Land Reforms in India: An Analysis

D Bandyopadhyay
The Sixth Five-Year Plan had indicated a time-frame for completing various tasks under land reforms. Legisla-
tion for conferment of ownership rights on tenants was to be enacted by 1981-82. The programme for taking over
possession and distribution of ceiling surplus land was to have been completed by 1982-83. Both these tasks still
remain unachieved.
This paper examines the present status of security of tenure of tenants and implementation of ceiling laws in
different parts of the country and against this background discusses the various administrative steps and other
supporting measures required for implementing land reforms.

I on informal or oral basis, under the guise
T H E Sixth-Five Year Plan of India (1980-85)
stated: " I f the progress of land reforms has
been less than satisfactory, it has not been
due to flaws in policy but due to indifferent
implementation. Often, the necessary deter-
mination has been lacking to effectively
undertake action, particularly in the matter
of implementation of ceiling laws, consoli-
dation of holdings and in not vigorously
pursuing concealed tenancies and having
them vested with tenancy/occupancy rights
as enjoined under the law'
The Plan also indicated a time-frame for
completing different tasks under land
reforms. legislation for conferment of
ownership rights on all tenants, except for
specified disabled categories, was to be done
by 1981-82. The programme for taking over
possession of and distribution of ceiling
surplus lands was- to have been completed
by 1982-83. Both these tasks still remain
unachieved.
A short narration of the present status of
security of tenure of .tenants and imple-
mentation of ceiling laws is necessary for a
proper appreciation of the situation. Secu-
rity of tenure to tenants has been given in
all states which have recognised the tenancy.
While the National Policy stipulates fixation
of rents payable by tenants at the rate of
l/5th to 1 /4th of the gross produce, the rent
payable is higher than this in Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra area), Haryana and
Punjab. It may be actually so in some other-
states also.
Ownership rights on tenants and share-
croppers have not been conferred in Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra area), Bihar, Haryana,
Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal (for
sharecroppers). It is also noticed that while
the 'Operation Barga' in West Bengal has
brought about 1.3 m i l l i o n bargadars
(sharecroppers) on record, similar attempt
has not been made in Bihar or Tamil Nadu
and the tenancies in the states are not largely
on record, Without bringing the tenants and
sharecroppers on record, security of tenurial
rights cannot be ensured and these persons
cannot get even a crop loan from credit
institutions. One of the main reasons for
inadequate growth in rice production in the
Eastern Region has been identified as the
prevalence, on a large scale, of sharecroppers
and, hence, inadequate flow of inputs and
credit as well as inadequate exploitation of
ground-water as the owners are least i n -
terested in investment in land improvement.
Even in the states where tenancy has been
abolished, concealed tenancy has emerged
of personal cultivation. While the National
Policy permits creation of tenancies or leases
by specified disabled categories only, larger
exemptions have been provided in some
states. For example, in Orissa 'privileged
raiyat' which consists of co-operative societies,
the Lord Jagannath Temple, Public Temples,
and trusts can create tenancies. Similarly, a
raiyat with an extent of land not exceeding
3 standard acres (i e, 3 acres to 13.5 acres
depending upon the class of land) can lease
his land. Extension of time limit to confer
ownership on sub-tenants and under-raiyats
has not yet been done.
Out of the 22 states, the states of Megha-
laya and Nagaland do not have any ceiling
laws. The law does not appear to have been
implemented in Sikkim. Land ceiling laws
were first enacted in the fifties and the
sixties, and later revised after National
Guidelines were issued in 1972.
Since the inception of the land ceiling pro-
gramme, a total of 2.97 million hectares have
been declared surplus under the pre-revised
and revised ceiling laws. Of this, 2.36 million
hectares have been taken possession of and
1.82 million hectares have been distributed
to 3.37 million persons. 79.35 per cent of
area declared surplus has been taken posses-
sion of and 61.29 per cent of the area
declared surplus has been distributed under
the revised and pre-revised laws; 43.61 per
cent of the area distributed has been given
to members of scheduled castes and sche-
duled tribes, who account for 54.63 per cent
of the total number of beneficiaries. Out of
1.15 million hectares declared surplus but not
distributed, 0.66 million hectares is involved
in litigation and 0.35 million hectares are
reported to be unfit for cultivation or
reserved for afforestation or other public
purposes.
