Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 37, No. 3 (2015), pp.

432–62 DOI: 10.1355/cs37-3e

© 2015 ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute ISSN 0129-797X print / ISSN 1793-284X electronic

What Next for the Indonesian

Navy? Challenges and Prospects
for Attaining the Minimum
Essential Force by 2024
KOH SWEE LEAN COLLIN

A greenwater navy ought to be effective within its country’s immediate

waters, especially the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) while also
possessing a limited extra-regional force projection ability. Based on this
definition, the Indonesian Navy does not adequately perform this dual
role. While President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s Global Maritime Fulcrum
(GMF) vision gives the navy’s long-term greenwater ambitions greater
traction, it still faces capacity-building constraints thus prompting it
to adopt the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) blueprint as an interim
measure. This article examines the Indonesian Navy’s prospects of
attaining its MEF targets by 2024 as part of its long-term greenwater
naval ambitions commensurate with Indonesia’s “maritime medium-
ness”. To identify these capacity gaps, this article models the navy’s
MEF projections based on three scenarios: Standard, Optimistic and
Austere. Results show that under an Austere Scenario, the navy cannot
possibly achieve its MEF targets across all categories by 2024. The
Optimistic and Standard Scenarios are more realistic. Gaps in certain
categories, primarily the PKR-10514 light frigate programme which
forms a key facet of the navy’s greenwater aspirations, are identified.
But the risks of project overruns and budget challenges may militate
against the modest projections derived in this study. Therefore, this

K oh S wee L ean C ollin is an Associate Research Fellow at the

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. Postal address:
Nanyang Technological University, Block S4, Level B4, 50 Nanyang
Avenue, Singapore, 639798; email: iscollinkoh@ntu.edu.sg.

432

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 433

article proposes a recalibration of the MEF specifications, by reducing

the number of high-capability PKR-10514s optimized for warfighting in
exchange for a larger force of low-capability “PKR-minus” optimized
for EEZ duties.

Keywords: Global Maritime Fulcrum, greenwater navy, Indonesian Navy, medium

maritime power, Minimum Essential Force, alutsista, renstra, TNI-AL.

As the world’s largest archipelagic nation-state stretching from the

eastern Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific rim, home to some
of the world’s critical sea lines of communications and endowed
with considerable marine resources, the development of Indonesia’s
maritime power has both regional and global consequences.
Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s Global Maritime
Fulcrum (GMF) vision has invited much discussion ever since it
was first announced in November 2014.1 The GMF comprises five
pillars: first, rebuilding the country’s maritime culture in order to
raise awareness among Indonesians that their identity, prosperity
and future will be determined by how they manage the oceans;
second, maintaining and managing national marine resources,
with a particular emphasis on fisheries; third, the development of
maritime infrastructure and connectivity; fourth, maritime diplomacy;
and fifth, building maritime defence. In short, the GMF represents
Indonesia’s newfound aspirations towards becoming a “medium
maritime power”, broadly defined as a medium power that seeks
to utilize the seas to enhance its ability to preserve the country’s
strategic autonomy.
Several new policy developments in Indonesia pertain to some
of the GMF pillars, including, for instance, efforts undertaken by
the Jokowi government to tackle illegal fishing in its exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). However, except for occasional press reports,
the modernization of the Indonesian Navy (Tentara Nasional Indonesia
— Angkatan Laut, TNI-AL) has elicited little attention in scholarly
circles. This is reflective of the dearth of scholarship on Southeast
Asian navies in general despite some recent scholarship.2 Hence,
the focus of this article is on the fifth GMF pillar — building
maritime defence — and, in particular, the navy’s modernization
efforts, especially its quest to achieve, by 2024, a Minimum Essential
Force (MEF) which allows for a minimum capacity to cover selected
geographical areas of interests across the Indonesian archipelago
while projecting limited force beyond it. Given Indonesia’s extensive
maritime interests, this article does not question Indonesia’s quest

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 434 Koh Swee Lean Collin

for a greenwater navy. But such ambitions warrant attention because

the navy has been plagued by chronic deficiencies while being
saddled with enormous maritime responsibilities. Yet, at the same
time, despite those constraints, the Indonesian political leadership
has called for the country’s armed forces to be strengthened beyond
the MEF level.3
This article first examines Indonesia’s maritime interests,
especially how the GMF may define its aspirations towards “maritime
medium-ness”. It then highlights the constraints faced by the navy
given the country’s vast maritime expanse and diverse maritime
interests, which then gives rise to the MEF blueprint as part of its
long-term greenwater ambitions. It is pertinent to ask whether the
TNI-AL will be able to achieve its MEF goals by 2024 given the
ongoing capacity-building efforts including equipment modernization.
To address this question, the article models the navy’s MEF
projections up to 2024. It shows that the MEF targets cannot be
attained across all categories by 2024. Therefore, this article proposes
recalibrating the navy’s MEF specifications to overcome persistent
budgetary constraints and to minimize the risks of project overruns
commonly associated with complex naval systems.

“Maritime Medium-ness” and a Greenwater Navy

The GMF’s aim is for Indonesia to achieve medium maritime power
status. This “medium” status, according to John Richard Hill, “lies
in between the insufficient (small states generally) and self-sufficient
(great powers generally)” capacity and where a state has more national
power at its disposal compared to small states, thus permitting it
a modicum of strategic autonomy.4 Hill goes on to explain that “if
a medium power is a state that prizes autonomy and is able to
manipulate power in order to preserve it, then a medium maritime
power will aim to use the sea in order to enhance this ability”.5
Sam Bateman expounds this concept thus:
medium-ness implies a certain level of development and size
(economy, population, geographical area, military strength, etc.),
as well as the state’s self-perception. Meanwhile, maritime-ness is
based on the state’s dependence on the sea which may be seen
as an amalgamation of factors such as maritime tradition, size
of navy and merchant fleet, dependence on seaborne trade, size
of the EEZ, value of offshore resources, and the capabilities of
domestic shipbuilding industry.6

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 435

What Dewi Fortuna Anwar, then Deputy for Political Affairs at

the Vice Presidential Office, said in September 2011 — three years
before the GMF was first mooted — is instructive: “Indonesia is the
[sic] middle power country right now meaning that we are in the
moderate position between major powers; traditionally, Indonesia
does keep distance from major powers and doesn’t let herself to be
co-opted by one side.”7 The GMF imbues this “medium power” self-
consciousness with a maritime flavour. Consequently, this “maritime
medium-ness” makes it imperative to build a greenwater navy by
2024, an ambition that was outlined in a ten-year naval development
plan, entitled Cetak Biru TNI-AL 2013 [Navy Blueprint for 2013]
released in 2002. This was not just motivated by the necessity
of modernizing an antiquated navy, but also to attain a level of
naval power commensurate with Indonesia’s stature as a medium
maritime power. According to then Navy Chief-of-Staff Admiral
Slamet Soebijanto, the greenwater navy represented a level of sea
power higher than that of a brownwater (coastal) navy, but below
that of a fully operational, ocean-going bluewater navy.8 As such,
one may observe the connection between “maritime medium-ness”
and greenwater navy within the Indonesian discourse. But what
exactly is a greenwater navy? Navies may be classified into global,
bluewater, greenwater and brownwater categories.9 As the name
suggests, global navies have a worldwide presence and can operate
independently on a continuous basis in more than one regional
ocean basin. Bluewater navies possess open-ocean capability (beyond
the EEZ) and external support (for short durations), and they are
capable of extra-regional deployments. Brownwater navies (excluding
riverine forces) are essentially coastal defence forces largely limited
to operations in a state’s territorial waters.
A greenwater navy falls in between bluewater and brownwater,
and is primarily oriented towards operating within the EEZ while
possessing a limited, secondary ability to conduct “out-of-area”
operations. Seen through this lens, Indonesia’s greenwater navy
aspiration is two-fold: effective EEZ policing and limited regional,
and occasionally even international, force projection capabilities.
The TNI-AL presently exhibits some greenwater characteristics
because of its “out-of-area” experience, most notably as part of
the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon since 2009. But it
has yet to attain true greenwater stature. For one, being effective
within the EEZ requires the TNI-AL to effectively safeguard the
Indonesian archipelago — totalling 93,000 square kilometres of

