necessary information.
Our perceptual modules and consequently our perceptions come from
the interaction of cellular growing processes only generically addressed
by genetic mechanisms and the profound ‘‘constitutive’’ action of the
intrinsic physical, chemical, geometrical and spatial characteristics, in
other words ontological, of the external context (the noumenal reality
‘‘out there’’) which will ‘‘then’’ represent the object of our own perceptions
and intellectual speculations – moreover of philosophical scepticism as
regards our existence and our comprehension and knowledge!
These facts radically alter the philosophical context that brought Kant
to his transcendental idealism, to his concepts of the a priori, and apart
from the latter, they have demonstrated historically how difficult it is to
proceed towards further philosophical solutions. What can these facts let
us perceive? How can we use them to give a new and effective interpreta-
tion of the philosophical themes we are interested in?
In past teleological ideas, the basic investigations have been of the
formation and the determination of the apparatus which reiterates, in
this way, the same teleological basis, an unaltered metaphysics where the
natural reality was the result of a far-seeing and very detailed finalism. A
powerful finalism that could express itself in spite of strong interminable
chains of causal events.
But nature suggests something different to us: a teleological structure
where we can philosophically get richer, more complex and dignified
contents. A reality where the ‘‘proper teleology’’ is constituted by the
‘‘free and absolutely a priori indeterminate’’ expression – particularly at
a detailed, ‘‘fine-grained’’ level of natural realities and dynamics.
This idea represents a teleological concept as legitimate as efficacious
that is immediately deducible from the natural dynamics analysis. Nature
shows realizations, phenomena and beings not coming out from a far-
seeing finalism where every natural object is generated and then given
precise and determinate basic roles. To explain it better, not one evolutive
cosmological process allowed spontaneously to develop can lead to a
natural specific reality as the one indicated by the following sentence:
‘‘Formation of a rocky planet around a G2 star type where a conscious
animal species emerges and is indicated as being human’’. This purely
contingent scenario cannot be intended as the final and predetermined
goal of any evolutive process left to itself.
As Stephen J. Gould used to say, ‘‘rewinding’’ an evolutive process and
then letting it ‘‘play’’ from the same point, we would never see again the
same process, the same evolutive sequence, the same facts and living
beings, even if we had cosmological times. Against this possibility, against
such ideas, stands (ignoring evolutive dynamics) a huge quantity of phen-
omena (from the queen of the hard science, the physics), that go from the
universally accredited non-linear dynamic roles of natural phenomena
to quantum indeterminateness. Last but not least, ‘‘Mach’s principle’’
according to which any being or physical process, though tiny, has space-
time in an absolutely unique position and definition in the universe; every
event must be physically intended as absolutely unrepeatable and it will
never be physically replicated in the universe, owing to the uniqueness,
and irreproducibility of the infinite factors from which those beings and
phenomena originated.
Given this disconcerting uniqueness but above all the uncertainty and
contingency of natural dynamics, it is impossible to exclude the common
teleological ideas – as they regard, without any exception, a metaphysical
location that goes deeply into theological concepts which become of great
significance in this context. This is a very important connection which
cannot be ignored even in this eminently philosophical analysis. The
teleological paradigm that philosophical attention and speculation have
been concentrated on for centuries, postulates an uncreated being (God)
who, by means of a powerful divine finalism, creates ex nihilo a created
being (the natural reality). Through this act, the natural historic reality
is originated, where facts and dynamics typical of the eschatological and
soteriological ambit will take place. References to Christian/Catholic
theology, from which a rich osmosis of content has been derived in
western philosophy, are obvious.
This archetype lay on one side a first cause that expresses an ‘‘impera-
tive’’ will in a ‘‘passive’’ created being which should manifest in his intrinsic
characters ‘‘the imprint’’ of the original intention. This is the archetype
to which all the attempts to lead against the evolutionary conceptions
into teleological interpretations are referred. But this is only one arche-
type. A ‘‘particular’’ and ‘‘contingent’’ archetype is not at all exhaustive

of the essence, of the formal and logic canon of such conceptions, nor the
complete scheme of the probable alternative notions.
The question is the following: ‘‘But can this archetype support what
comes out from the evolutionistic paradigm, its essence?’’ The answer
is ‘‘No’’.
Only a different model could, where a very weak finalism should be
taken into account, where the ‘‘created’’ reality is not the scene where
eschatological and soteriological dynamics take place, but where the
reality is ‘‘allowed to become free from any superior supervision and interfer-
ence, according to its own auto-organization emerging capacities’’. A scene
where the uncreated being actively expresses a remission of total authority,
shrinks from any finalistic imposition on a reality that is intrinsically
capable of originating ‘‘autonomously and freely, absolutely not preor-
dained’’, complex structures and phenomena which only statistically guar-
antees the possibility of the emergence of sentient and complex beings,
whatever their location, structure, ethologic context, anatomic peculiarity
etc. Paraphrasing Einstein we could say: ‘‘Yes, God plays dice ... and
expects to win without cheating’’.
No supervision is intended, no boundaries, no interference in the deter-
mination of the bioevolutive scenarios, no further intrusion, no subtle
determinism. An effective nature can ‘‘stand alone’’, its peculiarities do
not come from far-seeing and power-fulfilled finalism, but from the con-
tinuous manifesting of the self-emergence of the strong characteristics of
natural reality. It is the free play of the physical and chemical laws,
particularly the integration of a series of causal factors spread at any level,
from the sub microscopic to the overall cosmological one, that concurs
to the ‘‘sufficient’’ final determination of the various ‘‘realizations’’.
A teleological indeterministic account is outlined where the emergence
of singular realizations is due to an ‘‘autonomous creative determination’’
not ‘‘imperative’’ but ‘‘democratic’’.
A process where every being is at the same time causal factor and
emergent reality through complex natural transformations. Not a charac-
ter, nor a single event is foreseeable and predeterminate before such
dynamics. Only generic directions of an overall development can be
preventively traced in this idea.9 The fundamental aspect of this new
interpretation is that this indeterminateness has not to be seen as an
‘‘epistemic’’ aspect, connected to the knowledge of intelligent forms of life
as man, but as a natural reality’s ‘‘intrinsic’’ trait so ‘‘not epistemic’’.
In other words, this new idea presents a vague finalism, only statistically
perceivable, since the objects and dynamics of a certain space-time context
are always connected to the manifestation of many different factors,
endogenous and exogenous to that context, so full of a deep unpredictabil-
ity and contingency. The analogy with the example of tissue formation
in the nervous system should be noticed!
The second important aspect that comes out from a different analysis
of evolutionary dynamics is the absence of the absolute ‘‘logical-ontologi-
cal break’’, particularly in the genesis of the natural reality where we are
located, to which anyway we apply at a cognitive level, logic aspects
connected to the nature of our language, to our semantic dispositions.
Our intrinsic and logical perceptive capacities allow us to distinguish
beings and phenomena, to bring about an essential semantic classification
when composing and interpreting logically the cognitive and perceptive
experiences: for example when we distinguish an inanimate object from
a living organism, a bird from a man. As the ETK shows such cognitive
ability expresses an intrinsic categorization and classification of natural
reality, not a mere speculative fact: it represents an irreplaceable instru-
ment of our physical existence, of our experiences, which is the basis for
building our rationality and our capability to philosophize.
The point is that if we applied this ‘‘sound and objective’’ capacity to
discriminate to the realisation of the evolutionary processes, we would
immediately face evident contradictions. This happens because in an
evolutionary ambit these ‘‘discrete’’ categorizations are completely inap-
plicable. So our ‘‘intuitive’’ recourse to such logical cognitive perspectives
leads immediately to serious interpretative mistakes: this is what has
happened as regards the accurate evaluation of the evolutionistic
paradigm.
For example, modern biology carries out a detailed classification of the
current forms of documented fossils. Examining the process on a chrono-
logical and evolutionary basis we observe that any taxonomic classifica-
tion softens in a continuum, a never ending becoming where we witness
an uninterrupted as well as imperceptible and widely scientifically docu-
mented transformation of the various forms. Every taxonomic classifica-
tion represents a ‘‘snapshot’’ of a continuously becoming process where
the evident and undeniable simultaneously perceived divisions, at a
synchronous level, irreparably dissolve. It is obvious that to maintain the
usual logical interpretative categorizations in front of this reality creates
paradoxes such as the one referred to by Daniel C. Dennett about the
mammals existence or better non-existence (the paradox is valid for any

form of life):10
1) Every mammal has had a mother mammal.11
2) If mammals had really existed, there would have been a finite number.
3) But if only a mammal had existed, then according to 1) there would
have been an infinite number of mammals, this contrasts 2): so not a
single mammal can have existed. It is a contradiction in terms.
The evolutionary phenomena present a total lack of ‘‘break’’: here it is
an important aspect which neatly distinguishes the evolutionistic para-
digm from the others, in particular the fixist one, the implicit foundation
of various philosophical currents. Now compared to such alterity of the
evolutionistic paradigm the fixist conceptions are immediately understood
only as historical, contingent and anachronistic expressions of that
anthropomorphic distortion always present in human categorizations and
conceptualizations, often an obstacle to the correct interpretation of
reality.
So the absence of absolute and clear categories together with the lack
of any imperative–finalistic dynamic, characterize the evolutionistic para-
digm. As we want to avoid every possible interpretative distortion, we
will assume such characterstics as the basis of the evolutionary ‘‘distinct
logic’’ – adjusting then the metaphysical frame in which such a paradigm
is attributed to ‘‘this value’’.
Let us consider the aspects which arise from this proposal in a cosmo-
logical, anthropological and philosophical ambit, to mention, in the end,
some ideas of a theological type. This conception brings about without
any need of revision or metaphysical additions the indeterministic value
of the evolutionistic paradigm, and exalts it through a deep analysis of
the evolutionary modalities we find at cosmological and biological level.
At every analysis level it is verifiable how such a paradigm continuously
increases a logical interpretation of nature where the indeterminateness
and the prodigious capacity of spontaneous emergence of highly-complex
structures weave an extraordinarily richer natural scheme. The universe’s
physical and chemical evolution shows the development of more and
more complex and regular structures (galaxies, stars systems ...) starting
from a less rich and variegated former reality due to the ‘‘becoming’’ of
only basic and physical and chemical phenomena.
Nowadays, for example, the study of the processes that must have
taken place soon after the Big Bang, is done using what has been devel-
oped in the study ambit of the microscopic world. So we are aware of
our prodigious capacity of rebuilding the whole universe’s history down

to infinitesimal fractions of a second after the Big Bang (in the order of
10−40 sec.), appealing to the most sophisticated sub microscopic world
centred physical theories (quantum mechanics).12
The extraordinary fact is that the natural developing of the physical
chemical phenomena, though not ‘‘addressed’’ to any specific realization,
can ‘‘spontaneously’’ originate states of matter progressively more regular
and differentiated as ‘‘self-organization intrinsic capacity’’. Another exam-
ple is given by the study of the dissipative structures.13 In these physical
systems, in contrast with what the second principle of Thermodynamic
implies, peculiar thermodynamic states lead to the emergence of regular
and complex structures starting from former disordered and chaotic ones.
We are aware of a sort of spontaneous ‘‘bootstrap’’ of complex and
orderly structures from a chaotic status: a ‘‘miraculous absurdity’’ for a
quantity of previously metaphysical notions, but completely natural!
This silent and spontaneous, almost inevitable, climbing of nature
towards more regular structures, or negative entropy, re-echoes in the
kinetics with which the multiform star structures originated, starting from
interstellar clouds, homogeneous in their chemical composition (mostly
H and He). From these structures the forming of all the atomic configura-
tions of the table of elements is observed.
In the million years soon after the Big Bang, the chemistry of the
universe was extremely simple if compared to the present one: at the
beginning of the formation of the stars there were only few elements, at
a low atomic number, of the first two periods of Mendeleev’s system.
Only after the thermonuclear reactions in the stars and the explosions of
the Supernovas, all the other elements of the periodic table were formed
and the creation of life was due to them. All these processes are kept
finely in balance, on the one hand by the most surprising characteristics
of the quantum world – to notice for example the ‘‘tunnel effect’’ in the
‘‘proton proton’’14 economy of the reaction (p-p) that happens in the
nucleus or the Beryllium–Carbon ‘‘resonance’’15 – on the other by equally
crucial physical conditions.
The anthropological–philosophical implications of this new interpreta-
tion are particularly interesting.
The considerations regarding these two ambits are in fact strictly
connected, especially in the kind of approach such as the ETK, that
perfectly sums up the singular contents we are pointing to here. We have
already commented on the ETK perspective as regards the sentient being,
the ‘‘self ’’ and the debate on the world’s existence. What we now point
out is that classifying the sentient being as a gestalt expression, as a cast

of equipollent factors combination, coming both from the inner genetic
fraction and from external reality – latu sensu – the idea of our ‘‘self ’’
emerges completely differently from the one implicit in different philo-
sophical formulations, both realistic and idealistic. According to them the
conscious being archetype is still ‘‘fixist’’; and the ontological scheme of
the cognitive expressions and characters suffers from the applicative limits
of Aristotelian logic. A logic that is undoubtedly valid when analysing
single experiences and perceptive facts or ontological aspects inherent to
self-perception, but inadequate with its absolute categories and caesuras
when directed to the comprehension of the origin, nature and ontological
characteristics of the sentient being, the ‘‘Self ’’.
Unless these philosophies take into account the ontological cognitive
nature of man, that is his ‘‘ontopoiesis’’, they will never be able to express
its contents in some way coherent with modern scientific ideas.
The comprehensive account is characterized by the following points:
1) The man, the conscious being, is understood as a holistic expression
of natural phenomena intrinsically indeterministic, completely alien to
any realization of finalistic purposes – particularly the ones centred
on his biological emergence.
2) Perceptions, the neurocerebral supply and consequently the cognitive
and sensorial experiences, constitute a cognitive perceptive basis –
that brings us back to the Kantian a-priori – phylogenetically formed
as an expression of the intrinsic characteristics of the noumenal reality.
3) This cognitive perceptive basis expresses an ‘‘evolutively efficacious
ontological correspondence’’ between the ‘‘phenomenological’’ sphere
and an extensive portion of the ‘‘noumenal’’ reality – so the latter is
unknowable on the whole.
4) The evolutive dynamics express an explicit ‘‘anti-teleology’’ in the
sense that the natural evolutive processes show an absence of specific
teleologies. It is possible only to propose an ‘‘indeterministic’’ teleology,
of general and probabilistic value, completely extraneous to any final-
ism tending to the emergence of the specific natural realities.
5) The evolutive dynamics allow the emergence of complex and regular
beings and phenomena only as a consequence of the spontaneous
fulfilment of the natural being’s ‘‘free self-organization and self-deter-
mination’’. An intrinsic natural manifestation, ‘‘free and spontaneous’’,
in all alien to interventions and events of an ‘‘imperative supervision’’
– an important aspect to consider above all where supernatural
entities are contemplated (theologically). Furthermore, in this manifes-

tation a sort of ‘‘democratic nature’’ can be seen in the causal action
of various causal factors, all equally significant in the last definition
of single beings, thanks to the diffusion in the natural ambit of non-
linear dynamics, phenomena of emergent complexity and exponential
dependence on the starting conditions.
6) The ontogenesis of the conscious being is conceived of in a framework
extraneous to absolute distinctions imputable to the typical categories
of Aristotelian logic: the genesis of the Self, of the conscious Self, is
intended in a continuum, in an evolutive ontological emergence process
that does not provide for breaks.
These points define the foundation of a new ‘‘evolutionistic’’ metaphysic,
coherent with the intrinsic characteristic of the evolutionistic paradigm,
that we can oppose to the usual metaphysics which looks in vain for the
composition of an idea of natural reality through fixist–finalistic oriented
philosophies. The total alterity of this position as to such philosophies
and particularly to their teleological formulations, is clearly deducible
also from the great difference of the ontological theistic profile claimed
by our proposal.
According to us, the contrasts and misinterpretations that have condi-
tioned the development of a correct philosophical interpretation of the
evolutive concept, come from the erroneous evaluation of these peculiar
characters of the evolutive paradigm.
From the present analysis, we can derive applications that strongly
agree with the classification between ‘‘religions’’ and ‘‘theo-etho-tomies’’
debated at another time,16 where a metaphysical profile of a non-moral
divinity17 was formulated, not linked to a fixist finalistic teleology, com-
pletely exploitable in the interpretative framework here proposed.
We can mediate a philosophical theological formulation that agrees
with this theoretical account of themes such as the emergence of con-
sciousness, the authentic nature of our personal and intellectual experi-
ences, expressed through contents that are coherent with modern scientific
facts. An osmosis that, with new content and modalities, could go beyond
any dualistic contrast between science and faith. A framework capable of
exceeding the nature/culture, intellect/body antithesis at this point con-
futed by modern neuroscience as well as implicitly reasserted by a greater
part of present philosophical thought.18
To conclude, these new ‘‘natural’’ archetypes of conscious being, of
humanity, find expression in the ‘‘genesis’’ of a new, alternative, evolutive-
shaped philosophical idea, however ‘‘also’’ open to other similarly new

and interesting theological/teleological applications. The reversal of a
trend and producing a new trend in which the foundations of evolutive
theory and modern scientific evidence are subsumed completely intact to
make a synthesis of new, original philosophical models.
University of Camerino
Italy
NOTES
1 Terms like ‘‘indeterministic’’, ‘‘indeterminateness’’ etc. refer to causal phenomena where

there is no univocity in the events sequences E E E E . In them the knowledge of the
1 2 3 n
E event does not allow us to go back univocally (or computationally) to a specific causal
K
event E . Besides, such events are understood in comprehensive contexts whose ‘‘subtle’’
(k-z)
characters do not come from total original determination, but constantly emerge from
physical situations not synchronically determined – especially because of quantum and
relativistic phenomena.
2 Verolini Roberto, ‘‘Scenari teleonomici nei paradigmi scientifici moderni,’’ in Nuova civiltà
delle macchine, XV, n° 1. 4 (57–60) (January/December 1997), (ed. RAI-ERI, Rome 1998),
pp. 297–319.
3 Roberto Verolini and Fabio Petrelli ‘‘A new creative paradigm: chaos and freedom’’, in
Analecta Husserliana LIX, Book 1 (Ed. A-T. Tymieniecka: Kluwer Academic Publishers, The
Netherlands, 1999), pp. 83–114.
4 Von Ditfurt Hoiman, Non siamo solo di questo mondo (Ed. Longanesi & C., Milan,
September 1982), pp. 137–171.
5 Konrad Lorenz, L ’altra faccia dello specchio. Per una storia naturale della conoscenza (Ed.
Adelphi, Milan, 1974), pp. 196–280.
6 John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, Il principio Antropico (Ed. Adelphi, Milan, May
2002), pp. 131–274.
7 We are perfectly aware that the research and formulation of a probable teleologic value
can be intended as an expression of an intentionality to be understood as anthropomorphism
more or less weak. Undoubtedly man is inclined to such behaviour. The philosophical
analysis of the evolutionistic paradigm’s distinctive interpretative perspectives, implies such
a risk that we are aware of, but at the same time, we are determined to maintain it, in order
to show the foundations of an alternative idea.
8 Verolini and Petrelli, op. cit., pp. 102–104.
9 Only at this level can the hypothesis of ‘‘intelligent design’’ be inferred. This attribution
should be understood only at a level of the general structural definition of reality, in particu-
lar referring to universes in evolution that can make possible the emergence of specific levels
of complexity and self-organization. The eventual attribution of a ‘‘creative’’ function is
limited at a weak, probabilistic level.
10 Daniel C. Dennett, L ’evoluzione della libertà (Ed. Raffaello Cortina, Milan, 2004), p. 169.
11 This point comes from the definition of the fundamental assumption about natural
species.
12 Also this value is significant for the freedom grades epistemological evaluation between
the phenomenological and the noumenal sphere, which we mentioned before when referring
to the ETK.
13 I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, L a nuova alleanza. Metamorfosi della scienza (Ed. Einaudi
Turin, 1993).
14 The ‘‘tunnel effect’’ represents an application of Heisenberg’s indeterminacy principle.
The dualistic nature of subatomic particles is described by a function which determines the
probability that a particle is in a space region of a given width. When the distance between
two protons becomes less than that width, both have the possibility of ‘‘overlapping’’ in the
same area. As if the protons pierced the barrier which separate them, by means of a tunnel –
hence the process name – becoming an atomic nucleus formed by a proton and a neuron.
This disconcerting fact, experimentally verified, allows the reaction p-p also at temperatures
present in the Sun’s nucleus of about 1.5×107K, inadequate for the reaction according to
classical physics.
15 The resonance phenomenon is of the utmost importance in the chemical evolution of the
universe: only thanks to it can a sufficient quantity of Carbon be formed in the appropriate
mass of stars. Carbon is a basic element of life, starting from the fusion of a beryllium atom
with helium (He).
16 Verolini Roberto and Fabio Petrelli, Metamorfosi della Ragione. Esegesi evoluzionistico
psicosociologica di Gn 1,3 ed implicazioni bioetiche. Hygiene and Health-Environmental
Sciences Department (University of Camerino: Interdepartmental Audiovisual and Press
Center, September 1994), pp. 55–84.
17 Roberto Verolini, Il Dio L aico: caos e libertà (Ed. Armando Armando, Rome, 1999),
pp. 51–84. www.diolaico.it.
18 Roberto Verolini, Fabio Petrelli and Larissa Venturi, ‘‘Psychopathologies and cultural
factors: some neoevolutionist perspectives’’, in Analecta Husserliana LXXIX (Ed. A-T.
Tymieniecka: Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 2004), pp. 799–807.
IGNACY S. FIUT
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ECOPHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTORY NOTES
The subject of this chapter is the search for a common realm for philo-
sophical studies: a realm which stems from man’s direct experience of the
world and which arises on the borderline of phenomenological and eco-
philosophical studies. The results of analyses conducted so far, both
phenomenological and ecophilosophical, which focus on man’s approach
to the world, provide a basis for the following thesis: the realm in question
is the space of man’s direct and pre-reflective experience, which comes
into being in acts of his transcending towards the world. It is grounded
on the intentional property of consciousness, which enables one to have
a direct insight into the contents of experience. This insight, followed by
noesis, or research proceeding, which aims at discovering the primary
sense of objects given in that experience, seem to be the very thing the
new realm of philosophy, inspired by ecological studies and a sense of
crisis in man–nature relations, needs.
INTENTIONALITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AS A COMMON GROUND FOR

PHENOMENOLOGICAL AND ECOPHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
Phenomenological philosophy, created by Edmund Husserl, underwent

several stages of development, whose only unchangeable element was the
research method of man’s external reality. The outcomes of Husserl’s
work are already historical and the present ideas connected with phenom-
enological studies have different aims from the ones pursued by the author
of Cartesian Meditations. The followers and supporters of this tradition
have introduced considerable changes into it, both in respect to the way
the goals of phenomenology are understood and the way the subject of
phenomenological investigations is perceived. It does not mean, however,
that the present studies in this fold do not aim at the search for the
essence of phenomenal representations of the world in man’s mind; the
world, which appears directly in the scope of man’s visual perception.
Such an attitude has now become extremely desirable or even necessary,
since rapid changes that are taking place in the world undergoing globali-
sation call for constant attention to this world and for insight into its
forms and modes of existence. We witness the rise of subsequent genera-
137
138 IGNACY S. FIUT
tions of new modes of existence, which are the products of man’s creative
efforts. They are often inadequately understood and many of their charac-
teristics do not fit into traditional categories, which used to be helpful in
perceiving and valuing them. The world is becoming a continuous process
of change. Hence the continuous need for searching for and attaching to
it certain sets of meaning, which give sense to individual objects, entirities
of objects, and man’s activities.
The main problem the followers of phenomenological studies objected
to were definitely Husserl’s categories of the ‘‘transcendental I’’ and ‘‘pure
consciousness’’, which express his idealistic orientation. Among the ones
who have pointed to it are Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Jean Paul
Sartre, Albert Camus, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Roman Ingarden and
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. The main line of criticism was levelled at
Husserl’s categories of philosophical reflection on the world, which had
been mentioned earlier. The followers of the phenomenological tradition
regarded these categories as a form of idealistic solution and location of
the problems of sense and essence, which decisively limited the sense-
generating and creative possibilities of human subjects, thus limiting
responsible anticipation of man’s future in the world.
Husserl’s ideas and constructs were even more radically approached
by neophenomenologically oriented philosophers, generally referred to as
postmodernists and deconstructionists, for example Jacques Derrida,
Jean-François Lyotard or Niklas Luhmann.1 They claimed that Husserl’s
system contains elements of the logo-phonocentric system, with no foun-
dation totalising the sphere of essence, which originated in Western culture
and civilisation. Despite being criticised, Husserl’s phenomenological
research has also revealed the mechanisms that lead to the totalisation
of the Western knowledge. This knowledge in the shape of technology
rules man and the world – a fact which was pointed to by Martin
Heidegger. Wolfgang Welsch says that
In his Die Krisis der europäischen W issenschaften Husserl shows how a completely new idea
arises in Descartes’ philosophy: ‘the endless totality of being in general is a rational totality
in itself and can be utterly controlled correlatively by means of universal knowledge.’ Husserl
has bridged the gap between that new impulse and the present time by presenting the
modern crisis as a consequence of the contemporary conception of science. Heidegger, in
turn, explained that modern technology is not a side-effect of the breakdown of knowledge,
but is internally related to it, that – in short – technology is the very essence of knowledge.2
Similar conclusions concerning the connection between science and

technology have also been reached by philosophers of a differerent back-
ground, e.g. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno in their Dialectic
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ECOPHILOSOPHY 139
of Enlightenment. Just like Husserl and Heidegger, they held that as

Cartesian thought emerged and spread, the rule of the basic type of
Western rationality began: the rule of instrumental reason. It justifies the
mechanistic approach to the material world, the contemporary times and
their crises resulting from this kind of rule applied on a global scale.3
The sources of the ecological crisis have also been viewed in the light
of the domination of instrumental reason and technology in man’s way
of thinking and actions. These factors are moreover accompanied by the
socio-economic and psychosocial consequences of life in industrial and
consumerist society, which augment the negative outcomes of implement-
ing technology-dominated rationality on a global scale.4
Alongside the science and technology expansion guided by instrumental
reason one can observe the emergence of new philosophical conceptions
characterised by a critical attitude towards the present state of the world.
They gave rise to a specific philosophical reflection, whose starting point
was an attempt to change man’s ethical and moral attitude towards
nature. Gradually, it has managed to come up with an alternative style
in philosophical thinking, which is intentionally focused on man’s place
in his natural living environment. This type of systematic philosophical
reflection is known as ecophilosophy. Nowadays it has two basic forms:
the so-called ‘‘shallow ecology’’ and ‘‘deep ecology’’.
‘‘Shallow ecology’’ is a set of loose ideologies aiming at the struggle for
man’s harmonious coexistence with nature, which lacks more profound
epistemological and metaphysical-ontological reflection. ‘‘Deep ecology’’,
in turn, usually associated with Arne Neass as its creator, aims at develop-
ing an autonomous and systematic philosophical thinking of an ecophilo-
sophical nature, which would have its own epistemology, ontology,
axiology, metaphysics and even theology, providing a substantial philo-
sophical and axiological basis.5 Its purpose is to provide men with essen-
tial premises for philosophical and existential reflection, or arguments in
favour of the way of thinking, evaluating, and acting that foster man’s
dynamic and harmonious coexistence with other men, other species, both
animals and plants, in their natural environments, which, together with
man’s environment, constitute a biosphere, or the natural world of nature.
According to this thought, such a world is man’s existential basis, the
basis of his world, which is bound to coexist side by side with the worlds
of other living creatures.
Many researchers dealing with the man–nature relation argue that the
divergence between those two parts of the fundamental existential relation
is a result of Descartes’ dualism, which caused separation of man’s two
140 IGNACY S. FIUT
parallel existential components: res cogitans and res extensa. This, in turn,
resulted in the rise of the so-called question of ‘‘the Cartesian bridge’’,
which separated man’s physical from his rational and spiritual domains.
In practical terms, this dichotomy led in the sphere of science into a
mechanistic and reductionist view of nature and then into the separation
of man’s rational sphere from his will and emotions.6 The negative conse-
quences of Cartesian dualism were pointed out earlier by such philo-
sophers as Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, while Franz Brentano’s7
psychological research and the idea of intentionality proposed by him
has decisively diminished the separating influence of ‘‘the Cartesian
bridge’’, which reached its apogee in classical German philosophy. The
negative consequences of Cartesian dualism led – like in the case of Georg
W. F. Hegel’s idealism – to the absorption of nature by Absolute Reason.
Brentano’s psychological research had a key influence on the develop-
ment of Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, to which his Cartesian
Meditations testify. In this work Husserl adopts Brentano’s conception of
intentionality, which enriches the phenomenological method of analysis
of phenomena given in natural experience, obtained by the human subject
in his direct, natural contact with the world, in coexistence with Other
man, that is in acts of transcending towards their common existential
basis, which seems to be the world of nature – the physical world,8
‘‘Philosophy’’ – according to Husserl
calls for explanations, which are based on ultimate and the most concrete vital necessities;
these, in turn, are the ones that comply with the truth that the whole objective world is
inherently rooted in transcendental subjectivity; the ones that necessarily explain the world
as constituted sense. Only they allow one to see [still other] the most vital and ultimate
questions, which can be posed at the world even if it has already been interpreted in this way.9
The research on intentionality carried out by Brentano, Husserl and

Roman Ingarden inspired the subsequent generations of thinkers working
in the fields of both natural sciences and the studies of consciousness and
spirit to diminish the role of ‘‘the Cartesian bridge’’ separating nature
and consciousness, which used to dominate philosophical reflection.
Alongside this shift scholars and philosophers launched research into
such a naturalised model of mind and consciousness that would be
interwoven with its natural background. The ideas of evolutionism, formu-
lated by Charles Darwin, became helpful in this search, since they allowed
scholars to analyse psychological phenomena as interwoven with physical
processes and having their existential basis in them.10 It did not mean,
however, that mind and consciousness had to be reduced to body’s
physiological processes; researches and analyses of this kind do not aim
at depriving them of either their existential specificity or relative existential

autonomy. On the contrary, they let us grasp in a more profound way
the sense of the contents of consciousness, the sense of human and animal
instinctive behaviours, as well as close connections existing between inten-
tional and mental states in human minds with emotional states of men,
who are regarded as subjects capable of cognition and action. By observ-
ing the emotional states of other living creatures, men can also presume
their mental senses and intentions resulting from them and even effectively
cooperate with these creatures in nature, as evidenced by the domestica-
tion of plants and animals. This creates a chance of a better understanding
of axiological preferences of values among men and other living creatures.
It allows one to understand their choices of pursued directions and aims
in their thinking and actions, corresponding to certain intentions. These
intentions are expressions, however simplified and limited, of the basic
characteristic of transcending consciousness, that is its intentionality.
Ecophilosophy, on the other hand, aims at altering the axiological
relations between man and nature that are nowadays binding and perva-
sive. Even on the common-sense level these relations are determined by
a mental doctrine that almost automatically attributes positive values to
instrumental reason and technology, which, in practical terms, endorses
an unlimited consumerist lifestyle. People of this orientation are actually
blind to the values rooted in nature; and nature itself seems to them to
be merely an inexhaustible source of various consumer goods. Such an
attitude results in unrestrained degradation and commercialisation of
nature and consequently in the degradation of man’s existential basis – his
human condition, which, after all, is determined by nature. In the field of
ecophilosophy this creates a need for basic research into the intentional
nature of consciousness, that is into how intentional processes come into
being and how they operate. Intentional processes impart dynamism to
the transcending towards the world structures of consciousness. These
structures provide a framework, within which man perceives in nature
value-generating points, recognises them and constitutes as valuable. Thus
in a direct experience based on primal modes of transcending towards
nature man can discover values, or even whole systems of values rooted
in himself. Then he can recognise, constitute, and even create them anew.
I think that at this point the realms of phenomenological and ecophilo-
sophical studies converge, the key issue of the latter being the intentional
nature of consciousness, which is a source of its axiological contents and
which provides the foundation for all axiological changes in human
mentality.
142 IGNACY S. FIUT
In acts of direct experience of the world intentionality itself enables

man to discover, recognise, and constitute values as outcomes of earlier
visualisation of their direct existential points. Within the limits of inten-
tionality values can guide man’s actions on the existential level, that is in
the sphere of both individual and collective choices of sensible modes of
human existence.
The evolutionistic orientation in ecophilosophical thought also allows
one to view human intentionality as a form of evolutionary development
of other, pre-human forms of intentionality, which can be observed and
experienced in other living creatures, both in the animal and vegetable
kingdom.11 That would imply that living creatures are not only to some
extent intentionally directed towards values, but that they themselves,
like men, can be depositories of values and subjects of axiological choices.
We can even to some degree experience, recognise, and constitute the
world according to the norms arising from their natural preferences. The
situation becomes the most critical when human axiosphere poses a
mortal danger to the ‘‘values’’, or rather ‘‘valencies’’ which are preferred
by other living creatures and which in the course of historical development
and adaptation have been evolutionarily incorporated in a harmonious
way into ecosystems and biosphere – a common ground for men and
other living creatures. After all, however, it is only men that can be aware
of their choices and the values guiding these choices and therefore it is
men that are actually responsible for what happens to nature – their
existential basis. That is why ecophilosophical studies and reflection place
a great emphasis on man’s rule as ‘‘the shepherd of being’’ of all beings
in the real order of existence, which in phenomenological existential
analytics was pointed to by Martin Heidegger and which was further
developed by Hans Jonas in his ethics of responsibility for the future. Like
Heidegger, Jonas metaphysically places the duty of man’s ethical responsi-
bility for the future in the horizon of ‘‘the being of beings’’ – das Sein des
Seiende, which transcends our present time and their time (Zeit) in the
process of the timing of being (Sein).
Responsibility viewed in this way is not connected with any particular
being, but with the being of all possible beings in general. Man is endowed
with being in the primal and fundamental experience of the world as a
whole in the intentional layer of his consciousness when he transcends
towards it. This transcendence and the experience of being are the sources
of duty, which is a concept deeply rooted in existential experience and
which Jonas, following the example of Heidegger, calls ‘‘the care for
being.’’12 The care for being is nothing other than a sense of ‘‘duty’’ which
entrusts man with responsibility for the future. This responsibility is
expressed in the awareness that there must be someone in the past who
would bear the burden of responsibility for the future, or take care of
‘‘the being of beings’’ in order to ensure the continuity of human species
on earth; someone who would safeguard something which originally
grants the right of existence, i.e. is to every man, as well as other living
creatures and their common living environment. Thus the first principle
of this ecophenomenological conception is the claim that mankind should
not be allowed to question the imperative which obliges man to maintain
human existence in general. ‘‘The imperative which says that mankind
must exist is – as long as only man is concerned – the first imperative.’’13
It is neither a categorical nor a hypothetical imperative in Kantian terms:
it is founded on a new understanding of metaphysics, which does not
sanction the impossibility of moving from being to duty, but which
assumes the absolute priority of being over nothingness. According to
Jonas, being is a value in itself, because it grants the right of existence to
all beings, whereas it cannot be predicated that nothingness grants a
similar value to annihilation processes.14 This situation can only be true
if the concept of value is rooted in objects and not merely in thoughts.
On the ground of ecophilosophy it must be assumed, then, that the
existence of values is objective in character, because such an assumption
allows one to derive duty from being, whose horizon can be experienced
in primal acts of intentional transcending of consciousness towards the
world.15
SPECIFICITY OF THE RATIONALITY OF PROECOLOGICAL AWARENESS
Being a separate entity in the world of competing discourses, the rational-

ity of ecological awareness has its specific properties, which stem from
the notions accepted in its field, their hierarchies, and systems of values
that accompany them. The aim of these values is to form in men certain
attitudes and behaviours towards living creatures and their natural living
environments, generally referred to as biotic and abiotic nature respec-
tively. This awareness presumes implicite that, despite their numerous
declarations, the patterns of conduct widespread among people threaten
the proper existence of the natural living environment and consequently
lead to its degradation. What is at stake here is not only the present
existence of men and their coexistence with other living creatures, but
also their existence in both the past and the future.
Another presumption providing foundations for the development and
dissemination of proecological awareness are the assertions of its authors
144 IGNACY S. FIUT
and activists. They claim that nature has been recently damaged by man’s
anthropocentric and consumerist activity to such a great degree that its
autonomous being is seriously endangered, which means that the existence
of man and other living creatures is also at stake. This situation is all the
more critical for the self-regulation mechanisms operating in nature having
been badly affected. Nature cannot restore itself to the state of harmonious
existence, which would ensure natural being to all living creatures, includ-
ing man. According to many researchers and enthusiasts of proecological
ideas the cause of the degeneration process in the man–nature relation
lies in the structure and functioning of the traditional awareness and in
systems of hierarchies and values favoured within this awareness. This
necessitates a prompt and radical influence on the contents of man’s
traditional awareness, altering it in such a way that would result in
friendly coexistence with man’s natural environment and nature as a
whole, understood in a global sense. In short, on the moral ground not
only members of his own species, but many living creatures must become
man’s neighhbours. Biotic and abiotic nature itself ought to be regarded
by men as a depository of all values and not only utilitarian and vital
ones. Nature should be understood and experienced as a sanctuary of
higher forms of values, e.g. ethical, aesthetic, cognitive, and even ‘‘systemic
values’’, including sacral values. It cannot be treated by men merely
instrumentally, like an object, but instead it should become a creative
partner in the development of man’s generic essence which stems from a
long and evolutionary coexistence with and within nature. Thus the
primary concern of proecological awareness are actions directed towards
constructing a new ecological order, which would sanction a new ecologi-
cal equity. This equity would be expressed by a new social contract
between man and nature, which would grant rights to our ‘‘little brethren’’
and the interests of their species.
To use Jean J. Rousseau’s terms, the matter in question is a new
renaturalisation of man, although it is obvious that there are no more
areas of nature unaffected by man’s activity which makes his return to
‘‘the primal wildness’’ utterly impossible.16
The adopted theses, which determine man’s friendly and responsible
relations with nature on a global scale at the beginning of the 21st century,
find expression in the so-called balanced development project – planning
development on both local and global scale. The development would also
constitute a political project, which would provide a programme of activi-
ties for local communities, states, and the international community.
Environmental awareness and its intentional inclinations expressed in

the ecological outlook can be characterised by the following features,
which indicate the problems and objects of the intentionality of this
outlook and which can accurately guide the actions of a person adopting
it: – ecocentrism or biocentrism, which see man as an integral part of
nature, distinguished, if at all, only because of his intellectual and moral
capacities. Other living creatures and whole ecosystems, like men, have
their intrinsic values and values of a systemic nature, as well as the right
to live, hence one is obliged to adopt a respectful and sympathetic attitude
towards them and respect their living preferences in their natural
environments:
– treating nature as a mother, which should be expressed in adopting an
attitude of co-operation and altruistically oriented symbiosis, which
prefers friendship and reverence over inherently egoistic strife and
competition;
– holistic cosmology, accepting a thesis that the Universe is more than
the sum total of its elements and that together with the Earth it
constitutes an evolutionarily developing life, which originated from
evolving matter and which is an organic whole open to the still
unknown future;
– the awareness of the need to foster balanced development (ecodevelop-
ment) – an economic doctrine seeking such ideas that would effectively
serve the vital, spiritual, and cultural values. This doctrine would aim
at preserving a specific quality of life for all living creatures and their
offspring, which would ensure their good health. Work as a source of
wealth should be viewed in the light of self-fulfilment prevailing over
efficiency;
– seeking for adequate technologies submitted to the mural culture, which
demands that what had been damaged must be repaired and that
‘‘hard’’ industrial technologies should be replaced by ‘‘soft’’ technol-
ogies, which preserve harmony in nature;
– aiming at the model of decentralised politics, which favours the rights
of bioregional communities, self-organisation responsibility and eco-
nomic initiative proceeding from ordinary citizens rather than the
ruling elite and, as far as possible, local self-containment, that is aiming
at autopoetic politics which remains in accordance with the L ogos of
the world of living creatures;
– fostering the balance of sexes in the socio-political life, which would
reinforce the priority of compromise, kindness, and the preference for
146 IGNACY S. FIUT
the family values over the economic and political ones, as well as using
intuition in aid of thinking, which is directed towards the importance
of life in its present moment and which allows the intentionality of
human consciousness to develop naturally;
– a strong sense of transcendence, which assumes almost a divine dimen-
sion of man, nature, and all living creatures, to whom we owe respect
and due regard in the light of our transcendental attitude towards the
world as the existential basis of man;17
– a clear distinction between spirituality and religiousness, since spirituality
and its new global form is now becoming the aim of the entire biosphere
as yet another stage in its evolution, realised by means of the spread
of the Internet and its social counterpart – a society of information
technology, which is a new socio-economic structure originating at the
beginning of the third millennium. Assuming that spirituality is the
goal of the whole biosphere, pursued also by ecological man, his mode
of religiousness is only one of the means by which this spirituality is
achieved, provided that in spiritual practice this mode of religiousness
implies conscious renunciation of consumerist desires in favour of
transcendence;18
– respecting the NOMA (Non-Overlapping Magisteria) principle, which
instead of the fierce struggle for supremacy between science and religion
recommends actions based on dialogue, debates characterised by
mutual respect, and non-interference between the ‘‘magisterium of reli-
gion’’ and the ‘‘magisterium of science’’;19
– creating and cultivating language and forms of interpersonal communica-
tion, both on the verbal and non-verbal level, which would exploit
the semantic and syntactic capacities of language in order to develop
and consolidate man’s social interactions friendly to their living
environment.20
ECOPHILOSOPHICAL PREMISES OF PROECOLOGICAL AXIOLOGY
Seen against the background of ecophilosophical studies and research

into values, whose aim is to do away with the controversies and misunder-
standings concerning naturalised axiology promoted in this field, the
conception of values perceived in nature by Holmes Rolston III is worth
paying attention to. It was formulated in his Value in Nature and the
Nature of Value published in 1994.21 The author’s starting point is a well-
known thesis claiming that only men are able to value (valeo) and think
(cogito). This thesis is well-established in philosophy thanks to the philo-
sophical reflection inspired by Descartes’ solutions. This point of view,

predominant in philosophy and axiology, is questioned by Rolston III,
who refers to the claims of Aldo Leopold and J. Baird Callicott. He takes
into account the way non-human valuing and choosing subjects perceive
values existing in the world and use them in situations that involve
making a choice. These subjects include living creatures of higher order
and even complex systems of biological life, the most important of them
being ecosystem.
First, Rolston III questions the prevalent opinion that instrumental
values belong to natural and non-human beings, whereas other values
are routed in man, who has the exclusive right to perceive, experience
and constitute them. The author wonders then whether intrinsic values
man perceives in nature are discovered or bestowed by him on the objects
he perceives.22 Rolston III says:
Tourists in the Yosemite National Park do not value a sequoia as potential wood, but as
a natural masterpiece; they value its age, strength, persistence, majesty. It is this view that
establishes the value of the tree, the value being not independent of man’s valuation. It
follows that subjectivity needs value to place it in the world, but objectively it had been
placed in the world earlier. Hence the value in question is neither a value because of man,
although he constitutes it, nor a value in itself.23
Intrinsic values in this case are not to be considered metaphors. These

values are inherent in existing natural objects before man – a subject
experiencing and valuing them – appears in the neighbourhood. Objects
incite receptivity in the subject transcending towards them, which becomes
stimulated by sensory data. Then the subject re-evaluates his attitude and
the nature of the aims of his intentionality, translating them into values.
This process makes the object appear to man as a carrier of given values,
in which he perceived their value-generating moments.
Contrary to the common belief originating from the language practice
which suggests that the source of values are men, who then place values
in natural objects, Rolston III claims that men do not place there any
values, but merely perceive, recognise, and constitute them. Thus values
must be existentially rooted outside the subject that perceives them. The
subject, in turn, must possess in his intentionally oriented consciousness
appropriate structures to grasp these values.
An important problem put forward by Rolston III concerns the ques-
tion of the axiological and axio-generating quality of ecosystem. He argues
that this living system, which tunes (orchestrates) creatures with their
living environments into a uniform, relatively isolated system generated
148 IGNACY S. FIUT
in the course of evolution also follows a certain choice pattern. It contrib-

utes to the continuous innovation of living conditions in itself, creates
opportunities for new species to come into being and eliminates others,
therefore it has its own intrinsic value and in the general sense can be
regarded as a valuing subject. It prefers certain choices of values for
creatures living within its own limits and refuses to realise values which
are important to creatures living in other ecosystems.24 Its development
and functioning are inseparable from the pressure of selection and inces-
sant changes in adaptable abilities of individual organisms which live in
the ecosystem and which are connected by a network of feedback.
Products of evolution appearing in an ecosystem can be valuable or
invaluable to it. Simultaneously, they can be valuable or invaluable to
men, whose valuation does not have to concur with the ecosystem’s
valuation. It can be agreed that evolutionary processes that take place
within an ecosystem are able to produce values (new axiological qualities)
and to value innovations by both man and the ecosystem itself.25
The world of values according to Rolston III, is not limited to human
or non-human intrinsic values, in relation to which other values play a
subsidiary role. Instead, in nature organised into ecosystems and consti-
tuting a biosphere there exist intrinsic values, extrinsic ones, which can
be both instrumental and purely axiological in character, and systemic
values. All these values permeate one another and none of their types is
absolutely more important than other types. Systemic values play the
fundamental rule in these axiological systems. They determine the charac-
ter and enable the existence of other values, that is intrinsic, instrumental,
and even purely axiological values, to which man claims to have exclusive
right. According to Rolston III, by analogy to man’s axiological prefer-
ences, it can be stated that the ecosystem, too, is a ‘‘valuing subject’’,
which within the framework of the system chooses particular values and
their character and rejects others.26
Considering the whole Earth as a collection of hundreds of ecosystems,
Roston III rejects the idealistic-subjective approach towards the existence
of values, which claims that values exist so far as they are perceived,
experienced, and constituted. He does not question, however, the fact
that the perception and choice of values are typically subjective, based
on the intentional nature of experience, which is connected with man’s
transcending towards the world of nature. He argues that such ‘‘subjecti-
vity’’ can be characteristic not only of men, but also other living creatures,
as well as whole ecosystems, which constitute valuing subjects of various
ranks. In this sense the Earth, too, is a kind of value-creating and at the
same time valuing subjectivity. In the real order it is the most fundamental
subject of all. It gives existence to not only ecosystems, living creatures,
and their environments, but also man himself; and therefore his valuation
must take account of other systems of values that are transcendental in
relation to him and which belong to other living creatures and their living
environments, which constitute ecosystems. In such an axiologically
arranged world the question becomes vital of other than traditional
perception of man’s place in this world and his role in nature. Hence the
need for creating a new ecological order, new ecological justice, and,
consequently, the programme for the policy of balanced development.
These postulates must relate to the remodelled and reverentially disposed
towards the world intentional layer of man’s consciousness. Within its
limits the imperative formulated by Hans Jonas should be binding, since
it points to the fundamental value of existence given in man’s direct
relation to the world of nature.
CLOSING NOTES
The considerations presented here indicate that if the search for man’s
harmonious existence with transcendence, which is examined by research-
ers into both psychophysical and psychosocial phenomena, is to follow
in the right direction, it will have to take into account the essential
moments of the philosophical analysis of man’s relation to nature. They
also justify a thesis that modern patterns of ecophilosophical thinking
cannot do without a method developed in phenomenology and based on
the analysis of phenomenological insight and visualisation of phenomena
connected with man’s transcendence towards nature, which is based on
the intentional property of consciousness.
The modern world is undergoing rapid changes on a global scale; it is
becoming a process and man’s perpetually uncertain position in it obliges
him to incessantly define the sense and meaning of his relation with all
forms of transcendence. Directing attention to the axiological contents of
acts of man’s intentional relating to the transcendent world seems now
to be the core problem of ecologically-oriented thinking both in the
sphere of nature and spirit. These axiological contents, which are
expressed in Jonas’ imperative of man’s responsibility for the future,
should include a duty to give priority to the value of existence over non-
existence.
Cracow, Poland
150 IGNACY S. FIUT
NOTES
1 H. Hesse, Zagadkowa przemoc – o pytaniu o sprawiedliwość praw, w szczególności u

L uhmanna i Derridy, in J. Brejdak, W. Stegmeier, and I. Ziemiński (eds.), Polityka i etyka w
uje˛ciu filozoficznym i systemowym (Szczein: AMP Studio Paweł Majewski, 2003),
pp. 145–166.
2 W. Welsch, Nasza postmodernistyzna moderna (Unsere postmoderne Moderne) (Warsaw:
Oficyna Naukowa, 1998), pp. 97–98.
3 M. Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York: Herder
and Herder, 1972).
4 E. F. Schumacher, Małe jest pie˛kne. Spojrzenie na gospodarke˛ światowa˛ z założeniem, że
człowiek coś znaczy (Warsaw: PIW, 1981), pp. 272–278.
5 A. Naess, ‘‘Deep Ecology and Ultimate Promises’’, in T he Ecologist, 1988, pp. 130–131.
6 A. R. Damasio, Bła˛d Kartezjusza. T ajemnica świadomości (Descartes’ Error: Emotion,
Reason, and the Human Brain) (Poznań: Dom Wydawniczy REBIS, 2002, pp. 33–35.
7 F. Brentano, Psychologia z empirycznego punktu widzenia (Psychologie vom empirischen
Standpunkt) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN S.A., 1999), pp. 126–127 and 266–268.
8 E. Husserl, Medytacje kartezjańskie (Cartesinianische Meditationen) (Warsaw: PWN,
1982), pp. 157–212.
9 Ibid., p. 206.
10 D. C. Dennett, Natura umysłów (Kinds of Minds. T owards an Understanding of
Consciousness) (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo CIS, 1997), pp. 99–112.
11 Ibid., pp. 31–97.
12 H. Jonas, Zasada odpowiedzialnósci Etyka dla cywilizacji technologicznej (Cracow:
Wydawnictwo, PLATAN, 1996), pp. 79–84.
13 Ibid., p. 90.
14 Ibid., pp. 96–100.
15 Ibid., pp. 110–111.
16 L. Ferry, Nowy ład ekologiczny. Drzewo zwierze˛, człowiek (Warsaw: PIW, 1995),
pp. 17–19.
17 K. Waloszczyk, Wola życia. Myśl Pierre ’a T eilharda de Chardin (Warsaw: PIW, 1986),
pp. 228–235.
18 K. Waloszczyk, Planeta nie tylko dla ludzi (Warsaw: PIW, 1997), pp. 283–287.
19 S. J. Gould, Skały wieków. Nauka i religia w pełni życia (Rocks of Ages. Science and
Religion in the Fullness of L ife) (Poznań: PIW, 2002), pp. 10–11, 124–125.
20 J. Aitchison, Ssak, który mówi. W ste˛p do psycholingwistyki (T he Articulate Mammal. An
Introduction to Psycholinguistic) (Warsaw: PWN, 1991), pp. 13–16 and J. Aitchison, Ziarna
mowy. Pocza˛tki i rozwój je˛zyka (T he Seeds of Speech, L anguagae Origin and Evolution)
(Warsaw: PIW, 2002), pp. 30–42 and 126–149.
21 H. Rolston III, Value in Nature and the Nature of Value, in R. Attfield and A. Basly (eds.),
Philosophy and the Natural Environment (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), pp. 13 and L. Pyra,
Environment and Values. Holmes Rolston III’s Environmental Philosophy (Cracow:
Wydawnictwo AR w Karkowie, 2004), pp. 67–76.
22 Ibid., p. 13.
23 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
24 Ibid., pp. 18–25.
25 Ibid., p. 25.
26 Ibid., pp. 26–30 and I. S. Fiut, ECOetyki. Kierunki rozwoju aksjologii współczesnej
przyjaznej środowisku (Cracow: Wydawnictwo ABRYS, 1999), pp. 64–68.
LESZEK PYRA
MEN IN FRONT OF ANIMALS
Traditional ethics did not pay much attention to animals. It was usually
assumed that man could treat animals instrumentally and use them for
different purposes but should not cause unnecessary suffering to them.
Some attention, although not much, has been devoted to the problem
within the history of philosophy. Already Aristotle, two and a half thou-
sand years ago, stated that
Plants exist to give food to animals, and animals to give food to men – domestic animals
for their use and food, wild ones, in most cases, if not at all, furnish food and other
conveniences, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless
or in vain, all animals must have been made by nature for the sake of men.1
As is well known, it was assumed that nature, sometimes identified with

