BILL OF ATTAINDER/ EXPOST FACTO LAW AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
G.R. Nos. 61864-69 May 8, 1992
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE FAMILY
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (Formerly Family Savings
Bank), petitioners, vs.
HON. BENIGNO M. PUNO as PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BRANCH II, AND
HERNANI PALILLO, respondents.
Silvestre L. Tagarao for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside and
nullify the orders of respondent Judge Benigno M. Puno in
Criminal Cases No. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490,
all entitled "People of the Philippines v. Hernani Palillo" filed
before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II
with station at the City of Lucena, to wit: a) the order dated
July 30, 1982, granting respondent Palillo's Motion to Dismiss
dated July 30, 1982 and ordering the dismissal of the
aforementioned cases, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finding the Motion to
Quash filed by the accused TENABLE,
hereby DISMISSES the above-entitled cases.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED. (p. 27, Rollo)
and b) the order dated August 26, 1982, denying the separate
motions for reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 1982
filed by petitioner People of the Philippines (People) and
petitioner Family Bank and Trust Company (Family), which
reads:
AFTER a careful and thorough study of the
allegations in the Motions for Reconsideration,
dated August 3, and 13, 1982, filed by the
Prosecution, together with the Opposition dated
August 12, 1982 and the Supplemental
Opposition dated August 21, l982, filed by the
Defense, the Court finds the said motion(s)
without merit and, therefore, denies the same.
SO ORDERED. (p. 28, Rollo)
The facts of these cases are not in dispute. On December 23,
1981, the City Fiscal filed against the accused an information
(Criminal Case No. 10323) for six (6) counts of violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, with the City Court of Lucena,
Branch I.
On March 3, 1982, the accused was arraigned by the court
and she pleaded not guilty to the charge.
In compliance with a directive of the Ministry of Justice
contained in a letter from the Chief State Prosecutor dated
March 9, 1982 in connection with the criminal charges against
private respondent Palillo, the Office of the City Fiscal filed on
March 22, 1982 six separate criminal informations for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the then Court of First
Instance of Quezon, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos.
3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490, all entitled "People of
the Philippines V. Hernani Palillo," to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3485:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980,
in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
issue and make out Check No. AA37-54332
dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of
P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, but when said check
was presented for payment the same was
dishonored and was refused payment for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the herein
accused, did not have sufficient funds in said
bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the
complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank,
Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed
and refused to deposit with said bank the
necessary amount to cover the said check, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
complainant in the aforestated sum of
P85,000.00 Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law. (pp. 32-33, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3486:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980,
in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
issue and make out Check no. AA37-54330
dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of
P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, but when said check
was presented for payment the same was
dishonored and was refused payment for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the herein
accused, did not have sufficient funds in said
bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the
complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank,
Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed
and refused to deposit with said bank the
necessary amount to cover the said check, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
complainant in the aforestated sum of
P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law. (pp. 36-37, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3487:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980,
in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
issue and make out Check No. AA37-54330
dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of
P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, but when said check
was presented for payment the same was
dishonored and was refused payment for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the herein
accused, did not have sufficient funds in said
bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the
complainant herein the Family Savings Bank,
Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed
and refused to deposit with said bank the
necessary amount to cover said check, to the
damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
complainant in the aforestated sum of
P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to Law. (pp. 36-37, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3488:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980,
in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
issue and make out Check No. AA37-54328
dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of
P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, but when said check
was presented for payment the same was
dishonored and was refused payment for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the herein
accused, did not have sufficient funds in said
bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the
complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank,
Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed
and refused to deposit with said bank the
necessary amount to cover the said check, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
complainant in the aforestated sum of
P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to Law. (pp. 38-39, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3489:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980,
in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
issue and make out Check No. AA37-54331
dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of
P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, but When said check
was presented for payment the same was
dishonored and was refused payment for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the herein
accused, did not have sufficient funds in said
bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the
complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank,
Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed
and refused to deposit with said bank the
necessary amount to cover the said check, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
complainant in the aforestated sum of
P85,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law. (pp. 40-41, Rollo)
Criminal Case No. 3490:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 1980,
in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
issue and make out Check No. AA37-54334
dated January 28, 1980, in the amount of
P85,000.00, drawn against the Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, but when said check
was presented for payment the same was
dishonored and was refused payment for the
reason that the drawer thereof, the herein
accused, did not have sufficient funds in said
bank; and that thereafter, despite notice by the
complainant herein, the Family Savings Bank,
Lucena Branch, Lucena City, the accused failed
and refused to deposit with said bank the
necessary amount to cover the said check, to
the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid
complainant in the aforestated sum of
P85,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
On April 5, 1982, the City Fiscal filed a Motion to Withdraw
Criminal Case No. 10323, pending before the City Court of
Lucena, on the ground that proper informations have been
filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
The counsel for the accused filed an Opposition to the Motion
to Withdraw on the ground that the filing of so-called proper
informations with the Court of First Instance of Quezon is not a
legal ground to withdraw the above-entitled case, considering
that the City Court of Lucena had already acquired jurisdiction
over the case and the accused had already been arraigned
and had pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On April 16, 1982, the City Court issued an order, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 10323, for lack of jurisdiction.
Subsequently, upon motion of private respondent through
counsel, Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486, 3487, 3488, 3489
and 3490 pending in various branches of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, were consolidated for trial before Branch
II of the aforesaid CFI, presided by the respondent judge.