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 436 Koh Swee Lean Collin

water and 54,716 kilometres of coastline10 — in accordance with

the country’s Archipelagic Sea Defence Strategy (Strategi Pertahanan
Laut Nusantara or SPLN). However, it does not help that the State
Defence Policy 2014 outlined such a diverse array of traditional and
non-traditional maritime challenges, ranging from military conflict
(especially over disputes in West Kalimantan and the South China
Sea) to illegal fishing.11 This broad range of maritime challenges,
and hence responsibilities, consequently overstretches the navy’s
available capacity.
The TNI-AL’s envisioned force structure revolves around a three-
dimensional Integrated Navy Fleet System (Sistem Armada Terpadu
or SSAT) concept — comprising vessels as the basic asset, together
with aircraft, marines and naval bases.12 To this end, in October
2011, the navy considered creating a third fleet, to be known as
Central Fleet Command, to complement the existing Western and
Eastern Fleet Commands so as to effectively safeguard the three
strategic sea corridors through the Indonesian archipelago and existing
conflict-prone areas which come under each fleet’s responsibility.13
But the required size of an effective greenwater navy has long
been a matter of discussion. Since the early 1990s, Indonesian
policymakers have estimated the “ideal” fleet size to be between 300
and 600 vessels,14 plus 75 maritime patrol aircraft.15 But the navy’s
effectiveness in projecting power throughout the archipelago, while
performing limited overseas missions, depends on its flexibility. This
“flexibility” can be defined as the navy’s ability to conduct multiple
missions simultaneously in more than one geographical area; the
greater the number of ships and aircraft it possesses, the greater
its ability to undertake varied missions concurrently in dispersed
areas.16 In view of budgetary and resource realities, the navy does
not have surplus ships and aircraft. It could only economize its
limited capacity by conceiving of a MEF that can plausibly cover
selected geographical areas of interests across the archipelago while
projecting limited force beyond. The navy’s MEF blueprint for 2024
envisages 274 vessels and 137 aircraft (including 35 maritime patrol
aircraft and 30 helicopters), three Marine Corps (Korps Marinir,
or KORMAR) forces adding up to a division-sized formation, 890
marine combat vehicles and 11 primary naval bases.17 The vessels
are divided into: Combat Strike Force (110 vessels), including 10–12
submarines, 56 frigates/corvettes and 26 fast attack craft; Patrol
Force (66 vessels); and Support Force (98 vessels) including 18
mine countermeasures vessels, 45 large amphibious assault landing
ships and 6 replenishment oilers/tankers.18

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 437

This force structure corresponds with what Hill proposed as

a blueprint for medium power navies: first, constabulary forces
for EEZ policing and short-reach low-intensity operations; second,
long-reach surface forces optimized to low-intensity operations;
and third, a strictly limited number of long-reach surface, air and
submarine forces optimized for higher-level operations. 19 More
importantly, it also resonates with what John Mearsheimer calls
“defensive sea control” which he deems as less demanding than
offensive sea control underpinned by aircraft carrier battle groups,
nuclear-powered submarines and cruise missile platforms. Instead,
defensive sea control emphasizes conventional attack submarines,
land-based patrol aircraft, destroyers and frigates.20 However, it
is important to point out that the navy’s MEF blueprint is not
merely a technological shopping list. Though far from an “ideal”
greenwater navy, the blueprint is designed to allow the TNI-AL to
accomplish various types of operations ranging from low (naval
military operations other than war, such as counter-illegal fishing) to
high-intensity (naval military operations for war, such as repelling
foreign military aggression) that align with Indonesia’s diverse threat
perceptions.21
In view of its present capacity, the navy’s anticipated tasks
should be conceived with the objective of being primarily effective
within the Indonesian archipelago while demonstrating limited ability
for overseas missions. The primary focus on Indonesia’s immediate
waters, especially its EEZ from where the country partially derives
its wealth in line with the GMF vision, cannot be understated.
During an interview with Tempo in October 2010, then Indonesian
military chief Admiral Agus Suhartono noted: “Our defence strategy,
as much as possible, is preventing [foreign] encroachment on our
[EEZ]. If we underperform in the regions and in the EEZ, we are
unlikely to effectively defend our marine territories.”22 Even if one
concedes that the strategic focus is on Indonesia’s immediate waters,
the wide range of missions and operational capability requirements
expected of the navy means an across-the-board modernization effort
becomes necessary. But can the MEF goals be met by 2024?

Modelling the TNI-AL’s MEF Projections Until 2024

The MEF blueprint is divided into three phases known as Strategic
Plans (rencana strategis or renstra): Renstra I (2010–14), Renstra II
(2015–19) and Renstra III (2020–24). Following the completion of
Renstra I in 2014, and to give impetus to Renstra II, President Jokowi

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 438 Koh Swee Lean Collin

outlined several defence policy priorities, including intensifying the

acquisition of main weapon systems (alat utama sistem senjata,
heretofore referred as alutsista) and promoting defence self-sufficiency
through domestic defence industrial development so as to reduce
reliance on foreign imports.23 Using MEF budgetary allocations to
gauge the navy’s prospects of attaining its MEF targets may not
be accurate, not only because of the difficulty in obtaining official
data, but also because such statistics may not indicate specifically
how various alutsista projects are being managed. Therefore, a more
suitable alternative is to model the alutsista projections from 2015
to 2024. While data is available for pre-Renstra (the year 2008 is
utilized here as a snapshot) and Renstra I, “guesstimate” projections
for Renstra II and III have to be based on various sources (often
fragmentary reports augmented by open-source databases). To
model Renstra II and III projections, the following are considered.
First, like its sister services, the navy has adopted a three-pronged
MEF implementation strategy: first, procuring new systems by
prioritizing domestic production, failing which the plan will be
joint production with foreign vendors through transfer of technology
(ToT); second, refurbishing existing alutsista; and third, phasing out
obsolete alutsista.24 In this regard, the lifecycle of alutsista warrants
consideration. The lifecycle of a weapon system generally covers
the period it was procured, in service and finally withdrawn.25 Age
constitutes a crucial factor because it directly influences its lifecycle,
which translates into operational effectiveness, safety and economic
viability of its continued operation as well as of implementing service
life extension programmes. For this study, the Standard, Optimistic
and Austere Scenarios are projected. Under a Standard Scenario, the
lifecycle of a particular alutsista may last up to thirty years, given
that the average warship hull life is at least twenty or sometimes
thirty years.26 Airframe lifecycles may be shorter because of the
imposed aerodynamic stress. Typically, warships that serve over
twenty and nearing thirty years can be regarded as uneconomical
to operate, maintain and even upgrade.
However, the Standard Scenario is insufficient in the Indonesian
context, given that the navy traditionally operates assets well past
their twenty to thirty years’ useful lifecycles. Hence this modelling
also assumes an Optimistic Scenario, under which alutsista aged up
to forty years remain in service and undergo upgrades. However,
this assumes that the Indonesians can properly maintain ageing
alutsista. Finally, the modelling assumes an Austere Scenario whereby
the navy is compelled to retain alutsista aged up to seventy years

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 439

because budget constraints prevent block replacement of obsolete

equipment. This is not uncommon for the TNI-AL. For example,
many World War Two vintage US-built landing vessels remained
in service past 2010 before they were finally discarded. Of course,
they would be uneconomical and even unsafe for regular operation
and maintenance. This means new replacements become a more
cost-effective option even though that requires funding.
Renstra II and III scenarios modelled here assume no short-cuts
through the acquisition of second-hand alutsista, which require
shorter induction times and are also cheaper compared to acquiring
brand-new equipment. For example, the three British-built Multi-Role
Light Frigates would have cost Brunei — their originally intended
owner — US$600 million in the early 2000s, but Jakarta acquired
them in 2013 for just US$380 million.27 Having relied in part on
second-hand alutsista for decades, the navy is not averse to purchasing
used equipment, as do many other navies worldwide.28 But the
Indonesians should have learned hard lessons from this practice.
The first concerns false economies. Buying second-hand equipment
at prices lower than that for newbuilds (i.e. newly built equipment)
does not necessarily translate into overall cost-savings. The navy’s
purchase of thirty-nine former East German Navy warships in the
early 1990s is a prime example. Even though the vessels cost only
US$468 million, Jakarta had to spend an additional US$800 million
to refurbish them and develop the requisite support infrastructure.29
The second problem concerns operational inefficiencies. In 2007
a government audit found that in 2004–5, the navy wasted Rp64
billion (US$6.96 million) in POL (petroleum, oil and lubricants)
consumption because of the age of some of its warships.30 Such
wastage compounds the navy’s chronic fuel shortages.31 In all, these
factors compel the navy to adapt in order to cope with austerity.
For instance, warships would use a “waiting point” pattern to
conserve fuel i.e. idling in strategic locations while naval aircraft
patrolled the waters, and only got underway when an incident was
reported.32
Finally, second-hand alutsista can potentially be more
accident-prone. In April 2014, one of the twenty-four second-hand
F-16 fighter jets Indonesia received under a US grant scheme
malfunctioned, leading to a runway accident. As a result, Jakarta
pledged to review its policy on obtaining alutsista through external
grants.33 Even though in the foreseeable future it will continue to
buy second-hand equipment whenever expedient, the navy may
start to prioritize newbuilds. In recent years, it has tried to avoid

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 440 Koh Swee Lean Collin

purchasing second-hand equipment even if the price was attractive.