God, simply created plants for animals and animals for men to supply
food.
In the 18th century Jeremy Bentham, the co-author of utilitarianism,
examining the relation under discussion, suggested that we should not
ask whether animals could reason or talk, but whether they could suffer.
Bentham wrote as follows:
The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater
part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly
upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior races of animals are still.
The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which
never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have
already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should
be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may one day come to be
recognized that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os
sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate.
What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps
the faculty of discourse? But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more
rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week, or even
a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not,
Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?2
The kind of answer given to such a question determines the kind of

behaviour in relation to animals.
151
152 LESZEK PYRA
According to Holmes Rolston III, and he seems to be mistaken in this

respect, Bentham ‘‘pinpointed half of a long-standing ethic toward ani-
mals.’’3 The American author obviously thinks that the ethicists defending
animals – because of their ability to suffer – constituted half of all ethicists,
whereas I am deeply convinced that they were definitely in the minority.
I think that the great majority of philosophers approved of the instrumen-
tal treatment of animals treating it as a ruling paradigm according to
which animals were only means and not aims. It should be remembered
in this context, however, that, for example, St. Thomas stressed that
animals should not be treated badly by men, which meant not causing
needless suffering, because such treatment could eventually be imitated
by men (especially children) in regard to other men; it clearly shows that
pedagogical purposes dominated in such situations. Perhaps such
purposes are best seen in the words of John Locke who wrote:
One thing I have frequently observed in Children, that when they have got possession of
any poor Creature, they are apt to use it ill: They often torment, and treat very roughly,
young Birds, Butterflies, and such other poor Animals, which fall into their Hands, and
that with a seeming kind of Pleasure. This I think should be watched in them, and if they
incline to any such Cruelty, they should be taught the contrary Usage. For the Custom of
Tormenting and Killing Beasts, will, by Degrees, harden their Minds even towards Men;
and they who delight in the Suffering and Destruction of Inferior Creatures, will not be apt
to be very compassionate, or benign to those of their kind.4
One should notice that the problems of animals, in comparison to

some other problems of environmental ethics, e.g. non-biodegradable
pollutants, extinction of species, have a comparatively long tradition
because they were discussed already in classical philosophy. The other
problems mentioned above had no chance to appear so early, and for
obvious reasons so. It seems that our forefathers lived in much closer
contact with animals than we nowadays do, and this opinion refers both
to wild and domesticated animals. It is probably true but they did not
have our knowledge of the world, of the theory of evolution and ecology,
they did not develop the psychology of animals and therefore were unable
to construct suitable environmental ethics, which are being developed
nowadays. Everything that contemporary man knows about animals,
claims Holmes Rolston III, about their perception and behaviour, shows
clearly that man is a close relative of – especially higher – animals.5 The
problem of animals has become more and more pressing, especially in
the light of some alarming reports about misuse of animals in manufactur-
ing industries, scientific experiments, etc.
Holmes Rolston III remarks that he will use the notion ‘‘nonhuman
animals’’ when referring to sentient animals. It is a very clever move
MEN IN FRONT OF ANIMALS 153
because then it is easy to introduce the notion ‘‘human animals’’ (which

may sound like an abuse for at least some of the readers) and which was
de facto invented by Peter Singer.6 Holmes Rolston III asks whether it is
reasonable to use the notion of rights in regard to animals and gives
examples of theoreticians who used to do that, thinking it to be quite
natural, such as Tom Regan. But Holmes Rolston III does not seem to
be convinced that such a position is reasonable, so let us follow his
argument in this respect.
Arne Naess, referring to animals, writes: ‘‘In principle each of them
have the same right to live and blossom as we and our children have.’’7
But then he notices, and rightly so, I think, that the notion of rights is
certainly characteristic of the West: it does not appear clearly either in
the East or in ancient cultures; for example, there is not much about
rights in the writings of Plato or in the Bible. As we know, rights may
be divided into ascribed (to somebody) and natural. The ascribed rights
are established by a public agreement, whereas the natural ones are
attached to values found in persons and, as some environmental philo-
sophers claim, in higher animals. Of course, all rights are the product of
culture as such; in nature there are apparently no such rights. I wholly
agree with Holmes Rolston III who claims that any theory of rights, if
accepted, could only be applicable to animals remaining in the sphere of
culture, and not to those living in the wilderness. Only in culture such a
theory seems reasonable, even if only partly. In addition to this Holmes
Rolston III states that rights should refer to animals that are conscious
in a high degree. This seems to be arbitrary but, after all, the whole of
law is arbitrary, too.
Thinkers like Peter Singer, introducing the concept of ‘‘sentience’’ and
‘‘the principle of equal consideration of interests’’, seem to extend the
range of animals, including also, after Bentham, into the universum of
those possessing rights all animals which are sentient and therefore can
suffer or feel pleasure. Singer writes:
If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is

nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of sentience (using the term as a
convenient, if not strictly accurate, shorthand for the capacity to suffer or experience
enjoyment or happiness) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests
of others.8
According to me, Singer once more, at least partly so, comes back to the
so-called Schweitzer’s dilemma which puts so many restrictions on man’s
behaviour towards animals that hardly anything can be done in this
154 LESZEK PYRA
respect. Ultimately, Holmes Rolston III comes to a reasonable conclusion,

I think, that in regard to animals it is unnecessary to use the concept of
rights at all.
Although in wild nature we find no rights, we can discover values there
and also animals’ interests and needs that can be satisfied and which exist
without man being either present or absent. Therefore, claims Holmes
Rolston III, it is much better to assume that what should be taken into
consideration is the welfare of animals – that they have certain goods to
promote. At last, it seems, Holmes Rolston III tries to reformulate Singer’s
neoutilitarian views and states that man, in the case of beings able to
suffer, should minimise pain whenever it is possible. It is worthy of notice
that a similar idea was expressed by the Polish philosopher, Tadeusz
Kotarbiński, who insisted in his writings that man should first minimise
sufferings and only then maximise pleasures.9 Referring to the inter-
human activity Kotarbiński insists that man should, for example, first
build hospitals, thus minimising sufferings, and only then erect concert
halls, in order to maximise pleasures.
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN SUPERIORITY OVER ANIMALS
The paradigm of human dominion over animals has a long-lasting tradi-

tion. It prevails in the human consciousness almost from the very begin-
ning of humankind. And such a mode of thinking is not lacking some
sense. Holmes Rolston III notices that the supremacy is supported both
by the Bible and by the greatest philosophical authorities of the past and
of present times. Among others, he recalls in this context the opinion of
the philosopher of science, Michael Polanyi, according to whom ‘‘It is
the height of intellectual perversion to renounce, in the name of scientific
objectivity, our position as the highest form of life on earth, and our own
advent by a process of evolution as the most important problem of
evolution.’’10 There are many more such opinions but one can find easily
also some opposite views, too. For example, Albert Schweitzer, propagat-
ing his moral theory, writes: ‘‘We like to imagine that man is nature’s
goal; but the facts do not support that belief.’’11 More radical, and
therefore perhaps less acceptable, are the formulations of Paul Taylor
who, developing his theory of respect for nature, claims: ‘‘It seems quite
clear that in the contemporary world the extinction of the species Homo
Sapiens would be beneficial to the Earth’s Community of Life as a
whole.’’12
Analysing the problem of how to treat animals Holmes Rolston III
presents the list of twenty six characteristic traits of humans distinguishing
them from animals. He calls it ‘‘a trial list of human uniqueness and
superiority claims’’.13 They are not always very important, however, which
can be seen at the very first glance; the author himself turns the attention
of the readers to this unimportance. I personally would add that the list
was prepared, perhaps intentionally, in such a way as to mix up primary
with secondary and even tertiary characteristics. For example, the charac-
terisation of humans as being creative hardly compares with the opinion
that humans see better than animals (which is certainly not always true).14
Perhaps the intention of the author was to present man as not such an
extraordinary creature, after all; according to me, however, he definitely
failed in this respect.
There is no doubt that different species should be treated differently,
claims Holmes Rolston III. Therefore, one cannot introduce total equality
into environmental ethics as, for example, Schweitzer tried to do. In this
context the American author suggests a differential treatment of different
species. Undoubtedly, in the course of evolution, each species adapted
itself perfectly to its own ecological niche, and its representatives seem to
be especially efficient in just this, and not the other, niche. Man best
accomodated himself to his own niche, to the culture in which he lives,
and which is being constantly created and recreated by him; thus he also
follows a certain specific path of development. According to Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka,
Culture is what gives continuity to the pulsating life of the individual as well as the human
group or society. It is transmitted as inheritance from generation to generation; however,
this inheritance is transmitted only when individuals are capable of retrieving ideals and
corroborate their meaning with their own living stream of existence.15
In view of the above definition, it seems obvious that animals cannot

retrieve ideals and corroborate their meaning in their life. But if one
considers the similarities and the differences between men and animals it
is very difficult to show that men are better than animals, claims Holmes
Rolston III, because men and animals function in two different spheres,
animals in nature and men in culture.
Holmes Rolston III is right to notice that nature and culture are hardly
comparable, however, he seems to forget that both men and animals
sometimes appear in one sphere, and although they certainly are quite
different creatures, they nevertheless can be compared, at least in some
respects. When morality is taken into consideration, one must notice that
animals in their behaviour are not immoral, they are amoral, which means
that they remain outside of morality. Ultimately, one sighs with relief
when Holmes Rolston III states clearly and unequivocally that man’s
156 LESZEK PYRA
advantage over animals is not a fictitious prejudice. He is inclined to

admit that the best representatives of men (for instance Albert Einstein),
realise certainly a much greater spectrum of values than even the best-
developed representatives of animals.
Men should not forget, however, that higher animals are conscious,
sometimes even self-conscious. Holmes Rolston III recalls two examples
the first of which refers to chimpanzees. They recognise themselves in
mirrors. And if a red tag is put on a chimp’s ear while he is asleep, he
will after waking and accidentally passing a mirror remove it from his
ear. The second example refers to a gorilla named Koko. She was taught
a sign language by Stanford University researchers and she was able to
use several hundred signs to construct simple but reasonable sentences
perfectly adequate to the contexts in which they were produced. Such
examples show at least that there is also consciousness in the world of
animals. Writes Tom Regan: ‘‘Perception, memory, desire, self-conscious-
ness, intention, a sense of future – these are among the leading attributes
of the mental life of normal mammalian animals aged one or more.’’16
But it should be noticed that men are able, for example, to create meta-
physics, which animals are not capable of doing. I think there is much
truth in Holmes Rolston III’s opinion concerning men: ‘‘they have a
distinct metaphysical status just because they alone can do metaphys-
ics.’’17 Animals can only centre on food and defend their own life, whereas
humans can transcend their anthropocentric position and look at every-
thing as one whole.
According to Holmes Rolston III humans play a minor biological role
in their ecosystems, they are not very important as predators or prey,
they play an insignificant role in food chains and in regulating life cycles;
the last opinion can rather easily be questioned. The author also writes
about humans: ‘‘They are a late add-on to the system’’, but then he adds
immediately: ‘‘The human role is ethical, metaphysical, scientific, religious,
and in this sense humans are unique and superior, but their superiority
is linked in a feedback loop with the whole.’’18 Concluding, the author,
somewhat unexpectedly, especially in the light of his previous analyses,
stresses the unique and very important role of man in the world and
human superiority over all other creatures. Possessing the capacity to
know the world still better and better, man should try to understand
nature and then to imitate her in a certain sense. The problem is, however,
that from the rules holding in the world a purely biocentric ethical theory
does not come out. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that because of his
superior position man has not only privileges, he also bears responsibility
for what is around him, especially for everything which is alive. The
opinion of Kenneth E. Goodpaster sounds very convincing and seems to
be very promising in this respect:
Neither rationalism nor the capacity to experience pleasure and pain seem to me necessary
(even though they may be sufficient) conditions on moral considerability. And only our
hedonistic and concentric forms of ethical reflection keeps us from acknowledging this fact.
Nothing short of the condition of being alive seems to me to be a plausible and nonarbitrary
criterion.19
WILD ANIMALS
According to Holmes Rolston III the obligation to show universal benevo-

lence in regard to animals, especially wild ones, is too strongly formulated.
Within the area of environmental ethic we can put forward some postu-
lates that oblige man to treat animals, living in the sphere of culture, not
worse than they would have been treated if they had lived in wilderness,
under the pressure of the forces of natural selection. Environmental ethic
does not impose upon man the duty to improve nature, therefore he is
not obliged to prevent pain and death in wilderness. It seems to be quite
natural that in the trophic pyramids the omnivorous and carnivorous
animals inflict pain on others in order to survive. Concluding, Holmes
Rolston III claims that it is not necessary to intervene in wild nature
where natural evolutionary processes appear and are active; intervention
seems to be necessary where man acts in the way, e.g. industrial, which
threatens the existence of animals; in such a case man should certainly
be responsible for animals.
As a result it appears that Holmes Rolston III modifies Bentham’s
question, asking not whether animals are able to suffer but rather whether
they have enough free place in an ecosystem. Because the American
author’s views are holistic in character, he insists that a satisfactory
situation must be ‘‘distributed’’, so to say, equally among particular
animals in a given ecosystem; some of them will be losers but some
certainly winners, and the latter will survive and multiply. Pain and death
in ecosystems are their natural components and that is why people who
would like to limit animals’ pain are either sentimental or unnecessarily
anthropomorphise the world of animals. In the case of a predator, for
example, a satisfactory situation means a sufficient hunting area for a
given species (e.g. tiger, lion, bear).
158 LESZEK PYRA
DOMESTICATED ANIMALS
Holmes Rolston III is fully aware of the importance of the role played
by animals in the process of forming culture. Therefore he writes:
Consider beasts of burden. It is difficult to think that civilization could have developed to
its advanced state without beasts of burden. Humans would not have figured out how to
build motor cars and trucs without ever having built buggies and wagons, if no humans
have ever ridden a beast nor laid a load on its back.20
Discussing the problem of animals living in the sphere of culture, Holmes

Rolston III formulates two principles which should govern man’s behavi-
our in regard to them. According to the first, the so-called strong ethical
principle, man should not cause excessive suffering in comparison to the
one appearing in nature. According to the second, the so-called weak
ethical principle, man should minimise pain, especially when it is pointless.
Formulating such principles the author tries to base his theory on ecology,
and not on the categories characteristic of human social life, such as
charity or justice. In the case of domesticated animals, those ‘‘dragged’’
by man into the sphere of culture, much attention should be paid, Holmes
Rolston III keeps repeating, not to inflict more suffering upon them than
they would have experienced, if they had lived in the wilderness. It should
be remembered that even partly domesticated animals have no chance to
come back and live in the wild conditions in which evolutionary processes
operate. Men were shaped both as herbivorous and carnivorous, and as
a result as omnivorous beings, and there is no need to change it.
Formulating such an opinion the author rejects the idea of universal
vegetarianism so much propagated, for example, by Peter Singer and
Tom Regan. Of course, in nature it often happens that the representatives
of given predators eat the representatives of their own species; such a
situation must not happen in the human world and it is one of the
situations in which what is should not change itself into ought to be. Such
an example points to a certain departure from Holmes Rolston III’s
general line of reasoning on the nature of is and ought. The author’s
reason for cannibalism not to happen is that it destroys interhuman
relations. His reasoning here is not sound enough; one could ask a very
reasonable question: ‘Do not wars, for example, or acts of terrorism
destroy interhuman relations and still, unfortunately, happen here and
there all the time?’
One example of following nature is that humans eat meat and such
activity is a natural component of ecosystems. Animals are set in the
trophic pyramid, therefore eating them is consistent with the laws of
ecology. Sometimes it happens, however, that people inflict too much

suffering on domesticated animals. Holmes Rolston III considers, for
example, the case of Muslims and Jews in Britain. Modern abattoirs stun
animals, either by a strong blow or an electric shock, before butchering
them. But the situation is different in the case of the religious practice of
slaughter. Muslims, after a month of fasting (Ramadan), and usually
when a child is born, sacrifice an animal to Allah, without previously
stunning it. Jews require their meat to be kosher, which means that they
sever the major blood vessels of an alive animal; such a method involves
certainly much additional pain. The laws of ecology do not justify such
methods; one may only hope that Muslims and Jews will change their
religious convictions in the future. When wildlife commerce is considered
Holmes Rolston III pays attention to the fact that man uses animals not
only for meat – he has learnt to use them in numerous ways, unknown
in nature but characteristic of culture (and especially of science). He
accepts such uses of animals as, e.g., leather for shoes, wool for sweaters,
insulin for diabetics. Such usage is unknown in nature, but culture has
its own, specific requirements and needs. At this point I would like to
notice that Holmes Rolston III is usually ready to accept the human
attitudes that have a long-lasting tradition, and he does it sometimes only
semi-consciously. He accepts wearing furs, but not in all cases. Fur is
natural when worn as a means of protection against cold, which means
that Eskimos have the right to wear it, but wearing furs is unjustified
when it serves only as a symbol of status. And here ecology, once again,
comes to help: Holmes Rolston III concludes that the ethical attitudes
towards animal suffering should be consistent with ecology and not
distorted by economics. It seems that a good test for such human behavi-
ours should be whether they tend to respect animal life, even if such life
must be sacrificed. Writes Holmes Rolston III: ‘‘Legitimate human
demands for culture cannot be satisfied without the sacrifice of nature.
That is a sad truth.’’21
HUNTING
Hunting certainly is one of the oldest human activities, especially hunting

for food. However, it became much less important when so many animals
became domesticated and could supply meat, leather, etc. Man nowadays
hunts first of all for sport (with few exceptions). Not infrequently it is
said that such a kind of activity is the greatest evil. This is the context
for the complaint voiced by Joseph Wood Krutch:
160 LESZEK PYRA
Killing ‘for sport’ is the perfect type of that pure evil for which metaphysicians have
sometimes sought. Most wicked deeds are done because the doer proposes some good to
himself. The liar lies to gain some end (...). Even the murderer may be removing an
impediment to normal desire or gaining possession of something which his victim keeps
from him. None of these usually does evil for evil’s sake (...). The killer for sport has no
such comprehensible motive. He prefers death to life, darkness to light. He gets nothing
except the satisfaction of saying, ‘Something which wanted to live is dead’.22
No further comments are presumably needed on this point. Holmes

Rolston III only notices that meat must not be wasted when one hunts;
otherwise hunting is morally wrong.
In some cases, however, hunting can be justified. If predators (e.g.
wolves) are gone for some reason, certain animals may overpopulate. It
usually happens that herbivores, for instance deer, overpopulate and in
such a case people replace predators thus performing a positive role in a
given ecosystem: if they did not shoot deer, many of the animals would
die of painful, long-lasting starvation. As it appears, Holmes Rolston III
is inclined to adopt a somewhat utilitarian mode of thinking, at least in
this context. But he soon comes back to purely holistic grounds and
continues: ‘‘The ecological ethic, which kills in place, is really more
advanced, more harmonious with nature, than the animal rights ethic,
which, in utter disharmony with the way the world is made, kills no
animals at all.’’23
According to Holmes Rolston III it happens quite often that the hunter
does not feel ‘‘perfect evil’’ when hunting but rather perfect identification
with the world around, with the drama of creation which is full of
suffering. In such a way the hunter himself submits to ecology. For
example, the American author writes: ‘‘The authentic hunter knows
suffering as sacrament of the way the world is made.’’24 The last opinion
certainly remains in direct contradiction to what he wrote on hunting
only two pages earlier, calling it ‘‘a machismo killing for thrills, covering
up inferiority complexes.’’25 As we see, Holmes Rolston III has most
obviously not elaborated a full, coherent theory of hunting, there are too
many contradictory statements and unclear formulations in his writings
on this topic; according to me the problem of hunting only shows how
difficult it is sometimes to pass from is to ought to be.
DUTIES: ESTABLISHING THE BOUNDARY LINE
The next problem in environmental ethics concerns man’s duties to

organic life in general. There are some theoreticians who deny the exis-
tence of any such duties. On the other hand, there are some views
demanding respect for any forms of life. They are especially characteristic
of the East. Let us have a look, for example, at Jainism, which treats the
duties to all life extremely seriously. On the basis of ahimsa, which means
not inflicting suffering on anything alive and able to feel pain, Jain monks
condemn agriculture, especially using ploughs, because it may kill animals
living in the soil; they brush aside insects when they slowly walk along a
field or a forest path, etc. But Western culture does not go that far. For
example, Peter Singer notices that man’s duties to animals disappear
‘‘somewhere between a shrimp and an oyster’’,26 and the sphere of moral-
ity does not include lower forms of life, such as insects and plants. As it
is well known, Lynn White charged Christian tradition for the environ-
mental crisis. He wrote:
Modern science is an extrapolation of natural theology (...) modern technology is at least
partly to be explained as an Occidental, voluntary realisation of the Christian dogma of
man’s transcendence of, and rightful mastery over, nature (...). Over a century ago science
and technology joined to give mankind powers which, to judge by many ecologic effects,
are out of control. If so, Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt.27
In contrast with this negative opinion expressed in the context of the

environmental crisis, Holmes Rolston III points out that Christian tradi-
tion issued the first act concerning endangered species. According to the
Genesis book God created all things and then pronounced them good,
and after Noah’s ark helped to rescue so many species, God reestablished
his covenant ‘‘with every living creature (...) the birds, the cattle, and
every beast of the earth.’’28 Therefore the covenant refers not only to men
but to every living creature as well.
One of the most important problems in environmental ethic concerns
the question where the boundary line should be drawn, deciding to which
beings we still have duties and to which already not. Some claim that
our duties extend also to vegetative organisms (e.g. sequoias). But does
man have duties to endangered species or ecosystems? The positive answer
to this question unequivocally suggests, claims Holmes Rolston III, that
one has to do with environmental philosophy in the primary, and not
only secondary sense. It also undoubtedly means that one notices certain
values in different forms of organic life but also in some greater entities
like species and ecosystems. At the same time Holmes Rolston III when
referring to different organic forms (this sets him much apart from
Bentham), does not ask whether they can suffer, but rather whether they
are alive. Disregarding the problem of consciousness threshold the
American theoretician is inclined to ask whether different forms of organic
162 LESZEK PYRA
life are value carriers, and if so, whether it is somehow reflected in ethical
theory? In connection with this one should stress, however, that in such
cases one talks only about moral objects but not about moral subjects
(moral agents), ‘‘for there are no moral agents in nature apart from
persons’’.29 In courts one often uses the notion of ‘‘legal standing’’ in
reference to companies, societies, etc. Holmes Rolston III suggests that
the notion should be transferred into the sphere of morality and used in
regard to some collective entities, namely, endangered species, ecosystems,
etc.; then they would be thought of as having ‘‘moral standing’’. A given
entity may only be considered as having moral standing when it has
value; in other words, having value is a necessary condition of having
moral standing. Possessing values always implies certain obligations on
the part of people, claims Holmes Rolston III. And one of them, probably
even the most important, is not to destroy values.
Sometimes it is quite difficult, according to Holmes Rolston III, to
decide what differentiates living organisms from the artifacts created by
man, for example computers. Biologists always tried to find entelechy in
living organisms, a kind of spirit animating them, and of course they
never succeeded. Though living organisms consist of chemicals commonly
appearing in nature, they do not constitute common, simple collections
but rather structures organised at biological level. Their most characteris-
tic trait is that they resist entropy outside. The phenomenon of life can
be most briefly expressed by saying that life is a negation of entropy. Life
as such must maintain a negentropy in organisms, taking energy from an
environment, in which entropy prevails. Life’s mystery is hidden in genetic
sets and carried by DNA. An organism exploits its environment, and this
differentiates it definitely from any artifacts. Holmes Rolston III writes
about an organism:
But the living thing cannot exist alone. It must claim the environment as source and sink,
from which to abstract energy and materials and into which to excrete them. It takes
advantage of its environment. Life thus arises out of earthen sources (as do rocks), but life
turns back on its sources to make resources out of them (unlike rocks), which is done
because life is a propositional and motivational set.30
And in some other book we find the following formulation:

Organisms are self-maintaining systems; they grow, and are irritable in response to stimuli.
They resist dying. They reproduce. They can be healthy or diseased. They gain and maintain
internal order against the disordering tendencies of external nature. They keep rewinding,
recomposing themselves, while inanimate objects run down, erode, and decompose. Life is
a countercurrent to entropy, an energetic fight uphill in a world that overall moves thermody-
namically downhill. Organisms suck order out of their environment; they pump out
disorder.31
At the same time in the evolutionary processes, during the adaptation to

a given environment, there often appear some mutants, usually some
badly adapted organisms, which are unable to compete with other organ-
isms of their kind and most often do not survive. They also play a certain
positive role in the adaptation of given species to a given ecosystem, to
the life in a concrete ecological niche. Holmes Rolston III emphasises
that although he does not accept the theory of theodicy, and Earth is
perhaps not the best of possible worlds, nevertheless it is the only known
place in the universe which has produced life, and life as such is generally
something good and valuable. Also the role of death should be reconsid-
ered, claims Holmes Rolston III. From the point of view of both biology
and philosophy, death, as such, has ultimately a positive role as far as
species and ecosystems are concerned. Death is usually very painful from
the point of view of an individual, but it is obvious that without it there
would be no life. Particularly when one looks at death from a longer
perspective, it appears to be a precondition of life.
In comparison to artifacts produced by man, such as cars or computers,
organisms have their own telos. The values attached by man to artifacts
are purely instrumental and somehow existing only when given things
are being used, otherwise they are non-existent, or only potentially exis-
tent. The values of organisms come not from man, and because of this
organisms are independent, autonomous entities. But, artifacts aside, there
are also some differences among various kinds of life itself, namely sub-
jective and objective life. In this context a very well known theoretician
of morality, William K. Frankena, writes: ‘‘I can see no reason, from the
moral point of view, why we should respect something that is alive but
has no conscious sentiency and so can experience no pleasure or pain,
joy or suffering.’’32 Singer’s views are very similar in this respect. But
Holmes Rolston III supports a quite different opinion. He recalls the
views of panpsychists according to whom small amounts of consciousness
characterise even microbes and plants. It is really very difficult to prove
such a theoretical standpoint but contemporary examinations of plants,
for example, prove that they certainly are capable of feeling, and as a
result of this they react to a changing environment in their own, unique
way. Therefore Holmes Rolston III may be right when assuming that
sentience in nature emerges not rapidly and unexpectedly but rather in
an evolutionary way, gradually and, what is really important, probably
steadily. It appears therefore that environmental ethic should respect all
life in general, and not sentient life exclusively.33 In the light of such
considerations it is clear that Holmes Rolston III tries to defend objective
164 LESZEK PYRA
morality which refers to objectively existing life; he also tries to show

that environmental ethic is not the question of feelings, of psychology,
but rather of biology and – as I myself would complement his opinion –
of ecology. He adds also, and quite rightly so, that Frankena and Singer
base their beliefs on a hedonistic theory of values as though in nature
pain was only antivalue and pleasure the only value. He claims that
environmental ethic should be also holistic in character, which means
that it should understand pain and pleasure in a much wider context
than, for example, utilitarianism. Holmes Rolston III claims that below
the threshold of consciousness, which decides whether one can talk about
pain or pleasure, there appear biological interests and needs which should
be satisfied. For example, a tree, although not sentient, tends to fulfill its
needs when it spreads roots down deeper searching for water without
which it cannot live. As we see, below the threshold of sentience there is
still life, the life which deserves at least some respect from human beings.
A most simple organism is usually driven by genes and instincts, and
although remaining below the threshold of subjectivity, it nevertheless
seems to possess some value. And values as such deserve some respect
from humans, keeps repeating the American philosopher.
Agricultural University
Cracow
NOTES
1 Aristotle, Politics, 1256b, W. Ellis (trans.). London 1912, book 1, chapter 8.

2 Jeremy Bentham, T he Principles of Morals and L egislation. New York: Hafner, 1948,
pp. 311–312.
3 Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics. Philadelphia 1988, p. 45.
4 John Locke, Some T houghts Concerning Education, 5th ed. London 1905. Compare also:
James Axfell (ed.), T he Educational W ritings of John L ocke. Cambridge, 1968, pp. 225–226.
5 The similarities and relationships between men and animals are pinpointed again and
again by Tomas Regan, especially in his book T he Case for Animal Rights, London – New
York 1988. See also the Polish publication which is contributed to the relation men–animals,
Etyka 18, Warszawa 1980.
6 Such an expression, it seems, came originally from Peter Singer. Consult his book Animal
L iberation. T owards an End to Man’s Inhumanity to Animals, London 1977.
7 Arne Naess, ‘‘A Defense of the Deep Ecology Movement’’, Environmental Ethics 6
(1984): 266.
8 Peter Singer, ‘‘All Animals Are Equal’’, in: Animal Rights and Human Obligations, Tom
Regan and Peter Singer (eds.). New York 1976, p. 154.
9 Tadeusz Kotarbiński, compare: Utylitaryzm w etyce. Analiza i krytyka teorii, in: Pisma
etyczne, Paweł J. Smoczyński (ed.), Wrocław 1987, pp. 25–88. See also Kotarbiński’s analysis
of the relation men–animals in his book: Medytacje o życiu godziwym, Warszawa 1976,
pp. 111–120. See also my discussion of the problem of animals, O pewnym poszerzeniu zakresu
moralności, in: Czy jest możliwa etyka uniwersalna?, Janusz Sekłua (ed.), Wydawnictwa
Uczelniane Wyższej Szkoły Rolniczo-Pedagogicznej w Siedlcach, Siedlce 1994, pp. 345–355.
10 Michael Polanyi, T he T acit Dimension. New York 1967, p. 67.
11 Albert Schweitzer, An Anthology, Charles R. Joy (ed.). Boston 1947, p. 252.
12 Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature. New Jersey 1986, p. 114. Compare also the whole
subsection of that book, contributing to the same issues, under the characteristic title: T he
Denial of Human Superiority, pp. 129–156.
13 Holmes Rolston III, Environmental ... , p. 65.
14 Compare also the importance of the meaning of the following statements: ‘‘Humans run
faster, they copulate face to face’’, and ‘‘Humans are self-conscious, they form cultures,’’ etc.
15 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, L ogos and L ife: T he Passions of the Soul, the Elements in the
Onto-Poiesis of Culture, Dordrecht – Boston – London 1990, p. 41.
16 Tom Regan, T he Case for Animal ... , p. 81.
18 Ibidem, p. 72.
19 Kenneth E. Goodpaster, ‘‘On Being Morally Considerable’’, T he Journal of Philosophy
LXXV, no. 6 (1978): 308.
20 Holmes Rolston III, T heory Meets Practice, the paper presented at ‘‘The Second
International Conference on Ethics and Environmental Policies’’, April 5–7, 1992, Athens,
Georgia, USA, pp. 18–19.
21 Ibidem, p. 20.
22 Joseph Wood Krutch, T he Best Nature W riting of Joseph Wood Krutch, New York
1969, p. 148.
24 Ibidem, p. 92.
25 Ibidem, p. 90.
26 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics. Cambridge 1979, p. 92.
27 Lynn White, ‘‘The Historical Roots of our Ecologic Crisis’’, Science 155 (March 1967):
1206.
28 Holmes Rolston III, Environmental ... , p. 94; Mark 5, 10–20.
29 Ibidem, p. 99.
30 Holmes Rolston III, Science and Religion. A Critical Survey. New York 1987, p. 125.
31 Holmes Rolston III, Conserving Natural Value. New York 1994, pp. 168–169.
32 William K. Frankena, ‘‘Ethics and the Environment’’, in: Ethics and the Problems of the
21st Century, K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (eds.), Notre Dame – London 1979, p. 11.
See also chapters V and VI in: Włodzimierz Tyburski, Etyka i ekologia, Polski Klub
Ekologiczny, Toruń 1995, pp. 73–108.
33 Compare: Leszek Pyra, ‘‘Suffering and the Rights of Animals’’, in: SuVering as Human
Experience, Jan Pawlica (ed.). Jagiellonian University – Institute of Philosophy, Cracow
1994, pp. 125–132.
SECTION II
SOCIETAL SHARING-IN-LIFE
Kim Rogers, lecturing; sitting: Jorge Garcı́a Gomez, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Mauro
Carbone, Maria Gołe˛biowska, Ignacy Fiut.
GARY BACKHAUS
TOWARD A CULTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
In my preliminary reflection upon the problematic of grounding cultural

phenomenology, I have been led to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s doctrine
of ontopoiesis.1 What attracts me to this doctrine in terms of this specific
exploration is her description of the emergence of the societal and cultural
stations of ontopoiesis on the basis of human sense bestowal capacities,
and the recognition of culture as a progressively differentiated station in
life’s organization. The ontopoietic process of life offers a genetic frame-
work for tracing the essential structurizational dynamics establishing
social and cultural organizations as stations of life’s activities. Ontopoiesis
is the constitutive process of life, the open dynamic system of ‘‘first
makings,’’ from and to which all meanings accrue. Life itself is inherently
meaningful and its evolutionary process involves the progressive emer-
gence of logoic principles that establish interrelated hierarchical levels of
constitutive activity and formational constructions. Ontopoiesis evolves
through the progression of hierarchical processes whereby each autoch-
thonous level of organization allows for an exfoliation based upon individ-
uating principles, which establishes self-organizing, relatively stable
entities. The basic stations of life are physis, bios-vital/psychic, society,
and culture. The word ‘station’ is apropo because ontopoietic evolution
creates relatively stabilizing logoic parameters that function as meaning-
nexuses for the generation of individuated life forms. At each one of these
organizational levels/stations, the logoic principles specifying gestalt/
organismic limits are maintained in life’s progressive Becoming through
allowing for the perdurance of relatively stable individual self-organizing
systems, which are brought into existence by the very principles that they
sustain.2 To illustrate, ontopoietic evolution allows for the emergence of
logoic principles that are capable of organizing life on the basis of sen-
tience. Through the principle of individuation being limited by parameters
set by a nexus of logoic principles, taxonomies of individual, self-organiz-
ing, sentient beings emerge that maintain these parameters in Becoming,
comprising the substation of sentience in the biotic organization of life’s
ontopoiesis. And in turn their individuated forms carry virtualities
that provide the opportunity for the further, progressive evolutionary
169
170 GARY BACKHAUS
re-organization of life. Only by examining the morphologies, behaviors,

and mental capacities of the individuated forms that function as their
carriers can these virtualities (and the nascent re-organizational catalysts)
be discovered.3
Substantive ontologies take the perduring individuals to be the carriers
of real substances. By contrast, ontopoiesis focusses on the processes of
life’s unfurling, which means that life’s inherent meanings involve a
dynamic development of non-substantive patterns by which entities are
the outcomes, yet the sustaining carriers of progressive processes.
Becoming is concretized through perduring individuals that do not carry
the templates of Being, but rather are evolutionary outcomes subject to
the dynamics of life’s autochthonous Becoming. Their forms are chance
(but not arbitrary) exfoliations made possible through junctures (knots)
in life’s logoic dynamism.4 This point is important for it means that
individual beings are examined, not to discover their substance, but to
grasp the organizing principles that are the meanings forming the basis
of their life, and to grasp the emergent virtualities functioning to bring
about progressive re-organizations that will transcend them. With onto-
poiesis the question concerns how life erupts in new stations (open
dynamic systems-levels) of meaning through sustaining patterns of life’s
activity, which are made real by establishing perduring relatively stable
self-organizing systems – individuals.5 Tymieniecka prefers the word
‘Beingness,’ in place of ‘Being,’ for beyond the surface ontology of entities
(which suggests either substances of traditional metaphysics or non-sub-
stantive essences of classical phenomenology) is the evolutionary process
to which they owe their meaning. Thus, according to the ontopoietic
doctrine, it is not consciousness that ultimately constitutes meanings at
the human station. Rather, it is life that is organized at a certain systems-
level by which human beings perdure, and the concrete, individuated
form of human being serves as the carrier for life to constitute meanings
that transcend the levels of organization that make the human station
possible. Humanity is granted constitutive agency through life’s onto-
poiesis: humans are the occasions by which life progresses to its societal
and cultural stations. As transcendent to the individuated beings, these
stations of life are co-constitutive in organizing life at the human level.
This demonstrates the thesis of ontopoiesis that individuated forms are
carriers for constitutive activities of life, but also shows how at the human
level, life grants humanity new, creative constitutive powers.
Individuated life forms are sustained through the inner/outer exchanges,
the self-organizing systems in their interrelations with the milieux.
TOWARD A CULTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY 171
Individuation is only possible through interrelation, which manifests in

many ways – the interrelation of self-organization across all levels of life,
physis, bios, society and culture, and with all forms of self-organizing
systems. Ontopoiesis involves a differentiating/differentiated unity-of-
everything-that-is-alive, an open dynamic system of life’s interrelational,
creatively emergent, systems-progressive organizations, which concretely
manifests through the living entities establishing spacings – interrelational
exchanges with their milieux.6
New levels of Beingness manifest as new forms of interrelations. At the
organizational level of human life, three sense bestowing functions emerge:
the objective, the aesthetic and the moral senses.7 These senses are
moments; it is only by abstraction that it is possible to discuss them
separately. They function as the virtualities that prefigure the higher
emergent levels of interrelational organization called society and culture,
which are stations of life brought about on the basis of the interrelations
of the individuated human form. Society is the condition for culture, but
it is also an aspect of culture. Society cannot but carry the virtual
conditions for culture that emerge at the level of the social. This pro-
gressive relationship, in which cultural organization forms on the basis
of the social-level, needs analysis. A significant clue concerning analysis,
nevertheless, is that there are no perduring individuals beyond the human,
and so these organizational levels of ontopoietic significance occur
through the self-organization of perduring individual human beings in
interrelations with their milieux.
My specific strategy, then, is to return to the perduring human individ-
uals, the carriers of the virtualities, through which social and cultural
organizational levels of life’s significances manifest. It must be clarified
that ‘individual’ has nothing to do with individualism, atomism, or the
hypostatization of personhood. The principle of individuation refers to
the evolutionary factual existence of the single perduring self-organizing
system, the concretized outcome of life’s processes, the carrier of the
virtualities, or the potentialities for the continued progressive re-
organization of life. For the human virtualities to function, they need a
catalyst (efficient cause) to induce the autochthonic emergence of essential
logoic principles inherent to the societal and cultural stations. But all
open dynamic systems, which include self-organizing systems, are com-
plexities of contextualized and contextualizing parts and wholes that
involve webs of interrelations. All individuals, as self-organizing systems,
are parts in the differentiated/differentiating dynamic processes that
unfold as life’s interrelational progressively tiered web. Thus, both vertical
172 GARY BACKHAUS
and horizontal (stations and entities) interrelations are maintained

throughout ontopoiesis. Therefore, the catalyst must also exhibit vertical
and horizontal efficacy (ontopoietic progression and interrelational dialec-
tics with the milieu).
The concrete, individual human carries the three emergent human
senses. The genetic source for the systems-levels of society and culture
can only be understood by examining the re-organization of sense concret-
ized through the human individual. It is a mistake to consider this starting
point a reduction, for no transcendental bracketing is taking place and
it is appropriate to examine individuated manifestations of life in order
to apprehend the genetic principles sustaining life stations, in this case
made possible through the human individuated form of life. According
to Tymieniecka, the Imaginatio Creatrix, the source of human significance,
allows for the transposition of organic-vital-sentient significances (bios)
into these three moments of human significance. This particular process
of ontopoiesis will not be treated in my present analysis, for it concerns
re-organizing the organic/vital and the vital/sentient parameters as they
are transposed into the psychic/conscious phase of life (vertical interrela-
tions). But, as a later evolutionary development in ontopoiesis, through
the establishment of the objective, aesthetic, and moral senses within the
Beingness of the perduring individual self-organizing system – a human
being – the basis is formed for the creation of society and culture. These
two subsequent open dynamic stations organize human life beyond the
biotic stationing of other sentient beings whose transcendent capacities
are quite limited. Yet, the specifically human levels of societal and cultural
organization manifest in concrete forms of life, meaning-contexts, that
would be hypostatized and reified, if it were not possible for human
beings to ‘‘dig under’’ their own meaning sedimentations. Creative expres-
sion is possible only by returning to the Imaginatio Creatrix, which
‘‘transcends from below’’ the already deposited, constituted, and sedi-
mented existent forms in the fabulation of newly emergent meanings. This
requires an organismic return of consciousness to its pre-human levels in
order to re-organize creatively at the human level. Creative openness
allows for the myriad of differences found at the societal and cultural
levels of human life, not found in the more bounded and limited forms
of other sentient life.
Before proceeding to my analysis, it is worthwhile to also recall what
Tymieniecka has stated about the origins of the social world.8 It is upon
the moral sense that the social world emerges, which reverses the view
that morality is constructed on the basis of society and which also
critically challenges the view that morality is possible only on the basis
of apprehending a priori absolute values. Morality is not merely a social
construction, nor is it founded on a relative-natural, conditioned appre-
hension of preexisting absolute values; it is at the foundation for society.
‘Morality’ involves the ongoing process of moral negotiation, which is
always just that – a continual process of valuation. The moral sense is a
non-objectivating generator of meanings; the valuational process is an
interrogational process that must negotiate between the propensities of
self-interests and Other-interests, which brings morality into Beingness;
valuation is inherently dynamic. The deliberating process results in trans-
actions. This word, ‘trans-action,’ is hyphenated to signify and emphasize
that it transcends and does not synthesize the incommensurable centers
of interest, and it is this transcendence that forms the moral basis and
source for the emergence of society. It is a grave mistake to read this as
social contract theory, for human individuals are already in society and
they cannot help but exercise the moral sense. But, it is how they exercise
that moral sense (along with the other senses) that processually determines
the continually changing quality of society in its moral structurings. The
vital/sentient significance of animals only results in gregariousness (the
orientation to survival), whereas human significance involves the benevo-
lent sentiment that sustains social life.
A phenomenology of ontopoiesis must start from human experience,
and it is thus to the human being, to consciousness, that I now turn. If
ontopoiesis is the process of life’s constitutivity, the ‘‘sites’’ of constitution
need to be examined – those sites are forms of individuation. It is in the
investigation of the primordial structure of human consciousness (site)
that the catalyst for social and cultural meaning-constitution is to be
apprehended. The primordial structure is the I-me and the catalytic
principle is dehiscence.
THE I-ME: PROTO-FORMS FOR THE SOCIETAL AND CULTURAL

LEVELS OF THE ONTOPOIESIS OF LIFE
T he Proto-Societal L evel
The inquiry starts from the experiences of the empirical individual human
being, because by examining the individuated human form that exhibits
life’s unfurlings of meanings at its station, it is possible to intuit their
logoic principles. Through description of the stream of consciousness
within human individuation, I propose that the I-me structural process
174 GARY BACKHAUS
is the primordial structure of consciousness and that it houses the funda-

mental catalyst of dehiscence for establishing proto-societal and proto-
cultural principles of organization. It is clear that the We-us is equi-
primordial with the I-me, yet for heuristic purposes I abstract from it.
The strategy here is to ground a fundamental distinction within the
individuated stream, and the stream, not its contents, is always individu-
ated. The I-me, as it structures experience, engenders the above-mentioned
proto-forms by establishing dehiscence in the unity of consciousness. Thus
the initial investigation of the I-me is to be phenomenological in the
traditional sense of describing the a priori structures and processes of
appearances, in this case in terms of reflection on consciousness itself.
I have proposed that the three emergent sense-bestowing capacities at
the human level function as the virtualities for the progressive organiza-
tion of life at the societal and cultural levels. According to Tymieniecka
these senses are brought into Beingness through the Imaginatio Creatrix.
But the primordial structure inherent to the individuated human con-
sciousness that transposes these senses into societal and cultural stations
is the I-me. In other words, the Otherness of other human beings and
the otherness of objectivations (products of expression-cultural entities)
must already be anticipated within the very structure of human conscious-
ness. Rather than a pure unity of consciousness, the I-me manifests as a
proto-otherness within its own Beingness. So, in order to demonstrate
this, the workings of the three human senses in the I-me structure must
be explicitly correlated with how such workings entail proto-forms for
societal and cultural organizational-levels of life. By emphasizing the
I-me, it may seem as though I am returning to transcendental subjectivity,
but this is not the case. Husserl already failed to adequately account for
the societal and cultural levels through a reduction to transcendental
consciousness. Nevertheless, it is only possible to apprehend the virtuali-
ties that prepare for the societal and cultural levels through the way in
which the individuated carrier participates in meaning-constitution.
Without the structurization of meaning through the dehiscent catalytic
principle, the human carriers could not sustain the societal and cultural
stations, which means humanity entails societal and cultural levels of
ontopoiesis through the I-me structurization in each of its individuated
carriers.
Human consciousness exists as a stream by which its past exhibits
presence within the present as the horizon of its experience. Specific
aspects of its past are a moment in the thematic field of every now present
experience and the rest of its past functions as horizonal (along with the
margins of present consciousness),9 but segments of the past also can be

made the thematic core, i.e. remembering. The total context of ‘‘individual
life’’ does not act; activity is the sole function of the spontaneous con-
sciousness emergent within every now moment. The active moment of
consciousness entails the non-active moment, which is necessarily the
case for there to be a stream that exhibits historicity. And so, the I-me
structure inserts a primordial differentiation in the unity of consciousness
on the basis of the active/non-active functions of total consciousness. The
only active I, the spontaneous I of the now phase, is always in relation
to the me, which consists of all previous I-phases that can no longer act,
but synthetically form the historico-continuum of an individuated life
from which the now-I emerges and from which the now-phase acts. As
soon as an individual articulates in judgment or even thinks the ‘‘I’’
attributing it to him/herself, he or she conspicuously forms a ‘‘proto-
social relation’’ with him or herself. I-activity is possible only through
dehiscence: human freedom emerges on the basis of this otherness of
consciousness to itself. The I acts from the basis of that moment of its
Beingness that is partitioned from acting but not from the act, its non-
acting me. The I-me cannot be broken apart into independent parts, and
it comprises the continually emergent dehiscent process of human con-
scious life.
A ‘proto-social relation’ is formed on the basis of the I-me structure of
the empirical self-experience (self is not substantive – it is a self-organizing
process). In its temporal running-off modality the I of the now-phase
positions itself in relation to its me (the carrier of previous experiences
that can be formed into meaning-contexts in an infinity of ways) in the
exercise of its momentarily free spontaneous activity. By doing so, con-
sciousness positions itself in light of itself, which is the self-presence of
self-consciousness, for the me is the I’s own facticity, inherent to it. The
I-me is already implicit in consciousness, which is then articulated in the
‘‘I think’’ of consciously intended self-awareness or reflective self-con-
sciousness. Intentionality, as conceived by Husserl – consciousness is
always consciousness of some object or other, is similar to what
Tymieniecka means by the Objective sense. What I am proposing here is
that the spontaneous activity of the I in the now-phase of experience
exercises its freedom on the basis of its no longer free horizon of experience
– the me-moment of its self-organizing process, which as non-activity is
the self -objectivation of consciousness. It is not that the spontaneous I
constructs its identity qua object by projecting a self, rather the temporal
structure of consciousness involves the alienation of the me from its free
176 GARY BACKHAUS
activity, partitioning the objectivated experience of the no longer active

me from the present expressive activity. By ‘‘partitioning,’’ I mean the
impossibility for a past spontaneous I to act presently, yet it is always
present, at least horizonally. Thus, identity is an open horizon limited on
the basis of this me-matrix that in-forms the spontaneous I. The funda-
mental character of the unitary stream of consciousness involves this
dehiscence in which the I-active subject emerges out of, and exercises its
freedom from and against, its objectivated me-ness. And so Tymieniecka’s
Objective sense emerges in the perduring individual’s self-objectivating
process and this objective sense as self-relational functions as a proto-
social form. Specifically, the I-me manifests as a proto-Other-orientation
through the Objective Sense, for the non-acting me is objectivated as
Other to the acting I, yet a moment of its Beingness – there is no acting
I without the me. This is because the now-conscious activity is only a
continual objectivating process of consciousness othering itself and this
other is not mere form but is visible as objectivated contents – the process
of human historicity, resulting in its own positive history.
This dehiscent relation of oneself (spontaneous activity, expressive pro-
cess) to oneself (no longer spontaneous activity, objectivated process)
gives rise to conscience, by which the moral sense accompanies the
objectivated sense inherent to the I-me relation. Conscience is the negoti-
ating process by which the I animates its me-ness, which is what is meant
by talking to oneself – the call of conscience. The I gauges its actions by
a proto-face-to-face in which the me calls the I’s activity into question in
the negotiation of the morality of the I’s action. This is the basis for self-
responsibility. The I must take the me into consideration, for conscience
(the moral moment of the dehiscent catalyst) accompanies the I and ‘‘re-
minds’’ it of the me – its former self-negotiating spontaneities. An aspect
of the call of conscience concerns the a priori principle that the expressivit-
ies of the spontaneous I will also succumb to objectivation. The I yields
to the demand of conscience to animate the me as if it is due a valuational
account, for there are consequences concerning the who the me shall
become – what are you doing to yourself ? The me’s moral function is to
set the moral limits for the I’s spontaneous freedom. This I-me interroga-
tional dehiscence in self-valuational negotiation (who you have been
versus who you shall become on the basis of spontaneous activity) is the
proto-structure for moral trans-actions concerning Others. The freedom
of the spontaneous I must be imbued with benevolent/malevolent feeling
toward its non-acting self, for it is capable of ‘‘tearing down its own self ’’
or, on the other hand, ‘‘rejuvenating its self.’’ And so, the Moral Sense
emerges in the perduring individual’s self-valuational negotiations of its

activities, and this is a proto-social form. Specifically the I-me manifests
as this proto-face-to-face interaction through the Moral Sense.
The Aesthetic Sense is the immediate experience of self-enjoyment.10
Self-feeling ‘‘just happens’’; the individual cannot help but undergo
aesthesis. Self-enjoyment (feeling alive) accompanies all our acts in every
moment of the specious present. Self-enjoyment is non-objectivating; it is
self-consuming. Nevertheless, the feeling waxes and wanes (quantitative)
and vacillates between enthusiasm and indifference (qualitative) alongside
our cultivations. It would appear then that the aesthetic sense only
belongs to the active, spontaneous I and not to the me. But this is not
true, for self-feeling emerges on the basis of the me. It is the me that
delivers over this feeling to the I, for the contents comprising the feeling
passively manifest in the me-horizon. Self-feeling is not the activity of
consciousness but what it feels like to be consciously active during this
phase of activity. The I necessarily feels itself within its momentary phase,
and self-feeling, which as the experience of self-awareness, requires the
conjuring of the me. The me is required because self-feeling is not the
activity of freedom and so cannot be the spontaneous I; nevertheless, it
is the spontaneous I that enjoys self-feeling. In fact the I finds its self-
feeling qualified in some way or another through the reflection on the
me and on the basis of its interpretation seeks to provide forms of
experience that cultivate some quality or other of self-feeling. The I states,
‘‘I feel tired,’’ but this really means, ‘‘The me informs me that I feel tired,
and now I have to decide what to do concerning this.’’ The Aesthetic
Sense emerges on the basis of the perduring individual’s parodoxical non-
objectivating feeling of itself. But this means that the I feels itself without
being the source for the meaning of this feeling. The eye sees without
seeing itself; but the I does experience itself experiencing, without itself
being an object of experience – the non-objectivating Aesthetic Sense.
The Aesthetic Sense is fostered only through this proto-social form in
which the I finds out from the me how it is faring. Specifically, the I-me
manifests as a proto-social mirroring giving the self back to itself.
In sum, the Objective Sense emerging in the dehiscent catalyst of the
I-me primordial structure forms a proto-Other-orientation. The emer-
gence of the Moral Sense in the I-me forms a proto-face-to-face inter-
action, and the emergence of the Aesthetic Sense manifests as a proto-
social mirroring. These are not all of the proto-social forms that arise:
others arise, such as the they-relationship, but these others only can be
178 GARY BACKHAUS
adequately examined along with the investigation of the proto-cultural

aspects of the I-me.
At this juncture, I contrast this doctrine of I-me primordiality with
Sartre’s neo-Cartesian existentialism. Sartre maintains that consciousness
is nothing (no-thing) and that the spontaneous consciousness in the
passing present moments comprises pure freedom. But Sartre’s anthropol-
ogy only makes sense on the mistaken premise of Cartesianism that
consciousness is absolutely partitioned from Being. Sartre maintains that
consciousness is what it is not (it only can be its own facticity, what it
allegedly is not – its me). And, it is not what it is (the pure act or
spontaneous nothing, is not the I that the pure act constructs/projects
on the basis of its me – what it is). Interpreting this doctrine on the basis
of the I-me primordial relation means that the I is what it is not because
it necessarily sinks back into the non-active me, yet the I that is now is
not contained by the me against which it takes a stand. I argue that there
is neither a pure (nothingness) nor an empirical I (substantive ground of
states), but always an I-me dynamic relation even when consciousness
appears to be sunk merely into the aesthesis of the moment. Sartre makes
consciousness, which for him is always momentary, a pure nothingness,
which in my language partitions the I from the me as impenetrable
facticity; I put forth that the I-me is primordial and it is asymmetrically,
dialectically interrelational. The forming of a position against itself
involves active/non-active differentiation, negotiation, and self-reflection
– not pure negation. If an individual states, ‘‘I like steamed vegetables,’’
that I appresents (albeit naively) the I-me dehiscent processes of having:
differentiated itself as active against the non-active me; negotiated a
judgment about the me on the basis of its sedimented moral and non-
moral valuations; and mirrored itself on the basis of its self-feeling, its
faring. It is not the me that is speaking and it is not a purely free I, but
the I whose meanings are necessarily contextualized by the me. And this
I on the basis of the freedom granted to it in its living phase of the
specious present is taking the stance of articulating/presenting the me
under this aspect. Free/spontaneous activity does not begin at ground
zero; it is always shrouded in a totality from which it arranges its freedom.
It does so from its momentary position in relation to its own Beingness.
If consciousness meant pure freedom, there could be no falsities/truths
enduring beyond the moment and no authenticity/inauthenticity.
The point of this contrast with Sartre is to show that spontaneous
activity involves a primordial relation that foils pure act. Consciousness
always entails this relation within its Beingness, which is objectivated a
priori and so is not a constructed a posteriori objectivation as Sartre

