Spec pro

1) Nittscher vs. Nittscher, G.R. No. 160530, November 20, 2007

2) Maninang vs. CA, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]
3) Pedrosa vs. CA, 353 SCRA 620 [2001]
4) Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, 199 SCRA 646 [1991]
5) Aranas vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 156407, January 12, 2014
6) Coca vs. Borromeo, G.R. No. L-29545, January 31, 1978
7) Tan vs. Gedorio, Jr., G.R. No. 166520, March 14, 2008
Sagunsin vs. Lindayag, 6 SCRA 874
9) Agtarap vs. Agtarap, G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011
10) Nittscher vs. Nittscher, G.R. No. 160530, November 20, 2007
11) Hilado vs. CA, G.R. No. 164108, May 8, 2009
12) Tayag vs. Tayag-Gallor, G.R. No. 174680, March 24, 2008
13) Echaus vs. Blanco, 179 SCRA 704
14) Maglasang vs. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 171206, September 23, 2013
15) San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
16) Lim vs. CA, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 160530 November 20, 2007

CYNTHIA V. NITTSCHER, petitioner,

vs.
DR. WERNER KARL JOHANN NITTSCHER (Deceased), ATTY. ROGELIO P. NOGALES and
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI (Branch 59), respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari are the Decision1 dated July 31, 2003 and Resolution2 dated October 21,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which affirmed the Order3 dated September
29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Makati City, in SP Proc. No. M-2330 for the
probate of a will.

The facts are as follows.

On January 31, 1990, Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC of Makati City a petition
for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to herein
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales.
On September 19, 1991, after hearing and with due notice to the compulsory heirs, the probate court
issued an order allowing the said holographic will, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Holographic Will of the petitioner-testator Dr.

Werner J. Nittscher executed pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Article
838 of the Civil Code of the Philippines on January 25, 1990 in Manila, Philippines, and
proved in accordance with the provision of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby
allowed.

SO ORDERED.4

On September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a petition for letters
testamentary for the administration of the estate of the deceased. Dr. Nittscher’s surviving spouse,
herein petitioner Cynthia V. Nittscher, moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the
court in its September 29, 1995 Order denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and granted
respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, to wit:

In view of all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. The petition for the issuance of
Letters Testamentary, being in order, is GRANTED.

Section 4, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides "when a will has been proved and
allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor
therein, if he is competent, accepts the trust and gives a bond as required by these rules." In
the case at bar, petitioner Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales of the R.P. Nogales Law Offices has
been named executor under the Holographic Will of Dr. Werner J. Nittscher. As prayed for,
let Letters Testamentary be issued to Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, the executor named in the
Will, without a bond.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied for lack of merit. On May 9, 1996,
Atty. Nogales was issued letters testamentary and was sworn in as executor.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that respondent’s petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary should have been dismissed outright as the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter and that she was denied due process.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Order is AFFIRMED in toto. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the
proceedings below.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition anchored on the following grounds:

I.
 BOTH THE CA AND THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING OUTRIGHT THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS … TESTAMENTARY FILED BY ATTY. NOGALES WHEN,
OBVIOUSLY, IT WAS FILED IN VIOLATION OF REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 28-91 AND
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II.

THE CA ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LOWER COURT [HAS] NO

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE PRESENT SUIT.

III.

THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMONS WERE PROPERLY ISSUED TO THE

PARTIES AND ALL PERSONS INTERESTED IN THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC
WILL OF DR. NITTSCHER.

IV.

THE CA ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF

DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE LOWER COURT.7

Petitioner contends that respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters testamentary lacked a
certification against forum-shopping. She adds that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this case because Dr. Nittscher was allegedly not a resident of the Philippines; neither did
he leave real properties in the country. Petitioner claims that the properties listed for disposition in
her husband’s will actually belong to her. She insists she was denied due process of law because
she did not receive by personal service the notices of the proceedings.

Respondent Atty. Nogales, however, counters that Dr. Nittscher did reside and own real properties in
Las Piñas, Metro Manila. He stresses that petitioner was duly notified of the probate proceedings.
Respondent points out that petitioner even appeared in court to oppose the petition for the issuance
of letters testamentary and that she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. Respondent
maintains that the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary need not contain a certification
against forum-shopping as it is merely a continuation of the original proceeding for the probate of the
will.

We resolve to deny the petition.

As to the first issue, Revised Circular No. 28-918 and Administrative Circular No. 04-949 of the Court
require a certification against forum-shopping for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in
this case, the petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory pleading, but a mere
continuation of the original petition for the probate of Dr. Nittscher’s will. Hence, respondent’s failure
to include a certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said petition.

Anent the second issue, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant

of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the province in which he resides at the time of
 his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of any province in which he had estate. … (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their finding that Dr. Nittscher was a
resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at the time of his death. Such factual finding, which we find
supported by evidence on record, should no longer be disturbed. Time and again we have said that
reviews on certiorari are limited to errors of law. Unless there is a showing that the findings of the
lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous, this Court will not analyze or
weigh evidence all over again.10

Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr. Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which
then covered Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and for the issuance of
letters testamentary to respondent.

Regarding the third and fourth issues, we note that Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own
will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. – …

If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice shall be sent only to his
compulsory heirs.

In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr. Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher’s
children from his previous marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate
proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent’s petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary and she also filed a motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the denial of her motion
to dismiss. We are convinced petitioner was accorded every opportunity to defend her cause.
Therefore, petitioner’s allegation that she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is
without basis.

As a final word, petitioner should realize that the allowance of her husband’s will is conclusive only
as to its due execution.11 The authority of the probate court is limited to ascertaining whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law.12 Thus, petitioner’s claim of title to the properties forming part of her husband’s estate should
be settled in an ordinary action before the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated July 31, 2003
and Resolution dated October 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55330, which
affirmed the Order dated September 29, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Makati City, in
SP Proc. No. M-2330 are AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 79-93. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate
Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Arturo D. Brion concurring.

2 Id. at 95.

3 CA rollo, pp. 81-85. Penned by Judge Lucia Violago Isnani.

4 Rollo, p. 167.

5 Id. at 79-80.

6 Id. at 93.

7 Id. at 459-460.

8 Additional Requisites for Petitions Filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints. Effective April 1,
1994.

9Additional Requisites for Civil Complaints, Petitions and Other Initiatory Pleadings Filed in
All Courts and Agencies, Other Than the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, to
Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Such Pleadings. Effective April 1, 1994.

10Quezon City Government v. Dacara, G.R. No. 150304, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 243,
245.

11 Civil Code, Article 838.

Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

xxxx

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the
testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

12 Maloles II v. Phillips, G.R. Nos. 129505 & 133359, January 31, 2000, 324 SCRA 172, 180.

G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982

RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No.
12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs. Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta".

Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:

On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She
left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:

xxx xxx xxx

It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay
and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my death by
Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for around the
last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me.
... I have found peace and happiness with them even during the time when my
sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being troubled by my
nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like
me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for myself. I do not
consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things against my will.

xxx xxx xxx

On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent
with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred
to as the Testate Case).

On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the
sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First
Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case" for
brevity).

On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch
XI, presided by respondent Judge.

Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the
holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and,
therefore, intestacy should ensue. In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited
the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs.
Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878). 1

In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case
for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the
extrinsic validity of the will; and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent. 2

On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case in this wise:

For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta
which the Court finds meritorious, the petition for probate of will filed by Soledad L.
 Maninang and which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.

On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the same
Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia
Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is
not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the
duties of the trust. "

Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals alleging
that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case
(September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsideration (December 19, 1980).

On April 28, 1981, respondent Court 3 denied certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of
dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the
proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of. Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower
Court committed errors in issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only by
appeal and not by Certiorari. 'Thus, this Petition before us.

We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismissed the Testate
Case. Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.

No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. 4

The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated
and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be
rendered nugatory. 5

Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.

... The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which
the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by
implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be
impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The que0stions
relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the
will has been authenticated .... 6

Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if
the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law. 7

Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid 8, reading:

In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. However,
where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
 upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue. (Emphasis
supplied)

Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez 9 had a similar thrust:

The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an Idle
ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.

The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic validity of
the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so
demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the
intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or
not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the
Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.

Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely
preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is
whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or
disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are
two diverse concepts.

... Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited." (Neri
vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition
depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a cause authorized
by law." (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, "An Outline of Philippine Civil Law",
1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition
upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary" (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de
Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volume 2.o p. 1131). 10

The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.

... The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Pretention under Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the
institution of heir. This annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition,
testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective
disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also
"annul the institution of heirs", but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172). Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. 11

By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been
thoroughly considered. We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that
respondent Bernardo has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that
conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso 12

... it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied
legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary
succession will be shaken to its foundation, ...

Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that respondent
Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, certiorari is a proper
remedy. An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected
by Certiorari. 13 And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in
the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal
would not afford speedy and adequate relief.

WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of First Instance-
Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified. Special
Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch XI. Rizal,
therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana and Relova JJ., concur.

Vasquez, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., I concur.

Footnotes

1 pp, 23-33, CA Rollo.

2 pp. 34-36, Ibid.

3 Special Fifth Division composed of Justices B. S. de la Fuente, Oscar R. Victoriano

and Onofre A. Villaluz, ponente.

4 Art. 838, Civil Code.

5 Guevarra vs. Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479 (1943).

6 Montañano vs. Suesa 14 Phil. 676 (1909).

7 Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220.

8 17 SCRA 449 (1966).

9 64 SCRA 452 (1975).

 10 Nuguid vs. Nuguid, supra .

11 ibid.

12 46 SCRA 538 (1972).

13 Llamas vs. Moscoso, 95 Phil. 599 (1954).

G.R. No. 118680 March 5, 2001

MARIA ELENA RODRIGUEZ PEDROSA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE, CARMEN, MERCEDES & RAMON, all surnamed
RODRIGUEZ, ROSALINA RODRIGUEZ, CHAN LUNG FAI, MATEO TAN TE, TE ENG SUY,
LORETA TE, VICTORIO S. DETALIA, JEROME DEIPARINE, PETRONILO S. DETALIA, HUBERT
CHIU YULO, PATERIO N. LAO, LORENSITA M. PADILLA, IMMACULATE CONCEPCION
COLLEGE AND LILIAN EXPRESS, INC. and TIO TUAN, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1994 which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, of Ozamiz City in Civil Case No. OZ-1397.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings
before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez
Pedrosa. On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the
adopted child of Miguel and Rosalina.

On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the
estate of Miguel.

On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before
the CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as
OZ 349.

On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter,
the private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.

On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister,
Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs
except his brothers and sisters.

The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total
area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes,
Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226
square meters of parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9,
respectively.1 The total land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able
to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the
other respondents herein.2

Lots 504-A-6, 504-B-3 and 504-C-4, portions of Parcel 3, designated as Lot 504, were transferred to
respondents Chuan Lung Fai,3 but not included in the Deed of Settlement and Partition, were
transferred to respondent Lilian Express, Inc. and are now registered under TCT No. T-11337.
Parcel 6, Lot 560, was subdivided among Ramon, Jose, Carmen and Mercedes and was designated
as Lots 560-A, 560-B, 560-C, 560-D and 560-E. Lot 560-A covering 500 square meters was
transferred to respondent Victorino Detall4 and was subsequently transferred to Jerome Deiparine
who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-10706. Lot 560-B with 500 square meters was
transferred to respondent Petronilo Detalla5 and was later transferred to respondent Hubert Chiu
Yulo who registered it under his name under TCT No. T-11305. Lot 560-C was transferred and
registered under the name of respondent Paterio Lao with TCT No. T-10206. Lot 560-D was sold to
and subsequently registered in the name of Lorensita M. Padilla under TCT No. T-10207. The
remaining portion, Lot 560-E consisting of 43,608 square meters was bought by respondent
Immaculate Concepcion College and was registered in its name under TCT No. T-10208.6

On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa
filed a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but
upheld the validity of the adoption of petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from
the Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they
were not their blood relatives.

Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on
January 28, 1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation
"that earnest efforts toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but
the same failed."7

The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Its ruling was premised on the following grounds:8

1) that the participation of Rosalina has already estopped her from questioning the validity of
the partition, and since she is already estopped, it naturally follows that Maria Elena, her
successor-in-interest, is likewise estopped, applying Article 1439 of the Civil Code;

2) that the appeal of Maria Elena and her claim that the partition is null and void is weakened
by her inconsistent claim that the partition would have been alright had she been given a
more equitable share;

3) the action is essentially an action for rescission and had been filed late considering that it
was filed beyond the 4 year period provided for in Article 1100 of the Civil Code;9

4) that fraud and/or bad faith was never established.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated December 20, 1994.10
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner asserts that the following errors were allegedly committed
by the Court of Appeals in -

I. ……FINDING THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION ENTERED INTO BY

DEFENDANT JUREDINI AND DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS RODRIGUEZES WAS VALID AND
BINDING UPON THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WHO DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN SAID
TRANSACTION

II. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAVE ALREADY

PRESCRIBED TWO (2) YEARS AFTER PUBLICATION OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
AND PARTITION IN THE NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION

III. ...…CONCLUDING THAT THE CLAIM OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT IS BARRED OR

ESTOPPED IN FILING THIS CASE (sic) IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL IN CIVIL
CASE NO. OZ 349 INTERPOSED BY HEREIN DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES WHO WERE THEN
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS IN AC [C]-G.R. NO. SP-00208

IV. ……SUSTAINING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEES' CLAIM THAT AS THEY HAVE NOT AS

YET RECOGNIZED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AS AN ADOPTED DAUGHTER OF MIGUEL
RODRIGUEZ IT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THEM TO HAVE HER PARTICIPATE IN THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, EXHIBITS "S" AND "I"

V. ……CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT HAD NOT CONCLUSIVELY SHOWN

THAT MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE LANDS SOLD AND HENCE IT
FOLLOWS THAT SHE HAS NO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION OF THOSE LANDS

VI. ……FINDING THAT PORTION OF LOTS NOS. 504 AND 560 SOLD TO THE OTHER
DEFENDANTS–APPELLEES WERE CLEAN AND FREE FROM ENCUMBRANCES OR ANY
FLAWS HENCE WERE VALID

VII. ……FINDING THAT THE PLANTIFF–APPELLANT NEVER APPEARED IN COURT TO

TESTIFY OR REBUT THE ASSERTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS–APPELLANTS THAT THERE
WAS A VALID PARTITION

VIII. ……AWARDING PLAINTIFF–APPELLANT DAMAGES FOR THE INCOME OF HER SHARE IN

THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION11

In sum, the issues to be resolved in our view are (1) whether or not the complaint for annulment of
the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" had already prescribed; (2) whether or not said
deed is valid; and (3) whether or not the petitioner is entitled to recover the lots which had already
been transferred to the respondent buyers.