Examples include Jakarta’s rejection of ageing and unseaworthy
Libyan warships.34 Submarines provide another interesting example.
In March 2014, the navy declined Moscow’s offer to sell second-
hand Kilo-class submarines because of their poor condition.35 In
September 2015, however, Jakarta revived its interest in purchasing
Russian Kilos.36 The move originated from an official Russian visit
to Indonesia in October 2014 aimed at eliciting Jakarta’s interest
in Russian shipbuilding capabilities, including submarines. 37 Yet,
soon after, Indonesia began talks with France for the possible
purchase of brand-new Scorpene-1000 submarines.38 This suggests
that Indonesians may not buy the Kilos because what Moscow
was offering were essentially second-hand boats since the Russians
reportedly announced that the Kilo production line would be closed
after the last boat was completed.39
Therefore, Jakarta may increasingly prioritize newbuilds through
domestic production or ToT-based joint production with foreign
vendors. This study assumes an optimistic production rate, especially
for domestically-built warships. But lead time for a particular alutsista
depends on the technical complexities involved. Within each class
of weapons system, higher performance levels increase both unit
production cost and lead time. Generally, more sophisticated and
expensive weapon systems demand more extensive development
and trials programmes using expensive prototypes, more expensive
spare parts required to repair them in service and more rigorous and
costly personnel training.40 Typically four to five years are required
from project conceptualization to construction (keel-laying, module
assembly and systems fitting-out), followed by mandatory equipment
trials and basic personnel training before the asset can be deemed
operational.41 The navy’s first Sigma-class corvettes took around
five years to build and thus offer a useful yardstick. Therefore, a
low production rate is assumed for high-capability alutsista such as
the Sigma since they comprise various sensors, weapons, as well
as command, control and communications (C3) sub-systems (which
may be obtained from various sources) that require complex systems
integration.42 By contrast, an annual production rate of five to six
vessels per year, as elucidated by the navy authorities,43 is assumed
for low-capability alutsista such as patrol craft given their simpler
systems integration needs. Finally, this modelling considers all
planned and reported alutsista procurements up to 2024 (see Table 1)
in order to derive projections for Renstra II and III. Tables 2 to 5
present the navy’s projected inventories under the three modelled

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 Table 1

05 Koh-3P.indd 441
Projected TNI-AL Alutsista Procurements for Renstra II and III

In-Service Year
Alutsista Qty Builder(s) (est.)
SS209 Chang Bogo submarines 2 South Korea 2019
1 Local (with South Korean help) 2023
2000 to 3000-ton submarines of 5 Russian Federation or France 2020–24
unspecified class
PKR10514 frigates 2 Netherlands and local 2016–17
9 2020–24
Klewang corvettes 4 Local (with Swedish help) 2020–24
What Next for the Indonesian Navy?

KCR-40 missile fast attack craft 10 Local 2015–19

6 2020–24
KCR-60M missile fast attack craft 13 Local 2015–18
PC-43 patrol craft 30 Local 2015–19
33 2020–24
Teluk Bintuni landing ship tank 4 Local 2015–19
2 2020–24
Tarakan fleet oiler 1 Local 2015–16
Rigel research/survey vessels 2 France 2015–16
441

2/12/15 6:00 pm
05 Koh-3P.indd 442
442

Table 1  (continued)

In-Service Year
Alutsista Qty Builder(s) (est.)
10,000-ton fleet auxiliaries, possibly 1 Local/foreign 2015–19
oilers, of unspecified class 1 2020–24
1,500-ton fleet auxiliaries, possibly 2 Local/foreign 2020–24
research/survey vessels, of
unspecified class
BTR-4 amphibious armored vehicles 55 Ukraine 2015–19
Maritime patrol aircraft of 10 Local 2015–19
unspecified type, either the CN-235 6 2020–24
PATMAR, NC-212 or N-219
AS565MBe Panther ASW 11 France 2016–17
helicopters
Source: Compiled by the author using figures and estimated timelines adapted from the summary of Naval Systems Projections Database
(NSPD), American Maritime International (dba AMI International), available at <http://www.amiinter.com/>. The author thanks AMI
International for the data. These figures are also corroborated with data from IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security.
Koh Swee Lean Collin

2/12/15 6:00 pm
 Table 2

05 Koh-3P.indd 443
TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, pre-Renstra I (2008)

Austere Optimistic Standard

Age Group (year) Scenario Scenario Scenario
Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Total % MEF Total % MEF Total % MEF
Organization Category Qty 61–70 51–60 41–50 31–40 21–30 11–20 less Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled
Combat Strike Submarines  12 0 0  0   0  2  0  0   2  17   2  17   2  17
Frigates/  56 0 0  6   1 19  0  2  28  50  22  39  21  38
Corvettes
Fast Attack  38 0 0  0   0  4  2  0   6  16   6  16   6  16
Craft
Patrol Patrol Craft  66 0 0  1   7  0  7 23  38  58  37  56  30  45
Support MCM  18 0 0  0   9  2  0  0  11  61  11  61   2  11
Large AALS  45 7 0  1   6 10  0  3  27  60  19  42  13  29
What Next for the Indonesian Navy?

Fleet oilers/   6 0 0  3   2  0  0  0   5  83   2  33   0   0
tankers
Survey/   8 0 0  3   0  0  4  1   8 100   5  63   5  63
research
General  22 0 0  2   0  5  0  5  12  55  10  45  10  45
support
KORMAR Brigades   3 NA   3 100   3 100   3 100
Combat 890 0 0  0 176  0 34  0 210  24 210  24  34   4
vehicles
Naval Aviation Maritime  35 0 0  0  16  4  0  9  29  83  29  83  13  37
patrol
Helicopters  30 0 0  0   0 12  6  0  18  60  18  60  18  60
Total 7 0 16 217 58 53 43 397 Ave: 59 374 Ave: 41 157 Ave: 28

Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the International Institute of Strategic Studies
(IISS), Military Balance 2009 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 389–90; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database online, available at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/databases/armstransfers>; Werner
Globke, Weyers Flotten Taschenbuch 2008/2010 [Warships of the World Fleet Handbook 2008/2010] (Bonn, Germany: Mönch Publishing
443

Group and Oxford: Casemate UK Ltd., 2008); and IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security (formerly Jane’s) databases, primarily Jane’s Navy
International and Jane’s World Navies.

2/12/15 6:00 pm
 Table 3
TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, Renstra I (2010–14) Completed

05 Koh-3P.indd 444
444

Austere Optimistic Standard

Age Group (year) Scenario Scenario Scenario
Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Total % MEF Total % MEF Total % MEF
Organization Category Qty 61–70 51–60 41–50 31–40 21–30 11–20 less Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled
Combat Strike Submarines  12 0 0   0  2  0  0   0   2  17   2  17   0   0
Frigates/  56 0 0   6 15  4  0   7  32  57  26  46  11  20
Corvettes
Fast Attack  38 0 0   0  6  0  0  11  17  45  17  45  11  29
Craft
Patrol Patrol Craft  66 0 0   8  0  9  3  28  48  73  40  61  40  61
Support MCM  18 0 0   9  0  2  0   0  11  61   2  11   2  11
Large AALS  45 2 0   0 17  0  0   6  25  56  23  51   6  13
Fleet oilers/   6 0 1   4  0  0  0   1   6 100   1  17   1  17
tankers
Survey/   8 0 1   2  0  3  2   0   8 100   5  63   5  63
research
General  22 0 1   1  2  3  4   0  11  50   9  41   7  32
support
KORMAR Brigades   3 NA   3 100   3 100   3 100
Combat 890 0 0 176  0  0 34  54 264  30  88  10  88  10
vehicles
Naval Aviation Maritime  35 0 0  16  1  2  1  19  39 111  23  66  22  63
patrol
Helicopters  30 0 0   0  0  7  0   0   7  23   7  23   7  23
Total 2 3 222 43 30 44 126 473 Ave: 63 246 Ave: 42 203 Ave: 34

Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the International Institute of Strategic Studies
(IISS), Military Balance 2015 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 253–55; SIPRI Arms Transfers Database online, available at
<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/databases/armstransfers>; Werner Globke, Weyers Flotten Taschenbuch [Warships of the
World Fleet Handbook] 2013/2015 (Bonn, Germany: Mönch Publishing Group and Oxford: Casemate UK Ltd., 2011); Eric Wertheim, The
Koh Swee Lean Collin

Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World, 16th Edition: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Systems (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,
2013); and IHS Aerospace, Defence & Security (formerly Jane’s) databases, primarily Jane’s Navy International and Jane’s World Navies.