On July 28, 1982, private respondent was again arraigned,
now before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II
and she entered a plea of "Not Guilty" in all aforesaid six (6)
criminal cases.
After entering her plea of "Not Guilty," private respondent filed
on the same day a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned six
(6) criminal cases on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming
that the City Court of Lucena City had already acquired
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323 and that, therefore,
the dismissal of the last mentioned case, the very case
bearing the same causes of action as the six (6) criminal
cases, constituted a dismissal on the merits.
On July 29, 1982, the City Fiscal filed an Opposition to the
aforesaid Motion to Dismiss, citing as grounds therefore that
the private respondent had not been placed in jeopardy before
the City Court since she was arraigned under a defective
information before the latter Court and such court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
10323.
On July 30, 1982 the respondent CFI judge issued the first
questioned order granting private respondent's motion to
dismiss all the six (6) criminal informations filed against her.
On August 5, l982, the complainant through Assistant City
Fiscal Elviro Q. Quitain of Lucena City filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order.
On August 12,1982, private respondent filed an Opposition to
the City Fiscal's motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, the A.M. Perez and Associates Law Office,
through Atty. Dante T. Ramos, filed its formal appearance on
August 12, 1982 as private prosecutor in behalf of the Family
Bank and Trust Company (herein private petitioner) under the
direct control and supervision of the City Fiscal in the six (6)
criminal cases before the CFI of Quezon.
On August 16, 1982, with the conformity of the City Fiscal, the
private prosecutor through the above-named counsel filed its
own Motion for Reconsideration of the respondent judge's
order of dismissal.
On August 23, 1982, private respondent Palillo through
counsel filed a supplemental opposition to the prosecution s
motions for reconsideration.
On August 26, 1982, respondent Judge issued the second
questioned order, denying both the City Fiscal and the private
prosecutor's motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition which the City Fiscal and the private
prosecutor jointly filed directly with this Court.
In his comment, the Solicitor General recommended that the
questioned orders of the respondent judge be reversed and
set aside and that the case be remanded to the court a quo for
trial.
On the other hand, the counsel for the herein private
respondent, after four (4) motions for extension of time, failed
to file his own comment.
Accordingly, an March 2, 1983, this Court issued a resolution
dispensing with the private respondent's comment, giving due
course to the petition and declaring the case submitted for
decision.
In support of their petition, petitioners contend that, in issuing
the orders complained of, respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion and/or in excess or lack of jurisdiction
because:
a) The respondent judge was without jurisdiction to inquire
into, much less reverse the City Court's finding contained in its
order dated April 16, 1982 that the City Court had no
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 10323, the latter order
having long become final and constituted res judicata between
the parties thereto.
b) The respondent judge had no jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue of jurisdiction of the City Court over Criminal Case No.
10323, such competence being in law reserved only to the
Supreme Court.
c) The respondent judge's holding that the City Court had
concurrent jurisdiction with Court of First Instance of Lucena
over the offense charged under Criminal Case No. 10323 and
that the dismissal of said case thereby precludes further
prosecution of the accused under the six (6) cases before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon finds no valid support in law
and jurisprudence.
d) The orders complained of effectively denies the prosecution
of its day in Court and of its right to due process.
e) The respondent judge gravely abused its discretion in not
finding that the accused, herein, respondent PALILLO, has
waived the defense of double jeopardy and is thus estopped
from setting up said defense (p. 78, Rollo).
The main issue in this petition is whether or not the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. 10323 pending before the City Court of
Lucena, Branch I, for lack of jurisdiction and the subsequent
filing of other informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490)
with the respondent Court against the same private
respondent for the same offenses had placed her in double
jeopardy.
A careful scrutiny of the circumstances of these cases would
clearly show that no double jeopardy exists. It is a settled rule
that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense, or the second offense include or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (People
v. City Court of Manila, G.R. No. L-36528, September 24,
1987, 154 SCRA 175; Ada v. Virola, G.R. Nos. 82346-47, April
17, 1989, 172 SCRA 336).
And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment;
(b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) a valid
plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused (Tangan v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No.
73963, Nov. 5, l987, 155 SCRA 435).
As correctly found by the City Court of Lucena, jurisdiction
over the offenses charged in Criminal Case No. 10323
exclusively pertains to the Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provides for a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than
one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine or
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948 provides that the
municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-
provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction
as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an
offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which
the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or
fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both . . . (Section
87).
In determining whether a criminal case is within the jurisdiction
of a Municipal or City Court, the maximum punishment that
might be imposed is controlling, and the fact that the minimum
punishment is within its jurisdiction is immaterial.
Taking into account the amount of each check which is
P85,000.00 upon which the court may base the alternative
imposable penalty of fine pursuant to BP. Blg. 22, as alleged in
the information filed in the City Court, it is clear that the latter
has no jurisdiction to try the case considering that the
imposable fine will be P85,000.00 at the very least up to the
amount of P170,000.00 which is way beyond the maximum
amount of P6,000.00 from which the City Court may validly
draw concurrent jurisdiction over the case. It is this alternative
penalty of fine and not the penalty of imprisonment which
divests the City Court of its jurisdiction to try Criminal Case No.
10323. Hence, the City Court of Lucena correctly dismissed
said case and since the dismissal was based on lack of
jurisdiction, it did not constitute a bar to the prosecution of the
same offense in the proper court. (U.S. v. Bernardo, G.R. No.
