b) Lot No. 1234 covered by Tax Declaration No.

20305 was acquired by a Deed

of Extrajudicial Partition with the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and
THIRD DIVISION between Ceferino Bucago, Ildefonso Bucago, Victoria Bucago, Felomina B.
Higoy, Elizabeth B. Espejo, Ernesto B. Dacanay, Maria Bucago, Reinerio P.
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF TITLE G.R. No. 147359 Dacanay and the applicant at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, 1988
appearing as Doc. No. 411, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the
FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION, represented Present: notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the
by KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., Registry of Deeds for the province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
Petitioner, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson, c) Lot No. 47030 covered by Tax Declaration No. 21971 was acquired by a Deed
TINGA,* of Absolute Sale executed by and between Ernesto Adman, Amparo Carino
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, Adman, and the applicant at San Fernando, La Union, on August 27, 1990
NACHURA, and appearing as Doc. No. 235, Page No. 47, Book No. II, Series of 1990, in the
REYES, JJ. notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Register of Deeds for the Province of La Union on September 25, 1990.[4]
Respondent. Promulgated:

March 28, 2008 FATCO, thus, prayed for the registration or confirmation of its title over these parcels of land.

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. (FATCO), through Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr., appeals
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the October 23, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52366, and the March 7, 2001 Resolution[2] denying its
reconsideration.
On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Union an application for
confirmation of title to parcels of land, described as Lots No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030,[3] with
an aggregate area of 8,463 square meters, situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The
application was docketed as LRA REC. No. N-63835.
FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land which it
openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied for more than thirty (30) years under
a bona fide claim of ownership, tacking its possession with that of its predecessors-in-interest. It
allegedly acquired these lots in the following manner:
a) Lot No. 1505 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20304 was acquired by a Deed
of Exchange executed by and between the Brgy. Council of Poblacion,
Bacnotan, La Union, represented by its Brgy. Capt. Honesto Alcid and Brgy. Sec.
Teofilo Descargar, and the applicant, at San Fernando, La Union, on October
19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 415, Page No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in
the notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with
the Registry of Deeds for the Province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance, as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando, La Union to appear in the case.[5]
On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order setting the application for initial hearing on
February 28, 1995. The Order was published in the January 23, 1995 issue of the Official
Gazette,[6] and the February 18-24, 1995 issue of the Guardian.[7] The notice of hearing was,
likewise, posted in a conspicuous place in each parcel of land included in the application, and on
the bulletin board of the municipal building of Bacnotan, La Union. [8] The Provincial Prosecutor of
La Union was furnished with a copy of notice of hearing on November 18, 1994.[9]
At the scheduled initial hearing on February 28, 1995, Atty. Marita Balloguing entered
her appearance as collaborating counsel for FATCO, and requested the resetting of the marking of
exhibits.[10] The RTC granted the request and issued an Order resetting the hearing to April 19,
1995, viz.:
As prayed for by Atty. Balloguing, who entered her appearance in collaboration
with Atty. Ungria as counsel for the applicant, this case is reset to April 19,
1995 at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose of establishing jurisdictional facts.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The Republic, through the Provincial Prosecutor, was duly informed of the resetting.[12]
On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its appearance as counsel for the Republic and
once more deputized the Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the case. [13] On
the same date, the Republic filed its Opposition to FATCOs application for registration on the
following grounds: (1) neither FATCO nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since June
12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations of the applicant (and its
predecessors-in-interest) do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for, and do not appear to be genuine; (3) applicant (and its
predecessors-in-interest) can no longer claim ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title
or grant, since they failed to file the appropriate application for registration within the period of six
months from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892; (4) the parcels
of land applied for forms part of the public domain and are not subject to private appropriation;
and (5) the application was belatedly filed as it was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period
set forth under Sec. 2, P.D. No. 1073.[14]
During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan appeared for the
Republic. FATCO, through counsel, offered in evidence the following documents to establish
jurisdictional facts:
Exhibit A - Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 of Lots 1505, 1234
and 47030
Exhibit B - Technical Description
Exhibit B-1 - Certification in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate
Exhibit C - Notice of Initial Hearing from LRA
Exhibit D - Affidavit of Publication by publisher of The Guardian
Exhibit D-1 - Clipping of Publication
Exhibit E - Whole issue of The Guardian for February 18 to 24, 1995;
Exhibit E-1 - Section A of publication of said issue;
Exhibit F - Certificate of Publication from the Official Gazette/
National Printing Office;
Exhibit G - Certificate of Notification sent to Adjoining Owners
(Reserved);
Exhibit H - Certificate of Publication from LRA
Exhibit I - Sheriffs Certificate of Posting
Exhibit J - Certificate of Assessment[15]
The RTC then issued an Order[16] setting the case for the reception of evidence on May
25, 1995 at 8:30 in the morning.
In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other documents and testimonial evidence to prove
its title to the parcels of land applied for. The Republic, on the other hand, did not submit evidence
to controvert FATCOs assertion.
In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a finding that FATCO had sufficiently
established its ownership of the lands in question, ordered the registration thereof in its name,
thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby approves
the application and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 1505, 1234
and 47030, Bacnotan Cadastre Pls-1050-D, containing an area of EIGHT
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (8,463) square meters, more or less,
located at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, covered by Consolidated Plan Ccn-
013303-000129 (Exh. A), and more particularly described in the technical
description, Exh. B shall be registered in the name of the applicant Fieldman
Agricultural Trading Corporation, with address at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La
Union, under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree.
The encumbrance/mortgage of the property to the Far East Bank and Trust
Company, San Fernando, La Union Branch in the amount of Seventeen Million
(P17,000,000.00) Pesos, shall accordingly be annotated at the back of the title
to be issued in the name of the applicant.
Once this decision shall become final, let a decree of registration be issued. [17]
From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the CA. It faulted the RTC for giving due course
to FATCOs application arguing that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the same in view of the non-
publication of the notice of actual initial hearing. It also claimed that FATCO failed to prove open,
continuous and notorious possession of the subject properties for more than thirty (30) years, as
required by law.
On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA agreed with the Republic
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over FATCOs application because the publication of initial
hearing was fatally defective. The notice that was published in the Official Gazette and in
the Guardian was the hearing set on February 28, 1995, but no hearing was conducted on the said
date. The actual initial hearing was held on April 19, 1995, a date different from what was stated in
the notice, thereby defeating the very purpose of the publication requirement.
The CA disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the
Decision dated February 5, 1996 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
application for registration is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[18]
FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 7, 2001.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by FATCO theorizing that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT
THE COURT A QUO DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONERS
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.[19]
In its Comment on the petition, the Republic, through the OSG, argues that:
I
NO ACTUAL HEARING WAS HELD BY THE TRIAL COURT ON FEBRUARY
28, 1995 WHICH WAS THE PUBLISHED DATE OF INITIAL HEARING;
II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION TO HEAR
PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION DUE TO PETITIONERS FAILURE
TO PUBLISH THE NOTICE OF ACTUAL HEARING SET ON APRIL 19, 1995 AND TO
POST SAID NOTICE IN CONSPICUOUS PLACES AND TO SERVE THE SAME TO
ADJOINING OWNERS.
 III
NO TRACING CLOTH PLAN WAS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE IN THE
COURT A QUO.
IV
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ITS OPEN, CONTINUOUS, ADVERSE
AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN THE CONCEPT
OF AN OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[20]
We will deal first with the jurisdictional issue.
Section 23[21] of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, explicitly provides
that before the court can act on the application for land registration, the public shall be given
notice of the initial hearing thereof by means of publication, mailing, and posting.
FATCO insists that it complied with all the jurisdictional requirements, specifically the
publication of the notice of initial hearing. It, therefore, faulted the CA for reversing the RTC and,
accordingly, dismissing its application for registration.