Petitioner argues that the complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial partition has not yet prescribed
since the prescriptive period which should be applied is four years following the case of Beltran vs.
Ayson, 4 SCRA 69 (1962). She also avers that Sec. 4, Rule 74 which provides for a two-year
prescriptive period needs two requirements. One, the party assailing the partition must have been
given notice, and two, the party assailing the partition must have participated therein. Petitioner
insists these requirements are not present in her case,12 since she did not participate in the "Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition." She cites Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963), where we
held that a deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge and consent to the same, is fraudulent. She asserts that she is an adoptive daughter and
thus an heir of Miguel.13
Petitioner also contends that the respondent buyers were buyers in bad faith since they failed to
exercise the necessary due diligence required before purchasing the lots in question.14 In the
alternative, petitioner wants to redeem the said lots as a co-owner of respondent Rodriguezes under
the provisions of Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.15

Lastly, petitioner asserts that she will suffer lesion if the partition would be allowed. She asks for the
rescission of the said partitioning under Articles 165-175 of the Civil Code.16

Respondents, in response, claim that the action of petitioner had already prescribed. In addition,
they argue that petitioner, Maria Elena, and Rosalina already have their shares in the estate of
Miguel Rodriguez reflected in the compromise agreement they entered into with the respondent
Rodriguezes in AC- G.R. SP 00208. Finally, respondents aver that the non-participation of Maria
Elena in the extrajudicial partition was understandable since her status as an adopted child was then
under litigation. In any case, they assert that the shares of Miguel's heirs were adequately protected
in the said partition.17

Section 4, Rule 7418 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons who have participated
or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in addition (2) when the provisions of
Section 119 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through
guardians.20

Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial partition. Patently then, the
two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case.

The applicable prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11
SCRA 153 (1964), which held that:

[The action to annul] a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud...may be
filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have
taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates
of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.21

Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on January 28, 1987, or three years and
ten months after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983, was executed, we
hold that her action against the respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed.

Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the applicable rule on publication of extrajudicial
settlement. It states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of

general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.22

Under said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates a notice which
must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a
notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and
partition, not after, which was when publication was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and
the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the
settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of extrajudicial partition is
sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and
vicious.23 Maria Elena is an heir of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the
lone descendant of Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his
estate, following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code.24 The private respondent
Rodriguezes cannot claim that they were not aware of Maria Elena's adoption since they even filed
an action to annul the decree of adoption. Neither can they claim that their actions were valid since
the adoption of Maria Elena was still being questioned at the time they executed the deed of
partition. The complaint seeking to annul the adoption was filed only twenty six (26) years after the
decree of adoption, patently a much delayed response to prevent Maria Elena from inheriting from
her adoptive parents. The decree of adoption was valid and existing. With this factual setting, it is
patent that private respondents executed the deed of partition in bad faith with intent to defraud
Maria Elena.

In the case of Segura vs. Segura, the Court held:

This section [referring to section 4, Rule 74] provides in gist that a person who has been
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as
creditor, must assert his claim within two years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement
of such estate under Sections 1 and 2 respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will
be precluded from doing so as the right will have prescribed.

It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null
and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The
partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were
entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was
not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed
after two years from its execution in 1941.25

To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena,
the adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her
own interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate
automatically vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did
not include Miguel's estate but only Pilar's estate.

Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we
are constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to
be recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is
the doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for such purpose.26

Petitioner asks for the award of damages. No receipts, agreements or any other documentary
evidence was presented to justify such claim for damages. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.27 The same is true for
moral damages. These cannot be awarded in the absence of any factual basis.28 The
unsubstantiated testimony of Loreto Jocelyn Pedrosa is hearsay and has no probative value. It is
settled in jurisprudence that damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay
evidence.29 Nonetheless, the failure of the petitioner to substantiate her claims for damages does not
mean that she will be totally deprived of any damages. Under the law, nominal damages are
awarded, so that a plaintiff's right, which has been invaded or violated by defendants may be
vindicated and recognized.30

Considering that (1) technically, petitioner sustained injury but which, unfortunately, was not
adequately and properly proved, (2) petitioner was unlawfully deprived of her legal participation in
the partition of the estate of Miguel, her adoptive father, (3) respondents had transferred portions of
the properties involved to third parties, and (4) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, we
find it reasonable to grant in petitioner's favor nominal damages in recognition of the existence of a
technical injury.31 The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least commensurate to the
injury sustained by the petitioner considering the concept and purpose of said damages.32Such
award is given in view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in this
case.33 Thus, the grant of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS to petitioner as
damages is proper in view of the technical injury she has suffered.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by
private respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby
awarded to petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay
the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit "S," Plaintiffs Folder of Exhibits, pp. 87-91.

2 CA Records, pp. 5-7.

3 Spelled as "Chan Lung Fai" in petition.3 Mateo Tan Te, Te Eng Suy, Loreta Te and Tio
Tuan. These lots are now covered by TCT No. T-11358. Lots 504-A-5 and 504-B-1, included
in Parcel

4 Referred to as "Victorio Detalia in petition.

5 Referred to as Petronilo Detalia" in petition.

6 Ibid.

7 Rollo, p. 31.

8 CA Records, pp. 149-151

9The Court of Appeals mistakenly considered March 25, 1987 as the date when complaint
was fild when in fact, as the records will show, it was filed on January 28, 1987.
10In the said Resolution, the Court of Appeals retracted on its previous ruling that the
complaint was filed on March 25, 1987 and corrected itself by stating that the complaint was
indeed filed on January 28, 1997. However, it still held that the action had already prescribed
since the prescription period is not four (4) years (as it previously stated), but rather, it was
two (2) years, as provided for in Section 4 of Rule 74.

11 Rollo, pp. 36-38.

12 Id. at 40-43.

13 Id. at 44-51.

14 Id. at 51-53.

15 Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of
all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation
is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only the reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do
so in proportion to the shares they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

16 Articles 1098-1100, NCC.

17 Rollo, pp. 162-163.

18Sec. 4. Liability of distributees and estate – If it shall appear at any time within two (2)
years after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may compel
the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for the purpose
of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two (2) years, it shall
appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, or that
an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation payable in
money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after
hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in
what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue
execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or
against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such bond and such real estate
shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons for the full period of
two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate that may
have been made.

19 Now sections 1 and 2.

20Beltran vs. Ayson, 4 SCRA 69, 72 (1962), citing Sampillo, et. al vs. Court of Appeals, et.
al., 55 Off. Gaz., July 27, 1959, pp. 5775-5777, citing McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil.
211 (1912), underline supplied.

21Citing Mauricio vs. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959; underline for emphasis
supplied.
 22 Section 1, Rule 74, Rules of Court, underline supplied.

23 Villaluz vs. Neme, 7 SCRA 27, 30 (1963).

24Article 1003, in relation to Article 979, 2nd par.; Also, see annotations of Jurado in
"Comments and Jurisprudence on Succession", 1991 8th ed., p. 444.

25 Segura vs. Segura, 165 SCRA 368, 373 (1988).

26 Halili vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 257 SCRA 174, 184 (1996).

27 Marina Properties Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 273, 286 (1998).

28 Brent Hospital, Inc. vs. NLRC, 292 SCRA 304, 311 (1998).

29PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402, 425
(1998).

30 Lufthansa German Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 600, 616 (1995).

31PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA, supra, note 28 at 426, citing, Robes-
Francisco Realty and Development Corp. vs. CFI of Rizal (Br.34), 86 SCRA 59, 65 (1978).

32 China Air Lines, Ltd. vs. CA, 185 SCRA 449, 460 (1990).

33 PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA, supra, note 30.

G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989

BEATRIZ DE ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR IBAÑEZ VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, Administratrix,
ANTONIO DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA
JAVIER, respondents.

Basilio H. Toquero for petitioner.

Senen S. Ceniza for respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, We are asked to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on September 19, 1977 in CA-G.R. No. 53197-R 1 which affirmed the order of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City dated March 26, 1973, issued in Special
Proceedings Q-325, entitled "Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.". 2

Respondent administratrix, Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, is the surviving spouse of Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Sr., while petitioner Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes and the other heirs of said
estate, namely, Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique de Zuzuarregui and Jose de Zuzuarregui, are
the illegitimate children of the decedent. The parties herein are the only heirs of the deceased whose
estate was the subject of said settlement proceedings. Petitioner was the daughter of the deceased
by a mother different from that of his aforesaid three (3) sons, their mother being Pacita Javier who
was the niece of the herein respondent administratrix. 3

According to the project of partition dated June 17, 1958 and approved by the probate court, the
respective shares of said heirs in the real estate left by the deceased are as follows: Pilar Ibañez
Vda. de Zuzuarregui, 12/16 thereof, inclusive of 1/2 of said assets which pertains to her share in the
conjugal partnership; Beatriz, 1/16; Antonio, Jr., 1/16; Enrique, 1/16; and Jose, 1/16. 4

Among the real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land covered by and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 located in Antipolo, Rizal. In said project of partition, its area is
stated as 83,781 square meters, with an assessed value of P6,430.00. This statement of said area
was repeated in said document four time, 5 that is, in adjudicating the corresponding portions of said
land to Pilar (12/15), Antonio, Jr. (1/15). Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15). 6 The petitioner did not have
a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she relinquished her right thereto "in lieu of her
bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property." 7

On January 29, 1973, the respondent administratrix and the other three distributees filed a motion to
reopen Special Proceedings No. Q-325 for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error
in the description of the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 since,
according to them, the correct land area is 803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781 square
meters. 8 The heirs of Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes filed their opposition to said motion. 9

The court a quo issued the contested order, with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE,

(1) Sp. Proceeding No. Q-325 entitled, The Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Sr. is ordered opened for the purpose of correcting a clerical error in the
description of the parcel of land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643;

(2) The area of land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643 be corrected by cancelling 83,781
sq. meters and changing it to 803,781.51 sq. meters to conform with the description
of land area in T.C.T. No. 42643;

(3) That said corrections be made as pages 3, 6, 9, 10, and 12 of the project of
Partition. 10

As already stated, the affirmance of said order by the Court of Appeals eventuated in the elevation of
the controversy to Us under the present recourse.

It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission
plainly due to inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has
been entered. The correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no
amendment or correction may be made by the court in its judgment once the latter had become
final. 11 The court may make this amendment ex parte and, for this purpose, it may resort to the
pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions of law as expressed in
the body of the decision. 12
However, according to the petitioner, there was no such clerical error. While it is not disputed that
the area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 is 803,781.15 square meters, the
petitioner insists that "the area intended by the heirs of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., in the
Project of Partition as approved by the trial court is the area of 83,781 sq. m. and not 803,781,51 sq.
m. 13

She claims that she would not have relinquished her share in said parcel of land if the true area was
not fraudulently concealed from her at the time the project of partition was executed. 14 She further
contends that the fact that the description of the area as 83,781 square meters was repeated several
times is sufficient evidence to show that such was the area intended in the project of partition. 15

Such contentions are without merit. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb, much less to reverse,
the factual finding of the lower court that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by
inadvertence in the project of partition.

That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle
the entire estate of the deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to
intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided
because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the community of interests in properties held by
co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.

It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and
complete adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire
area of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by
the queries of the respondents, if the intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication
and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is it that they did not make any further disposition
of the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound reason would the heirs have in
holding in suspense the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters? 16

Besides, petitioner suggests that she and the male heirs could not see eye to eye because they did
not have a common mother. 17 If so, this supposed antagonism would even be a compelling reason
for the parties to insist on the total partition of all the properties in the first instance, rather than for
them to remain as co-owners for a long time. As hereinbefore indicated, the project of partition is
dated June 17, 1958, 18 while the motion to re-open the proceedings was filed only on January 29,
1973.

If We were to indulge petitioner in her stand that the area of 803,781 square meters was typewritten
in the document as 83,781 square meters, not because of the typist's error in omitting the number
"0" between the numbers "8" and "3" in the first three digits but because the latter area of only
83,781 square meters was the one intended for distribution, then the irresistible question would be
how and why the parties arrived at that particular latter figure. It will be observed that such a portion
would constitute only 10.42336% of the total land area covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
42643. On top of this, the assumed area of 83,781 square meters has still to be divided into fifteen
(15) parts to arrive at the aliquot portions of 12/15 and 1/15 of the other heirs in this particular
property. Why would the parties deliberately create such an unlikely mathematical situation which
would complicate the actual physical segregation of the area supposed to be distributed?

It is, therefore, a logical and credible explanation that the omission of the zero between the figures
"8" and "3" converted "803,781" to "83,781", a product purely of clerical oversight. Petitioner has not
offered any plausible contrary explanation. Parenthetically, she had the assistance of legal counsel
in the intestate proceedings and in the preparation of the project of partition.19
Petitioner's lamentations of injustice in the partition are demonstrably unfounded. It will be observed
that according to her own computation, 20 she received her 1/16 share in the estate consisting of
279,803 square meters of land, while her half brothers received on the average 154,975.11 square
meters each. Even if the supposed shares of the respondents in the remaining 720.000 square
meters in the lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 were to be added, the share of
each brother would be only 202,975. 11 square meters. There would not be a substantial difference
in value since the petitioner received 190,000 square meters of land located also in Antipolo, Rizal;
while in Balara, Quezon City, she received more than her half brothers, that is, 75,803 square
meters as against their individual 74,309.70 square meters. It was only in Pasong Tamo where she
received slightly less, 14,000 square meters compared to Enrique's and Jose's 14,115 square
meters each, but more than Antonio, Jr.'s 13,621 square meters.

