A.C. No.
8168, October 12, 2016 In a Resolution dated 15 April 2009,4 the Court, through the First
SPOUSES EDWIN B. BUFFE AND KAREN M. SILVERIO-
BUFFE, Complainants, v. SEC. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, USEC.
FIDEL J. EXCONDE, JR., AND CONGRESSMAN ELEANDRO
JESUS F. MADRONA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, ACTING C.J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a disbarment complaint filed by Spouses Edwin
B. Buffe and Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (complainants) against former
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez,1 former Undersecretary of
Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus
F. Madrona (respondents), for committing an unethical act in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's
Oath, particularly the willful violation of Republic Act Nos. (RA)
6713, 3019, and civil service law and rules.
The Facts


The undisputed facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
 RA 3019 should be filed with the Sandiganbayan; (3) the proper


chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryOn 15 July 2008, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Karen M. Silverio-Buffe
(Silverio-Buffe) as Prosecutor I/Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Romblon province. On 15 August 2008, Silverio-Buffe took her oath
of office before Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, Judge
Jesusa P. Maningas (Judge Maningas). She, then, furnished the Office
of the President, Civil Service Commission and Department of
Justice (DOJ) with copies of her oath of office. On 19 August 2008,
Silverio-Buffe informed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Romblon that she was officially reporting for work beginning that
day.
 However, Exconde, as Chief of Personnel Management and


In a letter dated 26 August 2008, Romblon Provincial Prosecutor
Arsenio R.M. Almadin asked former Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzalez (Gonzalez) to confirm the appointment of Silverio-Buffe
since the Provincial Prosecution Office did not receive any official
communication regarding Silverio-Buffe's appointment.
 Division, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines


In a Memorandum Order dated 19 December 2008, Gonzalez ordered
Silverio-Buffe "to cease and desist from acting as prosecutor in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon, or in any
Prosecutor's Office for that matter, considering that [she has] no
appointment to act as such, otherwise [she] will be charged of
usurpation of public office."2chanrobleslaw
 In a Resolution dated 20 October 2010,10 the Court, through the


On 11 February 2009, Silverio-Buffe, together with her husband
Edwin B. Buffe, filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a
Joint Complaint-Affidavit3 alleging that former Congressman
Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona (Madrona), acting out of spite or revenge,
persuaded and influenced Gonzalez and Undersecretary Fidel J.
Exconde, Jr. (Exconde) into refusing to administer Silverio-Buffe's
oath of office and into withholding the transmittal of her appointment
papers to the DOJ Regional Office. Madrona allegedly acted out of
spite or revenge against Silverio-Buffe because she was one of the
plaintiffs in a civil case for enforcement of a Radio Broadcast
Contract, which was cancelled by the radio station due to adverse
commentaries against Madrona and his allies in Romblon.

In their Joint Complaint-Affidavit, they narrated that: (1) on 1 August
2008, the Malacanang Records Office transmitted Silverio-Buffe's
appointment papers to the DOJ and they were received by a clerk
named Gino Dela Pena; (2) on 13 August 2008, a certain Cora from
the Personnel Division of the DOJ asked Silverio-Buffe if she had
any "connection" in the Office of the Secretary because her papers
were being withheld by Exconde, and when she said none, Cora told
her to come back the following day; (3) on 14 August 2008, Silverio-
Buffe was introduced to Gonzalez, who informed her that Madrona
strongly opposed her appointment and advised her to work it out with
Madrona; (4) since Gonzalez refused to administer her oath of office,
Silverio-Buffe took her oath before Judge Maningas on 15 August
2008; (5) Silverio-Buffe twice wrote a letter to Gonzalez pleading for
the transmittal of her appointment papers, but Gonzalez never
replied; and (6) on 13 November 2008, they went to the DOJ and met
Exconde, who informed them that they should think of a solution
regarding Madrona's opposition to her appointment. Exconde asked
for the reason of Madrona's opposition and Silverio-Buffe replied that
she supported Madrona's rival, Eduardo Firmalo, during the elections.
Exconde persuaded Silverio-Buffe to talk with Madrona, but she
insisted on not approaching Madrona because of their diverse
principles. Exconde, then, suggested that Silverio-Buffe write
Gonzalez a letter stating that she already approached Madrona yet the
latter ignored her plea, but Silverio-Buffe refused the suggestion.
 already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus,
Division, required the respondents to comment on the complaint.



In his Comment with Counter-Complaint dated 23 June
2009,5 Madrona denied that he acted out of spite or revenge against
Silverio-Buffe or that he persuaded, induced, or influenced anyone to
refuse to administer oath to Silverio-Buffe and to withhold the
transmittal of her appointment papers. Madrona insisted that the
allegations against him are without proof, and based on general
conjectures and hearsay. On the other hand, Madrona alleged that
complainants should be accountable for their dishonest and deceitful
conduct in submitting to the Court as annexes a complaint without its
last two pages and a contract altered by Silverio-Buffe.

In a joint Comment dated 1 July 2009,6 Gonzalez and Exconde
claimed that: (1) the complaint is unfounded and purely for
harassment because Silverio-Buffe's appointment papers were not
endorsed by the Office of the President to the DOJ for
implementation; (2) the Court has no jurisdiction over the complaint
because a case for violation of RA 6713 and civil service rules should
be filed with the Civil Service Commission and a case for violation of
venue for her grievance is with the Office of the President; (4)
assuming that her appointment papers were withheld, such act was
presumed to be the act of the President herself, with the presumption
of regularity of official functions; and (5) Exconde was erroneously
impleaded since he never signed any document relating to Silverio-
Buffe's appointment.



In her Reply dated 17 July 2009,7 Silverio-Buffe insisted that her
appointment papers were endorsed by the Office of the President to
the Office of the Secretary of Justice, as evidenced by the
Endorsement Letter of then Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita.
Development under the Office of the Secretary of Justice, refused to
forward her appointment letter to the Personnel Division of DOJ for
implementation.



In a Resolution dated 21 October 2009,8 the Court, through the Third
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.



In a Memorandum dated 12 July 2010,9 then DOJ Secretary Leila M.
De Lima transmitted Silverio-Buffe's appointment papers to the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon.



Second Division, referred the Motion to Dismiss11 filed by Madrona
to the IBP. Madrona sought to dismiss the present administrative
complaint on the ground of forum-shopping, because he received an
order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a
counter-affidavit based on the same administrative complaint filed
before the OBC.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated 5 October
2011,12 Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero
(Investigating Commissioner) found the complaint impressed with
merit, and recommended the penalty of censure against the
respondents.13 The Investigating Commissioner found respondents'
united action of stopping the appointment of Silverio-Buffe unethical.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-21514 issued on 28 June 2012, the IBP
Board of Governors reversed the Investigating Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation, to wit:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to REVERSE as it is hereby unanimously REVERSED,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and considering that the complaint lacks merit the case
against Respondents is hereby DISMISSED.


Complainants then filed a motion for reconsideration.



In Resolution No. XX-2013-30715 issued on 21 March 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration, to wit:



chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Complainants' Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the
Resolution and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
Resolution No. XX-2012-215 dated June 28, 2012 is hereby
AFFIRMED.


Hence, complainants filed a petition before this Court.
The Issue


The issue in this case is whether Gonzalez, Exconde, and Madrona
should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the
complaint.
The Ruling of the Court


We dismiss the administrative case against Exconde and Madrona for
lack of jurisdiction. The present administrative case should be
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman, considering that
complainants have filed a complaint before it on 12 February
2009.16 In the case of Gonzalez, his death on 7 September 2014
forecloses any administrative case against him.17chanrobleslaw
 in the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of what was


The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complainants'
administrative complaint is anchored on Section 13(1), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that: "[t]he Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient."
 unlawfully engaging in private practice. In addition, Olaybal sought


Under Section 1618 of RA 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance committed by
any public officer or employee during his or her tenure.19 Section
1920 of RA 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all
complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are
unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, or discriminatory.
 the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City in


Considering that both Exconde and Madrona are public officers being
charged for actions, which are allegedly unfair and discriminatory,
involving their official functions during their tenure, the present case
should be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman as the
appropriate government agency. Indeed, the IBP has no jurisdiction
over government lawyers who are charged with administrative
offenses involving their official duties. For such acts, government
lawyers fall under the disciplinary authority of either their
superior21 or the Ombudsman.22 Moreover, an anomalous situation
will arise if the IBP asserts jurisdiction and decides against a
government lawyer, while the disciplinary authority finds in favor of
the government lawyer.



WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the administrative complaint against
now deceased Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez for being moot.
We also DISMISS the administrative complaint against respondents,
former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr. and former
Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, for lack of jurisdiction.
 shall be fixed by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will not


Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever appropriate action the Ombudsman may
wish to take with respect to the possible administrative and criminal
liability of respondents Fidel J. Exconde, Jr. and Eleandro Jesus F.
Madrona.
A.C. No. 5582
ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant, 
 provided that the efficiency of the Provincial Legal Office shall not
vs.
 be prejudiced;
ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 5604
ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Complainant, 
 functions subject to limitations in Sec. 481 of RA 7160. 13
vs.
 Muñoz emphasized that his authority 'to engage in private practice
ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 5652
BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE, 1 Complainant, 

vs.

ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for
Absolution and/or Clemency2 (Joint Petition) dated May 14, 2009
filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with
the complaints for disbarment filed by Arthur O. Monares (Monares),
Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal (Olaybal) purportedly representing Albay
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante
(Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February 4, 2002 and March 21,
2002, respectively.
Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo
Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi
City. In his complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his
brother Ludolfo in the said case during regular government hours
while employed as Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City. 3
Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors
(BOD) engaged Muñoz as retained counsel sometime in June 1998.
Olaybal averred that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old BOD that
he was employed as Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal
raised that after its administrator, the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the ground of
mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained counsel of the NEA-
appointed team which took over the management of ALECO.
Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Muñoz illegally collected payments
agreed upon in their retainer agreement. 4
Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest
Construction and Development Corporation (Sunwest). Constante
claimed that Muñoz filed ten (10) cases against Sun west on
Ludolfo's behalf before the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
while he was serving as Provincial Legal Officer. 5
All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for
Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating
the rule against conflict of interest.6
To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had
been previously disciplined by the Ombudsman for two (2) counts of
unauthorized practice of profession in OMB-ADM-1-01-0462, and
was meted the penalty of removal and dismissal from service. The
complainants further manifested that Muñoz had been convicted by
Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of Section 7(b)(2)
in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713.7 Munoz's
conviction has since become final pursuant to the Court's Resolution
dated June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.8
In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that
he had requested Governor Al Francis C. Bichara (Governor Bichara)
for authority to continue his private practice shortly after his
appointment. This request was granted on July 18, 1995.10 Thereafter,
Muñoz submitted the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary Alexander P.
Aguirre granted Muñoz's request, under the following conditions:
1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be
utilized in connection (sic) and that no conflict of interest with your
present position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise thereby;
2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and
under what circumstances you can engage in private employment
impair in any way your efficiency; and
3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the
cancellation and/or revocation of this authority. 12 (Emphasis
supplied)
Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the
following conditions upon Muñoz:
a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;
b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic) working hours
c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your Daily Time
Record considering the limitation already mentioned above; [and]
d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are to perform
was renewed by Governor Bichara on July 3, 1998 for his second
term ending in July 2001, and again on July 5, 2001 for his third term
ending in July 2004. 14
The complaints were separately referred by the Court to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 15 The complaints were then consolidated through
the Order dated January 16, 2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros
V. San Juan. 16 Subsequently, the complaints underwent a series of re-
assignments, until finally assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B.
Aguila.17
In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report), Commissioner
Aguila recommended that Muñoz be found guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for an aggregate period of four
(4) years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP Board
of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted Commissioner
Aguila's recommendation in a Resolution dated October 22, 2005.20
On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy,
Clemency and Compassion before the IBP-BOG, praying that the
recommended penalty be reduced to one (1) year.21 This appeal was
denied on January 28, 2006.22
Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy,
Clemency, Forgiveness and Compassion23 (Appeal) dated April 8,
2006 praying for the reduction of the recommended penalty of
suspension for four (4) years to one (1) year or less, and the dismissal
of the complaints for disbarment filed against him. As an alternative
prayer, Muñoz requested that he be granted special limited authority
to practice law until all his pending cases are terminated. 24
In his Appeal, Muñoz insisted that when he served as Provincial
Legal Officer from June 1995 to May 2002, he engaged in private
practice pursuant to the three (3) written authorities issued by
Governor Bichara, and the written authority of the DILG issued
during his first term, which he claims had never been revoked.
Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed between
ALECO's old BOD and the NBA management team, since he was
engaged as retained counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its
management teams. 25
On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand Muñoz's Appeal to
the IBP for disposition. 26
Acting on Munoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution
reducing the recommended period of suspension from four (4) to
three (3) years. 27 Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the IBP-BOG denied on December 11,
2008.28
Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court through this
Joint Petition. In fine, Muñoz reiterates the allegations in his Appeal,
with the additional assertion that the fees he collected from ALECO
were contemplated under their retainer agreement. 29
The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and
recommendations.
Muñoz violated the conditions of his
 for ALECO under the management of the old BOD in the following
DILG authorization.
Muñoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing
government time for his private practice. As correctly observed by
Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires government
officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those
covered by special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of
work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a
week.30 The number of required weekly working hours may not be
reduced, even in cases where the department or agency adopts a
flexible work schedule. 31
Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at
least eighty-six (86) court appearances in connection with at least
thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He merely
alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his
office.
Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government
working hours, from 8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to
5:00 in the afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to study
each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of
cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that government time was
necessarily utilized in pursuit of his private practice, in clear violation
of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.0234 of the CPR.
Muñoz should have requested for
 In Catu v. Rellosa,39the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for
authority to engage in private practice
 six (6) months upon a punong barangay who acted as counsel for
from the Secretary of DILG for his
 respondents in an ejectment case without securing the authority of the
second and third terms.
Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably
construed to have been perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim
that he believed in good faith that the authority granted by Governor
Bichara for his second and third terms sufficed.
Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17),
which Muñoz himself cites in his Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no
room for interpretation. The power to grant authority to engage in the
practice of one's profession to officers and employees in the public
service lies with the head of the department, in accordance with
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which
provides, in part:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without
a written permission from the head of Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if
an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the
time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief
of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee x x x. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to
Munoz's appointment as Provincial Legal Officer, hence, he cannot
feign ignorance thereof.1âwphi1 As a local public official, it was
incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the proper authority from the
Secretary of the DILG not only for his first term, but also his second
and third. His failure to do so rendered him liable for unauthorized
practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.0135 of the CPR.
Muñoz represented conflicting interests.
Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini
Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36the Court explained the tests to determine
the existence of conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or
not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an
issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In
brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but
also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel
cases:
A. Civil Case No. 10007 -ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio Adonay,
NEA Project Supervisor and his team John Catral et. al., a case filed
by Oliver O. Olaybal and his group. For: Injunction, Accounting
with Prayer for Writs of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order, seeking to stop the election of the new set of
member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x x.
B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. as Petitioner, also filed by Oliver O.
Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus and Receivership, with
Preliminary Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining and Mandatory Orders. Among others, this Petition was
filed to stop the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board
of Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24,
2002.37 (Underscoring omitted; additional emphasis supplied)
Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the
direction of the NEA management team. Muñoz could have easily
anticipated that his advice would be sought with respect to the
prosecution of the members of the old BOD, considering that the
latter was deactivated due to alleged mismanagement. The conflict of
interest between Olaybal's board on one hand, and NEA and its
management team on the other, is apparent. By representing
conflicting interests without the permission of all parties involved,
Muñoz violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.38
Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40the Court imposed
the penalty of one (1) year suspension upon a lawyer who accepted a
new engagement that required him to oppose the interests of a party
whom he previously represented. In view of Muñoz's multiple
infractions, the Court finds the recommended penalty of suspension
for an aggregate period of three (3) years proper.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of any violation hereunder shall be dealt
with more severely.
A.M. No. P-15-3315
 In January 2010, Sps. Caños started giving jewelry to be sold, which
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3978-P)
SPOUSES RODEL and ELEANOR CAÑOS, Complainants 
 checks for the amounts due, payable in eight to ten monthly
vs.
 installments per transaction. At first, she was able to pay her debts
ATTY. LOUISE MARIE THERESE B. ESCOBIDO, Clerk of
Court V, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Digos City, Respondent
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from a letter-complaint1 filed by
complainants, Spouses Rodel and Eleanor Caños (Sps. Caños ),
against respondent Louise Marie Therese B. Escobido (Escobido ),
Clerk of Court, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Digos City,
before the Office of Court Administrator (OCA) for grave
misconduct, gross violation of oath as a public official, and violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
According to Sps. Caños, they have known Escobido since the latter
part of 2009 when she assisted them on the cases they filed before
RTC Branch 19. When Escobido learned that Sps. Caños are engaged
in selling jewelry and imported goods, she offered to get some items
to resell as she used to be in the same business. Since Sps. Caños
trusted Escobido as clerk of court and as a lawyer, they agreed to her
proposal.2
Sometime between January and November 2010, Escobido purchased
from Sps. Caños, on credit, various jewelry and imported goods
amounting to ₱4,777,945.00. The purchases were covered by Trust
Receipt Agreements.3
As payment for the goods, Escobido issued postdated checks, some
of which were made good during the first ten months. However, the
rest of the checks amounting to ₱3,827,299.30 were returned or
refused payment by the drawee banks for the reason "ACCOUNT
CLOSED."4
Aside from Escobido's purchases on credit, she also borrowed money
from Sps. Caños. As payment, she issued postdated checks in the
total amount of ₱164,866.10. The checks were likewise dishonored
by the drawee banks for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED."
Escobido never informed Sps. Caños on the status of her bank
account until they received the returned checks and asked her on the
reason for the dishonor.5
On February 15, 2012, Escobido executed an Undertaking6 and
acknowledged only ₱2,545,339.25 as the amount she owed to Sps.
Caños.
Sps. Caños made verbal and written demands on Escobido for her to
pay her debts.7 Despite demand,8 she refused to pay her obligations
amounting to ₱3,604,065.40.
Sps. Caños claimed that because of Escobido's large amount of debts,
they were forced to pay some of Escobido' s account with their
suppliers.9
Finally, Sps. Caños alleged that Escobido, as clerk of court and as a
lawyer, also used her position and profession to intimidate and coerce
them from filing cases against her. She allegedly told them that
should they decide to file a case against her, she could always find
ways to delay the filing of the same as she has friends and batchmates
in the City Prosecution Office of Davao City.10
In her defense, Escobido claimed that what transpired was a business
opportunity she and Sps. Caños took advantage of, but which,
unfortunately turned unsuccessful.11
She also belied Sps. Caños' allegation that they have known her only
in 2009. She claimed she had known Rodel since 1993 when she was
still studying law. Rodel became her boyfriend when she was in law
school, but their relationship did not last long. In 2009, Escobido met
Rodel again as he frequented her office to follow up cases which he
filed and were pending before RTC Branches 18 and 19. Rodel even
introduced Escobido to his wife. This new friendship paved the way
for business transactions and opportunities.12
Escobido denied that she offered to get jewelry and other imported
items from Sps. Caños. Instead, it was Rodel who persuaded her to
help them sell their goods.13 Under their agreement, Escobido signed
trust receipts for imported goods obtained from Sps. Caños. She was
allowed a certain period to sell the goods, after which the unsold
items were returned to Sps. Caños. She would pay for the total
amount of the items sold by issuing checks covering three equal
monthly installments.14
The business was doing well for months until Sps. Caños introduced
the jewelry business to Escobido. Rodel persuaded her that the
business is lucrative and that she can get more profits. Sps. Caños
proposed that they will give Escobido a "dealer's price," provided that
anything she gets from them will be considered sold unless defective.
In effect, what Sps. Caños and Escobido entered into was a contract
of sale.15
Escobido received by signing trust receipts. She usually issued
until most of her customers started to miss their payments. Escobido
allegedly told Rodel about her problem and he merely advised her to
be careful next time and gave her an extended period within which to
pay. Thus, despite her outstanding balance, Sps. Caños continued to
sell her jewelry.16
Escobido went on to get more items from Sps. Caños until she
decided to stop due to her increasing bad debts. She told them that
she would just return whatever jewelry she could get back from her
customers who had been remiss in their payments.17 Sps. Caños
refused because the jewelry was already considered sold and they
feared that their quality might have already deteriorated.18 She tried
to pay her debts, even borrowing from loan sharks until she could no
longer pay.19
In November 2010, Escobido recounted that aside from the checks to
cover business transactions, she also had to cover the checks she
issued for accommodation on behalf of her relatives and friends.
Since she could no longer cover all these checks, Escobido allegedly
requested Sps. Caños not to deposit her checks and to give her more
time to pay them with cash. Thus, contrary to their claims, she did
inform them of the status of her bank account.20 In fact, Sps. Caños
made her believe that they understood her situation and assured her
of their help in solving her problem.21
Escobido likewise denied refusing to pay Sps. Caños. She was paying
them even with meager amounts from December 2010 to February
2013. She claimed that she paid Rodel in March 2013 which he did
not acknowledge since he gave back her checks.22
When Sps. Caños realized that Escobido would never be able to pay
them, they agreed to accept the return of some of the jewelry.23 These
were supposed to be deducted from her outstanding accounts. When
she asked for the checks covering the returned jewelry, Sps. Caños
told her that the checks were still with their suppliers and that they
would just sign the acknowledgment receipts in the meantime.
However, they failed to give her the said checks.24
Escobido further claimed that she executed the Undertaking upon
Rodel's initiative and after consultation with her sister, Atty.
Genevieve Marie Dolores B. Paulino (Paulino).25 The amount of
₱2,545,339.25 was arrived at after deducting the value of the jewelry
that she returned to Sps. Caños.26
On March 14, 2012, however, Rodel gave to Escobido the final letter-
demand in the amount of ₱3,604,065.40.27She was hesitant to accept
and sign the letter-demand because the previous Undertaking
indicated a lower amount. She was forced to receive and sign the
letter-demand in the midst of family and financial problems.28
Escobido also denied the allegation that Sps. Caños did not file a case
against her due to lack of funds. They, in fact, filed a complaint
against her for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP)
22.29 She did not use her position as clerk of court or profession as a
lawyer to dissuade them from filing a case against her. She did not
boast about her connections in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City.30
Furthermore, Escobido claimed that Rodel promised to be lenient
with her if she would help him with his cases. Escobido's sister,
Paulino, agreed to render legal services to Rodel, provided that
compensation for such services would be deducted from the amount
owed by Escobido. Thus, Escobido asserted that the amount of debt
demanded by Sps. Caños is bloated.31 The amount she owed would
be greatly reduced if her payments, the value of the returned jewelry,
and the legal services of her sister would be deducted from her total
debt.32
Finally, Escobido argued that she should not be held liable for any
administrative violations attributed to her by Sps. Caños because she
never denied her debt. She never refused to pay, but was only unable
to do so. She was also not motivated by ill-will against Sps. Caños
since her only desire to venture into business with them was to
augment her family income.33
The Report and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum34 dated December 10, 2014, the OCA found that
Escobido is guilty of deliberate failure to pay just debts. The OCA
noted the more than 100 postdated checks she issued amounting to
more than ₱4,000,000.00, which all bounced. The willfulness in not
paying her obligation was shown by the several years her debt
remained unpaid from November 2010 to May 2013. The measly
payments Escobido made served as mere tokens to appease Sps.
Caños and did not show a serious intention to clear her debt.35
The OCA also noted that two administrative complaints have been
previously filed against Esco bi do for non-payment of debt.36 The
first complaint, docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No. 03-1705-P (Pham
Due Nhuan v. Louise Marie Therese B. Escobido, Clerk of Court V,
RTC, Branch 19, Digos City), charged Escobido with Conduct
Unbecoming a Public Officer and Failure to Pay Just Debts. She
allegedly failed to return ₱1,390,000.00, which was given by the
complainant as part of a business transaction between them despite
repeated demands. As guarantee, Escobido issued a check which was
dishonored by the bank. The Court dismissed the complaint for being
premature as the complainant has filed a criminal complaint
involving the same issue, which was then pending review before the
Department of Justice. In March 2014, a criminal case for violation
of BP 22, docketed as Criminal Case No. 109,581-B-F-C-2003, with
Pham Due Nhuan as private complainant, was filed against Escobido
before Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao
City.37
The second complaint, docketed as A.M. No. P-06-2259 [formerly
A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-2386-P] (Fe Lutero Cajegas, et al. v. Louise
Marie Therese B. Escobido, Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 19, Digos
City, Davao Oriental),charged Escobido with non-payment of debts
to six persons despite repeated demands. She borrowed money from
complainants, who were her former officemates at the Commission
on Human Rights, Region XI, Ecoland, Davao City, and issued
checks as payment for the loans. When presented to the bank, the
checks were dishonored because the accounts against which they
were drawn had been closed. In a Resolution dated October 16, 2006,
Escobido was reprimanded for willful failure to pay just debts.38
Upon review of the three administrative cases, the OCA found that
the cases show a disquieting parallelism among them. In these cases,
Escobido paid her debts with checks which upon presentment to the
drawee banks, were dishonored because the accounts from which
payments were drawn had to be closed. It was also found that she
indiscriminately opened checking accounts in different banks, with
numerous checkbooks per account to cover the amounts she owed her
creditors.39
The OCA discovered that three criminal complaints for estafa and
violation of BP 22 are pending before Branch 3, MTCC, Davao City.
1avvphi1 Two of these, Criminal Cases No. 150,071-D-B-C-14 and
150,072-D-B-C-14, were filed by Sps. Caños as private
complainants, while Criminal Case No. 109,581-B-F-C-2003 was
filed by Pham Due Nhuan as private complainant.40
The OCA also found that Escobido should be held liable for conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Her insidious and
repeated acts of issuing worthless checks with considerable amounts
involved, her cavalier treatment of the affidavit of undertaking to pay
the debt which she claimed she was forced to sign, and her second
time to commit the offense of willful failure to pay just debts evince
bad faith and a disposition to defraud.41
The OCA further noted that the recommendation is without prejudice
to the outcome of the pending criminal cases filed against Escobido.42
The OCA recommended the following:
(1) the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter against Atty. Louise Marie Therese B.
Escobido, Clerk of Court V, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court (R TC),
Digos City;
(2) respondent Atty. Lou[i]se Marie Therese B. Escobido be
found GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and willful failure to pay just debts and that she
be SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, with a STERN
WARNING that the commission of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely; and
(3) the Presiding Judge and/or the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 3,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City be DIRECTED to
apprise the Court on a quarterly basis, relative to the progress of
Criminal Case Nos. 150,071-DB-C-14; 150,072-D-B-C-14 and
109,581-B-F-C-2003 and to furnish the Court with copies of the
decision in said criminal cases.43
In a Manifestation44 dated July 17, 2015, Sps. Caños informed the
Court that aside from the three criminal cases filed against Escobido,
they have filed another complaint for estafa against her. The case is
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27(15) and is pending before Branch
18, RTC, Digos City.
On November 25, 2015, the Clerk of Court of Branch 3, MTCC,
Davao City, submitted45 the Orders of Dismissal46of Criminal Cases
No. 150, 071-D-B-C-14, 150, 072-D-B-C-14 and 109, 581-B-F-
C-2003 filed against Escobido.
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the OCA that Escobido should be held
administratively liable for willful failure to pay just debts and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides that a public employee's
failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action.47 Section
22, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as
modified by Section 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), defines "just
debts" as those: (a) claims adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims
the existence and justness of which are admitted by the debtor.
Classified as a light offense, willful failure to pay just debts is
punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension of one to
thirty days for the second offense, and dismissal from the service for
the third offense.48
Record shows that Escobido admitted the existence of her debt to
Sps. Caños. First, she admitted in her Comment that she owed sums
of money to Sps. Caños, but she is only contesting the amount of the
debt. She also executed an Undertaking acknowledging the debt. The
record likewise shows that Escobido did not exert any sincere effort
to settle her obligation to Sps. Caños. As the OCA correctly observed,
Escobido allowed her obligation to remain unpaid from November
2010 to May 2013. The total amount of ₱93 ,000 .00 she paid from
December 2010 to February 2013 was indeed paltry as to provide a
significant dent on her million-peso obligation.49 As the OCA also
aptly observed, this is not the first instance that she faces a complaint
for not paying her debts.
The Court has ruled that the penalty for willful failure to pay just
debts is imposed at a civil servant's actuation unbecoming a public
official, thus tarnishing the image of the public office:
In this relation, note that the penalty imposed by law is not directed at
respondent's private life, but rather at her actuation unbecoming of a
public official. As explained in In re: Complaint for Failure to Pay
Just Debts Against Esther T. Andres, willful refusal to pay just debts,
much like misconduct, equally contemplates the punishment of the
errant official in view of the damage done to the image of the
Judiciary:
The Court cannot overstress the need for circumspect and proper
behavior on the part of court employees. "While it may be just for an
individual to incur indebtedness unrestrained by the fact that he is a
public officer or employee, caution should be taken to prevent the
occurrence of dubious circumstances that might inevitably impair the
image of the public office." Employees of the court should always
keep in mind that the court is regarded by the public with respect.
Consequently, the conduct of each court personnel should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of onus and must at all times be
characterized by, among other things, uprightness, propriety and
decorum. x x x.
Also, as instructively held in Tan v. Sermania:
Indeed, when [respondent] backtracked on her promise to pay her
debt, such act already constituted a ground for administrative
sanction, for any act that would be a bane to the public trust and
confidence reposed in the judiciary shall not be countenanced.
[Respondent's] unethical conduct has diminished the honor and
integrity of her office, stained the image of the judiciary and caused
unnecessary interference, directly or indirectly, in the efficient and
effective performance of her functions. Certainly, to preserve decency
within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just
contractual obligations, act fairly and adhere to high ethical
standards. Like all other court personnel, [respondent] is expected to
be a paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all her
official conduct but also in her personal actuations, including
business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming her
court's albatross of infamy.50
Public employees may likewise be penalized for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.51 Acts may constitute conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish
the image and integrity of his/her public office.52 Such violation is
classified as a grave offense, punishable by suspension of six months
and one day to one year for the first offense and dismissal from the
service for the second offense.53
We agree with the OCA that Escobido' s repeated acts of contracting
loans and paying them with worthless checks reflect bad faith on her
part. We must note that Escobido, as clerk of court, is not a mere
public employee. She is both an employee of the Court and a member
of the Bar. Thus, she is expected to meet a high standard of
uprightness and propriety. By deliberately failing to meet her
contractual obligations, she fell short of such standard.
We likewise agree that Escobido holds a position of trust and
confidence with concomitant duties and responsibilities that require
from its holder competence, honesty, and integrity so essential for the
proper and effective administration of justice. Her actuation, although
arising from a private transaction, tarnished the image of the
Judiciary.
Finally, we find the penalty of one year suspension appropriate. In the
imposition of penalties, Section 50, Rule 10 of the RRACCS provides
that if the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or
counts, the penalty to be imposed should be that corresponding to the
most serious charge and the rest shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances. Thus, the penalty to be imposed should be that of the
graver offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. The charge of willful failure to pay just debts, being a light
offense, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, respondent Louise Marie Therese B. Escobido,
Clerk of Court V, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Digos City is
adjudged GUILTY of willful failure to pay just debts and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, for which she is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of ONE (1) YEAR. Further, she
is STERNLY WARNEDthat commission of the same or similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 9209
NENITA DE GUZMAN FERGUSON, Complainant 
 he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a Notary Public
vs.
 for two (2) years and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
ATTY. SALVADOR P. RAMOS, Respondents
DECISION
Per Curiam,
Before the Court is the Complaint-Affidavit, 1 filed by Nenita De
Guzman Ferguson (complainant), seeking the disbarment of Atty.
Salvador P. Ramos (Atty. Ramos) for falsification, violation of
notarial law and engaging in private practice while employed in the
government service.
The Antecedents
Complainant alleged that on November 25, 2007, she purchased a
house and lot located in San Rafael, Bulacan, for the sum of
₱800,000.00; that without her knowledge, the seller obtained a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) mainly to.transfer the
title of the said property to her name; that the seller was unaware that
the said CLOA was void ab initio as the subject land was not an
agricultural land and there existed a 10-year prohibition to transfer
the subject land; that in 2009; complainant instituted a petition for the
cancellation of the CLOA before the DAR Office; that the defendants
were represented by Atty. Ramos, who was the Chief Legal Officer of
DAR-Provincial Office in Bulacan; that complainant withdrew the
petition before the DAR and filed the case before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, Malolos City (RTC); that upon receipt of the
Answer, complainant found out that it was strikingly similar to the
one filed by the defendants in the DAR, which was prepared by Atty.
Ramos; that complainant discovered that the Deed of Sale,2 dated
April 24, 2009, which became the basis of the transfer of title was
fraudulently altered as it only covered the sale of the land, not the
house and· lot, and the price indicated was only ₱188,340.00, not the
amount of ₱800,000.00 3 that she actually paid; that her signature and
that of her husband, Douglas Ferguson -(Douglas), were forged; that
Atty. Ramos notarized the deed of Sale without their presence;· and
that complainant and her husband neither appeared, executed nor
acknowledged any document before Atty. Ramos as they never met
him in person.
In his Comment, 4 Atty. Ramos denied that he represented the
defendants in· the case before the DAR but he admitted that he
notarized their Answer. With respect to the charge of falsification of
the April 24,
2009 Deed of Sale and the notarization of the aforementioned deed,
Atty. Ramos likewise denied any participation and countered that his
signature as a notary public was forged. Atty. · Ramos, nonetheless,
admitted that he notarized the "genuine" Deed of Sale, 5 dated May
12, 2009, executed between vendor Alfredo Inosanto, and vendees
complainant and her spouse, involving the same property for the
amount of ₱300,000.00.6 Atty. Ramos surmised that whoever
benefited from such dastardly act could be the culprit in the
falsification of the document as the forged deed of sale which
indicated a lesser purchase price was the one presented in the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan in order to evade payment of a higher
capital gains tax.
In its Resolution, 7 dated February 29, 2012; the Court referred the
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The case was then set by the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of
the IBP for mandatory conference. Thereafter, parties were required
to submit their respective position papers.
In its Report and Recommendation,8 dated November 21, 2014, the
CBD found Atty. Ramos guilty of violating the law on notarial
practice and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one (1)year and, in case he held a commission as a
notary public; that it be revoked and that he be disqualified to act as a
notary public for a period of two (2) years to be counted after his
suspension. The CBD stated that the defense of forgery, without any
corroborative evidence, was not credible. As to the charge that of
engaging in a private practice while employed in the government
service against Atty. Ramos, the CBD'opined that it should be
addressed to the Civil Service Commission for the determination of
his appropriate administrative liability.
In its Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2015-458,9 dated June 6, 2015,
the IBP-Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification
the report and recommendation of the CBD, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part· of this Resolution as Annex "A", finding the recommendation to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and
Respondent's notarization of a document in the absence of the
parties'· in violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Thus,
Respondent Atty. Salvador P. Ramos' notarial commission, if
presently commissioned, is immediately REVOKED. Furthermore,
six (6) months.
The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP but differs on the
imposed penalty.
Section1, Public Act No. 2103, otherwise known as the Notarial Law
states:
The acknowledgment shall be before· a notary public or an officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgements of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The
notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify
that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known
to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged
that the same is· his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made
under the official seal, if he isrequired by law to keep a seal, and if
not, his certificate shall so state.
The importance of the affiant's personal appearance was further
emphasized in Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial
Practice of 2004 which specifically provides that:
A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of
the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The afore-quoted rules clearly mandate that a notary public, before
notarizing a document, should require the presence: of the very
person who executed the same. Thus, he certifies that it was the same
person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what were stated therein. 10The presence of
the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary ·public to
verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. 11
In the present case, Atty. Ramos denied having notarized the April 24,
2009 deed of sale and claimed that his signature was forged. He even
alluded that the person who benefited from it could be the forger as
the capital gains tax liability was reduced. He, nonetheless, admitted
notarizing the "genuine" deed of sale, dated May 12, 2009.
Regardless of who the culprit was and the motive of such forgery,
Atty. Ramos .cannot be exonerated from liability.
A perusal of the record would reveal that Douglas, one of the parties
in the; deed of sale, was not in the Philippines on May 12, 2009, the
day the "genuine" deed of sale was notarized. Complainant presented
a copy of Douglas' passport indicating that he entered the Philippines
only on May 26, 2001 and left on June 12, 2001. This substantially
established that indeed Douglas could not have personally appeared
before Atty. Ramos when he notarized the deed.
Moreover, an examination of the April 24, 2009 and May 12, 2009
deeds of sale disclosed that both documents bore the same document
number, page number and book number of the notarial registry of
Atty. Ramos. If, indeed, the April 24, 2009 deed of sale, which was
issued earlier was forged, how would the purported culprit know the
details of Atty. Ramos' notarial registry?
It must be emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless
and routinary act. It is imbued with public interest and only those
who are qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. 12 In the
case of Gonzales v. Ramos, 13 the Court explained the significance of
the act of notarization, thus:

