Review: 13

Reviewed Work(s):
Les Structures elementaires de la Parente. by Claude Levi-Strauss
Audrey I. Richards

Man, Vol. 52. (Jan., 1952), pp. 12-13.

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NOS. 12, 13 Man
of displaced persons. Unfortunately the argument for catastrophic
droughts, which cannot be demonstrated by palzobotany, depends
almost entirely upon the contention of the first section, the existence
in parts of Europe of dry-land houses at two distinct periods, upon
ground later submerged. In a final chapter the author applies to a
sketch of Wiirttemberg his New Picture of Prehistory.
N. K. SANDARS
Les Structures klkmentaires de la Parentk. By Claude Lkvi-
13 Strauss. Paris (Presses Universitaires de France), 1949. Pp.
xiv, 639. Rice 12oo/,ancs
This book strikes an English reader as the most im-
portant contribution made by a French anthropologist since the
war. It is built on what might be called classical lines. It is a volume
of over 600 closely written pages containing material drawn from
an enormous number of primitive societies after the manner of the
earlier anthropologists. It deals with incest, exogamy, preferential
marriages and kinship terminology-subjects which have been the
first and the most continuous preoccupation of anthropologists since
the middle of the nineteenth century. It has a major thesis, closely
reasoned and logically presented, which the author believes to be
universally, or at any rate widely, applicable. Les Structures 414tnen-
taires de la Parent4 has thus much of the scope and sweep of works
w h c h formed the foundations of anthropology, although it is of
course based on the more detailed type of structural analysis pro-
duced by modern fieldwork, and on a number of new theoretical
concepts, sociological and psychological.
Ltvi-Strauss sets out to explain the reason for the rules which
universally govern mating in human societies and he includes under
this heading incest, exogamy, preferential marriages, marriage
classes and marriage by exchange. He discusses and rejects previous
explanations of the phenomenon of incest and substitutes his own
view, which is, roughly speaking, that the rules of incest and exo-
g'amy are best considered as positive injunctions rather than as
prohibitions. They are laws which debar a man from marrying one
set of women, only to make it obliga'tory on society to give him
rights over other women. The prohibitions on marriage with the
mother, sisters and clan sisters are, from this point of view, no more
than injunctions to give the mother, sisters and clan sisters to other
men. To LCvi-Strauss marriage prohibitions are in fact an instance
of the phenomenon of reciprocity in goods and services which is
one of the nlost common and most elementary ways of distributing
scarce assets. Women are the 'supreme good' and the most pro-
ductive of all assets in societies of this type, and it is for this reason
that reciprocal obligations in marriage are characteristic of the most
primitive societies. As a man at this level of culture is willing to give
up meat from the buck he has killed to his fellows in order to secure
the right to claim meat from these Illen on other occasions, so he
consents to give up access to his own women in return for the as-
surance of access to a much larger group of women belonging to
another group. Incest rules 'freeze' women in their own families so
that the division of the females is done under the control of family
and lineage groups; and to Lkvi-Strauss, as indeed to Freud, these
regulations are the first distinction between thc society of animals,
here called 'nature,' and that of man, 'culture.'
The writer thus applies the concept of reciprocity in social rela-
tions, elaborated on the basis of Melanesian and Polynesian field-
work by Malinowski and Firth and in a series of theoretical articles
by Mauss, to explain the rules governing the disposal of women. He
bases his argument not only on economic and sociological grounds
as do these authors, but also on psychological factors. It is economi-
cally profitable to exchange scarce goods, but it also corresponds to
a universal psychological desire. The smallest children try to express
their power by giving presents to others and seek to win security
by offering gifts which pledge their parents to return them love. It
is a psychological fact too that human beings are ready to give up
precious assets if their neighbours are obliged to give them up too.
Ltvi-Strauss even suggests that there is something special in the
exchange of women, since women represent food to the early
consciousness of the child. (He here quotes arguments which I
developed in Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe, but drives them
further than I would myself.) He elaborates more familiar arguments
JANUARY, 1952
when he describes the more directly sociological functions of
reciprocal marital relations in binding together the members of
different groups and asks us to consider marriage as one of a whole
series of ties between the men of one line 'cr4anciers en &pauses,'and
those of the other, the ' lign4e dibitrice.'
It is on arguments of this type that the author bases his view of the
evolution of kinship from 'structures kl4mentaires' which he believes
to be those in which marriages are more or less automatically
determined by rules of reciprocity to those 111 which there is a free
choice of mate. There is an intermediate stage in which marriage
by means of payments of different kinds gives a greater measure
of elasticity in the selection of a bride.
The major pai-t of the book consists in an elaboration of the thesis
of reciprocity in marriage relations in the case of particular societies
or areas. Ltvi-Strauss considers that the rules of exogamy are similar
to those of incest. In the former a class of men renounce a class of
women and in the latter a single man renounces a group of women.