claims. Sartre states that there is no I in the running-after-a-streetcar,
which is to say that the I emerges as an object, after an interpretive
reflection, which means that it functions as an empirical construct. But,
I argue that it is not pure consciousness that objectivates itself through
a posteriori projection, rather it passes into the me moment of the I-me
primordiality, which as already objectivated continually births a sponta-
neous I in order for consciousness to continually act. The I’s act becomes
objectivated through concretization, while the me can receive it because
the me, which is the sum total of previous freedom, is objectivated a
priori to the I-act as the horizonal moment of it. Importantly, the objecti-
vated me is accounted for by the I, and the spontaneous activity of
running-after-the-streetcar is the I interpreting its me. There would be no
activity at all on the basis of pure freedom; there is activity on the basis
of freedom that takes into account its own Beingness – the I accounting
for the contextualization of the me that births the I of this and each
moment. So, objectivation is already a moment of consciousness, not an
a posteriori construct. Again, Sartre assumes a Cartesian view, but instead
of God calling each instance into existence, it is nothing. Yet, it is ridicu-
lous to think that activity is anonymous at the level of consciousness,
because the act that emerges in the stream of consciousness cannot be
disconnected from its objectivated moment, its me. And, the me, which
is pregnant with experiential contents, is necessarily a moment of the
present consciousness in the birthing of the I, even though it is of the
past and cannot act in the present, which is another way of saying that
the I-me interrelation is the primordial structure. The I is who it is on
the basis of the me – it acts from experience. The I knows that when it
states, ‘‘I love you,’’ it articulates this on the basis of the me, which is not
momentary, but that which gives over to the I its Beingness, its processual
life. The I can actively say, ‘‘I love you,’’ because the I knows its being-
in-love from its me, or on the basis of it opens itself to be involved in
love. The activity/non-activity of the stream of consciousness is an asym-
metrical dialectical relationship.
A caveat that can be raised against the primordiality of the I-me might
come from the structure of creative acts and such phenomena as the aha-
erlebnis, but these are only complications in the process. There is only
space for clues here: these phenomena call on a deeper form of the I-me
relation in which both poles function at primitive organizational levels
in order to bring about constitutional transpositions for the emergence
of novel sense.
180 GARY BACKHAUS
T he Proto-Cultural L evel
It is now possible to examine the proto-form of culture on the basis of

the I-me. Culture is defined as the sum of objectivations that are the
concretizations of human expressions, which forms a complex system of
interrelated parts and wholes – various sub-systems. These objectivations
form their own structurizations that then in-form human life. And so by
investigating self-objectivation, the proto-form of culture can be eluci-
dated. I have stated that an I phase sinks into the past, which concretizes
spontaneous activity in a way that it is sedimented in the stream as the
me. This is the process of the objectivation of self. The spontaneous activity
becomes a deposit in the stream of consciousness, an objectivated act –
the I finishes drinking ‘‘a few pints,’’ which is no longer spontaneous
action, but a completed act that now stands against the I, the standpoint
from which it now must act. The objectivation is alienated from the
spontaneous activity of the I, yet internalized into the me and thus in-
forms the context of experience from which the continually emerging
spontaneity of the I now must act. This aspect of historicity in which
objectivated contents exhibit a different structure than when expressed is
an essential moment of consciousness and is only so on the basis of the
I-me. The I actively expresses meanings that become objectivated – carry-
ing their own processual structurizations – and these are in turn internal-
ized into the me, which forms the context of the I’s experience. So this
contextualized I must act from the ramifications/reverberations of inter-
nalized objectivations. The I is ‘‘condemned to’’ those contextualized
sedimentations as its horizonal facticity. Moreover, since objectivations
have their own Beingness, the Beingness-of -objectivations mediates the
acts of the I. This mediation, through the in-forming from transcendent
objectivated structurizing systems, constitutes the self-enculturation of
the I. Through this systems-interrelational dialectic, spontaneity adds to
its own enculturation. Culture, in its proto-form, is this mediating aspect
within the I-me structural process. All meaning expressions of human
beings become objectivated, and all objectivations exhibit their own
Beingness. In the process, the me does not merely internalize the contents
of the transcendent structures experienced by the I. This more-than-the-
internalization-of-its-own-acts occurs because what has been expressed
through the I’s activity becomes an objectivation of some type that
engenders its own organizational constitutivity. Qua its objectivated
structurizational agency, objectivations filter subsequent expressivities
and subsequent internalizations. The I drinks the pints, which as an
objectivation, exhibits its own constituting agency that is internalized and

then exhibited in the tipsy I’s expressive activities. Objectivated structuriz-
ations, thus, mediate the I’s own expressions, because even though the I
spontaneously acts, it does so on the basis of the me, which always carries
the mediating structures with their inherent potencies, within it. To further
illustrate, the acquisition of a language is sedimented in the me, and for
the I to speak, it is condemned to how language structures thought. This
means that the Beingness of human language, the particular empirical
language, and the idiosyncratic mastery of it – as interrelated open
dynamic systems exhibiting their own peculiar dynamic processes – medi-
ate the I’s expressive acts and filter the I’s experience. And so mediation
is the very function of culture – the essence of culture is its role as
Worldly-Horizon comprising objectivated systems as the mediating struc-
tures in-forming human expression – the transcendent, but internalized
wedge within the intentional structure of consciousness.
It is worth noting Husserl’s genetic phenomenology in which he
explores the genealogy of the meanings constitutive of the transcendental
ego.11 Although a genetic study of a logically constructed development
of contexts of significances is a major breakthrough in phenomenology,12
its usefulness can be misleading. The fact that it does not correlate to the
meanings as lived by the concrete empirical individual serves to indicate
that its ‘‘purity’’ is only gained by abstraction. Primarily, the transcenden-
tal genealogy abstracts from the me – the carrier of mediations, and
merely poses the activity of the spontaneous I thought to be transcenden-
tally pure. But there is no pure genesis of transcendental meaning because
of mediational contextualization – the I’s experiences are always filtered
experiences by ontological/empirical systems that cannot be eliminated.
The reduction to the pure transcendental ego is impossible, for there is
no way to purify the objectivations that are necessarily a moment of
consciousness. Meanings are always co-constituted by transcendent medi-
ational structurizations.
To conclude briefly, the I-me structural process advances proto-forms
for the societal level and the mediating filters with their independent
structurizations comprise proto-forms for the cultural level forming a
co-constitutive Worldly-Horizon. But societal forms are culturally
inscribed and so they too are objectivated forms mediating experience.
Mediation is an a priori structurization of expression, yet due to the
continual potency of expressions, mediational factors are forever being
changed themselves. Culture and society are continually changing
phenomena.
182 GARY BACKHAUS
INTERRELATIONAL CO-CONSTITUTIONALITY: I/WE–ME/US
It would be a complete misunderstanding to interpret this I-me process

as ‘‘internally pure’’ in terms of its interrelations. There is neither pure
I-ness nor pure me-ness; the I-me is a primordial relation that is always
filtered by mediations that are transcendent structurizations. These tran-
scendent structurizations are co-constitutive. Elsewhere I have called the
co-constitutive regions the Worldly-Horizon and the EarthBody – the
Worldly-Horizon is constitutive of the cultural world and the EarthBody
is the constitutivity of natural morphology correlative of the lived-body.13
The interpretation of the empirical perduring individual’s experience
involves the I’s spontaneity, which is based on the internalized
me-experiences from which the I acts. So, the objects that appear to the
I now, only can do so against the sedimented meanings carried by the
me. The problem is to trace these sedimented meanings. It is to the
societal level of internalized transcendent meanings to which I return.
The individual human being is born to and already finds him/herself
amongst other human beings. Biological necessities and openness for
human forms of significance impose the need for societal interrelations
and so human Beingness necessarily must reorganize at the social level.
In moral negotiations with Others, structures of trans-actions are formed.
The species of expression, which is explicitly social on the empirical level
(objectivated as behaviors and products), involves the we-relation or they-
relation, but all social meanings are ultimately derived from the face-to-
face in which the we is established. As the I is primordially related to the
me, the we is primordially related to the us. It is the us-together that is
taken into account, directly or indirectly. In the explicit sociality of the
We-us relation, we express ourselves and this expression is objectivated.
The objectivated expression forms contents that function to develop into
the structures of the social world – institutionalization, roles, tradition,
legitimation, universe-maintenance, primary and secondary socialization,
etc.14 Once formed these objectivations become transcendent structuriz-
ations, which are then internalized through transmission, i.e., retrojected
back into us. Social structures function as cultural mediations from which
the I or the we acts. So, here is another way that the me is not a pure
me, because already it is filled with content that is the us. The I positioned
in life by the me, which is filled with the content of the us, acts from the
contexts provided by the me/us. This is the explication for socialization
by which the I’s expressions are not monadic, but also a function of
sociality, a we. Nevertheless the spontaneity of the I/we provides possi-
bilities for the dynamic transformation of the content that becomes ret-
rojected back into the me/us. It is now possible to revise our primordial
structure from the I-me to the I/we–me/us, for the perduring individual
is at once an enculturated social being. Nevertheless, this Beingness
necessarily is enacted through the self-organizing perduring individuals.
This statement merely indicates the obvious point: there is no social or
cultural world without individual human beings as their carriers, but
individual human beings are at once dialectically united through processes
of mediation, in the sense discussed above – social mediation.
However, all of the expressions of the we that then become objectiv-
ations carry their own Beingness. For example, an aspect of societal
construction through the negotiations between us involves power rela-
tions-politics. When power relations are objectivated, they take on
different forms, e.g., those of father-son, those of feudalism, those of
mercantile capitalism. Regardless of our subjective intentions these forms
inform us, which is to say they are co-constitutive, for they then mediate
the I/we–me/us relations. These forms filter our intentions co-constituting
their significances. This mediational aspect, again, is the cultural level of
life. Thus, the sociological level of moral negotiation with others becomes
objectivated and power-relations are one aspect of internalization of a
form that carries its own systems-organization. Even though moral trans-
actions are always a continual valuational process, these take place on
the basis of the institutionalized power-relations that mediate such trans-
actions. As objectivated and as mediated the multitude of objectivations
within a society constitutes the level of meanings called culture. Once the
level of culture is reached, and with human beings, it is always already
reached, human expression is condemned to socio-cultural mediation.
The we of a particular society creates its own structurization that acts
back on it in-forming the us. Products of that society, objectivations that
carry their own Beingness, are the objective moment of the culture and
this in-forms the expressions of the we, which are the subjective moment
of culture. It is the subjective moment of culture for its expressions are
not merely formed on the basis of its own objectivations. As creative,
human subjects engage in changing culture over time through on-going
expressivities.
SUBJECTIVE CULTURE–OBJECTIVE CULTURE
To understand culture properly, it must also be understood as a relation

just as I-me is a primordial relation and so is the we-us, or together, the
184 GARY BACKHAUS
I/we–me/us. Since culture fills the Worldly-Horizon with contents that in

turn mediates human experience, I employ the subject/object vocabulary
already appropriated by others who have worked on this problematic.
The primordial cultural relation is subjective culture–objective culture.
Georg Simmel most effectively explored this relation with several theses.15
One thesis concerns the tragedy of twentieth century culture: the domi-
nation of subjective culture by objective culture. It can be claimed that
the effects of this tragedy involve twentieth-century alienation, disorienta-
tion, and uprootedness, and also the emergence of simulacra in the sense
given it by Baudrillard.16 Relating this phenomenon to my present thesis,
mediation dominates constitution. The co-constitutivity of subjective
expression and of the Beingness of objectivation is unbalanced, and the
hegemony of objectivations oppresses expressions. I think that Simmel’s
thesis offers great insight here, but I have mentioned his work only as a
way to display the relationship. Subjective culture involves the gestalt
and sum total of subjective expressions that are always expressed in
interrelations with the already expressed. These subjective expressions of
meanings are objectivated and their objectivations mark their transition
into objective culture.
Subjective cultural expressions are indeed already cultural, for the
objective cultural horizon mediates them. This function parallels the
mediation by the me as the I expresses itself. Objective culture constitutes
the gestalt that exhibits the overall style of a culture and the sum total
of objectivated meanings, each exhibiting its own changing form of
Beingness. Now, to relate this to Baudrillard’s thesis, it seems that objec-
tive culture has reached a point in its development by which it can
reproduce itself (simulacra) and this reproductive feature overwhelms
subjective culture with a myriad of signs that reference only other signs.
I am rushing ahead of my inquiry, but these crises in contemporary
culture point out the importance of understanding mediation and the
objectivational process of culture. It is the endless stream of subjective
cultural expressions that are dynamically injected into objective culture,
which entering into an objectivated matrix constitutive of its own
Beingness, changes the Beingness of subjective culture. But these changes
in subjective culture occur on the basis of their function as mediators,
which indirectly structure subjective expressivity.
For Hegel, objective culture mirrors the development of subjective
culture, but this would be true only if objectivations did not carry their
own Beingness. Through their own self-organization, objectivations foil
the possibility of any such correlation and any such progressive historical
development. This is a major reason why it is so important to understand

the Beingness of culture. For example, Hegel sees language reflecting the
logical workings of mind, but what he does not see is the self-organizing
principles of language itself that transcend mind and are co-constitutive
through structures that mind did not birth and are unable to control.
Even if the march of an Absolute Spirit does occur, its concretization is
foiled by the structurizations of its own objectivations. These objectiv-
ations carry a Beingness that entails objectivation across every level of
ontopoiesis.
MEDIATION AND THE BEINGNESS OF CULTURE
The essence of culture involves the principle that all human expressions
result in objectivations and that these objectivations manifest their own
Beingness. These objectivations form a context – not merely an assem-
blage, a nexus of relations that form a dynamic whole that we call a
culture. Thus, an emergent level of ontopoiesis is a cultural world brought
into its own Beingness through the ever-active human sense bestowing
capacities. The objectivations at this level of organization transcend the
human constitutive acts that brought them into Beingness and the emer-
gent Beingness of a culture informs its human source, fashioning humanity
in its image. Humans express their culture (subjective culture), which adds
objectivations to their culture. The human openness that we call freedom
means that culture is in many ways highly plastic, which dynamically
changes as cultural objectivations mold human expressivity and as human
expressivity molds cultural objectivations.
There is a predilective naiveté about this process. For example, human
beings express themselves by creating machines, but the machines exhibit
their own Beingness, which in turn informs humanity. So, what happens
is that in operating machinery human beings are made to be machine-
like, a cog in the machinery. Or to say this another way, humans create
machines to release them from the bondage of work, yet machines exhibit
their own meaning structures, their own Beingness, which do not correlate
with human intentions. This transcendence of culture puts us into a
position of having to study the cultural forces in order to understand
how they are molding us. This notion of cultural forces is quite obvious,
but its obviousness has been hitherto left up to positivistic science.
Cultural forces must be studied in terms of sense-bestowal and that is
why elsewhere I have proffered an indirect phenomenological methodol-
ogy in order to study them in terms of their mediational function.17
186 GARY BACKHAUS
Human expressions can be innovative, or creative, but never novel in

an absolute sense. Creative objectivations are brought into the already
objectivated context of culture. Creative objectivations have their own
Beingness, which allows them to modify the Beingness of culture. And so
creative expressions bring about new objectivations, but such objectiv-
ations become contextualized in the already sedimented culture and at
the same time carry with them their own structurizations that will change
culture in unforeseen ways.
The Beingness of culture, although emergent at the human station of
life, nevertheless is never partitioned from the other levels of ontopoiesis.
This is obvious, just think of the cultural phenomenon of industrialization
or the creation of an auto-culture and the impact of such for every level:
physis, bios, society, culture. In terms of ontopoiesis, it is important to
understand the emergent principles at the level of culture, but it is also
as important to see how culture reorganizes and is supported by the
various levels of ontopoiesis. Culture affects and is affected by all levels
of ontopoiesis. Culture includes knowledge of the various levels of onto-
poiesis, which are objectivations of human expression in the form of
judgments.
The product-contents of culture entail the levels of physis and bios in
terms of reorganization, not changing the principles that are emergent at
those levels, but the nexus of organization. Cultural practices reorganize
biotic conditions in ways that can be therapeutic and in ways that bring
about dis-ease. Industrialized culture did not plan to create disturbances
in physis that have led to acid rain or global warming, but cultural
practices carry with them these mutual transpositional repercussions with
other levels of ontopoiesis. Smoking tobacco was not institutionalized in
order to create lung disease and other health problems. But, on the other
hand, while culture does not escape into pure spirit, it does enculturate
physis and bios. For example, food is immediately a cultural entity, which
is enculturation of the biotic level. The biotic level is interpreted from the
basis of culture and not vice versa. One may drink mercury thinking that
it makes him/her a god/dess and it surely does in terms of cultural
meanings. And so what another culture may call a poisoning effect does
not carry that meaning even though certain biotic changes, like vomiting
or death, cannot be denied.
MEDIATION AND INTENTIONALITY
Since ontopoiesis entails the phenomenology of life – meanings as they

are a function of life’s dynamic evolution – it is important to understand
the effects of cultural mediation at the level of the constitutive powers

of human agency. The phenomenological battlecry of Husserl, back to
the things themselves, provided Husserl with a lifelong problematic.
Elsewhere I have shown how mediation problematizes the phenomenolog-
ical project and I argued for an indirect phenomenology that takes into
consideration the transcendent mediational aspects of constitution that
can not be brought into reduction.18 Briefly, I enlist the widely known
criticisms of Jacques Derrida and of Ludwig Wittgenstein, both of whom
discuss paradigmatic cases – language and forms of life, in order to show
that their objectivated structures exhibit their own Beingness and function
as mediators within intentionality. The structures of their Beingness
cannot be reduced to the intentional relation. And so, the constitution of
sense entails a co-constitutive agency other than consciousness and one
that resists transcendental reduction. Husserl was beginning to work out
this problematic when he put forth the idea of the co-constitutivity of
what I label as the Worldly-Horizon. But Husserl’s phenomenology is
equipped only to grasp those aspects of mediation that can manifest
within surface ontology. With ontopoietic phenomenology, we can appre-
hend co-constitutivities at all levels of ontopoiesis, which is a necessary
turn, if indeed phenomenology is going to be a science not limited to
surface ontology.
I shall briefly describe the structure of mediation, for the study of
mediation is the key to understanding the ontopoiesis (the inner workings)
of the cultural station of life. Human consciousness intends some object
through an act. Consciousness has already been enculturated and the
subjective history of that enculturation provides consciousness with mean-
ing-contexts from which it can constitute an object. These meaning-
contexts provide consciousness with ways to express itself. But, these
ways exhibit structures that are not subject to the object focus of the
phenomenological reduction, because they are not the explicit object of
consciousness, but horizonal mediators of sense-constitution. This means
that the horizon of the natural attitude remains present and operable
through the fact that consciousness necessarily assumes transcendent
mediational structures even in the ‘‘transcendentally reduced sphere’’.
These mediations are cultural objectivations, which by essence carry their
own Beingness even in the reduced sphere because they transcend that
which is given as evidence to direct phenomenological seeing. Whether
consciousness is aware of it or not (in the everyday mode either unaware
or naively aware) cultural objectivations inform his/her own constitutive
agency from the standpoint of enculturation sedimented within the histo-
ricity of consciousness. Every intention of sense carries with it an otherness
188 GARY BACKHAUS
that cannot be reduced to pure intentionality. It must be remembered

that in Husserlian phenomenology the ego splits and the transcendental
ego accompanies the mundane ego whose experiential contents are left
intact. And, the mundane ego carries with it its enculturation with all the
co-constitutive systems in-forming it.
Merleau-Ponty’s claim is that the reduction cannot be complete,
because the being of the lived-body is ambiguous – not purely subject,
not purely object. My claim here is that within the very Being of encultu-
rated consciousness the purity of its intentions already are ‘‘corrupted’’
by a Beingness that it cannot help but exhibit. The mediation of intentions
the non-phenomenologically reducible horizon unintended by conscious-
ness is co-constitutive of its I-acts and pregnant within the me. And so,
the constitution of the object includes the co-constitutivity of the mediator
that transcends the intentionality of consciousness. This is the most
important essential principle of culture concerning phenomenological
inquiry. What phenomenological inquiry can do is to clarify the media-
tional aspect and engage in a dialogue with empirical science in order to
ascertain the Beingness of the mediations that foil phenomenological
purity. Human beings create a level of ontopoiesis that transcends its
societal relations and one that then maintains a partnership with human
expression in constitution. It does so in a twofold way. First, cultural
products express laws of their own of which humans must apprehend,
e.g., economic laws, laws of traffic congestion. Second, human expression
is mediated by the objective principles in the process of expression. Thus,
the study of mediation is an ambiguous enterprise that entails both
positivistic and phenomenological moments. The positivistic aspect appre-
hends transcendent structures, but is not appropriate for the description
of the mediational function. The study needs to apprehend empirical
reality from positivism, which it can treat eidetically, but from the
non-transcendental standpoint. This provides phenomenology with the
transcendent structures by which through an indirect methodology of
uncovering the co-constitutive agency, the structure of mediation is
phenomenologically clarified. Still the effects of mediation are too complex
to be made transparent. Yet, without the study of mediation from the
standpoint of ontopoiesis, phenomenological inquiry remains a surface
ontology, no matter how radical its study of meanings.
CONCLUSIONS
Cultural phenomenology is to be a study founded on ontopoiesis.

Individuation at the human station of life entails structurization that are
proto-social and proto-cultural. These proto-forms allow for the human

to engage in the social and cultural re-organizations of life’s meanings.
Human beings create these levels through their sense-bestowing capacities.
The cultural level is reached through the fact that human expression
creates objectivations that entail their own Beingness. These objectiv-
ations form the Worldly-Horizon of the cultural world. These objectiv-
ations are apprehended as meanings, and they entail interrelative
meanings at every station of ontopoiesis. Objectivations serve as media-
tors in the intentional structure of consciousness and provide it with a
transcendent non-reducible moment that is co-constitutive. This means
that cultural phenomenology is the form of phenomenological inquiry
that takes into account cultural mediation – meaningful transcendent
objectivations that bring systems-level structures to the process of consti-
tution. This transcendent moment foils the reduction to the transcendental
and thus requires an indirect approach that relies on the positivist moment
in order to supply the inquiry with the empirical facts concerning the
mediational factors. These facts are reinterpreted on the basis of onto-
poiesis, which evaluates trans-stational reverberations of meaning
throughout the ontopoietic hierarchy. Thus, cultural phenomenology
must always be informed of the other stations of ontopoietic dynamics
to know the extent of the re-organization of life being produced through
the activities occurring at the cultural level.
Morgan State University
NOTES
1 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘‘The Ontopoiesis of Life as a New Philosophical

Paradigm,’’ in Phenomenological Inquiry Vol. 28 (October 1998).
2 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘‘Measure and the Ontopoietic Self-Individualization of
Life,’’ in Phenomenological Inquiry Vol. 19, pp. 26–51. See, especially, ‘‘First and foremost, the
self-individualizing character of life whether it be at the organic, vital, psychic, or cultural
level will serve as our measuring stick in the vast expanse,’’ p. 35.
3 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘‘The Ontopoietic Self-Individualization of Being: In
Search of the Foothold of Change, Becoming and Transformation,’’ in Analecta Husserliana
LX (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999), pp. 3–20.
4 Tymieniecka, Phenomenological Inquiry Vol. 19, ‘‘The Human Condition establishes the
human living being in a most particular situation with respect to the total life expanse, the
entire existential schema of living beingness. Simultaneously it gives the human being an
outstanding position – a knot position – with respect to the spheres within which living being
is suspended’’, p. 45.
5 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, W hy is T here Something Rather than Nothing?
Prolegomena to the Phenomenology of Cosmic Creation (The Netherlands: Van Gorcum,
190 GARY BACKHAUS
1966), p. 42. ‘‘The individual being distinguishes himself as the only self-sustaining factor
within the flux of change. ... The individual autonomous being defines himself on the one
hand as the factor holding the strings of the world context in process, and on the other hand,
as a transformer of the spontaneity which sustains the world process.’’
6 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka ‘‘The Human Condition within the Unity-of-Everything-
that-is-Alive,’’ in Analecta Husserliana XXXI (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1990), pp. 3–17.
7 Tymieniecka, Phenomenological Inquiry Vol. 19, p. 45, ‘‘The Human Condition is a station
in life’s dynamic stream due to the virtualities that the progress of life deposited as its
foothold on life: the creative virtuality with three absolutely novel valuative factors of sense,
the aesthetic, intellectual, and moral senses.’’
8 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘‘The Moral Sense in the Origin and Progress of the Social
World,’’ in Analecta Husserliana XV (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979),
pp. 5–43.
9 See Aron Gurwitsch, Marginal Consciousness, Lester Embree (ed.) (Athens, Oh.: Ohio
University Press, 1985).
10 See Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ‘‘Aesthetic Enjoyment and Poetic Sense,’’ in Analecta
Husserliana XVIII (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984), pp. 3–21.
11 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, Dorion
Cairns (trans.) (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1960).
12 Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of L ogic, James
S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (trans.) (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
13 See Gary Backhaus, ‘‘Introduction: Earth Ways: The Primordial Relation Between the
Ways of Knowing and the Ways of Earthly Phenomena’’ and Chapter 4: ‘‘Toward a
Phenomenology of Cognitive Mapping,’’ in Earth Ways: Framing Geographical Meanings,
Gary Backhaus and John Murungi (eds.) (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2004).
14 See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, T he Social Construction of Reality: A
T reatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).
15 See for example, ‘‘The Conflict in Modern Culture,’’ in Georg Simmel: On Indivdiuality
and Social Forms, Donald N. Levine (ed.) (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971),
pp. 375–393.
16 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, Sheila Faria Glaser (trans.) (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2000).
17 See Gary Backhaus, ‘‘Introduction,’’ in L ived-Images: Meditations in Experience, L ife-
World and I-hood, Matti Itkonen and Gary Backhaus (eds.) (Jyväskylä, Finland: University
of Jyväskylä Press, 2003).
18 Ibid.
W. KIM ROGERS
CONTEXTS: THE LANDSCAPES OF HUMAN LIFE
INTRODUCTION
An appeal to context in order to understand human behavior is very

often made by both philosophical authors and those in the Human
Sciences. It seems obvious to those who study human actions that these
are context-sensitive and governed by rules that are context-dependent.
Furthermore, the landscapes in which human beings act are contextual-
ized, that is, composed of significant and connected affairs supporting
specific actions.
Consider what Sinologist Roger Ames and philosopher David Hall
have to say in their joint interpretation of the Confucian and Taoist
traditions. ‘‘It is the ‘art of contextualization,’ ’’ they wrote, ‘‘that is most
characteristic of Chinese intellectual endeavors’’ (1998, 40). In Ames and
Hall’s view a particular affair or person ‘‘is a determining focus of the
field that contextualizes it’’ (Ibid., 39). A particular person ‘‘is a realized
perspective upon things which at one and the same time centers the
individual and focuses his or her context’’ (Ibid., 248). There is an appro-
priate direction for a particular person to pursue ‘‘negotiated between its
own agency and the flux of its context’’ (Ibid., 39). Persons are radically
situated as persons-in-context, interacting as they do with a world defined
by specific social, cultural, and natural conditions. The result is what
Ames and Hall call an aesthetic order which is a consequence of the
contribution to a given context of a particular which both determines
and is determined by the context (1987, 16).
Everyone can understand most of what is said in these statements
concerning context, but only because the meaning of that term is vague.
Even though contextuality is a common feature of human life and
research, and its meaning in fact usually taken for granted, that does not
mean it is unproblematic.
CONTEXTUALITY
Benny Shanon writes that ‘‘as a factor that affects behavior context has,
of course, been the subject of extensive investigation.’’ Nevertheless, ‘‘a
perusal of the literature reveals, frequently as the term ‘context’ is
employed, it is seldom defined’’ (1990, 157). For the concept of context
191
192 W. KIM ROGERS
to become really useful, a further examination needs to be made of what

is meant by context. Shanon concludes that ‘‘context should be defined
by means of a terminology which, by its very nature, is interactional’’
(Ibid., 163). However, inexplicably, he does not then go on to offer such
a definition or description of context and contextualizing.
This, using an ecological approach, is now my goal. The term ‘‘ecologi-
cal’’ here draws its meaning from the provenance of its original use by
biologists and behavioral scientists: ‘‘Ecology ... expresses in a single
word, the idea of all components of a milieu in reciprocal interaction
with each other’’ (Bennett 1976, 163). An approach that takes the reciproc-
ity between living beings and their environment, the polarity and mutual-
ity in their interaction, as the basic framework for all of one’s studies, I
call an ecological approach.
In taking this approach, I reject the modern dualism between an
internal mental world and an external physical one, their implied separa-
tion, and the various theories of mental representations that are supposed
to mediate between these two worlds. In seeking to understand living
beings in interaction with their environment, one must also avoid interpre-
ting these in terms of their self-same identity, of their independence and
the passivity of one or the other.
Every particular form of life is a vital system of interactions jointly
produced by living beings and their environing affairs. To put it in simple
– certainly overly simple – terms we make the kind of life we have as we
respond to the environing affairs addressing us and responding to our
addresses and responses. The contexting by human beings of some envi-
roning affairs occurs when these are accorded significance and connected
in terms of human activities and in turn these contexts help shape the
activities of living beings with respect to their environing affairs.
In Tymieniecka’s view ‘‘the human individual essentially is the being
who invents and creates’’ (1983, 39). The creative act of human beings is
a shaping both of human forms of life and of the conditions in which
they live. The conditions in which human beings live change as human
beings change, or, more accurately, as they change their actions in
response to their life condition. New forms of human action call up
specific new types of life conditions and vice versa. By this creative activity
of human beings and the thus also changing face of their life conditions,
is inaugurated what she terms the ‘‘Human Condition’’ (1997, 12). The
‘‘Human Condition’’ is a humanly made setting for human life in which
the latter creatively establishes particular contexts of actions, invents
CONTEXTS: THE LANDSCAPES OF HUMAN LIFE 193
networks of actions that outlast the life-cycle of any one human being
(cf. 1996, 15).
We speak of contexts of actions and contexts for interpreting the
products of actions; for example, the contexts of ritual, work, play, the
contexts of a painting, an artwork or a musical piece, and so on. However,
one should be careful not to reify these contexts of actions as though
they were some kind of affair existing in the environment. Rather, as
connected landscapes of significant affairs they have suggestive and sup-
portive roles in the human-environment conversation.
Different kinds of interactions between human beings and environing
affairs arise from different kinds of contexts of actions and vice versa. As
one initiates specific forms of acting, specific types of contexts of actions
will be sometimes created, sometimes given, sometimes sought for, some-
times already present.
Human beings’ actions are contextualized as selected affairs in their
environment are connected and given significance in terms of meaning
and fit, that is, by what they afford for present and anticipated interactions
of living beings and their environment. In other words, as Tymieniecka
put it, ‘‘entering life’s constructive progress as a creator, the human being
assumes a crucial position with respect to its course: he introduces the
human significance of life’’ (1984, viii). ‘‘By inventively unfolding the
virtualities of the Human Condition the living being transforms the
primary avenues of life by bringing in new factors of sense. With these
new factors he expands his circumambient conditions into a socio-cultural
world, his very own universe within which he seeks his unique self-
realization’’ (1983, 68).
For example, let us consider the significance of the round white candle
which sits upon my desk. When the power goes off (as it does all too
frequently) it is a source of illumination as soon as I light the wick. I
often look at it as an affair I appreciate for its simple beauty, but at the
present moment it is something I placed there to hold some papers down
on my desk so they won’t get blown away. My little terrier rushes into
my study chasing the cat again and I consider throwing something at
him. Now I see how well that round white affair on my desk would serve
as a projectile.
The classical belief that this candle has a single meaning in itself is
clearly belied by the variety of my possible actions and experiences. The
meanings or affordances of this affair will correlate with my interactions
with my environment. But one affair’s significance cannot be determined
independently of its connection also to the fittingness and meaning of
194 W. KIM ROGERS
other significant affairs for the actions of human beings, that is, outside
of contexts of actions.
Contexts of actions are never fully determinate, significant affairs com-
posing them being added or subtracted, nor are they changeless. Just as
much as the kinds of interactions engaged in persist or change, so also
vary the contexts of actions related to them. As a variety of contexts of
actions may follow other contexts of actions, so too there may be a
variable sequence of shifting contexts of actions both up and down the
scales of size and duration.
Each context of action may be connected with others and may contain
or be nested in yet other contexts. No context of action, whether superor-
dinate or subordinate to others, is a cause of (explains) another context.
However, progressively inter-supportive layers of contexts of actions
within varying hierarchies of scale will promote the creating of new forms
of interaction and the creating of appropriate new contexts of actions.
The contextuality of actions in one’s environment is not just sometimes
there. Rather, none of one’s actions is context-free. The contextuality of
human activity is still present in the recognition of the absence of an
expected context of activity. Even when dreaming or daydreaming or in
the case of hallucinations such as those produced by human actors in an
artificially constructed stimulus-free environment, there are still affairs to
be given meaning in terms of what they afford for fantasied actions.
Contextualization occurs primarily but not exclusively in community
life. Community life is a social reality jointly made in and through the
interactions of human beings, in which the action of each comes to be
complemented and completed by the actions of the others. According to
Tymieniecka ‘‘the pristine nature, source, and significance of human
experience [i.e., the Human Condition] has to be elucidated and grasped
in its modalities in which man’s self-interpretation in existence blends into
the intersubjective existential network of the common life-world and its
natural milieu’’ (1983, 28).
One’s social activity involves reciprocity, that is, the mutual anticipation
of each other’s actions and experiences, a reciprocity that is actualized in
the following of commonly preferred patterns of acting or usages.
Reciprocity in turn involves familiarity with the affairs that are to be
regularly reckoned with in following such usages. In nearly all cases one
therefore does not need to invent meanings for the affairs met in one’s
environment. Rather, the affairs one encounters already have meanings,
have been made into ‘things’ through the interpretations of affairs incul-
cated by a community’s usages. One comes to know these ‘things’ through
one’s following the commonly preferred patterns of acting or usages of a

community.
The usages specific to particular communities as well as various forms
of human groupings within communities, for example, churches, schools,
sports, and so on, provide us with the basis for sharing common contexts
of actions. The activities of other human beings will not be understood
by us unless we share the contexts of their actions. As the Native American
proverb puts it, to step into the world of another human being, one must
‘‘walk a day in their moccasins.’’ The distinction between ‘‘them’’ and
‘‘us’’ is based to a considerable degree on unshared contexts of actions.
However, networks of actions can transcend the boundaries of ‘‘them’’
and ‘‘us,’’ especially between communities in which capitalist economies
are strongly developed.
The particular kind of common life which members of a community
essay in their environment is found in their culture. Their culture is
actualized in and through the distinctive organization of their commonly
preferred patterns of action or usages into a workable, comprehensible,
communicable and transgenerational program of life. This common life
program includes the acquiring of a commonly held set of beliefs, that is,
a repertory of acquired convictions about the nature of the world and
oneself, one’s fellow human beings, about the hierarchy of affairs and
values supportive of one’s continuation of preferred patterns of actions.
The particular contexts of actions belonging to a community are corre-
lated with the particular culture of that community.
To act in common with other human beings requires relying on (trust-
ing) the others to perform or to have performed certain acts in which
recognition is given ourselves as accountable, able to be treated or dealt
with on common grounds, which in turn enables our actions to be more
effective. These common grounds are to be found in shared or presumably
shared contexts of actions. A certain amount of trustworthiness must be
attributable to oneself and one’s co-actors in social interactions within
one’s community (including those activities intended to bring about social
change, e.g., protest marches, hunger strikes, etc.). Such trust, of course,
can be disappointed when the contexts of one’s actions are not shared
by others in one’s community or when one finds oneself encountering
unknown contexts of actions in new and unfamiliar social surroundings.
Note that a context of action which others are not able to share belongs
to the life of those we describe as insane, and is to be found also in the
‘‘spirit journeys’’ of shamans.
196 W. KIM ROGERS
CONTEXTED LANDSCAPES
So far so good, but we must go still further if we are to better understand

what is meant by context. We have spoken above of contexting and
creating contexts of actions through giving significance to environing
affairs in terms of some human activity. Significance, that is, the meaning of
some affair, is contextually determined.
However, contexting, the creating of contexts of actions, is also the
flexible knitting together or connecting of significant affairs in landscapes,
each affair helping to determine, in its interrelations with other affairs,
the sort of connectedness of a landscape. Simply put, contexts of actions
are neither more nor less than contexted landscapes.
The term ‘‘landscape,’’ having its origins in painting, would seem to
refer to something merely observed, but as J. B. Jackson writes: ‘‘The
idea of landscape is anchored upon human life; ‘‘the true and lasting
meaning of the word landscape: not something to look at but to live in;
and not alone but with other people’’ (Meinig 1979, 228). According to
Jackson, ‘‘A landscape is not a natural feature of the environment but a
synthetic space, ... a composition of man-made or man-modified spaces
to serve as infra-structure or background for our collective existence’’
(1984, 8).
Can we then meaningfully speak of natural vs. artificial landscapes?
We at least can still distinguish those landscapes that contain more affairs
which are the products of human artifice and imagination from those
which contain less and describe the former as being less and the latter as
more natural. Looking at this situation from Tymieniecka’s point of view,
a human life is one with Nature but surpasses Nature’s rules by expanding
its own (1986, 18). True, but we need to take this issue even further.
In one sense we now live in an environment largely of our own making
but in a deeper sense we do not. We recognize that there has occurred in
recent millennia a progressive introduction of humanly made changes
and artifacts into our environment. Today human beings are everywhere
surrounded by their own works, yet this has not diminished our integ-
ration into the ecosystem (Nature) in the least. We may live in built
environments, but we have built upon Nature.
Landscapes can vary from the sensorily given to the imaginary, from
the material to the mathematical. A landscape can be described in terms
of content and organization, significance and connection, but not always
as something spatially extended in two or three dimensions, nor as
necessarily sensorily experienceable. Even when a landscape contains only
those affairs which are sensorily experienceable, it has no physical edges

as such. In considering where landscapes begin and end we should speak
always only of liminality and passages.
Landscapes suggest and support particular ranges of activities for the
communities which live in them and so act as controls upon their actions
and experiences. Landscapes provide a certain set of opportunities and
barriers, settings which enable but also constrain the range of possible
activities.
Landscapes objectify their skills, values and beliefs and support distinc-
tive roles and usages for those who share these organized settings. In
Peirce Lewis’ view, we can see ourselves in our landscapes, ‘‘our human
landscape is our unwitting autobiography, reflecting our tastes, our values,
our aspirations, and even our fears ..’’ (Meinig 1979, 12).
A landscape can be related to still other landscapes depending on the
kind and interrelationship of specific social roles, social knowledge, nor-
mative requirements and groups of people involved. The determination
of appropriate ways of acting depends therefore not on any one particular
landscape alone but also on the related and nested character of landscapes.
A landscape is ordered perspectivally in terms of relevance through
one’s centering attention upon a significant affair or affairs, other signifi-
cant affairs being nearer and farther from this center. In relation to the
other affairs, oneself and this affair exist together at the center. The
ordering of the landscape by relevance is independent of the spatial
organization of one’s environment in terms of proximity and distance.
Through their perspectival ordering landscapes become organized as
scenes for one’s actions, and these scenes shift as one’s centering attention
is moved to another significant affair or affairs.
These perspectivally ordered landscapes become contexts of actions
when the significant affairs comprising them are linked in terms of one’s
‘plans’, that is, in terms of individually and commonly preferred patterns
of acting connectable in advance through anticipations of one’s being
able to do ‘‘thusly’’ followed by one’s doing next ‘‘so and so’’ and so forth
in the course which one takes in one’s negotiations with one’s environment
(Rogers 2003, 157). Let us not forget, however, that one can also change
one’s plans, revising the contexted landscape in which one acts, or
exchange it for another or even inventing a new one.
Interlocking ‘plans’ compose fields of actions which prefigure the con-
nectedness of significant affairs within each contexted landscape and so
provide the unity of the arena in which one acts. Furthermore, each field
of action has the potentialities of being storied, that is, having time-
198 W. KIM ROGERS
factored or sequential ways of patterning actions and experiences, within

which field specific types of stories are then enactable.
One’s field of action may, however, come apart when one encounters
an unexpected layout in one’s environment and one no longer knows
how to proceed with one’s story. One loses one’s sense of direction as
the familiar landscape vanishes.
To be lost is to be in a landscape where the wisdom of one’s continuing
with what one was doing is put into doubt. It is experiencing the breaking
of one’s ties to the sphere of everyday activities, being where one could
not have anticipated living and for which forethought could not have
prepared one. It is where one cannot find in their present experience any
openings leading to familiar places, the road to any goal cut off by the
absence of recognizable landmarks in the landscape, where an area of
safe and reasonable movement is undetectable in the vastness of the
possibilities which surround one.
To have an adventure is to be in a landscape where one is doing and
experiencing something out of the ordinary. It is the shattering of the
inert, insistent and unreflective sphere of everyday life that imprisons the
leaps of the imagination as if it were a bowl of glass. Each adventure is
a dropping out of the continuity of life, the incorporating into the familiar
round of our days of the unforseen, unthought of, the new. It is seeing
the world in the light of its possibilities. The obscurity of the future is
not less for adventurers than for others, but they proceed as if they were,
daring to risk traveling an unknown road as if it were familiar and the
end of it certain.
The diversity of these two sorts of landscapes lies not in their constituent
significant affairs (which in each case could be exactly the same affairs)
but in their contexting, and rests, first of all, on whether it is in one’s
character to or not to creatively entertain a new context in response to
an unexpected layout in one’s environment. Differences of context make
the difference for one between knowing or not knowing where one is,
being oriented or being lost. And it is different again when one explores,
when one is in landscapes where one can have adventures. The environ-
ment does not change, only our contexting of it as one goes from being
lost to being engaged in discovery.
In brief: On the one hand, we can speak of a contexted landscape as
a scene for us to act in where affairs, given significance in terms of
meaning and fit in relation to our actions, are perspectively ordered by
relevance. On the other hand, we can speak of a contexted landscape as
the arena where these significant affairs are connectable in advance
through the interlocking of ‘plans,’ our anticipating being able to actualize

in sequence particular patterns of actions.
PLACES
Places are especially deserving of attention in a discussion of landscapes

and contextuality. The significance of particular places was recognized
millennia ago by the Romans with their experiences of a Genius loci, the
latter being the manifestation in Cobb’s words of ‘‘a living ecological
relationship between ... a person and a place’’ (1977, 46). But the charac-
teristics of a place were and still are especially important for the ancient
Chinese practice of Feng Shui. Feng Shui considers the many contexts in
which a particular person, family, or business dwells to be integral ele-
ments in the art of living well. It has no other purpose than to interpret
the significance of a place in favorable or unfavorable terms.
Contexted landscapes may include places of varying size, from a spot
beneath a tree to a garden to villages and neighborhoods to cities. Though
they may differ in size, places are always on the scale of everyday experi-
ence, and thus they are to be distinguished from such areas as geographical
or political units or tribal territories. There are places which may be
distinguished from other places in terms of social status roles as well as
by their physical localities. Also there are private places which have
significance only for me, or for you and me.
While for some individuals or groups there may exist such and such a
place, for others it may be only a tract of land. Some places may not be
identified or understood, yet that they are some kind of place can still be
recognized by others. Places may be relatively stable or dynamic or
transitory. Places may be, but are not necessarily, rooted in one location
as is the case when one’s place travels as one travels, a situation of which
a sailor on a ship or someone flying from New York to London is
clearly aware.
Places are identified by their connection with the activities of specific
persons and groups or communities. We speak of empty places only when
human beings and their activities are not present there. ‘‘Place is socially
produced and constructed and, moreover, ... imagination plays a crucial
role in that construction’’ (Adams et al., 2001, xxi). If that description is
accurate, then place is different from physical space. A place is more than
where or where-when we are, although it is always that, too. A place
belongs to someone or some group, or rather, its connection to the
200 W. KIM ROGERS
activities of these human beings give character and focus to a place and
confers upon it a quality of uniqueness.
A place is unique – in this it is like persons, though we should not
make too much of this analogy. I do not deny there may be similarities
between places, but each place has its unique role within the life of
individuals and communities. Our connections to these unique places can
serve to unite or divide individuals and communities.
We can talk about local and foreign places precisely because we can
move from place to place. Note that paths, sidewalks, squares or plazas,
roads and highways are special examples of landscapes as they are for
going through or to places in other landscapes. We also talk about being
‘‘in our place’’ or being ‘‘at home’’ and their opposites, because we have
feelings of fitting in or not, of being in accord or discord with our
environment. The experience of displacement occurs when one is removed
from one’s place. Today homogeneity is becoming a form of displacement
which current globalization processes are imposing ever more rapidly
and ubiquitously through our environments.
It is important here to distinguish the meanings ‘‘our place’’ takes on
when we relate it to movement or emotions, from the meaning of ‘‘our
living space’’, colloquially referred to today as ‘‘our home ground,’’ which
is to be for us an enabling and limiting locus of a distinctive form of life.
We should not overlook here the use of the term ‘‘living spaces’’ also by
Stan Rowe where it means the ‘‘vital surrounding systems which sustain
us’’ (1990, 45). That is quite different from my use since I understand our
living spaces to have historical and biographical and not just biologically
sustaining properties.
This living space (one’s home ground) is a common place not chosen,
not sought, where we find ourselves already dwelling. It has stability, it
endures, it supports, is a haven of values. The importance of understanding
one’s home ground is well expressed by Scott Russell Sanders,
Distinguished Professor of English at Indiana University:
For each home ground we need new maps, living maps, stories and poems, photographs
and paintings, essays and songs. We need to know where we are, so that we may dwell in
our place with a full heart.1
To Sander’s list, be it noted, Confucius would surely have wanted us to

add ritual, that is, traditional patternings of action appropriate to the
different relationships existing between those who share the same living
space.
One’s living space is the most basic context of action, the place first in
importance in the lives of human beings. This place, one’s living space,
is the primary and common setting for the actions and experiences of the
members of a community. The distinguishing features of this, our primary
and most intimate contexted landscape, comprise the prototype for how
we order our experiential, intellective, and imaginary environments. The
most distinctive feature of our places, of our contemporary living spaces,
be is noted, is openness, and next is decentralization or polycentric
processes.
By way of summary and conclusion, let us briefly listen again to what
Ames and Hall had to say at the beginning of this paper about the
contextuality of particulars and persons, and then consider what we have
added to that in our explication of the meaning of contexts.
According to Ames and Hall, a particular affair or person ‘‘is a deter-
mining focus of the field that contextualizes it.’’ We can now say of this
contextualizing field that it is composed of affairs afforded significance in
terms of their meaning and fit in relation to the actions of an individual,
that is, by what they afford for the interactions of the individual and his
or her environment.
A particular person, they said, ‘‘is a realized perspective upon things
which at one and the same time centers the individual and focuses his or
her context.’’ We can now say that a context of action, a contexted
landscape, is ordered perspectivally in terms of relevance through the
individual’s centering attention upon a significant affair or affairs, oneself
and the affair(s) existing together at the center, and other affairs nearer
and farther from this center.
They said there is an appropriate direction for a particular person to
pursue ‘‘negotiated between its own agency and the flux of its context.’’
We can now say that these perspectivally ordered affairs within a land-
scape become connected in terms of one’s ‘plans,’ that is, individual and
commonly preferred patterns of acting connectable through anticipations
of one’s being able to do ‘‘thusly’’ followed by one’s doing next ‘‘so and
so’’ and so forth in the course one takes in one’s negotiations with one’s
environment. And being connectable in this way these landscapes of
significant affairs have become the contexts of our actions.
While Ames and Hall only relate particular persons to contexts, we
can now say that contextualization occurs primarily in community life.
The commonly preferred patterns of acting or the usages of a community
provide the basis for sharing common contexts of actions. The distinctive
kind of common life actualized in and through the organization of a
202 W. KIM ROGERS
community’s usages into a common program of life we call a community’s

culture. The particular contexts of action belonging to a community are
correlated with the particular culture of that community.
Besides the preceding elaborations upon the characteristics of contexts
of action, our attention has been drawn to places as contexted landscapes
of great importance, and in particular to the common place I have called
our living space or home ground. This latter, in relation to all other
landscapes has the distinction of being the basic, the primary and most
intimate context of action.
East T ennessee State University
NOTE
1 I have not been able to identify the source of this quote.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, P., Hoelscher, S. and Till, K. T extures of Place. Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 2001.
Ames, R. and Hall, D. T hinking through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1987.
——. T hinking from the Han. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.
Bennett, J. T he Ecological T ransition. New York: Pergamon Press, 1976.
Cobb, E. T he Ecology of Imagination in Childhood. New York: Columbia University Press,
1977.
Jackson, J. B. ‘‘Reading the Landscape,’’ in T he Interpretation of Ordinary L andscapes, D. W.
Meinig (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
——. Discovering the Vernacular L andscape. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984.
Lewis, P. ‘‘Axioms for Reading the Landscape,’’ in T he Interpretation of Ordinary L andscapes,
D. W. Meinig (ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.
Rogers, W. K. Reason and L ife. Lanham: University Press of America, 2003.
Rowe, S. Home Place: Essays in Ecology. Edmonton: NeWest Press, 1990.
Shanon, B. ‘‘What is Context?’’ in Journal for the T heory of Social Behavior 20 (1990):
157–166
Tymieniecka, A.-T. ‘‘The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition,’’ in Analecta
Husserliana, XIV. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983.
——. ‘‘The Theme: Phenomenlogy of Man and of the Human Condition,’’ in Analecta
Husserliana XXI. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984.
——. ‘‘First Principles of the Metaphysics of Life: Charting the Human Condition,’’ in
Analecta Husserliana XXI. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986.
——. ‘‘The Golden Measure: Self-Individualization of Life Bringing to Fruition the Ideal for
a New Epoch,’’ in Analecta Husserliana XLIX. Dordrecht: Reidel Press, 1996.
——. ‘‘The Theme: Phenomenology of Life (Integral and ‘‘Scientific’’) as the Starting Point
of Philosophy,’’ in Analecta Husserliana L. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
NATALIA M. SMIRNOVA
SCHUTZ’S CONCEPTION OF RELEVANCES AND ITS