The ineluctable consequence of the foregoing considerations is that, both in law and equity, the
court a quo and the respondent court committed no error prejudicial to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Special Fifth Division; Justice Luis B. Reyes, ponente, and Justices Jose C.
Bautista and Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., concurring. Rollo, 27-37.

2 Judge Jose C. Campos, presiding, Record on Appeal, 33- 35.

3 Petition, Annex C, 7; Rollo, 33 65.

4 Ibid., Ibid., 30-31.

5 In Item 14 on p. 6, item 15 on p. 9, item 1 1 on p. 10 and item 1 1 on p. 12, Record

on Appeal, 5-7.

6 Ibid., Ibid.; 31-33.

7 Record on Appeal, 24-25.

8 Ibid., 4-9.

9 Ibid., 11-17.

10 Ibid., 34-35.

11 Ang Lin Chi vs. Castelo, et al., 83 Phil. 263 (1949); Presbitero vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 129 SCRA 443 (1984); Rebuldela, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., 155 SCRA 520 (1987).
 12 Filipino Legion Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 56 SCRA 674 (1974);
Presbitero vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra; Republic Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.,
et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 152 SCRA 309 (1987).

13 Rollo, 22.

14 Ibid., 21, 70.

15 Brief for Appellant, 21-22.

16 Memorandum for Respondents, 7-8; Rollo, 49.

17 Rollo, 70.

18 Ibid., 30.

19 Memorandum for Respondents, 8-9; Rollo, 49.

20 Annex B, Petition; Rollo, 38-39.

G.R. No. 156407 January 15, 2014

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD
V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of
their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its
determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the
conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

Antecedents

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V.
Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his
two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M.
Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in
Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu
Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and
sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to
Mervir Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-
CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14,
1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time
of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25
in all, consisting of cash of ₱32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth ₱20,000.00; pieces of jewelry
valued at ₱15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth ₱6,585,585.80; and 30 shares
of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱22,708.25.2

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma
moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The
RTC granted Thelma’s motion through the order of January 8, 1993.

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993,3 supporting her
inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock;4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties
with the market value of ₱4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with
total par value of ₱4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱30,000.00.6

On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the
inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or
comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had submitted.

On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of
the inventory.7

On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to
examine Teresita on the inventory.

With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what
properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing
on that issue.8

Ruling of the RTC

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an
order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that
should be included, and accordingly ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby denies the
administratrix’s motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to
re-do the inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio
S. Mercado by including therein the properties mentioned in the last five immediately preceding
paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty (60) days from notice of this
order.

The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate
of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must render such
accounting within sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.9

On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of
the order of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353
located in Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the possession of and registered in the
name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.

On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent
reason for the reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the
issue of what properties should be included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them
from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.

Decision of the CA

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the
inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to
Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse
orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari,
stating:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION

(sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL
PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME
TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.

II

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION

(sic) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL
PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE
NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN
THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO.

III

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF
WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE
LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows:13

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The

assailed Orders dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar
as the inclusion of parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of
53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the
various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and
January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned and
affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of
the RTC directing a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the
Civil Code, to the effect that the ownership of the thing sold "shall be transferred to the vendee" upon
its "actual and constructive delivery," and to Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale
made through a public instrument was equivalent to the delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by
Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to Mervir Realty because the
deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had thereby
ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to
Mervir Realty as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the
difference that in the Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of
land were included"; that as to the January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been
"even at the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of
Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary consideration through shares of
stock"; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment dated January 10,
1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory "considering that there is nothing
wrong or objectionable about the estate planning scheme"; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also
had no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the
name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system should be
afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had
transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that
the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from
questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which
properties should be included in the inventory.

The CA further opined as follows:

In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from
questioning its jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its
jurisdiction of determining what properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be
submitted by the administratrix, because actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court clearly shows that
petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for which they
are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March
14, 2001 denying the administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which were
already titled and in possession of a third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private
corporation, which under the law possessed a personality distinct and separate from its
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the
presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand
undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the
applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court
was not merely acting in a limited capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed
to adjudge competent evidence that would have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate
fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of a corporation, the wrongdoing
must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.14

On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15

Issue

Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate
shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Was certiorari the proper recourse

to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?

The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action
for certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.

Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.

The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed
orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court
distinguished between final and interlocutory orders as follows:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more
to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not
completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order
deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does
the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary
injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The
reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during
the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits
of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions
raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An
interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil
action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted
to.

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory
and the order dated May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is
because the inclusion of the properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the concomitant determination of the ownership
as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional and subject to revision at
anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to
the effect that the order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was
interlocutory and could be changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration
proceedings, held that the order of exclusion was not a final but an interlocutory order "in the sense
that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots." The Court observed
there that:

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)

To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a "probate
court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally," and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of Appeals, that the "patent reason is the
probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result
in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action."
Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:

All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If
there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate
court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against
the assailed orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41,
Rules of Court,21 which also governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the
judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that completely disposes of the case, or of
a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable" may be the subject of an
appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution (interlocutory
because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that
material issues may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1,
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be
resorted to in special proceedings, viz:

Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may
appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person,
or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the
rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of
a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the
person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for
reconsideration.

Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances
in which multiple appeals are permitted.

II

Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion

in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?

In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for
including properties in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty
by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of
Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.

Was the CA correct in its conclusion?

The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion,
ignored the law and the facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the
discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the
person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC
becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of
the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to submit
the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83
of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months
after his appointment every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or
knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance
tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which
has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the
administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1
allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to
the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of
another person or entity.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the
decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or
the administrator, and in making a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate."23Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what properties should
be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in
order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded
from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the
estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts
should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there
has been a positive abuse of discretion."25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited.
The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed
to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to
determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered
by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the Court said in
Agtarap v. Agtarap:26

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special
and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate
proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed
to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to
final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to
the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then
the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion
of the properties in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:

In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs
of Severina Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of
properties submitted in Court in Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided
among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while being examined in Court by the counsel for the
petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in this case the shares of
Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting
Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of
properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.

In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that
she did not include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her
name and which were paid by her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her
husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being
conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof should be included in the inventory of
the estate of her husband.

In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she
had a bank account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive.
Again, the money in said bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-half
thereof should be included in the inventory of the properties constituting as estate of her husband.

In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-
657-D located in Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is
still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now. When it was the subject of Civil Case
No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of the late Emigdio
Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the
said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when
he testified in Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the
inventory in this case.

Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S.
Mercado to Mervir Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment
signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a
transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days before he died on January 12, 1991. A
transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that the transferor has not
long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909). Section 78
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall
be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So,
the inventory to be approved in this case should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado
which were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides, the said properties actually
appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months after his
death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31, 1991
(Exhibit O).28

Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant
to the procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations
indicated that the directive to include the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and
valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.

Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included
in the inventory because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by
Emigdio.

Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
in August 3, 1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the
settlement of Emigdio’s estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal
partnership of gains. The party asserting that specific property acquired during that property regime
did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the burden of proof, and that party must
prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and convincing evidence.30 In the
absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of Emigdio and
Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that
pertained to the estate of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.

Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the
RTC made findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had
involved the ownership of Lot 3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name. Indeed, the
1âwphi1

RTC noted in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained
registered in the name of Emigdio.

Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of
interest in Civil Case No. CEB-12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the
effect that the heirs of Emigdio could have already threshed out their differences with the assistance
of the trial court. This interpretation was probable considering that Mervir Realty, whose business
was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita herself as its President. In other
words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.

Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a
notarized instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties
involved. A notarized deed of sale only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its
execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal efficacy of the transaction under the
deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of
regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an
instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties
thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the
true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)

It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real
properties owned by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of
assignment two days prior to his death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on
his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was a finding about Emigdio having been
sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA correctly characterized the
exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be
established in court.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty
could not be a valid basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the
circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of
titles to lands. However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear
1âwphi1

the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of
his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens
system is to quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title,
except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.35

Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991,
such lots should still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the
assistance of the RTC itself, to test and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might have constricted the determination of the
rights to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the RTC as intestate court
from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is because the
RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still "deemed to
have all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective."37

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important
purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the
Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to
"bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the
partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the
decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the
RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent by
authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any
compulsory heir by the decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate
properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its
determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it
was best to include all properties in the possession of the administrator or were known to the
administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that could turn out in the end to
be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its
orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or
board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14,
2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in
Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the
late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case; and ORDERS the
respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes

1
Instead of administratrix, the gender-fair term administrator is used.

2
Rollo, p. 118.

3
Id. at 125.

4
Id. at 127-129.

5
Id. at 130.

6
Id. at 134.

7
Id. at 56.

8
Id. at 135.

9
Id. at 140.

10
Id. at 24.

11
Id. at 156.

12
Id. at 25.

Id. at 21-34; penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired), and concurred
13

by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired/deceased) and Associate Justice

Amelita G. Tolentino.

14
Rollo, pp. 32-33.

15
Rollo, p. 35.

16
G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 553, 566-567.

17
No. L-39532, July 20, 1979, 91 SCRA 540.

18
Id. at 545-546.

19
G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 216, 226-227.

20
G.R. No. 75773, April 17, 1990, 184 SCRA 367, 372.

21
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (as amended under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC;
effective December 27, 2007) provides:

Section 1. Subject of appeal.— An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final

order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
 No appeal may be taken from:

(a) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment;

(b) An interlocutory order;

(c) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal;

(d) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent, confession or

compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;

(e) An order of execution;

(f) A judgment or final order for or against one or more of several parties or in
separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the
main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and

(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.

In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action as provided in Rule 65.

22
The word all means "every one, or the whole number of particular; the whole number" (3
Words and Phrases 212, citing State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 66 Me. 488, 510). Standing
alone, the word all means exactly what it imports; that is, nothing less than all (Id. at 213,
citing In re Staheli’s Will, 57 N.Y.S.2d 185, 188).

23
Siy Chong Keng v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 493, 500 (1934).

24
71 Phil. 66 (1940).

25
Id. at 68.

26
G.R. No. 177099, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 455.

Id. at 471-473, citing, among others, Coca v. Pizarras Vda. De Pangilinan, No. L-27082,
27

January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 278, 283; Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14
SCRA 892, 899; Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227 (1948); and Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil.
561 (1942).

28
Rollo, pp. 139-140.

29
See. FAMILY CODE, Art. 105, 116.

Dewara v. Lamela, G.R. No. 179010, April 11, 2011, 647 SCRA 483, 490, citing Coja v.
30

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151153, December 10, 2007, 539 SCRA 517, 528.

31
See Alvarez v. Espiritu, No. L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899.
 San Juan v. Offril, G.R. No. 154609, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 439, 445-446 citing
32

Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652.

G.R. No. 114950, December 19, 1995, 251 SCRA 430, 452-453, cited in Nazareno v.
33

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138842, October 18, 2000, 343 SCRA 637, 652.

34
Rollo, p. 138.

Rabaja Ranch Development Corporation v. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits

35

System, G.R. No. 177181, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 201, 217, citing Republic v. Guerrero,
G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424, 445.

Reyes-Mesugas v. Reyes, G.R. No. 174835, March 22, 2010, 616 SCRA 345, 350, citing
36

Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62431-33, August 3, 1984,
131 SCRA 606.

37
Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra at 621.

38
Gregorio v. Madarang, G.R. No. 185226, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 340, 345.

Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 153852, October 24,
39

2012, 684 SCRA 410, 422-423.

G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA,
Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA,
namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P.
YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN,
namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed
PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978

FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,

vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her
Children, claimants-appellees.

Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for appellants.

Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether
belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or
in a separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the
litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.

Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of
August 13, 1969.

The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They
possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or
Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.

One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of
Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the
registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).

The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by
OCT No. P-8419 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented
by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
L-27082).

According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight
hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and
1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on
Appeal).

The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria,
Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who
died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of
Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is
not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the
deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).

Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on
September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan
and Teresa Magtuba.

On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined
areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:

(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or
CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in
accordance with the lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No.
2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L-27082), three hectares which
should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;

(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361
hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-B;
 (c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated
as Lot No. 1112-C, and presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on
Appeal).

(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No.
1927 and the remainder of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No.
1112-D.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the
estate to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for
each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that
amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.

The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They
contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963
which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112;
that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition;
that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while
that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.

The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the
estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the
ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six
hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded
from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action.

On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they
asked that Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be
included in the project of partition.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the
project of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of
the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve
hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.

That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the
lower court did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima
Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.

That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and
the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower
court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was
sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and
3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that decision in its resolution of
July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.

The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of
the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of
P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was
appropriated by the special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the
evidence.

In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965
that the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her
estate. The court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover
any amount due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the
amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in
its approval of the accounting of the special administrator.

The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed
from those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).

The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve
hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title
to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate.
proceeding.

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re
jurisdiction over the issue).

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-
42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions
justified by expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its
final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs.
Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs.
Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).

We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of
title should be ventilated in a separate action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be
forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine
the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in
the intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein
they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in
support of their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the
share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the
said portion, their claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the
Pangilinan spouses.

Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer
the motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the
ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to
support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan
and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the
expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.

After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the
probate court should receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs.
Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of
deciding what portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for
the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp.
26- 27, Record on Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.

After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan
spouses should include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be
allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112,
made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.

Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case
No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding
those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares
from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated
May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate
to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.

A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no
amicable settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within
thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines
already set forth. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Santos, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO
NIERRAS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN
RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of
the Decision1dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order2 dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June
2003 whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late
Gerardo Tan.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private
respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-
0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an
Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need
for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can
be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their
attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners
filed an Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private
respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country.
Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or
competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto
administratrix of his estate since his death.

On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives
to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix, to wit:

b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account of
the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully belong to
the estate of the decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;

b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all
sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or
about to undertake, which belong to the estate of the decedent;
 b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a
financial report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or
deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses incurred in course of her administration and other
relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which
submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as above-required.3

More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents’ Urgent Ex-
parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of
Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order4 appointing
Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, the fallo of which states:

Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby
GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall
immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his
filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court.5

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of
kin of the deceased.