According to the agricultural census of
operational holdings, the operational
holdings below 2 ha have gone up over the
years with re-distribution of land as well as
devolution by inheritance, but a skewed
distribution of land among different size
classes of operational holdings still persists.
The number of holdings below 2 ha has gone
up from 49.63 million in 1970-71 to 66,6
million in 1980-81. They constituted 74.5 per
cent of the total holdings in 1980-81 but
operated only 42.76 million ha or 26.3 per
cent of total operated area. Against this,
holdings above 10 ha have come down from
2.77 million in 1970-71 to 2.15 million in
1980-81. They constituted 2.4 per cent of the
total holdings in 1980-81 but operated as
much as 37.13 million ha or 22.8 per cent
of total operated area.
A significant feature which is apparent
from Table 1 is the phenomenal increase in
the number of marginal operational hold-
ings from 36.20 m in 1970-71 to 50.52 m in
1980-81. Of course, distribution of ceiling
surplus land to 3.24 million beneficiaries has
to be accounted for in this figure. Even
deducting the number of 3.24 m new bene-
ficiary marginal landholders the net figure
would be 47.28 m—an increase of 11.08 m
over 10 years. It means that on an average
1.1 m marginal holdings are coming into
existence annually. The annual rate of
marginalisation was 3.98 per cent or 4 per
cent which was significantly higher than the
1.9 per cent annual rate of growth of rural
population between 1971 and 1981. It,
perhaps, indicates that marginalisation was
more due to immiserisation rather than
normal devolution of property. Of course,
another noticeable feature also is the 22.4
per cent reduction in the number of large
holdings with 25.86 per cent decrease in area.
What is puzzling is that while the surplus
area distributed under the revised ceiling
laws of early seventies was only 0.91 million
hectare, 12.93 million hectare had been con-
sciously and wilfully dispersed, obviously
with a view to avoiding the ceiling law.
Devolution would not explain it, because,
had it been so the number of operational
holdings would have gone up instead of
sharply coming down. Thus, the Agri-
cultural Censuses which throw up very im-
portant data are unable to capture the real
picture of the agrarian society. The short
point is that while marginalisation of the
poor peasantry is going on, on a fairly fast
rate, there has not been any serious dent on
the effective concentration of land in a few
hands in spite of the revised land ceiling law
of early seventies and notwithstanding some
visible indication to the contrary.
Land ceiling laws were first enacted in 50s
and 60s. These were revised after the
national guidelines were issued in 1972.
There are no land ceiling laws in Meghalaya,
Nagaland, A and N Islands, Arunchal
Pradesh, Goa' Daman and Diu, and Mizoram.
There is no implementation in Sikkim.
According to certain estimates made on the
basis of data from National Sample Surveys
and Agricultural Census and certain assum-
ptions on average ceiling limits for each
state, the estimates of surplus were as
follows:

Economic and Political Weekly Vol XXI, Nos 25-26

A-50 Review of Agriculture, June 21-28, 1986
E C O N O M I C A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
(Million hectares)
16th round of NSS (1960-61) 8.87
26th round of NSS (1971-72) 4.80
Agricultural Census (1970-71) 12.10
Agricultural Census (1976-77) 8.88
Estimates made by
state governments 2,35
Actually declared surplus so far 2.94
The declared surplus land is far less than
the surplus estimated from agricultural
censuses and other data. Reasons are:
(a) Provision for holding land upto twice
the ceiling limit by families with over
5 members.
(b) Provision to give separate ceiling limit
for major sons of the family.
(c) Provision for treating every shareholder
of a joint family, under applicable
personal law, as a separate unit for
ceiling limits.
(d) Exemption of tea, coffee, rubber,
cardamom and cocoa plantation and of
lands held by religious and charitable
institutions beyond normal ceiling limits.