INFLUENCE ON SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
In contemporary European culture human beings find themselves in

postmodern condition. Postmodernism manifests itself by the ‘‘decline of
the major narratives’’ (J. F. Lyotard) and the far-ranging cultural incom-
patibility. Furthermore, we are facing the process of widening an
unbridgeable gap between different cultural communities within the same
society. Human reason seems to have fallen into an anemic syndrome of
resigned weakness, and Homo sapiens is rapidly transforming into Homo
ludens. A game (or gamble) becomes a key metaphor of contemporary
culture. It leads not only to the impoverishment of thought and soul, but
also threatens to make meaningless both human life and contemporary
culture in general. Moreover, it threatens the very essence of humanity
due to the fact that it challenges the most significant human values, which
constitute human beings as such. It implies that when dealing with social
and human problems, it seems reasonable to pay due attention to the
discourse of social thinking, which focuses on the meaningful structure
of the social universe. It acquires crucial significance for social theory
which seeks to find out how people act, think and understand each other
in everyday life. This is the question pertaining to all social sciences to
which each of them has to contribute.
A. Schutz’s conception of the life-world is just the case in point. His
papers, taken together, create a new paradigm in social thinking aimed
at the study of the meaning sedimentation process, which constitutes the
framework of human thought and activity, and eventually the meaningful
structure of the social world. It therefore lays the deepest foundation for
human understanding in social life.
The works of A. Schutz have become increasingly known since the
publication of his Collected Papers in the Netherlands. Its first volume,
entitled ‘‘The Problem of Social Reality’’ appeared in 1962.1 The paper
‘‘Reflections on the Problem of Relevance’’, on which we will focus our
attention in this paper, was not published during his lifetime. Its handwrit-
ten version was discovered among his manuscripts only after the author’s
death. Written between August 1947 and August 1951, it is supposed to
be (according to R. Zaner) the first part of his five-part study, preliminarily
entitled ‘‘T he World as T aken for Granted: T oward a Phenomenology of
203
204 NATALIA M. SMIRNOVA
the Natural Attitude’’. Part 1 bore the title ‘‘Preliminary Notes on the
Problem of Relevance’’. Although A. Schutz did not intend to publish
this separate portion of his study as significant in its own right (but only
as a part of a wider context), Prof. R. Zaner brought this piece of the
study, left in a very rough form, into linguistically acceptable shape. Thus,
Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, edited, annotated and with an
introduction of R. Zaner, successfully appeared in 1970. A few months
ago it became available to Russian-language readers. In the year 2004 it
was published together with the other selected papers and my concluding
remarks in the huge volume of the Russian edition of A. Schutz’s Selected
Papers.2 This Russian edition of the book bears a subtitle ‘‘The world
luminous by meaning’’ (which originates from M. Natanson’s work). As
the editor, I have divided the whole text into 6 parts: ‘‘Methodology of
the Social Sciences’’, ‘‘Phenomenology and the Social Sciences’’,
‘‘Reflections on the Problem of Relevance’’, ‘‘The Problems of Social
Reality’’, ‘‘Applied Theory’’ and ‘‘The Meaning Structure of the Social
World’’. Since then A. Schutz’s studies, including his Reflections on the
Problem of Relevance, became available not only to the narrow range of
professionals, but also to a wider Russian audience.
The growing interest in A. Schutz’s social philosophy in Russia origi-
nated from his first publications in Russian, which rapidly attracted sober
attention of the social theorists. His ‘‘Concept and Theory Formation in
the Social Sciences’’ appeared in Russian as early as 1962 (transl. by
S. Shorohova), ‘‘The Homecomer’’ (1997, transl. by N. Smirnova), ‘‘The
Stranger’’ (1998, transl. by Nikolaev), ‘‘Mozart and Philosophers’’ (2002,
transl. by N. Smirnova) which appeared (as can be clearly seen from the
dates) before the fundamental Russian edition of his 1050-paged Selected
Papers. Now let me briefly outline the context of the study.
Inspired by unceasing passion to understand what human being is, A.
Schutz refers to (and subsequently adhered to) the phenomenological
tradition in philosophy which takes its clues from E. Husserl’s transcen-
dental phenomenology. According to E. Husserl, philosophy is essentially
a strict science. Investigation of the deepest presuppositions of human
reason, he believes, should be the main thematic concern of transcendental
phenomenology. But in contrast to E. Husserl, who brackets (or suspends
of ) the natural attitude in the process of the so-called phenomenologically
transcendental reduction, A. Schutz, facing the problems of the social
world (rather then the problems of epistemology or the methodology of
pure science) makes the word as it is given in its natural sense the main
subject of his research.
SCHUTZ’S CONCEPTION OF RELEVANCES 205
In respect of the social world it turns out to be the question of the

constitutive phenomenology of the social world, that is, the study of the
meaningful structure of the social world, which is the only one able to
throw light on the question of what allows people to understand each
other, or simply ‘‘what makes the social world tick’’.
The attack on this problem is based upon two presuppositions, derived
from the phenomenology of natural attitude. They imply that:
– our commonsense knowledge of everyday life consists of the system of
constructs in its typicality, which form the life-world accepted beyond
doubts;
– life-world is shared with the other individuals, living and acting in
mutually interlocking activities.
The above-mentioned system of typical constructs is largely taken for
granted without questions (although they may be brought into question
under certain circumstances). Nevertheless, it implies that ‘‘taken-for-
grantedness’’ remains out of question (‘‘unthematized’’) within the frame-
work of our ‘‘natural attitude’’. In order to put them into questions we
have to make this natural attitude itself thematic. Only in this way are
we able to make explicit what is initially implicit (or taken for granted)
– the foundations of social reality. This is a particular phenomenological
perspective of studying the question of what it means to be ‘‘social’’ and
what it means to be ‘‘a world’’. In this sense A. Schutz’s project is at the
same time an effort to discover the deepest presuppositions of empirical
social sciences. ‘‘The foundational analysis and explications of the ‘‘social’’,
‘‘behavior’’ and the ‘‘human’’, states R. Zaner, is necessarily fundamental
to the determination of which methods and concepts are appropriate and
justifiable’’.3 It implies that the phenomenology of the social world is the
phenomenology of the social sciences at the same time.
A. Schutz’s study of relevance partly follows the mainstream of his
daily life structure investigations. His conception of relevance refers to
the concept of so-called multiple realities, derived from W. James’ work
as it has been presented in chapter 21 of his well-known Principles of
Psychology.4 Accordingly, multiple realities turns out to be the key notion
and the basic principle of the life-world stratification.
The term ‘‘reality’’, W. James insists, could hardly refer to the objective
world as it exists beyond our consciousness, experienced and conceived.
It rather designates our meaning of reality. He maintains that reality is
nothing but the set of our sensual, emotional, life and activity. Whatever
attracts our interest becomes real: W. James bestows upon it ‘‘the accent
of reality’’. To call something real means to assert that it captures our
interest in this or that way. There are an infinite number of reality strata,
each of them having its own particular style of existence, way of presenta-
tion and degree of attention to life. In other words, they are all real in
their own fashion. W. James calls them ‘‘sub-universes’’. These sub-uni-
verses embrace the meanings of physical things, scientific ideal types and
their relationships, religion, madness, the realm of dreams, fantasy and
so on. Living in one of them, we tend to obscure or even forget the
others, so there is no smooth traffic between the sub-worlds. And precisely
because of their relative autonomy and discrete existence E. Husserl
designates them as ‘‘the units of sense’’.5
W. James consciously restricted his analysis only to psychological
aspects of ‘‘multiple realities’’, investigating them in terms of beliefs and
disbeliefs (in his T he Fixation of Belief.) Nevertheless the father-founder
of phenomenology E. Husserl highly appreciated W. James’ idea of
multiple realities, because it paved the way to further investigations of
the structure of human consciousness. But in contrast to W. James’
approach, he frees them from psychological implications. E. Husserl tries
to contemplate the question not in terms of beliefs and disbeliefs, but
rather in a transcendentally phenomenological way, i.e. in terms of pure
consciousness structure. He uses it as a means for further elaboration of
the concept of the field of consciousness itself, i.e. relationship between
the theme and horizon, that is its thematic kernel and its surrounding
horizon as it is given at any moment of our inner time.
A. Schutz goes far beyond both W. James’ psychological approach
(‘‘orders of reality’’, ‘‘sub-universes’’) and even E. Husserl’s pure constitu-
tive phenomenology (‘‘sense-units’’). But following Husserlian tradition
to explore the ultimate presuppositions of each mental insight, he recog-
nizes it as one of the most important philosophical questions. He also
releases the concept ‘‘sub-universe’’ from its psychological implications
as well as bestows upon them the accent of reality by the name of ‘‘the
finite provinces of meaning’’. He prefers to speak about meanings rather
then sub-universes in order to stress that what he actually has in his mind
is not the ontological structure of the objects of outer space but rather
the meaningful structure of the social world. The latter is essentially
pluralistic, constituted by different kinds of human experiences. A. Schutz
ascribes each of them its particular cognitive style, which has its specific
degree of awakeness, tension of consciousness or attention to life, each of
them being the highest in the province of everyday life. There is no paved
way between the meaning provinces; the shift from one to another is
subjectively experienced as a shock or a leap. It is produced by the radical
change of the way in which each of them presents itself in inner time
consciousness. It was precisely that point of view he adhered to in On
Multiple Realities.
In his further consideration the problem of multiple realities A. Schutz
finds himself facing the following problems:
– cognitive borders of the finite provinces of meaning;
– interrelations among the different provinces;
– which of them can be considered as ‘‘paramount’’ reality?
All these questions he inherited from W. James. But here are some new
questions he raises:
– the type of constitutive activity which brings them about;
– the typical way in which they maintain themselves;
– what gives them the accent of reality or what makes them ‘‘real’’ at
any particular moment.
While the former three questions he scrutinizes in his daily life investiga-
tions, the latter turn out to be the subject of his Reflections on the Problem
of Relevance. It is this study which will be the focus of my further
reflections.
In his previous works A. Schutz concentrated his major attention upon
the ‘‘province of working’’, which he declared to be ‘‘the paramount
reality’’. Using E. Husserl’s terms, it is this particular realm of reality,
which becomes thematic for the whole study. Thus, the structurization of
multiple realities that is putting forward the world of working and ascrib-
ing it its privileged position among the others, has been substantiated by
the references to the basic structure of human consciousness. The study
on the world of working as governed by the system of relevance allows
him not only to shed important light on the essence of theme–horizon
relationship in general, but also on the structure of human actions in the
social world. These actions are supposed to have the center of space–
temporal continuum, namely, my actual ‘‘Here’’ and ‘‘Now’’, which com-
pose my field of actions. The latter appears hierarchically organized in
zones of actual, potential and restorable reach, the so-called ‘‘manipula-
tory sphere’’ being the center. Each zone has its own spatial and temporal
horizons and structures, typically conceived. These interrelated zones of
actual, potential and restorable experience form an unquestioned but
always questionable ‘‘world taken for granted’’. It may also be seen as a
cultural matrix of the world of working. Its initial presuppositions are:
‘‘I can do it again’’ as well as ‘‘And so forth and so on’’.
The second basic assumption of A. Schutz’s conception of relevance is
that at any moment I find myself in a biographically determined situation.
It is only partly defined by my actual experience. A. Schutz insists that

my biographically determined situation is necessarily historical, due to
the fact that it has to a large extent been formed by my previous sedimented
experiences which I preserved in my memory. It is the outcome of my
personal history. They constitute my ‘‘stock of knowledge at hand’’ on
which I rely at any moment in my acts and thoughts. At the same time
it is socially derived knowledge, which necessarily refers to the experience
of others.
A. Schutz agrees with W. James, that we are never equally interested
in all strata of the world of working at the same time. It is just my
pragmatic interest, which organizes and structures the world we live in,
into the different spheres of importance. In other words, ‘‘the selective
power of our interest’’ defines the spheres of major or minor intimacy
and anonymity within my world of working. How I define the situation
to which I pay attention, depends on my pragmatic interest, which guides
man within his natural attitude in daily life. It constitutes my ‘‘plan of
action’’ or ‘‘project at hand’’, prevailing on my ‘‘life plan’’ at any particular
moment. And each project he stresses is determined by my pragmatic
interest.
A. Schutz highly appreciated W. James’ idea of the human mind’s
selectivity, which guides man within his natural attitude in daily life. But
in contrast to the author of Principles of Psychology he does not tend to
root the selective function of the human mind exclusively in pragmatic
motives. The concept ‘‘selective function of our interest’’ used by H.
Bergson and W. James seems too ambiguous to designate the main idea
that A. Schutz actually has in his mind. Being derived from the psychology
of individuals, it is unable to describe the life-world which is essentially
intersubjective. Trying to release the notion ‘‘interest’’ from its psychologi-
cal implications, he changes it to relevance – just as he changed James’
‘‘sub-world’’ to the ‘‘province of meaning’’. Moreover, he takes into
account James’ idea of pragmatic justification with reference to his partic-
ular philosophical background, namely, to the philosophy of pragmatism.
According to its basic assumptions, practical ratification of thought by
events in the outer world should be regarded as the only criterion of
truth. Accordingly, our physiological states are taking as explaining our
feelings, and even the question legitimately arises, whether consciousness
exists at all. But within the framework of phenomenology the various
provinces of meaning or realms of reality are interconnected by the unity
of our consciousness. Closer inspection reveals, however, that although
being is a psychological unity, I live in several of these realms simulta-
neously. Thus, when writing this text, I am involved at least in three

different activities at the same time, namely, in thinking about A. Schutz’s
contemplation on the problem of relevance, in using my PC program
and in typing the text. Moreover, I am trying to put my thoughts in a
language which is obviously foreign to me, namely English. Taken
together, all these activities (theoretical contemplation, writing in a foreign
language, typing, using PC) are subjectively experienced as a single com-
plex activity undivided into the parts of different attention to life. But
although experienced as a unity of actions, my present doing is not a
single activity. To put it phenomenologically, I am actually involved in
at least two meaning provinces simultaneously, that is in the world of
working (pressing the buttons of my PC keyboard, looking through a
Russian-English dictionary, etc.) and in the world of theoretical conte-
mplation, each with its own attention to life, dimension of time and
particular articulation into its thematic kernel and horizonal surrounding.
This is precisely the point where A. Schutz deviates from W. James’
view, taking a step further in Reflections. He insists, that ‘‘the theory
concerning the mind’s selective activity is simply the title for a set of
problems more complicated even than those of field, theme and horizon
– namely, a title for the basic phenomenon we suggest calling relevance’’.6
To think that living in one province of meaning we may at any time
change it for another (and its selection defines what is thematic in the
field of consciousness) leads to oversimplification of the real state of
affairs. It is very important to realize, he suggests in Reflections, that the
levels of my personality are involved in several realms of reality simulta-
neously and to select one of them can merely mean that we are making
it our system of reference, the prevailing theme. In the example given, the
simultaneously performed activities are of different degrees of intimacy
in respect to nearness or distance of my personality. This heterogeneous
set of activities is also structured into its own theme and horizon. Typing
the text and looking through the dictionary are to a great extent automa-
tized. But making up the text by putting down my thoughts in words is
much closer to the kernel of my personality. Thus, only superficial levels
of my personality are involved in such performances as habitual, routine
and even quasi-automatic typing, while the deeper levels of my personality
are involved in theoretical contemplation. In other words my paper
preparation is certainly thematic, while the other activities, also important,
seem to have turned away to the horizon.
But actually all these activities have never been ‘‘released from my
grip’’. A. Schutz insists that two different levels of our personality (both
the superficial and the deeper) are simultaneously involved, the theme of
the activity of one of them being reciprocally the horizon of the other;
so the actualized theme receives the specific tinge from the other, which
remains the hidden ground of the former. A. Schutz illustrates the point
by a comparison to the structure of music. Imagine two independent
themes which are simultaneously going on in the flux of music. We may
pursue one of them, taking it as the main theme, and the other as the
subordinate one, or vice versa: one theme is leading the other which has
never been released from our grip. And our consciousness, A. Schutz
insists, is just the same. In the light of this study, it essentially acquires
contrapuntal structure, which manifests the artificial split of our personal-
ity. It also implies that theme, field, horizon and relevance are different
when viewed subjectively (i.e. from the subject’s point of view) and objec-
tively, that is from the observer’s point of view. Putting into play different
levels of our personality (different tensions of consciousness and modes
of attention to life, dimensions of time, degrees of anonymity and intimacy)
‘‘the contrapuntal articulation of the themes and horizons pertaining to
each of such levels (including finally the schizophrenic patterns of the
ego) are all expressions of the single basic phenomenon: the interplay of
relevance structures’’.7
Hence, it is just the system of relevance that turns out to be one of the
most significant of A. Schutz’s concepts in his highly sophisticated theory
of the life-world.
Now let me briefly outline the basic system of relevance, used in
Reflections. There are three basic kinds of relevance he described in
Reflections: topical, imposed/intrinsic and interpretative relevance.
Topical relevance seems to be the most important for the whole theory.
By virtue of this relevance something is constituted as problematic in the
unstructured field of unproblematic familiarity. It organizes the field into
theme and horizon and segregates the former from its unquestionable
background which is simply taken for granted. Even though topical
relevance is closely connected with the so-called ‘‘actual interest’’, they
must not be confused: while actual interest presupposes existence of the
problem, topical relevance constitutes the problem itself. As far as unfamil-
iar experiences are concerned, A. Schutz suggests that we should distin-
guish imposed relevance from intrinsic relevance. If we do not thematize
unfamiliar experience by means of the will (a voluntary act), we call this
kind of relevance ‘‘imposed relevance’’. For example, you find an unfamil-
iar object in the middle of your room. You have no intention to study it,
but the object attracts your attention by its very unfamiliarity. There are
many other kinds of imposed topical relevance. The experience of shock,

which is peculiar to any shift of attention from one province of meaning
to another imposes new topical relevance; any nonvolitional change in
the level of our personality, any change of relative intimacy to relative
anonymity; any change in time-dimensions in which we live simulta-
neously imposes another topical relevance. In general, any interruption
in the smooth running of the basic life-world idealizations of ‘‘and so
forth, and so on’’ and ‘‘I can do it again’’ creates imposed topical relevance.
As usual topical relevance is imposed in the course of social interaction.
But there exists some topical relevance which appears entirely different
from those which are imposed. If we voluntarily structure a field of
perception into thematic kernel and horizon, we put into play intrinsic
relevance. It has two subdivisions: the first one consists in enlarging or
deepening the prevailing theme. The second implies the voluntary shifting
of attention from one topic to another, both of them being separate, i.e.
without any connection between them. In the first case the original theme
has been retained, and the original thematic kernel remains more or less
related to the changed one. As E. Husserl reveals, each theme may be
viewed as an unlimited field for further thematizations. It is the locus of
an infinite number of topical relevances which may be developed by
further thematization of the intrinsic content. Closer inspection reveals,
however, that we put into play another level of our personality or change
the interplay of time-dimensions in which we live simultaneously.
Concerning the given example of nonimposed relevance, it means that
what was previously horizontal has become thematic, but the new theme
has not been created. Rather, the original theme has been modified in
such a way that previously horizontal and now thematic elements have
become intrinsic to the theme. In the second case, i.e. in shifting to a
completely different theme, the original theme has been abandoned. It is
the case when I have completed my work or temporarily put it off till
next time; in such a case the original theme is no longer in my grip.
Turning back to the first case, we may see that the original theme remains
constant as a determining factor of all further subthematizations. For this
reason we may call it the paramount theme (by analogy with paramount
reality as the world of daily life). Thus we may say that topical relevance
is intrinsic to the paramount theme. The paramount theme is maintained
as the home base, and all the referential structures of topical relevance
derive their meaning from the intrinsic meaning of the maintained para-
mount theme. A. Schutz calls this particular system the intrinsic topical
relevance in contrast to the imposed topical relevance. As we have seen
earlier, it is characteristic of the imposed topical relevance, that the

articulation into the theme and horizon is imposed by the emergence of
an unfamiliar experience, by the shift of the attentional ray from one
province of meaning to another, while in the system of intrinsic topical
relevance we may or may not pay attention to the indications implicit in
the paramount theme – that is we may or may not transform the hori-
zontal surrounding into a thematic kernel.
An unfamiliar experience is thematically given to the interpretation.
The latter may be seen as the process by means of which we grasp the
meaning of what is now in the thematic kernel of the field. We have to
subsume it under the various typical prior experiences which constitute
our stock of knowledge at hand. But not all sedimented experiences are
used as a scheme of interpretation. There are a few coherent types of
previous experiences with which the present object may be compared,
interrelated by sameness, likeness, similarity. We may say they are relevant
to interpreting the new set of experiences. This kind of relevance is
obviously different from topical relevance. A. Schutz calls it interpretative
relevance. I can by comparison interpret, A. Schutz believes, typical
moments of the percept by typical moments of my previous experiences.
But what is relevant to the interpretation depends on both the objective
and the subjective context. Supposing I find a strange thing in the dark
corner of the house. It is equally similar to both a pile of rope and a
snake. The guess ‘‘a pile of rope’’ is more plausible in a sailor’s rather
than in my own house. But if I find this object in my own house, A.
Schutz suggests, I tend to interpret it as ‘‘a snake’’. If the object does not
move, it enhances the plausibility that it is lifeless. But hibernating snakes
do not move either; so I do not succeed in trying to identify the unfamiliar
object, since interpretatively relevant elements remain ambiguous and
both interpretations of the same thematic object are obviously still plausi-
ble. Many authors, including E. Husserl, were inclined to treat the hesita-
tion between doubtful interpretations as an oscillation between two
themes. In contrast to this, A. Schutz suggests that only one theme
prevails throughout the whole process as paramount. What is thematic
is always the percept of the same strange object in the corner of the room
– an object of such-and-such shape, color and size. He insists that ‘‘the
noema8 of this percept remains unchanged, despite all possible noetical
variations’’.9 But it is true, he argues, that in order to collect new inter-
pretatively relevant elements intrinsic to the same thematic object, I must
shift my attentional focus in such a way, that data, formerly horizontal,
are drawn into the thematic kernel. Nevertheless, in spite of all these
variations, the percept of the same object remains my home base, my

paramount theme which is never out of my grip.10
Interpretative relevance may be both imposed and intrinsic. The ambig-
uous guess which originates in the passive synthesis of recognition (in
which the object is perceived as ‘‘similar’’, ‘‘like’’, ‘‘of the type’’) is certainly
imposed. It lacks any volitional character. But as soon as problematic
possibilities (as E. Husserl calls them) have been established as equally
plausible interpretations of the same object, the additional interpretative
relevance will be obtained by a volitional turning to the intrinsic elements
of the paramount theme. In general, the interpretative relevance of my
first guess is experienced as imposed, while examination of the plausibility
of such an interpretation originates in voluntary activities. These activities
transform the imposed relevant moments of the perceptual theme into
intrinsic interpretative relevances. The ‘‘weight’’ of the outcome of the
interpretation, that is the degree of certainty which will satisfy me, depends
upon the situation. If I hesitate to interpret the unfamiliar object as a
pile of rope or a snake I need a higher degree of certainty than if I am
in doubt whether it is a pile of rope or a pile of clothes. But any
interpretations remain tentative, subject to verification or falsification by
supervening interpretatively relevant material.
Motivational relevance is neither topical nor interpretational. It does
not presuppose the articulation of the field of consciousness into theme
and horizon, because this field has remained unchanged. Nor does it refer
to the interpretatively relevant material at hand. This kind of relevance
refers to ‘‘in-order-to’’ and ‘‘because’’ motives. The dictionary defines
motive as any idea, need, etc., that impels one to act. But this definition
covers two different situations, which have to be separated. On the one
hand, it is an idea of the state of affairs to be brought about by the
actions. The projected goal is phantasized before we start our action. It
is the motive which inspires us ‘‘let’s go!’’ We act in order to bring about
the projected state of affaires. A. Schutz calls this kind of motive ‘‘in-
order-to-motive’’ of action. But if I place myself at the moment after my
action has already begun, I may express the same situation by means of
‘‘because’’ sentences. In other words, the paramount project is motivation-
ally relevant for the projection of single steps of action – the single steps
to be performed are ‘‘causally relevant’’ for bringing about the desired
result. In the example given I want to investigate the unfamiliar object
because I fear that it is a snake. My fear of snakes is genuine because the
motive of my project is to make a decision. Whereas ‘‘the in-order-to’’
relevance motivationally originates from the already established para-
mount project, ‘‘the because-of ’’ relevance deals with the motivation for
the establishment of the paramount project itself.
Motivational relevance may also be imposed or intrinsic. Choosing the
paramount project seems intrinsically motivationally relevant. It origi-
nates in voluntary act. All motivational relevances derived from the
paramount project are experienced as being imposed.
All the above-mentioned relevances are interconnected with one
another in many respects. Thus, the system of interpretational relevance
may be motivationally relevant for the building up of the new intrinsic
topically relevant systems, while my motivational relevances are nothing
but sedimentations of my previous experiences once topically or inter-
pretationally relevant. It is very important to understand, A. Schutz
suggests, how the system of interpretational relevance functionally
depends on the system of topical relevance. It is clear that there are no
interpretational relevances as such, but only interpretational relevances
referring to the given topic. They are experienced as taken together.
E. Husserl points out that, it is the act of reflection which brings the
performed activity into view: it is a necessarily artificial act, by means of
which the flux of experiences can be grasped as such. The same is true
for the systems of relevance. As A. Schutz maintains, in our mental
activities (or in a wider context ‘‘working’’ activity as well) we are directed
exclusively toward the theme of the field of consciousness, that is toward
the problem we are concerned with, the object of our interest or attention,
in short, toward what is topically relevant. Everything else is in the
margin, in the horizon; the motives of our actions are also in the margin
of the field, whether the motives are of the ‘‘in-order-to’’ type or ‘‘because-
of ’’ type. And implicit in the inner and outer horizons of the topic are
those elements which become interpretatively relevant to the ongoing
activity of our mind as regards the topically relevant thematic kernel.11
I may obviously turn to what is implicit in these horizons and bring such
elements into the thematic kernel. And this is very important for A.
Schutz’s conception of relevance (in contrast to Husserl’s): I may shift
my attentional focus without letting what is formerly topically relevant out
of my grip. If I do keep it in my grip, it continues to subsist as the main
topic in relation to which the formerly horizontal elements now brought
into the thematic kernel, are constituted as subtopics or subthemes having
manifold relations (foundedness, contiguity, modification and modaliza-
tion) to the main theme. On the other hand, it is the prevailing system
of motivational relevance (my ‘‘evoked interest’’), which may lead to
constitution of the new topical relevance: namely to investigate the atypi-
cal, the strange event, which interrupts the smooth running of the daily
life idealizations ‘‘And so forth, and so on’’ as well as ‘‘I can do it again’’.
If any counterproof invalidates the hitherto unquestioned course of experi-
ence, things cannot be taken for granted any longer. Finally, the newly
created topical relevance may be the origin and starting point for a set
of new motivational relevances: a formerly irrelevant topic may become
interesting and constitute a new topic or at least a subtopic. Though
unfamiliar and hitherto irrelevant to me, it becomes motivationally rele-
vant and worth investigating. In order to transform the horizontal impli-
cations of the main topic into subtopics, I must modify my system of
interpretational relevance. And the shift in the system of interpretational
relevance becomes a starting point for a set of new motivational or topical
relevances.
A. Schutz’s study of the interdependence of the three systems of rele-
vance clearly reveals that none of them can occupy a privileged position.
Furthermore, interrelationships among the types of relevance are not at
all chronological in the sense that one of them is ‘‘the first’’, and the other
– ‘‘the second’’ etc. All three types are obviously experienced as insepa-
rable, as an undivided unity, and their dissection into three types is the
result of an analysis of their constitutive origin. Any one of them may
become the starting point for bringing about changes in the other two.
Nevertheless, the distinction between the three may essentially contribute
to the various problems of social philosophy and epistemology.
A. Schutz faithfully believes, that:
– the theory of topical relevance will contribute to the concept of value
and our freedom in selecting the values by which we want to be guided
in our practical and theoretical life;
– the theory of interpretational relevance will throw fresh light on the
function and meaning of methodology and furnish the foundation of the
theory of rationalization, and especially of the problem of verification,
invalidation and falsification of propositions in relation to the empirical
facts; it will also contribute to the constitutive problems of typicality.
– the theory of motivational relevance will be helpful for the analysis of
problems relating to personality structure and especially for the theory
of intersubjective understanding.
A. Schutz himself did not obtain these results. But it seems very important
that the conception of relevances which he sophisticatedly developed can
not be viewed as complete and significant as such, but in its reference to
further problems. The author of Reflections himself clearly saw the obvi-
ous shortcomings of his theory of relevances. Thus he acknowledged that

he did not pay due attention to the problem concerning the emergent
novel experience, i.e. the experience of the absolutely unknown, which
could not be grasped in its typicality. It is just the kind of experience
which can become known only by radical modification of the whole
system of relevances prevailing for the time being. However, it is always
the meaning-context that has been taken for granted which constitutes
the framework of all possible future questions which might be interpreta-
tively relevant to the topic and which becomes motivationally relevant
for looking at the situation hitherto taken for granted.12
The novel experience, he suggests, has to fill a vacancy in our stock of
knowledge at hand. The unfinished analysis of the problem of vacancies
or enclaves (Leerstelle)13 seems to be through breaking, which leads to
new dimensions in the theory of knowledge, or rather the theory of the
unknown. Schutz intended to develop a systematic theory of the vacancy
and conceive the unknown by means of typicality of the vacancies.14 It
was thought to be phenomenological epistemology in the proper sense
of the word. Is not the concept of vacancy and contour connected with
the structurization of the theme and horizon? It may be supposed that
the shifting ray of attention is directed through the contours of the
vacancies. Turning again to the example of the hesitation between two
possible interpretations (snake or pile of rope?), he raises the question:
when are the given elements sufficient for interpretation? Or, using the
newly introduced term: to what extent do the given elements predelineate
the vacancies which remain undefined? Is there a kind of typicality which
can be fitted to these vacancies? In this respect the process of knowledge
can be conceived as filling-in vacancies of what is still not known, but
these vacancies themselves are already typically predelineated through
the contour-lines of what is already known. This is possibly a definition
of the meaning-context which is the clue to the study of the social world
phenomenologically interpreted. But hic egregie progressum sum.
Institute of Philosophy
Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russia
NOTES
1 Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff. Vol. 1, 1962: The Problem
of Social Reality; Vol. 2, 1964: Studies in Social Theory; Vol. 3, 1966: Studies in
Phenomenological Philosophy.
2 Russian translation: A. Wou, Pazmsıwlehnr o npovleme pelebme pelebahmhocmu (pep.

H. M. Cmnphoboi). B kh.: Alsfped Wzvpahhoe: mnp, cbetrwnicr cmsıclom. Mockba,
Poccpqh, 2004, C. 235–398.
3 Richard M. Zaner. Editor’s introduction to: Alfred Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of
Relevance. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1970, p. XIII.
4 W. James. Principles of Psychology. New York, 1890. Vol. 2. Ch. 21, pp. 283–322.
5 See: Husserliana. New York, Macmillan, 1931. Sec. 55.
6 Alfred Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance. New Haven and London, Yale
University Press, 1970, p. 13.
7 Ibid., p. 15.
8 Following E. Husserl, A. Schutz uses the terms ‘‘noema’’ and ‘‘noesis’’, which refer to
‘‘object-as-experienced’’ (noema) and the process of ‘‘experiencing-of-the-object’’ (noesis).
9 Alfred Schutz. Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, p. 41.
10 Ibid., p. 42.
11 Ibid., p. 67.
12 Ibid., p. 157.
13 This piece of the original manuscript concerning the brief sketch of a theory of ‘‘vacancy’’
was written in German and entitled ‘‘Philosophie der Leerstelle’’.
14 The term ‘‘knowledge’’ has to be conceived in the broadest possible sense: not only in the
sense of clarified and distinct knowledge, but as including all kinds of beliefs, from unfounded
blind beliefs to well-founded convictions.
ANJANA BHATTACHARJEE
DEMONSTRATING MOBILITY
This chapter derives from a demonstration given under the auspices of

the World Phenomenological Congress 2004 during a session on phenom-
enology and the human sciences, within the broader theme of the logos
of phenomenology and the phenomenology of logos. In an attempt to
render a faithful textual account of the demonstration as presented in
person, this paper is divided into three parts. Part I introduces the
phenomenological approach taken in putting together this current textual
rendition. Part 2 presents a transcript of the original demonstration, as
given during the Congress, which had been prepared in advance of the
session itself. Part 3 allows for some reflection on the demonstration in
hindsight, as at the time of writing this piece. An earlier and alternative
version of a textual rendering of the experiential phenomena here being
described can be found in Bhattacharjee (2004) in the context of ‘‘inter-
pretive’’ approaches to information systems and computing research.
1.
I find that I am in the process of turning now to structuring my writing

for reading. Both for reading that which is staring back at me on the
printed page as I type, and for your reading of that which I am hoping
to be demonstrating. It would not have been long ago when I would not
have known where or how to start. But I can now, and I think I may
already have. My state is a state of surrender to my task (Wolff, 2002a,
2002b), and I attempt to follow in Wolff ’s footsteps by placing my trust
in the ineluctable wording of the first time through. At least, at this stage,
I write what seems to come to me in peace and tranquility, so that this
point of zero might be placed between us as a form of beginning – just
here, just so. A stillness, a calm, in equipoise.
219
220 ANJANA BHATTACHARJEE
2.
Monday August 16, Staircase 9 – Room 1, Wadham College, Oxford,

England:
Demonstrating Mobility
The mobility of a researcher has been distinguished on a number of levels,

from the geographical location of a researcher to the economic/political
position of a researcher, to the access of a researcher to ubiquitous
information environments. Platforms of one form or another are available
for development to support such movement, whether it be on a physical
geospatial plane or via a virtual computer supported protocol. However,
there is one aspect of a researcher’s mobility that has yet to be made
explicit for potential development – a researcher’s capacity for ‘‘inter-
pretive’’ mobility.
There are a number of ‘‘interpretive’’ approaches and methods in use
for information systems and computing research. Each has its own way
of advising the researcher to bracket their engagement with the world in
order to come to an understanding of their various investigations. This
coming to an understanding is a movement in and of itself, and hence
can be a relevant aspect of a researcher’s capacity for mobility. In particu-
lar, this capacity can be relevant for being an effective researcher within
different cultural environments and/or across disciplines. As we move
towards cross-cultural research and trans-disciplinary investigations, it
may be helpful to have some way of facilitating the capacity for this kind
of researcher mobility, within and across research teams.
Let us begin therefore with a mobius strip as a first platform for
exploring such mobility – as an ‘‘aid to the sluggish imagination’’, Herbert
Speigelberg might say.1
If you don’t have one to hand, I have a few here that I prepared earlier
that we can distribute shortly. But first, let me show and tell a little (Rose,
1992), and invite you to follow my present instructions as to how this
thing is made.
$ I take a strip of a piece of paper.
$ And draw a line through the middle of it lengthwise on one side, using
a red pen.
$ I hold the strip out in front of me with one end in each hand, so that
I am looking at the red line I have just drawn, held so that it appears
horizontal to me.
DEMONSTRATING MOBILITY 221
$ I take one end of this strip and twist it away from me so that I can
only see about half of the horizontal red line, with the other parts
facing away from me.
$ (Note that at this stage I may decide that I would like to start again
with a modified strip of paper as it may not be long enough, or is too
wide in proportion to itself, to be flexible enough to twist without
perhaps forcing the paper to tear).
$ Now, having twisted my strip, I maintain that twist, and start to bring
the two ends towards each other so that I am able to place one end
directly on top of the other.
$ I hold the ends together so that the red line is meeting itself by
facing itself.
$ I secure the join with a few staples.
$ I am now holding a mobius strip.
$ [Please now feel free to each take a single mobius from this box as an
aid to the remainder of this presentation].
$ Let’s consider for a moment the red line we have drawn.
$ Now, I invite you to take a pen, if you have one, and place it at the
join where the staples are.
$ Without lifting the pen off the surface of your mobius strip, please
proceed to draw a continuous new line along the centre of the two
edges that present themselves to you as you move the pen along
the strip.
$ Have a go – I’ll repeat this instruction.
$ ‘‘Without lifting the pen off the surface of your mobius strip, please
proceed to draw a continuous new line along the centre of the two
edges that present themselves to you as you move the pen along
the strip’’.
$ Stop when you have arrived back where you started drawing this
new line.
$ Please take a moment to consider how this completed new line com-
pares to the completed red line.
$ [Pause].
Now, having completed this exercise, we are armed with some form of
tangible tool to aid our intended analytical movement between the per-
haps subtly different perspectives and orientations that may come under
a possible phenomenology of Logos – and Logos of phenomenology.
In the interests of time, I will skip a detailed discussion of what we
have just here demonstrated, but if you would like to discuss this further,
please feel free to speak to me afterwards, or correspond by email. Either

way, I will include a fuller exposition in the paper to be published in the
Analecta Husserliana in due course.
For the time being, therefore, let’s just say that this has been our first
exercise in ‘‘interpretive’’ mobility. It raises the issue of careful description
and of relevance. For example, we might admit that there are simpler
ways of describing how to make a mobius strip, but we may be wanting
to achieve something more than just the making of a mobius strip – we
may be wanting to make reference to some of the details of the process
itself. Describing how to make a mobius strip in one sentence might gloss
over some details that we would want to suggest as relevant for our
research objectives.
I asked that you attempt to draw a continuous new line. Perhaps
impossible, but hopefully this encouraged your best efforts – noting that
perhaps the size of the drawing hand is a factor in accomplishing this
task, perhaps not, if we were to have used a rather longer strip of paper,
or a different shaped pen.
Returning to our mobius
Now, with our mobius in view, we may appreciate that at first glance,
and perhaps from some distance, there appears to be a space inside and
a space outside of our strip. If we were to plot some of these points on
a two-dimensional graph, we may find that we have what looks like a
closed loop becoming apparent. Joining the dots together with a line of
best fit, we may then decide that there is a space inside the loop and a
space outside the loop from which we can research the things of the
world that our two-dimensional dot-to-dot looping theorises. Further,
here could arise a divisioning between our perceived angles of approach
to this theoretical boundary that is dividing our perceived research
domain-space. Divisions such as micro and macro, subjective and objec-
tive, internal and external, psychological and social.
However, this does not quite shed light on possible divisions between
a Logos of phenomenology and a phenomenology of Logos.
So, we return again to our mobius in view. This time we add an extra
dimension in order to hold the mobius in 2+1 dimensions. Our physical
representation of the mobius can be held in the air to facilitate our
handling of its form and demonstrate that, actually, from this view, there
is no division between space inside and outside the loop. We can notice
that the loop has one continuous surface only. [For example, you can
try tracing this surface with the pad of a finger tip all the way around.]
Now, although each surface at any one moment may have opposing
approaches to it, the surface as a whole does not division the domain-
space of research approach. The dualities of our previous two-dimensional
approximation to our loop are thus appearing to dissolve.
In particular, with regards to this session on phenomenology and the
social sciences, we notice that the relationship between phenomenology
and ethnomethodology becomes apparent – one as a 1st person phenome-
nology the other as a 3rd person phenomenology of Logos. Ethno-
methodology here is described as a distinctly phenomenological approach
to the social sciences following Anderson, Sharrock and Hughes (1985).
Immersion in vivo
So, one more exercise in tracing our analysis therefore. Let’s imagine
what would happen if you were to place your hand-made mobius in some
water and wait for the paper to become translucent. Perhaps you would
notice some mixing of the red and the new line that you yourself drew.
We know that the line you drew went all the way along our surface in a
single loop, but it had previously appeared that the red line had only
spanned half the distance. Now, in immersion, we find that actually, the
red line had existed all the way around all along, it had only had appeared
to disappear. Having said this, however, we might note that both would
arguably be appearing as a rather different kind of a colour, with it’s own
inherent relationships.
In short, this immersion explicates the in vivo experience of an ‘‘inter-
pretive’’ researcher – the Lebenswelt pair of Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenological reduction and the epoche of the ethnomethodologist
at the surface of our interactional interface with the lifeworld.
From closed world to infinite universe
One final experiential demonstration therefore. If I may invite you to

enter into a state of phenomenological reduction, or epoche – whichever
you tend to use when doing your own phenomenology.
Now, imagine a perfect circle in front of you, just out of arms’ reach.
If you could point to that circle with the tip of your finger and trace its
outline in the air. Follow your finger tip, as you observe the circle being
drawn. That circle is ‘‘over there’’ – I would suggest that its finite boundary
over there is an ideal.
What do I mean?
Okay, now imagine that there is a circle in front of you within arms’
reach. Try tracing the boundary of this circle with your fingertip, but this
time, trace the outside of the boundary with the pad of your finger tip as
if feeling your way along its surface. Feel the boundary all of the way
around, observing the movement of your finger pad, your hand, your
wrist, and your arm.
Are you not, in actuality, tracing a mobius form? Does your movement
not involve a twist in an experientially embodied dimension in order to
accomplish this task? A twist in 2+1 dimensional space?
This is the difference between Husserl’s (1936: 1970) origins of geometry
and the mathematicization of our Logos. This 2+1 dimension as com-
pared to a two-dimensional depiction. It is in this extra in vivo dimension
– in this experiential sense – that both the Logos of phenomenology and
phenomenology of Logos can be recovered as Lebenswelt pairs.
Livingston (1986) in his detailed study of the ethnomethodological
foundations of mathematics, describes how the early Greeks were ‘‘both
amazed and perplexed by mathematical proofs. On the one hand, the
objects of geometry were made available and described, and their proper-
ties were established, through the use of drawn figures. Yet the Greeks
recognised that the geometric objects themselves had a curious, unexpli-
cated relationship to their depiction.’’
I hope the demonstrations we have stepped through today have gone
some way towards explicating this ‘‘unexplicated relationship’’ – that is,
the relationship between the Logos of phenomenology and the phenome-
nology of Logos.
3.
I re-read the paragraphs above. I find no words yet to say any more than
I had done that day, and yet the transcript had no doubt then been
supplemented with gesture and co-presence and the doing of phenomenol-
ogy, together, as a gathering of persons familiar with the said mode at
the time. Had this then achieved a successful demonstration? Some sort
of phenomenological ‘‘proof ’’? Some way of demonstrating the gestalt-
coherence of that which we were practicing (Gurwitsch, 1964)? And what
of your reading of it at this time? Is this a first time?
I recently came across two studies that helped in my articulation of

this paper, in addition to Wolff ’s (2002a, 2002b) explication of surrender-
and-catch. The first study is that of Livingston (1995) on the idiosyncratic
specificity of the methods of physical experimentation. I find that where
Livingston speaks of experimental demonstration, we here are speaking
of experiential demonstration. Hence the requirement for ‘‘interpretive’’
mobility which I hope to be able to develop further in good stead. The
second study is that of Ashmore and Reed (2000), where the ‘‘innocent’’
apprehension of objects in the ‘‘first time through’’ is contrasted with the
‘‘nostalgic’’ revisiting of previously produced objects as work done in the
‘‘next time through’’.
I thus hope we can return to precisely this point of beginning in
due course.
Brunel University
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thank you to all those who participated in the original demonstration,

especially W. Kim Rogers for telling me immediately afterwards – ‘‘Now,
it’s obvious’’.
NOTE
1 Herbert Speigelberg has been attributed with this phrase in H. Garfinkel, Studies in
Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967), p. 38. Although I would
argue that the context of this phrase as used within ethnomethodological studies may differ
from Speigelberg’s actual intent, I have not been able to locate its original source. Here, the
‘‘quote’’ is used within the body of this demonstration by way of attempting to introduce an
explicit point of both possible departure and possible entry into perhaps taken-for-granted
dimensions of imagining as potential dimensions for exercising ‘‘interpretive’’ mobility.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Anderson, R. J., Hughes, J. A., and Sharrock, W. W. ‘The Relationship Between

Ethnomethodology and Phenomenology’, in Journal for the British Society of
Phenomenology 16(3) (1985): 221–235.
Ashmore, M. and Reed, D. ‘Innocence and Nostalgia in Conversation Analysis: The
Dynamic Relations of Tape and Transcript’, in Forum: Qualitative Social Research 1(3)
(2000) at http://qualitative-research.net/fqs/fqs-eng.htm accessed on-line at 28 October
2004.
Bhattacharjee, A. ‘ ‘‘Interpretive Mobility’’, IS and Computing’, in European Journal of

Information Systems 13(3) (2004): 167–172.
Gurwitsch, A. ‘The Field of Consciousness’. Pittsburgh, P.A.: Duquesne University Press,
1964, pp. 87–153.
Husserl, E. ‘The Origin of Geometry’, D. Carr (trans.), in T he Crisis of European Sciences and
T ranscendental Phenomenology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, Evanston,
1936: 1970, pp. 353–378.
Livingston, E. ‘The Ethnomethodological Foundations of Mathematics’. London, UK:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.
Livingston, E. ‘The Idiosyncratic Specificity of the Methods of Physical Experimentation’, in
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 31(3) (1995): 1–21.
Rose, E. ‘The Werald’. Boulder, C.O.: The Waiting Room Press, 1992, pp. 323.
Wolff, K. ‘A Whole, A Fragment’. Lanham, M.A.: Lexington Books, 2002a.
——. ‘What It Contains’. Lanham, M.A.: Lexington Books, 2002b.
AMY LOUISE MILLER
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SELF AS NON-LOCAL:

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND
RESEARCH REPORT
INTRODUCTION
In our post-industrial Western culture, we grow up with the prevailing

understanding of the parameters of our individual self. In that system,
‘‘I’’ am a separate individual who exists locally within the boundary of
my skin. My thoughts take place in my mind, the wiring for which is in
my brain, inside my head. There is an assumed one-to-one relationship
between my mind and my body. The reality of self is constructed as being
local and unified, to some extent, in all cultures, but, in Western cultures
in particular, unity is the sole allowably ‘normal’ state. I will call this the
‘local’ view of self, i.e., self as ‘attached’ to and bounded by the body in
space and time.
In my private practice as a Psychologist, I have worked with what is
called Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID), commonly called ‘multiple
personality.’ The central diagnostic feature of Dissociative Identity
Disorder is defined as, ‘‘... the presence of two or more distinct identities
or personality states ... that recurrently take control of behaviour ...’’
(American Psychological Assoc., 1994, p. 84).
I was particularly interested to note the frequent occurrence in these
clients of anomalous experiences, experiences that appear to present
exceptions to the commonly accepted rules governing the properties of
time, space and materiality. In fact, the system of alter personalities itself
seems to function according to assumptions of non-locality. As Braude
comments:
... multiple personality appears to challenge various familiar assumptions about the nature
of personhood. Most notably ... we tend to assume that a person has no more than one
mind, or that there is a one:one correlation between persons and bodies (Braude, 1995, p. 66).
I became interested in exploring the phenomenon of non-locality of self

in general and the non-locality of self in dissociative identity, in particular.
The relationship between early trauma, dissociative identity and anom-
alous experiences is well supported by research. Severe early repetitive
physical and/or sexual abuse is prominent in the histories of 85–97% of
227
228 AMY LOUISE MILLER
persons with DID (Putnam, Guroff, Silberman, and Barban, 1986; Kluft,
1987). Traditionally, theorists in this area have assumed that the over-
whelming nature of the trauma causes the psyche, which is in the brain,
to create a dissociative system of separate personalities.
Several studies have found a strong relationship between anomalous
experiences/beliefs and early traumas as well as dissociation or dissocia-
tive identity (Irwin, 1994; Pekala, Kumar, and Marcano, 1995; Ross, 1997;
Ross and Joshi, 1992). Michelle Bennet, after a review of the literature,
concluded that the emergence of DID and the prevalence of anomalous
experiences might be part of the same phenomenon. She states, ‘‘When
childhood or adult experiences of trauma lead to certain types of dissocia-
tive experiences, these biological states may open access to altered states
of consciousness in which paranormal events are experienced’’ (Bennet,
1999, p. 155).
The psychological awareness of dissociation in general and dissociative
identity in particular traces its roots back more than one hundred years
to the work of Pierre Janet (1859–1947). Freud, influenced by Janet,
‘‘... considered the core of pathology to be the internal impression of a
traumatic experience that, because of its unbearable nature, was sealed
off from the rest of the personality ...’’ (van der Kolk and van der Hart,
1989, p. 3). We later abandoned this position.
Janet delineated the syndrome that he called ‘hysteria’ which he saw
as an adaptation through narrowing of consciousness paired with dissoci-
ation in the face of memories related to frightening experiences. Bessel
van der Kolk comments that,
Janet believed that ... [This led to] the formation of new spheres of consciousness around
memories of intensely arousing experiences which [Janet] called ‘subconscious fixed ideas’
... the most extreme example of this is multiple personality disorder, where fixed ideas
develop into entirely separate identities (van der Hart & Friedman, 1989, p. 6).
Janet found that these ‘successive existences,’ as he called them, could

develop their own life histories.
William James, one of the fathers of psychology, concluded that Janet’s
formulations were valid. Though James, as Eugene Taylor comments,
had determined to, ‘‘... keep to the rational, the acceptable, and the strictly
scientific,’’ in his interpretations though he seemed compelled to go
beyond this boundary. James alludes to the condition of multiple person-
ality as a possible opening to the ‘supernormal powers’ or ‘spirit influ-
ences.’ He indicates that, ‘‘If they can occur, it may be that there is a
‘chink’ ... The tendency for the self to break up may, if there be spirit
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SELF AS NON-LOCAL 229
influences, yield them their opportunity’’ (Taylor, 1984, pp. 86–87; 91–92).
It appears that James was recognizing that there might be a connection
between the mechanism of dissociative identity and the prevalence of
anomalous experiences, indicating an opening to an alternate reality.
Ruth Blizard, in reviewing the literature mentions two comprehensive
studies which demonstrate that disorganized attachment combined with
trauma has been found to be a statistically significant predictor of a
complex dissociative disorder in adulthood (Carlson, 1998; Ogawa, 1997,
as cited in Blizard, 2003). Both trauma and disrupted attachment in early
childhood point to a disruption in safety and predictability of the environ-
ment, leading to panic and systemic overload. Complexes of dissociated
characteristics coalesce in dissociated entities/ personalities. It is the pri-
mary characteristic of dissociative identity, the apparent multiplicity of
selves somehow attached to one body, which provides an intriguing
introduction to considerations of non-locality of self in this phenomenon.
Recently, the relationship between the ‘‘normal’’ developmental trajec-
tory of self and that which results in complex dissociative conditions is
being reviewed. Daniel Brown contrasts the integrative/continuity perspec-
tive with the multiplicity/discontinuity perspective. In the former case,
‘‘... conscious experience is relatively continuous, and ... the ordinary
sense of self is relatively unitary or cohesive ...’’ (Brown, 2003, p. 1). In
the case of the latter, ‘‘... conscious experience is relatively discontinuous,
and ... the ordinary sense of self is more a multiplicity of various discrete
self or ego states.’’ This view of consciousness as discontinuous allows for
the normalizing of dissociative identity, potentially reframing it as an
extreme case of the ‘ordinary’ arrangement of self. The notion of self as
multiple becomes more of a creative reality and less of an aberration.
Antonio Damasio comments that, ‘‘In some respects it is astonishing that
most of us have only one character’’ (Damasio, 1999, p. 225).
To underscore the distinct discontinuity between alter personalities,
there is a significant body of literature reporting changing physiological
indicators between separate alter personalities. Inter-alter physiological
differences suggest that a switch from one personality to another may
instigate a change all the way down to the cellular level.
In sum, current as well as classical views point to a number of factors
which could be construed as contributing to a non-local mechanism for
dissociative identity. Repetitive systemic overload accompanied by a nar-
rowing of focus, significant physiological changes, and the necessity of
eliminating traumatic material from conscious awareness could, in an
immature and discontinuous system of sub-personas/states of conscious-
ness, provide an opening into non-local aspects of consciousness as

expressed through the dissociative identity system and accompanying
anomalous experiences. The resulting system of dissociative identities may
be considered to be made up of discontinuous entities which exist outside
the local understanding of self. The purpose of my research project is to
identify information, which could support this interpretation.
Proving the bona fide ‘‘existence’’ of non-locality of self would be a
problematic endeavour. Any body of evidence in this area is always open
to contention depending upon the implicit view of reality of the inter-
preter. Further, the self is not available for direct observation. Therefore,
rather than look at locality of self from the ‘outside,’ I have decided to
look at it from the ‘inside’ as a lived experience. I have explored the
experiences of self of dissociative identity research participants, what
could be called their ‘‘perceived locality of self.’’ That is, I have investigated
the ideas that the participants have about the nature of their self/selves
with respect to non-local phenomena and function. My primary research
question is: How do persons with dissociative identity understand the
nature of their self with respect to the quality/dimension of locality?
In approaching this research, it is necessary to define terms. The term
‘‘self,’’ on its face a very simple, innocuous word, could easily become a
very slippery fish. The self is that which is aware. Further, it is the
subjective origination point of awareness usually referred to as ‘‘I.’’
Transpersonal psychologist, William Braud, suggests that the self is
defined by ‘‘knowing, being, and doing’’ (Braud, 1999, p. 13). Identification
with what Swami Dayananda Saraswati calls the ‘body-mind-sense com-
plex’ is the conventional type of self-identity (Dayananda, 1994). In this
case, the individual perceives herself to be mentally and physically sepa-
rate from others and limited to forms of knowing, being and doing
governed by a conventional understanding of time, space and causality.
This type of understanding of self is implicit in everyday ‘operations.’
Taken from the third person perspective, Cook-Greuter’s definition of
self from the ego development tradition in psychology: ‘‘that faculty which
synthesizes experience from all sources into a coherent whole,’’ is useful
in its succinctness (Cook-Greuter, 2000, p. 90).
Self can be viewed from the ‘outside’ or third person perspective a la
Cook-Greuter. It can also be viewed from the first person or phenomeno-
logical perspective. This latter has to do with the subjective sense of self
and the nature of the self-identity which characterizes this subjective
sense. In some fundamental sense, this research, in its operational aspect,
taking the first person perspective, will take ‘self ’ to mean whatever the
individual participants project its meaning to be.
The term ‘‘non-local’’ which I defined briefly above originated in the
field of physics As Amit Goswami notes, Einstein commented that, ‘‘The
assumption of locality – that all interactions between material objects are
mediated via local signals – is crucial to the materialistic view that objects
[including humans] exist essentially independent and separate from one
another’’ (Goswami, 1995, p. 46). Conversely, Goswami defines non-local-
ity as ‘‘communication or propagation of influence without local signals’’
(op. cit., p. 204). Braud, defines the term ‘non-local’ from a third person
perspective as, ‘‘human potentials or abilities beyond those that are
mediated by conventional sensori-motor processes or conventional ener-
getic and informational exchanges’’ (Anderson, Braud and Valle, 1996
p. 4).
Neither of the above definitions considers the specific case of self. They
are concerned with the other-than-local aspects of objects, energy, and
information. Self is looked upon (actually, implicated) to be local in two
ways. First, self is seen as local when it is embedded in a thoroughly local
understanding of reality, i.e., an understanding in which ‘mind’ emerges
from ‘brain.’ Second as an extension of the aforementioned local under-
standing, self is seen as local to the body, indissolubly linked to a material
entity. Any understanding of self as non-local will involve phenomena
which break down the boundaries of these premises of locality.
Paradoxically, upon closer examination, we find that the locality of self
is tenuous at best. Self as a concept has an indeterminate connection to
material existence. Self cannot be pointed to, i.e., objectified. It is ulti-
mately, in any system, subjective. The question of its locality has plenty
of leeway for interpretation from any perspective.
Christian De Quincey, when discussing non-local consciousness, sug-
gests that the proper term should be ‘nonlocated’ to indicate that con-
sciousness is, ‘‘... not located anywhere in space at all. It is nonspatial’’
(de Quincey, 1999, p. 30). De Quincey’s distinction underscores the prem-
ise of this research that self may be viewed as outside of the spatio-
temporal grid. The validity of de Quincey’s point notwithstanding, I will
stay with the term ‘non-local.’
METHODOLOGY
What are the implications of the research question in terms of appropriate

methodology? First, this research question is about a phenomenon that
is an emerging topic of research. The method used should cast a fairly