On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive
Judge, issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. 1avvphi1

Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the
17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilma’s right to be appointed as special
administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special
administrator thereof.

On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners’ Petition. On 6
December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed
by petitioners, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING
and DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special
Proceeding No. 4014-0.7

On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the
following errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
THEIR FATHER’S ESTATE.

II.
 THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’ PLEA FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT.8

On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution9 denying the Petition on the ground of late
filing, failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and
proof of such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit for the
Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriff’s fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioners, however, this Court issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution10 reinstating the
Petition.

Petitioners contend11 that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since they
are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are
purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the
nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator
of the decedent’s estate.

Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in-fact
to administer Gerardo’s estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo "Jake" Tan (Jake) claim to have lived
for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardo’s estate, while respondents are not even in the
Philippines, having long established residence abroad.

Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the estate
since Gerardo’s death on 14 October 2000 and is thus "well steeped in the actual management and
operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings)."12

As regards the denial of petitioners’ plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
TRO, petitioners argue that such denial would leave Romualdo, private respondents’ attorney-in-
fact, free to enter Gerardo’s estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the prejudice of
petitioners.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
 (c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a
special administrator.13 The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of
kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable.14

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which
implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law.15

We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavez’s appointment of Romualdo as special
administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:

Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma
Tan in the latter’s capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court
all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the estate within five
days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit in the same
account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She was
likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the cash on hand, if any,
the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo
on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago. On May 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent ex
parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten days to comply with the
directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be
that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not
satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the
estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs.16 (Emphases supplied.)

Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special
administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special
administrator of Gerardo’s estate, the latter’s appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of
judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which
the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an
appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals could not
have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.

Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner
Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special
administratrix of Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial
requirements after the lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her
appointment.

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as
regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as
special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally
administer Gerardo’s estate.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may
take over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a
regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in
granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the
event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any
cause.18 The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the
estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs.19

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives
of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still
appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by
her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense
that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court
the income of Gerardo’s estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that
Gerardo’s estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification for
petitioner Vilma’s non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should
have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the court’s orders.

Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any
need to discuss petitioners’ arguments regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its
Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the
estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican with Associate Justices Elvi John S.
Asuncion and Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 22-26.

2 Issued by public respondent Executive Judge Francisco C. Gedorio, Jr. Records, p. 130.

3 Id. at 82.

4 Id. at 112-113.

5 Id. at 113.

6 Id. at 130.

7 Rollo, p. 26.

8 Id. at 15.

9 Id. at 110-111.

10 Id. at 135.
 11 Petitioners state in their Memorandum:

Petitioner Vilma Tan is Gerardo’s biological daughter; Jake and Geraldine Tan,
together with their late brother Christopher, are petitioner Vilma Tan’s biological
children who were adopted by Gerardo Tan via adoption proceedings docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 1386 at the Regional Trial Court Branch VII, Tacloban City, Leyte.

The late Christopher Tan died on October 28, 1994, when he was only seventeen
(17) years old. He was single when he died, he had no children and did not leave a
last will and testament. For this reason, his interests in the estate of the late Gerardo
Tan are represented by his biological mother, herein Petitioner Vilma Tan. (Rollo, p.
176.)

12 Id. at 8.

13Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 416, 419-420 (1953); Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407, 410
(1948); Heirs of Belinda Dalhlia Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, G.R. No. 162934, 11 November
2005, 474 SCRA 747, 757.

14 Pijuan v. De Gurrea, 124 Phil. 1527, 1531-1532 (1966).

Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006, 480 SCRA 411, 416;
15

Banal III v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 167474, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 164, 174.

16 Records, p. 113.

17 Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 477 (1998).

18 Section 1, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Appointment of special administrator.—When there is delay in granting

letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to
take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing
the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

19 De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr., G.R. No. L-48585, 31 March 1980, 96 SCRA 938, 945.

G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008

VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 May 2006, and its Resolution2 dated 28 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79205.
The antecedents are as follows:

On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag.3 Respondent alleged in the petition,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5994 (SP 5994), that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate
children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner
herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own.

On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of
which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers ₱100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.

Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the annotation of 5
September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to be the paraphernal
properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to the
respondent’s and her brothers’ prejudice.

Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the petition
using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las Vegas, Nevada,
USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is
presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true that she is planning to sell the properties.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit because respondent failed to state a cause of action.4

In a Motion5 dated 31 August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to
allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.
There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court’s time,
petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.

The Motion was denied in an Order6 dated 3 April 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in an Order7 dated 16 July 2003.

The appellate court, in a Decision8 dated 29 May 2006, upheld the denial of petitioner’s motion and
directed the trial court to proceed with the case with dispatch. The Court of Appeals ruled, in
essence, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action,
without need to state that she had been recognized and acknowledged as such. However,
respondent still has to prove her allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner has the right to refute the
allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in a Resolution9 dated 28 August 2006.

In her Petition10 17 dated September 2006, petitioner asserts that respondent should not be allowed
to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayag’s estate. If, following the case of Uyguanco v.
Court of Appeals,11 the claim of filiation may no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with
more reason that it should not be allowed to be proved in an action for the settlement of the
decedent’s estate. Thus, petitioner claims, respondent may no longer maintain an action to prove
that she is the illegitimate child of the decedent after the latter’s death.
Unfortunately, the two-page Comment,12 dated 17 April 2007, fails to shed any more light on the
present controversy.

The Reply13 dated 3 September 2007 reiterates the arguments in the petition.

The main issue in this case is deceptively simple. As crafted by the Court of Appeals, it is whether
respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action
considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent,
without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. The appellate
court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.

Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag,14 the Court defined an interested
party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent.

Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is
dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no longer be established, such
contingent interest does not make her an interested party. Here lies the complication in the case
which the appellate court had not discussed, although its disposition of the case is correct. 1av vphi1

Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn,
may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.

Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil register,
a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.15 The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further
court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought
during the lifetime of the putative parent.16 Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand,
may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parents.17

Petitioner’s thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayag’s death, respondent’s
illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedent’s estate which the Rules require to
be material and direct, may no longer be established. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that
respondent’s successional rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an
illegitimate child.

In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, supra, Graciano Uyguangco, claiming to be an illegitimate child of

the decedent, filed a complaint for partition against the latter’s wife and legitimate children. However,
an admission was elicited from him in the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial that he
had none of the documents mentioned in Article 27818 of the 1950 Civil Code to show that he was
the illegitimate son of the decedent. The wife and legitimate children of the decedent thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that he could no longer prove his alleged filiation
under the applicable provision of the Civil Code.

The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled
that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the
action was already barred by the death of the alleged father.

In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show
whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of
petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as
yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been
foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to
maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.

We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices
even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of
the facts alleged therein.19 Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the

decedent’s illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be material and direct.
The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling that,
"respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement
proceedings."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 May
2006 and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 16-23.

2 Id. at 25.

3 Records, pp. 2-6.

4 Id. at 18-22; Opposition dated March 30, 2001.

5 Id. at 68.

6 CA rollo, p. 12.

7 Id. at 13.

8 Rollo, pp. 16-22.

9 Id. at 25.

10 Id. at 3-14.

11 G.R. No. 76873, 26 October 1989, 178 SCRA 684.

12 Rollo, pp. 72-73.

13 Id. at 79-81.

14No. L-17759, 17 December 1962, 6 SCRA 874, citing Trillana v. Crisostom and Espinosa
v. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311 (1951).

15 Art. 175 in relation to Art. 172 and Art. 173, New Civil Code.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
 The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in
a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.

See also In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Delgado and
16

Guillermo Rustia, G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 334.

Divinagracia v. Bellosillo, No. L-47407, 12 August 1986, 143 SCRA 356.

17 Id.

18Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing.

19 Drilon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106922, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 13.

G.R. No. 174680 March 24, 2008

VICTORIA C. TAYAG, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 May 2006, and its Resolution2 dated 28 August 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79205.
The antecedents are as follows:

On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag.3 Respondent alleged in the petition,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5994 (SP 5994), that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate
children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner
herein, Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own.

On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of
which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent’s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give
respondent and her brothers ₱100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.

Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the annotation of 5
September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the properties to be the paraphernal
properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly intends to dispose of these properties to the
respondent’s and her brothers’ prejudice.

Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the petition
using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las Vegas, Nevada,
USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is
presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true that she is planning to sell the properties.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the suit because respondent failed to state a cause of action.4

In a Motion5 dated 31 August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and
presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to
allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child.
There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment upon the court’s time,
petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.

The Motion was denied in an Order6 dated 3 April 2003. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in an Order7 dated 16 July 2003.

The appellate court, in a Decision8 dated 29 May 2006, upheld the denial of petitioner’s motion and
directed the trial court to proceed with the case with dispatch. The Court of Appeals ruled, in
essence, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action,
without need to state that she had been recognized and acknowledged as such. However,
respondent still has to prove her allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner has the right to refute the
allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in a Resolution9 dated 28 August 2006.

In her Petition10 17 dated September 2006, petitioner asserts that respondent should not be allowed
to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayag’s estate. If, following the case of Uyguanco v.
Court of Appeals,11 the claim of filiation may no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with
more reason that it should not be allowed to be proved in an action for the settlement of the
decedent’s estate. Thus, petitioner claims, respondent may no longer maintain an action to prove
that she is the illegitimate child of the decedent after the latter’s death.
Unfortunately, the two-page Comment,12 dated 17 April 2007, fails to shed any more light on the
present controversy.

The Reply13 dated 3 September 2007 reiterates the arguments in the petition.

The main issue in this case is deceptively simple. As crafted by the Court of Appeals, it is whether
respondent’s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action
considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent,
without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. The appellate
court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child suffices.

Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag,14 the Court defined an interested
party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct, not merely
indirect or contingent.

Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is
dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no longer be established, such
contingent interest does not make her an interested party. Here lies the complication in the case
which the appellate court had not discussed, although its disposition of the case is correct. 1av vphi1

Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on
whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn,
may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition.

Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil register,
a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.15 The voluntary recognition of an illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further
court action and is, therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought
during the lifetime of the putative parent.16 Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand,
may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parents.17

Petitioner’s thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayag’s death, respondent’s
illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the decedent’s estate which the Rules require to
be material and direct, may no longer be established. Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that
respondent’s successional rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and recognized as an
illegitimate child.

In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, supra, Graciano Uyguangco, claiming to be an illegitimate child of

the decedent, filed a complaint for partition against the latter’s wife and legitimate children. However,
an admission was elicited from him in the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial that he
had none of the documents mentioned in Article 27818 of the 1950 Civil Code to show that he was
the illegitimate son of the decedent. The wife and legitimate children of the decedent thereupon
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that he could no longer prove his alleged filiation
under the applicable provision of the Civil Code.

The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled
that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the
action was already barred by the death of the alleged father.

In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show
whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of
petitioner’s opposition to her petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as
yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been
foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to
maintain the suit by reason of the decedent’s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her
illegitimate filiation.

We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices
even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of
the facts alleged therein.19 Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the

decedent’s illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be material and direct.
The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the proceedings to continue, ruling that,
"respondent still has the duty to prove the allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the
decedent), just as the petitioner has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement
proceedings."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 May
2006 and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 16-23.

2 Id. at 25.

3 Records, pp. 2-6.

4 Id. at 18-22; Opposition dated March 30, 2001.

5 Id. at 68.

6 CA rollo, p. 12.

7 Id. at 13.

8 Rollo, pp. 16-22.

9 Id. at 25.

10 Id. at 3-14.

11 G.R. No. 76873, 26 October 1989, 178 SCRA 684.

12 Rollo, pp. 72-73.

13 Id. at 79-81.

14No. L-17759, 17 December 1962, 6 SCRA 874, citing Trillana v. Crisostom and Espinosa
v. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311 (1951).

15 Art. 175 in relation to Art. 172 and Art. 173, New Civil Code.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
 The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child, or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in
a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within
which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death
of either or both of the parties.

See also In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Josefa Delgado and
16

Guillermo Rustia, G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 334.

Divinagracia v. Bellosillo, No. L-47407, 12 August 1986, 143 SCRA 356.

17 Id.

18Art. 278. Recognition shall be made in the record of birth, a will, statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing.

19 Drilon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106922, 20 April 2001, 357 SCRA 13.

G.R. No. 164108 May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING

CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS
BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his
only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil
cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then
pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo
Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the
RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers
Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor
A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net
of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her
favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal
and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities
attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned
two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated
that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No.
95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private
respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the
estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela,9praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the
intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the
personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the
Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the
Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the
decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in
general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and
declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene
in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to
the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the
fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these
were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying
them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.
Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on
intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First,
they prayed that they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the
intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said
court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by
administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist
in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate
court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and,
upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due
notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on
intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x
x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in
the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased
persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil
Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under
Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now
before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that
petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the
disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of
those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus
to the Rules on Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any
persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate
proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which
recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to
file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of
hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person
interested in the estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows
an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment,
embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or
interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of
Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and
grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7)
Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the
distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or
provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied,
then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors
to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the
administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims
against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom,
Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as they
are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as
represented by its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the
other civil case21 was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases
where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of
petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet
until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us with
guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an
action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case,
learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom
Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead
Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-
intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be
appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be
closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond
and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate
proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the
estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their
desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said
proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and
distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the
unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far
reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of
civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes
of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be
branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or
authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action
pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88,
of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the
estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical
value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking
any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that
questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another
person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an
intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x
x23(Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-

intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this
court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do
so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24

Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also "any person interested" or "persons interested in the estate" various specified
capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based
on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the
time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been
distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate
proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in
those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the
petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their
interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There
is no questioning as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the
developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a
running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if
property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances
their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission
that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate
court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right
to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose
a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing
a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of
cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with
respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of
developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for
mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed
access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from
them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the records of every court of
justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x
x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in
the intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with the
Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the
completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against
Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate.
They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an
eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon
them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved
and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to
access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no
matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the
administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of
the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all
"interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The
instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in
reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or
administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or
administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and;
(3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate
residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission
by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to
assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission
thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them
and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot
grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while
Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one
(1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against
the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay
in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are
protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to
seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is
silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a
creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest
of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and
the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we
have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special
Proceedings as enunciated in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as
provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons
under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Acting Chairperson.