6027, 19 Phil. 265; Cristobal v. People, G.R. No. L-1542, 84
Phil. 473)
It is noteworthy that the Motion to Withdraw Criminal Case No.
10323 and the subsequent filing of the six (6) criminal
informations with the Court of First Instance were made in
compliance with the directive of the Ministry of Justice. Clearly,
these were designed to correct the error committed with
respect to the filing of the information in Criminal Case No.
10323. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the error does not
constitute substantial prejudice to private respondent
considering that no evidence yet has ever been presented and
the private respondent was never exposed to trial. Thus, the
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490 were as
though the accused was being tried and prosecuted under an
original information. The constitutional mandate against putting
a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second
time. But, since the first proceeding was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction and the State was not afforded the right to present
its own evidence to substantiate the allegations in the
information, there is no second jeopardy to speak of. Contrary
to the stand of the private respondent in its motion to quash
Criminal Cases Nos. 3485-3490, the City Court's order of
dismissal cannot be considered as a judgment of acquittal
since, as already pointed out, the said court has no jurisdiction
to try the case.
Moreover, the assailed order of dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. 3485-3490 unjustly deprives the State of its right to due
process.
This Court had occasion to rule in People v. Pablo, G.R. No. L-
37271, June 25, 1980 (98 SCRA 289) that the court should
bear in mind that it is the guardian of the rights of the accused
as well as of the people at large, and that it should not unduly
force the accused to go to trial, or for light cause, jeopardize
the rights or interest of the public. The rights of the offended
parties, who usually take active part in the trial, are equally
entitled to the protection offered by the courts to the public at
large in the trial of a criminal case. (People v. Declare, G.R.
No. 64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142)
In the earlier case of Silvestre v. Military Commission No. 21,
G.R. No. L-46366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA 19, We ruled that:
The State is entitled to due process in criminal
cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity
to present its evidence in support of the charge.
The Court has always accorded this right to the
prosecution and, where the right had been
denied, had promptly annulled the offending
court action. We have heretofore held that a
purely capricious dismissal of an information
deprives the State of fair opportunity to
prosecute and convict, it denies the prosecution
its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal
(in reality an acquittal) without due process,
and, therefore null and void. Such dismissal is
invalid for lack of a fundamental pre-requisite,
that is, due process, and, consequently, will not
constitute a proper basis for the claim of double
jeopardy. We have likewise held that a trial
court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-
founded motion of the prosecution for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal or
acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to
reopen the case will be set aside to give the
State its day in court and an opportunity to
prove the offense charged against the accused
and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially
when no substantial right of the accused would
be prejudiced thereby. (People v. Navarro, etc.,
63 SCRA 264).
We disagree, however, with the petitioner's contention that
respondent judge had no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of
jurisdiction of the City Court over Criminal Case No. 10323.
Respondent Court obviously has the competence to pass
upon the issue of the city court's jurisdiction over the first
information. It should be pointed out that in order to resolve
whether or not an accused has been placed twice in jeopardy,
the court should first determine whether or not a first jeopardy
had legally attached. As already discussed before, a legal
jeopardy attaches only if the court which first tried the offense
is a court of competent jurisdiction. And since the herein
private respondent interposed the defense of double jeopardy
on the basis that the city court had validly acquired jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 10323, it is necessary for the
respondent court to pass upon the said issue.
Anent the contention of petitioner that private respondent had
waived the defense of double jeopardy when she failed to
plead the said defense at the time of arraignment, suffice it to
say that the promulgation of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure had effectively granted to an accused the right to
invoke the defense of double jeopardy even after arraignment.
Thus, Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the New Rules provides:
Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege
any ground
therefore. –– The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before
he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash, or
failed to allege the same in said motion shall be
deemed a waiver with the grounds of a motion
to quash except the grounds of no offense
charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged, extinction, of the offense or
penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of
this Rule. (emphasis supplied).
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisitions with respect to the
procedural issues raised, this petition warrants the issuance of
the writ of certiorari prayed for, there being no double jeopardy
in this case.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed
orders are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. These cases
are hereby REMANDED to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court of Quezon to which Criminal Cases Nos. 3485, 3486,
3487, 3488, 3489 and 3490 are assigned to proceed with the
trial on the merits against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and
MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines
seek to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8
November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against
private respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with
personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search
warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed,
without the necessary authority from the city government, and
"architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" 1owned by the private
respondent. These electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner
"designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the
electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." 2 During the
subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written
statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices
"in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before
the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of
this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five
Pesos (P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not
exceed thirty (30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This
information reads as follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec.
6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of ordinance No. 1, S.
1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas,
and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as
follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric
wirings and devices to lower or decrease the consumption
of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at
Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a result of such
unathorized installations of electric wirings and devices
made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas
was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of
FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND
SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16) Philippine currency,
covering the period from November 1974 to February,
1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government
of Batangas in the aforestated amount of P41,062.16,
Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information.
