Taiwanese Independence: It’s in the Air

Michael Goldfarb asked “What Is a Nation in the 21st Century?” in the New York
Times on October 27, and to be sure that is a question relevant to Taiwanese people.
Whether we are talking solely about the here and now, or the idea of nationality in an
even larger, universal sense can be considered. To be sure, this question, whether local
or global, exclusive or all-embracing, lingers in the Taiwanese mind.
Goldfarb considered the Kurdish, Catalonian, Scottish, and British sense of
nationality in his article. To be sure all of these identities have been subject to
fluctuating, changeful dynamics in recent times. He did not mention Taiwan, an
oversight. In any case, the independence movements in the first three nations here,
particularly, are pertinent for Taiwan. And for that matter we could look at Britain and
the EU, as related to Taiwan and China, which will be considered below.
Goldfarb considers that there is a “new” sort of national identity in the 21st
century, largely based on the end of the 20th century when “The challenge to the
existing idea of nationhood began with the end of Communism” and the crack-up of
Yugoslavia. But Goldfarb does not explain this any further. And this opinion seems
somewhat mistaken. When the USSR yielded 15 new countries, and Yugoslavia
seven, these countries became independent nations in ways that were not dramatically
different from other claims to independence seen in the last hundreds of years. In
other words, they announced their own independence, created the legal agendas, and
then became sovereign states. Just like that, they were liberated and self-governing;
there was not some other factor that intervened. The same thing is brewing nowadays
with the nations we have looked at, and possibly, with Taiwan.
So where does Taiwan stand, what is its status? Is it “really” a nation or not? If
you asked a Kurd, Catalonian and even a Scot, they would say “Of course. We are a
proud sovereign people, with a unique culture, history and identity, and a given
independence in world affairs.” No doubt any Taiwanese person would say the same.
But the doubters would nevertheless intrude: Fine, but are you really independent in
the world? And then things begin to cloud—and Kurds, Catalonians, Scots and
Taiwanese would be forced to say “Well…not in the customary sense in terms of
actual international affairs and world law.” East Timor, Palau, and the Czech Republic
on the other hand, can all say, “Yes, it’s positively true. We are independent nations in
the world,” and indeed they are. In this respect a declaration of independence is the
key to achieving this, and such a declaration is legally binding in every strong sense
of the idea. Whether Catalonia, Kurdistan and even Scotland go this far remains to be
seen—exactly as it remains unresolved in Taiwan. (Britain is different in these
respects, for obvious reasons. The nation has a genuine independence that cannot be
doubted. Goldfarb considers UK’s independence within the structure of the EU; as
noted we will take this up below.)
This of course is not an easy question for Taiwan, for we all know the threat of
war with China stands in the way. But to cut to the chase, it is this observer’s view
that a declaration of independence is exactly what Taiwan will need. This is the only
route to freedom, to liberation. Claims that a sort of referendum in Taiwan, with the
people voting on this issue, could yield the final result are not accurate. Such a
referendum would not do the job—which has been seen in Catalonia, Kurdistan
(where referendums have made no true difference), and even Scotland, which rejected
the idea.
This writer is not an ardent Taiwan independence activist (he is in fact more of a
unificationist). But it cannot be denied that the majority of people in Taiwan clearly
appear to be leaning in this direction, and hoping for this outcome. And there is only
one way that Taiwan can actually achieve this goal—by way of the government, with
Tsai Ying-wen at its head. Only a government announcement and the creation of a
legal framework in terms of global law will actually achieve independence—exactly
what the other nations we have discussed did in their time. To be sure Taiwan has
never done anything like this. The ultimate responsibility for this miserable fiasco
rests on Chiang Kai-shek and his failure to achieve independence after Taiwan was
ejected from the United Nations—but let’s not focus on Chiang. We must focus on
Tsai Ying-wen, and her own negligence in making any progress in this direction.
Needless to say, Tsai adheres to “de facto” independence and a given status quo in
relations—spineless approaches to cross-strait association that have done nothing to
advance Taiwan’s interests in global affairs, to say nothing of not achieving anything
like true freedom and self-reliance for the Taiwanese people. Tsai’s talk of a “new
model” may be useful in its way, but in fact does not break any new ground. This will
have to change—though admittedly an actual declaration of independence may still be
a distant possibility.
 In terms of new thinking, we would like to make a suggestion. Far-reaching and
impractical though it may sound, it could be worth thinking about. This is the creation
of something like a “borderless” world in which all of these considerations and
conflicts will not even be required or addressed. This could include entities like the
EU—and not a few people have suggested that such a unifying body is needed in
Asia. An Asian Union would be a reasonably practical approach, and the hope would
be that this would be an environment in which borders are removed (the EU has
indeed something rather like this, with the Schengen Area). Something like a “world
passport” would take the place of all the separate documents that are now required to
travel and prove identity and nationality. This would have to take place to the extent
possible, and most likely many or most countries in the world would not go along
with the idea of dissolving their borders. A lot more negotiation would be needed
before we could get anywhere near this idea. But it still seems positive in important
ways. Call this writer a dreamer, with a desire for true “world citizenship.”
These options could possibly solve a lot of problems, and allow Taiwan entry into
global affairs as an essentially independent nation (but the final question of actual
independence may still not be answered). As far as borderlessness, this can be seen in
terms of Catalonia, which hardly has much of any border separating it from Spain.
Scotland has shown it would not be against this idea, and that it would more or less
gladly ally itself with England in a happy union. Kurdistan seems to be a bit different,
and the Kurdish people seem to have a stronger independent sense, in which they are
somewhat more separate and truly autonomous, not a piece of Turkey or a slice of
Iraq. Taiwan strikes me as somewhat similar to Catalonia in this regard. Catalonia is a
potential country within a country, with which it has very close economic, political,
cultural and linguistic ties. Indeed, the vote against independence there has been fairly
large, because this group simply feels that Catalonia is Spanish and that Spain in turn
encompasses, girds, demarcates and circumscribes Catalonia. The same goes for
Taiwan. That is, Taiwan really is Chinese in significant respects, culturally,
linguistically, and even economically (not so much politically, to be sure). Though
many people would not agree (they would indeed strongly disagree), the fact that
China ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 seems to indicate that Taiwan was once indeed
part of China. No, not the People’s Republic of China, but the PRC is in fact what
“China” is today, and thus can be essentially connected to the China that was in
existence in the 19th century. People were alive and Chinese in the late 19th century
and still alive and Chinese after 1949.
This closeness (call it that) across the Taiwan Strait could be helpful in various
ways: with an EU-like conglomeration, the possibility of Taiwan unifying with China
(with a good deal of independent power, it would be hoped), or, most broadly, in the
borderless world we have suggested.
Goldfarb points out that some 500 years ago a Polish nobleman was asked about
his national identity. He responded, “I am of the Polish nation, of the Lithuanian
citizenship, of the Ruthenian people, and of Jewish origin.” This is the sort of
borderlessness we have referred to, and is akin to a Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of
Civilizations” thesis—but we will dismiss his clash, and focus on what could be
positive. That is, Huntington said that a resident of Rome could define himself
upward as Roman, Italian, Catholic, Christian, European, and Western. This
accumulation could be seen as a very positive binding covenant in one’s identity,
opening new worlds of possibility and connection.
The time is now. Decisions need to be made. This is the 21st century, and though
there might not be a truly new idea of nationhood, the old idea and many connected
and related ideas can be seen as positives in our existence(s) and identification(s).
Step up Taiwan, make your voice heard in the world today. A new and exciting
selfhood, both associated and particular, awaits.