wide net. Second, the research question is about a phenomenon that is
implicit for the participants. Douglas MacDonald mentions the measure-
ment issue of ‘‘ineffability’’ (MacDonald, LeClair, Holland, Alter, and
Friedman, 1995, p. 174). William Braud, cites James on the ineVability of
the mystical experience, ‘‘that no adequate report of its contents can be
given in words (James, 1985[1902] as cited in Braud, 2002b, p. 142). The
methodology employed must guide the participant in the direction which
encourages introspection and allows for the implicit to become explicit.
Third, the research question is a question which asks about a phenome-
non which is intrapsychic. This is research which deals with the non-
observable. The data derived from this research will indicate characteris-
tics of the map and, from the map, the territory will be inferred. Fourth,
it is a question that asks how something is understood. There are two
aspects of that question. The first is, ‘‘what is experienced about the
nature of the self.’’ The second is, ‘‘what implicit understandings are
drawn from that experience.’’ Both of these questions require an answer
by means of a method that elicits rich, descriptive data.
Finally, it is a question which implies a process, i.e. the process of
experiencing and then forming a sense of something related to those
experiences. This research will investigate a ‘‘slice of life,’’ a moment
suspended in time. The research question demands a method which dips
into the ongoing stream of a process and extracts a reflection of that
process with as great a degree of verisimilitude as possible. It is incumbent
on the researcher to minimally disturb the process by examining the
phenomenon, as much as is possible, ‘‘in situ’’ in order to avoid causing
distortion of the data which emerges. To summarize, we are looking for
a research methodology which casts a wide net while uncovering and
encouraging descriptive expression of an implicit process with as little
disturbance as possible of that process. Further, a methodology which
embraces the nonobjectifiable is needed in support of this research.
A post-modern approach which moves from an objective to a socially
constructed world is appropriate for this problem. This approach, says
Kenneth Gergen, ‘‘proposes that arguments about what is really real are
futile’’ (Gergen, 2001, p. 806). In such a world, as Patti Lather comments,
identities are always in flux and, ‘‘the self becomes an empirical contin-
gency’’ (Lather, 1990, as cited in, Rappoport, 1993, p. 133). The post-
modern view allows one to explore the inner experience of the locality of
self in the empirical context, the ‘‘culture,’’ of dissociative identity. More
specifically, this project is concerned with transcendent aspects of self.
Leon Rappoport notes that, ‘‘postmodern thought undermines the

modern ego-mind barrier to transcendence’’ (Rappoport, 1993, p. 135).
Steve Baumgardner sees the postmodern in terms of ‘‘postmodern
science’’ which, ‘‘... embraces ... ‘reality’ as a cognitive construction’’
(Baumgardner and Rappoport, 1996, p. 122). He suggests that postmod-
ernism, ‘‘carries important implications for restructuring conventional
theoretical assumptions regarding the self and identity’’ (op. cit., p. 133).
He sees the self as, ‘‘... a relatively decentralized, flexible, horizontal
system ...’’ as opposed to the modern view of a ‘‘... centrally organized
hierarchical system.’’ Baumgardner he states that postmodernism chal-
lenges, ‘‘... the idea of a single sense of identity’’ (ibid.). He posits a theory
of ‘‘possible selves’’ in which, ‘‘... the self would appear multifaceted and
pluralistic’’ (ibid.). Both Baumgardner states that, ‘‘Postmodern views
suggest that conceptions of self should be opened to a broader range of
multiple and simultaneous possibilities’’ (ibid.). The dimension of decen-
tralization and that of plurality are better able to encompass and normal-
ize dissociative identity than modern conceptions of self. In light of this
comment, dissociative identity could almost be construed as an instructive
example of the postmodern self.
The phenomenological approach, in particular, seems to have signifi-
cant applicability to this project. Maurice Natanson notes that, ‘‘The first
step in phenomenological philosophy is reflection on the meaning or
essence of the experience of consciousness’’ (Natanson, 1973, p. 57,
excerpted in Robbins, 2003, p. 2). Phenomenological methods in the social
sciences have emerged from classic phenomenology as seen initially in
the works of Edmund Husserl.
Husserl’s phenomenological approach was greatly influenced by
William James and his ‘‘radical empiricism.’’ C. Jason Throop remarks
that James’ view was that, ‘‘no element or phenomena that are directly
experienced can be excluded from reality’’ (Throop, 2000, p. 36). James
commented that, ‘‘... a real place must be found for every kind of thing
experienced ... in the final philosophic arrangement’’ (James, 1904, p. 534).
He insisted on the legitimization of altered states of consciousness and
transcendent experiences.
Parelleling James, Husserl wanted philosophy to turn to a, ‘‘pure
description of what is’’ (Robbins, 2003). As Merleau-Ponty wrote, the
phenomenologist returns ‘‘to the world which precedes (scientific descrip-
tion) ... in relation to which every scientific characterization is an abstract,
as is geography in relation to the countryside’’ (op. cit., pp. 3–4). Husserl’s
concern with the essential experience of consciousness, shares its subject

matter with this project.
Husserl’s phenomenology bears on the methodology of my particular
research in an interesting if somewhat oblique way. Hanna points out
that, for Husserl,
the unbuilding [sic] or deconstruction of the conceptually constructed world was an intrinsic
aspect of the approach ... The final phase of the method – the transcendental reduction –
was the sphere of pure consciousness in which Husserl’s transpersonal insights came to
fruition ... Consistent with many transpersonal mystical themes, Husserl ... distinguished
between the transcendental ego and the psychological ego (Hanna, 1993, p. 183).
Husserl’s research strategy was to use himself as subject, employing the

method of epoche, which Piet Hut describes as follows:
... a switch to an attitude in which all that appears is seen and acknowledged as it appears,
in its own structure of appearing without tying it down immediately to the usual external
explanatory framework (of a physical world ...). (Hut, 1996, p. 11)
Hut comments that, for Husserl, the epoche was not just a ‘metaphorical
device,’ it was, ‘‘a deeply personal change in the way he related to life ...’’
(ibid.). Hut goes on to emphasize the transpersonal aspect of Husserl’s
experience:
... his [Husserl’s] description, in those rare passages where he tells us something about his
more personal engagement with the epoche is very much akin to that of a mystic trying to
find words to describe an experience that cannot be conveyed in words (ibid.).
Thus, we see that phenomenology is a method which leaves room for the
transpersonal and mystical ways of experiencing and understanding the
ego/self.
Phenomenological psychologist, Amedeo Giorgi, interviewed by
Christopher Aanstoos, discusses Husserl, transpersonal psychology, and
transcendental subjectivity of classical phenomenology. Giorgi comments
that, ‘‘there may be a way in which what the transpersonalists are pointing
to [is] the same thing that Husserl is pointing to ... our personal subject-
ivity can access a field of subjectivity’’ (Aanstoos, 1996, p. 11). He goes
on to delineate the transcendental reduction as, ‘intense receptivity,’ which
requires that we, ‘still all that ego stuff ’ (Aanstoos, 1996, p. 13). Giorgi
concludes that, ‘‘... if you could develop the reduction that would be one
way of exploring transcendental subjectivity’’ (loc. cit.). He describes
several levels of reduction, concluding with the deepest level, ‘‘... the
transcendental phenomenological reduction, which brackets the empirical

subject as well as the world’’ (Giorgi, 1997, p. 240). Husserl’s method,
developed in conjunction with the exploration of transpersonal experi-
ence, could be said to be particularly appropriate to illuminate a phenom-
enon of a transpersonal nature such as a non-local understanding of self.
While Husserl believed that objective interpretation of experience was
possible using the epoche, or bracketing (separating out), the subjectivity
inhering in the interpreter’s life-world, L ebenswelt, the world of personal
experience and desires, Heidegger, in the tradition of existential phenome-
nology, denied that bracketing is possible.
[He contended] that as a necessary part of human ‘‘being-in-the-world’’ (Dasein) things are
perceived according to how they are encountered and used ... Perception and apprehension
thus move from fore-knowledge to an existential understanding, a largely unreflective ...
grasp of a situation ... (Mallery, 1994, p. 1)
Rolf von Eckartsberg comments that, Dasein: ... ‘‘bridges the subject-
object split,’’ a bridging which is necessary when examining the self (Von
Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 14).
The philosophy of existential phenomenology seems to provide the
foundation for an ideal set of premises leading to a methodology appro-
priate for exploring sense of self. Ronald Valle observes that,
‘‘Existentialism as the philosophy of being became intimately paired with
phenomenology as the philosophy of experience because it is our experi-
ence alone that serves as a means or way to inquire about the nature of
existence (i.e. what it means to be)’’ (Valle and Mohs, 1998, p. 96). Valle
notes that phenomenological methods in social science are the ‘‘manifest,
practical form of this inquiry’’ (ibid.).
Though the phenomenological method used to gather this data might
be thought to be ‘‘non-scientific,’’ Jenny Wade’s comment on this is
of note:
Traditional scientific methods are ill equipped, any prejudice aside, to understand Non-
Newtonian states. ... Phenomenology and other forms of qualitative experimental research
may provide better methodologies for studying levels of consciousness outside the
Newtonian range [i.e., non-local aspects of consciousness] (Wade, 1996, p. 269).
Von Eckartsberg comments that, ‘‘the existential-phenomenological

approach in psychology does qualitative research, that is, meaning analysis
and explication of descriptions of real-life experiences’’ (von Eckartsberg,
1998, p. 17). Bennet notes that phenomenology [in psychology] is a form
which seeks to, ‘‘describe and contextualize knowledge within the meaning
frame of the knower’’ (Bennet, 1999 p. 161). James Barrell comments that,
‘‘Phenomenological research aims to understand the meaningfulness of
human experience as it is actually lived’’ (Barrell, Aanstoos, Richards,
and Arons, 1987, p. 446).
One of the important aspects of the existential phenomenological
approach in the social sciences, as derived from classical phenomenology
is the concept of the pre-reflective, Valle explains that the purpose of such
research is, ‘‘... to articulate the underlying lived structure of any meaning-
ful experience on the level of conceptual awareness’’ (Valle and Mohs,
1998, p. 98). Further, he comments that, ‘‘... each individual’s life-world
emerges at the level of reflective awareness as meaning,’’ and that meaning
is the, ‘‘manifestation in conscious, reflective awareness of the underlying
prereflective structure of the particular experience being addressed’’ (ibid.).
He expands on this concept by noting that, ‘‘Reflective conceptual experi-
ence is ... a preconceptual, and, therefore, prelanguaged, foundational,
bodily knowing that exists ‘as lived’ before or prior to any cognitive
manifestation of this purely felt-sense’’ (Anderson et al., 1996, p. 24).
Of note is the resemblance to James’ concept of, ‘‘pure experience which
formed the foundation of radical empiricism and is summarized by Jason
Throop as follows:
According to James, in its most ‘pure’ state, ‘experience is prior to distinction between
subject and object ... no differentiation between ... self and world, since the identical ‘bit’
of pure experience once reflected upon functions as both the qualities of the objects in
experience and the various states of consciousness in which those qualities inhere (James
1996 [1912], pp. 7, 13, & 37 as cited in Throop, 2003, p. 229).
The current research project seeks to bring the meaning of the pre-
reflective into conscious awareness.
Ferrence Marton, the originator of the phenomenographic application
phenomenology to social science comments that, ‘‘a way of experiencing
something is an internal relationship between the experiencer and the
experienced’’ (Marton, 1997, p. 115). Marton comments that experiences,
‘‘being located neither in the subject nor in the world, being neither mind
nor matter. ... An experience is of its essence nondualistic’’ (op. cit., p. 122).
Thus, using phenomenographical type of approach to explore partici-
pant’s direct, non-dualistic, gestalt of the experience of the self is appro-
priate for the project at hand.
Braud, when exploring research methods for transpersonal studies,
identified the phenomenological approach as among the most qualitative
of approaches and placed it at the ‘‘ideographic’’ end of a posited contin-
uum of conventional disciplined inquiry methods (Anderson et al., 1996,

p. 2). At this end of the continuum, the research provides, ‘‘the greatest
appreciation of experiences themselves and of the ways in which the
actual experients perceive and interpret their experiences ...’’ Further, he
defined transpersonal psychology as that which, ‘‘studies experiences and
processes that extend or go beyond ... the usual limits of ego and personal-
ity. It concerns itself with consciousness and unusual states of conscious-
ness ...’’ (op. cit., p. 3).
Then, in a discussion of transcendent awareness, Valle goes beyond the
concept of prereflective structures. He comments:
... these types of awareness are not really ‘‘experience’’ in the way we normally use the
word, nor are they the same as our prereflective sensibilities ... Transcendent awareness
seems somehow prior to this reflective-prereflective realm, presenting itself as more of a
space or ground from which our more common experience and felt-sense emerge ... which
appears to be inclusive of the intentional nature of mind but not of it (op. cit., p. 25).
Valle notes that this ‘‘ground’’ can be described as, ‘‘... a reality not of (or
in some way beyond) time, space and causality as we normally know
them’’ (op. cit., p. 26). Finally, Valle contends that, ‘‘This, for me, is the
bridge between existential/humanistic and transpersonal! transcendent
approaches in psychology ...’’ and suggests that phenomenological
research which addresses issues of this sort be called ‘‘transpersonal
phenomenological psychology’’ (ibid.). It is clear that an exploration of
non-local aspects of one’s sense of self falls within this area.
In conclusion, this methodology section has identified the importance
of a phenomenological approach for this project, tracing this approach
from its classical Husserlian roots through existential phenomenology
in its contemporary applications, to the, very current, transpersonal
phenomenological approach.
RESEARCH METHODS
There are two semi-projective methods which I have designed specifically

for this project. The impetus for their development was consideration of
the implicit nature of the sense of self which does not lend itself to direct
questioning. The ‘‘semi-projective’’ exercise provides some structure which
guides the participant towards the research target area while, at the same
time, allowing the participant to ‘‘dream into’’ the target area while
completing the exercise in a relatively free-form way.
I have called the first of these methods the Personal Construct Exercise.
The inspiration for this Exercise came from George Kelly’s Personal
Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955). As Valerie Stewart comments:
Kelly’s theory rests on the assumption that people are actively engaged in making sense of,
and extending, their experience. ... The personal constructs in Kelly’s theory refers to the
set of models, or hypotheses, or representations, which each person has made about their
world (Stewart, 2004).
I explore the participant’s personal construct of ‘‘self ’’ using small indivi-

dual cards each of which has a single word. The word list mixes terms
from the material realm with those derived from discussions of expanded
sense of self in the spiritual and psychological literature. I ask the partici-
pant to sort and lay out the word cards in a way that represents how
they are perceived as relating to the central card labeled ‘‘SELF.’’ The
Personal Construct Exercise (PCE) bypasses the verbal modality entirely
while still remaining in the comfortable arena of words.
The second semi-projective method combines Tony Buzan’s ‘‘mind-
map’’ and Joseph Novak’s ‘‘concept map’’ (Buzan and Buzan, 1993;
Novak and Gowing, 1984). Both of these very similar modalities involve
drawing spatial diagrams of concepts. Again, verbal instructions are mini-
mal. The participant is shown two model maps using concepts unrelated
to this project. The instructions involve putting the word ‘self within a
circle at the starting point with several lines going out from the term
‘‘self ’’ and, from there, related concepts are added. As this process is
elaborated, a spider web type diagram is developed. Instructions include
permission to build on or modify the basic format in whatever way makes
sense to the participants. I am calling this exercise MAP. For both the
Personal Construct Exercise and the Mapping Exercise, an informal
conversation that begins with an open-ended question such as, ‘‘Tell me
about what you’ve done here’’ follows the exercise, resulting in a conversa-
tion probing the material that emerges.
SELECTED DATA
The body of data to be described herein is selected from the larger project
in which dissociative identity participants and long-time meditators
receive a protocol which combines exploratory questionnaires, semi-pro-
jective exercises and taped interview/discussion. Here we will focus almost
entirely the semi-projective exercises and ensuing discussions from two
dissociative identity participants. Examples will be given from two areas:

(1) The participant’s sense of themselves as non-local, and (2) The partici-
pant’s narratives about the role of non-locality in their dissociative
identity.
The data to be presented is selected for its particular content. Not all
participants in the dissociative identity group had a clear sense of non-
local aspects of self. Some of those who perceived non-local aspects of
self were ambivalent about recognizing and accepting them. In general,
it appeared that an unambivalent understanding of non-locality of self
may tend to coincide with later stages of healing/recovery from the
dissociative identity condition. The participants presented here, from
Trudy and Sammi, both consider their alter personalities to be integrated
(a recent event for Sammi). Though there is often a tendency to return
to previous dissociative patterns in times of stress, neither Trudy nor
Sammi would receive the diagnosis of dissociative identity at this time.
However, the dissociative identity experience is very much ‘alive’ for them.
The first question to be considered is: what is shown in the data about
perceived locality of self in dissociative identity participants? Trudy, a
woman in her early 60’s, is a survivor of severe early sexual abuse as well
as programmed mind control. Her PCE demonstrates how non-locality
is an integral part of her life’s journey [Appendix #1]. Trudy lays out
her cards in her PCE in a progression with the SELF card in the lower
left moving up to the GOD card in the upper right. She states:
To me, it’s starting with self and moving through all those other things up to, in this
particular case, the top, which is God. In that cluster, I’ve included the whole concept of
eternity, spirit and consciousness because to me that’s where universal consciousness lies ...
Self [lower left] begins with a death from one reality into another ... The birth process is
a dying process ... this whole process is trying to get back here [upper right] ... Back to
God and the universal aspects of mind ... self is a starting point and the objective is to
move self from here to there [lower left to upper right], still be self, but be part of something
much, much bigger. To be part of something so interconnected that there is no separation
and yet there is a mind.., at the same time. Before implantation in the womb, there’s a
preexisting self and it’s here [upper right]. It’s a fight to get back there ...
Sammi, a woman in her early 50’s connects to an expanded sense of

self through ‘Edmund’ an inner guide figure who emerged for her long
before she became aware of her multiplicity. In her MAP, Edmund is
represented by the term SOUL. Sammi draws a ‘‘cycle’’ in which SELF
connects to SOUL which connects back to SELF [Appendix #2]. In the
center of this cycle are KNOWLEDGE and WISDOM. All of these
appear to be related to the non-local in terms of Sammi’s meaning system.

She states:
... there’s a cycle here [center-top] that keeps the self and the soul [connected] ... and the
emotions are kind of pulled together now ... this inner wisdom is connected to this universal
thing. I feel like this knowledge comes from out there somewhere ... [the] central thing is
still feeling this connection to the knowledge and the wisdom ... through me. Like there is
a cycle there, that I can pull from ... when I need strength ... I think that’s [SOUL] that
connection ... that I feel connected to that support and guidance ... there’s a sense of love
there that’s not from an external other ... I don’t connect that part of me to God, or I don’t
see it in religious terms. It just feels like a very strong connection. To know that the way
this part of me manifested himself, and that I actually have this image of my soul if you
will ... he represents that love and the knowledge and the wisdom, but I also know that
he’s connected to this to this total unknown that I just accept and trust ... it feels like he
has one foot in me, and one foot in this universal thing. He’s always tapped into that. He
guides what I’m tapped into. It’s like he’s a filter for whatever’s out there and what I need
to know ...
Sammi comments about some remote viewing experiments she has been
doing (for amusement with a friend) with some success:
It was, like, how can your brain do that? I think it’s that part of you being in the universal
consciousness ... The mind has this capacity ... I think the mind goes beyond realms of
what most people think. I see the mind as not being this thing that’s just contained in your
head ... that it goes through this part of me that I know of as my inner wisdom. [He’s the
intermediary]
Here Sammi states unequivocally that she sees mind as expanded and
non-local. Her inner-guide figure, Edmund, connects her to non-local
realms.
Next, let us explore some narratives which reveal views about the
mechanism of DI. Data about the DI participant’s sense of the locality
of their own alter system is less abundant than in some other areas.
Participant’s varied widely in their ability to reflect in this area.
Trudy seemed to have the most un-conflicted sense of her dissociative
system being non-local in nature. She states that, [the trauma she survived
led her]:
... To live in a subconscious realm. To have selves that live there, not here ... They live in
a whole different reality ... They are embodied in an entirely different universe ... It’s not
here, it’s there. Then it was as real as this is to me now? [and] The sub-conscious reality
has nothing to do with any of this [material reality] ... It’s almost alien to it ... it connects
into the alternate realities ...
Trudy goes on to describe an EMDR therapy session in which she had

insight into the creation of her alters.
I got to witness my organic brain, looking into my own brain, to see this split ... to recognize
the self that literally left the body ... a strand of self that was born ... the original self, the
self that was born. When I integrated, I move myself back into my head.
Sammi’s following comment on the relevance of her trauma history

indicates that, like Trudy, she saw her history as integral to her accessing
non-local realms.
I still experience this wisdom and guidance as a part of me ... Now that I’m whole again,
that would have been my inner wisdom no matter what ... I also kind of have a theory,
which has been validated in at least one book that I’ve read. That people with DID, maybe
it’s not DID but trauma at least, some trauma, in childhood, kind of get a jump start on
that wisdom coming to the forefront because the child needs a survival mechanism. So,
there’s sort of an internal care system that’s happening. That’s the sense that I get.
In this brief presentation of data, it is clear that dissociative identity may

be perceived as having decidedly non-local aspects which are integral to
the individual’s sense of self as non-local and their sense of the role of
their trauma history/dissociative identity in their personal development.
CONCLUSION
This paper has endeavored to introduce a conceptualization of non-

locality of self, particularly as it applies to the condition of dissociative
identity. Several considerations, including the issue of discontinuity of
self, relevant to the view that the nature of self in dissociative identity
can be seen as having a non-local aspect were explored. The application
of phenomenology, particularly existential transpersonal phenomenology
to research in this area was discussed.
In a partial report of ongoing research, two semi-projective exercises
designed specifically to elicit sense of self and to aid participants in
expressing their implicit understanding of the nature of their self were
described. Finally, some examples were presented of dissociative identity
participant’s responses to these exercises illustrating perceptions of self
as non-local. The material which emerged from the research sessions is
vivid and rich in detail as well as illustrative of the focal dimension of
this enquiry. Though this is a preliminary foray into a totally new area
of investigation, it appears that an appropriate choice of methodology
has been translated into a useful research method.
St. Martin’s College

L ancaster University
UK
APPENDIX
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——. Essays in Radical Empiricism. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996 [1912]
(cited in Throop, 2003).
Lather, P. Postmodernism and the human sciences. T he Humanistic Psychologist (Special
issue ‘‘Psychology and Postmodernity’) 18(1) (1990): 64–84 (cited in Rappoport, 1993).
Natanson, M. Phenomenology and the social sciences. In: M. Natanson (ed.), Phenomenology
and the Social Sciences, Vol. I. Evanston, ILL: Northwestern University Press, 1973 (cited
in Robbins, 2003).
Ogawa, J. R., Sroufe, L. A., Weinfield, N. S., Carlson, E. A. and Egeland, B. Development and
the fragmented self: Longitudinal study of dissociative symptomatology in a nonclinical
sample. Development & Psychopathology 9(4) (1997): 855–879 (cited in Blizard, 2003).
SECTION III
LOGOS IN EXISTENTIAL COMMUNICATION
( PSYCHIATRY )
SIMON DU PLOCK
AN EXISTENTIAL –PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE

OF PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING
The aim of this paper is to discuss commonalities and differences between

the theoretical stance and clinical practice of existential-phenomenological
psychotherapy and the currently-developing profession of philosophical
counselling, with the aim of identifying whether a dialogue between the
two might be possible and productive.
I come to the emerging profession of philosophical counselling with a
naive, curious attitude – just as I come to a client – and I am eager to
know what philosophical counselling is about and whether it offers some
useful insights which I need to be aware of in my practice as a therapist.
I also come with the recognition of an opportunity – to take a look at a
new area of theory and practice. This questioning attitude is of a part
with my way of being a therapist: I question myself constantly – am I an
existentialist; am I phenomenological; am I integrative ... what am I
doing/why am I doing it? For whom?
At the core of my practice is a wish not to become sedimented. When
I meet with my clients I can be certain of very little – I am sure I am not
meeting them as an expert, I know I do not have the answers to their
problems. Something may emerge in the relationship between the two of
us, but it still may well not be an answer, though it may be a different
perspective.
I also know that I do not want to be defined by the rules of a club; I
have fought hard for my freedom and autonomy and I have no wish to
give it up or pretend to myself that I have fewer choices in return for
security, status, power or money. I am glad that my ties of fellowship
with other existential psychotherapists are informative rather than
prescriptive. Indeed I often feel more different from than similar to those
with whom I associate. I am attracted to questioning minds rather than
closed systems, and at the same time I know I have to be constantly
vigilant so as not to give in to a deep-seated wish to belong, to have
approval, to be a member of Heidegger’s ‘they’ (das Man).
Roger L. Shinn expressed the dilemma well when he wrote:
Almost any self-respecting existentialist refuses to call himself an existentialist. To say, ‘‘I
am an existentialist’’, is to say ‘‘I am one of that classification of people known as existential-
249
250 SIMON DU PLOCK
ists’’; whereas the existentialist wants to say, ‘‘I am myself – and I don’t like your effort to
fit me into your classification’’. (1968: 13)
So starting from this place I am not attempting to argue for one system
over another, or to espouse the merits of existential psychotherapy. All I
can do in good faith is use what I know up to now of philosophical
counselling to shed some light on my own way of working from an
existential-phenomenological perspective.
If I find useful things in the philosophical counselling approach I will
want to try to incorporate them into my current evolving way of being
with clients and maybe try to alert other existential psychotherapists to
these insights. I think that there needs to be two way traffic between
academics and practitioners in mental health as in other fields. Closed
communities are not advantageous for us or for our clients. It may be
that the existential psychotherapy approach can also inform philosophical
counselling. It probably is not possible to avoid boundary disputes, but
I do not really find them very interesting.
In my journey to date into the territory of philosophical counselling I
first read the papers by Shlomit C. Schuster and Ran Lahav which
appeared in the Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis which I
jointly edit. Over the past few months I have also discovered Perspectives
in Philosophical Counselling and the papers published there. When I first
suggested a paper for this conference the poem by the 1940s English poet
Herbert Reed came to mind, in which a conscript describes his growing
familiarity with his rifle. At that point I wanted to be able to fire the
philosophical counselling gun, but I was still familiarizing myself with it.
Like the blind man and the elephant I may have the tail of philosophical
counselling, thinking I have the trunk. I am sure philosophical counselling
is not a monolith (indeed the more I read, the wider the spectrum of
views represented by it become), though you may not be fortunate or
unfortunate enough to have 300 distinct approaches yet as is the case for
psychotherapy and counselling. To take a last bite with these zoological
metaphors, even if I have some ammunition I am relying on you to tell
me if I am shooting at paper tigers.
With these provisos, I found Ran Lahav’s paper ‘On the Possibility of
a Dialogue Between Philosophical Counselling and Existential
Psychotherapy’ particularly apposite, since it seemed to be addressing the
question uppermost in my mind – namely how each of these approaches
might inform and enrich the practice of the other. Initially I was more
stuck by the shared ground than by differences. Both emphasize the
CRITIQUE OF PHILOSOPHICAL COUNSELLING 251
client’s world view; both view client’s difficulties as expressions of their

struggle with what it means to be human, rather than as symptoms of
some underlying psychopathology. Both are committed to the project of
de-psychologizing client work.
In part, the differences between existential psychotherapy and philo-
sophical counselling which I discover in Lahav’s paper are differences in
attitude. So it is that Lahav, in outlining the historical inheritance of
philosophical counselling, comes to claim ‘‘The 2500 years of the history
of philosophy’’ (1998: 130) as the preserve of philosophical counsellors.
To some extent I resonate with his view that ‘‘most types of psychotherapy
are largely severed from philosophy’’ (ibid: 13 1), but philosophy – loosely
defined – is present at the core of all forms of therapy. Most of the debate
between practitioners of the different approaches is about this but existen-
tial psychotherapists have long argued that, while every form of therapy
has its own philosophy (even to reject philosophy is in some sense to
espouse a philosophy), few engage in a rigorous manner with the insights
of academic philosophy. Maybe I should come right out at this point
and say they are right not to – where they are self-avowedly mechanical
they have as much use for academic philosophy as does a car mechanic.
The crux of the argument here seems to be our understanding of
‘philosophical dialogue’. Lahav appears to define ‘philosophical dialogue’
in a manner which excludes existential therapists. I am not sure on what
basis he does this. He states that
Importing ready-made ideas or theories from particular philosophers is not the same as
doing philosophy; in the sense of an open and critical philosophical inquiry ... existential
psychotherapy ... is an approach inspired by a specific philosophy, but it does not represent
a type of philosophising. (ibid: 131)
I am grateful to Lahav for what I deduce is the distinction he is making

here between subscribing to dogma on the one hand and engaging in a
relationship with a client to consider the art of life on the other. I believe
the two positions are antithetical. I do not meet with my clients to
persuade them of a particular way of living. The view that existential
psychotherapy is in some sense the slave of existential philosophy is naive.
Rather existential psychotherapy takes a particular attitude towards being
human and in the world from existential philosophy. It is also informed
by phenomenology and attempts to adopt a phenomenological approach
in working with clients.
I would suggest that the insights of existentialism and phenomenology
combined offer a way of philosophising. I find it exceedingly difficult, if
252 SIMON DU PLOCK
not impossible, to imagine a way of doing existential psychotherapy which

does not represent a type of philosophising. Perhaps it is helpful to clarify
what Lahav means when he employs this term ‘philosophising’. One of
the intriguing aspects for me of Lahav’s paper is that in general his
statements about the characteristics of philosophical counselling might
equally well describe existential psychotherapy.
This is not to suggest that there are no differences, but rather to wonder
whether the image of existential psychotherapy is in fact based on the
writings of existential psychotherapists, or on a reading of Heidegger or
Sartre – who were not, of course, practising therapists. I for one would
be grateful for some clarity on this point. I say this from my understand-
ing, for instance, that clients quite often act in bad faith and that in the
course of our work together they have the opportunity if they wish to
continue to be in bad faith, but to be in this place in a different way. Let
me explain: it might be that a woman comes to me saying that she is
unhappy in her marriage, but cannot leave her husband. What is she to
do? Clearly I could be dogmatic about this, attempt to bring her to an
acceptance that she is choosing to stay in the marriage, and is in bad
faith when she tells herself (and me) that she cannot leave.
I do not see the point of this, on a number of counts: psychotherapy
is rarely effective when the therapist has to rely on pressure to prevail
over the world view of the client. Even if it could be demonstrated that
it is effective, to behave in this manner raises numerous ethical issues,
and may in any case produce only a temporary change in behaviour
rather than a fundamental shift in the client’s self-construct. Secondly, I
do not know, I cannot know, what is best for the client, and it is grandiose
and absurd to suggest that I do. I may well have a different perspective,
even a broader or more balanced perspective, but I certainly do not
have answers.
The existential tradition offers an alternative way for the therapist to
engage with the client: the therapist can model a curiosity about the
client’s worldview which, should they find it useful, will help them gain
greater clarity about the way they live their life. In the course of obtaining
this greater self-awareness my imaginary client may get more of an
understanding of why she both wants to leave her husband, and feels
that she cannot. What actions she takes, or rejects, are of little concern
to me as a therapist. The point is that she acts or does not act from a
position of greater awareness. She may well elect to stay in a relationship
she dislikes in the knowledge that she does so because she is terrified of
being alone. This truth about her situation offers a firmer place from
which to go out into the world than do self-deceptions and received

wisdom. What I think is happening here is that clients have the opportu-
nity to stop being dogmatic with themselves. I think, incidentally, that
this is quite different from the hectoring tone of much Hellenistic philoso-
phy in which the philosopher is hell-bent on persuading their disciples
that they alone know the path to eudaimonia, or the flourishing life. As
Hadot has stated ‘‘In this period, to philosophise is to choose a school,
convert to its way of life, and accept its dogmas’’ (1995: 60).
I have argued at some length against the view that existential psycho-
therapy does not offer a type of philosophising. Essentially my point is
that existential psychotherapy is not about indoctrinating the client to
become an existentialist, but is about encouraging the client to engage
with their way of living, informed by a philosophical attitude. I strongly
resonate with Gerd Achenbach when he says that ‘‘Philosophical practice
is ... the culture of questions, not of desired solutions and recruited
decisions’’ (1987: 51).
What alternative does philosophical counselling have to offer? I frankly
find my reading of the philosophical counselling stance worrying on two
counts – first that it seems to suggest a way of working which owes more
to the lecturer-student or sage-pupil model than anything which draws
on the considerable literature on the therapeutic alliance which therapists
have built up over the years. Lahav raises the idea that existential psycho-
therapy and philosophical counselling can inform each other. I think that
if philosophical counsellors are to work with people who feel vulnerable,
depressed or mad they may find this literature invaluable. This point
alone could be expanded into a paper – given time constraints I would
only want to say research has indicated the crucial variable in therapeutic
work is the quality of the relationship. Effective therapy is about the
meeting of two human beings who together struggle with the issues raised
by the one who we have decided to call the client. Teaching, even wise
tutoring, is not necessarily therapy.
I also doubt whether I could ever aspire – if I wanted to – to the
wisdom Lahav speaks of, nor could I hope to draw on the whole philo-
sophical tradition. Surely no philosopher, in reality, does do this? Some
will know more than others about some areas, they will have their own
enthusiasms and un-thought-through biases. There are also problems
with philosophical trainings. Lahav opines that most existential psycho-
therapists ‘‘are not skilled in philosophical investigations. After all, they
are usually not trained in philosophy departments’’. Few university stu-
dents – at least in the British and American systems – will be fully versed
254 SIMON DU PLOCK
in continental philosophy. My own training involved almost no consider-

ation of European philosophy in this century: I had to wait until training
as a psychotherapist for this. As Lipman observes
For the most part, these students in the upper echelons of education have been expected to
learn philosophy rather than to do it. Often they study the history of systems of philosophy
... in preparation for final examinations, or they prepare extended philosophical arguments,
on obscure but respected topics to qualify for academic degrees (1988: 11).
My university lecturers would probably have concurred with Roger

Scruton’s view of Heidegger’s Being and T ime as ‘‘one of the most notori-
ous of all works of philosophy’’ (1994:154), or his comment apropos
nothingness, that ‘‘entering Les Deaux Magots to find Sartre is not there
is one of life’s blessings’’ (1994: 459).
Even assuming none of these problems it seems to me, and this is my
second concern, that there is a considerable art in knowing when and
how to introduce philosophical ideas. A number of texts have been
published recently which suggest that the therapist should introduce the
client to a particular book or film. Often study of these looks like the
sort of homework which cognitive-behavioural therapists give their cli-
ents. (I have worked as a cognitive-behavioural therapist in the British
state health service and am familiar with the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such task-setting). The British psychoanalyst Roger Casement,
in a text called On L earning From the Patient draws attention to the
importance of offering an interpretation at the point where the patient is
able to make use of it.
Now the crucial thing, perhaps, is how these competing or complemen-
tary approaches get operationalised. I can only compare them briefly
here, but nevertheless I want to see just how similar or different they are.
Lahav provides an example of his work with a visitor. I am going to
draw on my work with a client. We might expect that Lahav will engage
in a philosophical dialogue, while I will be importing ready-made existen-
tial theories, and will not be ‘doing philosophy’. In Lahav’s case study
his visitor feels imprisoned in a meaningless relationship with her husband
and constrained in her time-schedule as a mother and wife. He raises
their conversation from the biographical to the philosophical level by
pointing out the difference between two conceptions of freedom: ‘‘negative
freedom or freedom-from’’, and ‘‘positive freedom, or freedom-for’’.
Negative freedom, the visitor learns, is the absence of limitations. Positive
freedom means being free to commit to doing what we find meaningful
and significant. Lahav states that as his visitor
gained a deeper self-understanding of the various freedoms that may be relevant to her life,
she felt more and more capable of dealing with her predicament. Eventually she decided to
preserve her married life in its previous form, while working on changing her own attitude
towards the meaning of freedom (1998: 143).
Now this ‘freedom from’/’freedom to’ distinction, which apparently

provides the vehicle for moving from a biographical to a philosophical
level, is not at all absent in existential psychotherapy, though it is true
that an existential psychotherapist is more likely to concentrate on ‘self
as agent’ rather than the ‘self as subject’ which has been a theme of much
Western philosophy since Descartes.
I wrote up my own work with a client I called Louise as a chapter in
a book I edited in 1997 called Case Studies in Existential Psychotherapy
and Counselling. On referring back to it when thinking about this confer-
ence I find I draw a distinction which in terms of its function seems to
me somewhat similar. From 1991 to 1994 I held a post which included
responsibility for co-ordinating the student counselling service of a college
in Central London. Alongside home students, the college recruited widely
in Europe and North America and specialised in offering 1-year or
1-semester experience abroad for liberal arts students. Louise was one
such, spending a semester in London taking courses including psychology
before returning to the States for her final year of a BA degree. She had
initially seemed to her lecturers to be a model student but her performance
had, in their opinion, deteriorated rapidly over a period of a few weeks,
during which she had regularly missed classes or been silent and with-
drawn. She had finally confided to her tutor that she could no longer
cope and was terrified of failing her final exams.
Louise’s presenting problem in therapy was that she felt she had been
swindled out of the deposit which she had made at the beginning of the
semester on a house share. She felt cheated and wanted a remedy. It
would have been quite easy to have stayed at this level and had a
philosophical discussion about, say, fair play or the rules different people
observe. I was curious: there seemed to be a discrepancy between this
problem, and the major life events – leaving the parental home, travelling
abroad, constructing her own life – which had precipitated our meeting.
As we talked, and in fact I said very little at first but listened attentively
and tried to tune in to her way of being-in-the-world, Louise presented
herself in the guise of a victim who had been tricked and lied to by
strangers. She had suddenly found herself alone in a world of which she
could make no sense, since her usual ways of operating now failed to
256 SIMON DU PLOCK
provide her with the social acceptance she was accustomed to. Worse,
what she thought of as her customary openness and friendliness made
her an object of derision for her housemates. What she thought of as her
generosity simply served to reinforce their perception of her as foreign,
wealthy and privileged. No meeting of real people had taken place, only
a confirmation of a stereotype on the side of her housemates and a sense
of being rejected and used on hers.
The distinction I want to highlight here, though, is around the concept
of education. Having discussed her situation she would, she said, ‘‘rise
above it’’. ‘‘And maybe also learn from it?’’ I ventured. She still clung to
the somewhat sedimented idea that it had almost been a ‘‘disaster’’ and
that she had nearly been a ‘‘victim’’. I sensed, though, that this uncomfort-
able experience was one which, whilst she might not fully realise it, she
had actively sought. She had chosen to place an advert for a house share
rather than live on campus, she had chosen the wording of this advert
and, in due course, had chosen to move into the house where she had
the experience she had recounted to me, even though her initial feelings
about her decision to move there had been mixed.
One way into this might be to go to the reason for her time in London.
She had said that she came to London to improve her education: what,
I asked her, did she understand by the word ‘education’? Posed this
question, she began immediately to talk about a process of certification,
a fairly obvious route with a number of hurdles along the way in the
shape of written examinations – a steady conveyor belt, in other words,
to a well-paid professional career. But this, I pointed out, was a conveyor
belt with bumps and jumps which were there for her to experience and
which were sometimes unpredictable and could not be planned for. So, I
asked, how about the idea of education as experience, what could she
learn from her experience, what could she choose to take from it?
Once her agency in events became clearer, Louise was able to take a
certain amount of pride in her adventurousness. She began to appreciate
that what she had been describing in wholly negative terms had, in fact,
constituted a tremendously important rite of passage for her from ‘depen-
dent child’ to capable ‘angry adult’. At the time she also saw that her
lack of care in making arrangements about accommodation had ‘‘set her
up’’ for this experience – she had thrown herself into an experience of
which she felt a lack, but had done so incautiously. In appreciating more
fully the reasons for events in which she had been an agent, the feelings
of depression which had accompanied her muddled thinking abated.
I might formulate Louise’s view as a utilitarian view of education –

education as a means to an end – as against education as a process, as
a possible outcome of experience. For me the crucial point is what we do
with experience – do we really experience our experience – in which case
it becomes fully available to us – or do we incorporate parts of it into
our sedimented self-construct, and disregard those aspects of it which
challenge this. It might be objected that my distinction between education
as experience and education to achieve an end, and Lahav’s distinction
between ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom for’ are not of the same order since
Lahav enquires about the nature of freedom in general while I select a
particular perspective on education which is not grounded in academic
philosophy. I would counter this by saying that the ‘freedom from’/
‘freedom for’ distinction is only one of very many observations which
could be made by a philosopher. My observation about education arose,
not out of intuition or fancy, but as a result of inviting the client to
describe the meaning she gave to education, and noticing the attitude
which she held.
A philosophical counsellor objected to me that I failed to engage with
the extensive literature on the philosophy of education, and said that I
might do one of three things:
a) attend to the client’s meaning of the term education,
b) read up on the philosophy of education and introduce the subject
at the next session,
c) lend the client a book on the philosophy of education.
In the case of b) and c) there seems to be an assumption here that the
client would benefit from knowing about the philosophy of education
and I frankly doubt this to be true. I think that these two options also
throw up a number of serious issues regarding the dynamics of therapeutic
relationships. Further, they assume that there will be future sessions.
Lahav perhaps engages with a more standard concern of philosophy –
the nature of freedom – but I believe that clarification of the meanings
embedded in the client’s language is a fundamental activity for any
philosophical work. Moreover, the meaning of education seems to me to
be at the core of the relationship between philosophical counselling and
existential psychotherapy. It seems, as I have said, the former involves a
relationship between wisdom and confusion, the latter a co-operative
exploration of what it means to be human.
I would like to end by suggesting that this distinction might also be
useful for the relationship between philosophical counselling and existen-
258 SIMON DU PLOCK
tial psychotherapy. Neither, I am sure, has the monopoly on wisdom;

both take as their focus the clarification of the human condition. Lahav
states that ‘‘the process of philosophical self-examination does not at all
contradict the existential approach to therapy and counselling’’. I agree,
in fact it should already be there as an integral part of it. For me, at the
moment, the value of philosophical counselling is that it reminds me that
this process should be vital and rigorous, and not taken for granted. I
hope I have also been able to suggest some ways in which existential
psychotherapy might in turn inform philosophical counselling. By chance,
the second part of Reed’s poem T oday We Have Naming of Parts is called
Finding Direction: I will be interested to see to what extent existential
psychotherapy and philosophical counselling can do this together.
Regent’s College
L ondon, UK
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Achenbach, G. Philosophische Praxis. Cologne: Jurgen Dinter, 1987.

Casement, R. On L earning From the Patient. London: Tavistock Publications, 1985.
Hadot, P. Philosophy as a Way of L ife. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.
Lahav, R. On the possibility of dialogue between philosophical counselling and existential
psychotherapy. Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis 9.1 (1998): 129–144.
Lipman, M. Philosophy Goes to School. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988.
Macquarrie, J. Existentialism. Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1972.
Plock, S. du. ‘An Innocent Abroad? An Example of Brief Student Counselling’, in S. du Plock
(ed.), Case Studies in Existential Psychotherapy and Counselling. Chichester: John Wiley
and Sons, 1997.
Scruton, R. Modern Philosophy. London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994.
Shinn, R. L. (ed.) Restless Adventure: Essays in Contemporary Expressions of Existentialism.
New York, 1968.
Shuster, S. Philosophical narratives and philosophical counselling. Journal of the Society for
Existential Analysis 8.2 (1997): 108–127.
CAMILO SERRANO BÓNITTO
LOGOS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE PHENOMENA OF

ENCOUNTER AND HOPE IN THE
PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC RELATIONSHIP
How to approach the problem of the Logos in our psychotherapeutic

work? It is important to establish from the beginning that this points to
the necessity of contemplating a great number of typical elements of
psychotherapeutic work, from its sources to its most diverse destinies.
Pretending to describe in a brief study all and each of these elements,
would mean an excessive enterprise, and without doubt, Utopian. That
is why this paper pretends to establish a space of reflection that, starting
from the base of our daily psychotherapeutic experience, allows us to
generate some questions and statements about its essence.
Thus, and guided successively by three formulations, all of them belong-
ing to eminent humanists (Husserl, Heraclitus and Celan), we will show
how the phenomena of Encounter and Hope constitute the basis of the
Logos implicated in the work of psychotherapy.
This path, one of many possible paths, will permit us to build bridges
between different constitutive aspects of this Logos.
I. ‘‘GO BACK TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES!’’
This short formulation is conceived by Husserl in L ogical Investigations

(1901–1902) as the directrix of the eidetic reduction, a rigorous description
that permits us to perceive the essence of similar individual facts in order
to reach their invariable common nucleus.
In its deep simplicity and with the typical vigor of the great truths that
strengthen with the course of time, it reveals to us the first step that, in
its spreading out, becomes the last one to take the circularity of our
course. Now, let’s emphasize some of the implications of this fact in
our work.
To know the importance of psychotherapy for the comprehension of
the human being, to do so through its history, in its art and in its work,
in its signification of preoccupation or succor, of encouragement or
accompaniment, and first of all, in its noble purpose of lessening suffering,
invites us to explore carefully its origins and its roots, within those
universes created by word. By that word that designates and defines
259
260 CAMILO SERRANO BÓNITTO
through knowledge, of course. And by that other one that proposes and
prescribes. But first of all, by that word which connects us in the verb
and in silence, which welcomes with surprise and with trust the word of
the Other, which becomes alive thanks to it in order to encounter it, in
what they have in common and in their differences. That word, always
the same and always changing.
That one which, sometimes because of its imprecision, and sometimes
because of its exactitude, generates spaces that connect us and contain
us. The word that is at the same time spring and reflection of an uncondi-
tional tolerance.
Thanks to this word, the spaces are constituted and spread out. And,
in turn, they guarantee the existence of the word as a meaning and as a
link, as the truth of the soul, of that originating soul of every human
thought, thus, as Logos.
Therefore, conceiving a relation in a great dialectic way between the
word and the human spaces generated in and through it, it is necessary
to describe briefly some elements inherent to the psychotherapeutic spaces
which may allow us to foretell a foundation and an atmosphere of hope
in such spaces.
Initially we must indicate that the psychotherapeutic spaces basically
represent universes in which two or more persons coincide, some suffering
to a greater or lesser extent, others with diverse resources to help them.
In other words, the described spaces constitute, essentially, spaces of
encounter.
Which elements typical of these spaces permit us to understand the
Encounter occurred as a phenomenon, and not as the corollary of some
philosophic, psychological or other kind of thesis? It is necessary to collect
at this point some of the multiple meanings within the word encounter.
The basis of our quotations corresponds to the group of meanings of
the Diccionario de Uso del Español (Moliner, p. 1109). We will mention
in this paper a literal translation of those terms which are pertinent for
the clarification or magnification of the required meaning of the word
encounter: the totality of the meanings can be consulted in the original
text.
The ‘‘action of encountering’’, or the encounter (ibid.), implies a coinci-
dence in the time and in the space of one or more objects or beings, even
if they are previously provided with vitality (subjects, animals, etc.) or if
they get such thanks precisely to the encounter.
The attributes of these objects permit us to compare them and to
differentiate them simultaneously, in variable proportions, in one or sev-
LOGOS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 261
eral of their dimensions (nature, constitution, direction). This fact defines

a first attribute of the psychotherapeutic encounter: the asymmetry.
This asymmetry confers on encounter the meaning of event, of a
phenomenon with a particular vitality thanks to the synergies and resis-
tance typical of it, and to the balance points existing even within instabil-
ity, just as is shown in the following definitions: ‘‘action of bumping the
sheep or other animals’’, and ‘‘piece of timber that used to be placed in
the handloom to secure it and to prevent it from bending’’ (ibid.). But
besides, the reflexive form of the verb to encounter (let’s remember that
the first meaning tells us that the encounter is the action of encountering
– oneself ), implies that we encounter the Other, approaching the
encounter with ourselves. We approach and show ourselves to the Other
and to ourselves: co-incident gestation of the suffering – being and of the
therapeutic – being.
The distance outlined by these movements places us in front of the
Other and in front of ourselves as defined beings or beings in stanza, and
as projected or potential beings. This means, as beings in the presence of
something or other.
Let’s stop for a minute in this inter-subjective constitution of the
Encounter: its study implies, as highlighted by Blankenburg, to start from
the very experience between the therapist and the patient in order to
emphasize its attributes (Blankenburg, pp. 164 ff.).
This experience teaches us that the development of our singularity is
based on a subtle but constant oscillation between the affirmation of
oneself and the abandonment of oneself, based on the perception of the
Other. The flexibility inherent in this oscillatory movement is determinant
when allowing that the Other elapses in a natural way.
Thus, the Other appears, in the first instance, as a natural integrant of
our ‘‘world of living’’, with particularities which are relevant for our
perception, and at the same time as a being with an identity common
to ours.
To that ‘‘natural’’ Otherness we must add the ‘‘fundamental’’ Otherness
of the same ‘‘world of living’’, so the evidence of the inter-subjectivity is
already constituted in a common world.
This double aspect of the Otherness is able, thanks to the formation
of a natural common ante-predicative world, to create the sense of famil-
iarity, which development strengthens, on the one hand, the relation with
the Others in general (Others provided to a lesser or to a greater extent
of particularities), and on the other hand, the relation with the anonymous
or primordial Other.
From this double strengthening emerge the concept of Confidence as

an individual and voluntary relationship, as well as a general and involun-
tary relationship. Every psychotherapeutic relationship includes, there-
fore, the specific establishment of confidence in the ‘‘particular’’ Other
and the establishment of trust in the ‘‘general’’ Other.
If now we focus on the constitutive forces of the Encounter (synergy,
resistance, communion, opposition, familiarity) we can observe how they
determine an interchange, from the outlined principle and always in a
gradual formation, that configures a second fundamental aspect of the
Encounter: reciprocity.
Foundational elements of asymmetry and reciprocity, or even better of
what we will call in this paper the asymmetric reciprocity, are the Presence
and the Interchange. Presence and Interchange: two essential aspects in
every psychotherapeutic encounter.
The nature of the relation between these two elements is the basis for
every psychotherapeutic space.
As a matter of fact, just as we can appreciate that there is no interchange
without presence, we must suppose that an excessive presence annuls
every possibility of it. Therefore, an interchange which does not give
dignity and tolerance to the presence, inexorably takes away vitality
from it.
The presence and the interchange emerge initially as reflections of a
tonality and a rhythm pre-established in the primordial confidence of
every inter-subjectivity, in the originating Urdoxa (Urglaube in Husserl),
the germ of the foundational reception of our world.
Tonality and rhythm constitute the movement of a deep basal function,
which, connecting the hyletic elements of a world structured through its
internal coherence, impedes any discordant autonomy of these elements.
Consequently, the melodic link that is conceived between them consoli-
dates the identity of the own body of every psychotherapeutic space.
Thus, the encounter as pathic phenomenon of every psychotherapeutic
space, welcomes the individuals ‘‘united in its universe’’ (universe always
singular; uni-verse: thrown towards unity). And its global configuration
presupposes, both in the therapist and in the patient, a disposition that
revives in the intimate union of feeling and moving ourselves within it.
The kind of contact established there, according to the theory of E. Straus,
allows the constituents of this body to establish an intuitive and sensitive
communication with the hyletic elements, at the side of every reference
to any perceived object (Chrétien, pp. 37 ff.).
This esthesiologic property attributes to the Encounter the possibility

of developing the ‘‘pathic categories’’ of power (to have the possibility of,
to have the right of ) and of duty (to be impelled to), esthesiologic
principles according to Viktor von Weizsäcker (ibid.).
These categories represent at one and the same time the intimate
communion between the sensation and the individual or collective destiny,
as well as the basis for the anticipatory spreading out generated in every
encounter.
The Encounter constituted in that way is revealed as the organ of the
phenomenological experience in the art of psychotherapy, and the implicit
asymmetric reciprocity existing between the therapist and the patient,
makes it a body in continuous formation, eternal stroke, commotion and
opening. Body intervened by L ogos.
This is how we define the meaning of transcendence in gestation typical
of the Encounter, that when established, advises us about the possible
re-encounters to come. And this potential fact of encountering and
re-encountering, opens the psychotherapeutic spaces, once again, to the
revelation of the inter-subjective ante-predicative world. Being able to
encounter the suffering Other requires us to ‘‘go back to the things
themselves’’, a step without which it seems impossible to advance in our
therapeutic process.
Once having established the psychotherapeutic encounter as the essen-
tial topos of a relationship between patient and therapist (a present
relation, vital and endowed with multiple meanings thanks to its asymme-
try and to its reciprocity) and, guided by the following paradoxical maxim
by Heraclitus, let us describe some aspects of its atmospheric constitution
and let us detail how its destiny is imbued with the phenomenon of Hope.
II. ‘‘THE THUNDERBOLT STEERS ALL THINGS’’ 1
Let us recall, initially, how the asymmetric reciprocity establishes and

reflects, simultaneously, the possibility of any Encounter. The meaning
of encounter as: ‘‘the circumstance of two cards or two equal points
encountering together in the deck of cards or dice’’ (Moliner, op. cit.,
p. 1109), refers to a mutual support of the elements that coincide in place
and time, indicating the natural presence of a correspondence without
which we could not develop the potentialities of a world with certain
qualities. In every psychotherapeutic relationship, as well as in every
human relationship, this development requires an esthesiological trust
shared between the patient and the therapist, consisting on penetrating
into the Other being penetrated by the Other, a convergence of two or