By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, the respondent
converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from a private document into a
public document. Such act is no empty gesture. The principal
function of a notary public is to authenticate documents. When a
notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of a
document under his hand and ··seal, he gives the document the force
of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents to be
acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity
which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to
authorize such documents to be given without further proof of their
execution and delivery. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgement
executed before a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
Hence, a notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which
are impressed with public interest, with accuracy and fidelity.
Not only did Atty. Ramos fail to comply with the Rule on Notarial
Practice when he notarized the deed of sale without the presence of
the parties but he likewise violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which obliges a lawyer to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes; and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging
in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. 14
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, Atty. Ramos was
mandated to exercise the function of his office and must observe with
utmost care the basic formalities of his office and requisites in the
performance of his duties. 15When Atty. Ramos affixed his signature
and notarial seal on the deed of sale, he led us to believe that the
parties personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and
veracity of the contents thereof. His conduct was fraught with
dangerous possibilities considering the conclusiveness on the due
execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on
notarized documents. 16 Certainly, Atty. Ramos failed to exercise the
functions of the office and to comply with the mandates of the law.
In the case of Santuyo v. Atty. Hidalgo, the respondent lawyer
similarly denied having notarized the subject deed of sale. The Court
found him negligent not only in the supposed notarization but in
allowing the office secretaries to make the necessary entries in his
notarial registry which was supposed to be done and kept by him
alone. He was suspended from his commission as notary public and
was disqualified from being commissioned as notary public for a
period of two years.
In the case of Ocampo-lngcoco v. Atty. Yrreverre, Jr., 18 the
respondent lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months for notarizing a document without the
appearance of the parties. The Court held that a notary public should
not notarize a document unless the persons who signed it are the very
same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the truth of the contents therein.
In line with these cases, the Court finds the suspension of Atty.
Ramos for six (6) months in order.1âwphi1
With respect to the allegation that Atty. Ramos was engaged in a
private practice while employed in the government service, the Court
agrees with the CBD that the issue should be brought before the Civil
Service Commission for the determination of his appropriate
administrative liability, if any.
Finally, this Court cannot ignore the averments of Atty. Ramos that
there were two (2) deeds of sale covering Transfer Certificate of Title
No. CLOA-T-15831. One was the April 24, 2009 Deed of Sale which
was presented to the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, and the other one
was the May 12, 2009 Deed of Sale which was kept on file at the
Notarial Section of the RTC. Both deeds were registered in the
Notarial Registry of Atty. Ramos with document number 354, page
number 71 and Book VII series of 2009. Because of this irregularity,
the Court deems it proper to refer this matter to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for the assessment of the correct tax and for, investigation
for possible prosecution of the criminal liability of the culprits under
the National Internal Revenue Code.
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Salvador P. Ramos GUILTY of
violating the Rule on Notarial Practice and Rule 1.01 and Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six (6)
months; REVOKES his notarial commission, effective immediately;
and PERMANENTLYBARS him from being commissioned as
notary public, with a STERNWARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be attached to the personal record of Atty. Salvador P.
Ramos; the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
lower courts; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, for proper
guidance and information.
The Civil Service Commission and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
should likewise be given copies of this decision for their appropriate
actions.
A.C. No. 7478
EDUARDO R. ALICIAS, JR., Complainant, 

vs.

ATTYS. MYRNA V. MACATANGAY, KARIN LITZ P. ZERNA,
ARIEL G. RONQUILLO, and CESAR D. BUENAFLOR,
Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a isbarment complaint filed by Eduardo R.
Alicias, Jr. (Alicias) against Atty. Myrna V. Macatangay
(Macatangay), Atty. Karin Litz P. Zema (Zem), Atty. Ariel G.
Ronquillo (Ronquillo), and
Atty. Cesar D. Buenaflor (Buenaflor) for violation of the Lawyer's
Oath or Code of Professional Responibility, gross neglect of duty, and
gross ignorance of the law.
The Facts
The present administrative case stemmed from an initial complaint
filed by Alicias, an Associate Professor in the College of Education of
the University of the Philippines against Dean Leticia P. Ho (Ho) of
the same College for two counts of violation of Republic Act No.
6713. 1 The Civil Service Commission (CSC), through its Office of
Legal Affairs (CSC-OLA), then headed by Director IV Florencio P.
Gabriel, Jr., referred Alicias' complaint against Ho to its Regional
Office in the National Capital Region (CSC-NCR). In its 26 June
2002 Resolution, the CSC-NCR found that the complaint was
insufficient to support a prima facie case against Ho. Alicias'
complaint against Ho was dismissed.
On 12 July 2002, Alicia filed a petition for review2 with the CSC.
The CSC asked the CSC-NCR to comment. Pending the resolution of
the petition for review, Macatanga replaced Director Gabriel, Jr. as
Officer-in-Charge of the CSC-OLA. In a 1etter3 dated 5 May 2003,
Alicias followed up his petition for review and noti ed the CSC of his
new residential address in Cainta, Rizal. On 26 April 200 , Alicias
wrote a second letter4 to follow-up his petition for review. On 9
August 2004, the CSC, as a collegial body, deliberated on the draft
resolution prepared by the CSC-OLA. The draft resolution, however,
was returned for re-writing.
On 30 August 2004, Zerna succeeded Macatangay as Officer-in-
Charge of the CSC-OLA. A third follow-up was made by Alicias on
16 September 2004 through a han written note. 5 Alicias claimed that
he never received any reply from the SC-OLA. On 28 October 2004,
the CSC released a Resolution6 dismissing Alicias' petition for review
for lack of merit. 7 As CSC Commissioner, Buenaflor was one of the
signatories of the Resolution.
Alicias did not receive a copy of the Resolution. The records8 show
that it was mistakenly sent to his old address in Quezon City.
Unaware that the petition for review was already resolved, Alicias
moved for its resolution on 16 February 2006, followed by another
letter on 10 April 2006.9 Ronquillo, who assumed as Director IV of
the CSC-OLA, received Alicias' Motion for Resolution. Ronquillo
replied that the petition for review was already dismissed on 28
October 2004.
On 26 April 2006, Alicias received through registered mail a copy of
the CSC's Resolution. Alicias filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied on 1 August 2006. 10 Commissioner Buenaflor was
one of the signatories of the Resolution. Alicias did not appeal the
CSC 's Resolution with the Court of Appeals.
On 11 April 2007, Alicia's filed the present administrative complaint
before the Court accusing Macatangay, Zerna, Ronquillo, and
Buenaflor of violation of the Lawyer's Oath or Code of Professional
Responsibility, gross neglect of duty, and gross ignorance of the law.
Alicias alleged that respondents, by reason of their respective offices
in the CSC, participated directly or indirectly in writing or approving
the Resolution. Respondents allegedly (1) did not conduct a careful
evaluation of the records; (2) did not hear the arguments of both
parties; (3) ignored uncontroverted documentary evidence adduced
by him; (4) erroneously applied established jurisprudence; (5) denied
him due process of law by not furnishing him a copy of the CSC's
Order directing the CSC-NCR to comment and a copy of the CSC-
NCR comment; and (6) willfully did not give him a copy of the
Resolution of his petition for review.
In their Joint Comment11 dated 16 August 2007, respondents argued
that Alicias was not denied due process because after the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, he still had the available remedy of filing
a petition for review on certiorari 12 with the Court of Appeals.
Respondents contended that no clear and convincing evidence had
been offered to show bad faith or ulterior motive on their part.
In a Reply13 dated 30 A gust 2007, Alicias claimed that the present
administrative complaint is not an alternative remedy to seek judicial
relief since it is founded on a. different cause of action. Alicias
contended that bad faith is not an element to sustain an action for
gross ignorance of the law. He argued that the failure to follow
prescribed procedure constitutes malumprohibitum. Hence, proof of
mere violation is sufficient to sustain a conviction without need of
proving ill motive.
On 8 October 2007, the Court, through the Second Division, referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.1âwphi1
The Ruling of the IBP
In a Report and Recommendation 14 dated 20 October 2010, IBP
Commissioner Maria Editha A. Go-Binas (Commissioner Go-Binas)
recommended that the administrative complaint against Macatangay,
Zema, Ronquillo, and Buenaflor be dismissed for lack of
merit. 15 Commissioner Go-Binas found that the complaint was
baseless and Alicias failed to show sufficient proof in support of his
claims. 16
In Resolution No. XX-2011-288 17 passed on 10 December 2011, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Go-
Binas' Report and Recommendation, dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-73818 issued on 21 June 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors likewise denied the motion for
reconsideration 19 filed by Alicias. The Board found no cogent reason
to reverse its initial findings since the matters raised were reiterations
of those which had already been taken into consideration.
Hence, Alicias filed this detition.20
The Ruling of the Court
The Court disagrees with the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors. The IBP has no jurisdiction over the disbarment
complaint. The administrative complaint must be filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman.
Republic Act No. 677021(R.A. No. 6770), otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," pr scribes the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman. Section 15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
Section 15. Powers, Function and Duties.- The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any ac or omission of any public officer or employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency f Government, the investigation of such cases.
The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the
administrative disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute any
act or omission of any government official when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 22 The Office of
the Ombudsman is the government agency responsible for enforcing
administrative, civil, and criminal liability of government officials "in
every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to thepeople."23In Samson v.
Restrivera,24the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
encompasses 11 kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance
committed by any public officer or employee during his or her tenure.
Consequently, acts or missions of public officials relating to the
performance of their functions as government officials are within the
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.25
In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, 26 the Court held that the IBP
has no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged with
administrative offenses involving their official duties.27In the present
case, the allegations in Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay,
Atty. Zerna, Atty. Ronquillo, and Atty. Buenaflor, which include their
(1) failure to evaluate CSC records; (2) failure to evaluate
documentary evidence presented to the CSC; and (3) on-service of
CSC Orders and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct n the
discharge of their official duties as government lawyers working in
the CSC. Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over Alicias' complaint.
These are acts or omissions connected with their duties as
government lawyers exercising official functions in the CSC and
within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their
superior28 or the Office of the Ombudsman.29
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against Atty. Myrna V.
Macatangay, Atty. Karin Litz P. Zerna, Atty. Ariel G. Ronquillo, and
Atty. Cesar D. Buenaflor is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Ombudsman for whatever appropriate action the Ombudsman may
wish to take with respect to the possible administrative and criminal
liability of respondents Atty. Myrna V. Macatangay, Atty. Karin Litz
P. Zerna, Atty. Ariel G. Ronquillo, and Atty. Cesar D. Buenaflor.