2/12/15 6:00 pm
 Table 4

05 Koh-3P.indd 445
Projected TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, Renstra II (2015–19)

Austere Optimistic Standard

Age Group (year) Scenario Scenario Scenario
Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Total % MEF Total % MEF Total % MEF
Organization Category Qty 61–70 51–60 41–50 31–40 21–30 11–20 less Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled
Combat Strike Submarines  12 0 0   0  2  0  0   2   4  33   4  33   2  17
Frigates/  56 0 0   6 15  4  0   9  34  61  28  50  13  23
Corvettes
Fast Attack  38 0 0   0  6  0  0  34  40 105  40 105  34  89
Craft
Patrol Patrol Craft  66 0 0   8  0  9  3  58  78 118  70 106 70 106
Support MCM  18 0 0   9  0  2  0   0  11  61   2  11   2  11
Large AALS  45 2 0   0 17  0  0  10  29  64  27  60  10  22
What Next for the Indonesian Navy?

Fleet oilers/   6 0 1   4  0  0  0   3   8 133   3  50   3  50
tankers
Survey/   8 0 1   2  0  3  2   2  10 125   7  88   7  88
research
General  22 0 1   1  2  3  4   0  11  50   9  41   7  32
support
KORMAR Brigades   3 NA   3 100   3 100   3 100
Combat 890 0 0 176  0 34  0 109 319  36 143  16 143  16
vehicles
Naval Aviation Maritime  35 0 0  16  1  2  1  29  49 140  33  94  32  91
patrol
Helicopters  30 0 0   0  0  7  0  11  18  60  18  60  18  60
Total 2 3 222 43 64 10 276 614 Ave: 84 387 Ave: 63 344 Ave: 54

Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the summary of Naval Systems Projections Database
(NSPD), American Maritime International (dba AMI International), available at <http://www.amiinter.com/>; and IHS Aerospace, Defence
& Security (formerly Jane’s) databases, primarily Jane’s Navy International and Jane’s World Navies.
445

2/12/15 6:00 pm
 Table 5

05 Koh-3P.indd 446
446
Projected TNI-AL Inventory Compared to MEF Requirements, Renstra III (2020–24)

Austere Optimistic Standard

Age Group (year) Scenario Scenario Scenario
Force Alutsista MEF 10 or Total % MEF Total % MEF Total % MEF
Organization Category Qty 61–70 51–60 41–50 31–40 21–30 11–20 less Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled Qty Fulfilled
Combat Strike Submarines  12 0 0   2   0  0  0   8  10  83   8  67   8  67
Frigates/  56 0 6  15   4  0  7  15  47  84  26  46  22  39
Corvettes
Fast Attack  38 0 0   6   0  0 11  29  46 121  40 105  40 105
Craft
Patrol Patrol Craft  66 0 8   0   9  3 28  63 111 168  103 156  94 142
Support MCM  18 0 9   0   2  0  0   0  11  61   2  11   0   0
Large AALS  45 0 0  17   0  0   6   6  29  64  12  27  12  27
Fleet oilers/   6 1 4   0   0  0  1   3   9 150   4  67   4  67
tankers
Survey/   8 1 2   0   3  2  0   4  12 150   9 113   6  75
research
General  22 1 1   2   3  4  0   0  11  50   7  32   4  18
support
KORMAR Brigades   3 NA   3 100   3 100   3 100
Combat 890 0 176   0   0 34 54  55 319  36 143  16 143  16
vehicles
Naval Aviation Maritime  35 0 16   1   2  1  19  16  55 157  38 109  36 103
patrol
Helicopters  30 0 0   0   7  0  0  11  18 60  18  60  11  37
Total 3 222 43 30 44 126 210 681 Ave: 99 413 Ave: 70 383 Ave: 61

Source: Data compiled and corroborated by the author using multiple sources, including the summary of Naval Systems Projections Database
(NSPD), American Maritime International (dba AMI International), available at <http://www.amiinter.com/>; and IHS Aerospace, Defence
& Security (formerly Jane’s) databases, primarily Jane’s Navy International and Jane’s World Navies.
Koh Swee Lean Collin

2/12/15 6:00 pm
 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 447

scenarios when compared against stated MEF quantitative requirements

over four studied periods. Some technical abbreviations require
clarifications. MCM refers to mine countermeasures vessels; large
amphibious assault landing ships (AALS) include landing ship
tank (LST) category, but exclude inshore and coastal landing craft.
KORMAR brigades are fighting formations and not alutsista, but
are included as part of the modelling since they constitute an
MEF component. Finally, the modelling also calculates the average
percentage of MEF requirements fulfilled for each scenario.
The modelling results appear to corroborate with general
estimates recently made by Indonesian policymakers regarding the
military as a whole. For instance, in January 2014, then military
chief General Moeldoko opined that 40–42 per cent of the MEF
(i.e. force levels) would be attained by the time Renstra I was
completed in 2014, since 28.7 per cent had been met in 2013.44
However, in July 2015, he admitted that only 34 per cent of Renstra
I MEF had been attained, though he pointed out that the military
is in a better shape compared to when he first assumed the post,
because of better personnel remuneration and the purchase of new
equipment. Moeldoko further predicted that his successor could
increase the figure to 68 per cent.45 This is partly true. As Table 3
shows, by the end of Renstra I, the number of alutsista aged ten
years or less had experienced an almost 200 per cent increase over
the pre-Renstra I figure. However, during the same period, those aged
11–40 years decreased significantly, with the bulk of the alutsista
entering 41–50 years. Gains achieved in Renstra I can be attributed
to several new purchases. These include new domestically-built
fast attack craft and maritime patrol aircraft, but most significantly
KORMAR’s fifty-four new Russian-built BMP-3F combat vehicles.
Under a Standard Scenario for Renstra I, the navy fulfils 34 per
cent of the MEF requirements, whereas the Optimistic Scenario
derives 42 per cent (coinciding with Moeldoko’s initial “optimistic”
estimate in January 2014), and the Austere Scenario derives 63 per
cent. Based on this outlook, Renstra II and III projections warrant
closer attention.
Notably, in January 2013, then Defence Minister Purnomo
Yusgiantoro announced plans to reduce the renstras from three to
two, targeting MEF fulfilment by 2019 instead of 2024.46 A year
later, Jakarta remained optimistic that MEF objectives could be met
by Renstra II.47 However, the modelling shows that it will not be
possible to fulfill the MEF requirements by 2019. Even going by
the Austere Scenario, only 84 per cent will be fulfilled, and this

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 448 Koh Swee Lean Collin

decreases to 63 per cent and 54 per cent for the Optimistic and
Standard Scenarios respectively. Nonetheless, new alutsista aged ten
years or less are projected to increase by more than 100 per cent
compared to the Renstra I figures. The projected gains for Renstra
II can be attributed to sustained efforts in domestic production of
fast attack and patrol craft. Again, KORMAR’s projected fifty-five
new Ukraine-built BTR-4 amphibious troop carriers may contribute
significantly to these projected gains modelled in this study. Marginal
increases can be observed in the area of frigate/corvette, large AALS
and maritime patrol aircraft. The key reason has to do with cost
and the time required since they are larger and have more complex
systems integration needs.
Finally, Renstra III modelling postulates that under an Austere
Scenario, the MEF requirements will be virtually completed (99 per
cent). However, this means that a significant bulk of the alutsista
— especially KORMAR’s old, mainly Soviet-era combat vehicles —
have entered the 51–60 years bracket, making them uneconomical
and even unsafe to operate, maintain and upgrade. In other words,
achieving MEF requirements going just by numbers on paper will
inevitably come at the expense of operational effectiveness and
safety. The Optimistic and Standard Scenarios — at 70 per cent
and 61 per cent respectively — represent more prudent and realistic
projections. These fall short of the required MEF targets. In other
words, unless the navy retains all alutsista that have been in its
inventory since 2008 regardless of their lifecycles, there is no way
the MEF requirements can be met by 2024 for all alutsista categories.
However, there is a silver lining: assuming all projects proceed as
scheduled without delays and cost overruns, the required quantities
of each type of alutsista will most likely meet in-service dates. For
that, fast attack and patrol craft as well as maritime patrol aircraft
may exceed MEF targets, thereby translating into surplus capacity
and enhanced operational capabilities for the navy.
However, based on this modelling, excess gains in these categories
come at the expense of certain key capability areas which will
potentially undermine the navy’s greenwater aims. Accomplishments
in the frigate/corvette category — suitable assets that can allow
effective force projections into the EEZ and beyond — actually
pale in comparison. If one goes by the Standard Scenario without
any prior plans made within the next five years, the navy may
even lose its MCM capabilities, thus producing a force imbalance.
Moreover, this modelling adopts a “bean-counting” approach which
considers alutsista lifecycles while neglecting intangible indicators

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 449

of military effectiveness such as the platform’s inherent sensor and

weapons capabilities, the maintenance state (data which is not
easily obtainable and, even when available, should be regarded with
some scepticism) and capital investments in terms of fiscal, human
and material resources which include not just the platforms but
also the associated infrastructure, logistics and training support. 48
Furthermore, for high-capability alutsista, two challenges, namely
risks of project overruns and persistent budget constraints, may
undermine the already conservative projections reached in this
modelling exercise.