more beings with autonomous vitality, and therefore, with singular scopes.
The atmospheric nature of this trust determines the unitary and imme-
diate form of the existence of an inter-subjective ante-predicative world.
How can we specify the constitution of the Encounter as pathic body?
How can we perceive the vitality of that esthesiologic moment?
Tellenbach reminds us in his great work Goût et Atmosphère, that the
universe of the Encounter presupposes the establishment of a foundational
atmosphere that unites the emanations of its constituents, conferring on
the relationship an indivisible and untransferable identity; this atmo-
sphere, a convergence of personal halos, penetrates each and every one
of the components in formation. Thanks to the act of perceiving and
being perceived by the Other, we are able to mold jointly our particular
world. Although the quality of the therapeutic Encounter of being a
connecting world is common to every encounter, the particular way in
which this link is created gives it singularity: familiarity between all of
them and specificity of each one. Thus, every Encounter is unique, every
therapeutic relationship resulting from the multiplicity of it too.
There is also another specific atmospheric element that prefigures the
constitution of the Encounter. This element, a substrate of sensible intu-
ition, contains from its beginning, as a first stroke, all the possible futures
of the Encounter. This phenomenon is Hope. This hope, like a flowering
bud, precedes everything that in current gestation becomes constitutive
of the Encounter as time goes by, and also precedes that which never
appears within it. The therapeutic Hope always precedes the therapeutic
Encounter. How is this psychotherapeutic Hope able to generate the
Encounter? And how does it strengthen in its development in order to
finally transcend it?
Although Hope constantly guides us towards the future, it does so
perceiving its richness and its wideness, or, in other words, inviting it to
be part of our present, every single minute and without ceasing.
Thanks to this fact, our present becomes vast. Hope impregnates our
actual world with what is to come within it. In this way, when liberating
the future from the particular anguish of expectation, the way is free for
the establishment of the originating trust. And this Hope is nothing more
than a first Encounter, full of sense, between the future and the present.
Why can we make such a statement? Is it really Hope an Encounter
between these two instances?
We do believe so. As E. Minkowski affirms in such a decisive way, in
the hope generative of trust, we can predict everything that can exist in
the world beyond the immediate contact that establishes the expectation
between the future and the self (Minkowski, pp. 87 ff.). This precept is
valid both for our contact with the environment and for the contact with
our own inner world.
Then, in every psychotherapeutic relationship the horizons of introspec-
tion and extroversion of the therapist and the patient become wider,
gaining intensity. Thus, the future that moves towards the present favors
the creation of an individual space in its contact with the future, which,
on the other hand, develops itself from the distance. In the psychothera-
peutic field this confidence becomes alive in an atmosphere of unpredict-
able acceptation that presupposes an asymmetric reciprocity to come –
in order to originate an Encounter.
The atmosphere described here, conceived as the support of the
Encounter, irradiation of the originating Hope, allows us to understand
why the pathic topos is established as a communion of feeling and moving
ourselves. This esthesiologic movement is the first step in every Encounter,
a step without which there cannot be a possible development of any
psychotherapeutic project: to be touched in order to touch the ‘‘world
of living’’.
Up to this point we have described how Hope represents the basis of
the inter-subjective world, generating the appropriate atmosphere for the
right correspondence between the power of the suffering-being and the
power of the therapeutic-being.
Also supported on the primordial tonality and on the rhythm, Hope
is the precursor phenomenon of a horizon without a possibility previously
established. Gadamer highlights this fact, referring to Heraclitus’ thinking.
Indeed, fragment 18 teaches us that if we don’t expect, we will not find
the unexpected either (Gadamer, p. 67).
The instant in which this horizon bursts into our life, generates, on the
one hand, a rupture regarding our possible projections previously estab-
lished and regarding what could have happened to us in a universe
already configured; and on the other hand, an opening from Nothingness
to the unpredictable. This receptivity to the advent which transforms us
through the Encounter, is what Henri Maldiney understands as transpassi-
bility (Bouderlique, pp. 56 ff.), transpassibility that implicates an atmo-
sphere of hopeful revelation in our therapeutic work; the dynamism that
is generated in our projected self transformation, which, thanks to it,
constitutes the transpossibility for this same author (ibid.).
To encounter the suffering Other is to be in the presence of that Other
that cannot be reduced to the form of psychotherapeutic projects pre-
viously established. The Other, that ‘‘face of the Other’’ as Levinas knows
it, calls us from its uniqueness, to the alterity and to its extreme vulnerabil-
ity, awaking our consciousness (Levinas, pp. 201 ff.).
As a matter of fact, the Encounter as co-advent of two beings, generates
a crisis of ‘‘feeling oneself united with the world’’. The previous union of
the therapeutic-being and of the suffering-being with their worlds, has a
transformation at a pathic level, thanks to the irruption of the Encounter.
And this transformation permits the integration of the event in order to
solve the crisis: to touch the world of living in order to be touched.
In the psychotherapeutic field, the natural and progressive development
of the transpossibility determines our always unfinished assignation as
psychiatrists or as psychologists. Assignation given by life itself, of course,
and the invaluable importance of which is dignified by our deep wish to
be therapists.
In this way, the Heraclitean sentence cannot be clearly understood if
we do not add to the sudden presence of clarity, that other presence,
implicit, of the opacity which tends to devour that which is fulgurant, as
soon as it begins to grow. As a matter of fact, feeling and moving ourselves
requires the capacity to partially separate what is immediately accessible
to us, thus opening a wider world, or more precisely, a deeper spatial–
temporal solidarity. In this way, the transpassibility and the transpossi-
bility permit us to remember that the psychotherapeutic Encounter, like
a thunderbolt, surprises us and makes us tremble thanks to the clarity of
its sparkle and to the commotion inferred from its opacity. Phenomenon
and guignomenon. L ogos in movement.
III. ‘‘. . . A MESSAGE IN A BOTTLE . . . SENT OUT IN THE BELIEF . . .’’ 2
Paul Celan, ‘‘poet of hope’’, like very few others has been able to crystallize
the whole meaning of the words contained in a poem or in a phrase,
invites us to observe the importance of the opacity as a constitutive
atmosphere of the spreading out of Hope.
Let’s recall once again that the truly representative aspect of the atmo-
sphere of every psychotherapeutic relationship is what unites us and
contains us simultaneously. We must not forget that some aspects of this
opacity typical of the phenomena of Encounter and Hope in the psycho-
therapeutic spaces such as simultaneity, familiarity, reciprocity, asymme-
try, uniqueness and many others, clearly establish that the universe always
intuitively and sensibly, many times ineffably, unites and contains the
therapeutic-being and the suffering-being. The opacity establishes the den-
sities and the profoundness of the nascent interchange of the Encounter,

as well as those it guides.
The meaning of Encounter as: ‘‘clear spaces of the ones that you leave
when imprinting, to fulfil them later with letters in a different color’’
(Moliner, op. cit., p. 1109), illustrates how the psychotherapeutic
Encounter becomes alive in the confluence between the fulgurant
co-advent of the power of suffering-being and the power of the therapeu-
tic-being, on the one hand, and its projections outlined by Hope, on
the other.
Unstable and invisible harmony between the suddenness of the self
coincides with the movement and leading opacity of the possible destinies
of the established relationship.
The singular opacity of partial incomprehension of the patient’s suffer-
ing, the one contained in the optimism or in the pessimism generated in
a determined psychotherapeutic action, or the one that establishes the
trust or distrust that the patient can feel for his or her therapist, confirms
the starting point so that transpassibility and transpossibility progress as
therapeutic virtues.
In this way, opacity is constructed as a connecting point between the
substantiality of the Encounter and the natural growing of Hope, as form
and essence where it becomes present, before the first Encounter, and
beyond its elapse.
Hope in its more sublime giving outlines the originating embrace, full
of the sense of every psychotherapeutic relationship.
When we allow ourselves as therapists, to confront the dimensions of
the unfinished, of the incomprehensible and of the unknown of the Other’s
suffering, Hope takes the form of a continuous questioning, the pure
opacity of the L ogos, full of dignity and projection for our daily work.
Conferring honor on Encounter and Hope in every psychotherapeutic
relationship as well as on the opacity of every intersubjective convergence,
allows us to conceive of the meaning of our daily work as: ‘‘... a message
in a bottle ... sent out in the belief ...’’.
Phenomenology L atin American Circle
NOTES
1 Heraclitus. Quoted in: Early Greek Philosophy. London: John Burnet, 1920.
2 Bremen Prize of German Literature Discourse. Quoted in: J. Felstiner, Paul Celan: Poet,
Survivor, Jew. Yale University, 1995.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Blankenburg, W. L a perte de l’évidence naturelle (French translation of der Verlust der

naturlichen Selbstverstandlichkeit. Stuttgart, 1971.). Presses Universitaires de France. Paris,
1991. 237 pp.
Bouderlique, J. ‘‘Transpassibilité et Transpossibilité’’, in: Pringuey D. and Samy Kohl F.
(eds.), Phénoménologie de l’identité humaine et schizophrénie. Association Le Cercle
Herméneutique. Puteaux, 2001, pp. 56–62.
Chretien, J. L. ‘‘Lumiere d’épreuve’’, in: Meitinger S., Henri Maldiney. Une Phénoménologie à
l’impossible. Association Le Cercle Herméneutique. Puteaux, 2002, pp. 37–46.
Gadamer, H. G. El inicio de la sabidurı́a (Spanish translation of: Der Anfang des W issens.
Stuttgart, 1999). Paidós Ibérica, Barcelona, 2001, 150 pp.
Husserl, E. L ogical Investigations (English translation of: L ogische Untersuchungen, Halle,
1900, 1901). Translated by J. N. Findlay. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
Levinas, E. T otalidad e Infinito (Spanish translation of: T otalité et infini. Paris, 1971).
Ediciones Sı́gueme, Salamanca, 2002, 311 pp.
Minkowski, E. El tiempo vivido (Spanish translation of: L e temps vécu. Neuchatel, 1968).
Fondo de Cultura Económica. Mexico City, 1982, 403 pp.
Moliner, M. Diccionario de Uso del Español. Segunda edición. Tomo I. Editorial Gredos, S.A.
Madrid, 1998, 1597 pp.
Tellenbach, H. Goût et atmosphére (French translation of: Geschmack und Atmosphare. Otto
Muller Verlag, Salzburg, 1968). Presses Universitaires de France. Paris, 1983, 139 pp.
JARLATH FINTAN McKENNA
THE MEANINGFULNESS OF MENTAL HEALTH AS

BEING WITHIN A WORLD OF APPARENTLY
MEANINGLESS BEING
PREFACE
I present this essay for you to criticise and debate within the notion of
being too bold rather than too timid. For it is a well-known facet of Irish
society that if one is too daring and bold such persons may be cut above
the knee to bring them ‘back to size’. I firmly believe that it is better to
dare to rock the conventional and accepted, by questioning the difficulties
of our time that seem unsolvable – for the betterment, in this context, of
those human beings that are entrusted to our care.
SUMMARY
Four hundred and fifty million people suffer from a mental or behavioral
disorder, yet only a small minority of them receive even the most basic
treatment according to the World Health Organisation (WHO, 2001).
1,000,000 people die as a result of the act of suicide each year, and every
year across the world (Goldsmith et al., 2003). This problem permeates
all aspects and levels of our world civilizations despite the increased
interconnectedness of our peoples and the evolution of mans’ knowledge
and abilities over the last century. Such evidence directs a number of key
phenomenological questions within the seventh moment. Within the quest
of humanity to be, how do humans survive, exist and be within a mental
or behavioural disorder? Within the act of looking outwards to the
modern world for possible answers and explanations, that very global
world seeps inwards and captures our being. But within that duality,
interpretation and understanding, the evidence suggests that many
humans find aspects to that answer that may indicate an apparent mean-
ingless being. This question prompts the phenomenological question,
What is the nature and meaning of mental health and mental distress in
the world of today? And I ask whether philosophers have abandoned
this search to the detriment of humanity and therein neglected to question
the boundaries and limits of the actuality and potentiality of being?
Answering these questions is the key vocation and responsibility of philos-
269
270 JARLATH FINTAN McKENNA
ophy and the core of the project of phenomenology and in particular

phenomenology in the health sciences. Looking and reflecting inwards
on being, requires us to examine how the world of the seventh moment
impacts upon being. This paper examines these questions through phe-
nomenological methods by returning to the roots of being, and questions
Hegel’s (1990) theory of being, through an alternative integration or
convolution (Meleis, 1997) of ontological and teleological schema, the
Trialectic.
INTRODUCTION
The 1990’s witnessed a new methodological approach to analysing illness

and disease as the World Health Organisation (WHO) addressed the
global causes and effects of disease and its burden and economic cost.
This heralded the development of the Global Burden of Disease Project
(1990) by the World Health Organisation. This project provided new
data that addressed all diseases but also illuminated the problem of
mental health in global terms. WHO (2001, 2003) and HSPH (2004)
suggest that mental illness represents four of the ten leading causes of
disability worldwide. This increasing burden amounts to a huge cost in
terms of human unhappiness, disability and economic loss. WHO (2001)
projections also suggest that by 2020 depression will have the distinction
of becoming the second cause of the global disease burden. The findings
of the Global Burden of Disease Project (WHO, 1990, 2001) indicate that
there are significant changes within the overall health needs of the world’s
populations. It is a broadly held assumption that communicable diseases
are the main problem in developing regions of the world. This trend is
now changing and depression and mental health disease are replacing
these diseases as the leading cause of disability and premature death.
Murray and Lopez (1996) and Murray et al. (2001) indicate that psychiat-
ric illness accounts for five of the ten leading causes of disability (using
the measurement: years of life lived with a disability). Psychiatric disorders
are also accountable for over 1% of all deaths. Jenkins et al. (2002)
indicates that suicide is officially the tenth leading cause of death, compar-
able to death by road traffic accidents. 450 million people suffer from a
mental or behavioral disorder, yet only a small minority of them receives
even the most basic types of treatments or services (WHO, 2001). The
World Health Organisation (WHO, 2002) also reports that acts of suicide
across the world cause more deaths every year than homicide or war.
Goldsmith et al. (2003) indicate that 90% of suicides in the United States
MENTAL HEALTH AND MEANINGLESSNESS 271
are associated with mental illness. However, the data from China indicates
that less than half of the suicides have such a correlation. Furthermore,
in China more women than men carry out the act of suicide. The evidence
also suggests that within Eastern European countries, the suicide rate is
four to six times higher than in the United States. Hungarians sadly hold
the distinction of having the highest rate of suicide, however the rate in
some of the former Soviet Union states remains unclear (Goldsmith et al.,
2003). This foreground of evidence uncovers a reality that demands
phenomenological examination.
Many worldviews and orientations colour and distil the perspectives
of the human sciences, the aesthetic, the ethical and the cognitive. It is
acknowledged that each of these perspectives provides further and alterna-
tive arguments to the meaningfulness of mental health in being. However,
for the purposes of this paper the central focus of examination will explore
the possible relationships between the ontological and teleological poten-
tiality and actuality of mental health and distress in being.
MEANINGFULNESS
Much philosophical thought attempts to understand and construct a

constitution of meaning (Brentano, 1975; Buber, 1993; Taylor, 1985;
Heidegger, 1996; Husserl, 1997; Schwandt, 2001) and the meaningfulness
of the person in space and time. Taylor (1985) comments that where
words are used as instruments of meaning the elements that they are
attached to, within the ‘‘way of ideas’’ must provide clarity in terms of
that which such words designate. Hence, meaning is therefore designation.
It is contended that this approach enshrines an empirical overture. Husserl
(1997) in his critique of reason demonstrates this in his 1907 lectures,
T hing and Space, and argues that ‘‘meaningful’’ is a result of the unification
of things and space. Space for Husserl (1997) ‘‘applies to the lowest
constitutive stratum of the thing. ... Space is a necessary form of things
and not a form of lived experience’’ (p. xiii). I disagree with Husserl’s
(1997) position and argue that space does contain the substance of the
lived experience. Frege disagrees with the designative paradigm of mean-
ing and argues that both the sense and reference of the word provide a
route to understanding. Lincoln and Guba (1985), discussing Habermas’s
arguments for and against the empirical and natural sciences interpreta-
tion of the human sciences, suggests ‘‘that meanings are determined by
theory and understood by theoretical coherence rather than by correspon-
dence with the facts’’ (pp. 29–30).
Schwandt (2001) suggests that there is an assumption held within

qualitative investigation that examines ‘‘meaningful social action’’.
However, what is the meaning of this assumption? Schwandt (2001)
suggests that from one perspective the action of humans are interpreted
from many different views, and are more than the simple physical act;
and the meaning of such an action may have many interpretations. The
interpretivist school presents two differing views of the approach to
meaning, first in the context of the consciousness of the actor and
secondly, meaning may be constructed not from the intention of the actor
but from the fact that such an action plays a greater or lesser part in
social systems. Schwandt (2001) comments that in each of these cases,
meaning is fixed and determined. Within the alternative hermeneutic
school, the constitution of meaning lies not in the intentions of the actor
within the environment or the action itself, but meaning is ‘‘undecidable’’
in a fluid state.
For Gadamer (1997), meaning exists but is never complete within the
arbitration or dialogue of the action. The worldview and horizon of the
interpreter forms new meaning, which is created every time the interpreter
attempts to understand. Hermeneutics, in its variety of forms, is the act,
model and philosophy of the interpretation of meaning.
However, what is it of these things that are unified today in space and
what is the nature of this space? Is it not the case that humans today are
more directed to question what is and what is not meaningful. What is
a meaningful world, and how necessary is this meaningful world? Is it
possible that through the influence of global connectedness that the
theories of meaning require revision since that which is depicted or
represented changes in sense and reference rendering it ‘meaningless’.
Simmel (1971) argues that a tension is created between the individual
who wishes to maintain an independent and individual existence from
the socially created, historical and liberation from the self. Taylor (1985)
asks, ‘‘what is it we have to understand in order to understand meaning’’
(p. 253)? I ask, what is it that we must understand if we are to understand
the framing and representation of ‘‘meaningless’’ and its relationship, if
any, to mental distress in being? Is it possible that there is increasing lack
of clarity in terms of the signals that represent symbols, hence the mis-
interpretation of the observers’ position? Taylor (1985) provides analysis
of the Triple H Theory of meaning (Herder, Humbolt and Hamann) and
suggests that communication is transmitted in public space. Such
communication is reconstructed by the individual to give meaning
and rapport, hence being together. However, within the new global
interconnectedness, are we as different civilisations truly in rapport,

providing an ‘‘us’’ or ‘I–thou’ (Buber, 1970) or is such rapport today
superficial, meaningless and increasing the potential of mental distress?
To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude. He perceives what
exists round about him – simply things, and beings as things; and what happens round
about him – simply events, and actions as events; things consisting of qualities, events or
moments; things entered in the graph of place, events in that of time; things and events
bounded by other things and events, measured by them, comparable with them: he perceives
an ordered and detached world. ... Or on the other hand, man meets what exists and
becomes as what is over against him, always simply a single being and each thing simply
as being. What exists is opened to him in happenings, and what happens affects him as
what is. Nothing is present for him except this one being, but it implicates the whole world.
Buber (1970) (pp. 31–32)
Furthermore, that which is ‘meaningful’ is constantly menaced by ‘mean-

inglessness’ in the same way that sense is menaced by non-sense. Does
phenomenological neglect exist in terms of understanding the meaning
of meaninglessness? What is the substance of meaninglessness and what
is it that generates or produces this substance. Within the fragile human
being and in privation what are the forms of meaninglessness and what
if any is the relationship of this concept to potentiality, actuality
(Brentano, 1975) and mental distress? In the same way that the world is
a fact, meaninglessness is an ever-increasing inhabitant of our world and
it is necessary to understand the anatomy of meaninglessness and the
experience of meaninglessness, as it is an aspect of the world of natural
experiences. Attempts to solve the problems that meaninglessness brings
in terms of mental distress may enable solutions to enhance the potential
of human mental wellbeing. This prompts the question of the meaningful-
ness of mental wellbeing.
Many academics argue within the literature today that there is a
positive relationship between the concepts ‘mental’, ‘health’, ‘well’ and
‘being’. However, this may be a misnomer and I am uncomfortable with
the common acceptance of the use of these terms together, which presumes
that mental wellbeing is a positive place within human space and that it
is not as a result, neutral or negative. What therefore is the substance of
the meaning of mental wellbeing? However, before attempting to answer
this question, what is being?
THE ROOTS OF BEING
Brentano’s (1975) doctoral thesis on the Aristotelian corpus on the senses

of being provides four dimensions of being, accidental (on kata symbe-
bekos), being in the sense of being true (on hos alethes), non-being in the
way of falseness (me on hos pseudos) being of the categories and potential
and actual being (dynamei kai energeia). The allusions to being seek to
understand the determination of being. Aristotle in Metaphysics
IV.2.1003b6 states
one thing is said to be because it is substance, another because it is an attribute of a
substance, still another because it is a process toward substance, or privation of substantial
forms or quality of substance, or because it produces or generates substance or that which
is predicated of substance, or because it is negation of such a thing or of substance itself.
Hence for this reason it is argued that non-being is. Within the Lebenswelt
of today, world and life interact in a way that leaves many humans in a
place of mental distress and increasingly in the place of ‘‘non-being within
being’’. Non-being in this context does not refer to falseness as suggested
by Aristotle (Brentano, 1975) but an alternative interpretation of place
and substance where being and non-being co-exist more frequently, the
ultimate result, non-existence in the world ‘‘another being accidentally
co-exists with it in the same subject’’ (p. 14). Brentano (1975) also com-
ments that truth is found in affirmative judgements and falsity in the
negative. It is the case that mental health is judged by humans in society
as the affirmative and mental distress within negative connotations and
judgements. However, is this appropriate within the nature (Wesen) of
things?
Despite the many advances of science relating to mankind and the
uncovering of our microscopic world, humans have also begun to re-
discover and be reawakened to the true realities, meanings and natures
of mental distress created by man. In terms of our global reality, humans
increasingly encounter daily the sense of true being in terms of war, global
terror, oppression, famine, natural disaster and disease all of which result
in mental distress for those civilisations. I contend that these macro
occurrences confuse and hide the micro, the new silent holocaust of the
seventh moment wherein humans live and construct a meaningless world
in terms of their being. Many monumental atrocities of being are created
and demonstrated through the deliverance of man’s means upon man,
the genocide in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, the
attack upon the World Trade Centre, The Afghanistan war, The Iraq war
as examples. However, none of these examples are new departures for
man, since the history of human civilisation is dotted with similar exam-
ples of greater proportions. Therefore, in the phenomenological, what is
the significance of the ‘‘globality of being’’ and how does this concept
relate to categories, potential and actual being (Brentano, 1975) as

mental health?
THE SUBSTANCE OF MENTAL HEALTH
The concept of mental health may be traced back to early Greek civilisa-
tion. Since that period, the empirical, theoretical and philosophical litera-
tures regarding the concept of mental health have expanded in a variety
of directions in the quest to understand its meaning (Jahoda, 1958; Trent,
1992; McDonald and O’Hara, 1998) and its relationship with the concepts
psychological wellbeing (Bradburn, 1969; Cherlin and Reeder, 1975; Brant
and Veroff, 1982; Diener, 1984; Ryff, 1989, 1995), positive mental health
(Jahoda, 1958; Szasz, 1961; Bradburn, 1969; Beiser, 1974), positive psycho-
logical functioning (Jung, 1933; Erikson, 1959; Allport, 1961; Rogers,
1961; Buhler and Massarik, 1968; Maslow, 1968), subjective wellbeing
(Gurin et al., 1960; Neugarten, Havighurst, and Tobin, 1961; Cantril,
1965; Wilson, 1967; Bradburn, 1969; Wood, Wylie, and Sheafor, 1969;
Lawton, 1975; Morris and Sherwood, 1975; Andrews and Withey, 1976;
Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers, 1976; Larsen, 1978; Underwood and
Froming, 1980; Kammann and Flet, 1983; Diener and Lucas, 2000) and
more recently happiness (Myers and Diener, 1995; Argyle, 1997; Myers
and Diener, 1997; Lewis and Glennerster, 2000).
Phenomenology’s quest, similar to the central thread of questioning in
health sciences, asks, what of the attitudes of the individual toward himself
and community? What is the degree to which a person realizes his
potentialities through action? What of the functionality of the individual’s
persona? What level of independence of social influences has the human
today? How does the human interpret and seek meaning in the world
around him (Jahoda, 1958)? And can humans take life as it comes and
master it in a way that allows potentiality rather than actuality, resulting
in mental health, mental distress or non-being within our realities.
Humans exist daily in the world to meet the potential of their being
rather than the actuality of their being. What are the phenomena that
the intention of mental health and mental distress are accidental to each
other? Brentano (1975) indicates that in terms of ‘accidental being’ ‘‘the
two do not necessarily belong together; one property is not a consequence
of the other and the two do not stem from a common cause; the one has
the other kata symbebekos’’ (p. 8). However, within the mode of existence
for the human, each state may belong to the person and not as argued
by Brentano (1975) that ‘‘to say that one thing is another means the same
as that the second thing accidentally belongs to the first’’ (p. 9).
MENTAL WELLBEING
Beiser (1974) examines the components and correlates of mental wellbeing

and comments that in the decade 1964–74 the subject of mental wellbeing
became a construct for serious health science analysis. He argues that the
complex feeling state of wellbeing involves a number of psychological
processes and he presents evidence from a study of residents in Stirling
County. Besier presents research findings that:
demonstrate the conceptual and methodological importance of studying the affective compo-
nents of wellbeing separately and as they interact, rather than assuming that wellbeing can
and should be considered as an unidimensional, global construct (p. 320).
In a longitudinal five-year study from 1963 to 1968, the researchers

interviewed adults living in twelve separate rural communities utilising a
schedule constructed to capture a wide range of psychophysiological and
psychological symptoms. Beiser’s (1974) findings suggest that each of
these factors has a significant correlation with general wellbeing and that:
‘‘wellbeing is the resultant effect of a subject’s complex intrapsychic pro-
cess in which a person’s level of satisfaction with life interacts with more
short-lived and fluctuating affective states’’ (p. 325).
Beiser (1974) in discussing the conceptual and methodological implica-
tions of this study points out that the advantages of knowing the compo-
nents of general wellbeing provide a ‘‘more reliable index of that
phenomenona being studied than a single item’’, and from a conceptual
perspective ‘‘the absence of factors promoting negative affect does not
automatically ensure the emergence of positive state feelings or vice versa’’
(p. 325). Beiser (1974) also comments that there is a mixed pattern of
associations among the socio-demographic variables and the affect items
and suggests that the sampling techniques utilised may account for the
variations in comparison to the study of Bradburn and Caplovitz (1965,
1969). Beiser (1974) in his sampling method, weighted the variables
regarding people suffering from emotional problems/health problems
more so than in a random sample from the rural community. He also
comments that this sample reflects a rural population in contrast to the
urban population used in Bradburn’s study and that ‘‘the distribution of
educational levels is more limited here than in an urban setting’’ and that
these findings are the result of a six year longitudinal study (Beiser, 1974,
p. 1326).
WELLBEING
Bryant and Veroff (1982) provide a socio-historical analysis of the struc-

ture of psychological wellbeing. In their study they compared the data
from two national studies (1957, 1976) regarding Americans’ reactions to
life experiences and their mental health. They constructed eighteen indices
of wellbeing from items common to both studies. These items analysed
general happiness, self-perception, symptoms of stress, adjustment to
marriage, work and parenthood and feelings attached to these roles.
The focal point of both surveys was how people evaluate their own
perception of their wellbeing or distress, ‘‘as phenomena to be studied in
their own right’’ (p. 654). Their results suggest that there are three separate
dimensions of self-evaluation that underlie men’s and women’s responses
in both studies regarding the topic of subjective mental health. These
structures are: (a) positive affective evaluation (positively anchored unhap-
piness items), (b) negative affective evaluation (negatively anchored strain
items) and (c) the evaluation of personal competence (Bryant and Veroff,
1982). Each of these items, although related are separate from one another.
They found stability of structures in each of these four groups (men, 1957;
women, 1957; men, 1976; women, 1976), which suggest that the structure
is reliable in underpinning a theory of self-evaluation and they utilise this
structure to analyse sex and year differences in elements of the structure.
Bryant and Veroff (1982) comment that their finding relating to personal
competence reflects competence in relation to dealing with life stressors
rather than ‘‘enacting positive experience’’ (p. 672). In sum, they found
that people in the different time scales 1957 and 1976 used different role
sets for evaluating their personal adequacy, the structural importance for
work; and parenting changed for both men and women during this time
period as did the meaning of future morale on people’s affective evalua-
tions. This item had less impact in the 1976 study. Bryant and Veroff
(1982) state that: ‘‘... People in general become more uncertain, the
expression of uncertainty about one’s life becomes less diagnostic of one’s
own wellbeing’’ (p. 672).
Ryff (1989) identifies the most important literature that addressed
positive psychological functioning: self-actualisation (Jung, 1933; Allport,
1961; Rogers, 1961), life span/life cycle (Erikson, 1959; Buhler and
Massarik, 1968; Maslow, 1968) and positive mental health (Jahoda, 1958;
Szasz, 1961; Bradburn, 1969; Beiser, 1974). Ryff (1989) in her critique of
these theoretical positions presents five key points for consideration: (1)
these perspectives have little empirical underpinning due to an absence
of valid, reliable and credible assessment tools; (2) the criteria of wellbeing
generated by these positions are diverse and extensive; (3) there is no
clear criteria which illustrate the features of positive psychological func-
tioning; (4) the literature is ‘‘value laden’’ in how people should perform
if they have positive psychological functioning; (5) many of the above
theorists have deliberated over similar features of the same phenomenon.
Ryff (1989, 1995) argues that much of the literature up until this point is
based upon formulations of the concept wellbeing, with little theoretical
or empirical exploration of its links to positive functioning. Ryff (1989)
presents a new dimension where she attempts to consolidate a number
of alternative theoretical positions and explores the relationships between
indicators of ‘‘wellbeing’’ and new links to ‘‘positive functioning’’ from
previous empirical research in this area. The major aim of Ryff ’s (1989)
research was to provide operational definitions and measures of the
following attributes: self-acceptance, positive relations with others, auton-
omy, environmental mastery, purpose in life and personal growth. This
approach integrated the theoretical domains of mental health, clinical
and life span as ‘‘multiple converging aspects of positive psychological
functioning.’’ Ryff (1989) states that:
The empirical challenge therefore, is to operationalize these theory guided dimensions so
that they may be examined vis-à-vis the reigning indexes of positive functioning. Such
comparisons will clarify whether the alternative approach affords criteria of psychological
wellbeing that are theoretically and empirically distinct from existing formulations (p. 1071).
Ryff (1989) comments that the educational levels of the respondents were
high. Regarding health ratings the older respondents had significantly
lower self-rating scales than the middle or younger groups and the finan-
cial state of the majority of subjects was within the range good–
excellent.
Regarding sex differences, women rated their financial position more
negatively than men; most of the younger sample were single; the majority
of the middle-aged sample were married; and half of the older group were
married. One third of the older group were widowed; and regarding
religion, most of the sample were Catholic in belief.
Ryff (1989) constructed new measurement scales to reflect previous
tools and the theoretical literature and administered the new instrument
alongside other previously used scales to measure psychological wellbeing.
Ryff (1989) utilised a ‘‘construct-oriented approach to personality assess-

ment’’ in the development of the new measure. Each of the theoretical
constructs (self-acceptance, positive relations with others, autonomy, envi-
ronmental mastery, purpose in life and personal growth) as differing traits
in positive functioning were included as constructs within the self-report
instrument. The findings of Ryff ’s (1989) study supported the claim that
‘‘key aspects of positive psychological functioning emphasized in theory
have not been represented in the empirical arena’’ (p. 1077). The findings
also suggest that recent debates in the literature constitute a narrow view
of psychological functioning. Much of the key debate surrounds ‘‘short
term affective wellbeing (happiness)’’ where further questions require
exploration regarding continuing life challenges in terms of purpose and
direction and how subjects achieve long term relationships with others
and achieve a sense of self-actualisation or true potential. Ryff (1989) also
comments that life satisfaction has been used to measure wellbeing but
has neglected to measure constructs such as autonomy, positive relations
with others and personal growth. Ryff (1989) suggests that the focus of
empirical research is now in the direction of the behaviours that people
try to achieve on a daily basis regarding their personal goals (Emmons,
1986); and the focus in gerontological research is upon meaning and
purpose in life (Reker, Peacock and Wong, 1987). Ryff (1989) argues that
these constructs of goals and directions in life are in themselves central
to the understanding of psychological wellbeing and not simply the ‘‘ante-
cedents’’. In conclusion Ryff (1989) comments that future empirical studies
should examine the fit between the theoretical concepts and the values
and ideals of those to whom they are to be applied and
investigate the conditions under which particular ideals of wellbeing are obstructed or
realised and probe the long term consequences (individual and societal) of following one
rather than another conception of positive psychological functioning (p. 1080).
Ryff (1995) in discussing psychological wellbeing in adult life comments

that one key area that is absent within the scientific debate on mental
health is the identification of what is absent in peoples’ lives that provide
them with psychological wellbeing. Much research has been carried out
on those who have considerable psychological disorders and those who
have psychological wellbeing. However, ‘‘individuals who are not troubled
by psychological dysfunction, but who, nonetheless, lack many of the
positive psychological goods of life’’ (p. 103) have been neglected by
scientific research.
Jahoda (1958) following a literature search of the subject positive

mental health constructed six categories regarding the concept. Thirty
years later, Ryff (1989, 1995) explored the same concepts and constructed
six dimensions from her research.
Ryff (1989, 1995) argues that the earlier work carried out by researchers
like Jahoda (1958) offered explanations as to what constituted positive
mental health but such perspectives held little empirical foundation as
such assumptions were arrived at without the use of ‘‘credible assessment
measures’’ and the lack of valid and reliable measurement tools. Jahoda
(1958) in her discussion regarding the six categories states: ‘‘... it could
be argued that there exists an empirical or theoretical relationship between
these groups’’ (p. 24). Whereas these positions provide research-based
criteria for positive mental health, the answer to the question of the
psychological meaning of positive mental health remains unanswered.
Jahoda (1958) argues that since there are alternative views of what
defines health, it is therefore, inappropriate to take a reductionist position
regarding what constitutes mental health: ‘‘people vary so much in terms
of their native equipment that it is unreasonable to assume they could
all be measured by the same yardstick’’ (p. 68). Therefore, this argument
suggests that there are different constellations of mental health to be
extrapolated from the six categories of concepts as outlined above.
Conrad (1952) cited by Jahoda (1958) in an analysis of the health
continuum, suggests that it may be appropriate to separate out and
provide clarity to the following concepts: positive health, non-health and
negative health. It is also possible to argue that each of these concepts
exists to some degree in each individual dependent upon their circum-
stance. Building on the ideas of Conrad (1952) cited by Jahoda (1958),
mental illness would equate with negative mental health within that
continuum.
Table 1
Jahoda (1958) Ryff (1989, 1995)
Attitudes of an individual toward his own self Self-acceptance

Growth, development or self-actualisation Personal growth
Integration Positive relations with others
Autonomy Autonomy
Perception of reality Purpose in life
Environmental Mastery Environmental Mastery
Jahoda (1958) deals with the problematic area of ‘‘values’’ as her final
question. Values provide another level of analysis to each of these cate-
gories especially when ‘‘one calls these psychological phenomena ‘mental
health’ ’’ (p. 76). Jahoda (1958) suggests that empirical indicators to mea-
sure mental health require development. However, such a method (quanti-
tative approaches) may be fundamentally flawed as a scientific method
to fully understand mental health. Jahoda (1958) also argues that whereas
there are many interpretations of physical health the concept mental
health may be interpreted from a number of alternative viewpoints.
Hartmann (1951) cited by Jahoda (1958) states: ‘‘theoretical standards of
health are usually too narrow insofar as they underestimate the great
diversity of types which in practice pass as healthy.’’
Does this type of research finding enable us to clarify the meaningful-
ness of mental distress? The philosophical schema of the Trialectic is
tentatively presented as a new paradigm for viewing the relationships
between potentiality, actuality, mental wellbeing and mental distress,
through the ontological and the teleological.
THE TRIALECTIC
This schema is presented as an alternative beginning to the examination

of the ontological and teleological relationships between that which is
meaningful and that which is meaningless and their relationships to
potentiality, actuality and mental being, hence what I refer to as the
‘‘Trialectic place within space’’. Each and every one of us encounters self
and others at some point in the world and the ‘‘Trialectic’’ is in constant
movement to adjust to that which is perceived. What of the sameness
and difference in this temporal space? The Trialectic is presented as a
point or advance in the development of being. It is not only a mode of
thought, action and way but together they have consequences for that
individual. Hence the teleological position must be questioned. The ‘‘act’’
decided upon by the individual, has many implications for the individual
and is more difficult to clarify in terms of the implications within the
world of today. For although many people today still make decisions,
some of which are based upon the utilitarian principle of the categorical
imperative, is it the case that the boundaries of the individual and societal
ethic are confusing both for the individual and the society since both the
individual and society are changing within their global connectedness,
leading to greater consequence for mental distress and ultimate non-
being? It is contended that the teleological for the individual may be

meaningless within the meaning of the societal ethic. Simmel (1971) argues
the deepest problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the individual to maintain
the independence and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of society,
against the weight of the historical heritage and the external culture and technique of
modern life (p. 324).
Hegel (1990) argues that in the beginning, pure being constitutes pure
thought and immediacy, hence ‘‘the absolute is being’’ or ‘‘absolute
indifference’’ (p. 69). This, Hegel (1990) argues, emerges through a substra-
tum. Brentano (1975) argues that Aristotle suggests that ‘actual being (on
energeia) is either pure form or is actualised by form’ (p. 27). There are
close similarities in the explanations by both authors to this form of pure
being. Alternatively, Brentano (1975) argues that being may be ‘in various
ways’ (p. 13), and there are similarities between the ideas of substratum
and categories as presented by Brentano. I argue that each of the compo-
nents of the Trialectic exist within the curvature of the same plane of
being and are not substrata or alternative categories, but one (see Figure
1). The Trialectic is that position where the ‘I’ begins and the ‘Thou’
confronts, the thou as ‘other’ and the ‘world.’ The schemata of the
Trialectic rejects the assumption made by Hegel (1990) that ‘‘God is the
sum total of all realities ... and that God is the being in all existence’’
Figure 1.
(p. 68). This place is in a state of constant flux, reinterpreted, re-under-

stood, where each interpretation and horizon enables a new ontology
through teleological development. Hegel’s (1990) dialectic is also both
ontological in thought and teleological in terms of ‘act’ as potential and
actual (Brentano, 1975). The dialectic, as a pathway is also searching
outwards to the world for questions and answers in order to arrive at
self-determination and self-actualisation. Hegel (1990) also discusses the
notion of dialectic as the synergy of negativity. This suggests a tension
between that which is and the opposite, or, its other. Here Hegel (1990)
suggests that such negativity has specificity or unique attributes. This
concept is referred to by Hegel (1990) on many occasions in his writings
as captured by Spinoza as Omnis determinatio est negatio or that every
determination gives rise to a contradiction. Therefore, for Hegel (1990),
as a person evolves, during these experiences of transition from aspects
of potentiality and actuality new beginning dawns in the cycle of self-
reconstruction. However, I argue that Hegel’s (1990) theory, although
referring originally to the spiritual requires a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1996)
to a new plateau of interpretation, that of the Trialectic. This dimension
of change involves the evolution of the integration or convolution process
(Meleis, 1997) of the ontological and teleological to the potentiality and
actuality of being. Here, I question again what it is that is the simple
essence or substance of being and how does the external world now affect
consciousness, experience and self-realisation in terms of the substance of
being in mental health and the other or its contradictory, that of mental
distress? Does that which appears meaningless in the world of substance
enter a cycle of development resulting in mental distress with the potential
for ultimate non-being within being? And in ontological terms, what is
the nature of that which becomes other to itself as meaningless?
The anatomy of the Trialectic is presented as the substance of the
continuum between mental wellbeing and distress, the relationship
between the ontological and teleological self and the possibility of self-
expression and self-actualisation through potentiality and actuality
(Brentano, 1975). Within this pathway lies the horizon of consciousness,
the place in space of Trialectic (see Figure 1). Each of these three dimen-
sions together illuminate the momentum of the space of thought where,
as for Hegel (1990), harmony and discord exist in a tension for supremacy
within the horizon. However, the Trialectic exposes the fact that the
human condition of understanding of being is not a fixed position but
the interplay between each of the elements of the Trialectic, which provides
meaning. When this space of thought has neither understanding nor

meaning, the potential for mental distress increases towards actualisation.
CONCLUSION
This paper examined the possible nature and meaning of mental health
and mental distress in the world of today. Analysis of ‘being’, examining
how the world of the seventh moment impacts upon ‘being’ as interpreta-
tion of meaning, becomes a greater quest in our global world. This quest
also brings with it the opportunity for misunderstanding and the existence
of meaninglessness. An examination of these questions through phenome-
nological methods by returning to the roots of being, questions Hegel’s
(1990) theory of being through the convoluted pathway of paradigm
change (Meleis, 1997) and presents an alternative ontological and teleo-
logical schema, the Trialectic. The concept and experience of meaningless-
ness exists for many humans in our modern world in opposition to that
of meaningfulness, as does the increasing rate of mental distress. It is
contended that the importance of ‘the meaningfulness of mental health
as being’ is now one of the key philosophical questions for an understand-
ing within the seventh moment, as global interconnectiveness opens up a
new world of apparent meaningless being. Philosophers and health science
professionals, in particular mental health practitioners, must question the
possible implications of this dimension for human care through the rela-
tionships between clinical practice, theory and research.
Waterford Institute of T echnology
NOTE
I wish to acknowledge the advice of my mentor Dr. Oliver D’Alton Slevin, Senior Lecturer
in Nursing at the University of Ulster in the development of this paper.
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OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
ONTOPOIESIS AND UNION IN THE PRAYER OF THE

HEART: CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOTHERAPY AND
LEARNING
This article was inspired by the effects of phenomenological approach

observed in our practice of transformative education and spiritually ori-
ented psychotherapy. Phenomenology based education or healing meth-
ods engage the whole person rather than the separate human faculties.
When the deep faculties such as the direct intuition, or the foundational
processes such as ontopoiesis, become actively and consciously involved
in the individual developmental process, education and healing effec-
tiveness skyrocket.
The two central claims of Husserl’s program, the gnoseological value
of direct intuition, and the possibility to obtain knowledge by explication
of the interior contents of consciousness, are indispensable to psychologi-
cal research. For transformative and emancipating goals of psychology,
even of greater value is the idea to positively articulate the ineffable.
Phenomenology finds language for the experiences of ‘‘unsaying’’ (Sells,
1994), such as the high degrees of spiritual insight. Those who practice
spirituality-oriented psychotherapy know that the truly spiritual experi-
ences can be more transforming, developmental, and more healing for
the client than the years of conventional therapy. Powerful transformation
happens when people articulate spiritual experiences. In the ineffability
of spiritual experience, something always remains incomplete, closed,
intentionality devoid of final fulfillment. In this paper, I make a modest
attempt to articulate the experience beyond the ego, happening in the
practice of the Hesychast Prayer of the Heart. Explication of the dynamics
of the direct intuition, Union, and ontopoiesis leads to a better under-
standing of the psychological system generally called self, and suggests a
number of methodological approaches based on the enhancement of the
essential elements of self-structure. The term ontopoiesis, coined by Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka, is used in this article to address the self-creative
activity of consciousness manifesting for practitioners of the Prayer of
the Heart. It will be shown in the article that this activity unfolds in a
series of predictably organized experiences, leading from domains of the
ego and individual will to the domains of Union. These experiences unfold
289
290 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
a layered gradient structure, organized as an ontological hierarchy.

Actualization of every ontologically situated domain of experience may
have specific influences on the process of individual psychological devel-
opment, whence the term ‘‘ontopoiesis’’ is chosen over the more customary
term ‘‘autopoiesis’’.
In its emphasis on direct intuition, Husserl’s Method finds power-
ful predecessors in systems of thought concerned by the maxim gnothi
seauton (Greek), ‘‘know thyself ’’. Islamic philosophy of illumination
(al-Suhrawardi, 1999; Walbridge, 2000; Yazdi, 1992), Tantra (Louchakova
and Warner, 2003), Advaita Vedanta (Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi,
1996; Rambachan, 1991) are all based on the phenomenological self-
enquiry via knowledge by presence, i.e. direct intuition. The vision of
God in the early Christian mystics (Kirk, 1931), or in revelations of
Jewish Merkabah (Scholem, 1946), depends on the presence of direct
intuition. The Islamic spiritual philosopher al-Junayd qualifies direct intu-
ition as the only valid means of self-knowledge (Abdel-Kader, 1967). The
pervasiveness of the direct intuition-based phenomenological method in
the human endeavor of self-knowledge leads one to examine the modes
of ontological givenness of direct intuition among the contents of life.
What are the mental workings of the mind actualizing direct intuition?
For such a mind are relations with life permeated by the ongoing gestalt
of the interiority of consciousness. To begin with, direct intuition is
differentiated from noesis, the immediate apperception of noemata by
awareness. Direct intuition is optional, it develops, rises and subsides,
and some people report it more than others do. Noesis, on the contrary,
is a constant, rooted in the innate sentiency of consciousness. As Husserl
says in Ideas I, the noetic ‘‘grasping’’ of noemata is an essential activity
of consciousness foundational to all cognition. By noesis, the phenomena
of mental life appear sentient, conscious:
Every intentive mental process is precisely noetic ... It is of its essence to include in itself
something such as a ‘‘sense’’, and possibly a manifold sense on the basis of the sense bestowal
and, in unity with that, to effect further productions which become ‘‘senseful’’ precisely by
this sense bestowal (Husserl, 1999).
Noesis is always there, always in the background, as a known-ness of

things within a unified set of cognitions ‘‘awareness is’’ and ‘‘awareness
of something’’. The relationship within the noesis–noemata duo is para-
doxical: while noemata are in constant flux, the awareness of them is
unchanging. However, mentally differentiated from one another, they
present no ‘‘gap’’ between the two. Their existence is indivisible, and they
ONTOPOIESIS IN THE PRAYER OF THE HEART 291
are distinguished only for the sake of analysis. This unity of phenomenal
and pure awareness is implicit in consciousness.
On the contrary, direct intuition is not within this constancy of con-
sciousness. It applies selectively to the particular meanings or activities
of consciousness. It is intentional, as a direct intuition of something. The
common denominator of all instances of direct intuition is that it makes
the noetic activity of consciousness transparent to itself. People differ in
regard to direct intuition, i.e. in their awareness of the particular noesis.
The rise of direct intuition manifests in widening of internal vistas and
deepening of internal landscapes, in the emergence of foundational under-
standings, in the ability to see directly the essential structures and activities
of consciousness. While awareness that is grasping its own phenomenal
contents is always an ongoing background of phenomena in man’s natural
attitude, direct intuition, as the conscious perception of these activities,
presupposes reduction. It would be true to say that no one knows exactly
what internal process brought to life direct intuition such as in the genius
of Husserl. One can only speculate whether it happened in an instance,
or developed over the course of time. However, in spiritual traditions and
texts such as early Christian Philokalia, there is evidence that people can
arrive at ‘‘seeing’’ the interior workings of consciousness via a gradual
training of the mind.
‘‘Seeing’’ the interior operations and contents of consciousness is pro-
foundly transforming to all significant aspects of a person (Louchakova,
2004a). For example, it affects the ways people die. Schmitz-Perrin in his
study of theological influences on Husserl’s thought, indicates that during
the last hours of his life, Husserl stated: ‘‘God has welcomed me graciously
and has allowed me to die ... God is good, yes, God is good, but really
ununderstandable, it is a very hard time now for us ... I want him to be
with me. But I do not feel that He is close to me ... Pray for me’’ (as
quoted in Schmitz-Perrin, 1996, p. 488, footnotes 29 and 30). Later, the
minutes before he died, he said: ‘‘I have seen something wonderful. Hurry
up, and write!’’ But when the nurse came back, he had already passed
away. What did Edmund Husserl ‘‘see’’, and what did he want to describe
in the last moment when his speech still obeyed his self-transparent
consciousness? Evidently, this last ‘‘seeing’’ switched his mood from the
prior angst to joy.
Theophanis the Monk, the Hesychast ascetic of the 8th century, indi-
rectly points to the connection between the rise of direct intuition of the
structures of the self through Prayer of the heart and the removal of the
fear of death. Theophanis says that this is precisely the fear of death that
292 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
motivates people to practice the Prayer of the Heart. This esoteric practice
comprises complicated mental exercises, leading to the complete restruc-
turing of the intentional consciousness towards the state that the early
Desert Fathers knew as Union, Theosis (Chirban, 1986; Theophanis the
Monk, 1984). Apophegmata leave us exalted descriptions of the internal
steps in the Prayer of the Heart, opening direct intuition by which
contemplatives will ‘‘see God’’ (St. Hesychios the Priest, 1979; Theophanis
the Monk, 1984).
Spiritual Exercises of the Prayer of the Heart
Prayer of the Heart was transmitted from the early Desert Fathers
to Byzantine monks, and was preserved until our days by Russian,
Romanian and Greek hermits and pilgrims. Separate contemplatives
practice this Prayer in England, the United States and France. The
practice is traditionally ascribed to Hesychasm, the esoteric tradition of
early Christianity, later absorbed by the Orthodox Church. In
Catholicism, it seems to be an individual enterprise of particular monks.
The history of Hesychasm contains many disputes concerning the safety
and validity of this practice (Pelikan, 1974). As a rule, Prayer of the
Heart is considered among the spiritual exercises that are esoteric, com-
plex, and need caution. For the dedicated practitioner, over years Prayer
of the Heart turns into a journey of profound inner transformation,
affecting all the levels of the self – from perception, to character structure,
to the affective sphere and foundational identity (Louchakova and
Warner, 2003; T he Way of a Pilgrim, 1952; Ware, 1974).
Prayer of the Heart opens the interior structure-contents of the self
(Ware, 1974). This form of internal contemplation is not unique to
Christianity, but is common to all wisdom traditions that posit the
ontological value of personhood. Corresponding forms of contemplative
worshipful self-enquiry exist in Islam (as dhikr of Divine names), in
Shakta-Vedanta and Advaita Vedanta (as bodily forms of atma-vichara,
or self-enquiry). In Christianity, the Prayer of the Heart takes the form
of the Jesus Prayer, and is described largely in the collections of
Apophthegmata. Indications to the various form of the Prayer of the
Heart can be traced through the history of all religions of the
Mediterranean.
Formally, Prayer of the Heart consists of an uninterrupted repetition
of the name of the deity paced with the breath, and accompanied by
focusing attention on the sense of self in the chest. As practice matures
over the years, there are shifts of interior states such as a) progression
from the verbal prayer to the internal silent prayer, b) movement of the
focus of the internal prayer from the head to the chest, c) progression
from the volitional repetition of the name to the state where the name is
spontaneously emerging from within the very being of the practitioner, –
as Kallistos Ware (1974) says, God prays to Himself, d) dissolution of
the name into wordless prayer of sustained presence, e) degrees of Union
(Dionisius the Areopagite, 1965). Within these roughly defined steps, this
is a structured phenomenological introspection into the human person.
Introspection happens as the deepening of the reversed flow of attention
via the embodied sense of self, taken back to its phenomenological origins
in pure subjectivity. A series of spontaneously rising reductions leads to
explication of the essential structures of the self.
The esoteric, interior part of practice consist of these spontaneously
rising reductions. Eventually, attention is reduced into the focus in
Spiritual Heart, a psychospiritual center of embodied consciousness in
the interior space of the chest (Louchakova and Warner, 2003; Spidlı́k,
1986). The Spiritual Heart is generally associated with the mystical experi-
ence of I–Thou, and transcendence of the individual I, followed by Union.
In this process, the hidden and latent content of the psyche becomes
available to awareness. This may include the traces of past trauma, early
forms of psychological self and adaptive mechanisms. The difficulties of
facing the content of subconscious and unconscious make the Prayer into
a psychologically challenging process. Due to this transformative
encounter with the psyche, Prayer of the Heart is considered as being
among the spiritual disciplines that are difficult to practice (T he Way of
a Pilgrim, 1952; Ware, 1974).
In our study of the effects of spiritual practices (Louchakova, 2004b)
Prayer of the Heart stands out for its capacity to advance direct intuition.
Consequently, in psychology Prayer of the Heart and similar practices
can serve as models for studying and articulating direct intuition, the
essential structures of consciousness co-emerging with it, and the overall
psychological effects of this process. There is no full description of the
practice of the Prayer available in known literature, and it is a part of
the oral tradition. To learn this method one needs a living teacher (T he
Way of a Pilgrim, 1952). Mastering the Prayer takes many years. To
capture the internal processes happening in the practice of the Prayer,
the author phenomenologically analyzed accounts of people who prac-
ticed Prayer of the Heart, which allowed describing the longitudinal
maturing of the practice of the Prayer of the Heart, and explicating the
294 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
essential structures of consciousness associated with the rise of direct

intuition.
Phenomenological Method in the Study of Prayer of the Heart
The author uses the comparative historical and the psychological