Office of the Court Administrator vs. Umblas and
Atty. Baltazar Aquino

PER CURIAM:
The instant administrative case arose from a Memorandum[1] dated
January 15, 2009 filed before the complainant Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) by then Deputy Court Administrator Reuben P.
De La Cruz (DCA De La Cruz) reporting the commission of
malversation thru falsification of official documents committed by
employees of the Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros, Cagayan,
Branch 33 (RTC-Cagayan Br. 33).[2]



The Facts


To verify DCA De La Cruz's report, an audit and investigation was
conducted in the RTC-Cagayan Br. 33 covering the financial
transactions of the court's former Officer-in-Charge, respondent
Legal Researcher Eduardo T. Umblas (Umblas), from February 1997
to July 31, 2005 and respondent Clerk of Court Atty. Rizalina G.
Baltazar-Aquino (Atty. Baltazar-Aquino) from August 2005 to
January 31, 2009.[3] The results thereof were contained in a
Memorandum[4] dated May 12, 2009 submitted before the OCA. In
said Memorandum, the audit and investigation team discovered that
during respondents Umblas and Atty. Baltazar-Aquino's
(respondents) respective periods of accountability, they have
committed various irregularities in the collections and deposits of the
Judiciary Development Fund, General Fund, Sheriffs General Fund,
Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund, Fiduciary Fund, Legal
Research Fund, Publication, and Sheriffs Trust Fund. It was likewise
found out that there have been cases of uncollected and/or
understated fees, tampered official receipts, and collections without
issuing official receipts.[5] After collating all the relevant data, the
audit and investigation team concluded that Umblas had total initial
shortages amounting to P1,334,784.35,[6] while Atty. Baltazar-
Aquino's total initial shortages amounted to P796,685.20.[7]



Adopting the recommendation of the audit and investigation team,
the Court issued a Resolution[8] dated July 6, 2009 which, inter alia:
(a) docketed the report as a regular administrative complaint against
respondents; (b) ordered respondents to explain in writing their
shortages as well as various irregularities they committed as
accountable officers; and (c) ordered respondents to pay and deposit
their shortages.[9]



In her Compliance[10] dated November 24, 2009, Atty. Baltazar-
Aquino explained as follows: (a) for the Publication shortage
amounting to P25,000.00, she issued an acknowledgement receipt in
lieu of an official receipt, believing that the same is not part of the
funds of the judiciary as it was turned over to the concerned
publisher; (b) for the Sheriffs Trust Fund shortage of P48,000.00, she
did not issue any receipt as the same was disbursed to the RTC-
Cagayan Br. 33 Sheriff to cover expenses for delivering summonses
and other court processes; and (c) for the P248,000.00 shortage in
Fiduciary Fund, the cash bond amounting to P200,000.00 received in
Criminal Case No. 33-611-33, entitled People v. Wilfreda Uclos, was
already withdrawn upon the case's dismissal, while the remaining
P48,000.00 should not be imputed to her as the transaction transpired
from July to December 2005 and that the Fiduciary Fund account was
only turned over to her by Umblas in January 2006. Further, Atty.
Baltazar-Aquino requested for a copy of the financial audit report to
enable her to explain all her remaining accountabilities.[11]
 The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents should


Accordingly, the Court ordered the OCA to furnish Atty. Baltazar
Aquino with the detailed list of the tampered official receipts, copies
of acknowledgement receipts she issued in lieu of official receipts,
and the detailed accounting of all funds audited and the
corresponding shortages.[12] Despite this, Atty. Baltazar-Aquino
repeatedly failed to submit her written explanation. As such, she was
fined twice for such failure, and was even warned of being arrested
should she fail to comply with the directives of the Court.[13] Finally,
Atty. Baltazar-Aquino submitted a Compliance[14] dated April 14,
2014 voluntarily and unconditionally admitting to be the author of
and thus, guilty of the falsifications, tampering, erasures, and
shortages of funds imputed against her. In this regard, she expressed
remorse over her actions, expressed willingness to return her incurred
shortages, and pleaded for the Court to exercise some degree of
compassion and mercy towards her.[15]



On the other hand, Umblas requested for additional periods to file his
written explanation, but despite the periods given him, he never did
so, and thus, was fined twice for such omission.[16]
 dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,


The OCA's Report and Recommendation


In a Memorandum[17] dated May 5, 2016, the OCA recommended
that: (a) respondents be found guilty of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Gross Neglect of Duty, and accordingly, be meted
the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all retirement benefits
excluding leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any
government office, including government-owned and controlled
corporations; (b) Atty. Baltazar-Aquino be made to explain why she
should not be disbarred for violations of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; (c) the Leave
Division of the Office of Administrative Services, OCA be directed to
compute each of respondents' accrued leave credits; (d) the Financial
Management Office, OCA be directed to apply the monetary value of
respondents' leave credits to their respective cash shortages, and
should the same prove to be insufficient, to order respondents to
restitute the balance; and (e) the proper criminal charges be filed
against respondents.[18]
 in the Judiciary."[25]
As for Atty. Baltazar-Aquino, the OCA found that her voluntary and
unconditional admission to falsifying and tampering various official
receipts reveals a serious depravity in her character and integrity
which has no place in the judiciary. The OCA added that she
disregarded her mandated duty to safeguard court funds, thereby
undermining the public's faith in the courts and in the administration
of justice as a whole. Moreover, the OCA pointed out that Atty.
Baltazar-Aquino did not collect initial sheriff's fees pursuant to
Section 10 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court nor issued official
receipts for sheriff's fees she received, in violation of the directives
contained in Circular Nos. 22-94 and 26-97. With regard to her
Fiduciary Fund shortage, the OCA opined that Atty. Baltazar-Aquino
was able to substantiate her claim that the cash bond in the amount of
P200,000.00 posted in Criminal Case No. 33-611-33, entitled People
v. Wilfreda Uclos, was already withdrawn after the case was
dismissed. However, the remaining P48,000.00 was found to have
been withdrawn within the period of her accountability, hence, she
remained liable therefor. Thus, the total shortages incurred by Atty.
Baltazar-Aquino should be pegged at P596,685.20.[19]
 custodian of court funds with the corresponding duty to immediately


Finally, the OCA opined that Atty. Baltazar-Aquino's actuations not
only ruined the image of the judiciary, but also put her moral
character in serious doubt, thus, rendering her unfit to continue in the
practice of law. As such, she should be made to explain why she
should not be disbarred.[20]
 misappropriation of such collections, viz.:
As for Umblas, the OCA found that aside from various shortages in
his books of account, there were also unreceipted collections, series
of official receipts which were not reflected in the cashbook and
monthly reports of collections and deposits, use of separate receipts,
and various alterations/erasures in official receipts. In this regard, his
failure to: (a) file any written explanation to controvert the aforesaid
findings despite his numerous requests for additional periods to
submit the same; and (b) comply with the Court's show cause
resolutions, constitute not only an admission of guilt of the charges
imputed against him, but also exhibits an act of defiance to a lawful
order and lack of respect to authority which has no place in the
judiciary.[21]
 delay by itself in remitting collections, keeping the amounts, and


The Issue Before the Court


be held administratively liable for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct,
and Gross Neglect of Duty.



The Court's Ruling


The Court concurs with the OCA's findings and recommendations,
with modification holding respondents also administratively liable for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.



"Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness;
disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."[22]



On the other hand, "[m]isconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and
must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross
misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in the former."[23]



Finally, and "as compared to Simple Neglect of Duty which is
defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a
required task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or
indifference, Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized by want of even
the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences,
or by flagrant and palpable breach of duty."[24]



"Needless to say, these constitute [C]onduct [P]rejudicial to the
[B]est [I]nterest of the [S]ervice as they violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish - or tend to diminish - the people's faith


Jurisprudence outlined the following acts that constitute this offense,
such as: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office,
failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to keep in
safety public records and property, making false entries in public
documents, and falsification of court orders.[26]



"In order to sustain a finding of administrative culpability under the
foregoing offenses, only the quantum of proof of substantial evidence
is required, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."[27]



In this case, Atty. Baltazar-Aquino, being the Clerk of Court of RTC-
Cagayan Br. 33, is considered to be the chief administrative officer of
said court. With respect to the collection of legal fees, she performs a
delicate function as the judicial officer entrusted with the correct and
effective implementation of regulations thereon. Even the undue
delay in the remittances of amounts collected by her at the very least
constitutes misfeasance. Moreover, as a Clerk of Court, she is the
deposit various funds received by her and not keep the funds in her
custody.[28] In OCA v. Acampado,[29] it was held that a Clerk of
Court's failure to perform the aforementioned duties exposes him/her
to administrative liability for Gross Neglect of Duty, Grave
Misconduct, and also Serious Dishonesty, if it is shown that there was


Clerks of Court are the custodians of the courts' "funds and revenues,
records, properties, and premises." They are liable for any loss,
shortage, destruction or impairment" of those entrusted to them. Any
shortages in the amounts to be remitted and the delay in the
actual remittance "constitute gross neglect of duty for which the
clerk of court shall be held administratively liable."



Respondent Acampado committed gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct when she failed to turn over the funds of the Judiciary
that were placed in her custody within the period required by law. We
said in [OCA] v. Fueconcillo [(585 Phil. 223 [2008])] that undue
spending it for the respondent's "family consumption, and
fraudulently withdrawing amounts from the judiciary
funds, collectively constitute gross misconduct and gross neglect
of duty." Such behaviour should not be tolerated as is denigrates this
Court's image and integrity.
 individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor


x x x x
 accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the


Respondent Acampado's actions of misappropriating Judiciary
funds and incurring cash shortages in the amounts of 1) Twenty-
three Thousand Seven Hundred Twelve Pesos and Fifty-three
Centavos (P23,712.53) for the Judiciary Development Fund; 2)
Fiftyeight Thousand Two Hundred Eighty-five Pesos and Eighty
Centavos (P58,285.80) for the Special Allowance for the Judiciary;
and 3) Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for the Mediation Fund
(MF), totaling to Eighty-six Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-eight
Pesos and Thirtythree Centavos (P86,998.33) are serious acts of
dishonesty that betrayed the institution tasked to uphold justice
and integrity for all. Moreover, respondent Acampado's act of
repeatedly falsifying bank deposit slips is patent dishonesty that
should not be tolerated by this Court. Restitution of the
missinamounts will not relieve respondent Acampado of her
liability.[30] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Here, Atty. Baltazar-Aquino voluntarily and unconditionally admitted
that she authored the various acts of falsifying and tampering official
receipts, resulting in cash shortages in her accountabilities. More
importantly, she expressed her willingness to return the amount
comprising such shortages, thereby impliedly admitting that she
misappropriated the same for her personal use.[31] Clearly, the
foregoing admissions rendered Atty. Baltazar-Aquino
administratively liable for the same.
 is thus, DISMISSED from service. Accordingly, her civil


Meanwhile, while Umblas was only a Legal Researcher, it must
nevertheless be pointed out that he acted as RTC-Cagayan Br. 33's
Officer-in-Charge from February 1997 to July 31, 2005 and was
therefore an accountable disbursement officer thereof. In fact, during
this period, he incurred cash shortages, all of which were left
unexplained as he failed to file his written explanation despite his
requests for numerous extensions of time to do so. As succinctly put
by the OCA, his inexplicable silence on the matter can already be
viewed as an admission of guilt on his part, warranting the imposition
of administrative liabilities against him.
 is DIRECTED to compute each of respondents' accrued


With respect to the proper penalty to be imposed on them, the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS)[32]classifies the offenses of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service as Grave Offenses, with the first three
punishable with Dismissal for the first offense, while the last one
punishable with Suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year for the first offense and Dismissal for the second
offense.[33] Applying Section 55[34] of the URACCS, respondents
should be meted the supreme penalty of Dismissal from the service.
Corollary thereto, they shall likewise suffer the accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the
perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government
service.[35] It is well to clarify, however, that their accrued leave
credits, if any, shall not be forfeited, as it is a standing rule that
"despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are
entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of
their employment. As a matter of fairness and law, they may not be
deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their
dismissal."[36] Nevertheless, such earned leave credits shall be first
applied to respondents' respective cash shortages, and should such
leave credits be insufficient, then respondents should be made to pay
for the balance.

At this juncture, it must be noted that in an earlier case decided by the
Court entitled OCA v. Umblas,[37] Umblas was already meted the
penalty of dismissal along with its accessory penalties. Further,
in Garingan-Ferreras v. Umblas,[38] Umblas was supposed to be
meted the same penalty as well, if not for the earlier imposition
thereof. Thus, he was instead meted with the penalty of a fine in the
amount of P40,000.00. Hence, the Court can no longer impose the
penalty of dismissal with its accessory penalties to Umblas in this
case. In lieu thereof, a penalty of a fine in the amount of P40,000.00
shall be imposed on him instead, which amount shall be deducted
from his accrued leave credits and if such is insufficient, he shall be
ordered to pay the balance.
 Emmanuel E. Laforteza (Atty. Laforteza), docketed as A.C. No. 9364,


Furthermore, suffice it to say that the Court agrees with the OCA's
recommendations that: (a) the proper criminal charges be filed
against respondents; and (b) Atty. Baltazar-Aquino should be made to
explain why she should not be disbarred for violations of Canons 1
and 7, and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
 2011, Atty. Laforteza transferred to the Department of Justice.4


As a final note, it is well to emphasize that "those in the Judiciary
serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part
immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the
people's confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible
condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public
people in the justice system. In this light, the Court will not hesitate
to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an
effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its
image in the eyes of the public."[39]



WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Respondent Eduardo T. Umblas, Legal Researcher of the
Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros, Cagayan, Branch 33, is
found GUILTYof Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross
Neglect of Duty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. In lieu of dismissal, he is
hereby ORDERED to pay a fine of P40,000.00 to be
deducted from his accrued leave credits. In case his leave
credits be found insufficient, respondent is directed to pay
the balance within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision.

2. Respondent Atty. Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino, Clerk of
Court VI, of the Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros,
Cagayan, Branch 33, is likewise found GUILTY of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
service eligibility is CANCELLED, and her retirement and
other benefits, except accrued leave credits,
are FORFEITED. Further, she is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reemployment in the government
service, including government owned and controlled
corporations;

3. The Leave Division of the Office of Administrative
Services, Office of the Court Administrator
leave credits, while the Financial Management Office,
Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to apply
the monetary value of respondents' leave credits to their
respective cash shortages in the amounts of P1,334,784.35
for respondent Eduardo T. Umblas, and P596,685.20 for
respondent Atty. Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino. Should their
accrued leave credits prove to be insufficient to cover their
respective cash shortages, respondents are ORDERED to
pay the balance;

4. The Office of the Court Administrator is
hereby DIRECTED to file the appropriate criminal
charges against respondents Eduardo T. Umblas and Atty.
Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino; and

5. Respondent Atty. Rizalina G. Baltazar-Aquino
is DIRECTED to explain why she should not be disbarred
for violations of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to
respondents' respective records.
A.C. No. 9364

[Formerly CBD Case No.13-3696]
FLORDELIZA E. COQUIA, Complainant 

vs.