(e) Benami transfers to defeat the ceiling law.
(f) Mis use of exemptions and miscalcula-
tion of lands.
(g) Non-application of appropriate ceilings
of lands newly irrigated by public
investment.
The declared surplus is less than 2 per cent
of the cultivated area. The declared surplus
land is also not fully taken possession of due
to litigation.
An estimate made on data from agri-
cultural census of 1980-81 with the same
assumption about average ceiling limit as
made in the other estimates, but allowing for
area under plantations and orchards, gives
a figure of 5,95 million hectares as surplus,
if no other concessions were given. Similarly,
if a ceiling of 12 ha for dry land was
assumed, the 1980-81 agricultural census
data show an estimate of 9.84 million ha as
surplus after allowing for plantations and
orchards, but showing no other concessions.
In the Seventh Five-Year Plan there has
been a conceptual change for the better. The
approach to the Seventh Five-Year Plan,
1985-90, states: "The core of the anti-poverty
programmes lies in the endowment of
income-generating assets on those who have
little or none of these. Hence, r e d i s t r i b u t e
land reforms and security of tenure to the
informal tenants have to be directly inte-
grated with the anti-poverty package of pro-
grammes" (para 30, page 4).
The Seventh Five-Year Plan also reiterates
this position. It observes: "Land Reforms
have been recognised to constitute a vital
element both in terms of the anti-poverty
strategy and for modernisation and increased
productivity in agriculture Redistribution of
land could provide a permanent asset base
Review of Agriculture June 1986
for a large number of rural landless poor for
taking up land-based and other supple-
mentary activities. Similarly, consolidation
of holdings, tenancy regulation and updating
of land records, would widen the access of
small and marginal land-holders to improved
technology and inputs and thereby directly
lead to increase in agricultural production"
(Vol 2, page 62, paragragh 2.64).
Thus, land reform has been brought into
the mainstream of rural development acti-
vity under the Seventh Five-Year Plan. It is
no longer a side programme implemented
by Revenue Departments in total isolation
of other activities in the field of rural
development.
In view of this renewed emphasis on land
reforms as a core activity of anti-poverty
programme, the state ministers in charge of
Revenue Departments and Land Reforms
were consulted in an All-India Conference
in May 1985 and a number of decisions were
taken.
States have been requested to take up
measures for plugging loopholes in the
existing law for expediting decisions in cases
under litigation by creating special benches
of High Courts or by constituting Tribunals
under Article 323B of the Constitution of
India and for vigorous implementation in-
cluding countering evasion and avoidance of
law and bringing areas newly irrigated by
public investment under appropriate ceilings.
States have also been requested to consider
inclusion of major sons in the definition of
family with effect from 24.1.1971 to deter-
mine family holding ceiling limits, bringing
lands with religious and charitable institu-
tions in the purview of land ceiling and to
consider further lowering of ceiling limits to
get more land for distribution to the land-
less. They have also been requested to see
that when surplus land is allotted, mutations
are affected in land records, land is physically
demarcated and possession given and that
legal provisions are made and enforced to
provide security to such assignees from
eviction and for prompt restoration by
evicting encroachers or unlawful possessors,
especially in case of lands belonging to
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.
Further, lowering of ceilings suggested was
5 ha for irrigated land with two crops, 7.5 ha
irrigated land with one crop and 12 ha for
other lands.