Endogamy is sinlilarly shown to have features in common with
cross-cousin marriage and dual organization. In endogamy marriage
is prescribed within the group; in cross-cousin marriage there is an
obligation to marry a particular person; and in dual organization a
man is obliged to marry into a special class. Cross-cousin marriage
is, to Ltvi-Strauss, the most elementary form of marriage exchange
and one which leads later to forms of dual organization. The two
systems are described as 'two stages in awareness of social relations.'
The author invites us to consider all these regulations of mating as
forms of reciprocal exchange and to &vide these ihto two main
cfasses: 'limited exchanges' (&changesrestreints) in which there is a
direct exchange of a girl for a girl, and 'general exchanges' (&changes
g4n4ralis4s) in which the exchanges are not directly reciprocal, but
can nevertheless be traced out over several generations and influence
the kinship tern~inologies.The limited exchanges are described as
characteristic of the less :organized societies and they give place to
generalized exchanges. The author maps out the distribution of
forms of generalized exchange in societies situated on an axis run-
ning from Burma (Kachin) to east Siberia (Gilyak), with Australia,
parts of south India and Sumatra as the areas of the greatest distri-
bution of limited exchange. Assam, the Tungus and the Manchu
provide examples of hybrid systems.
The most detailed examination of the concept of reciprocity is
made in the case of Australian societies, where the famous marriage
classes are again analysed and projected on to numerous diagrams,
Burma, India and China. Ltvi-Strauss's treatment of the kinship
terminologies of these selected areas will probably be the most open
to criticism, since he does not give hinlself the necessary space to
work these systems out to the full. The material is however very
rich in ideas. The book has a single thesis and is, in this sense,
doclrinaire. But once marriage has been declared to be one of a
series of reciprocal relations between the nlembers of two or more
groups, the honest writer is bound to admit, a5d even to stress, the
number of determinants which can shape or deform the system of
marriage exchanges. Ltvi-Strauss here shows how the desire for
political alliances may dominate over simple exchange considera-
tions, so that security as to wives may be exchanged for security in
the political field as among the Nambikwara of south Brazil. He
describes rules of rank and residence cutting across more clear-cut
marriage obligations. He speaks of economic determinants, but
does not in fact give much detailed examination of these, and an
essay on the effects of cattle and other forms of stock on marriage
exchanges remains to be made according to his thesis. Finally he
emphasizes the necessity of starting with the family and constantly
stresses the bilateral nature of kinship. He has here some interesting
things to say on the particular forms of marriage exchange in
nlatrilineal societies and confirms recent British work on the greater
variability of marriage rules in nlatrilineal and patrilineal societies
(see articles on the matrilineal systems of Ashanti and Northern
Rhodesia by M. Fortes and A. I. Richards respectively in Ajiican
Political Systems, edited by A. R . Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde,
1950). The book thus avoids the concep'tual superficiality of recent
treatments of kinship which have been alnlost entirely based on the
study of urlilineal descent groups.
It is for these reasons that readers who disagree with Livi-Strauss's
 JANUARY,
1952 Man
main thesis or with his analysis of particular systems will yet find
a number of suggestive ideas scattered through the descriptive
material. They seem to be struck off almost casually in the
hammering-out of the central theme, and to be struck off in happy
and often brilliant phrases. Many of these suggestions cannot in the
nature of the case be followed up and I confess to some of the
CORRESPONDENCE
Social Anthropology: Past and Present. Cf:MAN,1g50,198,254,
271; 1951, 33-5, 62, 78, 120, 150, 199, 250
I4 SIR,-In his recently published book1 Professor Evans-
Pritchard has expanded the Marett Lecture that was pub-
lished in MAN (1950, 198). From what I hear of the reception
of the book and the lecture I gather that they are likely to cause a
good deal of misunderstanding and perhaps confusion which is both
undesirable and unnecessary. Professor Evans-Pritchard is concerned
to show that he is in disagreement about the nature of social anthro-
pology with those ofhis colleagues who111 he refers to as 'functional
anthropologists.' It is important to recognize just what the real
disagreement is.
One statement that I would challenge is a factual statement that
'functional anthropologists' hold that the history of social systems
'has no scientific relevance' (p. 57) or that 'the history of an institu-
tion is irrelevant to an understanding of it as it is at the present time'
(p. 58). It is perhaps possible that Mahowski may at one time have
said something like this, but it is certainly not true that those who
are lumped together as 'functional anthropologists' hold such a
view, and it is certainly quite false to say that it is a corollary of the
idea of social systems as natural systems. As I understand the position
of the 'functionalists' it seems to be precisely that of Professor
Evans-Pritchard himself when he writes: 'To understand an institu-
tion one is certainly aided by knowing its development, but a
knowledge of its history cannot of itself tell us how it functions in
social life. To know how it comes to be what it is, and to know how
it works, are two different things' (p. 38). 'Most of us would cer-
tainly take the view that, since the history of the institutions of
primitive peoples is not known, a systematic study of them as they
are at the present time must precede any attempt at conjecturing
how they may have originated and developed' (p. 39). This is pre-
cisely the view that I have taught for thirty years, and I am one of
those to whom the label 'functionalist' is attached.