ATTY. EMMANUEL E. LAFORTEZA, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment dated February 6, 4012 filed
by Flordeliza E. Coquia1 (Coquia) against respondent Atty.
for Conduct Unbecoming of a Lawyer due to the unauthorized
notarization of documents relative to Civil Case No. 18943.2
Atty. Laforteza was a former Clerk of Court of Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan, having assumed
office in November 17, 2004 until January 31, 2011.3 On February 1,
In her Complaint, Coquia alleged that on January 7, 2009, while in
office as clerk of court, Atty. Laforteza conspired with Clemente
Solis (Clemente) to falsify two (2) documents, to wit: (1) an
Agreement between Clemente Solis and Flordeliza Coquia,5 and the
(2) Payment Agreement executed by Flordeliza Coquia, and
subsequently notarized the said documents. Coquia claimed that the
documents were forged to make it appear that on the said date, she
subscribed and sworn to the said documents before Atty. Laforteza
when in truth and in fact on the said date and time, she was attending
to her classes at the Centro Escolar University in Manila as evidenced
by the certified true copy of the Centro Escolar University Faculty
Daily Time Record for the period of December 16, 2008 to January
14, 2009.6
Coquia asserted that under the law, Atty. Laforteza is not authorized
to administer oath on documents not related to his functions and
duties as Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 68, Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Thus, the instant complaint for disbarment for conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer.
On January 12, 2012, the Office of the Bar Confidant referred the
complaint to Atty. Cristina B. Layusa, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar
Confidant, Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.7
On March 19, 2012, the Court resolved to require Atty. Laforteza to
comment on the complaint against him.8
In compliance, Atty. Laforteza submitted his Comment9 dated July 2,
2012 where he denied the allegations in the complaint. Atty.
Laforteza recalled that on January 7, 2009, while attending to· his
work, fellow court employee, Luzviminda Solis (Luzviminda), wife
of Clemente, with other persons, came to him. He claimed that
Luzviminda introduced said persons to him as the same parties to the
subject documents. Luzviminda requested him to subscribe the
subject documents as proof of their transaction considering that they
are blood relatives. Atty. Laforteza claimed that he hesitated at first
and even directed them to seek the services of a notary public but
they insisted for his assistance and accommodation. Thus, in response
to the exigency of the situation and thinking in all good faith that it
would also serve the parties' interest having arrived at a settlement,
Atty. Laforteza opted to perform the subscription of the jurat. He,
however, insisted that at that time of subscription, after propounding
some questions, he was actually convinced that the persons who
came to him are the same parties to the said subject documents.10
Atty. Laforteza likewise denied that there was conspiracy or
connivance between him and the Solis'. He pointed out that other
than the subject documents and Coquia's bare allegation of
conspiracy, no evidence was presented to substantiate the same. Atty.
Laforteza lamented that he was also a victim of the circumstances
with his reliance to the representations made before him. He invoked
the presumption of regularity and extended his apology to this Court
should his act as a subscribing officer be deemed improper.11
In a Joint-Affidavit12 dated July 2, 2012 of Clemente and
Luzviminda, both denied to have connived or conspired with Atty.
Laforteza in the preparation and execution of the subject documents.
They narrated that Atty. Laforteza in fact initially refused to grant
their request to notarize the subject documents but they were able to
convince him to assist them in the interest of justice. Clemente
insisted that he was one of the signatories in the said documents and
that he has personal knowledge that the signature of Coquia inscribed
in the same documents are her true signatures having seen her affixed
her signatures.13
On October 11, 2012, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.14
During the mandatory conference, both parties agreed that Atty.
Laforteza is authorized to administer oaths.1âwphi1However, as to
the requirement to establish the identity of the parties, Atty. Laforteza
admitted that he does not personally know both Coquia and
Clemente, and he merely relied on Luzviminda and Loma Viray, who
are known to him as fellow court employees, to establish the
identities of the parties. He likewise admitted that Coquia did not sign
the documents in his presence and that someone present on the said
date allegedly owned the signature of Coquia as hers.15
In its Report and Recommendation16 dated December 18, 2013, the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CED)recommended that the
instant complaint be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence.
However, in a Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-818 dated October
11, 2014, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to reversed and set
aside the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, and instead
reprimanded and cautioned Atty. Laforteza to be careful in
performing his duties as subscribing officer.17
We concur with the findings of the IBP-Board of Governors, except
as to the penalty.
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers,
the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.18 In the absence of
cogent proof, bare allegations of misconduct cannot prevail over the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.19
In the instant case, We find that Coquia failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence to show that Atty. Laforteza had direct and
instrumental participation, or was in connivance with the Solis' in the
preparation of the subject documents. While it may be assumed that
Atty. Laforteza had a hand in the preparation of the subject
documents, We cannot give evidentiary weight to such a supposition
in the absence of any evidence to support it. The Court does not thus
give credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation.20
As to the allegation of unauthorized notarization:
As early as the case of Borre v. Moya,21 this Court had already
clarified that the power of ex officio notaries public have been limited
to notarial acts connected to the exercise of their official functions
and duties.
Consequently, the empowerment of ex officio notaries public to
perform acts within the competency of regular notaries public - such
as acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations, jurats, signature
witnessing, copy certifications, and other acts authorized under the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice - is now more of an exception rather
than a general rule. They may perform notarial acts on such
documents that bear no relation to their official functions and duties
only if (1) a certification is included in the notarized documents
attesting to the lack of any other lawyer or notary public in the
municipality or circuit; and (2) all notarial fees charged will be for
the account of the government and turned over to the municipal
treasurer. No compliance with these two requirements are present in
this case.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza notarized and
administered oaths in documents that had no relation to his official
function. The subject documents, to wit: (1) an Agreement between
Clemente Solis and Flordeliza Coquia, 22 and the (2) Payment
Agreement executed by Flordeliza Coquia, are both private
documents which are unrelated to Atty. Laforteza's official functions.
The civil case from where the subject documents originated is not
even raffled in Branch 68 where Atty. Laforteza was assigned. While
Atty. Laforteza serve as notary public ex officio and, thus, may
notarize documents or administer oaths, he should not in his ex
officio capacity take part in the execution of private documents
bearing no relation at all to his official functions.
Under the provisions of Section 4123 (as amended by Section 2 of R.
A. No. 673324) and Section 24225 of the Revised Administrative
Code, in relation to Sections G,26 M27 and N,28 Chapter VIII of the
Manual for Clerks of Court, Clerks of Court are notaries public ex
officio, and may thus notarize documents or administer oaths but only
when the matter is related to the exercise of their official functions.
29 In Exec. Judge Astorga v. Solas,30 the Court ruled that clerks of
court should not, in their ex-officio capacity, take part in the
execution of private documents bearing no relation at all to their
official functions. Notarization of documents that have no relation to
the performance of their official functions is now considered to be
beyond the scope of their authority as notaries public ex officio. Any
one of them who does so would be committing an unauthorized
notarial act, which amounts to engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law and abuse of authority.
As to the Violation of Notarial Law:
We likewise agree and adopt the findings of the IBP-Board of
Governors which found Atty. Laforteza to have violated the Notarial
Law.1âwphi1
In this case, it is undisputed that Atty. Laforteza failed to comply with
the rules of notarial law. He admitted that he notarized a pre-
signed subject document presented to him. He also admitted his
failure to personally verify the identity of all parties who purportedly
signed the subject documents and who, as he claimed, appeared
before him on January 7, 2009 as he merely relied upon the assurance
of Luzviminda that her companions are the actual signatories to the
said documents. In ascertaining the identities of the parties, Atty.
Laforteza contented himself after propounding several questions only
despite the Rules' clear requirement of presentation of competent
evidence of identity such as an identification card with photograph
and signature. Such failure to verify the identities of the parties was
further shown by the fact that the pertinent identification details of
the parties to the subject documents, as proof of their identity, were
lacking in the subject documents' acknowledgment portion. Atty.
Laforteza even affixed his signature in an incomplete notarial
certificate. From the foregoing, it can be clearly concluded that there
was a failure on the part of Atty. Laforteza to exercise the due
diligence required of him as a notary public ex-officio.
Notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a
document. Notarization of a private document converts such
document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages
public interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that
interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized
to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts
and administrative offices generally.31
Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. The purpose of this requirement
is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party's free act and deed.32
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the
affiant's personal appearance before the notary public Rule II, Section
1 states:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.-"Acknowledgment" refers to an act
in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and
integrally complete instrument or document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules;and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument
or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in
the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the
instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if
he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the
authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
Rule IV, Section 2(b) further states:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as
signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the
notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
Thus, a document should not be notarized unless the persons who are
executing it are the very same ones who are personally appearing
before the notary public. The affiants should be present to attest to the
truth of the contents of the document and to enable the notary to
verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined
from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their
duty to demand that the document presented to them for notarization
be signed in their presence. Their function is, among others, to guard
against illegal deeds.33 For this reason, notaries public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this
form of conveyance would be undermined.34
PENALTY
While Atty. Laforteza was merely an ex-officio notary public by
virtue of his position as clerk of court then, it did not relieve him of
compliance with the same standards and obligations imposed upon
other commissioned notaries public.35 However, this Court can no
longer acquire administrative jurisdiction over Atty. Laforteza for the
purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions over erring court
employees since the instant complaint against him was filed after he
has ceased to be a court employee.
In Talisic vs. Atty. Rinen,36 respondent, as ex-officio notary public,
failed to verify the identity of all the parties to the document. Thus,
the Court ordered his notarial commission revoked and disqualified
him from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one
year. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, Atty. Emmanuel E.
Laforteza's notarial commission, if there is any, is REVOKED, and
he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of one (1) year. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to Atty. Laforteza's personal record.
Further, let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
A.C. No. 7424
NATIVIDAD R. MUNAR, BENNY O. TAGUBA, REYNALD S.
LAMPITOC, ADELINA A. FARNACIO, ANITA R. DOMINGO,
LUZ T. DOMINGO, EVANGELINE G. VINARAO, MOISES J.
BARTOLOME, JR., ROSARIO R. RAMONES, MERCEDITA
G. PIMENTEL, MYRNA A. . CAMANTE, LEONIDA A.
RUMBAOA, NORMA U. VILLANUEVA, ANTONIA M.
TANGONAN, ASUNCION C. MARQUEZ, JULIETA B.
MADRID, ESTRELLA C. ARELLANO, LUDIVINA B. SALES,
JEANY M. FLORENTINO, and SHRI B. VISAYA, Petitioners 

vs.