On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the
grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the
civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of
the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the
Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which
prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing
further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months
after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another
information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised
Penal Code. This information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel
Opulencia y Lat of the crime of theft, defined and
penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309,
paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November,
1974, and the 21st day of February, 1975, at Kumintang,
lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the Batangas Electric Light System, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
steal and appropriate electric current valued in the total
amount of FORTY ONE THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO
PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Batangas Electric Light System, owned and operated
by the City Government of Batangas, in the
aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned
thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the
second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976,
the respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered
the case dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following
paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first
case can be properly pleaded by the accused in the
motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges
that the prosecution "accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of
violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec. 6(d) and Sec. 10
Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage
to the City Government of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis
supplied). The first case, as it appears, was not simply one
of illegal electrical connections. It also covered an amount
of P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with
intent to defraud, deprived the city government of
Batangas. If the charge had meant illegal electric
installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections
which were done at one instance on a particular date
between November, 1974, to February 21, 1975. But as
the information states "that from November, 1974 to
February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with intent to defraud the City Government of
Batangas, without proper authorization from any lawful
and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make
unauthorized installations of electric wirings and
devices, etc." (Emphasis supplied), it was meant to include
the P 41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect,
defrauded the city government. The information could not
have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February
1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the
indictment before the City Court, he had already been
exposed, or he felt he was exposed to consequences of
what allegedly happened between November 1974 to
February 21, 1975 which had allegedly resulted in
defrauding the City of Batangas in the amount of P
41,062.16. (Emphases and parentheses in the original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the
petitioner was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated 18
November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was
filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the
People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second or later
jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the
first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for
unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts
which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas.
Only two elements are needed to constitute an offense under this City
Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority
therefor had been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City
Electrical System or the District Engineer. The petitioner urges that the
relevant terms of the City Ordinance — which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) x x x
(b) The work and installation in the houses and building
and their connection with the Electrical System shall be
done either by the employee of the system duly authorized
by its Superintendent or by persons adept in the matter
duly authorized by the District Engineer. Applicants for
electrical service permitting the works of installation or
connection with the system to be undertaken by the
persons not duly authorized therefor shall be considered
guilty of violation of the ordinance.
would show that:
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to
ensure that electrical installations on residences or
buildings be done by persons duly authorized or adept in
 the matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty
electrical wirings. It is primarily a regulatory measure and
not intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid which is
already covered by the Revised Penal Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument
continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices without authority
from the proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense
under the city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the
part of the offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to
appropriate and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of
the Revised Penal Code filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas
in Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential elements. These
elements are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the
owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence
6
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can
be effected even without illegal or unauthorized installations of any kind by,
for instance, any of the following means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not
register the actual electrical consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down
the rotation of the same. 7
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance
[of Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity
[under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense
is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof and that the second offense is not necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is
clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved —
which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV
(22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same
section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an
offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although
both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The
second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the
constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a
national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from
the same act or set of acts. This was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of
the Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No.
22, Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the
City of Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an automobile — "recklessly and
without reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and
pedestrians passing in said street." Three months later, Yap was again
charged in Criminal Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court, this time
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The information
charged him with violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992
as amended by Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating
an automobile in a reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof
inflicting injuries upon an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the
second information upon the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. This motion was denied by the respondent
municipal judge. Meantime, another municipal judge had acquitted Yap in
Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap then instituted a petition for certiorari in the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo to set aside the order of the respondent
municipal judge. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo having reversed the
respondent municipal judge and having directed him to desist from
continuing with Criminal Case No. 16443, the respondent Judge brought the
case to the Supreme Court for review on appeal. In affirming the decision
appealed from and holding that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy was available to petitioner Yap, then Associate Justice and later
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property through
reckless driving — with which Diaz stood charged in the
court of first instance — is a violation of the Revised Penal
Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile
Law (Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587).
Hence, Diaz was not twice accused of a violation of
the same law. Secondly, reckless driving and certain
crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable
under different provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence
— from the view point of Criminal Law, as distinguished
from political or Constitutional Law — they constitute,
strictly, different offenses, although under certain
conditions, one offense may include the other, and,
accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for one, the plea of
double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as
in the Diaz case. (Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double
jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article
III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said
clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, whereas the second
contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same
act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same act provided that he is
charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in
one case is not included in or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to
the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges
are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. 12 Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached
under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may
be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if
there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether
or not, under the information in case No. 16443, petitioner
could — if he failed to plead double jeopardy — be
convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in
which he has already been acquitted. The information in
case No. 16054 alleges, substantially, that on the date and
in the place therein stated, petitioner herein had wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly
and without reasonable caution" an automobile described
in said information. Upon the other hand, the information in
case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the same date
and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent
manner at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992), as
amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city
 ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned in the second
information were not established by the evidence,
petitioner could be convicted in case No. 16443 of the very
same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No.
16054, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred
eventually sustaining the theory of petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which
the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or
have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses
under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes
are charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged
under a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If
the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written
into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance
would never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a
national statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by
definition, different from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would
never constitute the same offense having been promulgated by different
rule-making authorities — though one be subordinate to the other — and the
plea of double jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-
1935 Constitutional Convention show that the second sentence was inserted
precisely for the purpose of extending the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be covered by the
first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as
such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to
have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of
such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the
two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and
where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing,
intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately
characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability
simultaneously under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and
a national statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo
City Ordinance and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
under the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the same act or sets
of acts — that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The
additional technical element of serious physical injuries related to the
physical consequences of the operation of the automobile by the accused,
i.e., the impact of the automobile upon the body of the offended party.