What is the precise nature of the disagreement betweeil Professor
Evans-Pritchard and some other anthropologists? Briefly it is that
some anthropologists speak of social anthropology as being a
scientific discipline, meaning by that that it uses the inductive
method of observation, comparison, classification and generaliza-
tion, similar in essentials to the method used in such a science as
zoology, in order to arrive at a theory based on and tested by
empirical data. Professor Evans-Pritchard says that, on the contrary,
social anthropology is a historical discipline making use of the same
methods as those ordinarily adopted by historians.
W e shall land ourselves in utter confusion unless we distinguish
two different kinds of investigations with which social anthro-
pologists do or may concern themselves. One is the systenlatic com-
parison of a number of diverse societies; this is what was understood
by social anthropology forty years ago. The other is the ethnographic
study of a particular society in which there is some theoretical
analysis; an example of an excellent study of this kind is Professor
Evans-Pritchard's book on the Nuer. At the present time a very
large part of the investigations carried out from departments of
social anthropology consists of ethnographical studies, influenced,
to a greater or less extent, by theoretical considerations.
Professor Evans-Pritchard accepts the defmition of social anthro-
pology of Frazer as the branch of sociology that deals with primitive
societies. He himself writes that he 'understands by social anthro-
pology 'a distinctive discipline in which theoretical problems of
general sociology are investigated by research in primitive societies.'
No one cquld agree more completely with this description than
myself. Thus social anthropology is a branch of sociology, which
I3
Nos. 13, r4
irritation of conceptional indigestion and to a sense that this is in
some ways a transitional book which is bound to lead the author
into clarifying new positions. I prophesy, however, that the careful
research student will find in Les Structures kldmentaires de la Parent6
the material for a score or so of interesting Ph.D. theses, and I hope
such students will get to work. AUDREY I. RICHARDS
is in turn defined by Professor Evans-Pritchard as 'a general body of
theoretical knowledge about human societies.'
Some sixty years ago there started a controversy about history,
the famous Methodenstreit of the last century. The book of Professor
Evans-Pritchard is a contribution to this interminable discussion,
which, having lasted for sixty years bids fair to last for another sixty,
since its continuance depends on different persons using the same
words, such as 'history,' 'science,' et cetera, with different meanings.
The questions that were debated were such as whether history was
or could be scientific, what was the relation of history to sociology,
and many others. The anthropologists later joined in with the
historians and sociologists, and in America it was decided that
anthropology is a historical study, defined as the reconstruction of
the history of mankind. The statement (by myself) some twenty years
ago that social anthropology is a branch of comparative sociology
was met by the response from an American anthropologist that in
that case it nlust not be called anthropology. In arguing that anthro-
pology is a historical study Professor Evans-Pritchard has the
support of half a century of American anthropologists.
If we really wish to avoid the disputes about words rather than
realities, we can avoid the words 'history' and 'science' and such
words as 'law' and fall back on technical terms accepted in logic
and methodology. Here the important distinction is between
idiographic and nomothetic enquiries. An idiographic enquiry, as the
name implies, is one that aims at establishing particular propositions
about facts or events. A nomothetic enquiry, as again the name
implies, is one that aims at establishing acceptable general pro-
positions. A particular investigation may call for a combination of
idiographic and nomothetic enquiries, but in describing any
investigation we have to consider not the incidental propositions
that may be used but the kind of conclusions that are aimed at,
whether these are particular or general propositions.
Historical study, in the ordinarily accepted meaning of the word,
is the study of records and monuments for the purpose of establish-
ing acceptable factual statements about conditions and events of the
past, including even the immediate past. (But history can also be
a form of literature and there are some of us who like to read
history in Thucydides and Gibbon.) Historians have consistently
taken the view that history is primarily and predonlinantly idio-
graphic, aiming at providing particular or ,factual propositions.
There is some disagreement as to whether, or to what extent, theo-
retical considerations or generalizations can be admitted in a work
of history. One extreme view is that the historian should confine his
activity to annotating, editing and publishing historical documents.
Theoretical sociology, as the name clearly indicates, is a nomo-
thetic, theoretical, generalizing, study, not an idiographic study
concerned with establishing factual statements. W e thus land up
against the paradox which Professor Evans-Pritchard presents to
us. Social anthropology is theoretical sociology and therefore a
nomothetic study, but it is one kind of history and therefore an
idiographic study. The paradox is easily solved as soon as we
recognize that the name social anthropology refers to two different
kinds of investigations. There is comparative sociology, the syste-
matic comparative study of all the various forms of social life,
drawing its factual material from history and ethnography, and
aiming at the establishment of generalizations connected into a
theory. This is clearly nomothetic and not idiographic. Then there
is ethnography, consisting of studies-of particular societies, which,
even whep theoretical considerations are taken into account, is
primarily idiographic.
W e can thus solve or eliminate the paradox by realizbg that it