The Risk of Project Overruns

The modelling of the navy’s MEF projections does not consider
the risk of project overruns and assumes implementation according
to schedule. In reality, however, this is seldom the case. Other
countries have often experienced serious project overruns (e.g.
Australia’s Air Warfare Destroyer project). Moreover, foreign ToT is
not risk-free. Indonesia is slated to build its own submarines under
a ToT deal with South Korea for three boats. In February 2014, the
House of Representatives Commission I, which oversees defence
and security affairs, approved a US$250 million disbursement to
state-owned shipbuilder PT Penataran Angkatan Laut (PT PAL) to
prepare building a third vessel.49 Though work was slated to begin
in 2015, and scheduled for completion by 2018, delays pushed the
expected in-service date to 2023.50 This possibly compelled Jakarta
to consider Germany and Russia as alternative sources.51 The much-
touted Sigma-10514 light frigate programme (designated Perusak Kawal
Rudal or PKR-10514) — critical alutsista that enables Indonesia’s
realization of a greenwater navy — is another example. In 2007,
when the TNI-AL received its first Dutch-built Sigma corvette, there
was optimism that as many as forty such ships could be acquired
by 2015.52 However, by 2014 only four vessels had been completed,
and construction on the newer, more capable PKR-10514 only began
recently and is expected to be completed in 2016–17.
Another assumption is that actors throughout the domestic
supply chain, such as shipbuilders and steel producers, are able to
synergize with sufficient government support. Yet government support
is often lacking. In an interview with the Jakarta Post in October
2011, the head of PT PAL, Harsusanto revealed that the navy usually
pays only 20 per cent of the total production costs upfront, thus
compelling the shipyard to seek alternative resources to support its

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 450 Koh Swee Lean Collin

working capital. He lamented: “I think there’s a lack of appropriate

spirit to revive the strategic industry. Maybe the authorities do not
understand how a strategic company works. Perhaps they refuse to
help the industry, thinking it is costly and useless.”53 This problem
persists notwithstanding the official rhetoric about prioritizing
domestic production over foreign imports.54 For example, Indonesian
officials have opined that the domestic shipbuilding industry is not
strong enough to support the country’s GMF vision. They have also
urged agencies such as the navy to purchase locally-made products,
which implies a still stronger domestic preference towards foreign
products.55 Despite having earlier emphasized “buy Indonesian first”,
Moeldoko subsequently remarked that “weapons systems that have
a high level of competitiveness” have to be imported, indicating
his personal inclination towards foreign-made weapons.56
This calls into question the ability of domestic industries to
meet the navy’s requirements especially for hi-capability alutsista
such as the PKR-10514. There may be better prospects for KORMAR,
Patrol Force and naval aviation since domestic industries are able
to produce those platforms, though of course critical components
such as propulsions, sensors and weapons may have to be sourced
abroad which again subjects the navy to risks if foreign vendors fail
to deliver them on time or at all. In this regard, whether the navy
receives the PKR-10514 is dependent on consistent foreign, in this
case Dutch, technical support. In December 2010, the Indonesians
called on The Netherlands to render consistent support for PT
PAL’s PKR-10514 programme. The head of the military’s Information
Centre, Commodore Iskandar Sitompul, said: “Yes, we have asked
the Dutch to be more consistent in supervising the development of
the ship as there are things that PT PAL cannot yet do.”57

Persistent Budget Constraints

As Indonesian policymakers freely admit, budget constraints have
been a recurrent problem, and which is widely acknowledged in
the existing scholarship on Indonesian military affairs.58 According
to Indonesian policymakers, ideally defence spending needs to reach
1.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in order to address
long-term military requirements, especially alutsista recapitalization.
Yet, as Table 6 shows, it has remained below the desired target.
The year 2013 marks the only time in the 2007–14 period when
defence spending reached even 1 per cent of GDP.

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 451

Table 6
Indonesia’s Defence Spending 2007–14

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014

Defence Spending in 3.35 3.23 3.30 4.66 5.84 7.77 8.36 7.02
Current US$ billion
Defence Spending as 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8
Share of GDP (%)
Defence Spending 3.8 3.0 3.4 3.7 3.7 4.5 4.8 4.1
as Share of Govt
Spending (%)
Source: Data compiled by the author using 2008–15 editions of the International Institute
of Strategic Studies’ Military Balance (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press); and the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Military Expenditures Database,
available at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database>.

Persistent budget constraints is a problem that affects the navy’s

sister services. The situation was at its worst in the aftermath
of the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis, and the initial economic
bounce-back after 1999 did not improve the military’s budgetary
situation because Jakarta’s priority was economic recovery and not
raising defence spending. Since 2004, except for a dip in 2009
due to the Global Financial Crisis, Indonesia has enjoyed steady
GDP growth of 5–6 per cent per annum.59 But defence spending
has not experienced a corresponding increase. In fact, despite the
decrease in GDP growth in 2009, the government increased the
state budget to Rp1,000 trillion (US$105.7 billion), but the defence
budget remained unchanged at Rp33.6 trillion (US$3.3 billion).60
Nevertheless, Jakarta resolved to recapitalize its increasingly
decrepit arsenal. Following the promulgation of the MEF Blueprint
in 2008, there has been some progress. In September 2011, a total
of Rp99 trillion (US$11.09 billion) for alutsista, comprising Rp32.5
trillion (US$3.64 billion) for maintenance and another Rp66.5
trillion (US$7.45 billion) for new equipment, was included in the
2010–14 National Mid-Term Development Plan.61 This figure was
later raised in January 2012, when Rp150 trillion (US$16.4 billion)
was earmarked for alutsista modernization over 2010–14 (Renstra I).62
The navy benefitted from these defence allocations, even if the
increases fell short of desired levels. Especially since Renstra I
began in 2009, the government has resolved to allocate more of

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 452 Koh Swee Lean Collin

the defence budget on new navy and air force procurements. 63

For example, in the 2012 state budget allocated for alutsista, the
navy was given Rp20 trillion (US$2.13 billion), whereas the army
received Rp14 trillion (US$1.49 billion) and the air force Rp22
trillion (US$2.35 billion).64 Nevertheless, the advantage enjoyed by
the navy over the army should not be exaggerated.65 Considering that
the navy is a more capital-intensive service compared to the army,
the 2012 budget advantage of Rp8 trillion (US$640 million) may
not actually amount to much, and was perhaps only sufficient to
cover the unit production cost for five PKR-10514s (each estimated
to cost at least Rp1.6 trillion or about US$110 million, equivalent
to two Sukhoi multi-role fighters or twenty Leopard-II main battle
tanks).66 Where state defence funding is insufficient, the navy may
count on direct domestic bank loans which can be settled via
multi-year payments. However, such loans may have little effect.
For example, in May 2010 the navy received an annual allocation
of Rp200 billion (US$22 million) through a five-year loan from the
Mandiri Bank for the period 2010–14.67 This loan, amounting to just
US$110 million, was perhaps sufficient for up to eight KCR-60M
fast attack craft (each costs US$13.75 million excluding weapon
systems) but barely enough for one PKR-10514. In any case, such
cost differentials was one reason why projections derived by the
modelling were easier to attain for smaller fighting vessels but not
larger, high-capability platforms such as the PKR-10514.
Although Jokowi’s GMF vision offers promise to maritime
defence capacity-building efforts, he cannot afford to sideline the
army, which has held a privileged position in Indonesia since
independence. Jokowi’s decision to appoint Army Chief-of-Staff
General Gatot Nurmantyo as the new military chief in June 2015 ran
counter to the post-Soeharto tradition of rotating the post between
three service chiefs.68 Undoubtedly the army is seeking to stay
relevant and not be sidelined by the GMF vision which favours
the air force and navy. The army’s push to purchase 100 Leopard-II
tanks, notwithstanding domestic criticism in 2012, underscores a
desire not to lag behind the other services in terms of budgetary
allocations.69 As such, the only way to ameliorate inter-service rivalry
while attaining MEF goals will be to raise defence spending. But
raising it to the desired 1.5 per cent GDP or more is only possible
if economic growth reaches 7 per cent per annum. In October
2014, Jokowi, echoing his predecessor, remarked: “I have said on
many occasions that when the economic growth reaches 7 per
cent, the military budget could be increased two to three times.”70

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 453

Yet, in December 2014, the World Bank reduced its projections for
Indonesia’s economic growth in 2015 from 5.6 to 5.2 per cent, and
in July 2015, adjusted growth forecast downwards to 4.7 per cent
for 2015.71 Such gloomy economic forecasts portend a situation in
which the navy continues to endure persistent budgetary constraints.