The Republic, on the other hand, asserts that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over
FATCOs application because the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. It points out
that the initial hearing set on February 28, 1995 was reset to April 19, 1995. The actual initial
hearing, therefore, took place on a date different from what was stated in the published notice of
initial hearing. Hence, re-publication of the new notice of hearing was necessary, but FATCO failed
to publish the notice of hearing set on April 19, 1995, thus, preventing the RTC from acquiring
jurisdiction over the application.
The Republic is correct that in land registration case, publication of the notice of initial
hearing is a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith affects the jurisdiction of the
court. The purpose of publication of the notice is to require all persons concerned, who may have
any rights or interests in the property applied for, to appear in court at a certain date and time to
show cause why the application should not be granted. [22]
It is not disputed that there was publication, mailing, and posting of the notice of the
initial hearing set on February 28, 1995. FATCO, thus, complied with the legal requirement of
serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the registration proceedings. Accordingly, as of
that date, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over FATCOs application.
Even if, at the February 28, 1995 hearing, FATCOs counsel requested a resetting, and the
RTC granted said request, the Republic and all interested parties were already fully apprised of the
pendency of the application. When the hearing was reset to April 19, 1995, interested parties, the
Republic included, may be deemed to have been given notice thereof. [23] There was, thus, no need
for the re-publication of notice of hearing, for clearly, the avowed purpose of Section 23 had
already been accomplished. We, therefore, find that the application for registration was rightfully
given due course by the RTC. The CA, thus, committed reversible error in holding otherwise.
Be that as it may, we cannot grant FATCOs plea for the reinstatement of the RTC
Decision granting its application for registration or confirmation of its imperfect title.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree explicitly states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to the land, whether
personally or through their authorized representatives.
(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.
Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show that: first, he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive
possession and occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier, and second, the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.[24]
To prove its length of possession, FATCO offered the testimonies of Antonio Casugay, its
division manager, Emilio Paz, owner of the adjacent lot, and of Ernesto Adman and Cifirino Bucago,
its predecessors-in-interest. It also presented deeds of conveyance and several tax declarations
covering the lands in question.
Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its witnesses do not serve to prove the
validity of its cause. Antonio Casugay and Emilio Paz merely stated that FATCO acquired the
subject lots and had taken possession of the same in 1988 or 1989.[25] FATCOs predecessor-in-
interest, Ernesto Adman, on the other hand, testified that he acquired ownership and possession
of Lot No. 4703, also described as Lot No. 1504-A, from Victor Dacanay only in 1983 or
1984.[26] Similarly, Cifirino Bucagos testimony[27] did not establish the period of possession
required by law over Lot No. 1234. His testimony consists merely of general statements with no
specifics as to when he began occupying the land. He did not introduce sufficient evidence to
substantiate his allegation that he possessed Lot No. 1234 for the length of time prescribed by law.
Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCOs assertion. The earliest tax declarations
presented for Lot No. 1505 and Lot No. 47030 were issued only in 1948,[28] while the earliest tax
declaration for Lot No. 1234 was issued in 1970.[29] We have ruled that while a tax declaration by
itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring
possession.[30]
Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration case must prove the facts and
circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements which
are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot
suffice.[31]
In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the subject lots since June 12, 1945. At best,
FATCO can only prove possession of Lots No. 1505 and No. 47030 since 1948, and of Lot No. 1234
since 1970. But as the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty (30) years or more
is not sufficient. It must be shown too that possession and occupation had started on June 12,
1945 or earlier.
 It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the prescribed period and occupation not
only as required by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree but also by Commonwealth
Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, which states:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein,
but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, even if FATCOs case is considered as one for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public
land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, it would still meet the same fate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for registration of title filed by Fieldman
Agricultural Trading Corporation is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO,
substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed
ABISTADO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case
mandatory or directory?
Statement of the Case
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to cause such
publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the application. But the Solicitor
General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set aside the Decision[1] promulgated on July 3,
1991 and the subsequent Resolution[2] promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court
of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:[4]
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside,
and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado,
Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and
substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado,
represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are hereby dismissed
for want of evidence.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this land, let an
order for the issuance of a decree be issued."
The Facts
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original
registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529.[5] The application was docketed as Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to
Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. [6] However, during the
pendency of his petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold
and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was
appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition for
want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]
"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23
(1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official
Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not
legally acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation."
The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in its
pertinent portion provides:[8]
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529] has a two-fold
purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the aforequoted provision refers to
publication in the Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in
the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but
also in a newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably necessary because
without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration
case. As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general
circulation is indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any
decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as earlier
explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration of the title in the
name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution
dated November 19, 1991.
The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this recourse to
us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on Rule 65. This is an
error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is appealing a final disposition of the
Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for
certiorari under Rule 65.[9]
The Issue
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion[10] in holding
x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need not be
published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of
such publication.
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing shall be
published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. According to
petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial
court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of
due process.[11]
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the requirement
of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural defect. They add that
publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:[13]
x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with
equal force that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to
explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this wise:[14]
x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure prejudiced them in
any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice
by mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were complied with and these
are sufficient to notify any party who is minded to make any objection of the application for
registration.
The Courts Ruling
We find for petitioner.
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of the
notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five days from filing of
the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be
earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
1. By publication. --
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette
and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice shall
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why
the prayer of said application shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication in
the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the
question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the
land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of statutory
construction and the due process rationale behind the publication requirement.
The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land
Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing.The said
word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute.[15] While
concededly such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import
ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the
term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,[16] the
Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of
the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be
complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in
detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who, per Section
15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if
mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by
mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason
is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as
newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein
may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners
of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as
possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would not have mattered
because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense
with such mandatory requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again,
this Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application. [19] There is
no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have
been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land registration
is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.[17] Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the state,
who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. This being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons
who may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from
contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a party as an owner
seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court must prove by satisfactory and
conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the
same situation as one who institutes an action for recovery of realty.[18] He must prove his title
against the whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all
persons concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why the application
should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require that before the claimed
property is taken from concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties SECOND DIVISION
must be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
[G.R. No. L-35787. April 11, 1980.]
 FAUSTA FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO F. SANTOS and RAMONA
FRANCISCO (Substituted by: JOSE SAN DIEGO; CELSO GARROVILLAS, HONORIO GARROVILLAS,
EDILBERTO GARROVILLAS, AMALIA GARROVILLAS; VIRGINIA GARROVILAS, PACITA GARROVILLAS
and LOPE GARROVILLAS), Respondents.
Sumulong Law Office for Petitioner.
Candido G. del Rosario & Associates for Private Respondents.
DECISION
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the judgment rendered by a vote of 3 to 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 37818-R, entitled Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, applicants-respondents, v. Fausta
Francisco, petitioner-appellee, reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Land
Registration Case No. N-4383, L.R.C. Record No. N-25140, wherein said trial court granted the
petition for review of the decree of registration earlier issued by it, after a virtually ex parte
hearing and judgment, and ordered said previous decision and decree set aside and the land in
question registered instead in the name of now herein petitioner Fausta Francisco.
As recounted in the original decision of the Court of Appeals, on May 23, 1964, the
aforementioned trial court rendered a decision ordering the registration of the land in dispute
situated in Barrio Singalong, Antipolo, Rizal, in the names of herein private respondents Alejandro
F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, which decision became final and executory, and on June 27, 1964
the order was issued to the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree,
which it did, No. N- 99323 on July 13, 1964, followed by the issuance of Original Certificate of Title
No. 4064 in their names.
According to the Record on Appeal, on July 31, 1964, herein petitioner Fausta Francisco, filed a
petition for review alleging under oath inter alia that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"2. She is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for in this case, which is situated in
Barrio Singalong. Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and covered by Plan Psu-1992781 and
now embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal.
"3. She and her predecessors in interest have been in continuous, open, adverse, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the land in dispute since time in memorial.
"4. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained a Decree of Registration No. N-99332 for
the parcel of land in question through fraud. In their application dated October 29, 1963, they
claimed to be the owners of this parcel of land by possession. This is not true. Alejandro F. Santos
and Ramona Francisco have never been in possession of the parcel of land in question.