Decision in respect of redefining 'personal
cultivation' more strictly bringing all tenants
and sharecroppers on record, withdrawal of
unnecessary exemptions permitting tenancy
or lessees and conferment of ownership
rights on tenants and sharecroppers require
popular mobilisation and ground swell of
pressure from below. In regard to agricultural
land ceiling laws, while it may not be possi-
ble to remove provisions for holding land
upto twice the ceiling limit by families with
over 5 members and giving exemptions for
plantations of tea, coffee, rubber, cardamom
and cocoa, it will require considerable
pressure and political action to bring the
major sons within the definitions of family
from 24.1.1971, to remove provision for
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 giving every co-parcener of a joint family
under applicable personal law a separate unit
of ceiling with notional partition, to remove
permission to hold land beyond normal
ceiling limits by religious and charitable
institutions or public trusts and endowments
and to lower the ceilings to the level sug-
gested. However, administrative and legal
measures for vigorous implementation
should be possible for expediting decisions
in cases before courts, cuntering benami (in
someone else's name)and farzi (fradulent)
transfers to defeat the ceiling law as well as
misuse of exemptions and mis-classification
of lands, for applying appropriate ceilings
for lands newly irrigated by public invest-
ment and for providing security to assignees
of surplus land as well as help to develop
the land and other assets based on land.
As has already been mentioned, till today
the area declared surplus is less than 2 per
cent of the cultivated area. While the
number of small and marginal holdings
have, no doubt, increased between 1970-71
and 1980-81 as a result of devolution as well
as distribution of ceiling surplus land, the
number of large holdings of 10 hectares and
above is still very large (2.4 per cent of the
total number) and operate a large area (22,8
per cent of the total area). Annexure I gives
the position of percentage distribution state-
wise from 1970-71 to 1980-81 of holdings
below 2 ha and holdings of 10 ha and above.
Annexure II gives the present ceilings,
average operational holding area in holdings
of 10 ha and above and estimates of surplus
based on certain assumptions on average
ceiling limits in each state. An estimate has
also been made of possible surplus land, if
the ceiling limit for unirrigated land were to
be reduced to 12 ha for a family, after allow-
ing exemptions for plantations and orchards.
Even if the ceiling were to be 1.5 times or
twice the normal ceiling for a family of more
than five members (but including major sons
in the family and not giving a separate unit
of ceiling to a co-parcener of a joint family)
the estimate of surplus land would be at least
about 3 to 4 million hectares (i e, as much
as declared surplus till now or a little more)
which can be distributed to the landless.
What is rather ominous is that in some states
average size of holdings in the highest
bracket has shown a tendency to increase.
II
Thus a lot remains to be done. It is time
we took a close look at the various admini-
strative steps and other supportive measures
required for implementing land reforms.
If the actual steps required in detecting
ceiling surplus land were analysed schema-
tically one would find that the following
tasks are involved after the scrutiny of the
legal declaration made by the land owners:
(i) identification of families having and
suspected to have lands above ceiling,
(ii) locating and identifying all plots of land
in the effective and real possession of every
such family both according to record of
rights (where they exist) or title deeds and
in tracing of lands held clandestinely or in
somebody else's name (benami) real or
imaginary through fictitious or collusive
transactions, (iii) initiating quasi-judicial
process of vesting of all surplus land in-
cluding land kept through collusive transfers
and benami by gathering adequate evidence
which should stand the scrutiny of review/
appeal at a higher judicial level, (iv) taking
over possession of vested land after com-
pleting quasi-judicial and other admini-
strative processes, (v) assigning such surplus
land according to the legally/administrative
prescribed priority among the landless or
land poor peasantry, (vi) providing a
minimal self-defence mechanism to prevent
illegal physical eviction from the assigned
land through violence by the erstwhile
owners, and (vii) some provision for con-
sumption and production credit to enable
the new allottee to start cultivation without
getting into the debt trap of the former
patron with the eventual possibility of
alienating the land.
Similarly, for tenancy reform whether for
ultimate conferment of ownership right or
heritable occupancy right the steps would be:
(i) identification of genuine tenants (either
the genuine tenants would be browbeaten
and evicted or made to surrender 'volun-
tarily' or fake tenants who are the henchmen
of landowners would be set up; (ii) gather
evidence of tenancies as all or most such
tenancies are oral; (iii) to provide for a
mutual support system among the genuine
tenants to overcome the genuine fear com-
plex of retaliation of the landowners;
(iv) initiation of legal process to establish
tenancy right and to register name in the
record of rights; (v) if the procedure involves
buying of occupancy or ownership right
financial arrangements for making such
payment; (vi) meeting immediate need for
consumption and production loan as credit
of the landowner would be withdrawn;
(vii) support system to prevent illegal and
physical eviction from land by violence; and
(vii) legal and physical support from being
evicted from the homestead as most of the
tenants in a number of areas live on the land-
owner's land as mere permissive possessors.