ATTY. ELMER T. BAUTISTA and ATTY. WINSTON F.
GARCIA, Respondents
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court from the Resolution2 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) passed by its Board of Governors on June 5, 2008 adopting the
Report and Recommendation3 dated March 27, 2008 of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Investigating Commissioner
Atty. Salvador B. Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) and dismissing
the undated administrative Complaint for Disbarment4 filed on
February 1, 2007 by Benny O. Taguba, Natividad R. Munar, Reynald
S. Lampitoc, Adelina A. Farnacio, Anita R. Domingo, Luz T.
Domingo, Evangeline G. Vinarao, Moises J. Bartolome, Jr., Rosario
R. Ramones, Mercedita G. Pimentel, Myrna A. Camante, Leonida A.
Rumbaoa, Norma U. Villanueva, Antonia M. Tangonan, Asuncion C.
Marquez, Julieta B. Madrid, Estrella C. Arellano, Ludivina B. Sales,
Jeany M. Florentino, and Shri B. Visaya (collectively, the petitioners)
against Atty. Elmer T. Bautista (Atty. Bautista), Chief Legal Counsel
and Atty. Winston F. Garcia (Atty. Garcia), General Manager
(respondents), both of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), for violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02,5 Canons 16 and 57 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the Attorney's
Oath.
Factual Background
The petitioners are public school teachers and members of the GSIS
residing in the provinces of Isabela and Ifugao.8 They alleged that
sometime in November 1998, marketing representatives of the GSIS
and the San Lorenzo Ruiz Realty and Development Corporation
(SLRRDC), namely Ferdinand Patajo, Levy Gonzales and Martina
Guerrero (Representatives), visited a number of public schools in the
provinces of Isabela and Ifugao, and enticed the teachers to avail of
SLRRDC's low-cost housing units in San Lorenzo Ruiz Subdivision
(the Subdivision) located at Marabulig I, Cauayan, Isabela based on
the following representations, to wit: (1) the Subdivision is financed
by the GSIS; (2) the housing units are available to the teachers at the
least cost, not exceeding ₱1,000.00 or ₱2,000.00 monthly, depending
on the teacher's capacity to pay; (3) the monthly amortizations are
payable on any convenient time of the year for the teachers, or after
five or 10 years; (4) there are no processing fees or downpayment; (5)
no salary deduction but only direct payments to the nearest GSIS
Branch Office; (6) when the housing units are ready for occupancy,
the teachers will receive a cash gift of ₱3,000.00 for the installation
of water and electricity facilities; (7) that the units are payable until
the teacher-buyer reaches 70 years old; (8) the units may not be
foreclosed until the 10th year for its payment; (9) in case a teacher-
buyer is unable to continue payment, he/she may sell his right to the
unit before it is foreclosed; and (10) that the Subdivision is fully
developed with first class amenities that blends with nature's finest,
such as: a) guarded entrance; b) concrete paved roads; c) perimeter
fence; d) street lights and street names; e) shady trees every three
meters; f) centralized water system; g) underground drainage; h)
clubhouse; i) tennis court; j) basketball court; k) children's
playground; and l) one perante orange tree per unit. The
Representatives boasted that the Subdivision will "set the standard of
fine living" where the teachers' "dreams are now a reality."9
The petitioners claimed that they were induced to sign blank forms to
supposedly reserve housing units in the Subdivision and were not
given the opportunity to review its contents due to the
Representatives' excuse of being in a hurry. The Representatives,
however, assured them that they will return with the filled-up forms
for the petitioners' inspection and final decision, and that more GSIS
personnel would meet them regarding the housing project and loan.
The petitioners highly relied on the said assurances by signing the
blank forms in contemplation of a good future investment.10
Apparently, none of the Representatives or any person from
SLRRDC or GSIS returned as promised for the supposed further
orientation and explanation on the housing project and loan.
Sometime in August 1999, the petitioners were aghast at their
respective salary deductions in the amount of ₱5,000.00 monthly for
an alleged housing loan from the GSIS. They complained that the
deduction left them with a measly ₱1,000.00 as "take home" pay. The
petitioners claimed that their signatures in the Authority to Deduct
were forged.11
In October 1999, Elvira Agcaoili of the GSIS Main Office visited
GSIS Cauayan, Isabela to invite the petitioners to a forum and
convinced them to go on with the housing loan on the premise that
the GSIS was after their welfare but to no avail. She agreed to stop
the salary deductions against the monthly pay of the petitioners by
cancelling the Deeds of Conditional Sale (DCS). She, however, told
them that it would take six months to do so. It was only in or about
August 2003 that the Notices of Cancellation12 were mostly sent to
them by the GSIS.13
In 2004, the petitioners received notices from the GSIS that they still
remain liable to pay for the accrued interests of the principal amount
of the housing loan. To their dismay, the value of the housing loans
reflected in their GSIS records ranged from ₱800,000.00 to more than
₱1,000,000.00 for a house and lot they allegedly never bought or
even saw, much less occupied. They were also directed to pay the
alleged arrears in order to stop the loans from further escalating in
interest and their retirement pay may not be even enough to settle
them.14
On January 19, 2004, Atty. Bautista issued a
Memorandum15 regarding the right of GSIS to retain ownership of
the subject housing units and to collect the purchase price thereof
through monthly salary deduction against the petitioners. In support
of the collection enhancement of the GSIS on the matter, the GSIS
Board of Trustees (BOT) passed Board Resolution No.
48.16 Accordingly, Atty. Garcia, as GSIS General Manager, enforced
and implemented the same by effecting salary deductions on the
monthly pay of the petitioners as public school teachers.17
The petitioners claimed that the allowance and implementation of the
collection on arrears on cancelled housing loans are tantamount to
double recovery for the GSIS.18 The respondents ought to know that
double recovery is not only prohibited by law, but it is also against
public policy and morals. The respondents, therefore, committed
serious infractions of the profession's ethical rules and put in question
their moral and continued fitness to remain as members of the legal
profession.19
In the Resolution20 dated March 7, 2007, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the complaint.
In compliance, Atty. Bautista commented21 that he rendered a legal
opinion on July 25, 2003, as former Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS
Legal Services Group, upon the request of Arnaldo Cuasay, the
Senior Vice President of the Housing and Real Property Development
Group, regarding the issue on whether the GSIS can collect
arrearages on a housing loan with a DCS that was cancelled vis-a-
vis Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6552 or the Maceda Law.22
The legal opinion of Atty. Bautista, in part, reads:
It is clear then that the law expressly recognizes the vendor's right of
cancellation of sale on installments with full retention of previous
payments only in commercial and industrial properties. The law does
not provide recovery of arrearages from the defaulting buyer in case
of cancellation of conditional sale of residential properties. On the
contrary, the refund of the cash surrender value of the payments on
the residential property to the buyer is mandated.
The application of said law in the case of Valarao vs. Court of
Appeals, x x x, is also clear when the Supreme Court held that "the
rescission of the contract and the forfeiture of the payments already
made could not be effected, because the case falls under [R.A.] No.
6552 x x x."23
He explained that he needed to re-study the matter because the GSIS
was unable to implement the cancellation of the DCS between
SLRRDC and the borrower/member (herein petitioners) to take
possession of the subject property through ejectment proceedings, or
to even recover its investment in the housing unit. Worse, the
awardees of the cancelled housing loans continually occupied the
housing units without paying their amortizations or any reasonable
rental fees.24 Hence, Atty. Bautista issued a new legal opinion which
provided for the collection of arrearages by the GSIS because of its
acquisition of all of SLRRDC's rights in the DCS and the Deed of
Absolute Sale and Assignment (DASA) by legal subrogation under
Article 130325 of the Civil Code. It was also provided therein that
allowing the borrower/member to go scot-free after the cancellation
of the DCS would be contrary to the principle of unjust enrichment
and solutio indebiti and at the same time repugnant to the mandate of
the GSIS to ensure collection or recovery of all indebtedness payable
in its favor.26
On March 10, 2004, the GSIS-BOT passed and approved Board
Resolution No. 48, as recommended by the Housing and Real
Property Development Group based on Atty. Bautista's memorandum
pursuant to Section 41(a)27 of R.A. No. 8291,28 which supported the
collection of arrearages on the cancelled housing loans through salary
deduction against the petitioners.29
In his Comment,30 Atty. Garcia averred that the disbarment complaint
against him constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of Board
Resolution No. 48. He discussed that a real property developer
obtains a loan from the GSIS then assigns its rights under a DASA in
favor of the latter. GSIS would then collect on the housing loan
through monthly amortizations from the member's salary through
monthly deduction. Title to the property would only transfer upon full
payment of the loan.31
To amplify his defense, he explained that the petitioners' non-
payment of the monthly amortizations resulted in the cancellation of
the DCS and that such rampant practice of non-payment prompted
the GSIS to devise a policy that would enhance its collection efforts
such as the assailed Board Resolution No. 48, which sought to collect
rental fees and not the purchase price of the housing units that were
occupied by the petitioners.32
As General Manager, he averred that it was his ministerial duty to
implement an official act of the GSIS-BOT which, under the law,
enjoys a presumption of validity. He further updated the petitioners
that Board Resolution ·No. 48 is no longer effective because it has
already been superseded by Board Resolution No. 125 which was
adopted by the GSIS-BOT on October 4, 2006 which significantly
reduced the amount of the rentals that had to be paid by the
petitioners due to non-accumulation of interests and surcharges in the
rentals due.33 Thus, the complaint for his disbarment is baseless and
futile.
In conclusion, the comments of the respondents criticized the
petitioners for resorting to a disbarment complaint as a wrong
remedy. Since the issue circulates on the issuance of Board
Resolution No. 48, they opined that the petitioners should have filed
a petition before the GSIS-BOT to question its validity pursuant to
Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No. 8291 which read:
SEC. 30. Settlement of Disputes. - The GSIS shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes arising under this Act and
any other laws administered by the GSIS.
xxxx
SEC. 31. Appeals. - Appeals from any decision or award of the Board
shall be governed by Rules 43 and 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure adopted by the Supreme Court on April 8, 1997 which will
take effect on July 1, 1997: Provided, That pending cases and those
filed prior to July 1, 1997 shall be governed by the applicable rules of
procedure: Provided, further, That the appeal shall take precedence
over all other cases except criminal cases when the penalty of life
imprisonment or death or reclusion perpetua is imposable.
The appeal shall not stay the execution of the order or award unless
ordered by the Board, by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme
Court and the appeal shall be without prejudice to the special civil
action of certiorari when proper.
In the Resolution34 dated July 9, 2007, the Court referred the case to
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Ruling of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation35 dated March 27, 2008, the IBP-
CBD, through Commissioner Hababag, found no merit in the
complaint because the disbarment suit constitutes an unwarranted and
improper collateral attack against the validity of Board Resolution
No. 48 which the GSIS-BOT adopted pursuant to its mandate; that
such collateral attack against an official act of the GSIS-BOT
infringes public interest and militates against the legal presumption
on the regularity of performance of an official duty; and, that the
petitioners failed to avail of the remedy of a petition in assailing the
resolution's validity before the GSIS-BOT as set forth in Sections 30
and 31 of R.A. No. 8921. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint was
recommended.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the Report of Commissioner Hababag through Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-267,36 as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that the complaint lacks
merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.37
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration38 reiterated the same
arguments raised in their complaint.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration through Board Resolution No. XIX-2011-499,39 as
follows:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY [the petitioners'] Motion for
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings
of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had
already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack
of substantial ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of
Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-2008-267 dated June 5, 2008 is
hereby AFFIRMED.40
Undaunted by the adverse decision of the IBP, the petitioners filed the
instant petition for review before the Court.1âwphi1
Ruling of the Court
The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.
The petitioners clarify that the instant administrative case is directed
against the fitness of the respondents as members of the legal
profession and not against the validity of Board Resolution No. 48.
They asseverate that the issuance of the memorandum by Atty.
Bautista which paved the way for the passage of Board Resolution
No. 48 and its implementation through the management of Atty.
Garcia were in blatant disregard and flagrant violation of Canon 1,
Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 5 of the CPR and the Attorney's Oath.
They further argue that the collection of arrears on the supposed
housing loans was a disguised payment of the purchase price of the
realties involved and, that the policy authorizing its collection was a
scheme to window-dress the huge financial losses suffered by GSIS
due to mismanagement.
Citing Article 138541 of the New Civil Code, the petitioners put to
fore the restoration of their prior position before the execution of the
housing contracts upon the cancellation of the DCS. This being so,
the GSIS cannot legally collect anything from them anymore as it has
retained possession and ownership of the subject properties.
The contention is untenable.
A careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint would show that
the issue hinges on the validity of Board Resolution No. 48 which
allowed GSIS to collect arrears for the cancelled housing loans. As
aptly found by the IBP Board of Governors, the controversy should
have been resolved in accordance with the GSIS Law as set forth in
Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No. 8291 which confers original and
exclusive jurisdiction on the GSIS on matters arising therefrom such
as in the instant case. The Court quotes the IBP-CBD Report and
Recommendation, to wit:
The disbarment suit is a[n] unwarranted and improper collateral
attack against the validity of a Board Resolution duly adopted by the
GSIS[-BOT] in accordance with its mandate. The complaint assails
the validity of Board Resolution No. 48.
A collateral attack against the official act of a duly mandated body
such as the GSIS[-BOT], will undermine public interest and will
militate against the legal presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed x x x[.]
A.C. No. 11043
[R.A. No.] 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997 provides a remedy for [the
petitioners]. Herein [petitioners ]/borrowers should have filed a
petition before the GSIS[-BOT] to question the validity of Board
Resolution No. 48. x x x.42
It should also be noted that Board Resolution No. 48 was passed to
enhance the collection efforts of the GSIS in view of its fiduciary
duty to its members regarding the GSIS funds. The assailed
memorandum issued by Atty. Bautista was an enhancement of the
collection efforts of the GSIS on delinquent accounts of members
who availed of housing loans. The cancellation of the DCS and the
cession of SLRRDC 's rights in favor of GSIS warranted such
collection upon the monthly salaries of the petitioners. There being
no administrative declaration of the resolution's invalidity, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Garcia to implement the same, as GSIS
President and General Manager, in accordance with his mandate
under Section 4543 of R.A. No. 8291. Any disobedience would hold
him liable under R.A. No. 301944 and the GSIS Charter.
As held in Arma v. Atty. Montevilla:45
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as
such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great
caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and member of the bar.
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent
of the charges proffered against him until the contrary is proved, and
that as an officer of the court, he has perfom1ed his duties in
accordance with his oath. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof is upon the complainant and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear,
convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Considering the serious
consequence of disbarment, this Court has consistently held that only
a clear preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition of such a
harsh penalty. It means that the record must disclose as free from
doubt a case that compels the exercise by the court of its disciplinary
powers. The dubious character of the act done, as well as the
motivation thereof, must be clearly demonstrated.46 (Citations
omitted)
It is well-settled that protection is afforded to members of the Bar
who are at times maliciously charged, not just by their clients.
Regrettably, the failure of the petitioners to discharge the burden that
the acts of the respondents-lawyers violated Canons 1 and 5, Rules
1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR and the Attorney's Oath warrants the
dismissal of the instant petition.
It should be noted that the focal point of the complaint for disbarment
against the respondents was the collection of arrears against the
monthly salaries of the petitioners to pay off housing loans. The
rampant collection problems which plagued the GSIS from housing
loans that were prevalently unpaid by its members resulted in the
influx of receivables and bad debts to the detriment of the GSIS fund.
The scenario geared the GSIS-BOT and the Management to enhance
its collection efforts as a result of which Atty. Bautista issued the
second memorandum regarding the legal right of the GSIS to demand
payment of the arrearages47 from the cancelled housing loans due to
delinquency, the issuance of Board Resolution No. 48, and the
implementation of the same through the management of Atty. Garcia.
Clearly, nothing from the acts of the respondents is deemed a
violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR, its Canon 5,
and the Attorney's Oath.
Lastly, the Court commiserates with the sad plight of the petitioners
who are among minimum-income earners highly depending on their
wages for their daily needs. Nonetheless, they still remain liable to
pay the arrears indicated in their GSIS records not only for failing to
discharge the burden of proving their allegations in the complaint but
also for resorting to a wrong remedy. Despite thereof, the new GSIS
Board Resolution No. 125 which replaced the assailed Board
Resolution No. 48 is deemed to have given them sufficient leeway
from payment because interests and surcharges will no longer
accumulate and put to a halt, as explained by Atty. Garcia. Therefore,
their chances of paying the balance of the housing loans would
become lighter and no longer that burdensome.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
LIANG FUJI, Complainant 

vs

ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ, Respondent
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Failure to exercise utmost prudence in reviewing the immigration records of an alien, which resulted in the alien's wrongful detention, opens the
special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration to administrative liability.
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 dated November 23, 2015 filed by Liang Fuji (Fuji) and his family, against Bureau of Immigration
Special Prosecutor Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz (Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz) for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law in relation to her
issuance of a Charge Sheet against Fuji for overstaying.
Through a letter2 dated December 8, 2015, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa directed the complainants to file a
verified complaint "with supporting documents duly authenticated and/or affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged"3 in
the complaint.
Complainants replied4 by furnishing this Court with copies of the Verified Petition to Reopen S.D. O. No. BOC-2015-357 (B.L.O. No. SBM- 15-420)
and for Relief of Judgment with Urgent Prayer for Immediate Consideration, and Administrative Complaint (Verified Petition and Administrative
Complaint),5 which Fuji filed with the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, and prayed that the same be treated as their verified
complaint. Complainants further informed this Court that they had difficulty obtaining certified true copies of the November 21, 2013 Order of the
Board of Commissioners, which granted Fuji's Section 9(g) visa, Summary Deportation Order dated June 17, 2015, and Warrant of Deportation from
the Bureau of Immigration personnel who just gave them the "run[-]around."6 They alleged that the Bureau of Immigration personnel were not
particularly helpful, and did not treat Fuji's case with urgency.7
The facts of this case show that in a Summary Deportation Order8 dated June 17, 2015, Fuji, a Chinese national, was ordered deported for
overstaying. From the Order, it appears that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz was the special prosecutor who brought the formal charge against Fuji and
another person upon her finding that Fuji's work visa had expired on May 8, 2013, with extension expired on December 6, 2013.9 Special Prosecutor
Dela Cruz found that Fuji had overstayed for one (1) year and six (6) months in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 37(a)(7).10 Her
investigation was triggered by a complaint-affidavit dated April 30, 2015 of a certain Virgilio Manalo alleging that Fuji and another person had
defrauded him.11
On June 29, 2015, Fuji filed his Motion for Reconsideration.12
On July 28, 2015, the Bureau of Immigration Intelligence Division served Fuji's Warrant of Deportation, and thereafter arrested him at Brgy.
Maloma, San Felipe, Zambales with the assistance from local police.13 Fuji was brought to and detained at the Bureau of Immigration Detention
Facility, National Capital Region Police Office, Taguig City.14
On October 9, 2015, the Board of Commissioners denied Fuji's Motion for Reconsideratios.15
On November 23, 2015, Fuji filed his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint.16 Subsequently, on March 10, 2016, Fuji filed an Omnibus
Motion to Reopen and Lift S.D.O. BOC-2015-357, and Release on Bail through counsel.17
On March 22, 2016, the Board of Commissioners issued a Resolution dismissing the deportation charge against Fuji on the ground that "[t]he records
show that Liang has a working visa valid until 30 April 2016 under Jiang Tuo Mining Philippines, Inc. as Marketing Liason."18 Fuji was directed to
be released from Bureau of Immigration-Warden's Facility on March 23, 2016.19
In his administrative complaint, Fuji alleged that his rights to due process were violated since he was not afforded any hearing or summary
deportation proceedings before the deportation order was issued against him.20 Fuji further alleged that Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz failed miserably
in discharging her duties because a simple initial review of the Bureau of Immigration records would have revealed that he was not overstaying
because his Section 9(g) work visa was valid until April 30, 2016.21
In her August 25, 2016 Comment,22 respondent Special Prosecutor Dela Cruz denied that she committed any grave misconduct.23 She claimed that
Fuji was accorded due process during the summary deportation proceedings.24 He was directed, through an Order dated May 14, 2015 of the Legal
Division, to submit his Counter-Affidavit/Memorandum, which he failed to do.25 Fuji was also able to file his motion for reconsideration and verified
petition to reopen the case.26
Respondent further claimed that the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of the Bureau of Immigration - Management Information System (BI-MIS)
constituted a substantial evidence of Fuji's overstay in the country, hence, her formal charge had legal basis.27
Respondent added that as a civil servant, she enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of her duties.28 She had no intention to violate
any law and did not commit any flagrant disregard of the rules, or unlawfully used her station to procure some benefit for herself or for other persons.
29 Respondent pointed out that the Ombudsman had in fact dismissed the complainant's charges against her.30 She added that Fuji stated in his March
29, 2016 Affidavit of Desistance that he had mistakenly signed some documents including the administrative complaint.31
We find respondent administratively liable for her negligence in her failure to ascertain the facts before levying the formal charge against
Fuji for overstaying.
I
Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in government service arising from their administrative
duties, and refers the complaint first either to the proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or employee
or the Ombudsman.32
For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales,33 this Court dismissed the disbarment complaint against former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez,
former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former
Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials being charged for actions involving their official
functions during their tenure, which should be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman.34 In that case, one (1) of the respondents sought to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a
counter-affidavit based on the same administrative complaint filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant.35
Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay,36 the Court dismissed the complaint against respondents - government lawyers in the
Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . . official functions in the
[Civil Service Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman."37 It would
seem that the complainant directly instituted a disbarment complaint with this Court instead of filing an administrative complaint before the proper
administrative body.
This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show that the Office of the Ombudsman had
previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of
Immigration, and considered the case closed.38
The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuji's petition to reopen his case and ordered his release. However, it was silent as to the culpability
of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji.
Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and the apparent inaction of the Bureau of
Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint, this Court considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there
is sufficient ground to discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary authority"39 over members of the legal profession.40
Contrary to respondent's stance, Fuji's purported Affidavit of Desistance is not sufficient cause to dismiss this administrative complaint. This Court
has previously held that proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same."41 The primary object of disciplinary proceedings is to determine the
fitness of a member to remain in the Bar. It is conducted solely for the public welfare,42 and the desistance of the complainant is irrelevant. What will
be decisive are the facts borne out by the evidence presented by the parties. In Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:43
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of
the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no
interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.44
II
Respondent Dela Cruz claimed that she issued the formal charge against Fuji for overstaying on the basis of the Memorandum dated June 4, 2015 of
the BI-MIS.45 A copy of the Memorandum with attachments was attached to respondent's Comment.46
However, nowhere in the Memorandum was it stated that Fuji "overstayed" or that "Liang's working visa expired on 8 May 2013 and his TVV
expired on 6 December 2013"47 as respondent claims. Relevant portions of the Memorandum read:

For : ATTY. GEMMA ARMI M. DELA CRUZ

From : ACTING CHIEF, MIS DIVISION

Re : REQUEST FOR IMMIGRATION STATUS; VISA EXTENSION PAYMENT, LATEST

TRAVEL AND DEROGATORY OF THE FOLLOWING:
1. MR.IMS. LIANG FUJI
2. MR./MS. CHEN XIANG HE
3. MR.IMS. JACKY CHANG HE

Date : 04 June 2015

#
Further to your request for verification of Immigration Status; Visa Extension Payment and TRAVEL
RECORD/S, please find the result/s as follows:
...