phenomenological methods. The details of this approach to the analysis
of the self are available directly from the author (Louchakova, 2005). The
historical accounts were obtained from Philokalia, an extremely complex
Hesychast text consisting of first person reports of introspection and
spiritual experiences, comments on the experiences of others, reflections
on Christian doctrine, personal letters, allusions to Scripture and inter-
pretations of passages from Christian texts. Because of this diversity, it is
hard to ascribe a literary genre to Philokalia. It is a multidimensional
representation of the life world of a mystic, a ‘‘snapshot’’ of a lived reality
of the early Christian contemplative in the pursuit of self-knowledge.
Within this complex textual fabric, one can observe how the live
intentional consciousness seamlessly shifts the modes of reduction and
planes of reality. Modalities of experience flow into one another, move-
ments towards apophasis are immediately complemented by sweeping
cataphatic expressions. In the phenomenological analysis of Philokalia,
one flows within the Escher-like worlds of infinitely unfolding meanings,
navigating consciousness in its dazzling never-ending interiority.
The author analysed the texts and the descriptions provided by others,
using his/her own mind as a tool to perform reductions and imaginative
variations on the contents of descriptions. Since in this method the
researcher analysed somebody else’s account, to obtaining the accurate
data there was a need to control the interpretive, hermeneutic part of the
analysis. This was controlled by extensive bracketing of researcher’s pre-
suppositions. Within this framework, some areas of text in Philokalia
came through as the general structures of experience, or even essences
seminal to the whole class of experiences.
In addition, the author used the interviews, instructions and commen-
taries provided by living experts in the tradition, as well as field observa-
tions, self-observations, and interviews with active practitioners. The
longitudinal part of the study included the analysis of the experience of
people in the guided Prayer of the Heart groups, as well as focus groups
of people interested in self-inquiry. In working with groups of people, the
explication of the essential structures of experience frequently happened
in a specially developed dialogical procedure, sometimes during, and
sometimes after the process of introspection. Practitioners provided the

in-depth descriptions of their introspective experiences, sometimes self-
identifying the essential structures. Dialogue aimed at explication of both
the psychological (meaningful, content-related) and perceptual (cognitive,
precognitive, structures of awareness related) elements of experience. As
the understanding of the essential structures emerged, it sponsored the
new hermeneutic cycles of guidance of the Prayer practice, which in turn
served the more precise explication to follow. This article presents obser-
vations based on the dialogical interviewing of practitioners over the
period of 10 years, with the total number of people exceeding 300.
Research also included the self-study using the traditional Husserl’s
method.
Prayer and Ontopoiesis
The principal initial movement of attention in Prayer of the Heart consists

in focusing attention on the embodied sense of self in the chest. Attention
is established in (not ‘‘on’’) the current of the ‘‘I-sense’’. A majority of
people identify it as situated slightly to the right side of the chest bone.
More rarely, it is in the center of the chest or on the left. The oral
tradition suggests focusing initially on the right side. Experientially, when
the focus is on the right side, it is easier to distinguish the essential
structures of experience, and to integrate the insights of the interior
contents of consciousness with everyday life.
One begins by associating the repetition of the Divine Name (the name
of Jesus in the Jesus prayer which is a subtype of Prayer of the Heart)
with the somatic sense of self in the chest. In the older, traditional forms
of Prayer, when the practitioner develops the practice over the course of
decades, the connection between the invocation and the self-sense arises
spontaneously due to connotations of ‘‘human subject’’, ‘‘son of God’’,
‘‘God within’’ and the like, associated with the Name. In the contemporary
grass-root, ‘‘accelerated’’ forms of Prayer, from the very beginning atten-
tion is fixed in the chest, in order to access the Gnostic ‘‘mind of the
heart’’ (Louchakova, 2004a; Louchakova and Warner, 2003; Ware, 1974).
Whence, the phenomenological analysis of the Prayer of the Heart uncov-
ers the interior structures of consciousness within this ‘‘mind of the Heart’’,
as opposed to ‘‘mind of the head’’. Data from the focus groups show that
intentional consciousness associated with the head usually consists of
self-reflective, analytic/synthetic, logic based constructs, as opposed to the
immediacy of the lived experience in the chest. The processes leading to
296 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
the rise of direct intuition of the primal lived experience of intentional

consciousness happen only in association with the focus of attention in
the chest.
The focus in the felt sense of self in the chest corresponds to the rise
of egological, self-referencing experience. As attention becomes more
focused, this sense of self strengthens and turns into an uninterrupted
current. Following Edith Stein, De Monticelly emphasizes the importance
of discrimination between the ‘‘egological’’ and ‘‘non-egological’’ lived
experiences as the entrance into the ‘‘inner being’’ and a tool to serious
epistemology of personal knowledge (De Monticelli, 2002). Our analysis
of the accounts of the participants of the focus groups shows that the
egological experience always involves the spontaneous focus in the body.
In Prayer of the Heart, or in the similar practice of self-enquiry of the
Indian saint Sri Ramana Maharshi (Ramana, 1996), focusing on the right
side of the chest aids sorting the sense-thought of self out of the general
flow of intentional consciousness. The structure of egological experience
associated with the chest is different from the one associated with the
head and other areas of the body: in the chest the sustained self-sense
becomes subject to spontaneously rising reduction. In that sense, one
may speak about the ontologically primary and secondary egological
experience, primary being associated with the focus in the chest, and
secondary being associated with the focus in the head and possibly other
body zones.
Different from the perspective of De Monticelli (2002), the reports of
the participants in self-enquiry focus groups show that egological experi-
ences, rather than being purely affective or volitional, have a more compli-
cated structure including cognition. The notion of the self within this
experience can be either inferential, associated with the focus in the head,
or immediate, lived, associated with the focus in the chest. The cognitive
element common to both experiences will be the ‘‘I am’’ thought, which
creates the clusters with other cognitions in the process of constructing
identity. Self-referencing may happen within both modes, resulting in the
different understandings of human consciousness. However, the direct
intuition of ontopoiesis rises through the ‘‘mind of the Heart’’, not so
through the ‘‘mind of the head’’. The self-experience within the ‘‘mind of
the head’’ always remains within the delimiter ‘‘I am an individual’’. As
shown below, the transcendence of individual identity, necessary for the
rise of the direct intuition of ontopoiesis (see below), happens only via
reduction of the egological experience associated with the focus of atten-
tion in the chest. Consequently, the instructions of the 10th century
Hesychast St. Simeon the New Theologian for the practice of the Prayer
say, ‘‘Search inside yourself with your intellect so as to find the place of
the heart ...’’ (St. Simeon the New T heologian, 1995, p. 73).
More precisely, the egological experience which rises in fixing attention
on the sense of self on the right side of the chest contains the blend of
fields of meaning such as ‘‘I am’’, ‘‘I am the person, the self ’’, ‘‘I am the
body’’ and the narrative connotations of one’s history. Experience also
involves sensing the specific tactility of ‘‘personhood’’, a sort of warm
effulgence of personal sentiency, which can be associated with affect,
interpretation, image and thought. St. Simeon the New Theologian
possibly refers to this experience as finding ‘‘the place where all the powers
of the soul reside’’ (St. Simeon the New T heologian, 1995, p. 73), while the
Indian saint Sri Ramana Maharshi calls it aham-sphurana (Sanskrit), the
radiance of the ‘‘I’’.
This thought/sense experience of personhood can be navigated inwards
to its phenomenological origins. Ibn al’-Arabi, the Andalusian philosopher
of the XII century, calls the current of this body-related self-awareness
back to its source ‘‘the river of Jesus’’. The practitioner locates the Divine
Name, paced with breath, within flow of this reversed intentionality. The
current is spatially represented in the introspective space inside the chest,
and goes back to the subtle center of the embodied awareness called the
Spiritual Heart. The Spiritual Heart is the spatial bodily correspondent
to the innermost core of both self-sense and cognitive self (Ibn al-Arabi,
1978). It is known in Hesychasm as a junction of self-transcendence
(Spidlı́k, 1986), where the individual I–Thou eternally falls into and
emerges from the I–I, the Union.
As the concentration deepens, the flow of intentionality attempting to
grasp its own origin, effortful initially, becomes spontaneous, as though
it were ‘‘pulled’’ from within. In Indian Tantra, the power providing the
possibility of the reverse flow of awareness is personified as Goddess
Kundalini. Simultaneously with being viewed as a power of awareness to
grasp its origins, Kundalini is viewed as an evolutionary power of con-
sciousness, bringing to life the multiplicity of phenomena (Louchakova,
2004c). This keen conclusion regarding the double agency of Kundalini
captures the phenomenological observation that in deep meditation the
full collapse of awareness onto itself is preceded by the increase of the
internal flow of phenomena. In this simultaneity, the inward return of
awareness to its source and the outward deployment of the latent content
of consciousness, are in fact two sides of one process. As will be shown
298 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
later, this manifests as the increase of ontopoiesis under the presence of

direct intuition in the Prayer of the Heart.
The ‘‘pull’’ inward is personified as Goddess Uma. In different Tantric
systems, both Kundalini and Uma are the consorts to the Lord Shiva,
the personification of the principle of pure consciousness. In the beginning,
navigation towards the source of self-awareness is volitional, but at the
time of the actualization of the ‘‘pull’’, the impetus for this flow is recog-
nized as coming from beyond the individual will. Sufism accommodates
for this fact by a common statement that the rise of intuition of God
happens ‘‘by invitation [from within, from Deity] only’’.
There is the invariability of these specific details across traditions. As
the stable factors in this process, they are the part of the essential structure
of the body-based introspection into the self. What provides this shift
from the individual effort to the effortlessness of the inward flow of
attention? The mere reduction of the meditating I to transcendental ego
by a phenomenological epoché does not show this effect. The process of
Prayer differs from the Cartesian reduction or existential self-enquiry not
only by the bodily focus, but also by the overall relational setting contain-
ing the introspective process.
The worshipful repetition of the Divine Name in the spatial interiority
of the sense of self supports the polarity of I–Thou. The practitioner of
the Prayer intends, invites, and opens to the presence of the Other, the
great prototype of all others. Reduction within the self is accompanied
by the sense of the open unknown potentiality, the possibility of the
encounter with the sacred. One releases any claim to ownership of con-
sciousness, assuming that the source of the givenness of awareness-exis-
tence maybe beyond individual reach. Having this as an operating
assumption opens the awareness for receiving of the disowned intentional-
ity. In contrast to the existential self-inquiry, which locks the person into
the infinitely regressive monolog of self-transcending me–I, Prayer of the
Heart is implicitly a dialog. The epoché happens in the contexts of
increasing intimacy, in between the two affectively animated principles,
ascending (known, owned, individual) and descending (transcendental,
unknown, disowned, inferred, Divine). As De Monticelli (2002, p. 72)
notices, our loves are what get us closer to ourselves.
Prayer of the Heart encourages the practitioner to love beyond the
object, to conceive an open-ended intentionality with the affect directed
into the Unknown, and to cultivate opening into pure potentiality. The
systematic reduction of cognitions associated with the embodied sense of
self, and the absorption of awareness towards its origin, is paralleled by
worshipful receptivity to the Unknown. The inward motion continues in

the direction of an increasing sense of intimacy. In that, the gradual
changes of perception begin. As awareness comes closer and closer to
turning onto itself, the rise of direct intuition opens the inward fecundity
of consciousness and transcendence into the greater Self, to which the
egological experience is but the door.
As the inner space opens, one
... will find there darkness and an impenetrable density. Later ... you will find, as though
miraculously, an unceasing joy. For as soon as intellect attains the place of the heart, at
once [notice the characteristic suddenness of this transition – the interior space is quantum
structured] it sees things of which it previously knew nothing. It sees the open space within
the heart and it beholds it entirely luminous and full of discrimination. From then on, from
whatever side a distractive thought may appear, before it has come to a completion and
assumed a form, the intellect immediately drives it away and destroys it with the invocation
of Jesus Christ ... the rest you will learn for yourself (St. Simeon, 1995, p. 73).
Examination of this phenomenon of interior darkness and the sense of

impenetrable density is relevant to the analysis of the rise of direct
intuition. Metaphorically, this is the first encounter with the ‘‘veil’’ that
obscures the interiority of consciousness. The vector of intentionality is
turned in a direction that it never explored before, and the faculty of
seeing is initially unavailable. Psychologically speaking, the interior cogni-
tive schemas, which provide for the discernment of a particular phenome-
nal world, are not developed. In turning onto itself, awareness ‘‘clashes’’
with the outward vector of its own intentionality, resulting in the tempo-
rary ‘‘arrest’’ of intentional processes. Yet, if the focus is sustained, before
long the concentration is established in the Spiritual Heart. This leads to
activation of the new type of intentionality. Consciousness begins to
intensely deploy its own contents. Upon the touch of awareness, the
initially dark space of introspection breaks open with meanings and
images, analogous to the dark fertile ground sprouting under water and
sunlight. In that, awareness both manifests as a noesis/noemata duo, and
as a catalyst of the discharge of its own latent interior contents. The
repetition of the Name removes distracting thoughts and assumptions
that could construct the experience, and keeps the focus on the reverse
flow of self-sense. The practitioner enters the observatory of the inner
workings of the Logos, and sees how from within itself it produces
phenomena that engage in the activity of the temporal weaving of the
intentional networks.
300 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
Gradually, the interior space of consciousness opens up as luminous

(fully available to awareness) and full of discrimination. The very process
of the rising of the meaning is witnessed, initially as thoughts and images
deployed by impenetrable darkness, and in its mature form – immediately,
as the rising of phenomena from pure consciousness on the divide between
subject and object. Metaphorically, it is akin to the removal of the
overcast and the rise of the sun. Awareness perceives its own self-luminous
nature. The relationship between pure and phenomenal consciousness is
observed as a triad ‘‘awareness is – awareness is aware of itself – awareness
is aware of the meanings arising from awareness’’. This opens the intuition
of the origins of intentionality itself, beyond the contents of meaning, as
a sheer dynamic creative force, simultaneously the same and yet different
from the unchanging substratum that it deploys.
This deployment of the interior content of consciousness, and the
beginning of ontopoietic intuition initially happens in the context of the
individual self. Maturing ontopoietic intuition loses the qualifier of the
individual ‘‘I’’, and opens up the vistas of trans-spatial and trans-temporal
meanings emerging from the ‘‘field’’ of the unqualified and indescribable
potentiality of pure reason. The meanings, rising from within, are woven
into cognitive schemas, logical chains and the inner tapestry of discursive
thinking. Two processes, identified by Tymieniecka (2002) as the hori-
zontal and vertical lines of the unfolding of the intentional constructive
system in its manifestation of objectivity, complement each other in the
construction of the self.
Direct intuition, which is the awareness of these happenings, and the
deployment of latent meaning, are mutually enhancing. In fact, this is
one continuum of logoic expression, described from the two different
vistas, interior and external, or those of releasing and receiving, taken
together. The process unfolds in stages gradually progressing from the
bodily impressions to full logoic expression. Theophanis the Monk, who
practiced Prayer of the Heart in the 8th century, described the process
of Jesus Prayer in the following verses:
... The first step is that of purest prayer,

From this there comes warmth of heart,
And then a strange, a holy energy,
Then tears wrung from the heart, God-given.
Then peace from thoughts of every kind.
From this arises purging of the intellect,
And next the vision of heavenly mysteries.
Unheard of light is born from this ineffably,
And thence, beyond all telling, the hearts illumination.

Last comes – a step that has no limit
Though compassed in a single line –
Perfection that is endless ...
(Theophanis the Monk, 1994, p. 67)
These experiences, like beads, are ‘‘sitting on’’ the thread of central cogni-
tion, which is the reverse flow of the sense of personhood. This is an
essential structure as explicated by Theophanis. Remarkably, the same
structure emerges over a period of several decades, as well as within a
single set of introspection. The self-initiated practitioners, who never
received instructions, also arrive at this internal order due to the actualiza-
tion of direct intuition. Indeed, the latter remains the ‘‘gift of the gods’’
(Tymieniechka, 2002, p. 8). The explication of this structure happens
repeatedly in self-enquiry focus groups, and groups that practice the
Prayer of the Heart. In a single act of introspection, these are states, and
over decades of practice, these are stations. It is a stable phenomenon,
pertinent to the internal architecture of self-awareness in the Spiritual
Heart. The analogous structures are reported in phenomenological philos-
ophy of Shakta-Vedanta as ‘‘coverings of the Self ’’ (Siddharameshwar,
1998). The invariability of this structure points to the ontological nature
of it. When the introspective process constructs this experience, then the
construction invariably resolves into the hierarchies of being.
The layers are discretely perceived by the practitioner as ontologically
‘‘prior’’ and ‘‘posterior’’. The innermost layers of this interior architecture
of self-awareness carry the sense of deep intimacy, immediacy and pri-
macy. They also carry the sense of deeper authenticity and independence
than the outer layers. The outer layers are experienced as more ‘‘inert’’,
and less ‘‘real’’ than the inner. Spatiality and layers (spheres, domains)
then are the primary structural principles of the self, pervasive to the
whole internal organization. The components of the self are organized in
the ‘‘internal space’’ of introspection as layers around the central experi-
ence of the ‘‘I am’’ – consciousness. ‘‘I am’’ in association with sensations,
emotions and feelings, images, verbal thoughts, deeper non-verbal under-
standings, mental states such as torpor or confusion, and ‘‘nothing’’, forms
the easily identifiable phenomenological clusters within the egological
experience.
The interior switching of the direct intuition from layer to layer is
discrete, quantum. In that, two aspects can be distinguished – spontaneous
reduction by perception (structure) versus reduction by image/meaning
(contents). Both become actualized in the Prayer of the Heart, and com-
302 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
plement each other; however, they open up two different vistas in regards
to the ontopoiesis and Union.
Reduction by perception, bouncing back to the subjectivity of pure
awareness against the observed objects, leads one to regress into the I
abstracted from the world, spatial forms and temporal flow. There is
nothing concrete left, except for pure sentiency, slightly conditioned by
the ‘‘I’’-thought. The negation, leading to this absorption, happens in the
context of the natural attitude (Bello, 2002). The thought moves on the
level of the pregiven world rather than within the area prescribed by
Prayer of the Heart. This process allows the insights into simultaneity
and sameness of awareness and being, and can show that selfhood extends
beyond the existence of the body. However, the mere reduction into the
subject does not open the fullness of ontopoiesis or the understanding of
Union. This is the existential ‘‘cul-de-sac’’ – the practitioner will either
finish in the ‘‘nothing’’ or will be caught in the process of infinite
regression.
The unceasing repetition of the Name, recommended in the process of
Prayer, initiates a reduction by meaning. The focusing on the Name
neutralizes the ‘‘horizontal’’ (Tymieniecka, 2002) networks of conscious-
ness, and brackets the assumptions of multiplicity of existences implicit
to ordinary thinking. This continuous bracketing, accompanied by the
affective flow in the direction of inwardness and intimacy with the
unknown Other, intends on the origins of things. The essential ethical
moment in this ascent consists in ‘‘giving greetings’’. In Prayer of the
Heart, greetings are implicit to the repetition of the name. Instructions
to meditation on the self in both Ibn al’-Arabi’s (1978) written teaching,
and in the oral tradition of Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta that the author
was exposed to, suggest that one should pause and give internal greetings.
This engagement with the unknown Other is a pivotal moment. In giving
greetings, consciousness, fluctuating into and out of self-absorption, opens
into the direct intuition of limitless presence. The affect of love loses its
vector and instead becomes a continuum, a field.
In this epiphany of the I–Thou, the shift of identification happens. The
otherness disappears, and the former Other becomes the only One that
Is. Awareness/am-ness drops the qualifier of the individual I, and is
recognized as the attribute of the previously unknown Other. This shift
ends the egological experience. The incoming experience can be described
as ‘‘I am not, but He is, and in that somehow I am’’ (Sri Ranjit Maharaj,
personal communication, Encinitas, California, 1997). The transition from
the ego to the larger Self, also known as Union, happens not by reduction
or unification, but by a quantum shift of identity. Without this shift, the

experience remains locked within the individual I, acquires the feeling of
inertness and is prompted to return to the corporeal otherness.
Egological experience, and the experience of dissolution of the ego into
the larger Self, differ in regard to the affect of fear. ‘‘Existential dread’’ is
pertinent to the condition of the individual, while fearlessness of death is
characteristic of the condition of the Other, Union, state of annihilation
of individual. It opens in the Prayer of the Heart (Theophanis the Monk,
1984), or properly conducted Vedantic self-inquiry (Avadahu: ta Gı:ta: ,
1981). This shift of identification is also captured in the descriptions given
by other contemplatives such as Marguerite Porete, Meister Eckhart, or
our contemporary Kallistos Ware (1986).
Practitioners of the Prayer of the Heart reported at least two variants
of Union, different in regard to the transformation of the mode of identifi-
cation. One mode results in the opening of the ontopoietic expression
with the direct intuition of the fecundity of the Self; the other – in a
rather indescribable sense of the static transcendentality of the Self encom-
passing all the present, past and future phenomena. The latter mode is
more effective in reducing fear; the former seems to be more effective in
sponsoring individuation. It seems that the process of Prayer of the Heart
described by Theophanis the Monk also relates more to the second, static
variant of Union. In our research of the contemporary practitioners of
Prayer, the first mode seems to be prevalent. The educational outcomes
described at the end of this article are connected with the ontopoietic
mode.
To summarize, the explication of self-experience in the Prayer of the
Heart happens in several steps: first, singling out the egological experience
out of the mixture of egological/non-egological experience corresponding
to the natural attitude. Then, continuous bracketing of non-egological
cognitions and reduction of egological experience to the stream self-
awareness directed at the internal Other. As the reduction deepens, the
shift of identification switches the egological experience to the non-egolog-
ical, but with a quality that is radically different from the non-egological
experiences in the natural attitude. In the natural attitude, non-egologi-
cally ‘‘I’’ does not exist, and things just happen. There is no center,
consciousness itself is not the psychic reality of the individual (De
Monticelli, 2002). The experience is unified by a narrative ‘‘horizontal’’
meaning making, and by the implicit identification with the body. In the
Prayer of the Heart, when the individual I stops to exist, consciousness
itself is the psychic reality of the individual. The whole fullness of life,
304 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
previously veiled and constricted within the domain of the individual I,

gets augmented, expanded and absorbed into the prior Other. As John
the Baptist says, ‘‘He must increase, but I must decrease’’ (John 3:30).
The awareness and existence, liberated from the constraint of the
individual I, attain limitlessness within the larger transcendental identity.
The individual I turns into an empty shadow of the prior egological
identity, annihilated in the transcendental Self. It is reduced to being a
mere locator, the locus of Self-Encounter in which Transcendental Self
directly intuits its own meaning and meanings. The display of this
encounter is not blank or homogenous; phenomena are present; the
perception continues to function; direct intuition applied to the source of
phenomenal consciousness continues its fertilizing effect on ontopoietic
expression; intentionality continues – and the practitioner becomes aware
of the innermost mystery of the ontopoietic process. The prayed-to,
inferred unknown possibility is actualized as the ontopoietic fullness of
the Transcendental Ego. The interior meanings of things become available
and dynamically unfold, things are seen ‘‘as they are’’ – the practitioner
witnesses the ‘‘lights’’ or presences of things emerging from the ‘‘darkness’’
of the sacred indescribable field of One presence.
The specifics of ontopoietic intuition, then, consists in positioning the
awareness so that it can simultaneously receive the undifferentiated
‘‘womb’’ of consciousness, the great divide between the manifest and
unmanifest, and the completely manifested cascades of meaning. An even
subtler perception allows immersion into the functioning of the creative
force itself, which conceives phenomena and endows them with existence.
There lies the origin of intentionality, will, desire, knowledge and the like.
Within the deployed ontopoietic structures, available to the direct intu-
ition in the process of Prayer, one can also differentiate several domains,
such as the domain of essential relations, or the domain of accidental
thoughts. Our preliminary data show that the actualization of a particular
ontopoietic domain provides different effects on psychological life.
Understanding the specifics of these influences in future research may
provide keys to understanding the interior mechanisms of human trans-
formation. Meanwhile, the current data lead to the conclusion that the
overall opening of the ontopoietic intuition at large causes the general
characterological transformation.
Ontopoiesis and Individual Development

As longitudinal observations show, the rise of the direct ontopoietic
intuition has profound effects on perception, identity, motivational sphere,
i.e. all significant psychological aspects of one’s being (Louchakova,

2004a). They contribute to one’s characterological transformation, which
seems to be a specific psychological outcome of the direct intuition of the
ontopoiesis. In the practitioners of the Prayer of the Heart, characterologi-
cal transformation happens roughly in two consecutive stages: a) acquir-
ing of a healthy character structure, b) changing the character structure
towards an increase of positive traits. While the possibility of character
change is still disputed by psychology, this effect is clearly indicated in
the writings of Christian (Behr-Sigel, 1992), Islamic (Murata, 1992) and
Hindu saints (Bader, 1992; Louchakova and Warner, 2003, Louchakova,
2004a), and observed in our participants. The above-mentioned phenome-
non of the deployment of the latent content of consciousness upon the
application of the reverse flow of awareness speeds up the evolutionary
unfolding of one’s own latencies. Fluctuations of the states of separateness,
and the states of intimacy, proximity and Union, actualize the deployment
of positive characterological traits such as virtues. In fact, the practitioner
of the Prayer finds him/herself to be on the fast developmental track,
rapidly confronting the contents of subconscious and opening up of the
unconscious. Repetition of the Name brackets the negative contents, and
the reverse intentionality within the flow of the self-sense brings more
wholesome alternatives to the negative or destructive aspects of the
psyche.
Affects such as fear or anger in their fully manifested form belong to
the psychological boundary setting mechanism. However, in the ontopoie-
tic field of the Logos, the internal polarities of these affects manifest
themselves as soteriological sentiments, such as bliss or compassion.
Intuition of the interior essences of emotions leads to the transmutation
of the emotional sphere, where anger, sadness, loneliness, fear and despera-
tion gets transmuted into their wholesome counterparts such as compas-
sion, tranquility, fullness, joy, and hope. Sovatsky (1998) suggests that
the experience of these feelings has a healing effect on prior psychological
trauma. Then, the psyche of the practitioner of the Prayer over the course
of years finds the resource of healing within itself.
The powerful source of character change consists in the transformation
of the spectrum of the Divine Names, the foundational attributes of deity
(Dionisius the Areopagite, 1965), functioning in the individual psyche.
The choice of the name, such as the nouns Good, Love, or Beauty,
personal names such as Jesus, nouns such as Guide or Protector, is
usually reflective of the archetypal constituency of the individual psyche.
Jungian psychology views the dynamics of the archetypal contents as a
306 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
defining factor in one’s individuation. Prayer of the Heart brings up the

awareness of the archetypal contents of the psyche, and transformation
within the archetype towards its positive polarity. In the process of the
Prayer of the Heart, the archetypal level is actively engaged. The unfolding
of the archetypes happens in the direction of actualization of the inner
meanings. For example, the archetype of Betrayal may be transmuted
into the understanding of the illusory nature of phenomena, or the meta-
phor of veils concealing the true nature of things. When the archetypal
contents of one field is fully actualized or exhausted, the ontopoietic
process may provide the ‘‘descent’’ of a different, new archetype, accompa-
nied by the emergence of the new qualities in the psyche.
Interestingly, characterological change seems to be connected to the
dynamics of the focus in the body. As our prior research has shown, the
domains of intentional consciousness are tied to the particular areas of
the body-schema (Louchakova and Warner, 2003). In spiritual traditions,
this phenomenon corresponds to the concept of chakras or centers of
embodied consciousness. The focus of awareness in certain areas of the
body is associated with the necessary arousal of particular groups of
meaning. In our research, the change of archetypal contents was predomi-
nant if the practitioner over the years spontaneously gravitated to the
focus on the left side of the chest. The psychodynamic change (reframing
and healing of the individual’s history) was more associated with the
focus on the right. The overall opening up of the ontopoietic intuition
happens initially with the activation of the core center of Spiritual Heart,
and in its developed forms transcends any connection with the spatiality
of the body.
As compared to the direct intuition of ontopoiesis, absorption in pure
subjectivity also changes the qualities of the mind in the direction of
explication of the latencies and dealings with the subconscious. Contrary
to the full practice of Prayer, the consequences of this process can be
very dramatic and difficult to integrate, due to the actualization of archaic
emotions such as rage or terror associated with the early developmental
stages of the self. In the full practice of the Prayer of the Heart, the
integration of the subconscious and the transformation of the psyche are
more harmonious and faster acting. Indeed, things are different if con-
sciousness is seen as alive and the creative Logos as supporting its own
evolutionary process, rather than as a mere depository. The internal
transformation frequently corresponds to the tangible change of life cir-
cumstances, making a full circle integrating the ontopoietic and the life
world networks, and supporting the ancient alchemical dictum ‘‘as above,
so below’’.
Applications to T herapy and L earning
Once marginalized in the wake of a limited empiricism, the notion of self

now enters the center of psychological discourse (Benson, 2001; Misra,
2001; Schweder, 1991).The current typology of the self does not accommo-
date all the evidence (Matsumoto, 1999), and needs more research. The
depth-phenomenological knowledge of the structure of the self, acquired
in the study of the Prayer of the Heart, served to develop the techniques
for learning and psychotherapy, based on enhancement of the essential
elements of self-structure.
The psychological focus of phenomenological analysis uncovers the
inner, essential structural groupings, such as self-concept/self-sense, interi-
ority/exteriority, constancy/changeability (subjectivity/objectivity), self-
hood/transcendentality, and body-schema relatedness/unrelatedness. Self-
concept/self-sense axis includes the polarity of self-related concepts versus
the body-based, spatial sense of one’s own self. Interiority/exteriority
includes the polarity of meaning and verbal expression, constancy–change-
ability relates to the subject (constancy)–object (changeability) relation-
ship within the introspective field. Transcendentality accommodates the
transpersonal psychological dimensions of experience such as ‘‘larger-
than-self ’’ or ‘‘no self ’’, and body schema relatedness refers to the psycho-
logical phenomena that emerge in connection with particular locations
within the body schema. These modalities were used as the avenues of
self-explorations and guided meditation for people diagnosed as having
a ‘‘religious or spiritual problem’’ (DSM-IV category V-code 62.89), also
known as a spiritual emergency (Grof and Grof, 1989). This condition
can imitate psychosis, depression, existential crisis and therefore occasion-
ally gets misdiagnosed and medicated. The structured, guided phenome-
nological self-exploration, based on the analysis of the Prayer of the
Heart, helps clients to understand the interior structure of their condition,
and establish the more congruent sense of self.
The ‘‘I am’’-sense, a persistent subjective component of self-awareness,
can be easily differentiated from its changing objectifiable components in
guided open-eyed introspection. After some initial training, the ‘‘I am’’-
sense becomes available for the continuous fixing of voluntary attention.
This brings about a sense of well-being and an increase in reflection about
the self. The increase of these secondary reflective thoughts corresponds
308 OLGA LOUCHAKOVA
to the human experience of becoming more conscious. Focusing on the

‘‘I am’’-sense was also used in therapy with clients diagnosed as having
a ‘‘religious or spiritual problem’’ (DSM-IV category V-code 62.89)
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000). This technique helped to neut-
ralize depersonalization by reestablishing the normal structure of self-
experience.
A spiritual, non-denominational body-based self-enquiry, leading to
the rise of direct intuition, was used in the training of phenomenological
researchers in psychology (Louchakova, 2004a). In psychological
phenomenological research, the researcher’s mind is the only ‘‘tool’’ used
by the researcher. Consequently, the quality of this tool defines the
effectiveness of the research. Training of the mind to make it into a good
tool for phenomenological research was based on practices opening up
direct intuition, such as the Prayer of the Heart. It was applied in teaching
phenomenological research to four teams (40 students) of graduate stu-
dents at the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology. As a result, students
felt more at ease with the method and started using it in their dissertation
research.
Training of direct intuition was also used in teaching Culture and
Consciousness and Diversity Research in transpersonal psychology to
seven teams (about 190 students) of graduate and one cohort (total of
12) of undergraduate students. Frequently, associations of the topics with
personal cultural traumas would slow down the absorption of the material
and adversely affect the educational outcome. The direct intuition training
provides for better assimilation of complexity and fuller integration of
trauma traces, and increases educational effectiveness.
Since knowledge about the self is typically remembered better than
other types of semantic information (Kelley et al., 2002), the focusing on
the ‘‘I am’’–sense was used as an educational mnemonic technique with
graduate students (n>100) in psychology seminars. Students reported
that the voluntary focus of attention on the constant aspect of the self in
the process of learning decreases performance anxiety and enhances learn-
ing. The phenomenological map of the spatial components of the self
resonates with the in situ distribution of neuromediators and neuropep-
tides, challenging the belief in the exclusive neurocentricity of conscious-
ness (Louchakova and Warner, 2003). Research suggests that the positive
effects of focusing on the ‘‘I am’’-sense may have a biological basis
connected with changes in the chemistry of the body.
The phenomenological explication of the self in the Prayer of the Heart
allowed a glimpse of the interior workings of the direct intuition of
ontopoiesis. The transformative impacts of the rise of direct intuition,

applied to ontopoiesis and Union, improve the human constitution and
assist self-understanding. Identifying the deployment of the interiority of
consciousness as an ontopoietic process provides a cognitive paradigmatic
shift, which may have powerful consequences in terms of understanding
and of further research into human transformation and development.
While the multiple applications of this knowledge in all areas of human
activity are yet to be explored, it is certain that direct intuition of onto-
poiesis rejuvenates one’s life and appreciation of what it means to be
human. I would like to acknowledge with deep gratitude my teachers,
Carol Radha Whitfield, Ph.D., Sri Ranjit Maharaj, and Amedeo Giorgi,
Ph.D., who creatively adapted the phenomenological method to psycho-
logical studies.
Institute of T ranspersonal Psychology

Palo Alto, California
www.itp.edu/E-mail: olouchakova@itp.edu
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EVA SYR̆IS̆T̆OVÁ
DAS LACHEN ALS DIE KEHRSEITE DER

EXISTENZIELLEN NOT
Beitrag zur Phänomenologie einer Grenzsituation des L ebens
Aus dem Schlaf weckte mich ein lautes, schreckliches Lachen. Es war in
ihm etwas unmenschliches – niemals vorher – bis zu meinem noch nicht
vollendeten neunten Lebensjahr – habe ich etwas ähnliches nicht gehört.
Kaum dämmerte es. Ich lief an offenes Fenster meiner Kinderstube zu,
ganz verworren von der Frechheit dieses unübertäubten Lachens, welches
mich von allen Seiten überfiel, um festzustellen, woher es eigentlich
kommt. Es kam von allen Seiten, oder von Nirgends – es war überall
anwesend.
Es fiel mich die Angst über und zugleich ein Protestgefühl. Wie könnte
jemand so laut und grob lachen? Dieses Lachen erschrak und folterte
und drosselte meine Kehle, hängte sich überall fast spöttisch und grauen-
haft über alles umher: es war unmöglich ihm zu entweichen, ihn nicht zu
hören, seinem Gewalt und Ansturm sich zu wehren. Schreckliches, allgeg-
enwärtiges Lachen kam dabei von weiter Ferne oder Tiefe, es schallte
mehr und mehr und entsprang in wilden Kaskaden weit hinter den
Grenzen unseres schönen Gartens, die morgens immer mit sanfter Stille
gesättigt war. Voll von schwarzroten Rosen, blühenden Sträuchen und
Bäumen gehörte er unteilbar zu meinem Heime.
Das reissende Lachen bohrte mich wie ein Marterwerkzeug durch. Ich
fühlte dabei seine Gleichgültigkeit und Leere. Ich konnte mich nicht des
allverzehrenden Lärmes los werden. Er schluckte mich und würgte wie
eine Lawine. Dabei fühlte ich mich wie gesperrt und gelähmt in eine
wehrlose Regungslosigkeit in meiner Einsamkeit und tiefer Angst. Ich
war nicht im Stande ein Wort zu sagen, wenn ich es auch so viel brauchte
und wollte das unbarmherzige Lachen zu Schweigen bringen.
‘‘Bitte sehr, schreien Sie nicht so viel, nur einen Augenblick, hören Sie
auf. Hören Sie mit dem schrecklichen Lachen, Sie erweckten doch meinen
kleinen, kranken Bruder!’’ Er hatte sicher wieder eine schwere Nacht-
dachte ich- er möchte vielleicht auf eine Weile von Erschöppfung und
Müdigkeit einschlalfen. Er kämpft ja Tag und Nacht nur um die
Möglichkeit ein Atem zu holen. Er kann nicht schlafen, er stützt sich
halbsitzend im Bette an seinen Vater, durch Ersticken und Hustenanfälle
gefoltert.
313
314 EVA SYR̆IS̆T̆OVÁ
Zum letztenmal sah ich meinen Bruder, wenn er aus dem Krankenhaus
heimkehrte: sie trugen ihn auf der Tragbare in das Zimmer im Erdgeschoss
unseres Elternhauses. Weisse Hände auf der weissen Decke, weisses, zartes
Gesicht eines Kindes, eines Engels. Weiss am Weiss. Wie im Traumbild.
Nur die Augen, noch wirkliche, dunkle, prächtige, beredsame im Leiden
– mehr denn je. Zarte, fast kaum bemerkbare Linie der schweigenden
weissen Lippen. Ich konnte ihn noch an die Stirn küssen. Dann durfte
ich ihn nicht mehr besuchen. Miliartuberculosis – hiess die Diagnose. Oft
wartete ich vor dem Zimmer meines Bruders. Ich hatte keine Angst vor
der Infektion. Ich dachte nicht daran. Den Eltern wollte ich aber keine
weiteren Sorgen zufügen.
Wenn ich eines Abends an der Türschwelle sass, hörte ich, wie mein
dreizehnjähriger Bruder meinem Vater abgebrochen sagt: ‘‘Papi, bitte,
lass mich nicht sterben, ich habe doch noch nicht gelebt!’’
Die Tränen sprangen mir hervor. Fieberhaft überlegte ich, was dem
allmächtigen Gott, von dem mir damals in der Kindheit erzählten, anzu-
bieten, um meinen Bruder zu retten. ‘‘Mein Gott’’, sagte ich dringend,’’
du weisst gut, dass es mir an meinem Leben nicht zuviel liegt. Bitte, nimm
mich statt meines Bruders. Hörst du, mein Gott, er sehnt sich so viel
nach dem Leben. Erfülle ihm diesen Wunsch, bitte, nimm sich mein Leben
als Geschenk statt des seinen. Du weisst doch, dass ich die Wahrheit sage,
dass er glücklich sein wird und mich wirst du damit nicht verletzen. Ich
bin gesund, ich werde nur im Paradies meines lieben Gartens einschlafen.
Keine Sorge ... Ich Werde nicht leiden. Ich nehme mit mir mein bisheriges
Glück, welches du mir gegeben hast. Im Falle, dass ich verbleibe, werde
ich nie Ruhe finden.
Täglich wiederholte ich meine Bitte. Ich wartete entspannt eine
Verbesserung des Gesundheitszustandes meines Bruders.
* * *
Ich lief aus meinem Zimmer, um dem unerträglichen Lachen, welches

mich morgens früh erweckte, zu entfliehen. So ein seltsames, schrilles
Lachen -überall und dabei ausser Alles, als ob es keinen Mund hätte,
als ob etwas unermessliches lachte und dabei bedrohlich leeres. So ein
rieseiges lachendes Nichts.
Der Gang war kalt, die Fliesen frierten blosse Füsse. Ich wollte die
Treppe hinablaufen, zu meinem Bruder, zu meinen Eltern, ich brauchte
eine Stütze finden.
DAS LACHEN ALS DIE KEHRSEITE DER EXISTENZIELLEN NOT 315
‘‘Ich muss hinablaufen’’ – sagte ich zu mir – ‘‘an der Tür warten –
vielleicht werde ich die Stimme des Bruders hören, mag sein, dass er mich
wieder rufe. Nein, heute darf mich nichts zurückhalten! Mein Gott, wende
doch von meinem Bruder mingestens das rücksichtslose Lachen ab, bitte,
er soll es nicht hören; er leidet so viel, du hast sicher auch gehört, wie er
um Hilf ’e flehet!’’
Ich lief zu dem Zimmer meines Bruders. Da hielt mich etwas an. Als
ob ich versteinerte. Und wieder schallte das Lachen. Ich fühlte aber, als
ob es auf seinem Gipfel zersprang. Als ob ein Riss in ihm entstünde, eine
unübertretende Pause. Auf einmal innerhalb des unbarmherzigen, allgeg-
enwärtigen Lachens tauchte etwas für mich tief verständliches. Ich hörte
gespannt zu. Aus seinem Massiv stiegen leise menschliche Worte, nahe,
mitfühlende, barmherzige. Sie hatten keine Gestalt, aber sprachen sie zu
mir. Es war das Weinen der wehrlosen menschlichen Liebe, die das Kind
vor dem unbegreiflichen Leid und schmerlichen Sterben nicht retten
konnte: das Weinen meiner Mutter, welches das unmenschliche absolute
Lachen betäubte.
An diesem Morgen, wenn mich auf einmal das laute Lachen erweckte,
mein Bruder starb.
‘‘Höre, mein Gott, hörst du mich? Wo bist du?’’ – rief ich. Zum erstenmal
stand ich vor einer so lebendigen Wirklichkeit des Todes des geliebten
Menschen.‘‘Wo bist du, Gott, wenn ich deiner so viel brauche?’’
Ich fühlte, dass meine Kräfte nicht genügen, dass meine Bitten nicht
erhört bleiben, dass mein angebotenes Geschenk für die Rettung meines
Bruders nicht angenommen wurde. Ich konnte das nicht begreifen, ich
konnte auch nicht verstehen, dass hier etwas für immer zerbrach.
‘‘Zu wem soll jetzt, mein Gott, mein kleiner Bruder gehen? Welche
Arme bietest du ihm an? Bist du so fern, Allgegenwärtiger, dass du mich
nicht hören könntest? Bist du vielleicht auch todeskrank und wirst ster-
ben, oder bist du mit seinem Tode auch gestorben? Und wenn du, Gott,
auferstehen wirst und geheilt wirst, könntest du auch ihm wiederbeleben
und heilen? Werden alle Wunden, alle Kinderleiden in dir geheilt? Begreifst
du einmal alle Verzweiflungen und Sehnsucht der Menschenseele? Ist das
nicht auch deine Verzweiflung, deine Hoffnung, deine Sehnsucht? Welchen
Trost wirst du meiner Mutter geben, der die Krankheit den Sohn zum
Tode gemartert hat? Welchen Schutz würdest du den Unschludigen in
unerträglichen und unbegreiflichen Schmerzen leisten? Mein Gott, du
wohnst doch in uns, in uns bist du geboren, in uns lebst du und stirbst.
Mit uns leidest du doch auch. Warum bist du jetzt nicht mit mir? Wo
bist du? Du lebst in uns eingewohnt, doch auch in unserem Sterben und
316 EVA SYR̆IS̆T̆OVÁ
in unserer vergänglichen Zeit. Oder verschlingst du jeden menschlichen

Tod und jedes Leben, alles Sterben und Jubeln, Schicksale und Streiten
mit deinem teilnahmslosen Lachen?
Schau mal her! Meine Hände sind leer. Sie können jetzt nicht die
verschwitzte Stirn meines Bruders und sein durch Fieber verbranntes
Gesicht herzen. Wohin soll ich jetzt mit meinem tödlich verletzten
Gedächtnis gehen?
Mein Gott, Allmächtiges Lachen, du Nichts, voll und leer, in Allem
eingewohnt, ich kann in dir kein Heim finden.’’
Heute bin ich fast am Ende des Weges. Damals, zum erstenmal in der
Kindheit, im Angesicht des Todes des geliebten Menschen bin ich alt
geworden bis zu dem heutigen tiefen Herbst. Schon damals, auf der Kante
der todbringenden Zeit, die oft zu den Menschen nicht in die ‘‘richtige
Zeit’’ kommt. Ich denke an Rilkes Worte:
Denn dieses macht das Sterben fremd und schwer,
dass es nicht unser Tod ist: einer, der
uns endlich nimmt, nur weil wir keinen reifen ...
O Herr, gib jeden seinen eignen Tod
Das Sterben, das aus jenem Leben geht,
darin er Liebe hatte, Sinn und Not.1
Ich kann nicht las entsetzliche Lachen vergessen, welches mich von
vielen Jahren aus dem Schlaf erweckte – das Lachen der absoluten Macht,
welche teilnahmslos vorbeigeht und verschlingt das Schicksal des
Menschen.
Mundloses Lachen, welches kein Dialog gestattet. Allmächtiges Lachen
der absoluten Wahrheit mit unendlich vielen Gesichter, zugleich ges-
ichtslos. Leer und gleichzeitig voll. Alles vereinigend In-Sich und Ausser-
Sich. Stets anwesend und abwesend. Die Wahrheit, die immer in die Zeit
eintritt und lebt vom Tode. Sie lauft unendlich in einem Punkt vorn und
zugleich zurück. Unaussprechlich und unansprechlich, sie täuscht uns in
allen Sprachen, die auftauchen und wieder zurückkehren in das keimvolle
Nichts des ewigen Schweigens. Die absolute Wahrheit, mächtig, aber
entgleist durch die Krankheit der menschlichen Unerfüllung,
Vergänglichkeit und das ewige Suchen. Wahnsinnige Wahrheit, die im
inneren Exil der menschlichen Angst und im blinden Tappen der Freibeit
beruht, und ohne diesen ihren eigenen Sinn und Spiegel verliert.
Das absolute Lachen, das mich vor Jahren enweckte und betäubte an
der Kante eines schmerzlichen Todes, war offensichtlich der Schöpfer und
zugleich Opfer seines eigenen Szenarium.
DAS LACHEN ALS DIE KEHRSEITE DER EXISTENZIELLEN NOT 317
Damals, zum erstenmal in der Kindheit begriff ich ganz klar, dass ich
nichts anderes tun kann – wenn ich weiter leben soll und das Vertrauen
in den Sinn meines eigenen Weges nicht verlieren – als in Grenzen meiner
Möglichkeiten das Menschenleiden zu mildern. In der menschlichen
Solidarität, teilnahmsvollen Miteinander-Sein suchte ich die Antwort auf
die philosophischen Fragen, so dringend geöffneten, in der vorzeitigen
Konfrontation mit Menschenleid und Sterben. Ich suchte eine Antwort
auf das unbegreifliches Lachen der absoluten Macht, welche den Namen
den höchsten Wahrbeit trägt.
Mit Erstaunen stehe ich vor der Genialität des Universum und seiner
Ordnung, welche aber tief verletzt und offen bleibt durch das Irren und
die immanente Transzendenz der menschlichen Freiheit.
Die Philosophie ist für mich ein inneres Imperativ sich an dem
Menschenschicksal teilnehmen und die Wege aus seiner geistigen und
physischen Not finden. Sie ist für mich die innerste Möglichkeit, wie sich
gegen Uebel, Menschenunglück und Katastrophen wehren.2
Charles University
Prague
ANMERKUNGEN
1 R. M. Rilke: Werke in zwei Bänden, Bd.1.S 93,94, Insel Verlag, Lepzig, 1958.
2 Dieser Artikel knüpft an die vorhergehende Publikationen des Autors:
E. Syr̆is̆t̆ová: Die gespaltene Zeit, Osveta, Martin, 1988.
E. Syr̆is̆t̆ová: Der Mensch in der kritischen Lebenssituationen, Karolinum, Prague, 1994.
E. Syr̆is̆t̆ová: Die imaginäre Welt, MF, Prague, 1973.
E. Syr̆is̆t̆ová: Die kreative Explosion der Träume in den Grenzsituationen des Lebens, Profil,
nr. 24, Bratislava, 1992.
INDEX OF NAMES
Aanstoos: 234, 236 Blankemburg: 261

Abdel-Kader: 290 Blizard, R.: 229
Achenbach, G.: 253 Block, N.: 97
Adams: 199 Bogdanov, A.: 46
Adorno, T.: 139 Bouderlique: 265
al’-Arabi, I.: 297, 302 Bowen, G. M.: 109
al-Junayd: 290 Bradburn, N.M.: 275–8
Allport, G. W.: 275, 278 Braud, W.: 230–2, 236
al-Suhrawardi: 290 Braude: 227
Alter: 232 Brentano, F.: 68, 140, 271, 273–6, 282–3
Ames, R.: 191, 201 Brough, J.: 109–10
Anaximander: 21, 30 Brown, D.: 229
Anderson: 223, 231, 236 Bryant, F.B.: 275, 277
Andrews, F.W.: 275 Buber: 271, 273
Aquinas, T.: 152 Buhler, C.: 275, 278
Arendt, H.: 58 Buzan, T.: 238
Argyle, M.: 275
Aristotle: 24, 29, 57, 151, 274, 282 Callicott, J.B.: 147
Arons: 236 Campbell, A.: 275
Ashmore: 225 Camus, A.: 138
Cantril, H.: 275
Bader: 305 Caplovitz, D.: 276
Bakhtin, M.M.: 68–9, 71–2 Carlson: 229
Barban: 228 Casement, R.: 254
Barrell, J.: 235 Celan, P.: 259, 266
Baudrillard: 184 Cezanne: 105
Baumgardner, S.: 233 Cherlin, A.: 275
Beaulieu, A.: 114–15 Chrétien: 263
Behr-Sigel: 305 Cobb: 199
Beiser: 275–8 Coen, E.: 62
Bello, A.A.: 302 Conduitt: 81
Benioff: 27 Confucius: 200
Bennet, M.: 228, 235 Conrad: 280–1
Bennett: 192 Converse, D.E.: 275
Benson: 307 Cook-Greuter: 230
Bentham, J.: 151–3, 157, 161 Coraut, R.: 5
Berdyaev, N.A.: 68 Craik, K.: 24
Bergson, H.: 68, 208
Bertalanfy, L.: 46 Da Vinci, L.: 23–4
Bhagavan, S.R.M.: 290 Damasio, a.: 229
Bhattacharjee: 219 Darwin, C.: 119, 140
319
320 INDEX OF NAMES
Dayananda: 230 Hameroff, S.: 27

De Quincey, C.: 231 Hanna: 234
Democritus: 50 Hartmann, N.: 48, 281
Dennett, D.: 131 Hauighurst, R.J.: 275
Derrida, J.: 138, 187 Hawes: 82, 84
Descartes, R.: 78, 100, 138, 140, 147, 255 Hegel, G.W.F.: 46, 67, 140, 184–5, 270,
Deutsch: 27 282–4
Dewey, J.: 13 Heidegger, M.: 48, 58, 67–76, 107, 121,
Diener, E.: 275 138–9, 142, 235, 249, 252, 254, 271
Dionisius: 293, 305 Heisenberg, W.: 26
Heraclitus: 21, 30, 57, 259, 263. 265–6
Eccles, J.: 27 Herder: 272
Eckhart: 303 Hesychios: 292, 294
Eco, U.: 111 Hölderlin: 63
Einstein, A.: 123, 129, 156, 231 Holland: 232
Elkins, J.: 106, 116 Horkheimer, M.: 139
Emmons, R.A.: 279 Hounsfield, G.: 25
Empedocles: 57 Hughes: 223
Erikson, E.: 275, 278 Humboldt: 272
Husserl, E.: 14, 39–44, 58, 67–72, 106–12,
Feynmann, R.: 27, 45 114, 121, 137–40, 174–5, 181, 187,
Flet, R.: 275 204, 206–7, 211–14, 224, 233–5, 259,
Frank, S.: 52, 68 262, 271, 289–91, 294–5
Frankena, W.: 163–4 Hut, P.: 234
Frege, G.: 5–6, 101, 271 Hwang, W. S.: 33
Friedman: 232
Froming, W.J.: 275 Ihde, D.: 110
Ingarden, R.: 138, 140
Gadamer, H-G.: 265, 272 Irwin: 228
Galileo: 7
Gergen, K.: 232 Jackson, J.B.: 196
Giorgi, A.: 234 Jahoda, M.: 275, 278, 280–1
Glennerster, H.: 275 James, W.: 12, 205–8, 228–9, 232–3, 236
Goeckel, R.: 29 Janet, P.: 228
Goldsmith: 269–71 Jenkins, R.: 270
Goodpaster, K.E.: 157 Jonas, H.: 58–9, 63, 142–3, 149
Goswami, A.: 231 Joshi: 228
Gould, S.J.: 128 Jung, C.G.: 275, 278
Grof: 307
Guba, E.G.: 271 Kammann, R.: 275
Gurin, G.: 275 Kant, I.: 45, 100, 121, 133
Guroff: 228 Karsavin, L.: 52, 68
Gurwitsch: 224 Kelley: 308
Kelly, G.: 237–8
Habermas: 271 King, C.: 28
Hadot: 253 Kirk: 290
Hall, D.: 191, 201 Kluft: 228
Hamann: 272 Knorr-Cetina, K.: 108
INDEX OF NAMES 321
Kojeve: xiii Mendeleev: 132