Recalibrating MEF Specifications to Meet the TNI-AL’s

Greenwater Ambitions
In order for the TNI-AL to align Renstra II and III with its eventual
greenwater goal, it may become necessary to recalibrate the original
specifications for certain alutsista categories. The frigate/corvette
category fronted by the PKR-10514 programme represents a particularly
challenging gap to fill, going by existing MEF requirements. Indeed,
PKR-10514s are considered the most ideal platform, allowing the
navy effective force projection into the EEZ and beyond — and
therefore represent a key component of its greenwater ambitions.
Larger than patrol and fast attack craft, a PKR-10514 possesses the
requisite physical size for long endurance, reduced reliance on home
bases and good seakeeping quality in open waters. With a larger
physical capacity, it is also more flexible in handling a range of
low- to high-intensity operations. Besides being capable of combating
multi-dimensional wartime threats, the PKR-10514 is also expected to
perform peacetime EEZ policing. This notion relates to mainstream
thought that modern warships are so increasingly expensive that
they can only be procured in limited numbers, hence they ought
to be bigger and flexible enough to perform the full spectrum of
low- (i.e. military operations other than war, such as EEZ policing)
to high- (i.e. naval military operations for war) intensity missions.72
This also matches Indonesia’s diverse threat perceptions which
thereby dictate that the navy fulfil this full operational spectrum.
However, as earlier discussed, project overruns and budgetary
constraints may stand in the way of meeting the MEF target for
fifty-six frigates/corvettes optimized for high-intensity operations,
which means vessels equipped with the full suite of sensors, weapons
C3 systems so as to be capable of sinking enemy warships.73 This
article thus proposes a Hi/lo–Lo/hi dual configuration to recalibrate
requirements for the frigate/corvette category. The Hi/lo configuration
is tailored for high-intensity missions dictating a reduced quantity
of high-capability PKR-10514s. Conversely, the Lo/hi configuration
tailors for low-intensity missions dictating an increased quantity of
low-capability PKR-10514s (dubbed here as “PKR-minus”).

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 454 Koh Swee Lean Collin

The following reasons underpin this proposed Hi/lo–Lo/hi

configuration. First, high-intensity threat scenarios such as military
confrontations in the South China Sea remain a possibility. But
Indonesia’s immediate maritime challenges stem mainly from extant,
frequently recurring, low-intensity threats such as illegal fishing
which costs Jakarta Rp300 trillion (US$24.27 billion) in lost revenue
annually.74 Second, persistent budgetary constraints, coupled with the
costs (including lifecycle) and time associated with such complex
alutsista as PKR-10514, may prevent the navy from acquiring the
desired quantity. Finally, it makes little economic sense to operate
combat-configured vessels for low-intensity missions where a larger
number of less sophisticated, cheaper assets can act as an effective
deterrent. As Harold Kearsley has written,
Although patrolling the EEZ is a new and important task, states
feel traditional naval ships can do the job and still cover their
wartime roles, thus killing two seagulls with one stone. In reality,
however, an effective ship for patrolling the EEZ is not necessarily
a modern frigate, or even a fancy and impressive fast attack craft
no matter what arms salesmen may say; it may look very different.75

Indeed, in the early 2000s, due to a shortage of patrol vessels, the

navy was compelled to deploy combat ships whose operating costs
for such missions were, according to the TNI-AL authorities, “far
greater than operating costs for patrol boats”.76
The PC-43, which is destined to become the backbone of the
Patrol Force, is far from adequate for effective EEZ duties. Derived
from the KCR-40 fast attack craft, the 250-ton PC-43 is optimized
for inshore and coastal patrol work. But because of its small size
and lower freeboard, it is less suited for sustained operations in
the open EEZ where rough seas during inclement weather may be
expected. An intermediate alutsista, between a patrol craft and a
corvette/frigate, optimized for effective EEZ duties is thus necessary. A
“PKR-minus” may utilize the same hull but initially configured with
less complex sensors, weapons and C3 suite. This configuration still
offers the requisite characteristics suitable for EEZ duties — visible
weaponry, high speed, good seakeeping, manoeuvrability and hull
strength — yet still be reasonably priced.77 Of all the components
required in a warship, the hull is not as expensive as the installed
systems.78 As such, a common PKR-10514 hull configured as an
offshore patrol vessel (OPV) is certainly cheaper because it lacks
high-powered combat systems. Notably, this “PKR-minus” is not
permanently OPV-configured; it possesses sufficient physical capacity

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 455

for subsequent retrofits or other capability upgrades, including the

installation of warfighting systems whenever economically expedient.
This is made possible by exploiting modular mission payload
technologies, such as the Royal Danish Navy’s STANFLEX concept.79
The Polish Navy’s Project 621 Gawron II (modified German
MEKO A100) programme is one noteworthy example that could be
emulated for this proposed “PKR-minus” programme. Conceived in
the early 2000s, it originally specified a high-capability, multi-purpose
corvette. However, following its launch, the programme suffered over
a decade of delays due to financial constraints, competing operational
needs and debts incurred by the shipyard.80 By early 2012, a total
of US$118.5 million had been spent just on hull construction and
basic essential work for the first ship, whereas US$295 million was
needed to install the required combat systems, according to the
original corvette configuration. This is despite fitting out the hull as
an OPV requiring just a quarter of the cost at US$73.75 million.81
The sole vessel, ORP Slazak, was finally launched in July 2015
and slated to enter service by December 2016. If Warsaw had not
decided to adapt flexibly to budget realities, the hull could have
continued to lay idle in dry dock, inflicting needless costs on the
Polish government.

Conclusion
This article has examined the TNI-AL’s prospects of attaining its
MEF targets by 2024 as part of its long-term greenwater naval
ambitions commensurate with Indonesia’s “maritime medium-ness”.
By definition, a greenwater navy should be effective within its
immediate waters, especially the EEZ, while possessing a limited
extra-regional force projection ability. However, the TNI-AL does not
adequately perform this dual role, even though it is working towards
achieving this aspiration. While Jokowi’s GMF vision gives its long-
term greenwater ambitions greater traction, the navy still faces an
uphill task in building its capacity. The MEF blueprint is a step in
the right direction, but it is designed primarily to first address the
navy’s longstanding capacity shortfalls and obsolete inventory. With
this MEF goal in mind, the navy is expected to perform a spectrum
of low- and high-intensity operations.
To accurately gauge the navy’s prospects for attaining its MEF
goals by 2024, this article modelled its Renstra I and II projections,
taking into account planned procurements, the alutsista lifecycle
and duration of production until in-service time. The study put

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 456 Koh Swee Lean Collin

forward three scenarios — Standard, Optimistic and Austere — to

identify capacity gaps, and demonstrated that unless the TNI-AL
retains all existing alutsista from 2008 and augments them with
new ones under an Austere Scenario, there is little chance it can
achieve MEF targets across all alutsista categories by 2024. The
Optimistic and Standard Scenarios are more conceivable as alutsista
aged well past their useful lifecycles should be discarded and only
newer ones retained, safely operated and properly maintained. The
modelling demonstrated gaps in certain alutsista categories, primarily
the PKR-10514 programme which forms a key facet of a greenwater
TNI-AL. The risks of project overruns commonly associated with such
complex weapon systems, as well as persistent budget challenges, are
factors that may undermine even those modest projections derived
from this modelling exercise.
Therefore, this article proposes a recalibration of the MEF
specifications in order to align the goals closer to the eventual aim
of a greenwater TNI-AL. This calls for reducing the number of high-
capability PKR-10514s in exchange for a bigger force of low-capability
“PKR-minus” optimized for the more salient peacetime missions of
EEZ policing. Several strategic, fiscal and technical factors justify this
recalibration, further enabled by contemporary warship technologies
and proven by existing examples found elsewhere. But certainly,
this article does not claim to offer a panacea to the problems the
navy faces in fulfilling its MEF goals. However, it does highlight
the common challenges many navies face in an era of competing
requirements for defence budgets, geopolitical uncertainties and
growing strategic pressures. These challenges are amplified when
one considers Indonesia’s vast geographical expanse and its maritime
responsibilities. With political will and a viable strategic vision, being
flexible and taking advantage of modern technological innovations,
it may be after all possible for the navy to overcome its hurdles
and fulfil its MEF goals, with an eye to realizing its long-term
greenwater aspirations.

NOTES
The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful
insights and comments.
1
Joko Widodo, “The Seas Should Unite, Not Separate Us”, Jakarta Post,
14 November 2014 [Excerpt of President Joko Widodo’s address at the East Asian
Summit in Myanmar]. Also see Aaron L. Connelly, “Sovereignty and the Sea:
President Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy Challenges”, Contemporary Southeast
Asia 37, no. 1 (April 2015): 1–28.