"5. Petitioner and her five (5) brothers and sisters namely, Anastacia, Leoncio, Paula, Perfecta, all
surnamed Francisco, with residence in Morong, Rizal and Venancia Francisco Nepomuceno,
residing in Calumpang, Marikina, Rizal, who are the adjacent registered owners of the land in
question, were not notified of any alleged survey of this land nor of the present application for
registration.
"6. Neither petitioner nor her tenant was notified of the alleged survey nor of the present
application for registration as actual occupant and possession of the land in question.
"7. Notice of this land registration proceedings was published in The Official Gazette but herein
petitioner does not read it.
"8. The land in question was never actually surveyed by or for the applicants for reason among
others that when petitioner caused the recent survey of the same there were no monuments
found on this land."cralaw virtua1aw library
Herein private respondents opposed the above petition for review maintaining principally
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"4. That in her petition for review, petitioner claims to be the owner of the land covered by the
decree of registration but failed to state in said petition how she became the owner thereof and
under what color of title does she claim to be owner of the land; neither did petitioner attached
any instrument supporting her claim other than a supposed affidavit of merit signed by her alone
containing allegations amounting to the existence of intrinsic fraud only; that assuming without
admitting that there was indeed intrinsic fraud, nevertheless said allegations even if true is not
sufficient ground for reopening and review of the corresponding decree of registration;
"5. That petitioner’s petition is not sufficient in form and substance and therefore should be
dismissed by the Honorable Court. In support of this contention, we most respectfully quote the
following doctrine:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘The essential requisite for a valid petition for the reopening and review of a decree under Sec. 38
of Act 496 is that it be made only by a person who has been deprived of land or of any interest
therein by virtue of the decree sought to be reconsidered. A mere claim of ownership is not
sufficient and the petition of any person whose interest in the land is short of absolute ownership,
lacks the essential requisite, and for that reason should not be considered. Thus in the case of
Broce v. Apurado, 26 Phil. 581, 586, the Supreme Court clearly and unequivocably said: "In order
to obtain the benefits of section 38 the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land,
and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration. A mere claim of
ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act.’
"Philippine Land Registration Law, Vargas, Mañalac & Mañalac, p. 284)." (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 20-
22.)
It may be noted at this point that because the Bureau of Lands withdrew its opposition to herein
respondents’ application, Judge Guillermo Torres, the trial judge, commissioned the clerk of court
to receive their evidence and subsequently rendered his original favorable decision. In contrast,
when Judge Torres gave due course to herein petitioner’s petition for review, he held a trial and
heard the evidence of the parties himself, with private respondent Alejandro F. Santos and his
former witnesses Lauro Cruz and Eugenio Francisco as well as petitioners and her witnesses
testifying in open court. After such trial, on April 5, 1966, the same judge, the Honorable Guillermo
Torres, rendered the new decision now in dispute reversing that of May 23, 1964, thus setting
aside the latter, the decree of registration and original certificate of title of private respondents
issued pursuant thereto and ordering instead that the land under litigation be registered in the
name of petitioner. When Justice Mateo Canonoy prepared the first draft of the decision, the
other two members of the Division, Justices Antonio Lucero and Eulogio Serrano disagreed with
him. Justices Juan F. Enriquez and Manuel P. Barcelona were designated to join to form the
division of five required by law, and on March 17, 1972, with Justice Canonoy as ponente and
Justices Enriquez and Barcelona concurring, the decision favorable to herein private respondents
was promulgated. Justice Serrano dissented in an extended opinion pointing out the existence of
actual fraud committed by private respondents in securing the judgment in their favor and
sustaining, with a careful analysis of the relevant and material evidence, the contention of
petitioner that she, by herself and thru her predecessor in interest has been the one, instead of
respondents, in continuous, open, adverse possession of the land in issue, under a claim of title. In
due time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied with the same votation.
In reversing himself in the light of the evidence he himself had subsequently heard, instead of his
clerk of court, unlike in the original proceeding, Judge Torres reasoned out and made his findings
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioner alleges in her petition for review that applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona
Francisco obtained through fraud Decree No. N-99332; that she is the absolute owner in fee
simple of that parcel of land in question situated in Barrio Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo,
Province of Rizal, described in Plan Psu-1992791 and embraced in Original Certificate of Title No.
4064 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal; that she has been in possession of said land,
together with her father who is her predecessor in interest, openly, peacefully, adversely and
continuously since time immemorial. On the other hand, applicants-respondents contend in their
application for registration that the land in question was owned by applicant Alejandro Santos’
father, Toribio Santos, and that upon the latter’s death in 1922, he inherited the said parcel of
land. However in the presentation of his evidence in this petition for review, Alejandro F. Santos
testified that this land had no previous owner; that he merely occupied this land sometime in 1920
and had been in possession of the same for more than thirty years.
"The main issues in this case are: (a) Whether or not the applicant secured thru fraud Decree No.
N-99332 and (b) Who is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.
"It appears clearly from the evidence that since 1918, Diego Francisco, father of petitioner, had
occupied the parcel of land in question; that this land is a portion of a bigger parcel of land with an
area of fifty hectares which was occupied and possessed by Diego Francisco since 1918.
Comprising this fifty-hectare parcel of land are the land in question described in Plan Psu-199278,
Exhibit A, the land described in Plan Psu-199277, Exhibit B, and the land described in plan H-
114240, Exhibit C, embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, formerly the
homestead patent of Diego Francisco. The whole area of fifty hectares is fenced with barbed wire
and planted with mango trees, a portion planted to palay and a bigger portion devoted to
pasturing of carabaos. All these improvements were introduced by petitioner’s father, Diego
Francisco, during his lifetime. In 1940, Diego Francisco, was able to obtain a title on a portion of
this big parcel of land, now embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, in the
names of petitioner Fausta Francisco and her sister and brother, Anastacia, Leoncio, Venancia,
Perfecta and Paula, all surnamed Francisco.
"The petitioner’s father, Diego Francisco, died in the year 1941 and after his death, petitioner
continued to possess the land in question which was not embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 23434, Exhibit J, and her possession over said portion of the land is open, public, peaceful
continuous, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of an owner. In 1964, petitioner
had the land in question surveyed by a private land surveyor, Jose de Guzman, who, upon inquiry
from the Bureau of Lands, discovered that there was already a survey plan in the name of the
applicant in this case, Alejandro F. Santos. Petitioner likewise discovered that this land is already
titled in the name of the said Alejandro F. Santos.
"It was clearly established that petitioner, as adjacent owner of the land in question was not
notified of the alleged survey. The Surveyor’s Certificate, Exhibit 6, with respect to notices of
adjoining owners cannot be given any credence. It could be seen from Exhibit 6 that Jose P. Cruz,
who is no longer the adjoining owner of the land in litigation and who is admittedly dead was
notified on October 29, 1962 and that said Jose P. Cruz appeared on the date of the survey,
although being dead, it was, impossible for him to appear on the date of the survey. The Santol
Creek was also allegedly notified but that it did not appear. This is ridiculous. The Santol Creeks is
not a person or entity, and the one notified should have been the proper government official or
office. Similarly, it was made to appear by applicants-respondents that Diego Francisco,
petitioner’s father, an adjoining owner, was notified of the survey. Diego Francisco has been long
dead, since 1941, and neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters received the purported
notice. By thus avoiding the sending of actual notices to the petitioner and other interested
parties, applicants were able to have the land in question surveyed, Plan Psu-1992791. It is
likewise admitted that neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters as adjacent owners were
notified of the registration proceedings in this case. It was established thru the testimony of the
petitioner that she does not read the Official Gazette, the publication where the notice of initial
hearing was published. By thus avoiding the sending of actual notice of initial hearing to petitioner
as adjoining owner and as actual owner and possessor of the land in question, the applicants were
able to obtain the decision dated May 23, 1964 in their favor. Furthermore, the Court is convinced
by the evidence that it is petitioner and her father before her, who have actually possessed and
occupied the land in question, and not the applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco. It
was shown thru the testimony of Quiterio San Jose, former Mayor of Teresa, Rizal, who is an
adjacent owner across the Santol Creek, that Alejandro F. Santos was never in possession of this
land in question and that it was Diego Francisco who was the one in possession of this parcel of
land during his lifetime and after his death, his heirs. By virtue of this continuous, adverse, and
open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47) years now, Fausta Francisco has
become the absolute owner of this parcel of land." (Pp. 26-31, Record on Appeal.)