** Per Special Order No. 619, Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro is hereby designated
as additional member of the Second Division in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, who
is on official leave

1 Rollo, p. 45.

2 Id. at 13.

3 Id. at 56.

4 Id. at 67-69.

5 Id. at 76-85A.

6 Id. at 85-A.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 87.

9 Id. at 101-104.

10 Id. at 121-125.

11 Id. at 132-133.

12Id. at 45-52. Decision penned by Associate Justice Amelita G Tolentino of the Sixteenth
Division, and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Magdangal M. De
Leon.

13More particularly, the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons. See Rules 73
to 91, Revised Rules of Court.

14 See rollo, p. 103.

15 Id. at 124.
 16 Id. at 124-125.

17Batama Farmers’ Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., et al., v. Hon. Rosal, etc. et al.,
149 Phil. 514, 519 (1971).

18 See Section 1(a), Rule 72, Rules of Court.

19 See Rules of Court, Rule 86, Secs. 1 & 3.

20See Aguas v. Llemos, et al., 116 Phil. 112 (1962); Leung Ben v. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 189-
194 (1918)

21 88 Phil. 477 (1951).

22 G.R. No. L-3342, 18 April 1951.

23 Id. at 480-481.

24 Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501, 503 (1953); citing 2 Moran, 432, 1952 revised edition,
citing the case of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Lee Liong, Dinglasan, et al. v. Ang Chia,
et al., G.R. No. L-3342, April 18, 1951.

25 G.R. No. 163155, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA 282.

26 Id. at 301

G.R. No. 179051 March 28, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
GILBERT MALLARI y TAYAG, Appellant.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

On August 30, 1994, appellant Gilbert Mallari y Tayag was charged with forcible abduction with
rape1 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 25 under the following information:

Criminal Case No. 94-5604

That on or about August 28, 1994, in the City of Naga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [appellant], with lewd design take and carry away by the use of a motor vehicle the
herein complainant against her will while walking alone at Barlin Street and once [appellant] was in
possession of the herein complainant, by means of force, violence and intimidations and threats and
with the use of a bladed weapon, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with the undersigned complainant against her will.

That the commission of said offense is attended by the aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle and disregard of sex and age and superior strength.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.

The prosecution essentially established that appellant forced complainant AAA to board his vehicle
and to engage in sexual intercourse with him. AAA testified that she feared appellant because he
was armed with a fan knife. Moreover, he kept threatening to kill her and to chop up her cadaver if
she did not obey him. For these reasons, she failed to offer any resistance and appellant succeeded
in carrying out his bestial design.

For his defense, appellant asserted that AAA voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse with him. 1avvphil

In a decision dated April 28, 1997,2 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds [appellant] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 and hereby sentences [him] to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay
[AAA] the sum of ₱50,000 as moral damages and to pay the cost of suit. Attorney’s fee is pro bono.

SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals (CA), on intermediate appellate review, affirmed the findings and ruling of the
RTC with modification as to the amount of the damages. 3 In addition to moral damages, appellant
was ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.4

We affirm the decision of the CA.

There is no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. The records are replete
with evidence establishing appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the January 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02209 finding appellant Gilbert Mallari y Tayag guilty of simple rape is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is further ordered to pay AAA ₱50,000
as civil indemnity and ₱50,000 as moral damages.

Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-5604.

2 Penned by Judge Jose T. Atienza. CA rollo, pp. 38-78.

3Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal and concurred in by Associate

Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr. of the Twelfth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Dated January 31, 2007. Rollo, pp. 3-26.

4 See People v. Mendoza, 440 Phil. 775, 785-786 (2002).

G.R. No. L-30453 December 4, 1989

ANGELINA PUENTEVELLA ECHAUS, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the Estate of
Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, RENE ECHAUS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON BLANCO, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and PHILIPPINE
COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL BANK, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the late
Charles Newton Hodges, AVELINA A. MAGNO, as Administratrix of the Testate Estate of the
late Linnie Jane Hodges, respondents.

Sarmiento, Guatelara & Associates and Nepomuceno, Hofileña & Guingona for petitioner.

Rizal R. Quimpo & Cornelio P. Ravena for respondents A.A. Magno & Judge R. Blanco

T. U. Benedicto & Associates for respondent PCIB.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for mandamus seeking to compel respondent presiding judge of the then Court of
First Instance of Iloilo (now Regional Trial Court) in Special Proceedings No. 1672 to issue an order
directing respondent Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PICB) as administrator of the
estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) to pay herein petitioner the amount of eight
hundred fifty-one thousand four hundred seventy- two pesos and eighty-three centavos
(P851,472.83) with legal interest, adjudged in Civil Case No. 6628.

The antecedent facts of the instant case are as follows:

Herein petitioner Angelina Puentevella Echaus, in her own behalf and as Administratrix of the
intestate estate of her deceased father Luis Puentevella, assisted by her husband, Rene Echaus
filed a complaint on May 30, 1962 against Charles Newton Hodges (C.N. Hodges) praying for an
accounting of the business covering the Ba-Ta Subdivision, the recovery of her share in the profits
and remaining assets of their business and the payment of expenses and moral and exemplary
damages (p. 10, Rollo). The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 6628 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental.

On July 20, 1962, C. N. Hodges, through counsel, filed his Answer (p. 10, Rollo).

Trial on the merits commenced on December 7, 1962, with the testimony of Angelina Echaus (p.
12, Rollo). Sometime thereafter, counsel for C. N. Hodges manifested that defendant C. N. Hodges
died on December 25, 1962. No motion to dismiss was filed by C. N. Hodges' counsel. On February
14, 1964, the trial court ordered the substitution of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB), as administrator of the estate of deceased C. N. Hodges, as party defendant. No objection to
the order was interposed by PCIB.

A petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, the date of which does not appear in the records, and docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 1672. A notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general
circulation in its issues of March 13, 20 and 27, 1963 (p. 190, Rollo).

On November 12, 1966, the parties in Civil Case No. 6628 submitted a stipulation of facts and
submitted the case for decision on the basis of said stipulation of facts (p. 12, Rollo). The parties
also agreed in the stipulation of facts that:

1. The parties, being duly represented in the panel of Commissioners constituted by

this Honorable Court, shall be bound by the Commissioners' findings on the
questions of facts presented to them for determination, if such findings are accepted
by this Honorable Court in its Decision.

2. With a view to the, speedy settlement and termination not only of the Estate of C.
N. Hodges (Special Proceedings 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo pending
since 1962) but also of the estate of Luis Puentevella (Special Proceedings 1968 of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental pending since 1951), in accordance
with the letter and spirit of the Rules of Court, and relying upon the wisdom and
impartiality of the Presiding Judge of this Honorable Court who is now on the point of
closing a brilliant and exemplary career on the Bench, the parties shall accept its
Decision herein as final.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 20, Rollo)

On December 5, 1966, judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of plaintiff Angelina F.
Echaus, the dispositive portion of which states:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the defendant, in its capacity as Administrator

of the Estate of Charles Newton Hodges is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of EIGHT(Y) HUNDRED FIFTY-ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY-TWO PESOS and EIGHTY THREE CENTAVOS (P851,472.83) with legal
interest thereon from date of judgment until paid. All other claims arising from the
counterclaim, and third-party complaint, not otherwise adjudicated, are hereby
dismissed, with costs against the defendant,

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Bacolod City, Philippines, December 5, 1966.

(SGD) EDUARDO D.
ENRIQUEZ Judge

(p. 41, Rollo)

On January 21, 1967, the same trial court issued an order granting plaintiff's motion for the issuance
of a writ of execution (p. 43, Rollo) against PCIB. However, the writ was not enforced as plaintiff
opted to file a motion dated February 20, 1967 (pp. 44-46, Rollo) in Special Proceedings No. 1672
(estate proceedings of deceased C. N. Hodges) for the payment of the judgment. Herein respondent
Avelina A. Magno, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Linnie Jane Hodges (wife of C. N.
Hodges) opposed the motion (p. 3, Rollo). Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 6628, Avelina Magno, filed a
petition for relief from judgment on March 27, 1967 and a motion to intervene dated April 24, 1967
(p. 57, Rollo). On June 6, 1967, the heirs of C. N. Hodges filed a motion to intervene in the same
Civil Case No. 6628. On July 20, 1967, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco, presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo City, Branch V, taking cognizance of Special Proceedings No. 1672,
issued on Order (pp. 52-56, Rollo) holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion of Angelina
Echaus for payment of the judgment rendered in her favor in Civil Case No. 6628, until after the
resolution of the "Petition for Relief from Judgment" filed by Administratrix Magno before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6628.

On November 23, 1967, the petition for relief from judgment was denied on the ground that Magno,
as administratrix of the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges was not a party to the case (p. 58, Rollo). The
twin motions to intervene filed by the heirs of C. N. Hodges and Avelina Magno, as administratrix of
the estate of Linnie Jane Hodges were likewise denied on the ground that pleadings in intervention
are allowed only before or during the trial and not when a final and executory judgment had already
been rendered (p. 61, Rollo).

In a motion (pp. 66-68, Rollo) dated November 25, 1968, Angelina P. Echaus prayed for the
resolution of her previous motion to direct payment of the judgment credit which was held in
abeyance, stating that the petition for relief from judgment filed in Civil Case No. 6628 was
dismissed by the trial court which dismissal has become final and executory in view of the failure of
Avelina Magno to file a record on appeal on time.

On February 26, 1969, respondent Judge Ramon Blanco issued an Order (pp. 72-74, Rollo)
reiterating his position that the motion to direct payment of the judgment credit cannot yet be
resolved and holding in abeyance the resolution thereof in view of the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, (PCIB v. Blanco), enjoining
respondent judge from hearing Special Proceedings Nos. 1307 and 1672, entitled "Testate Estate of
the late Linnie Jane Hodges" and "Testate Estate of Charles N. Hodges," respectively. It is noted
that in the same Order, respondent judge mentioned that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the Supreme Court was clarified in another resolution dated October 4, 1967 to the effect that he
(respondent judge) is not restrained from approving final deeds of sale executed by the
Administrator PCIB covering properties of the respective estates and that he can act on such other
routinary administrative matters necessary for the gathering and preservation of the estate (pp. 73-
74, Rollo).

The pertinent portion of said Order states:

In G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896, PCIB vs. Blanco, the Supreme Court on August
12, 1967 issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the presiding judge of this
Branch V from hearing Sp. Proc. 1307 and 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
entitled 'Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges and Testate Estate of C. N.
Hodges' which writ of preliminary injunction was clarified by the Supreme Court in its
resolution of October 4, 1967 to the effect that the presiding judge of this Branch V is
not restrained from approving final deeds of sale executed by the administrator PCIB
covering properties of the said estate and that the presiding judge of this Branch can
act on such other routinary administration matters necessary for the gathering and
preservation of the estate.

In view therefore of the said writ of preliminary injunction, it is the considered opinion
of the undersigned presiding judge that he cannot act, meanwhile, on the motion or
motions and the oppositions thereto taking into account that the said motions involve
substantive and mandatory procedural, requirements considering that the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental of Civil Case 6628 is being
questioned by the oppositors as a money claim and as such should have been
prosecuted in the probate court.

WHEREFORE, unless allowed by the Supreme Court to resolve the instant motions
and oppositions thereto thus further clarifying the writ of preliminary injunction which
was issued on August 12, 1967, the resolution on the said motions and oppositions
thereto is thereby held in abeyance.

SO ORDERED.

In a manifestation (pp. 69-71, Rollo, Annex "H" of Petition) dated February 28, 1969, petitioner
manifested that private respondent Avelina Magno's petition for certiorari and mandamus (G.R. L-
30013) filed before this Court questioning the validity of the decision in Civil Case No. 6628 was
dismissed for lack of merit on January 15, 1969 (p. 109, Rollo). Still, petitioner failed to obtain an
affirmative response to their motion.

Petitioner then filed the instant petition for mandamus dated April 21, 1969 seeking: a) to set aside
respondent judge's order of February 26, 1969; and b) to order PCIB to pay the judgment credit in
Civil Case No. 6628.

It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is now final and executory
and the execution thereof becomes a matter of right under Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
The duty to order the execution of a final and executory judgment is ministerial and the failure of
respondent judge to issue such order is a proper case for mandamus.
On the other hand, private respondents contend that the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 6628
is null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. Money claims against a defendant who
dies without a judgment having been rendered in the Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed and
prosecuted as a claim in the estate proceedings as laid down under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court. This procedure was not followed in Civil Case No. 6628. Also, even, if it is assumed that
the judgment in the said civil case is valid, the claim presented in the estate proceedings is already
barred by the statute of non-claims.

It must be noted that Civil Case No. 6628 which is a money claim, was Instituted during the lifetime
of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the Regional Trial
Court hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died. Upon his death, he was substituted by PCIB as
administrator of his estate. Being a money claim, said civil case should have been dismissed and
instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of C. N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1627) in
accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive.-When the action is for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of
First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in these rules.