Resul : 1. LIANG FUJI

t/s - Derogatory Record Not Found
- Latest Travel Record Found (Please see the attached files for your ready
reference. NOTE:
DOB: 18 October 1991)
- Immigration Status Found
- Latest Payment Record Found in BI-Main (Please see the attached files for
your ready reference. NOTE: DOB: 18 October 1991)48
The Memorandum merely transmitted copies of immigration records showing details of filing of applications, such as official receipts, - and travel
record of Fuji. It was respondent Dela Cruz who made the determination that Fuji overstayed on the basis of the documents transmitted to her by the
BI-MIS.
Among the documents transmitted by the BI-MIS were computer print-outs showing details of official receipts dated June 14, 2013, August 7, 2013,
and November 19, 2013 for temporary visitor visa extension and official receipt dated July 15, 2013 for an application for change of immigration
status. Also, the travel records of Fuji show the following details:

Date & Time : 4 June 2015 3:05 PM

Verifier : DIMARUCOT J

Database : TRAVEL-ARRIVAL

TRAVEL DATE TRAVEL FLIGHT IMMIG PORT OFFICER ACTION REMARKS

TIME NO. STATUS

10- 11:34PM CZ377 9G NAIAI MIJARES ALLOWED

FEBRUARY-201
4
06- 11:51PM CZ377 9A NAIAI PARANGUE ALLOWED
JANUARY-2012

22- l 1:25PM CZ377 9A NAIAI NUNEZ ALLOWED49

SEPTEMBER-2
011

Fuji's travel records as of June 4, 2015, show his arrival in the Philippines on February 10, 2014 under a work visa immigration status.50 Simple
prudence dictates that respondent Atty. Dela Cruz should have verified whether or not the July 15, 2013 application for change of status had been
approved by the Bureau of Immigration Commissioners, especially since she had complete and easy access to the immigration records.
Respondent failed in the performance of her basic duties. Special prosecutors in the Bureau of Immigration should exercise such degree of vigilance
and attention in reviewing the immigration records, whenever the legal status and documentation of an alien are at issue. For while a deportation
proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, it is however, a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person.511âwphi1
Respondent was expected to be reasonably thorough in her review of the documents transmitted to her by the BI-MIS, especially as it may ultimately
result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective deportee. She should not have simply relied on the handwritten note by a personnel from the BI-
MIS at the bottom portion of the receipt dated November 19, 2013 for 9A visa extension stating "Valid until: 06-Dec-2013." Had she inquired further,
she would have discovered that Fuji's application dated July 15, 2013 for conversion from temporary visitor visa (9A) to work visa (9G) was
approved by the Board of Commissioners on November 21, 2013 - or one (1) year and seven (7) months earlier - with validity until April 30, 2016.
Thus, even if Fuji's temporary visitor (9A) visa had expired on December 6, 2013 his stay in the country was still valid under the 9G work VISa.
Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of her duties as a
government official.52 However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of her oath as a lawyer and the Code of
Professional Responsibility,53 then she may be subject to disciplinary sanction by this Court.1avvphi1
Atty. Dela Cruz failed to observe Rule 18.03 of the Code of the Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." As a special prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration,
she is the representative, not of any private party, but of the State. Her task was to investigate and verify facts to determine whether a ground for
deportation exists, and if further administrative action - in the form of a formal charge - should be taken against an alien.
Had respondent carefully reviewed the records of Fuji, she would have found out about the approval of Fuji's application, which would negate her
finding of overstaying. Because of her negligence, Fuji was deprived of his liberty for almost eight (8) months, until his release on March 23, 2016.
Simple neglect of duty is defined as a failure to, give attention to a task due to carelessness or indifference.54 In this case, respondent's negligence
shows her indifference to the fundamental right of every person, including aliens, to due process and to the consequences of her actions.
Lawyers in government service should be more conscientious with their professional obligations consistent with the time-honored principle of public
office being a public trust.55 The ethical standards under the Code of Professional Responsibility are rendered even more exacting as to government
lawyers because they have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics, competence, and professionalism in
public service.56 In this case, respondent's negligence evinces a failure to cope with the strict demands and high standards of public service and the
legal profession.
The appropriate sanction is discretionary upon this Court.57 Under the Civil Service Rules,58 the penalty for simple neglect of duty is suspension for
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. In previous cases,59 this Court imposed the penalty of suspension of three (3) months to six (6)
months for erring lawyers, who were negligent in handling cases for their clients. We find appropriate the penalty of suspension of three (3) months
considering the consequence of respondent's negligence. This suspension includes her desistance from performing her functions as a special
prosecutor in the Bureau of Immigration.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz 1s SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months.
The respondent, upon receipt of this Resolution, shall immediately serve her suspension. She shall formally manifest to this Court that her suspension
has started, and copy furnish all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where she has entered her appearance, within five (5) days upon receipt of this
Resolution. Respondent shall also serve copies of her manifestation on all adverse parties in all the cases she entered her formal appearance.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be attached to Atty. Gemma Armi M. Dela Cruz's personal record.
Copies of this Resolution should also be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its proper disposition, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

A.C. No. 8658

FRANCIS C. ARSENIO, Complainant 

vs.

ATTY. JOHAN A. TABUZO, Respondents
DECISION
TIJAM, J.:
Before this Court is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated June 18, 2010 filed by Francis C. Arsenio (Arsenio), seeking the disbarment of Atty. Johan A.
Tabuzo (Atty. Tabuzo) for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

The Facts
This case stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Arsenio before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against JS
Contractor, a recruitment agency.2 During a scheduled hearing on May 10, 2000, Atty. Tabuzo, the Overseas Employment Adjudicator who was
assigned to hear the case, asked him to sign three blank sheets of paper to which Arsenio complied.
A week after the scheduled hearing, Arsenio asked Atty. Tabuzo the reason why he was made to sign blank sheets of paper. Atty. Tabuzo angrily
said, "Bwiset! Napakakulit mo, doon mo malaman mamaya pagdating.ng kalaban mo!" Thereafter, Arsenio called up the office of Senator Rene
Cayetano who advised him to make a clarification regarding the signed sheets of blank paper. Arsenio then approached Atty. Tabuzo but the latter
again shouted at him saying, "Bwiset! Goddamit! Alam mo ba na maraming abogado dito sa POEA na nagbebenta ng kaso?" Atty. Tabuzo further
said, "Sabihin mo sa Cayetano mo at abogado mo na baka masampal ko sa mga mukha nila ang pinirmahan mong blanko! Sabihin mo na ang
pangalan ko ay Atty. Romeo Tabuzo at kung hindi ka bumalik bukas ay mawawala ang kaso mo!"3
Arsenio later on discovered that his case against JS Contractor was dismissed. Hence, he filed a complaint against Atty. Romeo Tabuzo before the
Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. "
In a Resolution4 dated February 1, 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II Wilfred Pascasio ordered that an Information be filed against Atty. Romeo
Tabuzo upon finding of probable cause against him.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging, among others, that there is no Atty. Romeo Tabuso in the POEA and that he was never
handed any copy of summons. He claimed that he was merely taking the initiative in filing the said motion to clear his name as he believed he was
the person referred to in the earlier Order of the Office of the Ombudsman. Nonetheless, such motion was subsequently denied in an Order dated July
16, 2002.
Meanwhile, in a Decision dated December 6, 2011, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City acquitted Atty. Tabuzo for violation
of RA No. 3019.1âwphi1
Subsequently, Arsenio filed the present Complaint-Affidavit before this Court. In a Resolution 5 dated November 24, 2010, this Court referred the
case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBPCBD)
docketed the case as CBD Case No. 11-2912, entitled "Francis C. Arsenio v. Atty. Johan Tabuzo ".
In his Omnibus Comment with Motion to Dismiss,6 Atty. Tabuzo denied the accusations against him, claiming that the alleged unethical acts are
baseless. He averred that he had never acted in any conduct unbecoming of a public officer or uttered invectives and other alleged acts. To support his
claim, he attached the Affidavits7 of two (2) Overseas Employment Adjudicators (OEA) who occupied the tables immediately adjacent to him in the
Recruitment Regulations Branch. In said Affidavits, the OEAs attested to the effect that no such incident or any untoward event that called for
attention transpired. Atty. Tabuzo also said that his constitutional right to due process was violated since he was not notified of the case against him
before the Office of the Ombudsman as he was never served nor had personally received Orders from such Office.

The Resolutions of the IBP Commissioner and Board of Governors

In his Report and Recommendation, 8 Investigating Commissioner Atty. Eldrid Antiquierra recommended that reprimand be imposed upon Atty.
Tabuzo. The Investigating Commissioner ruled in such wise on the basis of the sworn affidavit of Arsenio and the Resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification the said Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner upon finding that Atty. Tabuzo violated the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 8.01 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, the IBP Board of Governors suspended Atty. Tabuzo from the practice of law for three months.
Atty. Tabuzo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. 10

The Issue
Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Tabuzo.

The Court's Ruling

After examining the records of this case, the Court resolves to dismiss the instant disbarment complaint.
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks
of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. 11
Jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. 12 In the recent case
of Reyes v. Nieva, 13 this Court had the occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is substantial evidence.
In this case, noteworthy is the fact that the reason advanced by the IBP-CBD in recommending reprimand against Atty. Tabuzo is its consideration of
the: (1) Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, which states that there was probable cause against Atty. Tabuzo for violating RA 3019;
and (2) Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio, which alleges that Atty. Tabuzo made offensive statements.
However, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented reveals that the degree of proof indispensable in a disbarment case was not met.
Firstly, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman is predicated on the fact that the allegations of Arsenio were uncontroverted; hence,
the Office of the Ombudsman concluded that such allegations were true.
However, there was a seeming discrepancy as to the name of Atty. Tabuzo when a case against him was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Undisputedly, the case before said Office was filed against a certain Atty. Romeo Tabuso, when the name of herein respondent is Atty. Johan Tabuzo.
As such, the respondent claimed that he failed to controvert Arsenio' s claims because he never received any notice or order from the Office of the
Ombudsman. In fact, the said Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was made on the basis of the complaint of Arsenio alone since Atty.
Tabuzo failed to file his answer. 14 However, a reading of the RTC Decision reveals that Arsenio was able to verify the identity of Atty. Johan Tabuzo,
not as Atty. Romeo Tabuso, even before he filed his complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman. It is confusing, therefore, why there was
discrepancy as to the name of herein respondent when a clarification was already made. Nevertheless, Atty. Tabuzo was acquitted15 in a criminal case
filed against him on the basis of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Despite such acquittal, a well-settled finding of guilt in a criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case.
Conversely, the acquittal does not necessarily exculpate one administratively. 16Thus, it is proper to deal with the other evidence presented by
Arsenio.
The Court, thus, finds that the Complaint-Affidavit of Arsenio failed to discharge the necessary burden of proof. In his Sworn Affidavit, Arsenio
merely narrated that Atty. Tabuzo uttered offensive statements and no other evidence was presented to substantiate his claim. Emphatically, such
Complaint-Affidavit is self-serving.
Summarily, the Resolution issued by the Office of the Ombudsman together with the Affidavit of Arsenio cannot be considered as substantial
evidence. For one, the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman was decided on the basis of the failure of Atty. Tabuzo to controvert the
allegations of Arsenio. Also, the Complaint-Affidavit was not sufficient as no evidence was further offeted to prove the allegations contained therein.
While the quantum of evidence required in disbarment cases is substantial evidence, this Court is not persuaded to exercise its disciplinary authority
over Atty. Tabuzo.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolved to DISMISS the disbarment complaint against Atty. Johan A. Tabuzo.




[ AC. No. 7253, Aug 29, 2017 ]

ATTY. PLARIDEL C. NAVA II v. PROSECUTOR OFELIA M. D. ARTUZ +

PER CURIAM:
For resolution are the two (2) consolidated cases filed by complainant Atty. Plaridel C. Nava II (Nava) against respondent then Prosecutor, now
Presiding Judge, Ofelia M. D. Artuz (Artuz) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City, Branch 5, (MTCC, Br. 5): (a) A.C. No. 7253 that
sought to disbar Artuz, then a Prosecutor at the time of the filing of the petition; and (b) A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-1911-
MTJ) that sought to nullify the nomination and appointment of Artuz as Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Br. 5, for being patently illegal, improper, and
irregular.




The Facts


A.C. No. 7253



In the Petition for Disbarment[1] dated February 10, 2006 (disbarment case), Nava claimed that on July 28, 2005, he filed a Request for Inhibition and
Re-raffle[2] of his client's case before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City on the ground that he and Artuz, as then the assigned prosecutor
handling his client's case, are not in good terms because they are adversaries in various administrative and criminal cases.[3] In response to his
request, Artuz filed her comment,[4] where she willfully and viciously maligned, insulted, and scorned him and his father, who is not a party to the
case;[5] thus, Nava asserted that Artuz violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) that enjoins lawyers to conduct themselves
with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward their colleagues in the profession.[6] He added that Artuz: (a) made malicious and false accusations in her
comment when she accused him of crimes which are baseless and purely conjectural; (b) had maliciously filed criminal cases against him, along with
others, before the Department of Justice (DOJ) intended to harass, annoy, vex, and humiliate him; and (c) had maligned her former superior and
colleague, City Prosecutor Efrain V. Baldago,[7] which acts constitute grave misconduct and are violative of the CPR and of Republic Act No. (RA)
6713.[8]



In a Resolution[9] dated August 2, 2006, the Court referred the disbarment case to the DOJ for appropriate action.