To the foregoing, We only need to add by adoption the following well taken discussion by
distinguished counsel of petitioner in his memorandum of December 13,
1973:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The true adjoining owners at the
time of the filing of application.
"When the applicants, the spouses Alejandro Santos and Ramona Francisco, filed their application
for registration on October 29, 1963, they did not state the true adjoining owners at the North,
East, and West, of the land in question.
"At the North, they stated that the adjoining owner was Diego Francisco, when in truth and in fact,
as they knew full well, Diego Francisco died in 1942 and his homestead patent title over the land at
the North bad been cancelled and transferred to his children-heirs, namely Fausta (petitioner
herein), Anastacia, Paula, Perfecta, Venancia, and Leoncio, all surnamed Francisco (see TCT No.
23434 issued to the latter and marked as Exh. `J’).
"At the East, they stated that the adjoining owner was Jose P. Cruz, when in truth and in fact, as
they knew full well, Jose P. Cruz died in 1952 and his homestead patent title over the land at the
East had been cancelled and transferred to Estela Angeles to whom his children (Lauro Cruz and
two others sold on January 1, 1954 (see TCT No. 32697 issued to Estela Angeles marked as Exh. `L-
2’). On November 7, 1957, Estela Angeles sold the land to Vicente Antonio who issued TCT No.
32697 (Exh. `L-3’). On August 31, 1959, Vicente Antonio sold the land in favor of Antonio Astudillo
(TCT No. 96527 (Exh. `L-4’). who in turn sold the land to Arturo Rojas (TCT No. 100145 (Exh. `L-5’)
who on May 22, 1962 sold the land to Pilar V. Romack who was issued TCT No. 100146 on June 7,
1962.
"At the West, they stated that the adjoining owner was Eugenio Francisco, when in truth and in
fact, as they knew full well, at the time of the filing of their application, Paula Francisco (sister of
petitioner Fausta Francisco) was the actual occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land. The
application for registration of the said land filed by Eugenio Francisco in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal was opposed by Paula Francisco and is to be noted that Eugenio Francisco was not even
present during the hearing and did not continue presenting evidence. After Paula Francisco had
presented her evidence, the Court of First Instance decided that the said land at the West should
be registered and decreed in the name of Paula Francisco, which decision became final as Eugenio
Francisco did not appeal therefrom, resulting in the issuance of decree and OCT No. 6945 to Paula
Francisco (see the said decision of the CFI Rizal attached to our motion for reconsideration dated
August 26, 1966 filed with the respondent Court of Appeals, Annex `B’ of Petition).
"Motive of the Applicants in not
stating the true adjoining owners.
"The intent and motive of applicants in not stating that the true adjoining co-owners at the North
were Fausta Francisco and her sisters and brother, was because they knew that Fausta was the
one occupying the land in question or at least that Fausta was claiming the land in question to be
hers, so if notice of their application for registration were sent to her as an adjoining co-owner at
the North, she would surely oppose their application for registration.
"The intent and motive of the applicants in making it appear that the adjoining owner at the East
was still Jose P. Cruz, when in truth it was already Estela Angeles, was because they were intending
to utilize Lauro Cruz (son of Jose P. Cruz) as their witness to testify, as he did testify, before the
Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at the East and as such knew that applicant
Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in question since 1929 when the latter’s
father died.
"The intent and motive of the applicants in not stating the true fact that both Eugenio Francisco
and Paula Francisco were claiming to be the owners of the land at the West, was because they
knew that Paula was the sister of petitioner Fausta Francisco, so if notice of their application for
registration were sent to Paula as one of the claimants to the land at the West, Paula would surely
tell her sister Fausta about it, and the latter would surely oppose their application for registration.
Moreover, applicants were intending to utilize Eugenio Francisco as their witness to testify, as he
did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of Court that he was the boundary owner at the West and as
such knew that the applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of the land in question since
1929 when the latter’s father died.
"It will thus be seen that the applicants did not state the true adjoining owners with the deliberate
intention of preventing notices of their application for registration to be sent to petitioner Fausta
Francisco and to her sister Paula Francisco, and in that way prevent petitioner from appearing in
the land registration case and file an opposition to their application for registration." (Pp. 198-201,
Record.)
Indeed, how could two dead persons and a creek be legally upheld as having been separately
properly notified of the application here under discussion? It is high time, the Court made it
patently clear and emphasized that it is the inescapable duty of surveyors to find out by
themselves who are the occupants and boundary owners of any land being surveyed by them for
purposes of registration. Beyond doubt, had the surveyors of respondents complied with this
simple and logical obligation imposed by the very nature of their professional undertaking, the
obvious anomalies extant in the instant case would not have happened. No dead persons nor a
creek could have been certified as duly notified by the Land Registration Office of the application!
Besides, as pointed out in the above-quoted portions of petitioner’s memorandum, the boundary
owner at the north in 1963 when the application of respondents was filed could not have been
Diego Francisco, for the simple reason that said person had died twenty-one years before or in
1942. Factually, under ordinary circumstances, if respondents were indeed in possession of the
land in dispute, it stands to reason they would have known of their neighbor’s long demise. More,
legally speaking, Diego Francisco had a Torrens Title which was duly transferred subsequently in
TCT 23434 (Exh. J) to the name of his children. Registration under the Torrens System constitutes,
at the very least, constructive notice to any boundary owner of who is his neighbor.
The same observations may be made insofar as Jose P. Cruz, the alleged former boundary owner in
the east. He had died in 1952, eleven years before the application, and the title he had acquired
over his land had been transferred several times in the Office of the Register of Deeds to Estela
Angeles, TCT 32697, Exh. L-2; to Vicente Antonio, TCT No. 32697 (sic) Exh. L-3; to Antonio Astudillo,
TCT 96527, Exh. L-4; to Arturo Rojas, TCT 100145, Exh. L-5; to Pilar V. Romack, TCT 100146 on June
7, 1962. (See Petitioner’s memo pp. 1-2.) These facts have never been denied in any pleading of
respondents.
Again, respondents knew or ought to have known that the boundary owner in the west could not
have been Eugenio Francisco, because it is judicial record that OCT No. 6945 was actually issued to
Paula Francisco who had opposed Eugenio’s attempt to have the land registered in his name. (See
Annex B of the petition.)
In addition, it is admitted that petitioner was never notified of the application, let alone her not
having had any chance to read or perhaps even know the Official Gazette.
In the light of the foregoing. the matters that require Our resolution in the instant case may be
said to be one of mixed fact and law, but apparently more legal than factual. Did respondents
commit fraud of the nature contemplated in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, (Act 496) that
would warrant the cancellation of the decree of registration and Torrens Title already issued to
them? The pole star jurisprudential pronouncements in this respect are found, as every student of
Land Registration knows, in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, by Justice Trent. Therein, it was
declared definitely that a land registration proceeding is one in rem and notice thereof by
publication binds the whole world, inclusive of those who may be adversely affected thereby,
innocent factually as they might have been of such publication. Understandably, such a rule could
be the only way to give meaning to the finality and indisputability of the Torrens title to be issued.
It may be said that to a certain degree such a strict rule could result in actual injustice, considering
not only the rather irregular publication of the Official Gazette and other publications, and, of
course, the illiteracy, not to speak, of the inaccessability to those concerned of such
publications.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Thus, Grey Alba should not be read, as the majority in the Court of Appeals decision under review,
did as entirely depriving victims of obvious fraudulent intent of the remedy of having a decree
reopened. This is clear in that decision itself. As the present Chief Justice, Hon. Enrique M.