Kotarbinski, T.: 154 Merleau-Ponty, M.: 29, 98–9, 121, 138,
Krutch, J.W.: 159 188, 233
Kuhn, T.: 283 Minkowski, E.: 265
Kumar: 228 Misra: 307
Mohs: 235
Lahav, R.: 250–4, 257 Moliner: 260, 266
Lao Tzu: 22 Morris, J.N.: 275
Larsen, R.: 275 Murata: 305
Lashley, K.: 24 Murray, C.J.L.: 270
Lather, P.: 232 Myers, D.G.: 275
Latour, B.: 108
Lawton, M.P.: 275 Naess, A.: 139, 153
LeClair: 232 Natanson, M.: 204, 233
Leerstelle: 216 Neugarten, B.L.: 275
Leibniz, G.: xi, 140 Newton, I.: 7, 81–92
Leopold, A.: 147 Nietzsche, F.: 21
Levinas, E.: 59, 266 Nikolaev: 204
Lewis, J.: 275 Novak, T.: 238
Lincoln, Y.S.: 271
Livingston: 224 O’Hara, A.: 275
Locke, J.: 152 Ogowa: 229
Lopez, A.D.: 270
Lorenz, K.: 60–1, 63, 123 Pappus: 82
Lorhard, J.: 29 Parmenides: 50
Losev, A. F.: 68 Peacock, E.J.: 279
Losskiy, N.: 52 Pekala: 228
Louchakova: 290–3, 295, 297, 305–6, 308 Pelikan: 292
Lucas, R.E.: 275 Penrose, R.: 27
Luhmann, N.: 138 Pevsner, J.: 24
Lynch, M.: 108, 112–3 Philo: 31
Lyotard, J-F.: 138, 203 Piets, W.: 24
Pjatigorsky, A.M.: 77
MacDonald, D.: 232 Plank, M.: 46
Maldiney, H.: 265 Plato: 57, 67, 115, 153
Mallery: 235 Polyani, M.: 154
Mamardashvili, M.K.: 77 Porete, M.: 303
Marcano: 228 Putnam: 228
Martin, E.: 113–14 Pylkkänen, P.: 27
Marton, F.: 236
Masciotra, D.: 109 Raman, S.: 117
Maslow, A.H.: 275, 278 Rambachan: 290
Massarik, F.: 275, 278 Ranjit: 302, 309
Matsumoto: 307 Rappoport, L.: 232–3
McCulloch, W.: 24 Reed, H.: 250, 258
McDonald, G.: 275 Reed: 225
Meinig: 196–7 Reeder, L.G.: 275
Meleis, A.I.: 270, 283–4 Regan, T.: 153, 156, 158
322 INDEX OF NAMES
Reker, G.T.: 279 Socrates: 98–9

Richards: 236 Sovatsky: 305
Ridley, M.: 59–61 Speigelberg, H.: 220
Robbins, H.: 5 Spidik: 293, 297
Robbins: 233 Spinoza, B..: 49, 62–4, 140, 282
Rodgers, W.L.: 275 Stafford, B.M.: 106, 116
Rogers, C.R.: 275, 278 Stewart, V.: 237
Rogers, W. K.: 225 Straus, E.: 262
Rogers: 197 Szasz: 275, 278
Rolston, H.: 146–8, 152–64
Rose: 220 Taylor, C.: 271–2
Rosenberg, A.: 12 Taylor, E.: 228
Rousseau, J-J.: 144 Taylor, P.: 154
Rowe, S.: 200 Tellenbach: 264
Russ: 228 Theophanis: 291–2, 294, 300–1, 303
Ruth, W-M.: 108–9, 111–12 Throop, C.J.: 233, 236
Rutherford, E.: 45 Tobin, S.S.: 275
Ryff, C.: 275, 278–80 Trent, D.R.: 275
Trudy: 239–41
Salk, J.: 22, 30 Turing, A.: 24
Sammi: 239–41 Tymieniecka, A-T.: 138, 155, 169–70, 172,
Sanders, S.R.: 200 174–6, 192–4, 196, 289, 300–2
Sartre, J.-P.: 11, 15, 29, 111, 121, 138,
178–9, 252, 254 Underwood, B.: 275
Scheler, M.: 138
Schmitz-Perrin: 291 Valle, R.: 231, 235, 237
Scholem: 290 van der Hart: 228
Schuster, S.C.: 250 van der Kolk: 228
Schutz, A.: 203–15 Van Gogh: 105
Schwandt, T.A.: 271–2 Van Neumann, J.: 24
Schweder: 307 Vernadsky, V.: 46
Schweitzer, A.: 154–5 Veroff, J.: 275, 277
Scruton, R.: 254 Von Eckartsberg: 235
Searle, J.: 97 von Weizsäcker, V.: 263
Shannon, C.: 24
Shanon, B.: 191–2 Wade, J.: 235
Sharrock: 223 Walbridge: 290
Sheafor, B.: 275 Ware, K.: 292–3, 303
Sherwood, S.: 275 Warner: 290, 292–3, 295, 305–6
Shinn, R. I.: 249 Welsch, W.: 138
Shorohova, S.: 204 White, L.: 161
Siddharameshwar: 301 Whitfield, C.R.: 309
Silberman: 228 Wiener, N.: 24
Simeon: 294, 296–7, 299 Willis, T: 23–4
Simmel, G.: 272, 282 Wilson, W.: 275
Simons, J.: 117 Withey, S.B.: 275
Singer, P.: 153–4, 158, 161, 163–4 Wittgenstein: 187
Smirnova, N.: 204 Wolff: 219, 224
INDEX OF NAMES 323
Wong, P.T.P.: 279 Yazdi: 290

Wood, V.: 275
Woolgar, S.: 108 Zaner, R.: 203–5
Wren, C.: 23 Znaniecki, F.: 3
Wylie, M.L.: 275
APPENDIX
T he T hird World Congress of Phenomenology
PHENOMENOLOGY WORLD-WIDE
Organized by: The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological

Research and Learning (1 Ivy Pointe Way, Hanover, NH 03755, United
States) its centers and affiliated societies, as well as other phenomenology
groups and societies.
T heme
LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY
AND PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LOGOS
Historical Research; Great Phenomenological Issues;
Present Day Developments
Wadham College, University of Oxford, England

August 15–21, 2004
The Congress begins at 4:00 p.m., Sunday, August 15, 2004, with an
Opening Reception and Registration on site, in the Cloister Garden, near
the Cloister, which is located behind the College Hall.
Registration on site will continue at 8:30 a.m. on Monday, August 16, in
the Auditorium.
Plenary sessions will run from 9:00 a.m. until 1:00 PM. Lunch will run
from 1:00 p.m. until 2:30 p.m.. The afternoon sessions will run from
2:30 p.m. until 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. (with a coffee break in the afternoon).
Coffee may be taken in your room or in the King’s Arms (a pub).
325
326 APPENDIX
PROGRAM
Monday, August 16
8:30 a.m. The Auditorium, Registration
9:00 a.m. INAUGURAL LECTURE

Presided by: Brian McGuinness, Siena, Italy
THE LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LOGOS
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Institute for Advanced
Phenomenological Research and Learning, United States
PLENARY SESSION I
Chair: Grahame Lock, Oxford University, Great Britain
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HERMENEUTIC OF
TRADITIONS
Mafalda Blanc, Center of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon,
Portugal
ONTOLOGICAL INTENTIONS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM
Anatoly Zotov, Russia
SCIENCE IN MIND. EXPLORING THE LANGUAGE OF THE
LOGOS
Leo Zonneveld, The Netherlands
HEIDEGGER’S TAUTOLOGICAL THINKING AND THE
QUESTION CONCERNING THE END OF PHILOSOPHY
Tze-wan Kwan, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch
Monday, August 16
2:30 p.m., The Auditorium
SESSION I:
PHENOMENOLOGY OF HISTORY
Organized and Presided by:
Mark E. Blum, University of Louisville, United States
PHENOMENOLOGICAL HISTORY AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX 327
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE CHALLENGE OF HISTORY

Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, United States
PHENOMENOLOGY, HISTORY AND HISTORICITY IN KARL

JASPER’S PHILOSOPHY
Filiz Peach, City University, Great Britain
THE TASK OF A HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY OF

HISTORY
Osborne Wiggins, University of Louisville, United States
4:00–4:30 p.m. Coffee Break
‘‘PHENOMENOLOGICAL HISTORY:
A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION’’
W ith the following participants:
Filiz Peach, City University, Great Britain
Osborne Wiggins, University of Louisville, United States
Monday, August 16
2:30 p.m., Staircase 1 – Room 3
SESSION II:
FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION
Chair: Maija Kule, University of Latvia, Latvia
OUTLINE OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF

VIOLENCE. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Michael Staudigl, Institute for Human Sciences, Austria
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF RESISTANCE

Kadria Ismail, Ein-Shams University, Egypt
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE’S OPENING TO THE MORAL

PHILOSOPHY – THE VIRTUE’S ISSUE
Carmen Cozma, ‘‘Al.I.Cuza’’ University, Romania
4:30 – 5:00 p.m. Coffee Break

328 APPENDIX
PATOCKA AND DERRIDA ON RESPONSIBILITY

Eddo Evink, Groningen University, The Netherlands
SARTRE’S METHOD, THE DIALECTIC OF FREEDOM AND
NECESSITY
Raymond Langley, Manhattanville College, United States
‘‘PERFECT HEALTH’’ AND THE DISEMBODIMENT OF THE
SELF. AN APPROACH TO MICHAEL HENRY’S THOUGHT
Stella Zita De Azevedo, Universidade do Porto, Portugal
Monday, August 16
SESSION III:
LIVING TOGETHER IN THE PSYCHIATRIC PERSPECTIVE
Presided by: Simon Du Plock, Regents College, Great Britain
PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOLOGY
Simon Du Plock, Regents College, Great Britain
LOGOS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: PHENOMENON OF
ENCOUNTER AND HOPE IN THE PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC
RELATIONSHIP
Camilo Serrano Bonitto, Latinoamerican Circle of Phenomenology,
Colombia
THE MEANINGFULNESS OF MENTAL HEALTH AS BEING
WITHIN A WORLD OF APPARENT MEANINGLESS BEING
Jarlath McKenna, Waterford Institute of Technology, Ireland
FUNCTION AND MEANING OF DESIRE IN DEPTH-
PSYCHOLOGY
Mina Sehdev, Italy
ONTOPOIESIS AND UNION IN THE PRAYER OF THE HEART:

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOTHERAPY AND LEARNING
Olga Louchakova, Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, United States
DIE VERWANDLUNG DES SCHIZOPHRENNEN IN-DER-WELT-
SEINS
Eva Syristova, University of Prague, Czech Republic
APPENDIX 329
Monday, August 16
SESSION IV:
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE HUMAN AND
SOCIAL SCIENCES
Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States
TOWARD A CULTURAL PHENOMENOLOGY
A SCHUTZ’S CONCEPTION OF RELEVANCE AND ITS
INFLUENCE ON SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
Natalia Smirnova, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia
DEMONSTRATING MOBILITY
Anjana Bhattacharjee, Brunel University, Great Britain
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND THE CHOICE TO

CHOOSE
Marianne Sawicki, United States
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SELF AS NON-LOCAL:
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH REPORT
Amy Louise Miller, United States
USER-FRIENDLY MARKET AS A PROJECT OF MODERN
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM
Maria Bielawka, Krakow, Poland
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Tuesday, August 17
8:30 a.m., The Auditorium, Registration
9:00 a.m., The Auditorium
PLENARY SESSION II: CROSSING BRIDGES
Chair: Angela Ales Bello, Lateran University, Italy
SOME COMMENTS ON ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND
PHENOMENOLOGY
Grahame Lock, Oxford University, Great Britain
330 APPENDIX
‘‘THE TEMPTATIONS OF PHENOMENOLOGY ARE VERY

GREAT HERE’’: ON THE CURIOUS (ABSENCE OF) DIALOGUE
BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE
PHILOSOPHY
Richard Paul Hamilton, Saitama University, Japan
LESSONS FROM SARTRE FOR THE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
OF MIND
Manuel Bremer, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany
PROBLEM OF THE ‘‘IDEA’’ IN DERRIDA’S ‘‘THE PROBLEM OF
GENESIS’’
Dasuke Kamei, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan
NON-INTENTIONALITY OF THE LIVED-BODY
Andreas Brenner, University of Basel, Switzerland
1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch
Tuesday, August 17
SESSION V:
PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION
Presided by:
Thomas Ryba, Notre Dame University, United States
BEFORE THE GENESIS: LEVINAS, MARION AND
TYMIENIECKA ON CONSTITUTION, GIVENNESS AND
TRANSCENDENCE
Thomas Ryba, St. Thomas Aquinas Center at Purdue, United States
MATER-NATALITY: AUGUSTINE, ARENDT, AND LEVINAS
Ann Astell, Purdue University, United States
LEVINAS AND THE NIGHT OF PHENOMENOLOGY
Sandor Goodhart, St. Thomas Aquinas Center at Purdue, United
States
THE POTENTIALITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF
PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO ISLAM
Aziz Esmail, Institute of Ismaili Studies, Great Britain
APPENDIX 331
AL-SUHRAWARDI’S DOCTRINE AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Salahaddin Khalilov, Azerbaijan Universiteti, Azerbaijan
RELIGION WITHOUT WHY: EDITH STEIN AND MARTIN
HEIDEGGER ON THE OVERCOMING OF METAPHYSICS
Michael F. Andrews, Seattle University, United States
HERMENEUTICS OF THE MYSTICAL PHENOMENON IN
EDITH STEIN
Carmen Balzer, Universidad Católica Argentina, Argentina
Tuesday, August 17
SESSION VI:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ORCHESTRATION OF THE ARTS
Presided by: Mao Chen, Skidmore College, United States
PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORK
OF ART: R. INGARDEN, M. DUFFREN, P. RICOEUR
Elga Freiberga, University of Latvia, Latvia
NATURAL BEAUTY AND LANDSCAPE PAINTING
David Brubaker, University of New Haven, United States
TOWARDS PHENOMENOLOGY OF NATURAL –
ARCHITECTURAL MEMORIAL
Ljudmila Molodkina, State University of Land Use Planning, Russia
PATINA – ATMOSPHERE – AROMA, TOWARDS AN
AESTHETICS OF FINE DIFFERENCES
Madalina Diaconu, Academy of Fine Arts, Austria
THE PERSISTENCE OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL TIME:

REFLECTIONS OF RECENT CHINESE CINEMA
Mao Chen, Skidmore College, United States
THE TRUTH OF SUFFERING (LEVINAS) AND THE TRUTH
CRYSTALLIZED IN THE WORK OF ART (GADAMER)
Aleksandra Pawliszyn, Uniwersytet Gdanski, Poland
332 APPENDIX
Tuesday, August 17
SESSION VII:
‘‘THE MOST DIFFICULT POINT’’: ‘‘THE BOND BETWEEN THE
FLESH AND THE IDEA’’ IN MERLEAU-PONTY’S LAST
THOUGHT
Organized and presided by:
Mauro Carbone, Universita degli Studi di Milano, Italy
LET IT BE
THE INVISIBLE AND THE FLESH. QUESTIONING CHIASM.
Patrick Burke, Seattle University, United States
MERLEAU-PONTY ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LOGOS
PROPHORIKOS AND LOGOS ENDIATHETOS
Wayne Froman, George Mason University, United States
UN ECART INFIME (A MINUSCULE HIATUS): THE CRITIQUE

OF THE CONCEPT OF LIVED-EXPERIENCE (VECU) IN
FOUCAULT
Leonard Lawlor, University of Memphis, United States
THE INVISIBLE AND THE UNPRESENTABLE
Luca Vanzago, Universita degli Studi Pavia, Italy
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Tuesday, August 17
ROUNDTABLE ON A-T. TYMIENIECKA’S PHENOMENOLOGY
OF LIFE
Presided by: Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States
THE LOGOS OF LIFE AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE
Agnes B. Curry, Saint Joseph College, United States
Lawrence Kimmel, Trinity University, United States
APPENDIX 333
ONTOPOIESIS AS THE FIRST ONTOLOGY OF BEINGNESS-IN-

BECOMING
Peter Abumhenre Egbe, Lateran University of Rome/Nigeria
ECOLOGY
Zaiga Ikere, Daugavpils Pedagogical University, Latvia
HUMAN CONDITION-IN-THE-UNITY-OF-EVERYTHING-ALIVE
AS A NEW CONCEPTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY
Mieczyslaw Pawel Migon, Gdansk, Poland
THE MEASURE
Carmen Cozma, University ‘‘Al.I.Cuza’’, Romania
THE NEW CRITIQUE OF REASON
Nancy Mardas, Saint Joseph College, United States
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Tuesday, August 17
SESSION VIII:
DISCLOSURE AND DIFFERENTIATION:
THE GENESIS OF BEAUVOIR’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL VOICE
Presided by:
Laura Hengehold, Case Western Reserve University, United States,
and Shoichi Matsuba, Kobe City College of Nursing, Japan
BEAUVOIRIAN EXISTENTIALISM: AN ETHIC OF
INDIVIDUALISM OR INDIVIDUATION?
Laura Hengehold, Case Western Reserve University, United States
BEAUVOIR’S CONCEPT OF DISCLOSURE: ORIGINS AND
INFLUENCES
Kristana Arp, Long Island University, United States
THE ORIGINS OF BEAUVOIR’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL
METHOD
Edward Fullbrook, Case Western Reserve University, United States
334 APPENDIX
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Wednesday, August 18
8:30 a.m., The Auditorium, Registration
PLENARY SESSION III:
LIFE IN NUMEROUS PERSPECTIVES
Presided by: Kadria Ismail, Ein-Shams University, Egypt
THE LANGUAGE OF OUR LIVING BODY
Angela Ales Bello, Lateran University, Italy
PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW EVOLUTIONISTIC
PARADIGMS
Roberto Verolini, Italy, and Fabio Petrelli, Universita degli Studi de
Camerino, Italy
HUMAN BEING IN BEINGNESS: ANNA-TERESA
TYMIENIECKA’S VISION
Zaiga Ikere, Daugavpils Pedagogical University, Latvia
WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE EMBODIED, NATURALIZING
BODILY SELF-AWARENESS
Peter Reynaert, University of Antwerp, Belgium
SENSIBLE MODELS IN COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Arthur Piper, University of Nottingham, Great Britain
1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch
SYMPOSIUM
Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology in Dialogue
Around the Perennial Issue: MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM
Nader El-Bizri, University of Cambridge, Great Britain
BEING AND NECESSITY: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL
APPENDIX 335
INVESTIGATION OF AVICENNA’S METAPHYSICS AND

COSMOLOGY
Nader El-Bizri, University of Cambridge, Great Britain
THE ILLUMINATIVE NOTION OF MAN IN PERSIAN
THOUGHT: A RESPONSE TO AN ORIGINAL QUEST
Mahmoud Khatami, University of Tehran, Iran
THE MICROCOSM/MACROCOSM ANALOGY IN IBN SINA
AND HUSSERL
Marina Banchetti-Robino, Florida Atlantic University, United States
MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM IN LOTZE
Nikolay Milkov, Universität Bielefeld, Germany
MICROCOSM AND MACROCOSM IN MAX SCHELER IN

RELATION TO ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
AL-GHAZALIAN INTERPRETATION OF AN ARISTOTELIAN
TEXT USED BY HEIDEGGER
Abu Yaareb Marzouki, International Islamic University of Malaysia,
Malaysia
MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND OMAR KHAYYAM ON THE
QUESTION OF ‘‘THERENESS’’
Mehdi Aminrazavi, Mary Washington College, United States
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Phenomenology Institute, United
States
SESSION IX:
CLASSIC PROBLEMS OF PHENOMENOLOGY IN THEIR
TRANSFORMATION
Presided by: Carmen Cozma, University ‘‘Al.I.Cuza’’, Romania
THE FORMAL THEORY OF EVERYTHING: HUSSERL’S
THEORY OF MANIFOLDS
Nikolay Milkov, Universität Bielefeld, Germany
336 APPENDIX
ON THE MODE OF EXISTENCE OF THE REAL NUMBERS

Piotr Blaszczyk, Pedagogical University, Poland
ON THE ONTO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF HUSSERL’S
PERCEPTUAL NOEMA
David Grunberg, Middle East Technical University, Turkey
HERMENEUTISCHE VERSUS TRANZENDENTALE

PHANOMENOLOGIE
Jesus Adrian Escudero, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
PHÉNOMENOLOGIE TRANSCENDENTALE ET CRITIQUE DE
LA RAISON THÉOLOGIQUE
Arion Kelkel, La Terrase, France
ROUNDTABLE:
EPOCHÈ AND REDUCTION TODAY
INTRODUCTION: EPOCHÈ AND REDUCTION AFTER
HUSSERL
CONCEPTION OF TIME IN HUSSERL’S SOCIAL WORLDS –
MODERN PERSPECTIVE OF ‘‘METAXU’’
Cezary J. Olbromski, University Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej, Poland
ON SCHUTZ CONCERNING THE TRANSCENDENTAL
REDUCTION
BODY OR FLESH (FROM HUSSERL TO MERLEAU-PONTY

Luca Vanzago, Italy
APPENDIX 337
BEYOND THE EPOCHE: INTUITION AND CREATIVE

IMAGINATION (ON TYMIENIECKA)
Nancy Mardas, Saint Joseph College, United States
GENERAL DISCUSSION
SESSION X:
TIME, ALTERITY, AND SUBJECTIVITY: REFLECTIONS ON
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
EMMANUEL LEVINAS
Richard Sugarman, University of Vermont, United States
EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND THE DEFORMALIZATION OF

TIME
Richard Sugarman, University of Vermont, United States
THE JUSTIFICATION AND JUSTICE OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Richard A. Cohen, University of Vermont, United States
EMMANUEL LEVINAS: NON-INTENTIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

AND THE STATUS OF REPRESENTATIONAL THOUGHT
Roger Duncan, Promisek Center, United States
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME IN PHILOSOPHY OF

LEVINAS: TEMPORALITY AND OTHERNESS IN THE HEBRAIC
TRADITION
Shmuel Wygoda, Israel
GENERAL DISCUSSION
338 APPENDIX
SESSION XI:
Chair:
Francesco Totaro, University Degli Studi di Macerata, Italy
and Ignacy Fiut, Krakow, Poland
LES FIGURES DE L’INTERSUBJECTIVITÉ CHEZ HUSSERL
Maria Manuela Brito Martins, Universidade do Porto, Portugal
ESSENTIAL INDIVIDUALITY: ON THE NATURE OF A PERSON
Roberta de Monticelli, University of Geneva, Switzerland
EGO-MAKING PRINCIPLE IN CLASSICAL INDIAN
METAPHYSICS AND COSMOLOGY
Marzenna Jakubczak, Pedagogical University of Krakow, Poland
THE EMPIRICAL EGO AND THE PROBLEM OF NARCISSISM:

PREAMBLES TO A READING OF ‘‘IDEEN I’’ 27–32
Jeffrey Bloechl, College of the Holy Cross, United States
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY OF THE BEING-WITH:
THE NOTION OF CO-EXISTENCE IN MAURICE MERLEAU-
PONTY AND JAN-LUC NANCY
Rinalds Zembahs, University of Latvia, Latvia
SESSION XII:
TIME, CONSCIOUSNESS AND HISTORICITY
Presided by: Kathleen Haney, University of Houston, United States
THE PRINCIPLE OF HISTORICITY IN THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE
Maija Kule, University of Latvia, Latvia
TIME AND HISTORY IN P. RICOEUR’S THOUGHT
Marı́a Avelina Cecilia Lafuente, University of Seville, Spain
APPENDIX 339
HUSSERL AND BERGSON ON CONSCIOUSNESS AND TIME

Rafael Winkler, University of Warwick, Great Britain
THE HISTORICITY OF NATURE
Konrad Rokstad, University of Bergen, Norway
THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND EARLY ROMANTIC CONCEPTS

OF NATURE AND THE SELF
Oliver W. Holmes, Wesleyan University, United States
ANXIETY AND TIME IN THE HERMENEUTIC
PHENOMENOLOGY OF HEIDEGGER
Marta Figueras I Badia, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, Spain
Thursday, August 19
PLENARY SESSION IV:
THE LIVING SPACE
Presided by: Jorge Garcia-Gomez, Southampton College, United States
LIVING SPACES: THE LANDSCAPES OF HUMAN LIFE
W. Kim Rogers, East State Tennessee State University, United States
DISCUSSION ON THE NOTIONS OF ‘‘LIFE’’ AND
‘‘EXISTENTIA’’ IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTIONS OF
HEIDEGGER AND MERLEAU-PONTY
Maria Golebiewska, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland
VARIATIONS OF THE SENSIBLE, TRUTH OF IDEAS AND IDEA
OF PHILOSOPHY MOVING FROM THE LATER MERLEAU-
PONTY
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE OF ANNA-TERESA
TYMIENIECKA IN RELATION TO HER ANTHROPOLOGICAL
CONCEPTION
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ECOPHILOSOPHY
Ignacy Fiut, Krakow, Poland
340 APPENDIX
MEN IN FRONT OF ANIMALS

Leszek Pyra, Poland
1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch
Thursday, August 19
Roundtable (and lectures)
GREAT CLASSICAL QUESTIONS REVISITED
Presided by: Andreas Brenner, University of Basel, Switzerland
STRUCTURE AND THE CRITIQUE OF EVIDENCE
Helena De Preester, Ghent University, Belgium, and Gertrudis Van de
Vijver, Ghent University, Belgium
DESCARTES AND ORTEGA ON THE FATE OF INDUBITABLE
KNOWLEDGE
Jorge Garcia-Gomez, Southampton College, United States
THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE QUESTION IN HUSSERL

AND FINK WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ‘‘SIXTH
CARTESIAN MEDITATION
Jonathan Lahey Dronsfield, University of Southampton, Great Britain
AN INTERPRETATION OF HUSSERL’S CONCEPT OF
CONSTITUTION IN TERMS OF SYMMETRY
Filip Kolen, Ghent University, Belgium
Thursday, August 19
SESSION XIII:
Presided by: Carmen Balzer, Universidad Católica Argentina, Argentina
PHENOMENOLOGICAL METHODOLOGOS IN
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
Rimma Kurenkova, Vladimir Pedagogical Institute, Russia
Y. A. Plekhanov, Vladimir Pedagogical Institute, Russia
Elena Rogacheva, Vladimir Pedagogical Institute, Russia
APPENDIX 341
HOW ARE WE STUDYING PHENOMENOLOGICAL

PHILOSOPHY IN MONGOLIA?
Danzankhorloo Dashpurev, The Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and
Political Science, Mongolia
PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFELONG LEARNING

Klymet Selvi, Anadolu University, Turkey
FROM THE STATION TO THE LYCEUM

Matti Itkonen, University of Jyväskylä, Finland
THE FRUITS OF THE LABOR: TYMIENIECKA’S

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF HUMAN CREATIVITY
Nancy Mardas, St. Joseph College, United States
CREATIVITY AS A CHANCE FOR MAN

Monika Kowalczyk-Boruch, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Poland
Thursday, August 19
SESSION XIV:
PHENOMENOLOGY AND LITERATURE
Presided by:
Jadwiga Smith, Bridgewater State College, United States
LOGOS, THE AESTHETIC IMAGINATION, AND SPONTANEITY

Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, The University of Maine, United States
AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT GENRE WITHIN

PHENOMENOLOGICAL AESTHETICS
Donald F. Castro, Mesa Community College, United States
EXPLORING AESTHETIC PERCEPTION OF THE REAL IN IRIS

MURDOCH’S ‘‘THE BLACK PRINCE’’
Calley Hornbuckle, University of South Carolina, United States

342 APPENDIX
PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMOTIONS: AUREL KOLNAI’S ON

DISGUST AND JACOBEAN DRAMA
A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF LITERARY
CREATIVITY: RICOEUR AND JOYCE
Raymond J. Wilson III, Loras College, United States
Thursday, August 19
Presentation of our ‘‘Encyclopedia of Learning’’:
PHENOMENOLOGY WORLD-WIDE
Foundations – Expanding dynamics – Life-engagements
A Guide for Research and Study
Robert D. Sweeney, John Carroll University, United States
Thursday, August 19
SESSION XV:
Presided by:
Robert D. Sweeney, John Carroll University, United States
UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURE IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY
OF LIFE
Rihards Kulis, University of Latvia, Latvia
LIFE WORLD BETWEEN SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
EXPERIENCE: ON ‘‘EUROPEAN CRISIS’’
Andrina Tonkli Komel, Slovenia
TIME, SPACE AND BEING IN THE WORLD THROUGH THE
LIFE COURSE
Judith A. Glonek, Somerton, Australia
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL
CONCEPTION IN THE WORKS OF A-T. TYMIENIECKA WITH
SOME ISSUES OF CONTEMPORARY GEORGIAN
PHENOMENOLOGY
Mamuka G. Dolidze, Institute of Philosophy, Tblisi, Georgia
APPENDIX 343
THE PHILOSOPHICAL SENSE IS THE MATURE SENSE –

HUSSERL’S REFLECTION ON THE MEASURE OF
PHILOSOPHY
Włodzimierz Pawliszyn, University of Gdańsk, Poland
LANGUAGE, TIME AND OTHERNESS
Julia Ponzio, University of Bari, Italy
VIRTUAL DECADENCE
Martin Holt, City University, Great Britain
Friday, August 20
PLENARY SESSION V:
WORLD OF LIFE, CULTURE, COMMUNICATION
Presided by:
Tze-wan Kwan, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
IMAGINARY WORLD AND WORLD OF LIFE. MASS
COMMUNICATION AS NEW ‘‘IDEENKLEID’’ AND
IMPLICATIONS OF SENSE
Francesco Totaro, University Degli Studi di Macerata, Italy
THE INTERFACING OF LANGUAGE AND WORLD
Erkut Sezgin, İstanbul Kültür Üniversitese (İ.K.Ü.) & İstanbul Teknik
Üniversitesi, Turkey
LES DEPENDANCES INTER-SUBJECTIVES OU LE LANGUAGE
ET LA COMMUNICATION JOUENT UN ROLE IMPORTANT
Jozef Sivák, Filozoficky Ustav Sav, Slovakia
LIFEWORLD: MEANING OF SIGNS AND COMMUNICATION
Ella Buceniece, University of Latvia, Latvia
PHENOMENOLOGICAL HERMENEUTICS OF
INTERMEDIACY AND THE CONSTITUTION OF
INTERCULTURAL SENSE
Dean Komel, Slovenia
ARENDT’S REVISION OF PRAXIS: ON PLURALITY AND
NARRATIVE EXPERIENCE
William D. Melaney, American University in Cairo, Egypt
344 APPENDIX
1:00–2:30 p.m. Lunch
Friday, August 20
SESSION XVI:
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AS A NEW EXCAVATION
INTO THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELD
Presided by:
Angela Ales Bello, Lateran University, Italy
HISTORY AS THE UNVEILING OF THE T EL OS. THE

HUSSERLIAN CRITIQUE OF THE WELTANSCHAUUNGEN.
Nicoletta Ghigi, University of Perugia, Italy
THE ‘‘PERSON’’ AND THE ‘‘OTHER’’ IN MARÍA ZAMBRANO’S

PHILOSOPHIC ANTHROPOLOGY
Maria Mercede Ligozzi, Ministry of Culture, Italy
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO

ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHICS
Mobeen Shahid, Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City
VITOLOGY: THE AFRICAN VISION OF THE HUMAN PERSON

Martin Nkafu Nkemnkia, Lateran University, Vatican City
WHOSE LIFE IS A HUMAN LIFE?

Victor Gerald Rivas, Meritorious University of Puebla, Mexico
PLATO’S TEACHING ABOUT ‘‘LIVING CREATURE’’ AND

PHENOMENOLOGY
Olena Shkubulyani, Ukraine
DISPOSITION TO PHENOMENOLOGY IN W. JAMES’S

CONCEPTION OF PURE EXPERIENCE
Velga Vevere, University of Latvia, Latvia
APPENDIX 345
Friday, August 20
SESSION XVII:
THE MORAL SENSE OF LIFE
Presided by:
Marı́a Avelina Cecilia Lafuente, University of Seville, Spain
MORAL ASPECTS OF LIFE
Tadeusz Czarnik, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski, Poland
THE PRINCIPLE OF GRATEFULNESS: THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF GIVING AS THE CONSCIOUSNESS
OF ONE’S OWN IDENTITY AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF
GLOBALIZATION
Shannon Driscoll, Pontifical Georgian University, Rome, Italy
THE CREATIONISM OF LEONARDO COIMBRA AND THE
SAUDADE AS A MORAL GIFT
Maria Teresa de Noronha, Universidade Aberta, Portugal
FICTION AND THE GROWTH OF MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS:

ATTENTION AND EVIL
Rebecca M. Painter, Marymount Manhattan College, United States
THE SOCIAL, AFFECTIVE AND TRANSCENDENTAL
DIMENSIONS OF BEING IN DOSTOIEVSKY’S, PROUST’S AND
WOOLF’S NOVELS
Michel Dion, Université de Sherbrooke, Canada
PHENOMENOLOGY FOR WORLD RECONSTRUCTION
Chiedozie Okoro, University of Lagos, Nigeria
Friday, August 20
SESSION XVIII:
EXPERIENCE AND LOGOS IN FINE ARTS
Presided by:
Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Siena College, United States
346 APPENDIX
LEONARDO DA VINCI’S WORKING METHOD, IN LIGHT OF

A-T. TYMIENIECKA’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE
Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Siena College, United States
PRINCIPIOS DE OBJECTIVIDAD POETICA
Antonio Dominguez Rey, Universidad Nacional de Educacion
Distancia, Spain
ESSENTIAL ‘‘POIESIS’’
J.C. Couceiro-Bueno, Univ. de la Coruna, Campus Elvina s/n, Spain
PHENOMENOLOGY OF COUNTENANCE. PORTRAITING THE
SOUL, REPRESENTING A LIVED EXPERIENCE
Piero Trupia, UPS University, Italy
MUSICAL PROGENY: THE CASE OF MUSIC AND

PHENOMENOLOGY
Ellen J. Burns, State University of New York, Albany, United States
ART, ALTERITY AND LOGOS: IN THE SPACES OF
SEPARATION
Brian Grassom, Gray’s School of Art, The Robert Gordon University,
Great Britain
Topic to be Announced
Maha Salah Taha, Misr International University, Egypt
LOGOS, RATIONAL AND DESIRE IN CONVERGENT ART
PRACTICES
James Werner, Gray’s School of Art, The Robert Gordon University,
Great Britain
Friday, August 20
SESSION XIX:
PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE DIALOGUE WITH THE SCIENCES
Presided by: Leszek Pyra, Poland
‘‘OBJECTIVE SCIENCE’’ IN HUSSERLIAN LIFE-WORLD
PHENOMENOLOGY
Aria Omrani, Isfahan, Iran
APPENDIX 347
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF NATURAL

COORDINATE SYSTEM
Nikolay Kozhevnikov, Yakut State University, Russia
ALIENATION AND WHOLENESS: SPINOZA, HANS JONAS,
AND THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT ON THE ‘‘PUSH AND
SHOVE’’ OF MORTAL BEING
Wendy C. Hamblet, Aldelphi University, United States
M. HEIDEGGER’S PROJECT FOR THE OPTICAL
INTERPRETATION OF REFLEXION AND THE LOGOS
Alexandr Kouzmin, Yaroslav Wise Novgorod State University, Russia
‘‘PHENOMENA’’ IN NEWTON’S MATHEMATICAL

EXPERIENCE
A.L. Samian, National University of Malaysia, Malaysia
WHAT COMPUTERS COULD NEVER DO: AN EXISTENTIAL
PHENOMENOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE PROGRAM OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Eldon C. Wait, University of Zululand, South Africa
INHABITED TIME: COUPERIN’S PASSACAIL L E
Jessica Wiskus, Duquesne University, Australia
Friday, August 20
SESSION XX:
HEIDEGGERIAN PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY
Mark Wrathall, Brigham Young University, United States
HEIDEGGER ON LANGUAGE AND ESSENCES
Mark Wrathall, Brigham Young University, United States
HEIDEGGER’S PERFECTIONIST PHILOSOPHY OF
EDUCATION, OR: BILDUNG IN BEING AND T IME
Iain Thomson, University of New Mexico, United States
348 APPENDIX
HEIDEGGEREAN, TAOIST AND THE BOOK OF CHANGES

Xianglong Zhang, Peking University, China
7:00 p.m., Friday, August 20: Farewell dinner at Wadham College, tickets
to be ordered at registration (18.50 pounds).
Organization Committee:
Keith Ansell-Pearson, Gary Banham, Ullrich Haase, Matthew Landrus,
Grahame Lock (Great Britain); William Smith, Chair.
Program Director:
Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, World Institute for Advanced
Phenomenological Research and Learning, Hanover, NH, USA.
Assisted by: Gary Backhaus, Morgan State University, United States;
Tadeusz Czarnik, Jagiellonian University, Poland
The Congress begins with the Opening Reception on August 15 at

4:00 p.m. and ends by a Farewell Banquet on the night of August 20.
Analecta Husserliana
The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research
Editor-in-Chief
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka
The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning,
Belmont, Massachusetts, U.S.A.
1. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Volume 1 of Analecta Husserliana. 1971

ISBN 90-277-0171-7
2. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Later Husserl and the Idea of Phenomenology.
Idealism – Realism, Historicity and Nature. 1972 ISBN 90-277-0223-3
3. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenological Realism of the Possible Worlds.
The “A Priori’, Activity and Passivity of Consciousness, Phenomenology and
Nature. 1974 ISBN 90-277-0426-0
4. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Ingardeniana. A Spectrum of Specialised Studies Estab-
lishing the Field of Research. 1976 ISBN 90-277-0628-X
5. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Crisis of Culture. Steps to Reopen the Phenomeno-
logical Investigation of Man. 1976 ISBN 90-277-0632-8
6. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Self and the Other. The Irreducible Element in Man,
Part I. 1977 ISBN 90-277-0759-6
7. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Human Being in Action. The Irreducible Element
in Man, Part II. 1978 ISBN 90-277-0884-3
8. Nitta, Y. and Hirotaka Tatematsu (eds.), Japanese Phenomenology. Phenomenol-
ogy as the Trans-cultural Philosophical Approach. 1979 ISBN 90-277-0924-6
9. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Teleologies in Husserlian Phenomenology. The
Irreducible Element in Man, Part III. 1979 ISBN 90-277-0981-5
10. Wojtyła, K., The Acting Person. Translated from Polish by A. Potocki. 1979
ISBN Hb 90-277-0969-6; Pb 90-277-0985-8
11. Ales Bello, A. (ed.), The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology. 1981
ISBN 90-277-1071-6
12. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Philosophical Reflection of Man in Literature.
Selected Papers from Several Conferences held by the International Society for
Phenomenology and Literature in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Includes the essay
by A-T. Tymieniecka, Poetica Nova. 1982 ISBN 90-277-1312-X
13. Kaelin, E. F., The Unhappy Consciousness. The Poetic Plight of Samuel Beckett.
An Inquiry at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Literature. 1981
ISBN 90-277-1313-8
14. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Con-
dition. Individualisation of Nature and the Human Being. (Part I:) Plotting the
Territory for Interdisciplinary Communication. 1983 Part II see below under
Volume 21. ISBN 90-277-1447-9
15. Tymieniecka, A-T. and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), Foundations of Morality, Human
Rights, and the Human Sciences. Phenomenology in a Foundational Dialogue
with Human Sciences. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1453-3
16. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology. Man and
Nature. 1983 ISBN 90-277-1518-1
17. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Phenomenology of Life in a Dialogue Between Chinese
and Occidental Philosophy. 1984 ISBN 90-277-1620-X
18. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Existential Coordinates of the Human Condition:
Poetic – Epic – Tragic. The Literary Genre. 1984 ISBN 90-277-1702-8
19. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. (Part
1:) The Sea. From Elemental Stirrings to Symbolic Inspiration, Language, and
Life-Significance in Literary Interpretation and Theory. 1985
For Part 2 and 3 see below under Volumes 23 and 28. ISBN 90-277-1906-3
20. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Moral Sense in the Communal Significance of
Life. Investigations in Phenomenological Praxeology: Psychiatric Therapeutics,
Medical Ethics and Social Praxis within the Life- and Communal World. 1986
ISBN 90-277-2085-1
21. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condi-
tion. Part II: The Meeting Point Between Occidental and Oriental Philosophies.
1986 ISBN 90-277-2185-8
22. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Morality within the Life- and Social World. Interdisci-
plinary Phenomenology of the Authentic Life in the “Moral Sense’. 1987
Sequel to Volumes 15 and 20. ISBN 90-277-2411-3
23. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Poetics of the Elements in the Human Condition. Part
2: The Airy Elements in Poetic Imagination. Breath, Breeze, Wind, Tempest,
Thunder, Snow, Flame, Fire, Volcano . . . 1988 ISBN 90-277-2569-1
24. Tymieniecka, A-T., Logos and Life. Book I: Creative Experience and the Critique
of Reason. 1988 ISBN Hb 90-277-2539-X; Pb 90-277-2540-3
25. Tymieniecka, A-T., Logos and Life. Book II: The Three Movements of the Soul.
1988 ISBN Hb 90-277-2556-X; Pb 90-277-2557-8
26. Kaelin, E. F. and Calvin O. Schrag (eds.), American Phenomenology. Origins and
Developments. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2690-6
27. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Man within his Life-World. Contributions to Phe-
nomenology by Scholars from East-Central Europe. 1989 ISBN 90-277-2767-8
28. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Elemental Passions of the Soul. Poetics of the
Elements in the Human Condition, Part 3. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0180-3
29. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Man’s Self-Interpretation-in-Existence. Phenomenolo-
gy and Philosophy of Life. – Introducing the Spanish Perspective. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0324-5
30. Rudnick, H. H. (ed.), Ingardeniana II. New Studies in the Philosophy of Roman
Ingarden. With a New International Ingarden Bibliography. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0627-9
31. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Moral Sense and Its Foundational Significance: Self,
Person, Historicity, Community. Phenomenological Praxeology and Psychiatry.
1990 ISBN 0-7923-0678-3
32. Kronegger, M. (ed.), Phenomenology and Aesthetics. Approaches to Comparative
Literature and Other Arts. Homages to A-T. Tymieniecka. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-0738-0
33. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Ingardeniana III. Roman Ingarden’s Aesthetics in a
New Key and the Independent Approaches of Others: The Performing Arts, the
Fine Arts, and Literature. 1991
Sequel to Volumes 4 and 30 ISBN 0-7923-1014-4
34. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era.
Husserl Research – Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1134-5
35. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key. Intersubjec-
tivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1146-9
36. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Husserl’s Legacy in Phenomenological Philosophies.
New Approaches to Reason, Language, Hermeneutics, the Human Condition.
1991 ISBN 0-7923-1178-7
37. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), New Queries in Aesthetics and Metaphysics. Time,
Historicity, Art, Culture, Metaphysics, the Transnatural. 1991
ISBN 0-7923-1195-7
38. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), The Elemental Dialectic of Light and Darkness. The
Passions of the Soul in the Onto-Poiesis of Life. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1601-0
39. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Reason, Life, Culture, Part I. Phenomenology in the
Baltics. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-1902-8
40. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Manifestations of Reason: Life, Historicity, Culture.
Reason, Life, Culture, Part II. Phenomenology in the Adriatic Countries. 1993
ISBN 0-7923-2215-0
41. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.), Allegory Revisited. Ideals of Mankind. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2312-2
42. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.), Allegory Old and New. In Literature,
the Fine Arts, Music and Theatre, and Its Continuity in Culture. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2348-3
43. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): From the Sacred to the Divine. A New Phenomenolog-
ical Approach. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2690-3
44. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Elemental Passion for Place in the Ontopoiesis of
Life. Passions of the Soul in the Imaginatio Creatrix. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2749-7
45. Zhai, Z.: The Radical Choice and Moral Theory. Through Communicative Argu-
mentation to Phenomenological Subjectivity. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2891-4
46. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Logic of the Living Present. Experience, Ordering,
Onto-Poiesis of Culture. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-2930-9
47. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Heaven, Earth, and In-Between in the Harmony of Life.
Phenomenology in the Continuing Oriental/Occidental Dialogue. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-3373-X
48. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. In the Glory of its Radiating Manifestations. 25th
Anniversary Publication. Book I. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3825-1
49. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life. The Human Quest for an Ideal.
25th Anniversary Publication. Book II. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3826-X
50. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life. Phenomenology of Life as the Starting Point of
Philosophy. 25th Anniversary Publication. Book III. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4126-0
51. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Passion for Place. Part II. Between the Vital Spacing
and the Creative Horizons of Fulfilment. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4146-5
52. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Con-
dition. Laying Down the Cornerstones of the Field. Book I. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4445-6
53. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Reincarnating Mind, or the Ontopoietic Outburst
in Creative Virtualities. Harmonisations and Attunement in Cognition, the Fine
Arts, Literature. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition.
Book II. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4461-8
54. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Ontopoietic Expansion in Human Self-Interpretation-
in-Existence. The I and the Other in their Creative Spacing of the Societal Circuits
of Life. Phenomenology of Life and the Creative Condition. Book III. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4462-6
55. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Creative Virtualities in Human Self-Interpretation-in-
Culture. Phenomenology of Life and the Human Creative Condition. Book IV.
1997 ISBN 0-7923-4545-2
56. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Enjoyment. From Laughter to Delight in Philosophy,
Literature, the Fine Arts and Aesthetics. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4677-7
57. Kronegger M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life. Differentiation and Harmony...
Vegetal, Animal, Human. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-4887-7
58. Tymieniecka, A-T. and Matsuba, S. (eds.): Immersing in the Concrete. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty in the Japanese Perspective. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5093-6
59. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life - Scientific Philosophy/Phenomenology of Life and
the Sciences of Life. Ontopoiesis of Life and the Human Creative Condition. 1998
ISBN 0-7923-5141-X
60. Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): Life - The Outburst of Life in the Human Sphere.
Scientific Philosophy / Phenomenology of Life and the Sciences of Life. Book
II. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5142-8
61. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Aesthetic Discourse of the Arts. Breaking the Bar-
riers. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6006-0
62. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Creative Mimesis of Emotion. From Sorrow to Elation;
Elegiac Virtuosity in Literature. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6007-9
63. Kronegger, M. (ed).: The Orchestration of The Arts – A Creative Symbiosis of
Existential Powers. The Vibrating Interplay of Sound, Color, Image, Gesture,
Movement, Rhythm, Fragrance, Word, Touch. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6008-7
64. Tymieniecka, A-T. and Z. Zalewski (eds.): Life - The Human Being Between Life
and Death. A Dialogue Between Medicine and Philosophy, Recurrent Issues and
New Approaches. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-5962-3
65. Kronegger, M. and Tymieniecka, A-T. (eds.): The Aesthetics of Enchantment in
the Fine Arts. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6183-0
66. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Origins of Life, Volume I: The Primogenital Matrix
of Life and Its Context. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6246-2; Set ISBN 0-7923-6446-5
67. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Origins of Life, Volume II: The Origins of the
Existential Sharing-in-Life. 2000
ISBN 0-7923-6276-4; Set ISBN 0-7923-6446-5
68. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): PAIDEIA. Philosophy / Phenomenology of Life Inspir-
ing Education of our Times. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6319-1
69. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Poetry of Life in Literature. 2000
ISBN 0-7923-6408-2
70. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Impetus and Equipoise in the Life-Strategies of Reason.
Logos and Life, volume 4. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6731-6; HB 0-7923-6730-8
71. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Passions of the Earth in Human Existence, Creativity,
and Literature. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-6675-1
72. Tymieniecka, A-T. and E. Agazzi (eds.): Life – Interpretation and the Sense of
Illness within the Human Condition. Medicine and Philosophy in a Dialogue.
2001 ISBN Hb 0-7923-6983-1; Pb 0-7923-6984-X
73. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life – The Play of Life on the Stage of the World in Fine
Arts, Stage-Play, and Literature. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-7032-5
74. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life-Energies, Forces and the Shaping of Life: Vital,
Existential. Book I. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0627-6
75. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Visible and the Invisible in the Interplay between
Philosophy, Literature and Reality. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0070-7
76. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Life – Truth in its Various Perspectives. Cognition,
Self-Knowledge, Creativity, Scientific Research, Sharing-in-Life, Economics......
2002 ISBN 1-4020-0071-5
77. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Creative Matrix of the Origins. Dynamisms, Forces
and the Shaping of Life. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-0789-2
78. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Gardens and the Passion for the Infinite. 2003
ISBN 1-4020-0858-9
79. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Does the World Exist? Plurisignificant Ciphering of
Reality. 2003 ISBN 1-4020-1517-8
80. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Phenomenology World-Wide. Foundations - Expanding
Dynamics - Life-Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study. 2002
ISBN 1-4020-0066-9
81. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Metamorphosis. Creative Imagination in Fine Arts
Between Life-Projects and Human Aesthetic Aspirations. 2004
ISBN 1-4020-1709-X
82. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Mystery in its Passions. Literary Explorations. 2004
ISBN 1-4020-1705-7
83. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Imaginatio Creatrix. The Pivotal Force of the Genesis/
Ontopoiesis of Human Life and Reality. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2244-1
84. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Phenomenology of Life Meeting the Challenges of the
Present-Day World. 2004 ISBN 1-4020-2463-0
85. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): The Enigma of Good and Evil; The Moral Sentiment in
Literature. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-3575-6
86. To be published.
87. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Human Creation Between Reality and Illusion. 2005
ISBN 1-4020-3577-2
88. Tymieniecka, A-T. (ed.): Logos of Phenomenology and Phenomenology of the
Logos. Book One. Phenomenology as the Critique of Reason in Contemporary
Criticism and Interpretation. 2005 ISBN 1-4020-3678-7
Logos. Book Two. The Human Condition in-the-unity-of-everything-there-is-
alive. Individuation, Self, Person, Self-determination, Freedom, Necessity. 2006
ISBN 1-4020-3706-6
Logos. Book Three. Logos of History – Logos of Life. Historicity, Time, Nature,
Communication, Consciousness, Alterity, Culture. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-3717-1
Logos. Book Four. The Logos of Scientific Interrogation. Participating in Nature-
Life- Sharing in Life. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-3736-8
Logos. Book Five. The Creative Logos. Aesthetic Ciphering in Fine Arts, Litera-
ture and Aesthetics. 2006 ISBN 1-4020-3743-0
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LOGOS OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

OF THE LOGOS. BOOK FOUR

THE YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Founder and Editor-in-Chief:

For sequel volumes see the end of this volume.

Published under the auspices of

ISBN-10 1-4020-3736-8 (HB)

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved

Printed in the Netherlands.

IGNACY S. FIUT / Phenomenology and Ecophilosophy 137

INDEX OF NAMES 319

APPENDIX / The Program of the Oxford Third World

UNVEILING THE LOGOS OF SCIENTIFIC

If we consider that humanity started on her path of civilization with the

As a matter of fact, we seem to ﬁnd in this ever increasing emergence of

Scientiﬁc Inquiry in Alliance with the Phenomenology of L ife

However, the subject of inquiry, as much as it represents the living

This new wave of scientiﬁc developments whose methodologies

SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN

In this paper the problem of the relation of scientiﬁc objectivity to human

excluded from scientiﬁc knowledge. This kind of reductionist approach

THE QUEST FOR THE PHILOSOPHER’S STONE

Various branches of science have pretended to have reached the truth,

(e.g. psychology, sociology). Traditionally, mathematics is described as

In ancient times logic was understood very broadly (logikos – in accord

of art can be achieved. Well, this requires suspending the objectivist

reach deﬁnite goals, which transcends all documentation. The ‘‘objectiv-

Let us now move towards scientiﬁc or rather philosophical syntheses, to

mentary. From the point of view of the humanistic coeﬃcient it is quite

– persons with a primary general education are characterized by naive

The materialistic orientation (including Marxism–Leninism–Stalinism

approach into a ‘‘scientiﬁc Weltanschauung’’. This world outlook was

merely verbal. Thus, there are no rigid principles, closed systems or

from God has its source in personal experiences: E. Husserl started to

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL ‘‘I’’

I wish to complete this necessarily brief review of modern philosophical

Scientiﬁc, objective, formalized Human, humanistic knowledge

using artiﬁcially created language using natural, simple language

striving to achieve a fully taking into account, apart from

strictly limited to experimental going beyond experimental and

striving to achieve computer-type satisﬁed with natural

scientiﬁc, objective knowledge human, humanistic knowledge

rejecting questions of a taking up metaphysical problems

claiming primacy of striving to ﬁnd an explanation of

the issue of whether a given anthroposphere for the sake of

SCIENCE IN MIND: EXPLORING THE LANGUAGE OF

Heraclitus of Ephesus claims to announce the everlasting Word (Lege or

of learning shows measurable physiological correlates in terms of changes

point of recognition and connectivity, a point of prospective validation,

In T rends in Neurosciences Jonathan Pevsner asks himself ‘‘Which areas

magnetic resonance imaging fMRI, that allows us to localise the sources

While looking at the very promising outcome of new technologies there

interesting parallels which can be drawn between quantum theory and

Phenomenology is a philosophical method that may be practised to gain

While the nature of subjective conscious experience remains the central

entities, the embodied mechanical constructions to which we are now, by

itself – on its shape and form, and ultimately on what it means to

The Logos keeps re-anchoring our forward-looking process of self-

Science and Innovation Section, British Embassy, T he Hague

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke, Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 14, Maximillian A.

‘‘OBJECTIVE SCIENCE’’ IN HUSSERLIAN

The life-world, as Husserl holds, is a realm of original self-evidences