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 457

2
Some of the most recent works include James Goldrick and Jack McCaffrie,
Navies of South-East Asia (London and New York: Routledge, 2013) and
Geoffrey Till and Jane Chan, eds., Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia:
Nature, Causes and Consequences (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).
3
President Jokowi advocated ramping up military capabilities beyond MEF
levels in August 2015, repeating a similar call made in December 2014. His
predecessor, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, once envisioned Indonesia
as an “Asian Tiger” within the next ten years, a timeline which coincides with
the MEF’s envisaged completion by 2024. Yeremia Sukoyo, “SBY Tells Troops:
Indonesia an Asian Tiger in Ten Years”, Jakarta Globe, 7 October 2014; Ina
Parlina, “Jokowi wants RI Military to be Strongest in the Region”, Jakarta Post,
31 December 2014; “Indonesia to build Defense Force More than Minimum
Level: President”, Xinhua News Agency, 14 August 2015.
4
John Richard Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (London: Croom Helm,
1986), pp. 20–21, 27.
5
Ibid., p. 48.
6
Sam Bateman, “Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers: An Australian
Perspective”, in Maritime Forces in Global Security: Comparative Views of
Maritime Strategy as We Approach the 21st Century, edited by Ann L. Griffiths
and Peter D. Haydon (Halifax, Canada: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies,
Dalhousie University, 1995), p. 242.
7
“Indonesia Fits as a Middle Power Country: Official”, Asia Pulse, 16 September
2011.
8
Jun Honna, “Instrumentalizing Pressures, Reinventing Mission: Indonesian Navy
Battles for Turf in the Age of Reformasi”, Indonesia 86 (October 2008): 71.
9
Thomas J. Hirschfeld, Multinational Naval Cooperation Options (Arlington,
Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1993), p. 12; James L. Lacy,
Between Worlds: Europe and the Seas in Arms Control (Santa Monica, California:
RAND Corporation, August 1990), p. 22.
10
There are just only 229 surface vessels and 28 maritime surveillance aircraft
belonging to the military and civilian enforcement agencies available to police
the Indonesian archipelago. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook,
available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/>; International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance
2015 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 253–55.
11
Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara Tahun 2014, Lampiran Keputusan Menteri
Pertahanan RI, Nomor: KEP/25/M/I/2014, 7 Januari 2014, pp. 9–15 [State Defense
Policy 2014, Decree of the Ministry of Defence, Republic of Indonesia (RI),
No. KEP/25/M/I/2014, 7 January 2014, pp. 9–15].
12
Andi Widjajanto, “Budget Creativity Needed in Building a Future Navy”, Jakarta
Post, 3 March 2008.
13
The first corridor passes through the South China Sea, Karimata Straits, Java
Sea and Sunda Straits. The second corridor crosses the Sulawesi Sea, Makassar
Straits, Flores Sea and Lombok Straits. The third corridor passes through the
Pacific Ocean, Maluku Straits, Seram Sea and Banda Sea. “Navy to Add Third
Fleet by 2014”, Jakarta Post, 4 October 2011; “Navy Hopes Navy’s Third Fleet to
be Operational in 2014”, ANTARA News, 23 January 2013. Even though official

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 458 Koh Swee Lean Collin

approval has yet to be given, recent developments such as the inauguration of

a new main TNI-AL base in West Kalimantan in August 2015 signals a step
towards realizing the plan for a third fleet. “Navy Chief Inaugurates Naval Base
XII in West Kalimantan”, Tempo, 7 August 2015.
14
This wide bracket is based on TNI-AL statements in the following reports:
“Indonesian Navy Says It Needs More Warships”, Reuters, 18 April 1994;
“Indonesian Admiral Says 400 More Warships Needed”, Agence France
Presse, 1 February 1995; “Navy Needs More Ships, Aircraft to Safeguard
Waters”, Jakarta Post, 5 May 2000; “Navy Needs More Warships”, Jakarta Post,
22 September 2000; “Indonesian Navy to Modernize Warships, Weaponry”, Xinhua
News Agency, 13 November 2000; “Indon Navy Needs 75 More Warships”,
ANTARA News, 30 January 2002; “Indonesian Navy Needs 113 Ships up to
2013 — Minister”, Xinhua News Agency, 24 February 2003; “Navy Needs 200
Patrol Boats, Shortfall due to Lack of Funding”, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific,
8 April 2003; “Indonesia’s Navy Says It Needs Hundreds of Boats to Keep Out
Terrorists”, Associated Press, 6 September 2003; “Indonesian Navy Needs At
Least 302 Warships: Naval Officer”, ANTARA News, 11 February 2005; and
“Indonesia Short Of Warships: Navy Chief”, Jakarta Post, 2 August 2007.
15
The 75 planes comprise 54 medium-range NC-212s and 21 long-range CN-
235PATMARs, built locally but fitted with foreign-sourced components. “Maritime
Patrol to Track Boat People”, Jakarta Post, 4 October 2013.
16
Daniel Todd and Michael Lindberg, Navies and Shipbuilding Industries: The
Strained Symbiosis (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996), p. 54.
17
Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2008, Departmen Pertahanan Republik Indonesia,
2008 [Indonesian Defense White Paper 2008, Department of Defence, Republic
of Indonesia, 2008], pp. 127–28; Evan A. Laksmana, “Rebalancing Indonesia’s
Naval Force”, in Till and Chan, Naval Modernisation in South-East Asia,
op. cit., p. 189; and “TNI Expects Stronger Navy Fleet by 2024”, Jakarta Post,
30 August 2012.

18
Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “Minimum Force: TNI AL Tackles the Essentials”, Jane’s
Navy International, 19 September 2012.
19
Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, op. cit., p. 209.

20
John J. Mearsheimer, “A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence
in Europe”, in Naval Strategy and National Security, edited by Steve E. Miller
and Stephen Van Evera (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988), pp. 56–57, 88, 99.

21
For a detailed exposition of the basic operational capabilities and requirements
matched to the number of vessels specified under the MEF Blueprint, see
Laksmana, “Rebalancing Indonesia’s Naval Force”, op. cit., p. 191.

22
“Indonesian Magazine Interviews New Forces Commander”, BBC Monitoring
Asia Pacific, 25 October 2010.

23
“President Jokowi Outlines Four Priorities of Defense Policy”, ANTARA News,
30 December 2014; “Indonesia Set to be Self-supporting in Defense Industry
in 2015”, ANTARA News, 27 February 2015.

24
Novan Iman Santosa, “Navy Ready to Modernize Warship Fleet”, Jakarta Post,
30 December 2009.

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 459

25
David L. Kirkpatrick, “Life Cycle Costs for Decision Support — A Study of
the Various Life Cycle Costs used at Different Levels of Defence Policy and
Management”, Defence and Peace Economics 11, no. 2 (2000): 333–68.
26
Department of Disarmament Affairs, The Naval Arms Race, Report to the
Secretary-General, A/40/535 (New York: United Nations, 1986), p. 16.
27
“Purchase Confirmed, Navy Waits for Three New Ships”, Tempo, 11 December
2013. However, the MRLFs are not fully combat-capable when commissioned in
July 2014 because they lacked key anti-air and anti-submarine systems. Ridzwan
Rahmat, “Indonesia Commissions First Two of Three Bung Tomo-class Corvettes”,
Jane’s Navy International, 24 July 2014; Ridzwan Rahmat, “Indonesian Navy
to Equip Bung Tomo Corvettes with Panther ASW Helicopters”, Jane’s Navy
International, 7 October 2014.
28
For example, despite a generous defence budget exceeding Indonesia’s, Singapore
also purchases second-hand equipment, such as refurbished ex-Swedish
submarines.
29
The refurbishment was partially financed by a $235 million German government
loan. “Germany Loans 235 Million for Indonesian Naval Repairs”, Agence France
Presse, 10 July 1993; and “Indonesia to Modify Warships for $800 Million”,
Reuters, 7 December 1993. In June 1994, Indonesian defence authorities stated the
total cost at about $1.1 billion, which actually exceeded the navy’s estimates of
$300 million, on which the Finance Ministry’s allocations were based. “Minister
Explains Cost of Purchase of 39 Warships from Germany”, BBC Monitoring
Service: Asia-Pacific, 6 June 1994.
30
According to a navy official, ageing warships drastically increase POL consumption
by two to three times that of new vessels; and these vessels include the
1960s-vintage ex-East German ships. “Indonesia: Aging Warships Waste Too
Much Fuel”, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 17 April 2007.
31
Then Navy Chief-of-Staff Admiral Marsetio said that government allocations for
just 27 per cent of the navy’s total fuel requirements remain far from optimal.
“Limited Fuel Supply Hampers National Maritime Security”, Tempo, 3 December
2014.
32
“Naval Base Lacks Fuel, Uses New Strategies to Guard Waters”, Jakarta Post,
7 November 2009.
33
“National Scene: Govt to Review Weaponry System Grant”, Jakarta Post,
29 April 2015.
34
TNI-AL authorities recounted the “bad experience” and “headache” they had
with the ex-East German warships. “Indon Navy Rejects Nine Warships to be
Offered by Lybia [sic]”, ANTARA News, 27 January 2004.
35
According to the navy, the boats had idled for two years and their damaged
engines and other components were too costly to repair. Wahyoe Boedhiwardhana,
“RI passes on Unseaworthy Russian Subs”, Jakarta Post, 13 March 2014.
36
“National Scene: House Support Plans to Buy Russian Submarine”, Jakarta Post,
30 September 2015.