Fernando, pointed out in Minlay v. Sandoval, 53 SCRA 1, "all that is required is a showing according
to this leading Grey Alba decision" of intention to deprive another of (his) just rights, which
constitutes the essential characteristic of actual fraud." And in this connection, the Chief Justice
went on thus: "It is to be stressed likewise that the Land Registration Act commands that the
applicant ‘shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names
and addresses of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known,
it shall state what search has been made to find them.’ (Section 21 of Act No. 496 [1902].) What
can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court was not sufficiently mindful of what the law
ordains when it refused to hear petitioner on his claim that appellee Sandoval was guilty of fraud
in including in his application the disputed lot." The pertinent statutory provision reads
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn to by the applicant, or by some
person duly authorized in his behalf. All oaths required by this Act may be administered by any
officer authorized to administer oaths in the Philippine Islands. If there is more than one applicant,
the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each. It shall contain a description
of the land and shall state whether the applicant is married; and, if married, the name of the wife
or husband; and, if unmarried, whether he or she has been married, and, if so, when and how the
married relation terminated. If by divorce, when, where, and by what court the divorce was
granted. It shall also state the name in full and the address of the applicant, and also the names
and addressee of all occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known,
it shall state what search has been made to find them. It may be in form as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
"To the Honorable Judge of the Court of Land Registration:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I (or we) the undersigned, hereby apply to have the land hereinafter described brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, and to have my (or our) title therein registered and
confirmed. And I (or we) declare: (1) That I am (or we are) the owner (or owners) in fee simple (or
by possessory information title) of a certain parcel of land with the buildings (if any, if not, strike
out the words `with the buildings’), situated in (here insert accurate description). (2) That said land
at the last assessment for taxation was assessed at _____ dollars. (3) That I (or we) do not know of
any mortgage or encumbrance affecting said land, or that any other person has any estate or
interest therein, legal or equitable in possession, remainder reversion, or expectancy (if any, add
`other than as follows,’ and set forth each clearly). (4) That I (or we) obtained title (if by deed, state
name of grantor, date and place of record, and file the deed or state reason for not filing If any
other way, state it). (5) That said land is ______ occupied (if occupied, state name in full and place
of residence and post office address of occupant and the nature of this occupancy. If unoccupied,
insert `not’). (6) That the names and addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all
lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same directions as above.) (7) That I am (or we are)
married. (Follows literally the directions given in the prior portions of this section.) (8) That my (or
our) full name (or names), residence, and post office address is (or are) as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Dated this ____ day of _____ in the year nineteen hundred and _____
(Signature) _______
"(SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS)
"UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
"Province (or city) of ________ (date)
"There personally appeared the above-named ______ known to me to be the signer (or signers) of
the foregoing application, and made oath that the statements therein, so far as made of his (or
their) own knowledge, are true, and so far as made upon information and belief, that he (or they)
believe them to be true. The residence certificate _____ of the applicant (or applicants, or
representative) was exhibited (or applicants, or representative) was exhibited to me, being No.
_______ issued at ____ dated _____, 19 ____
BEFORE ME:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(Notary Public or other
official authorized to
administer oaths)"
As maybe readily noted, No. (6) of the suggested sufficient form says: "That the names and
addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all lands adjoining the above land are as
follows (same directions as above)." But more importantly, it should be borne in mind, the text of
the law requires not mere statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and
adjoining owners by also "what search has been made to find them." As earlier indicated,
respondents could not have escaped, if they had "search(es)" as the law definitely mandates, the
names of their "colindantes", it being a fact that the latter’s lands were duly registered. Surely,
they would have known, as it can be presumed they did, that Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz,
whom they would name as boundary owners in their application is 1963 had already been long
dead and buried. In Grey Alba, the reason found by the Court for the failure of the applicant to
notify the acknowledged occupant of the land applied for was because, from the circumstances
known to them, it was evident that they were no more than their lessees and could have had no
registerable interest at all in the property, which is far from what happened in the instant case.
Here, We cannot bring Ourselves to believe that the naming of Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz,
two persons long dead, as boundary owners in their application, not to speak of the "creek", (who
was also "proven" to have been notified) does not constitute actual fraud. Petitioner’s evidence of
her own occupancy, considering it is contradicted by respondents’ evidence, need not be
mentioned anymore. Anyway, the unrebuttable proof alone is to Us sufficient, by and large, to
uphold not only the dissenters in the Court of Appeals but also the trial judge who had heard the
respondent Alejandro Santos and his witness Lauro Cruz somehow deviate substantially and
materially from their testimonies given before the clerk of court in the original
proceeding.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In Grey Alba itself, We find the following significant pronouncements at p. 50, (Vol. 17, Phil.) "By
fraud is meant actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This meaning should be given to the word
‘fraud’ in section 38 of the Land Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to
authorize the Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific acts
intended to deceive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner injure him, must be
alleged and prove."cralaw virtua1aw library
We hold that as above discussed, the majority decision of the Court of Appeals under review,
cannot be reconciled even with Grey Alba. The emphasis given in that decision to the in rem
character of land registration proceedings and the broad legal significance of such kind of
proceeding could not have by any degree minimized the paramouncy of truth and justice itself in
any actual case before the court. As Our Chief Justice quoted from Justice Torres "The registration
of (land) cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith" (p. 12, 53 SCRA), just
as it is reiterated therein what We said in Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil. 498, "it is fraud to knowingly
omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person." (taken
from Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934, at p. 938.) Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion
that in law, the better view is that of the distinguished dissenters in the Court of Appeals, and We
find no alternative but to uphold the same. Incidentally, the binding force of a finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals, assuming the instant case were in any degree factual in nature, diminishes
correspondingly according to the number and content of the dissent, when there is or are any. In
the case at bar, it is Our conclusion that the majority’s bases, much more its reliance in their purely
literal understanding of Grey Alba do not conform with the dictates of truth and justice.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed, and the second
decision of Judge Guillermo Torres of April 5, 1966 is affirmed, without prejudice to petitioner and
the trial court complying with the additional requirements for the issuance of the corresponding
title in favor of petitioner. Costs against private respondents.
[G.R. No. 146527. January 31, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANNA PROPERTIES, INC., Represented by its
President, JOSE TANYAO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals Decision[2] dated 20
December 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26,
San Fernando, La Union (trial court) dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-2352
(LRC No. N-2352) approving the application of respondent Manna Properties, Inc. (Manna
Properties) for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San
Fernando, La Union.
Antecedent Facts
As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case are as follows:
On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the registration of title of two
(2) parcels of land, specifically:
a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; and
b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in Barangay Pagdaraoan,
San Fernando, La Union measuring around 1,480 square meters.
Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo.
Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes and record were
forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court a quo on October 7, 1994.
However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration Authority, the full names
and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot owners were not stated for notification
purposes. As a result thereto, per Order dated December 5, 1994, the applicant was directed to
submit the names and complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of Lots 9514 and 9516.
On December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance, which was forwarded to the Land
Registration Authority on December 22, 1994 together with the notice of the Initial Hearing, which
was reset to April 13, 1995.
On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the resetting of the initial
hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a non-working day to a date consistent with LRC
Circular No. 353 or ninety (90) days from date of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible
mail delays and to enable them to cause the timely publication of the notice in the Official Gazette.
The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a quo.
On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995 from the LRA with the
information that the notice can no longer be published in the Official Gazette for lack of material
time since the National Printing Office required submission of the printing materials 75 days
before the date of the hearing. It was again requested that the initial hearing be moved to a date
consistent with LRC Circular No. 353.
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18, 1995.
The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant is a private corporation
disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold alienable lands of public domain.
Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing Office, the Notice of
Initial Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette officially released on
June 19, 1995. The same notice was published in the July 12, 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald.
Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on the acquisition of the
subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepea, co-owner of the subject property, who testified on
the possession of the applicant-appellees predecessors-in-interest.
The [documentary] evidence presented were:
1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006;
2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate;
5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
6. Notice of Initial Hearing;
7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the LRA;
8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the National
Printing Office;
9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the Circulation
Manager of the Ilocos Herald;
10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing;
11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995;
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995;
13. Sheriffs Return of Posting;
14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice of Initial
Hearing on July 18, 1995.
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996 granting the application.
(sic)[3]
The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), promptly appealed the trial courts decision to the Court of Appeals. On 20
December 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners appeal.
Hence, this petition.
The Regional Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and competent
evidence all its allegations in the application for original land registration. The Land Registration
Authority (LRA) did not present any evidence in opposition to the application. The trial court ruled
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the application, and orders that the
parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total
area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters, situated in Barangay
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union and embraced in Plan AS-1331434 (Exh. A and the technical
description described in Exhibit B and B-1) shall be registered in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree in the name of the
applicant Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its President Jose [Tanyao], Filipino citizen, of
legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao] with residence and postal address at Jackivi Enterprises,
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529. [4]
The Court of Appeals Ruling
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling and dismissed petitioners argument that
the applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of Presidential Decree No.
1529[5] (PD 1529). The Court of Appeals pointed out that the 90-day period for setting the initial
hearing under Section 23 of PD 1529 is merely directory and that it is the publication of the notice
of hearing itself that confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated that the records of the case
reveal that the testimony of Manuel Sobrepea was not the sole basis for the trial courts finding
that Manna Propertiess predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question as
early as 1953. The Court of Appeals added that while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of
ownership, they are the best indicia of possession.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION; and
 2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN POSSESSION OF THE
PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE PERIOD.
The Ruling of the Court
On Whether Manna Properties Failed
to Comply with the Jurisdictional
Requirements for Original Registration
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between the court order
setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself. Petitioner points out that in this case, the
trial court issued the order setting the date of the initial hearing on 15 March 1995, but the trial
court set the hearing date itself on 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125 days in between
the two dates, petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the 90-day period set by PD 1529.
Thus, petitioner concludes the applicant [Manna Properties] failed to comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for original registration.
The petitioner is mistaken.
The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads:
Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the
application, issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier
than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
xxx
The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration court. After an
applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of a court order setting the initial
hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court document. The notice of initial hearing is
signed by the judge and copy of the notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. This involves
a process to which the party applicant absolutely has no participation.
Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly comply with
the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant complied with the jurisdictional
requirements.
The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set beyond
the 90-day maximum period. The records show that the Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly
requested the trial court to reset the initial hearing date because of printing problems with the
National Printing Office, which could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in the
Official Gazette. Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna Properties failed to perform
the acts required of it by law.
We have held that a party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the Clerk of
Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in
the performance of his duties.[6] A party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of
the trial court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole
power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant has
neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.
Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of the order
setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself. Petitioner does not raise
any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the application. Petitioner does not also question
the sufficiency of the publication of the required notice of hearing. Consequently, petitioner does
not dispute the real jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases compliance with the
publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of hearing was published
both in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of
hearing. This complies with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice
of the registration proceedings.
On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently
Established Possession of the Land
For the Period Required by Law
Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession of the land for the
period of time required by law. Petitioner alleges that the trial court and the Court of Appeals
based their findings solely on their evaluation of the tax declarations presented by Manna
Properties.
The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to
the review and revision of errors of law.[7] This Court is not bound to analyze and weigh evidence
already considered in prior proceedings. Absent any of the established grounds for exception, this
Court is bound by the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the required
possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question of fact. [8] It invites an
evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us to re-evaluate the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the trial and appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not
allow this. Matters of proof and evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a
Rule 45 petition, except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances. [9] We find one such
circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not support the conclusions of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties that, as a private
corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from holding alienable lands of the public domain,
except by lease. Petitioner cites the constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the public domain.
On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that the land in question
has been in the open and exclusive possession of its predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s.
Thus, the land was already private land when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-
in-interest.
The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) otherwise known as the Public
Land Act. Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from the public domain
by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of alienable public land for the period prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into
private land.[10] Judicial confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the
earlier conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law from the
moment the required period of possession became complete.[11]
Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-interest of Manna
Properties have been in possession of the land in question since this date, or earlier, Manna
Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director
of Lands v. IAC,[12] Manna Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of
the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-interest first.
We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and remains part of
the public domain.
Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of
land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. [13] Any applicant for confirmation of
imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his
name.[14] Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only subject to formal
recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open, continuous and adverse
possession for the requisite period of time.[15] It is only when the applicant complies with this
condition that he may invoke the rights given by CA 141.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of possession
consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest, Manuel Sobrepea
(Manuel),[16]transferees affidavits, and several tax declarations covering the land in question.
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership, it
may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.[17] However, the tax declarations presented
by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their cause. Although Manna Properties claimed during
trial that they were presenting the tax declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945,[18] a
scrutiny of the tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed it
to be. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued on 28 November
1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration indicates that it was issued to replace the
1945 tax declaration covering the land in question. A substitute is not enough.
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 June 1945, is
material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June 1945 or earlier. A tax declaration
simply stating that it replaces a previous tax declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this
standard. It is unascertainable whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or after
12 June 1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued in 1945
may have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of issuance in 1945 is
stated, compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 cannot be established.
There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna Properties must fail.
The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked as Exhibit Q-16 bears several
irregularities. A small annotation found at the bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it
cancels a previous tax declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued in
1945, Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that will enable this Court or
any interested party to check whether the original 1945 tax declaration ever existed.19 The blanks
left by Exhibit Q-16 render any attempt to trace the original tax declaration futile. Moreover, on its
face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted tax declaration.
The net effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax declaration.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states that it was FILED
UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160. Republic Act No. 7160 is the Local Government Code of 1991.
The sworn undertaking by the Deputy Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads,
Subscribed and sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950 This means that the tax declaration
was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used came into existence. Manna
Properties gave no explanation why its tax declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of
the alleged issuance of the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to
conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of making it appear that Manna
Properties predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land in question since 12 June
1945.
The earliest of the un-cancelled tax declarations presented by Manna Properties is dated
1950. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945. The same can
be said of the transferees affidavit, which was dated 1955. Manna Properties reliance on Manuels
testimony is similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and self-serving on its own
but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents or predecessors-in-interest were
in possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The only clear assertion of possession made
by Manuel was that his family used to plant rice on that piece of land.20
Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not present sufficient
proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and adverse possession of
the land in question since 12 June 1945. At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since
1952. Manna Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of Manuel and
substitute tax declarations. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on such secondary
evidence in cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title over public land. 21 Manna
Properties evidence hardly constitutes the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary to
acquire title through adverse occupation under CA 141.22
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562. The Application for Registration filed
by Manna Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San
Fernando, La Union, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-3637. August 31, 1907. ]
PEDRO P. ROXAS, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ANASTASIO CUEVAS, ET AL., Respondents-
Appellants.
Jose Santiago, for Appellants.
Del-Pan, Ortigas & Fisher, for Appellees.
SYLLABUS
1. APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS IN LAND ADJUDICATION CASES. — If it is the opinion of the appellants
that the land awarded to the petitioners does not belong to private individuals but to the
Government, it follows that they can have no interest in such land since they do not represent the
Government, being private citizens only. Since the property belongs to the Government, being
private citizens only. Since the property belongs to the Government, although the lower court has
not so held it in its judgment, the prejudiced party would be the Government, not a private
individual, and the right to appeal rests with the Government, not with the respondents nor any
other private individual to whom the representation of the State or Government has not been
intrusted.