However, this is not to suggest that because the claim of petitioner was pursued to its conclusion in
Civil Case No. 6682 instead of being dismissed and filed as a money claim in Special Proceedings
No. 1672, the judgment rendered therein is null and void. The case of Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co.,
Inc., L-18936, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 126, is in point. In the said case, Pampanga Bus Co., Inc.,
(Pambusco) filed a suit to collect P105,000.00 against defendants Valentin Fernando and
Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando. The latter died during the pendency of the case. On
Pambusco's motion, the court ordered Jose Nicolas, then Administrator, to substitute for deceased
Encarnacion Elchico Vda. de Fernando as one of the defendants. No objection to the order was
registered. A judgment was rendered therein which became final. Pambusco then moved in 'the
intestate proceedings of the deceased for the payment of the judgment credit. The administratrices
opposed. Pambusco's motion was granted. This order admitting Pambusco's claim was brought to
us. We ruled therein that:

1. xxx xxx xxx

The philosophy behind the rule which provides for the dismissal of the civil case is
that, upon the death of a defendant, all money claims should be filed in the testate or
intestate proceedings 'to avoid useless duplicity of procedure.' Obviously, the legal
precept just quoted is procedural in nature. It outlines the method by which an action
for recovery of money, debt or interest may continue, upon the terms therein
prescribed. whether the original suit for the recovery of money as here-proceeds to
its conclusion, or is dismissed and the claim covered thereby filed with the probate
court, one thing is certain: no substantial rights of the parties are prejudiced.

2. ... . Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say
that said judgment-reached after a full dress trial on the merits-will now go for
naught. The estate has thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in
the estate proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is
generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's representative. And,
waiver is to be determined from the administrator's 'acts and conduct.' Certainly, the
administrator's failure to plead the statute of non-claims, his active participation, and
resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to such waiver.
 3. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial proceedings are entitled to
respect. Non quieta movere. Plaintiff's claim has passed the test in three courts of
justice: the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and this Court. The
judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced. Appellant's technical objection-after
judgment had become final in the civil case that plaintiff's claim should have been
litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgment. For, such
objection does not go into the court's Jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Moreover, when PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to be substituted
as defendant, it registered no objection to the order. Thus, even if We admit for the sake of argument
that the trial court, after the death of C. N. Hodges has no jurisdiction to render a judgment therein,
the argument must fail. PCIB, participated actively in the said case. It did not appeal the decision
rendered therein, neither did it raise the issue of jurisdiction ion at any stage. It has been consistently
held by this court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active
participation in the proceedings before the court without jurisdiction will estop such party from
assailing such lack of jurisdiction (Tajonera v. Lamaroza, (1981), 110 SCRA 438; Nieta v. Manila
Banking Corp., (1983), 124 SCRA 455, cited in Sps. Antonio Martinez and Benedicta Balatbat v. The
Hon. Judge de la Merced, et al., G.R. No. 82039. June 20, 1989).

Of more importance is the fact that the validity of the decision in Civil Case No. 6628 had been
passed upon by us with finality in G.R. No. L-30013 (PCIB v. Blanco). In that case, the estate of C.
N. Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges questioned the decision of the trial court dismissing the petition
for relief from judgment. We dismissed the petition for lack of merit on January 15, 1969 (p.
109, Rollo).

Private respondent Avelina Magno, in her memorandum in lieu of oral argument. alleged that the
Judgment sought to be enforced is barred under the Rules of Court (p. 180, Rollo,). The proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was opened in 1962 and the notice to creditors was
published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation in its issues of March 12, 10, and 27, 1963.
Under Section 2, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, the time provided for filing claims against the estate
shall be stated by the court in the notice, which shall not be more than twelve (12) months nor less
than six (6) months after the date of its first publication. Since petitioner filed her motion to direct
payment only on February 20, 1967, which is more than four years from the publication of the notice
then, it is already barred.

The above argument of private respondent is not correct. The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file
his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in
the rules are present. The rule provides:

Sec. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed.-... . However, at any time before an
order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his
claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such
terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one
(1) month. (Rule 86)

It is clear from the foregoing (Section 2 of Rule 87 [now Rule 86]) that the period prescribed in the
notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be allowed any time
before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for cause and upon such
terms as are equitable (Quisumbing v. Guison, 76 Phil. 730; Edmands v. Phil. Trust Co., G.R. No. L-
2670, September 29, 1950, 48 O.G. 139; Paulin v. Aquino, G.R. No. L-11267, March 20.1958: Afan
v. de Guzman, G.R. No. L-14715, April 28, 1960). At the time petitioner's motion to direct payment of
the judgement credit was filed, no order of distribution was issued yet. Also, it is worthy to cite herein
a situation, similar to the case at bar. which was considered by this court as a good excuse for the
late filing of a claim against the decedent:

Here the claim filed in the probate court on February 25,1959, while the defendants in the civil case
were still perfecting their appeal therein. The record does not show that the administrator objected
thereto upon the ground that it was filed out of time. The pendency of that case, we are persuaded,
to say is a good excuse for tardiness in the filing of the claim. (In pari materia: De Rama v. Palileo, L-
18935, Feb. 26, 1965). An the order of the final distribution is still to be given. (Ignacio v.
Pambusco, supra.)

It is also petitioner's contention that properties under custodia legis may be reached for the
satisfaction of a judgment, citing the case of Reganon v. Imperial, G.R. No. 24434, January 17,
1968; Fores v. Santos, G.R. No. L-24538, May 4, 1968 and De Borja, et al. v. De Borja, et al., L-
14951, August 31, 1961. A cursory reading of the text of the above-cited cases will reveal that what
is involved therein is the attachment for purposes of execution of theinterest of an heir (to answer for
claims against such heir) in the estate of the decedent which is allowed by the Rules; and not the
attachment of the estate itself nor any property therein for the satisfaction of a claim against the
decedent:

Sec. 7. Attachment of real and personal property; recording thereof. -Properties shall
be attached by the officer executing the order in the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

(f) The interest of the party against whom attachment is issued in property belonging
to the estate of the decedent, whether as heir, legatee or devisee, by serving the
executor or administrator or other personal representative of the decedent with a
copy of the order and notice that said interest is attached, ... . (Rule 57, Rules of
Court)

While the judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 has become final and executory, execution is not the
proper remedy to enforce payment thereof. The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of
indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person, ..., is for the claimant to present a claim
before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof
(Domingo v. Garlitos, L-18994, June 29, 1963). This was the procedure correctly chosen by
petitioner. In Aldamiz v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro, L-2360, December 29,
1949, We held:

... a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for
the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for
the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property
of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the
proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be
issued upon motion of the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs,
legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, Section 3,
and Rule 90, Section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the
regulations contained in Rule 90, Section 7, should be complied with.

xxx xxx xxx

And in the case of Domingo v. Garlitos, p. 446, supra:

 The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate
proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, the properties belonging to
the estate are under the jurisdiction of the Court and such jurisdiction continues until
said properties have been distributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the
pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis and the proper
procedure is not to allow the sheriff, in case of a court judgment, to seize the
properties but to ask the court for an order to require the administrator to pay the
amount due from the estate and required to be paid.

Nevertheless, while We hold that the judgment credit should be admitted as a claim against the
estate of C. N. Hodges, the question of whether an order to direct payment thereof is compellable by
mandamus is doubtful. At the time the second motion for payment was filed by petitioner,
respondent judge's hands were "tied" by an existing writ of preliminary injunction issued by Us in
G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 (PCIB v. Blanco) restraining him from hearing Special Proceedings
Nos. 1307 (Testate Estate of Linnie Jane Hodges) and No. 1672 (Testate Estate of C. N. Hodges
where the motion to direct payment was filed). While this writ was clarified by a subsequent
resolution issued on October 4,1967 to the effect that respondent judge is not restrained from
approving final deeds of sale executed by the administrator PCIB covering properties of the estate
and from acting on such other routinary administration matters for the gathering and preservation of
the estate, it is clear that an order to direct payment is not embraced under the clarificatory
resolution. Even if petitioners' judgment credit allowed as a claim against the estate. immediate
payment thereof by the administrator of the estate, is not a matter of right. A judgment against the
executor or administrator shall be that he pay, in due course of administrator, the amount
ascertained to be due, and it shall not create a lien upon the property of the estate, or give the
judgment creditor any priority in payment (Sec. 13, Rule 86, Revised Rules). The time for paying
debts (and legacies) is to be fixed by the probate court having jurisdiction over the estate of the
deceased (Sec. 15, Rule 18). In the absence of any showing that respondent judge who is taking
cognizance of the estate proceedings had already allowed the administrator to dispose of the estate
and to pay the debts and legacies of the deceased, a writ of mandamus will not issue to compel him
to order payment of petitioner's claim.

It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the (plaintiffs) should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act
required (Province of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, 80 SCRA 376).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for the writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 171206 September 23, 2013

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES FLA VIANO MAGLASANG and SALUD ADAZA-MAGLASANG,
namely, OSCAR A. MAGLASANG, EDGAR A. MAGLASANG, CONCEPCION CHONA A.
MAGLASANG, GLENDA A. MAGLASANG-ARNAIZ, LERMA A. MAGLASANG, FELMA A. ·
MAGLASANG, FE DORIS A. MAGLASANG, LEOLINO A. MAGLASANG, MARGIE LEILA A.
MAGLASANG,MA. MILALIE A. MAGLASANG, SALUD A. MAGLASANG, and MA. FLASALIE A.
MAGLASANG, REPRESENTING THE ESTATES OF THEIR AFORE-NAMEDDECEASED
PARENTS, Petitioners,
vs.
MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, now substituted by FIRST SOVEREIGN ASSET
MANAGEMENT SPV-AMC, INC. FSAMI, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 20, 2005 and
Resolution3 dated January 4, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50410 which
dismissed petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision4 dated April 6, 1987 of the Regional Trial
Court of Ormoc City, Branch 12 (RTC) directing petitioners to jointly and severally pay respondent
Manila Banking Corporation the amount of ₱434,742.36, with applicable interests, representing the
deficiency of the former’s total loan obligation to the latter after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage subject of this case, including attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

The Facts

On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit line
from respondent5 in the amount of ₱350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate
mortgage6 executed over seven of their properties7 located in Ormoc City and the Municipality of
Kananga, Province of Leyte.8 They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of
₱209,790.50 and ₱139,805.83 on October 24, 1975and March 15, 1976, respectively,9 both of which
becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. Further, the parties agreed that the said
loans would earn interest at 12% per annum (p.a.) and an additional 4% penalty would be charged
upon default.10

After Flaviano Maglasang (Flaviano) died intestate on February 14,1977, his widow Salud
Maglasang (Salud) and their surviving children, herein petitioners Oscar (Oscar), Concepcion
Chona, Lerma, Felma, FeDoris, Leolino, Margie Leila, Ma. Milalie, Salud and Ma. Flasalie, all
surnamed Maglasang, and Glenda Maglasang-Arnaiz, appointed11 their brother petitioner Edgar
Maglasang (Edgar) as their attorney-in-fact.12 Thus, on March 30, 1977, Edgar filed a verified petition
for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the then Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Ormoc City, Branch 5 (probate court), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 1604-0.13 On August 9,
1977, the probate court issued an Order14 granting the petition, thereby appointing Edgar as the
administrator15 of Flaviano’s estate.

In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court, on August 30, 1977, issued a
Notice to Creditors16 for the filing of money claims against Flaviano’s estate. Accordingly, as one of
the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified17 the probate court of its claim in the amount of
₱382,753.19 as of October 11, 1978, exclusive of interests and charges.

During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and Oscar were able to obtain several
loans from respondent, secured by promissory notes18 which they signed.

In an Order19 dated December 14, 1978 (December 14, 1978 Order),the probate court terminated
the proceedings with the surviving heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of
Flaviano’s estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate to respondent, however, remained
unsatisfied due to respondent’s certification that Flaviano’s account was undergoing a restructuring.
Nonetheless, the probate court expressly recognized the rights of respondent under the mortgage
and promissory notes executed by the Sps. Maglasang, specifically, its "right to foreclose the same
within the statutory period."20
In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps.
Maglasang’s properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction for the amount of
₱350,000.00.21 There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasang’s obligation to
respondent. Thus, on June 24, 1981, respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount of
₱250,601.05 as of May 31, 1981 against the estate of Flaviano, his widow Salud and petitioners,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1998-0.22

The RTC Ruling and Subsequent Proceedings

After trial on the merits, the RTC (formerly, the probate court)23 rendered a Decision24 on April 6,
1987 directing the petitioners to pay respondent, jointly and severally, the amount of ₱434,742.36
with interest at the rate of 12% p.a., plus a 4% penalty charge, reckoned from September 5,1984
until fully paid.25 The RTC found that it was shown, by a preponderance of evidence, that petitioners,
after the extra-judicial foreclosure of all the properties mortgaged, still have an outstanding obligation
in the amount and as of the date as above-stated. The RTC also found in order the payment of
interests and penalty charges as above-mentioned as well as attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of
the outstanding obligation.26

Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal, contending,27 inter alia, that the
remedies available to respondent under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court (Rules) are
alternative and exclusive, such that the election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the
others. Thus, when respondent filed its claim against the estate of Flaviano in the proceedings
before the probate court, it effectively abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage. Moreover,
even on the assumption that it has not so waived its right to foreclose, it is nonetheless barred from
filing any claim for any deficiency amount.

During the pendency of the appeal, Flaviano’s widow, Salud, passed away on July 25, 1997.28

The CA Ruling

In a Decision29 dated July 20, 2005, the CA denied the petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC’s
Decision. At the outset, it pointed out that the probate court erred when it, through the December 14,
1978 Order, closed and terminated the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 1604-0 without first satisfying
the claims of the creditors of the estate – in particular, respondent – in violation of Section 1, Rule 90
of the Rules.30 As a consequence, respondent was not able to collect from the petitioners and
thereby was left with the option of foreclosing the real estate mortgage.31Further, the CA held that
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does not apply to the present case since the same does not involve
a mortgage made by the administrator over any property belonging to the estate of the
decedent.32According to the CA, what should apply is Act No. 313533 which entitles respondent to
claim the deficiency amount after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage of Sps.
Maglasang’s properties.34

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied in a Resolution35 dated January 4,
2006. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s award of the
deficiency amount in favor of respondent.