Clearly, such consequence occurred in the same occasion that the accused
operated the automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence
permeated the acts of the accused throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame:
from November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused
Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring
and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he
effected or permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of
reducing electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the
very moment that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate
physical effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric
current into Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording
thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of
offenses that must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second
offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the
first or a frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to
be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in
the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of
an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one
another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements. As Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People
vs. del Carmen et al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits
prosecution for the same offense, it seems elementary that
an accused should be shielded against being prosecuted
for several offenses made out from a single
act. Otherwise, an unlawful act or omission may give use
to several prosecutions depending upon the ability of the
prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many
offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by
simply adding or subtracting essential elements. Under the
theory of appellant, the crime of rape may be converted
into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by force
and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl
from remaining a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53; emphases
supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same
occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and
therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were,
to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal
ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the
information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that
such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused
of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability."
Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari
and mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a
businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the
community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment
because an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file
an information for an offense which he should have known had already
prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the
protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private
respondent in this case.
The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made by the
Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action both before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First
Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability whether by
prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present
case, as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the
police investigation having stolen electric current through the installation and use of
unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty before
the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny having appropriated electric power.
However, there is no evidence in the record as to the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated by Manuel Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by
the City Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas City
electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial could begin. Accordingly, the
related civil action which has not been waived expressly or impliedly, should be remanded
to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City for reception of evidence on the amount or
value of the electric power appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition
of judgment conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the
civil action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance
of Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., [1956] 51). This provision of the Philippine Bill was carried
concur. over in Identical words in the Jones Law of August 29,
1916 (Sec. 3, Ibid, 105).
Cruz, J., took no part.
10 The case law on this point includes: Lu Hayco vs. Court
of Appeals, 138 SCRA 227 (1985); People vs. Bocar, 138
SCRA 166 (1985); People vs. Militante, 117 SCRA 910
(1982); Flores Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 115 SCRA 236 (1982);
Footnotes People vs. Glorin 80 SCRA 675 (1977); People vs.
Consulta, 70 SCRA 277 (1976); Tacas vs. Cariaso 72
1 Petition for certiorari and Mandamus, dated 27 SCRA 527 (1976); Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA
November 1976, p. 2. 155 (1972); People vs. Mencias, 46 SCRA 88 (1972);
People vs. Doriquez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968); Culanag vs.
2 Id. Director of Prisons, 20 SCRA 1123 (1967); People vs.
Ramos, 2 SCRA 523 (1961); Yap vs. Hon. Lutero, 105
Phil. 1307 (1959); People vs. Opemia 98 Phil. 698 (1956);
3 Id.; and Annex "A " of the Petition. People vs. Alger 92 Phil. 227 (1953); People vs. del
Carmen, 88 Phil. 51 (1951); Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766
4 Order dated 6 April 1976 of Acting City Judge Aguileo S. (1950); People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933); People vs.
de Villa, City Court, Branch I, Batangas City, Criminal Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82 (1922); Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil. 247
Case No. 2385. (1903).

5 Memorandum for the Petitioner dated 16 April 1977, pp. 11 G.R. No. L-12669, 30Aprill959.Unfortunately,this
13-14. decision is not reported in full; see 105 Phil. 1307 (1959).

6 Memorandum for the Petitioner dated 16 April 1977, p. 12 Emphases supplied.

14, citing Reyes, Revised Penal Code [1971] p. 584.
13 The second sentence of Article Ill (22) of the 1935
7 Memorandum for Petitioner dated 16 April 1977, p. 15. Constitution was originally introduced by Delegate
Francisco. The amendment read:
8 Id., p. 16; emphasis in the original; brackets supplied.
"Si un acto esta penado tanto por una
ley general como por una ordenanza
9 The above paragraph is taken verbatim from Article III
municipal, la absolucion o condena bajo
(20) of the 1935 Constitution and is carried over,
la una sera obice para un
again verbatim in Article III (21) of the proposed
procesamiento ulterior bajo la otra. "
Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Commission of
(IV Proceedings of the Philippine
1986. The Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 had provided that
Constitutional Convention [1966; SH
"no person for the same offense shall be twice put in
Laurel, Ed.] p. 97)
jeopardy of punishment-" (Sec. 5, 1 Phil. Anno. Laws
Delegate Jose P. Laurel speaking in connection with the
Francisco amendment said:
"MR. LAUREL. Mr. President and
Gentlemen of the Convention: Pardon
me if I have to make a little explanation
in connection with this case. In the case
of the United States vs. Grafton, the
Supreme Court of the United States said
that a person accused before a military
tribunal and acquitted, cannot again be
accused before a civil court, because to
do so will be to place a person twice in
jeopardy. In that case, Grafton who was
a soldier was accused before the
military court. This military court
acquitted him. Later on he was again
prosecuted for the same offense before
a civil court, and the civil court convicted
him to fourteen years, eight months and
one day. Upon the appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, the
U.S. Supreme Court set aside the
judgment of the lower court on the
ground that Grafton had been placed
twice in jeopardy.
Now, in connection with my statement
regarding laws and municipal
ordinances, we have in our
jurisprudence quite a number of cases,
particularly the cases of US. vs. Joson
US. vs. Espiritu Santo and other cases
holding that the conviction under a
general law settled power to prosecution
(sic) under a local law, and vice
versa, on the ground that there are two
distinct sovereignties and two distinct
violations of the law. We have,
therefore, reached a situation where you
have in one case the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States,
and the decision of our Supreme Court
in the Philippine Islands. Now, the
theory in the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Grafton case was
that when the courts acquitted Grafton
the acquittal was by the same authority,
the authority of the United States that
established the military court. The civil
government was established by the
same authority of the government of the
United States, and consequently-to
convict a man already acquitted would
be [to] place [him] twice in jeopardy on
the same principle that it was the same
authority that convicted and condemned
Grafton.