2. SCOPE OF THE RESPONDENTS’ APPEAL. — In order that an application for registration of the title
in the Court of Land Registration may be objected to, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496,
the opposition have been injured the latter can have no right to appeal from the judgment,
whatever it may have been; neither the said act nor any other law grants to anyone the right to
appeal on behalf of another party, and not in his own name and by reason of his own interest. It is
only the legal personal right of the respondent prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court that
can be considered by this court upon appeal. As no claim was made by the respondents in their
own name, and as the decision which they seek from this court is that it be held that the land
adjudicated by the judgment appealed from is the property of the Government, there is no
possible way for this court to consider and decide as to a right which has not been claimed on
appeal by the party really prejudiced. In the present case the proper party would be the Insular
Government, represented by the Attorney-General, and the latter has not appealed from the
judgment.
3. HOMESTEAD RIGHT SUBORDINATE TO RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. — An application for the
grant of a homestead can only be considered when it refers to public lands, not when private
property is concerned. Wile it remained doubtful, in the course of a litigation, whether a portion of
land claimed to be private property does or does not belong to the Government, the applicants for
homesteads might be allowed to appear in the suit as coadjuvants, though it may have been the
initial right that induced them to defend the public rights of the Government, although
subordinate to this public interest; but from the moment when such public interest has
disappeared, by reason of proof of private ownership, cooperation in such an action can no longer
be insisted upon, nor can the coadjuvant claim to have better rights than the principal plaintiff
himself.
DECISION
ARELLANO, C.J. :
The judgment appealed from contains the following statements:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on the 22d of December, 1904, application was filed with the Court of Land Registration,
whereby the applicants asked for the registration in their name of certain land situated in the
Province of La Laguna, known as Hacienda of Calauang, having an area of 7,813 hectares and 87
ares, valued according to the last assessment at $525,000 in money of the United States; that the
following parties opposed the application: The Government of the Philippine Islands through the
Attorney-General; 367 residents of the town of Calauang, Province of La Laguna, represented by
Jose Santiago; 136 residents of the ancient town of Alaminos, now a barrio of the municipality of
San Pablo, Province of La Laguna, and three residents of Santo Tomas, in the Province of Batangas,
represented by Juan Alvarez; and 80 residents of the municipality of San Pablo, Province of La
Laguna, represented by Julian Gerona and Gregorio Pineda.
"That the lands in question were originally Crown lands of the Kingdom of Spain, and were
conveyed to one Francisco Xavier Salgado by royal grant dated February 2, 1777, Salgado being
already in possession on the 5th day of March, 1776. That after the death of Salgado his estate was
taken in administration by the ’Auditoria de Guerra,’ and on the 7th day of February, 1829, the
Hacienda of Calauang was sold at auction, one Benito Machado becoming the purchaser for the
sum of 16,000 pesos, one-half of which was paid in cash, the purchaser agreeing to pay the
balance in three years, giving a mortgage upon the hacienda to secure the satisfaction of the
deferred payment. That the purchase by said Machado was made with the funds, in the name, and
for the use of one Domingo Roxas; that the latter performed the conditions as to the payment of
the remaining one-half of the purchase price and thereupon became the owner in fee of the
hacienda, free and clear of any incumbrance; that by various mesne conveyances and in regular
order of succession the title to the Hacienda of Calauang became vested in the applicants in this
case, who are now the owners of the same in fee, free and clear of all incumbrance, except the lien
of a "censo" in favor of "Las Cajas de Comunidad," dated February 26, 1834, for the sum of twelve
thousand pesos, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. That in certain proceedings
held in the years 1847, 1848, 1878, and 1880, before the courts of the Spanish sovereignty, with
the assistance of the inspector general de montes in representation of the Government, various
questions disputes concerning the boundaries and limits of the hacienda with adjoining lands and
towns were heard and determined. That pursuant to these proceedings surveys were made by the
said inspector general de montes and a plan was prepared by him showing the true boundaries of
the hacienda as established by the decision of the court and recognized by the Government. The
said plan was introduced in evidence and forms part of the record herein, marked ’Exhibit U.’"
In reviewing the case, the court stated the following conclusions of facts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) That at the time of the entry by respondents upon the lands in question the same were
lawfully possessed by another under a good and sufficient title;
"(2) That contained and uninterrupted possession has been maintained by the original owner of
the lands and his successors down to the present date; and
"(3) That both prior and subsequent to the entry aforesaid, by respondents and their predecessors,
knowledge of the title and legal possession of the true owner was repeatedly brought home to
them by means of judicial decrees and official surveys of the land in questions."
And further on:
"The testimony shows that Francisco Xavier Salgado, the original owner of the lands in question,
entered into immediate possession of the same under his grant from the Spanish Crown in 1777;
that he contained in such possession in during his lifetime and that after his death the possession
was continued by his legal successors, and has been continued by them without interruption down
to the present day, for a period of one hundred and thirty years. This possession was not a purely
constructive but a very active one, exercised by Salgado and his successors by means of actual
occupancy, construction of valuable buildings, cultivation, appointment of administrators,
collection of rents, measurements, surveys, placing of boundary monuments, and the employment
of persons whose duty it was to, and who actually did at stated intervals, inspect the said
monuments and attend to their proper maintenance. It further appears that upon two occasions,
when infringements upon the rights of the owners were attempted, the aggressors were met by
legal proceedings in the courts, resulting in judgments confirming the ancient title and possession.
In contemplation of law, applicants have never been out of possession.
"Respondents allege in their answers possession by themselves and their predecessors for periods
of from thirty to one hundred years, but their testimony was limited, in most cases, to showing
possession by themselves alone. Some went a little further and introduced testimony tending to
show possession by their immediate grantors; but that this possession was at best a precarious
and doubtful one is clear from the testimony, which shows that in most cases the respondents
resided at considerable distances from the lands claimed, having merely made use of the same for
agricultural purposes from time to time, under circumstances from which it is fair to infer that
their possession was nothing more than a permissive one."cralaw virtua1aw library
And, lastly:
"There is evidence in the record tending strongly to show that many of the persons occupying
lands within the limits of the Hacienda of Calauang were carried upon the books, kept by the
administratory of the hacienda, as tenants, and recognized the title of its proprietors . . .
"For the reason given (so ends the judgment) the oppositions herein must be overruled; and it is
ordered that the record of the above-mentioned documents in the registry of property of the
Province of La Laguna be canceled."cralaw virtua1aw library
And the findings in said judgment are of this tenor:
"The court finds that the appellants have legally acquired title to and are the owners in fee of the
lands hereinafter described, and that they are entitled to a decree of registration for the same as
provided by law.
"The court surveyor will prepare a new plan in accordance with this decision, showing therein the
following described land, title to which is hereby confirmed to and ordered registered in the name
of the applicants in the manner in which the interest of such of the applicants is set forth in the
petition."cralaw virtua1aw library
This judgment was rendered on the 17th of February, 1906. On the 26th of the same month the
respondents residing in the town of Calauang, by their attorney, Jose Santiago, duly excepted to
said judgment, and announced their intention to present a bill of exceptions. On the same date
they also filed an application for a new trial to be held on March 1, alleging as reason "that the
exceptions submitted to this court the appellants state that "on the first instant (March, 1906) the
new trial was denied."cralaw virtua1aw library
The record does not show that the motion was considered or that the petition for new trial was
denied, nor that exception was taken in consequence of such denial.
In accordance with paragraph 3 of section 497 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, if the
excepting partly filed a motion in the Court of First Instance for a new trial, and the judge
overruled the motion, and due exception was taken, the Supreme Court may "review the evidence
and make such findings upon the facts, and render such final judgment, as justice and equity
require."cralaw virtua1aw library
Therefore, in this case, there is no basis provided for a review of the evidence, and the findings
upon the facts, as set down by the trial court in its decision, must stand.
Under the bill of exceptions presented, this court, in accordance with the said section 497, can
only decide the questions of law therein contained.