Petitioners assert36 that it is not Act No. 3135 but Section 7, Rule 86of the Rules which applies in this
case. The latter provision provides alternative and exclusive remedies for the satisfaction of
respondent’s claim against the estate of Flaviano.37 Corollarily, having filed its claim against the
estate during the intestate proceedings, petitioners argue that respondent had effectively waived the
remedy of foreclosure and, even assuming that it still had the right to do so, it was precluded from
filing a suit for the recovery of the deficiency obligation.38

Likewise, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was null
and void, not having been conducted in the capital of the Province of Leyte in violation of the
stipulations in the real estate mortgage contract.39 They likewise deny any personal liability for the
loans taken by their deceased parents.40

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their
estate.41 Such proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the
Rules, although rules governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply
suppletorily.42 Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule86)
provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate:

SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. – A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured
by a mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the
manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he
may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or
administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the
mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon
the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section;
or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within
the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and
shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein
contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or
pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the
court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As the foregoing generally speaks of "a creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a
mortgage or other collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that the
aforementioned section covers all secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of
collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the estate of the deceased debtor. On the contrary,
nowhere from its language can it be fairly deducible that the said section would – as the CA
interpreted – narrowly apply only to mortgages made by the administrator over any property
belonging to the estate of the decedent. To note, mortgages of estate property executed by the
administrator, are also governed by Rule 89 of the Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and
Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."

In this accord, it bears to stress that the CA’s reliance on Philippine National Bank v. CA43 (PNB) was
misplaced as the said case did not, in any manner, limit the scope of Section 7, Rule 86. It only
stated that the aforesaid section equally applies to cases where the administrator mortgages the
property of the estate to secure the loan he obtained.44 Clearly, the pronouncement was a ruling of
inclusion and not one which created a distinction. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that it is Section 7,
Rule 86which remains applicable in dealing with a creditor’s claim against the mortgaged property of
the deceased debtor, as in this case, as well as mortgages made by the administrator, as that in the
PNB case.

Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor
has three remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness.
In particular, he may choose to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of
the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as
an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same
before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency.45 It must,
however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from
each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others. With respect to real
properties, the Court in Bank of America v. American Realty Corporation46 pronounced:

In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not
cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a
remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint
in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage
creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the
province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No.4118.47 (Emphasis supplied)

Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of extra-judicially
foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135,as availed of by respondent in this case. However, the
plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover
any deficiency from the estate.48 These precepts were discussed in the PNB case, citing Perez v.
Philippine National Bank49 which overturned the earlier Pasno v. Ravina ruling:50

Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of
his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:

(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim;

(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and

(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at anytime before it is barred by
prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency

In Perez v. Philippine National Bank, reversing Pasno vs. Ravina, we held:

The ruling in Pasno v. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we have carefully
reexamined the same, and after mature deliberation have reached the conclusion that the dissenting
opinion is more in conformity with reason and law. Of the three alternative courses that section 7,
Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the
entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage
judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively,
foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription, without right to file a claim for
any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno v. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually
wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would
precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative.
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to
recover any deficiency from the estate. Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes

extrajudicial foreclosure sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any
further deficiency claim. x x x.51 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

To obviate any confusion, the Court observes that the operation of Act No. 3135 does not entirely
discount the application of Section 7, Rule 86, or vice-versa. Rather, the two complement each other
within their respective spheres of operation. On the one hand, Section 7, Rule 86 lays down the
options for the secured creditor to claim against the estate and, according to jurisprudence, the
availment of the third option bars him from claiming any deficiency amount. On the other hand, after
the third option is chosen, the procedure governing the manner in which the extra-judicial foreclosure
should proceed would still be governed by the provisions of Act No. 3135.Simply put, Section 7, Rule
86 governs the parameters and the extent to which a claim may be advanced against the estate,
whereas Act No. 3135sets out the specific procedure to be followed when the creditor subsequently
chooses the third option – specifically, that of extra-judicially foreclosing real property belonging to
the estate. The application of the procedure under Act No. 3135 must be concordant with Section 7,
Rule 86 as the latter is a special rule applicable to claims against the estate, and at the same time,
since Section 7, Rule 86 does not detail the procedure for extra-judicial foreclosures, the formalities
governing the manner of availing of the third option – such as the place where the application for
extra-judicial foreclosure is filed, the requirements of publication and posting and the place of sale –
must be governed by Act No. 3135.

In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties previously
belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the third option. Lest
it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as
petitioners assert, since it merely notified52the probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim
against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring the account.53 Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule
86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier
discussed.

As a final point, petitioners maintain that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the subject properties was
null and void since the same was conducted in violation of the stipulation in the real estate mortgage
contract stating that the auction sale should be held in the capital of the province where the
properties are located, i.e., the Province of Leyte.

The Court disagrees.

As may be gleaned from the records, the stipulation under the real estate mortgage54 executed by
Sps. Maglasang which fixed the place of the foreclosure sale at Tacloban City lacks words of
exclusivity which would bar any other acceptable for a wherein the said sale may be conducted, to
wit:

It is hereby agreed that in case of foreclosure of this mortgage under Act 3135, the auction sale shall
be held at the capital of the province if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the province
concerned, or shall be held in the city if the property is within the territorial jurisdiction of the city
concerned; x x x.55

Case law states that absent such qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the
agreed forum, the stipulated place should only be as an additional, not a limiting venue.56 As a
consequence, the stipulated venue and that provided under Act No. 3135 can be applied
alternatively.

In particular, Section 2 of Act No. 3135 allows the foreclosure sale to be done within the province
where the property to be sold is situated, viz.:

SEC. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province which the property sold is situated;
and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to stipulation,
such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality in which the
property or part thereof is situated. (Italics supplied) ..

In this regard, since the auction sale was conducted in Ormoc City, which is within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Province of Leyte, then the Court finds sufficient compliance with the above-cited
requirement.

All told, finding that the extra-judicial foreclosure subject of this case was properly conducted in
accordance with the formalities of Act No. 3135,the Court upholds the same as a valid exercise of
respondent's third option under Section 7, Rule 86. To reiterate, respondent cannot, however, file
any suit to recover any deficiency amount since it effectively waived its right thereto when it chose to
avail of extra-judicial foreclosure as jurisprudence instructs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The complaint for the recovery of the deficiency
amount after extra-judicial foreclosure filed by respondent Manila Banking Corporation is hereby
DISMISSED. The extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, however, stands.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 3-25.

2Id. at 39-50. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices
Vicente L. Yapand Enrico A. Lanzanas, concurring.

3 Id. at 52-53.

4 Id. at 71-76. Penned by Judge Francisco C. Pedrosa.

5Id. at 401-402. Now substituted in these proceedings by First Sovereign Asset

Management (SPV-AMC), Inc. (FSAMI). See Resolution dated October 4, 2010.

6 Id. at 54-55.

7 Id. at 56-57.

8 Id. at 6 and 40.

9 Id. at 7.

10 Id. at 40-41.

11 Records, pp. 325-327. See Bill of Exhibits and Minutes.

12 Rollo, p. 97.

13 Id. at 41.

14 CA rollo, pp. 146-147. Penned by Judge Numeriano G. Estenzo.

15 Id. at 148.

16 Id. at 149.

17 Records, p. 344. See Bill of Exhibits and Minutes.

18 Id. at 328-342.

19 Id. at 346.

20 Id. at 344.

21 Rollo, p. 42.

22 Id.

23 Ibid.

24 Id. at 71-76.

25 Id. at 76.

26 Id.

27 Rollo, p. 43.

28 Id. at 10.

29 Id. at 39-50.

30 Id. at 45-46.

31 Id. at 46.

32 Id.

33"AN ACT TO REGULATE THE SALE OF PROPERTY UNDER SPECIAL POWERS

INSERTED IN OR ANNEXED TO REAL-ESTATE MORTGAGES." Effective March 6, 1924.

34 Rollo, pp. 46-49.

35 Id. at 52-53.

36 Id. at 214.

37 Id. at 11-14.

38 Id. at 14-18.

39 Id. at 18-20.

40 Id. at 22-24.

41See Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No.
170498,January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 225, 237.
42 Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules provides:

SEC. 2.

Applicability of rules of civil actions. — In the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.

43 412 Phil. 807 (2001).

44 See id. at 812-815.

45 Id. at 814.

46 378 Phil. 1279 (1999).

47 Id. at 1291.

48 Id. at 1289-1304.

49 124 Phil. 260 (1966).

50 54 Phil. 378 (1990).

51 Philippine National Bank v. CA, supra note 43, at 814-815.

52 Records, p. 344. See Bill of Exhibits and Minutes.

53To note, petitioners did not file a claim against the estate since its notice deviates from the
proper characterization under Section 9, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court which sets forth the
manner through which a claim against the estate may be filed, to wit:

SEC. 9.

How to file a claim. Contents thereof. Notice to executor or administrator. – A claim

may be filed by delivering the same with the necessary vouchers to the clerk of court
and by serving a copy thereof on the executor or administrator. If the claim be
founded on a bond, bill, note, or any other instrument, the original need not be filed,
but a copy thereof with all indorsements shall be attached to the claim and filed
therewith. On demand, however, of the executor or administrator, or by order of the
court or judge, the original shall be exhibited, unless it be lost or destroyed, in which
case the claimant must accompany his claim with affidavit or affidavits containing a
copy or particular description of the instrument and stating its loss or destruction.
When the claim is due, it must be supported by affidavit stating the amount justly
due, that no payments have been made thereon which are not credited, and that
there are no offsets to the same, to the knowledge of the affiant. If the claim is not
due, or is contingent, when filed, it must also be supported by affidavit stating the
particulars thereof. When the affidavit is made by a person other than the claimant,
he must set forth therein the reason why it is not made by the claimant. The claim
once filed shall be attached to the record of the case in which the letters
testamentary or of administration were issued, although the court, in its discretion,
 and as a matter of convenience, may order all the claims to be collected in a
separate folder. (Emphases supplied)

54 Rollo, pp. 54-55.

55 Id. at 55.

56"The doctrine that absent qualifying or restrictive words, the venue shall either be that
stated in the law or rule governing the action or the one agreed in the contract, was applied
to an extra-judicial foreclosure sale under Act No. 3135." (Auction in Malinta, Inc. v. Luyaben,
544 Phil. 500, 505 [2007].)

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and
January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc.
No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement
of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and
son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further
claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress
of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal 10of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the
two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised
the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang
Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove
that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s bigamous
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the
Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It
ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and
that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and
academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S.
Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on
the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June
14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of
Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It
also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and
did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo’s
legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to
the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved
by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a
subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic
policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law.
The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage
between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the
petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it
was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of
Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at
the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence
or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used
in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5,
1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August
to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by
the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards 49 stating
that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa
was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule
in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife,
which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still marriedto private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in
effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph
was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.
The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in
the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent. 1aw phi 1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent.
An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is
to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to
apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again,
"where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and
the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well
as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments.
It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners
shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144
of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband
and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property
is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings
or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent
evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters
of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner
under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and
affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to
dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and
concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.

2 Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

3 Id. at 391-393.

4Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and
concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.

5 Records, p. 125.

6 Id. at 137.

7 Id. at 116.

8 Id. at 1-5.

9 Id. at 10-24.

10 Id. at 30-35.

11 Id. at 38.

12 Id. at 39-138.

13When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

14 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

15 See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.

16 This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

17 Records, p. 259.

18 Id. at 260.

19 Id. at 262-267.

20 Id. at 270-272.

21 Id. at 288.

22 Id. at 301.

23 Id. at 302-303.

24 Id. at 306-311.

25 Id. at 318-320.
26 Id. at 339-349.

27 Id. at 350-354.

28 Id. at 391-393.

29 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.

30 Supra note 14.

31 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

32Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of
fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973
(not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San Luis with respondent was
celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988.

33 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.

34 See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.

35 Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.

36 Id. at 75.

37 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

38 G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.

39SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. — If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)

40 G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.

41 Id. at 199-200.

42 Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.

See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v.
43

Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.

44 Records, pp. 76-78.

45 Id. at 60-75.

46 Id. at 79.
47 Id. at 80.

48 Id. at 81-83.

49 Id. at 84.

50The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case
because the value of Gov. San Luis’ estate exceeded ₱200,000.00 as provided for under
B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).

51 SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the
Executive Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983,
declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby defined as follows:

xxxx

5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati – over the municipalities of
Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa and Parañaque. x x x

52 Supra note 14.

53 Id. at 139, 143-144.

54
Id. at 144.

55 Supra note 31.

56 Id. at 664.

57 G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.

Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472
58

SCRA 114, 121.

Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
59

Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.

60 G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.

61 Id. at 447.

62 Supra note 58.

63 Id. at 119-121.

64 Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).

 65ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

66Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.

67 Supra note 14 at 144.

68 G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.

69 Id. at 264-265, 268.

70 Supra note 60.

71 Id. at 448-449.

72 Records, pp. 118-124.

73 Supra note 60 at 451.

74SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If x x x a person dies

intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.

75 Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).

76 Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.

77 Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).

78Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February
16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.

79 G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.

80 Id. at 686.

81 Id. at 679, 686-687.

G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000

RUFINA LUY LIM, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AUTO TRUCK TBA CORPORATION, SPEED DISTRIBUTING, INC.,
ACTIVE DISTRIBUTORS, ALLIANCE MARKETING CORPORATION, ACTION COMPANY,
INC. respondents.

BUENA, J.:

May a corporation, in its universality, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the
estate of a deceased person?

Petitioner disputes before us through the instant petition for review on certiorari, the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 April 1996, in CA-GR SP No. 38617, which nullified and set
aside the orders dated 04 July 19952 , 12 September 19953 and 15 September 19954 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a probate court.

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of
probate proceedings in Special Proceedings Q-95-23334, entitled, "In Re: Intestate Estate of Pastor
Y. Lim Rufina Luy Lim, represented by George Luy, Petitioner". 1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing,
Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing
under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens system.

On 11 June 1994, Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly
represented by her nephew George Luy, fried on 17 March 1995, a joint petition5 for the
administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion6 for the lifting of lis pendens and motion7 for exclusion of certain
properties from the estate of the decedent.