Now, the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, and with due apology
to the Supreme Court, failed to follow
the logic of the Grafton case and
adhered to the practice obtaining in
several states of the Union that in cases
where there are two violations, one for a
general law and one against a local law,
there is no double jeopardy on the
ground of two distinct sovereignties and
two distinct laws. But there is no doubt
that it would be unjust and should not be
allowed. The objection and the example
given here by the Representative from
Cebu that a person may be influential or
may be shrewd enough in case he is
accused, for instance, of gambling, in
hurrying to the chief of police and having
him accused of violation of a municipal
ordinance in which case, according to
him, it will not be possible to accuse him
under a general law, and therefore that
will defeat in a way the administration of
 justice because that will make the
administration of justice dependent upon
the ability and the shrewdness of the
person accused of gambling to hurry to
the justice of the peace court. But I
desire to inform the members of this
Convention, in answer to that
argument, that in my opinion it is
preferable that a man should be only
accused and convicted once, for
instance, for violation of a municipal
ordinance and no longer be prosecuted
for violation of a general law, rather than
to permit that same person be convicted
say one month in the municipal court
and then six months in another court for
the same offense. I [would] rather see a
person convicted once in violation of a
municipal offense, rather than to permit
the conviction of that person, one for
violation of a municipal ordinance, and
one for violation of a general law for the
same offense, in gambling in that case.
If the selection is made, I would prefer
the prosecution of a man under a
general law than to permit his
prosecution twice for the same act of
gambling.
x x x (IV Id. pp. 113-115; brackets
supplied)
The distinction between "acts" and "offenses" in the
context of the double jeopardy provision was present in
the minds of the delegates to the Convention. Thus:
MR. LAUREL. Mr. President, that has
practically been brought up here,
because some of our delegates
suggested that the word "act" be
incorporated, which would give rise to
difficulties, because one act may
constitute different offense. But when we
retain the word "offense, " there will be
distinct offenses, and consequently, that
may be desirable here to retain what is
stated in the draft, that is, the word
"offense;" but as I said, still if we accept
in principle the fact that no person shall
be prosecuted twice for violation of a
general offense, or if you give latitude to
the Committee as to the form of
expression, we shall be able to arrive at
that point where we can present a
proper precept embodying the Idea that
we shall approve in principle only. I am
not in a position to say now whether it
would be advisable to retain it; I do not
know whether it would be advisable to
insert the word "act," because an act
may constitute several offenses. It
seems to me that it is for the committee
to study properly the draft, and
recommend what it thinks best.
MR. JOVEN. Does not the gentleman
think that such modification is a question
of form and not of substance?
MR. LAUREL. Well my suggestion that
we approve in principle the proposition
covers this particular case. That is to
say, a person may not be prosecuted
twice in a case where there are two
laws, one general law and one municipal
ordinance. That is to say, in case he is
prosecuted under a general law, that is
a part or the consequences of a
municipal ordinance, and vice versa.
That is the Idea, the primary Idea, and
that is our recommendation. Now, as to
how we should word it, whether we
should retain the draft as it is or we shall
modify or amplify that and then
incorporate the amendment suggested
by Delegate Francisco, I think it is just a
matter of style and can be entirely left to
the Committee on Style. " (IV Id, pp.
116-117)
xxx xxx xxx
"SR. FRANCISCO. Senor Presidente,
Caballeros de la convencion, voy a ser
breve. Yo no estoy conforme con la
ultima parte del discurso de mi
distinguido amigo el Delegado por
Batangas, Sr. Laurel, al decir que la
frase "en ningun caso se pondra a una
persona en peligro de ser condenada
dos veces por el mismo delito," cubre la
enmienda que he presentado. La razon
es muy sencilla. Las palabras "mismo
delito" no quieren decir un mismo
acto. Esta cuestion ha sido planteada
ante la Corte Suprema. Al ejecutar un
acto penado bajo o una ordenanza
municipal y penado bajo o una ley
general, se presents una accion contra
el en el juzgado de paz. Convicto en el
juzgado de paz y firme la sentencia, se
presenta otra acusacion contra el en el
juzgado de Primera Instancia por
infraccion de una ley general. El
acusado se defiende alegando que esta
en jeopardy, porque ya habia sido
condenado por ese mismo acto, y la
Corte Suprema declaro que la teoria del
acusado era erronea, porque dice que lo
que la ley prohibe es que se ponga a
uno en peugro de ser condenado por un
mismo delito y no por un mismo acto, y
la Corte Supreme declare, en ese caso
particular, que como quiera que aquel
acto estaba penado por una ordenanza
municipal y por una ley general, se
cometen dos delitos; uno contra el
municipio y otro contra el Estado o
contra la ley general de ahi que mi
enmienda en el sentido de que cuando
un acusado ha cometido un acto
penado por una ordenanza municipal y
al tiempo por una ley general, y dicho
acusado ya ha sido convictopor la
infraccion procesado ulteriormente bajo
otra ley. Creo, por lo tanto, que no es
cuestion solamente de estilo, sino que
es una cuestion fundamental" (IV Id, p.