Thus from the scheme of tasks involved
both in the implementation of ceiling on
surplus land and security of tenancy, it is
evident that the best of bureaucracy unaided
by the organisations of rural workers cannot
achieve any significant success. Good
evidence in respect of both the major items
of action can come from the sharecroppers,
tenants and agricultural workers who work
on the landowners' land. It is they who can
prove the fact of effective possession, enjoy-
ment of usufruct of land, and the type of
crops grown to establish both the identity
of tenants and tenancy. They are basic
materials upon which depend findings
regarding ceiling surplus land and actual
tenancy. But no sharecropper or agricultural
worker would dare come forward indi-
vidually and separately to give evidence
because of fear of immediate and severe
retaliation. It is only when organisations of
rural poor come forward to give such infor-
mation collectively that the bureaucracy can
function effectively. In the absence of such
organisational support the implementing
authorities even if they are not biased in
favour of landowners, have to depend on
evidence which the landowners would pro-
duce and obviously the decisions in most
cases would go in their favour. Where the
implementing authorities d i d not seek or
shunned the co-operation of organisation of
rural poor the results are likely to be dismal.
But given all the constraints wherever the
bureaucracy sought and depended on the
support of the rural poor the results have
been encouraging. In West Bengal, both for
vesting of land above ceiling in 1967-70 and
later on since 1978 for registration of
sharecroppers to give them permanent
occupancy and heritable right, the govern-
ment which had a bias in favour of the poor
allowed and sought direct participation of
structured organisation of rural workers as
well as informal groups of rural poor in
detection of ceiling surplus land and identi-
fication of sharecroppers. As a result West
Bengal contributed around 27 per cent of
total land vested in India and about 60-70
per cent of informal sharecroppers have been
registered in record of rights enjoying
security of tenure heritable right of culti-
vation and fair rent. Similarly, in the late
sixties in the state of Kerala a massive
programme of conferment of titles to lands
of hutment dwellers and tenancy was under-
taken with the help of rural workers'
organisations. The result was equally good.
In a short time most of the eligible hut-
ment dwellers and tenants got their legal
documents.
However, desirable and necessary orga-
nisation of rural workers might be for
furthering and protecting the interest of
different segments of rural poor, the fact
remains that in most of the states these are
rather weak and undeveloped. Their spread
and growth had been uneven and shaky. A
report of 1974 showed that the claimed
membership of all the peasants and rural
labour organisations was not more than 5
per cent of poor peasantry and agricultural
labourers. 2 There might be some change at
present but one cannot expect a fundamental
change in the intervening years. It is common
knowledge that in India such organisations
have strength in certain parts of the country
and that there are vast tracts where organisa-
tions do not exist even in rudimentary form.
It is also well known that in some of the
areas such organisations of rural masses are
looked upon with grave suspicion and are
thought as coterminus with incipient in-
surgency movement. In such an atmosphere
of distrust of the state power it is difficult to
form and operate such organisation.
There are certain inherent difficulties
regarding formation and development of
genuine organisations of rural poor to
espouse, promote and protect the interests
of different sections of rural workers. The
fact that these organisations have not
developed to any significant extent indicates
that there are numerous factors—some of
which are internal and others external—
which inhibit their growth and spread.
Among the factors external to the system are
the coercive power of the propertied class,
economic dependence of the poor, the
inbuilt bias of the law and order machinery
to maintain the status quo, lack of suppor-
tive legislation and non-implementation of
the existing laws enacted in their favour.3
Other factors hindering the development of
such organisations come out of hetero-
geneity of poverty itself. The poor are
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differentiated and divided by such factors as
conflicting economic interests, caste and
community differences, sex discrimination
and other division which compel the poor
to compete among themselves for limited
opportunities and resources. Precarious
A-54
economic existence of the vast masses of the
rural poor makes them easy victims of
manipulation by the landed class and not
infrequently seeds of dissension are skilfully
and deliberately planted among them to
make the poor fight the poor Disabilities
of destitution are to cleverly played upon that
poor tend to look upon their exploiters for
support and deliverance rather than on their
own organisational strength through unity.