The questions of law presented in the statements of errors, in which, according to the appellants,
the trial court has incurred, are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. For having admitted "Exhibits C" and "D" as evidence from the applicants, the first of which is
the instrument whereby the Hacienda of Calauang was acquired by Benito Machado, at public
auction, in February, 1829, and the second a statement made by the same party interested in the
hacienda, which does not invalidate the deed of sale in favor of Machado. (I and II.)
2. For having admitted from the applicants, as counter- proofs and additional evidence, the
exhibits stated above, which do not justify the right or dominion of the petitioners on the
Hacienda of Calauang, and for having accepted as sufficient proof of dominion the documents
offered by the petitioners when the same are not deeds of successive conveyances from the first
holder to the petitioners. (III, IV, V, and VI.)
3. For not having considered that the land in question belongs to the Government when, as a
matter of fact, the exclusion of a parcel thereof, as such Government land, had been ordered; for
having included in the judgment land the title to which is recorded in the Court of Land
Registration in favor of persons other than the petitioners, said title having been issued by the
Government; in view of the fact that the chief of the Bureau of Public Lands had approved several
applications for homesteads; according to "Exhibits 1" to "10" of the respondents; since one of the
very same petitioners had himself applied for a permit to cut timber within the land in question.
(VII, VIII and IX.)
4. For not having considered that the petitioner have exhibited only a title by mere possession, a
right which was forfeited for having failed to possess the property during more than eight years;
and for having failed to consider the preferential rights of the respondents to the land occupied by
them, when the evidence of the latter had not been objected to by the petitioners, in accordance
with the agreement entered into by both parties on page 8 of the bill of exceptions. (X and XI.)
This last point touched by the appellants, and by the appellees as well, is extremely important on
account of its significance and decisiveness. In fact, it has been agreed between the parties herein
that the contents of the answers filed by the respondents may be taken as confirmed.
And it is because the respondents of Calauang have maintained in all their pleadings "that the land
claimed and a portion thereof is occupied by the respondents." (Bill of exceptions, 6.) And in the
brief filed before this court they maintain "that the Roxas people have alleged, as applicants, that
they were the owners of the land in question, and that the respondents residing in the town of
Calauang said that the land belonged to the Government . . ." And they reproduce the essential
parts of their answer in opposition, wherein the first thing that they state is that the land in
question is the property of the Government. And when referring to the documents offered by
them as evidence, they said "that the same clearly established that the land in question is owned
by the Government and not by private individuals." This statement is repeated in several parts of
the brief.
If it is the opinion of the appellant that the land awarded by the judgment to the petitioners does
not belong to private individuals but to the Government, it follows that the appellants, as
respondents residing in Calauang, can have no interest in said land, as they are not the
Government but mere citizens.
Since the land belongs to the State, and since the lower court has not so held it in its judgment, the
aggrieved party would be the State and not a mere citizen, and it is the State that would have been
entitled to appeal from the judgment and not the respondents of Calauang or any other private
individual to whom the representation of the State or the Insular Government has not been
entrusted.
The Insular Government, duly represented at the trial by the Attorney-General, has not appealed
before us, nor have we to decide any question connected with the rights of the State or of the
Insular Government.
In order that an application for registration of the title of ownership in the Court of Land
Registration may be objected to, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496, the opposition must be
based on the right of dominion or some other real right opposed to the adjudication or recognition
of the ownership of the petitioner, whether it be limited or absolute; and if none such rights of the
respondent have been injured by the judgment, he can not have, on his part, the right to appeal
from the said judgment, whatever it may be, as neither the said act nor any other law on this
matter grants any one the right to appeal on behalf of another party and not in his own name and
by reason of his own interest.
It is only the legal personal right of the respondent, prejudiced by the judgment of the lower court,
that can be considered by this court upon appeal. No right of their own being claimed by the
respondent, and inasmuch as the decision they seek from this court is one declaring that the land
adjudicated by the lower court is the property of the Government, there is no way for his court to
consider and decide as to a right which has not been claimed in the appeal by the party prejudiced,
which in the present case would be the Insular Government, represented by the Attorney-General,
who has not appealed from the said judgment.
Therefore the assignment of errors filed by the appellants is overruled as being absolutely contrary
to law and worthless, and the appeal filed by the respondents of Calauang, from the judgment of
the 17th of February, 1906, of the Court of Land Registration, is dismissed, with the cost of this
instance.
But there is yet another judgment by the same court in this same action, bearing date of the 20th
of July, 1906, rendered upon the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On account of the opposition to the application in question, filed by the Attorney-General, with
regard to a certain tract of land in the Hacienda of Calauang, the Court of Land Registration, in its
judgment above referred to, of February 17, 1906, made also this
statement:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That portion of the application which refers to lands not included in the above description is
hereby denied, reserving, nevertheless, the right of the petitioners to file an amended application
asking for the registration of the land thus excluded, in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Act and in the manner therein provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. Although the applicants excepted to this part of the decision, they, however, subsequently
availed themselves of the benefits of the said act, and the action was reopened in view of the
amended application.
3. In his opposition the Attorney-General asked that certain persons who had applied for
homesteads be notified in order that their rights might be protected; these persons appeared with
Santiago and ratified their former answers in this case. (Minutes of proceedings.)
The court rendered its aforementioned judgment of the 20th of July, 1906, whereby, with the
exception of about 213 hectares held to be public forest, it adjudged to the applicants the
remainder of the lands which had been excluded by the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906,
announced his appeal.
On the same date a petition for new trial was filed on the ground that the decision was contrary to
law, and on the 28th of September of the same year he stated who were the respondents to the
amended application, on account of their respective homesteads, to wit: Jose Antillon, Maria
Salvador, Mariano Marfori, Gabino Quincaco, Juan Palejon, Domingo Ramos, Brigido Pascual,
Leopoldo Atienza, Regino Martinez, Vicenta Jazmin, Magdalena Avapo, Mariano Medel, and
Catalino Marfori, on whose behalf the defense excepted to the decision rendered in connection
with the amended application. (Petition on p. 188, part 12.)
In the aforesaid petition, as well as in their previous one, the petitioner asked that the last proofs
produced by both parties in support of and against the amended application, in connection with
the tract of land excluded by the first decision, be included in the bill of exceptions. And upon this
basis the appeal was heard together with the former one.
Out of the 1,000 hectares, more or less, excluded from the adjudication, under the judgment of
the 17th of February, 1906, the court in its last decision, rendered on the 20th of July of the same
year, finally excluded but 213 hectares, and adjudicated to the petitioners the remaining 787
hectares, more or less.
If the land claimed by the respondents of Calauang is included within the 213 hectares which have
been excluded, and are not adjudged to the petitioners, their is no object in the appeal and the
same should be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the same is included in the 787 hectares, more or
less, transferred by the judgment of the 20th of July, 1906, the appeal can not prosper because in
the last decision the court found as a fact that the petitioners, and not the respondents, have been
and are not in possession of the 787 hectares. The thirteen respondents are not, therefore,
entitled to the homestead for the reason that they have not been, nor are they at the present
time, in possession of the land included therein.
Be that as it may, the fact is that in connection with the judgment of the 20th of July, 1906,
although the aforesaid thirteen respondents excepted thereto, the bill of exceptions announced by
them at the time has not been brought before us. Consequently the evidence expressly stated as
forming part of the bill of exception can not be reviewed, for the reason that the bill has not been
submitted with or without the evidence.
And even if submitted, they could not have been reviewed by this court, in view of the fact that
the motion for a new trial was made on the ground that the judgment was contrary to the law, a
basis which does not authorize the reviewing of evidence taken before a lower court. The motion
for a new trial was neither heard nor denied, and no exception was taken as to any ruling denying
the same.

The jurisdiction of this court being thus limited to deciding mere question of law, none of which,
except those already set forth in the bill of exceptions to the judgment of the 17th of February,
1906, have been offered in connection with the judgment of the 20th of July following, yet, and in
order to avoid confusion, the foregoing remarks are made on points of law that might have arisen
on the second appeal.

For the reasons above set forth, the judgments of the 17th of February and 20th of July, 1906,
appealed from, are affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.