119, emphases supplied)
14 Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court.
15 Sections of and 8, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court;
see Cabral vs. Puno, 70 SCRA 606 (1976).
16 Supra, Note 3.
17 People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1046 (1946); People v.
Maceda, 73 Phil. 679 (1942); People v. Liggayu et al. 97
PhiL 865 (1955)
G.R. Nos. 101557-58. April 28, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. AMADO and TERESA RUBITE,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 51,
PALAWAN, and LEONARDO SALDE, SR., LEONARDO SALDE, JR.,
FLORESITA SALDE, GLORIA SALDE-PANAGUITON, and JOJETA
PANAGUITON, respondent.
V. Dennis for petitioners.
Perfecto delos Reyes and Roberto delos Reyes for private respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Jeopardy is the peril in which an accused is placed when put on trial before a
court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment or information which is
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. No person can be
twice put in this peril for the same offense. The Constitution prohibits it.
Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto. This is the defense raised by
accused-private respondents after respondent Judge, upon motion of the
Provincial Fiscal, ordered without notice and hearing the dismissal of Crim.
Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 both for frustrated murder, which thereafter were
reinstated upon initiative of the Secretary of Justice and docketed anew as
Crim: Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573.
It appears that on 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of
Puerto Princesa City filed Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 for frustrated
murder against accused Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita
Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly
conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting complainants,
the spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite
and hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left fronto-parietal
area which would have caused his death in Crim. Case No. 8572 (G.R. No.
101557), and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with
a bolo which would have caused her death in Crim. Case No. 8573 (G.R.
No. 101558).
On 3 June 1988, accused Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr.,
Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all
pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, accused Jojeta Panaguiton was also
arraigned and likewise entered a plea of "not guilty."
On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the
Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved for the
suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the
accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial
Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor.
On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the
Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the
Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the
Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the dismissal
of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that petitioner-
spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the
accused only acted in self-defense.
On 9 February 1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of Crim.
Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397.
Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial
Prosecutor to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, two (2) new
Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused were filed by
Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala, docketed as Crim. Cases
Nos. 8572 and 8573.
On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the
accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was
opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial
court granted the motion and dismissed Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573.
The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial
Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Hence, this petition for
certiorari filed by private petitioners Amado and Teresa Rubite, complainants
in the court below.
Petitioners contend that the filing of the two (2) new Informations did not
place accused-private respondents in double jeopardy since the dismissal of
the previous cases was made with the latter's express consent, which can
be equated with their motion for reinvestigation of the cases, dismissal of the
cases being their ultimate intention in moving for reinvestigation. It is the
position of petitioners that when the dismissal is with the express consent of
the accused, such dismissal cannot be the basis of a claim of double
jeopardy.
Petitioners further submit that the dismissal of the previous cases is null and
void as the motion to dismiss filed by the Provincial Prosecutor which led to
the dismissal of the cases did not contain a notice of hearing; hence, it was
then a "mere scrap of paper" which the lower court should not even have
entertained.
Finally, petitioners maintain that where the prosecution has been deprived of
a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
violated.
In this regard, the Solicitor General, interestingly, concurs with petitioners.
Instead of filing a Comment as We required him to do, he filed a
Manifestation, citing Gumabon v. Dir. of the Bureau of Prisons, and
submitting that "[c]onsidering that the Order of respondent judge dated
February 9, 1989 favorably granting the Motion to Dismiss without notice and
hearing constituted a violation of basic constitutional rights, the respondent
court was consequently ousted of its jurisdiction when its Order violated the
right of the prosecution to due process." In effect, the first jeopardy never
terminated as the respondent trial court was not competent to issue the 9
February 1989 Order.
While the Solicitor General concedes that "[w]hat should have been done by
the new Provincial Prosecutor was to refile the Informations in Crim. Cases
Nos. 7396 and 7397 and not to file new Informations which were docketed
as Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573," he nevertheless avers that the filing of
the new Informations amounted merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy
and did not expose the private respondents to a second jeopardy. People v.
Bocar laid down the requisites of a valid defense of double jeopardy: (a) a
first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that in the first. Consequently, there being no valid
termination of the first jeopardy, the defense of double jeopardy must fail.
Private respondents on the other hand, invoking the now repealed Sec. 9,
Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, asseverate that the "rules provide and
speak of EXPRESS CONSENT" which cannot be equated with intention.
Hence, while they may have intended to have their cases dismissed upon
moving for reinvestigation, they never gave their express consent to the
dismissal of the cases. In fact, they never sought the dismissal of the
charges against them.
Furthermore, private respondents, in response to the allegation that the
orders of respondent judge dismissing the first two cases were null and void,
argue that if indeed the dismissal orders were null and void, petitioners
should not have waited for the filing of the new Informations and their
subsequent quashal. They should have immediately challenged the
dismissal order. After sleeping on their rights, they cannot belatedly say that
they were denied due process.
The cases at bar raise two (2) fundamental issues: (a) whether private
respondents gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original
Informations; and, (b) whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.
We answer both in the negative. Then, double jeopardy lies.
The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of
any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or
convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at
rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the
peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. This
Court, as early as ninety (90) years back, in Julia v. Sotto, said —
"Without the safeguard this article establishes in favor of the accused, his
fortune, safety, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the
complaining witness, who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed
by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or
restriction than his own will and pleasure. The accused would never be free
from the cruel and constant menace of a never-ending charge, which the
malice of the complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his
head . . ."