In an order8 dated 08 June 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 93, sitting as a
probate court, granted the private respondents' twin motions, in this wise:

Wherefore, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to lift, expunge or delete
the annotation of lis pendens on Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 116716, 116717, 116718,
116719 and 5182 and it is hereby further ordered that the properties covered by the same
titles as well as those properties by (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 613494, 363123,
236236 and 263236 are excluded from these proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, Rufina Luy Lim filed a verified amended petition9 which contained the following
averments:

3. The late Pastor Y. Lim personally owned during his lifetime the following business entities,
to wit:
 Business
Address:
Entity

xxx xxx xxx

Alliance Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF
Marketing, Homes, Parañaque, Metro
Inc. Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

Speed
910 Barrio Niog, Aguinaldo
Distributing
Highway, Bacoor, Cavite.
Inc.

xxx xxx xxx

Auto Truck 2251 Roosevelt Avenue,
TBA Corp. Quezon City.
xxx xxx xxx

Active Block 3, Lot 6, Dacca BF

Distributors, Homes, Parañaque, Metro
Inc. Manila.

xxx xxx xxx

Action 100 20th Avenue Murphy,
Company Quezon City or 92-D Mc-
Arthur Highway Valenzuela
Bulacan.

3.1 Although the above business entities dealt and engaged in business with the
public as corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally
owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the alleged stockholders and officers
appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities
were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes
of registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

4. Pastor Lim, likewise, had Time, Savings and Current Deposits with the following banks: (a)
Metrobank, Grace Park, Caloocan City and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City Branches and (b)
First Intestate Bank (formerly Producers Bank), Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and
in other banks whose identities are yet to be determined.

5. That the following real properties, although registered in the name of the above entities,
were actually acquired by Pastor Y. Lim during his marriage with petitioner, to wit:

Corporation Title Location

xxx xxx xxx

k. Auto Truck TCT No. 617726 Sto. Domingo TBA
Corporation Cainta, Rizal
 q. Alliance Marketing TCT No. 27896 Prance, Metro Manila

Copies of the above-mentioned Transfer Certificate of Title and/or Tax Declarations are
hereto attached as Annexes "C" to "W".

xxx xxx xxx

7. The aforementioned properties and/or real interests left by the late Pastor Y. Lim, are all
conjugal in nature, having been acquired by him during the existence of his marriage with
petitioner.

8. There are other real and personal properties owned by Pastor Y. Lim which petitioner
could not as yet identify. Petitioner, however will submit to this Honorable Court the identities
thereof and the necessary documents covering the same as soon as possible.

On 04 July 1995, the Regional Trial Court acting on petitioner's motion issued an order10 , thus:

Wherefore, the order dated 08 June 1995 is hereby set aside and the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City is hereby directed to reinstate the annotation of lis pendens in case said
annotation had already been deleted and/or cancelled said TCT Nos. 116716, 116717,
116718, 116719 and 51282.

Further more (sic), said properties covered by TCT Nos. 613494, 365123, 236256 and
236237 by virtue of the petitioner are included in the instant petition.

SO ORDERED.

On 04 September 1995, the probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special administrator11 and Miguel
Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which
letters of administration were accordingly issued.

In an order12 dated 12 September 1995, the probate court denied anew private respondents' motion
for exclusion, in this wise:

The issue precisely raised by the petitioner in her petition is whether the corporations are the
mere alter egos or instrumentalities of Pastor Lim, Otherwise (sic) stated, the issue involves
the piercing of the corporate veil, a matter that is clearly within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court and not the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, in the case
of Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483, the crucial issue decided by the regular court
was whether the corporation involved therein was the mere extension of the decedent. After
finding in the affirmative, the Court ruled that the assets of the corporation are also assets of
the estate.

A reading of P.D. 902, the law relied upon by oppositors, shows that the SEC's exclusive
(sic) applies only to intra-corporate controversy. It is simply a suit to settle the intestate
estate of a deceased person who, during his lifetime, acquired several properties and put up
corporations as his instrumentalities.

SO ORDERED.
On 15 September 1995, the probate court acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, issued an
order13 the dispositive portion of which reads:

Wherefore, the parties and the following banks concerned herein under enumerated are
hereby ordered to comply strictly with this order and to produce and submit to the special
administrators, through this Honorable Court within (5) five days from receipt of this order
their respective records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other deposits in
the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned, showing all the transactions
made or done concerning savings/current accounts from January 1994 up to their receipt of
this court order.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari14 , with an urgent prayer for a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the Court of Appeals questioning the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, sitting as a probate court.

On 18 April 1996, the Court of Appeals, finding in favor of herein private respondents, rendered the
assailed decision15 , the decretal portion of which declares:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant special civil action for certiorari is hereby
granted, The impugned orders issued by respondent court on July 4, 1995 and September
12, 1995 are hereby nullified and set aside. The impugned order issued by respondent on
September 15, 1995 is nullified insofar as petitioner corporations" bank accounts and
records are concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, herein petitioner Rufina Luy Lim now
comes before us with a lone assignment of
error16 :

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in reversing the orders of the lower court which
merely allowed the preliminary or provisional inclusion of the private respondents as part of
the estate of the late deceased (sic) Pastor Y. Lim with the respondent Court of Appeals
arrogating unto itself the power to repeal, to disobey or to ignore the clear and explicit
provisions of Rules 81,83,84 and 87 of the Rules of Court and thereby preventing the
petitioner, from performing her duty as special administrator of the estate as expressly
provided in the said Rules.

Petitioner's contentions tread on perilous grounds.

In the instant petition for review, petitioner prays that we affirm the orders issued by the probate
court which were subsequently set aside by the Court of Appeals.

Yet, before we delve into the merits of the case, a review of the rules on jurisdiction over probate
proceedings is indeed in order.
The provisions of Republic Act 769117 , which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
are pertinent:

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate
exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila,
where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the
value of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such personal
property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's, litigation
expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees, Provided
further, that where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same
or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the
causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

xxx xxx xxx

Simply put, the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends
upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent.

As to the power and authority of the probate court, petitioner relies heavily on the principle that a
probate court may pass upon title to certain properties, albeit provisionally, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory.

In a litany of cases, We defined the parameters by which the court may extend its probing arms in
the determination of the question of title in probate proceedings.

This Court, in PASTOR, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS,18 held:

 . . . As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may
pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

We reiterated the rule in PEREIRA vs. COURT OF APPEALS19 :

. . . The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the
competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may
be instituted by the parties.

Further, in MORALES vs. CFI OF CAVITE20 citing CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE21 , We made an
exposition on the probate court's limited jurisdiction:

It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate
or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there
is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

Again, in VALERA vs. INSERTO22 , We had occasion to elucidate, through Mr. Justice Andres
Narvasa23 :

Settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting as a
probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and thus has no power to take cognizance of
and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property
consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the
exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by
the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special
court (e.g. probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of
procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. . . .

. . . . These considerations assume greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title is not in
the decedent's name but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion
to rule . . . . (emphasis Ours)

Petitioner, in the present case, argues that the parcels of land covered under the Torrens system
and registered in the name of private respondent corporations should be included in the inventory of
the estate of the decedent Pastor Y. Lim, alleging that after all the determination by the probate court
of whether these properties should be included or not is merely provisional in nature, thus, not
conclusive and subject to a final determination in a separate action brought for the purpose of
adjudging once and for all the issue of title.
Yet, under the peculiar circumstances, where the parcels of land are registered in the name of
private respondent corporations, the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID 24 is of great
essence and finds applicability, thus:

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her
claim of ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor,
which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter
as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. . . .

. . . . In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered

by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due
weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof
should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or
modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. . . .

A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by
petitioner to bolster her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the
properties. Even so, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree", proscribes
collateral attack on Torrens Title, hence:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.

In CUIZON vs. RAMOLETE, where similarly as in the case at bar, the property subject of the
controversy was duly registered under the Torrens system, We categorically stated:

. . . Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of
third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name
of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the motion of the respondent
administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of
the property. . . .

Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor Y. Lim are
in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, which under
the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their stockholders, and in the absence of
any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction, the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in
favor of private respondents should stand undisturbed.

Accordingly, the probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for exclusion.
While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and exercising
limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving inclusion or exclusion of
certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent, and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally
the question of title over properties, it is no less true that such authority conferred upon by law and
reinforced by jurisprudence, should be exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
Notwithstanding that the real properties were duly registered under the Torrens system in the name
of private respondents, and as such were to be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title, the
probate court obviously opted to shut its eyes to this gleamy fact and still proceeded to issue the
impugned orders.

By its denial of the motion for exclusion, the probate court in effect acted in utter disregard of the
presumption of conclusiveness of title in favor of private respondents. Certainly, the probate court
through such brazen act transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence
on this matter.

Moreover, petitioner urges that not only the properties of private respondent corporations are
properly part of the decedent's estate but also the private respondent corporations themselves. To
rivet such flimsy contention, petitioner cited that the late Pastor Y. Lim during his lifetime, organized
and wholly-owned the five corporations, which are the private respondents in the instant
case.25 Petitioner thus attached as Annexes "F"26 and "G"27 of the petition for review affidavits executed
by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao which among others, contained averments that the incorporators
of Uniwide Distributing, Inc. included on the list had no actual and participation in the organization
and incorporation of the said corporation. The affiants added that the persons whose names
appeared on the articles of incorporation of Uniwide Distributing, Inc., as incorporators thereof, are
mere dummies since they have not actually contributed any amount to the capital stock of the
corporation and have been merely asked by the late Pastor Y. Lim to affix their respective signatures
thereon.

It is settled that a corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the
persons composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may
not be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected
with it.28

Rudimentary is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality distinct and separate
from its stockholders or members. In the same vein, a corporation by legal fiction and convenience is
an entity shielded by a protective mantle and imbued by law with a character alien to the persons
comprising it.

Nonetheless, the shield is not at all times invincible. Thus, in FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS29 , We enunciated:

. . . When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or as a

vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the circumvention of statutes, the
achievement or perfection of a monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime,
the veil with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the members or
stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its consideration merely as an
aggregation of individuals. . . .

Piercing the veil of corporate entity requires the court to see through the protective shroud which
exempts its stockholders from liabilities that ordinarily, they could be subject to, or distinguishes one
corporation from a seemingly separate one, were it not for the existing corporate fiction.30

The corporate mask may be lifted and the corporate veil may be pierced when a corporation is just
but the alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Where badges of fraud exist, where public
convenience is defeated; where a wrong is sought to be justified thereby, the corporate fiction or the
notion of legal entity should come to naught.31
Further, the test in determining the applicability of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction
is as follows: 1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but complete domination, not
only of finances but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the
corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own;
(2) Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetuate the
violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and unjust act in contravention of
plaintiffs legal right; and (3) The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the
injury or unjust loss complained of. The absence of any of these elements prevent "piercing the
corporate veil".32

Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital
stock of a corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of separate
corporate personalities.33

Moreover, to disregard the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the wrong-doing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.34

Granting arguendo that the Regional Trial Court in this case was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, petitioner nonetheless failed to adduce competent evidence that would
have justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction. Truly, the reliance reposed by petitioner
on the affidavits executed by Teresa Lim and Lani Wenceslao is unavailing considering that the
aforementioned documents possess no weighty probative value pursuant to the hearsay rule.
Besides it is imperative for us to stress that such affidavits are inadmissible in evidence inasmuch as
the affiants were not at all presented during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. To put
it differently, for this Court to uphold the admissibility of said documents would be to relegate from
Our duty to apply such basic rule of evidence in a manner consistent with the law and jurisprudence.

Our pronouncement in PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. LEONIDAS35 finds pertinence:

Affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the
affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant's statements, which
may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits
are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon.

As to the order36 of the lower court, dated 15 September 1995, the Court of Appeals correctly
observed that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93 acted without jurisdiction in issuing said order;
The probate court had no authority to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of the
private respondent corporations.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals which nullified and set aside the orders issued
by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, acting as a probate court, dated 04 July 1995 and 12
September 1995 is AFFIRMED. 1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
In CA GR SP No. 38617, promulgated on 18 April 1996, penned by Justice Ramon A
Barcelona and concurred in by Justice Artemon D. Luna and Justice Portia Alino-
Hormachuelos, Thirteenth Division.

2
Rollo, p. 83.

3
Rollo, pp. 92-94.

4
Ibid, 95-97.

5
Docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-95-23334; Rollo, pp. 76-82.

6
Rollo, p. 32.

7
Rollo, pp. 84-87.

8
Rollo, p. 33.

9
Ibid.

10
Ibid, p. 35.

Order dated 04 September 1995, issued by RTC-Quezon City Branch 93, Presiding Judge
11

Amado M. Costales, in SP Proc. No. Q-95-23334; Rollo, pp. 88-91.

Order dated 12 September 1995, issued by RTC-Quezon City, Branch 93, Presiding Judge
12

Amado M. Costales, in SP. Proc. No. Q-95-23334; Rollo, pp. 92-94.

Order dated 15 September, issued by RTC-Quezon City, Branch 93, Presiding Judge
13

Amado M. Costales, in SP Proc. No. Q-95-23334; Rollo, pp. 95-97.

14
Rollo, p. 32.

15
Ibid, pp. 32-40.

16
Petition for Review in G.R. No. 124715; Rollo, pp. 20-21.

Republic Act 7691, otherwise known as "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
17

Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980", approved on 25 March 1994.

18
G.R. No. L-56340, 24 June 1983; 122 SCRA 885.

19
G.R. No. L-81147, 20 June 1989; 174 SCRA 154.
20
G.R. No. L-47125, 29 December 1986; 146 SCRA 373.

21
129 SCRA 495.

22
G.R. No. L-56504, May 7, 1987; 149 SCRA 533

23
Later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

24
G.R. No. L-45494, August 31, 1978; 85 SCRA 213.

25
Rollo, p.17.

26
Affidavit executed by Teresa T. Lim, dated 13 January 1995; Rollo, p. 74.

27
Affidavit executed by Lani G. Wenceslao; Rollo, p. 75.

28
Mataguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 490.

29
252 SCRA 259.

30
Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 15.

31
Concept Builders, Inc. vs. NLRC, 257, SCRA 149.

32
257 SCRA 149.

33
Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 15.

Mataguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 491, citing Del
34

Rosario vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 85416, 24 July 1990, 187 SCRA 777.

35
207 SCRA 164.

36
Rollo, pp. 95-97.