Lack of adequate legal support has a
dampening effect on efforts to organise.
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A-55
Review of Agriculture June 1986
Even in countries with old trade union
history, trade union laws have not been
suitably modified to cover organisation of
rural workers. National Legislation relating
to the trade union rights of workers is often
silent on these rights as they apply to self-
employed rural workers, the sharecroppers,
tenants, and marginal farmers. In some cases
an examination of the labour legislation
reveals that it applies to wage earners only,
and therefore, unless (as is infrequently the
case) the rights of association of self-
employed rural workers are covered by
separate legislation, self-employed rural
workers are precluded from organisation. 4
ILO Convention 141 defined rural workers
to include this category to facilitate amend-
ments to national legislation. Absence of a
protective legal cover exposes the organisers
and members to civil action and charge of
criminal conspiracy. A concerted move to
withhold delivery of produce in excess of the
legal dues or to cultivate land when illegally
prevented by landowners or to occupy vested
land are often treated as breach of peace and
are dealt with accordingly under ordinary
criminal laws of the country.
The attitude and behaviour of the bureau-
cracy as contra distinguished from the
political government have a serious impact
on the growth of such organisations. India
has inherited as a legacy of British colonial
rule a very strong and well developed
bureaucracy. We have retained the basic
structure of administration even after inde-
pendence. To maintain 'Pax Britannica' the
bureaucracy developed the tradition of main-
taining order with or without law. The
tradition continues, not withstanding
changes that have taken place meanwhile. It
is well known that significant segments of
bureaucracy have a class bias as they have
direct linkage with the rural elite. Though
undesirable, it is understandable, that such
a bureaucracy would have an additional
block against any radical land reform. But
even where the bulk of the bureaucracy
comes from the urban middle class with no
land-linkage, it behaves the same way. A
bureaucracy imbibes the dominant ethos of
the state. In the market economies where the
propertied classes had been controlling the
state apparatus, it was natural that the basic
laws, administrative and judicial traditions
would be heavily weighted in favour of the
existing social order. In such a situation the
bureaucracy would develop a bias against
any movement or concerted action or even
against an isolated law which aims at the
alternation of the existing social arrange-
ments. Any organisational effort demanding
change of the existing system is looked upon
as a threat to the established order and
retaliatory action is set in motion almost
automatically. That apart, a strong bureau-
cracy considers itself as the custodian of
public interest as perceived by itself. It,
therefore, abhors or at least resents associa-
tion of organisations of rural poor as inter-
ference in the legitimate discharge of these
basic functions.
The anti-rural poor attitude which arises
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ECONOMIC A N D P O L I T I C A L WEEKLY
from the class linkages would be difficult to
counter but when it comes out of the long-
standing administrative tradition it might be
cured to some extent provided there is some
pressure from the top with a deliberate policy
to reorient it. Faced with the same problem
while launching the 'Operation Barga' the
West Bengal government started a series of
reorientation camps where 30 to 40 agri-
cultural workers and sharecroppers and a
do/en and a half officers of land reform and
other related departments were made to stay
together, eat together and discuss together
in the same premises in distant rural areas.
The main purpose of these camps was to
make the poor think about their basic
problems of poverty and to come out with
their own perception about its cause and
possible solution. The officers were given the
role of observers or scribes as most of the
participants from the non-official groups
were illiterate. These camps had a solutory
effect on the mind and attitude of official
participants. "Their smugness, arrogance,
superciliousness get a terrible jolt and they
think afresh of their own role as change
agents"5 But in the entire arena i! was a
unique example of a government attempting
to change the attitude of its bureaucracy by
exposing them to the controlled wrath of the
rural poor. Everywhere else, the bureaucracy
rules the roast.