37
The visit sought closer bilateral trade and industrial cooperation and the
prospect of building Russian submarines in Indonesia was being discussed.
“Trade Between Russia, Indonesia to go to $5bln, Plans Include SS100, New

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 460 Koh Swee Lean Collin

Submarines — Ministry”, Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 22 October

2014.
38
Ridzwan Rahmat, “Pacific 2015: Indonesia in Talks with France over Possible
Sale of Scorpene 1000 SSK”, Jane’s Navy International, 6 October 2015.
39
“Construction of Diesel Electric Submarines of Project Varshavyanka 636 is
Stopped”, WPS: Defense & Security, 7 September 2015.

40
Juha-Matti Lehtonen and Jukka Anteroinen, “The Capability Factors as Explanatory
Variables of Equipment Unit Cost Growth: A Methodological Proposal”, Defence
and Peace Economics (April 2015): 1–19.

41
This timeframe takes reference from Clark G. Reynolds, History and the Sea:
Essays on Maritime Strategies (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South
Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 11–12.

42
For example, one KCR-40 fast attack craft requires twelve months to construct
because it has more complex systems integration requirements, compared to its
derivative PC-43 patrol craft which is equipped with simpler systems. “Defense
Minister Receives Beladau Warship”, Tempo, 25 January 2013.

43
Then Navy Chief-of-Staff Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh remarked about the
ideal situation of acquiring five to six new patrol vessels annually, contingent on
Indonesia’s economic growth. “Indonesian Navy Needs At Least 302 Warships:
Navy Officer”, ANTARA News, 11 February 2005.

44
“Indonesian Defense Force Sets Targets of 42% MEF”, ANTARA News, 8 January
2014.

45
“Moeldoko Boasts of Feats During Tenure”, Jakarta Post, 8 July 2015.
46
“Indonesia Speeds Up Military Modernization”, Xinhua News Agency, 9 January
2013.
47
Syaiful Hakim, “Kekuatan alutsista TNI yang mulai diperhitungkan” [TNI to
Begin Accounting for the Strength of Primary Armament Systems], ANTARA
News, 23 February 2014.
48
Ian Anthony, The Naval Arms Trade, SIPRI Strategic Issue Papers (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 165; Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power
and the Twenty-First Century (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1992),
p. 179; Joseph R. Morgan, Porpoises among the Whales: Small Navies in
Asia and the Pacific, East-West Centre Special Reports No. 2 (March 1994),
p. 12.
49
Novan Iman Santosa, “Local Weapons Ramped Up”, Jakarta Post, 20 February
2014.

50
Jon Grevatt, “IndoDefence 2014: PT PAL, DSME Submarines Negotiations
Continue”, Jane’s Defence Industry, 6 November 2014.
51
“Indonesia Plans to Purchase Russian Submarines”, ITAR-TASS World Service,
21 October 2014; “President Jokowi Discusses Defense Industry with Angela
Merkel”, Tempo, 17 November 2014.
52
Jon Grevatt, “Indonesia Plans to Acquire up to 40 Corvettes”, Jane’s Navy
International, 1 October 2007.

53
Nani Afrida and Hasyim Widhiarto, “Wayward Policies Plague Shipyard: PAL
President”, Jakarta Post, 5 October 2011.

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 What Next for the Indonesian Navy? 461

54
“TNI Prioritizes Local Military Weapon System”, ANTARA News, 6 November
2014; see also “Joint Chief of Staff Candidate Promises Weapons Improvement”,
Tempo, 2 July 2015.
55
“Shipyards Not Yet Strong Enough to Support Maritime State: Official”, ANTARA
News, 11 September 2014; “Best Opportunity for Shipbuilding Industry: Minister”,
ANTARA News, 4 August 2015.
56
“TNI Still Needs Imported Weapons”, Jakarta Post, 14 January 2015.
57
“Indonesia asks Dutch for More Consistent Support with Guided Missile Frigate”,
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 15 December 2010.
58
Read for example, Benjamin Schreer, “Moving Beyond Ambitions? Indonesia’s
Military Modernisation”, Strategy (Australian Strategic Policy Institute), November
2013; and Yuddy Chrisnandi and Leonard C. Sebastian, “Defence Budgeting
in Indonesia: Some Policy Options”, RSIS Commentaries, No. 126/2007,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 21 November 2007.
59
The World Bank, World Development Indicators Database: Indonesia, available
at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/indonesia>.
60
“Indonesian Defence Department Seeks Additional Funds for 2009 Budget”,
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 14 January 2009.
61
“Indonesian President Earmarks 11 Billion Dollars to Modernize Defence Systems”,
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 21 September 2011.
62
Kebijakan Penyelarasan Minimum Essential Force Komponen Utama, Peraturan
Menteri Pertahanan Republik Indonesia 2012, Nomor 19 Tahun 2012 [Policy
on the Alignment of Primary Components of the Minimum Essential Force,
Regulation of the Minister of Defence, Republic of Indonesia, No. 19, 2012],
p. 27.
63
“Govt Eyes Used Weapons From Europe”, Jakarta Post, 11 November 2011.
64
“Army Receives the Lowest Budget Allocations for Its Armament System”,
ANTARA News, 4 October 2012.
65
This point was particularly emphasized by Ms Curie Maharani, who is faculty
member at Binus University and consultant for the Indonesian Department
of Defence. The author thanks Ms Maharani for her valuable insights on the
TNI-AL’s budget allocations vis-à-vis its sister services. Email interview on
1 October 2015, Singapore.
66
“Indonesia to Purchase Three More Corvettes from Netherlands”, BBC Monitoring
Asia Pacific, 22 June 2010.
67
“Indonesia Navy Receives Funding for Defence Equipment”, BBC Monitoring
Asia Pacific, 26 May 2010.
68
The Air Force Chief-of-Staff was expected to take over following the retirement
of Moeldoko, formerly an Army Chief-of-Staff. “Indonesian President Breaks
Tradition in Picking New Military Chief”, Reuters, 10 June 2015.
69
“House says TNI’s Priorities Wrong in Leopard Tank Procurement”, Jakarta Post,
18 January 2012.
70
“Jokowi Committed to Improving Military Weapons Defense System”, ANTARA
News, 7 October 2014.

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 462 Koh Swee Lean Collin

71
“World Bank cuts Indonesia 2015 Growth Projection to 5.2 Percent”, Reuters,
8 December 2014; “Slower Gains”, Indonesia Economic Quarterly, The World
Bank, July 2015, available at <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/
document/EAP/Indonesia/IEQ-JUL-2015-english.pdf>.
72
Todd and Lindberg, Navies and Shipbuilding Industries, op. cit., p. 15; Rear
Admiral N.D.H. Hammond, RAN, “Technological Change and Surface Forces”,
in Naval Power in the Pacific: Toward the Year 2000, edited by Hugh Smith
and Anthony Bergin (Colorado and London: Lynne Reiner, 1993), p. 102.
73
“Indonesian Navy Chief Outlines New Maritime Defence Blueprint”, BBC
Monitoring Asia Pacific, 9 December 2004.
74
“Minister Susi: Our Losses Are Not Made Up Numbers”, Tempo, 23 June 2015.
75
Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-First Century, op. cit., p. 46.
76
“Navy Needs 200 Patrol Boats, Shortfall due to Lack of Funding”, BBC Monitoring
Asia Pacific, 8 April 2003.
77
Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan
Press, 1984), p. 186.
78
Michael A. Morris, Expansion of Third-World Navies (Basingstoke: MacMillan,
1987), p. 43.
79
STANFLEX was first pioneered by the Danish Flyvefisken class multi-role vessels
built in 1987–96. This concept uses a standard hull with containerized mission
modules to allow the vessel to change role quickly for surveillance, surface
combat, anti-submarine, and MCM, minelayer or pollution control. STANFLEX
continues to be employed by the Danish Navy, such as the current Absalon
class Flexible Support Ship.
80
“Polish Navy ‘Gawron’ in Financial Trouble?”, Naval Forces 24, no. 4 (January
2003): 103; Tim Fish, “Poland Plans to Resurrect Corvette Programme”, Jane’s
Navy International, 14 June 2010.
81
Remigiusz Wilk, “Poland Awards Contracts to Complete Former Gawron Corvette
as an OPV”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 December 2013; “Poland Decides to
Discontinue Work on Partially-built Corvette for Navy”, BBC Monitoring European,
28 February 2012; Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, “Polish Corvette Project Axed Amid
Rising Costs”, Jane’s Navy International, 2 March 2012.

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permission.