Meanwhile, record shows that Nava filed before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) an opposition[10] dated January 4, 2006, to the application for
judgeship of Artuz. Notwithstanding, Artuz was appointed on September 28, 2006[11] and took her Oath of Office as Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
Br. 5 on October 9, 2006.[12] Thus, the record of the disbarment case was retrieved from the DOJ[13] and referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.[14]



A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717



In the petition[15] for nullification of the nomination and appointment of Artuz as Presiding Judge of MTCC, Br. 5 filed on October 17, 2006
(nullification case), Nava alleged that Artuz is unfit and incompetent to be appointed as a trial judge as she faces "several criminal and administrative
cases, the nature of which involves her character, competence, probity, integrity and independence which should not have been disregarded in her
application to the judiciary."[16] These cases are: (a) four (4) disbarment cases - A.C. No. 6605 filed by a certain Zenaida Ramos, A.C. No. 7253 filed
by him, a case filed by a certain Julieta Laforteza on July 11, 2006,[17] and another filed by a certain Herminia Dilla on November 9, 2005; (b) four (4)
criminal cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) - OMB-V-C-06-0218-D, OMB-V-C-06-0219-D, OMB-V-C-06-220-
D, and OMB-V-C-06-221-D; and (c) one (1) criminal case - I.S. No. 2175-05, and one (1) administrative case filed on October 23, 2003, both
pending before the DOJ.[18]



Nava reiterated that during her incumbency as a public prosecutor, Artuz received numerous judicial fines and admonition for tardiness, absences
without prior notice, and lack of interest to prosecute cases. In fact, some of the cases she handled were dismissed due to her dismal performance.
[19] Further, Nava narrated specific incidents showing Artuz's character as vindictive, oppressive, and discourteous.[20]



In her defense,[21] Artuz alleged that the nullification case is a desperate retaliatory move on Nava's part because of the disbarment case she filed
against him, where he was found guilty of gross misconduct and suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.[22] She claimed
that the charges filed against her were already dismissed or outrightly not given due course.[23] She thus prayed that the nullification case be
dismissed, since she met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for a judicial position.[24]



Meanwhile, on October 19, 2006, the OCA wrote separate letters for the DOJ and the Ombudsman, requesting information as to the date of filing and
status of the criminal and administrative cases filed against Artuz before their respective offices, and whether she has been duly notified thereof.[25]



In a letter[26] dated January 29, 2007, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Anthony D. Fadullon, stated that it only learned of
the criminal cases filed against then Prosecutor Artuz through Regional State Prosecutor Domingo J. Laurea, Jr. (RSP Laurea). The latter furnished
said office of copy of his 2nd Indorsement[27] dated March 16, 2006, forwarding the records of the cases to Officer-in-Charge Virginia Palanca-
Santiago of the Deputy Ombudsman's Office (OIC Santiago), due to RSP Laurea's inhibition from the said cases. As regards the administrative cases
filed against Artuz, in her capacity as then public prosecutor, the DOJ stated that there was already a draft resolution as of October 2005; its contents,
however, could not, at that time, be disclosed as it was still subject for review by the Office of the DOJ Secretary.



On the other hand,[28] in a letter dated November 22, 2006 (which the OCA-Legal Office received only on September 4, 2007), OIC Santiago
informed the OCA that OMB-V-C-06-0218-D, OMB-V-C-06-0219-D, OMB-V-C-06-0220-D, and OMB-V-C-06-0221-D, all entitled "Herminia
Dilla v. Ofelia Artuz," were received by the Ombudsman on March 24, 2006; that Artuz was notified of the three (3) cases wherein she filed her
counter-affidavit and position paper; and that two (2) of the cases are pending resolution, while the other two (2) were already forwarded to
the Tanodbayan for appropriate action.



On February 27, 2007, the OCA requested[29] from the Secretary of the JBC a certified copy of Artuz's Personal Data Sheet (PDS),[30]which she
submitted relative to her application to the judiciary. On March 13, 2007, then Clerk of Court and Ex Officio JBC Secretary Ma. Luisa D. Villarama
forwarded to the OCA the application documents of Artuz on file with the JBC, including the latter's PDS subscribed and sworn to on October 28,
2005 (October 28, 2005 PDS).[31]



In a Memorandum[32] dated October 3, 2007, the OCA noted that the nullification case is deemed mooted by Artuz's appointment to the judiciary, but
nonetheless opined that the Court can review her appointment, pursuant to its administrative supervision powers under Section 6, Article VIII of the
Constitution.[33] Thus, it recommended that Artuz "be [directed] to show cause within ten (10) days from receipt of notice why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her for not disclosing in her [October 28, 2005 PDS] filed with the JBC the fact that she has been formally charged and that
she has pending criminal, administrative and disbarment cases."[34]



The Court adopted the OCA's recommendation in a Resolution[35] dated November 28, 2007.



On February 7, 2008,[36] Artuz filed her Compliance[37] to the November 28, 2007 Resolution, alleging that the disbarment case against her has
already been dismissed by the Court on December 6, 2007.[38] She likewise denied the accusations against her and claimed that she will never
exchange her thirty-one (31) years of government service by perjuring her records, much less her PDS. Finally, she reiterated that she had complied
with all the requirements of the JBC and possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for the appointment to the judiciary.[39] The
Court referred her compliance to the OCA for evaluation, report, and recommendation.[40]



In a Resolution[41] dated August 20, 2008, the Court, upon the recommendation of the OCA in its Memorandum[42] dated July 11, 2008, resolved to:
(a) consider as unsatisfactory her compliance with the Court's November 28, 2007 show cause Resolution for her failure to sufficiently explain why
no disciplinary action should be taken against her for not disclosing in her October 28, 2005 PDS the fact that she has been formally charged; (b) re-
docket the complaint as a regular administrative matter, i.e., A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717; and refer the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (RTC) for further investigation.



During the investigation, Artuz reiterated her previous allegations that the nullification case is frivolous, malicious, and a harassment citing her
complaint for disbarment against Nava which resulted in the latter's suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.[43] Artuz
presented: (1) a Certification[44] dated January 30, 2007 issued by the DOJ, certifying that she has no pending administrative case; (2) a
Certification[45] dated June 15, 2004 issued by the Ombudsman, stating that she has no pending criminal and administrative cases; and (3) the Court's
Resolution[46] dated November 21, 2005, noting the dismissal of her disbarment case.



On February 16, 2011, the Court, on Artuz's motion,[47] relieved Executive Judge (EJ) Antonio M. Natino from investigating the matter and directed
First Vice EJ Danilo P. Galvez (EJ Galvez), RTC, Iloilo City to continue with the investigation.[48]



In his Investigation Report[49] dated September 30, 2014, EJ Galvez submitted that Artuz missed the point of the administrative matter as she failed to
explain why she omitted or falsely answered the subject questions in her October 28, 2005 PDS submitted before the JBC.[50] He noted that, while a
disbarment case filed against her had been pending before the DOJ since October 23, 2003, Artuz nonetheless did not answer the PDS question
requiring disclosure of any pending case or complaint filed against her. Worse, she answered "NO" when asked whether she had been charged with,
convicted of, or sanctioned for violation of any law, decree, ordinance, or regulation, or otherwise found guilty of an administrative offense in the
same PDS.[51] In another PDS[52] dated November 6, 2006, which she filed before the Office of the Administrative Services-OCA (OAS-OCA), Artuz
likewise answered "NO" to the question "Have you ever been formally charged?."[53] EJ Galvez opined that Artuz omitted and falsely answered these
questions purposely to deceive the JBC which was then deliberating on her application.[54]



In a Resolution[55] dated February 23, 2015, the Court referred the September 30, 2014 Investigation Report of EJ Galvez to the OCA for evaluation,
report, and recommendation.




The OCA's Evaluation and Recommendation



In the Memorandum[56] dated November 3, 2015 issued in A.M. MTJ-08-1717, the OCA recommended that Artuz be found guilty of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of Public Documents, and accordingly be dismissed from service effective immediately.[57]



The OCA agreed with EJ Galvez's observation that Artuz not only missed the point of the investigation, but also the opportunity to explain her side as
to why she did not disclose in her two (2) PDS - submitted on October 28, 2005 and November 6, 2006 (subject PDS) - the material fact that she had
been formally charged.[58] To the OCA, Artuz deliberately lied in her answers in the subject PDS to conceal the truth and make it appear that she is
qualified for a judgeship position to which she was eventually appointed.[59] Had she disclosed this material fact, the JBC would have surely
disqualified her from nomination for judgeship based on its rules. Her act of making an obviously false statement in her two (2) PDS is a clear
indication that she does not deserve any position in the judiciary.[60] Worse, she repeatedly disregarded the Court's directives to show cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for not disclosing in the subject PDS the fact that she had been formally charged and that she had
pending criminal, administrative, and disbarment cases.[61]



In this light, the OCA held that Artuz's act of making untruthful statements in her two (2) PDS amounts to dishonesty and falsification of an official
document which carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government service.



In the interim, the OCA, in a Memorandum[62] dated August 7, 2014 issued in A.C. No. 7253, recommended that A.C. No. 7253 (disbarment case) be
consolidated with A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 (nullification case), which the Court adopted in a Resolution[63] dated June 17, 2015.




The Issues Before the Court



The essential issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not Artuz is guilty of: (a) Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of official
document for her failure to disclose in the subject PDS the material fact that she had been formally charged; and (b) Grave Misconduct and violating
the CPR and RA 6713.




The Court's Ruling



The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA in A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717 that Judge Artuz is guilty of Grave Misconduct,
Dishonesty, and Falsification of official document for her false statements in her two (2) PDS and for her willful defiance of Court directives.



Misconduct has been defined as any unlawful conduct, on the part of the person concerned with the administration of justice, prejudicial to the rights
of the parties or to the right determination of the cause.[64] It implies wrongful, improper, or unlawful conduct, not a mere error of judgment,
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, although it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent, and must have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.[65]



On the other hand, dishonesty has been defined as "intentionally making a false statement on any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice
any deception or fraud in securing his examination, appointment, or registration. [It] is a serious offense which reflects a person's character and
exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his honor, virtue, and integrity. It is a malevolent act that has no place in the judiciary, as no other
office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an employee than a position in the judiciary."[66]



Proceeding from these definitions, the Court agrees that Artuz deliberately and calculatedly lied in her answers to the subject questions in her two (2)
PDS to conceal the truth and make it appear that she is qualified for the judgeship position which she now holds. Indeed, it is inconceivable for her
not to have been aware of any of the pending cases against her since an administrative case filed against her had been pending before the DOJ since
October 23, 2003, or long before she submitted her application with the JBC.[67] Had she disclosed this material fact in her October 28, 2005 PDS, the
JBC may have disqualified her from nomination for judgeship, or disregarded her application. Because of this intentional omission, the judiciary may
have lost someone truly deserving of the judgeship post. Moreover, when she filed her November 6, 2006 PDS, Artuz was already clearly aware of
the pending charges against her before the Ombudsman, i.e., OMB-V-C-06-0219-D, OMB-V-C-06-0220-D, and OMB-V-C-06-0221-D, all of which
appear to have been filed, at most, in the early part of 2006, and received[68] by the Ombudsman on March 24, 2006 through the March 16, 2006
Indorsement of RSP Laurea.[69] In several cases, the Court has held that a duly accomplished PDS is an official document and any false statements
made in one's PDS is ultimately connected with one's employment in the government. An employee making false statement in his or her PDS
becomes liable for falsification.[70]



Artuz, as a member of the Bar, is presumed to be a learned individual, who knew, and is in fact expected to know, exactly what the subject questions
called for, what they mean, and what repercussions will befall her should she make false declarations thereon. Obviously, she knew that she was
committing an act of dishonesty, but nonetheless decided to proceed with this action, in her October 28, 2005 PDS, and even tenaciously repeated the
same in her November 6, 2006 PDS submitted after she had been appointed to the judiciary.



Worse, notwithstanding the several opportunities given to her (through her May 28, 2007 and February 6, 2008 compliances and during the
investigation of the nullification case), Artuz did not explain, in disregard of the Court's directive, why no disciplinary action should be taken against
her for not disclosing in the subject PDS the fact that she has been formally charged and has pending cases. Instead, she attempted to wriggle her way
out of her predicament by maintaining that the cases against her had been dismissed or outrightly not given due course. She even argued and insisted
that these charges were motivated by ill will and were initiated for the purpose of humiliating her and putting her under public contempt and ridicule.
Finally, she adamantly denied committing perjury in her PDS and insisted that she has all of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
appointment to the judiciary.



In this regard, EJ Galvez aptly observed that Artuz indeed missed the point of the investigation.[71] Whether or not the cases were already dismissed
and whatever motive impelled the complainants and petitioners to file these cases against her were completely irrelevant as the questions: "Is there
any pending civil, criminal or administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending in any court, prosecution office, or
any other office, agency or instrumentality of the government or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?" "Have you ever been charged with or
convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal, or any other
government office, agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in foreign country, or found guilty of an administrative [offense] or imposed any
administrative sanction?" (in the October 28, 2005 PDS),[72] and "Have you ever been formally charged?" (in the November 6, 2006 PDS)[73] simply
called for information on cases filed against her at any time in the past or in the present, regardless of their current status, i.e., whether decided,
pending, or dismissed/denied for any reason. To note, jurisprudence[74] elucidates that a person shall be considered formally charged when:


(1) In administrative proceedings — (a) upon the filing of a complaint at the instance of the disciplining authority; or (b) upon the finding of the
existence of a prima facie case by the disciplining authority, in case of a complaint filed by a private person.



(2) In criminal proceedings — (a) upon the finding of the existence of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor and the consequent filing of an
information in court with the required prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the
Ombudsman or his deputy; (b) upon the finding of the existence of probable cause by the public prosecutor or by the judge in cases not requiring a
preliminary investigation nor covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure; or (c) upon the finding of cause or ground to hold the accused for trial
pursuant to Section 13 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.[75]
Without a doubt, Artuz had been formally charged under both contexts and yet, chose to conceal the same in her PDS, for which she should be held
administratively liable.



Time and again, the Court has emphasized that a judge should conduct himself or herself in a manner which merits the respect and confidence of the
people at all times, for he or she is the visible representation of the law.[76] Having been a public prosecutor and now a judge, it is her duty to ensure
that all the laws and rules of the land are followed to the letter. Judge Artuz's dishonesty, and tenacity to commit the same, misled the JBC and
tarnished the image of the judiciary. Her act of making false statements in her PDS is reprehensible, depraved, and unbecoming of the exalted
position of a judge.



All told, Artuz committed Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of official document warranting the penalty of dismissal from service.
Under Sections 46 (A)[77] and 52 (a),[78] Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[79](RRACCS), in relation to
Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292,[80] Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification
of official document are grave offenses that carry the extreme penalty of dismissal from service for the first offense, with cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for holding public office.[81]



In this regard, the Court invites attention to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC,[82] entitled "Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar" Under this rule, the administrative case
against a judge for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification — which are also grounds for the disciplinary action against members of the Bar
- are automatically considered as disciplinary proceedings against him or her as a member of the Bar. This is the proper course for the Court to take
as a violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct, embodied in the new Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the CPR:


CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.



Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.



CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION x x x.



CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.



Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.



CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.[83]
Artuz's misconduct likewise constitutes a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which enjoins a judge, at the pain of
disbarment or suspension, from committing acts of deceit or for willfully disobeying the orders of the Court:


Section 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphases supplied)
Membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench; his or her moral fitness as a judge also reflects her moral fitness as a
lawyer. Thus, a judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates her oath as a lawyer.[84]



In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby requires Artuz to show cause why she should not likewise be suspended, disbarred, or otherwise proceeded
against, as a member of the Bar.



As regards A.C. No. 7253, the record does not show that Artuz had been given an opportunity to defend and answer the allegations against her for
Grave Misconduct and violations of the CPR and RA 6713. The Court, therefore, finds it proper to require Artuz to file her comment before it takes
action on this disbarment case.



Accordingly, the Court hereby requires Artuz, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice, to show cause why she should not be
suspended, disbarred, or otherwise proceeded against, as a member of the Bar for her actions in A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717, and file her Comment in
A.C. No. 7253.



WHEREFORE, the Court resolves the following:



In A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717: the Court finds Ofelia M. D. Artuz (Artuz), Presiding Judge of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 5, Iloilo
City, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Falsification of official documents. Accordingly, she is DISMISSED from service effective
immediately, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, without prejudice to her criminal liabilities.



She is likewise REQUIRED to SHOW CAUSE within fifteen (15) days from notice why she should not be disbarred, specifically for her apparent
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Canon 7, Rule 10.01, Canon 10, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in this Decision.



In A.C. No. 7253: Artuz is REQUIRED to file her COMMENT to the Petition for Disbarment within fifteen (15) days from notice.