The burden of crushing poverty itself acts
as a deterrent to the growth of organisation.
Poverty leading to utter dependency breeds
a strange state of fatalism and the poor tend
to think and arc made to think that men are
born unequal and there is no way out of tin-
poverty trap. It is better to accept the situa-
tion without murmur and try to get the best
through the munificence of the patron. The
illusory security of bondage appears to be
preferable to the uncertainty and trouble
associated with any organisational effort to
change the situation. They neither have the
financial support to build an organisation
nor the staying power to withstand the
economic blacklash from the landowners.
They get submerged in what Paulo Freire
described as the "culture of silence of the
dispossessed".
Rural workers are not a homogeneous
category—but consists of different groups
like marginal owner cultivators, tenant
farmers, sharecroppers, landless agricultural
workers, off farm wage workers and the like,
with diverse and often with conflicting
interests. Hence, the problem arises whether
there should be common organisation for all
or separate organisation for each sub-group.
This is a matter which has to be solved by the
rural workers themselves. But it may be
pointed out that too many fragmented orga-
nisations would reduce the bargaining power
of each and in the totality each may tend
to lose. Further, the contradictions among
the sub-groups not being of antagonistic in
nature, these could be resolved in a partici-
patory organisation through mutual discus-
sion and occasional accommodation on
tactical and strategic consideration.
Another point to consider is that because
of special disadvantages of rural workers,
external agency's role as catalytic assumes
great importance. Lack of finance, lack of
organisational skill, lack of staying power,
lack of cadre all tend to indicate that external
support at the initial stages of formation and
growth of indigenous organisation of rural
poor might be a critical factor. Whether such
external support would be forthcoming and
even if they were available how far they
would act as authentic catalytic agents
without creating a new dependency relation-
ship is a matter on which nothing much
could be said in terms of generality. Each
situation would reveal its own contradiction
and produce its solution.
The Governmet of India recognised the
need for the beneficiaries of anti-poverty
programmes to organise to derive the maxi-
mum benefit from the variety of schemes.
It was felt that the active involvement of the
beneficiaries was necessary to ensure that
benefit reaches them. Hence, it launched a
scheme recently called "Organisation of
Beneficiaries of Anti-Poverty Programmes".
The scheme proposes to sharpen the aware-
ness and response of the rural poor through
awareness generation camps. These camps
would be organised with the assistance of
voluntary agencies, Nehru Yuvak Kendra
and National Service Camps. The scheme
is not peculiar to the beneficiaries of land
reform. But to the extent the scheme
succeeds it would help in increasing the
bargaining power of the poor and to that
extent it would help in effective implementa-
tion of land reform and other programmes.
Ill
The Task Force on Agrarian Relations set
up by the Planning Commission of India
while reviewing the failure of land reform
laws in the early seventies observed: " W i t h
resolute and unambiguous political will all
other shortcomings and difficulties could have
been overcome; in the absence of such a will
even minor obstacles become formidable
road blocks in the path of Indian Land
Reforms" That was in the summer of 1973.
The statement remains substantially valid
in the spring of 1986.
Notes
[Views expressed in this paper are those of the
author. The author is indebted to G Aswatha-
narayan for all the statistical Tables.]
1 D Bandyopadhyay, ' L a n d Reforms in West
Bengal; IFDA DOSSIER, 24, July/August
1981, Nyon, Switzerland, pp 8(48}-9(49).
2 D Bandyopadhyay, 'External Impediments
to the G r o w t h of Organisation of Poor in
Asia; Freidrich-Ebert-Stifting Workshop
Series Report V, Bangkok, 1974.
3 U N / E S C A P , "Rural Development A d m i n i -
stration in India: Some Emerging Power
Issues", Bangkok, 1979.
4 I L O , "Structure and Functions of Rural
Workers' Organisations", Geneva, 1978, p 26.
5 D Bandyopadhyay, 'Rural Workers' Camps
Show the Way; Mainstream, Vol X I X , No 44,
July 4, 1981.