Que v. Cosico enumerates the requisites which must concur for double
jeopardy to attach: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and, (d)
the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or
terminated without the express consent of the accused.
The concurrence of all these circumstances constitutes a bar to a second
prosecution for the same offense, an attempt to commit the said offense, a
frustration of the said offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense charged.
In the cases before Us, it is undisputed that valid Informations for frustrated
murder, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 were filed against private
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of
competent jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that private respondents, after
being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then
remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their
express consent.
Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given either viva
voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning. This is hardly what private
respondents gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of
the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the
accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the
meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent
of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original
Informations.
The Solicitor General then claims that there can be no valid defense of
double jeopardy since one of the requisites for its valid defense, i.e., that
there be a valid termination of the first jeopardy, is unavailing. He further
argues that the motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor should not
have been entertained, much less granted, since there was no notice of
hearing, nor was it actually set for hearing.
We do not agree.
While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a
notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases present
an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity
of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting
Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that after a reinvestigation it was found that —
". . . the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The
spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused
Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended themselves from the attack
of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to
prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case."
Besides, who should invoke "lack of notice" but the party deprived of due
notice or due process. And when the Provincial Prosecutor moved to dismiss
on the ground that the complaining witnesses were instead the aggressors
and the accused simply acted in self-defense, would the accused have
opposed the motion as to require that he be first notified before the cases
against him be dismissed?
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides that "[a]ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be under the direction and control of the fiscal." It must be
remembered that as public prosecutor he is the —
"representative not of the ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As
such , he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."
Hence, the fiscal or public prosecutor always assumes and retains full
direction and control of the prosecution. The institution of a criminal action
depends upon his sound discretion. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court; whether a
prima facie case exists to sustain the filing of an Information; whether to
include in the charge those who appear to be responsible for the crime;
whether to present such evidence which he may consider necessary;
whether to call such witnesses he may consider material; whether to move
for dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. As in the case at bar,
he may move for the dismissal of the case if he believes that there is no
cause of action to sustain its prosecution, which was what in fact he did after
being convinced that it would be "unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to
prosecute the accused" who were really the victims, as the reinvestigation
showed.
Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who
thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was
not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in cases
of contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be
contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best interest if the accused did not
oppose the motion. The private complainants, on the other hand, are
precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the
dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss
would be useless and futile.
On the other hand, the order of the court granting the motion to dismiss,
notwithstanding the absence of a notice and hearing on the motion, cannot
be challenged in this petition for certiorari which assails the dismissal of the
two (2) cases on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioners can no longer
question the dismissal of the previous cases as the order has already
become final there being no appeal therefrom.
It has been repeatedly held that once an Information is filed with the court, it
acquires jurisdiction over the case, and the consequent discretion to dismiss
it. While the prosecutor retains full control over the prosecution, he loses
jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. Hence, what petitioners should have
done was to appeal the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the said
motion failed to include a notice of hearing, and should not have waited for
the dismissal of the subsequent cases on the ground of double jeopardy,
and thereafter question the first dismissal, which by then had already
become final, erroneous though it may be.
The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a
notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the
case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion.
The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order
set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the
complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari.
It must be stressed that after a court has obtained jurisdiction over the case,
the failure to give notice of a subsequent step in the proceedings does not
deprive the court of jurisdiction. If substantial injury results from failure of
notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the court may be held
to be erroneous and will be corrected in the proper proceeding, but it is not
an act without or in excess of jurisdiction and is not void. There is a great
difference in the results which follow the failure to give the notice, which is
necessary to confer on the court jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter of the action, and that which follows a failure to give notice of a step
taken after the court has obtained such jurisdiction and is proceeding with
the action.
Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the
defense of double jeopardy must prevail.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, committed
by public respondent, and, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132374 August 22, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUCIO ALBERTO y DANAO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Subject of this appeal, which we find meritorious, is the judgment1 dated
August 21, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City,
convicting Lucio Alberto of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of October 1993 at about 7:30 o’clock in the
evening at Barangay Gandiangan, Municipality of Imelda, Province of
Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to gain and by means of
violence did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take and rob
one Teresa2 Semic of cash money and by reason and on the occasion of
said robbery, the above-named accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab said Teresa Semic
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused her death
immediately thereafter.3
During his arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the
merits then followed.
The prosecution presented as its first witness VIRGILIO ALAP-
AP, barangay captain of Barangay Israel, Imelda, Zamboanga del Sur. He
testified that on the morning of October 19, 1993, he was informed by
members of his Bantay Bayan that there was a killing
at Barangay Gandiangan. He was also informed of the suspicious acts of
Lucio Alberto, who would take out his bag from a sack whenever there was
no one around but would place it back when people were around. On the
basis of this information, he brought Lucio Alberto and Titing Medel to the
house of the barangay captain of Barangay Gandiangan, where they were
investigated. He was informed by Titing Medel that the slippers which were
recovered near the body of Teresa Semic used to belong to him before he
exchanged it for a necklace from Alberto by way of barter. Alap-ap then
accompanied Alberto to the PNP Police station of Imelda where he was
turned over to SPO1 Francisco dela Cruz. He alleged that he was present
when the police conducted a physical examination on Alberto. They
discovered blood-stained currency bills amounting to a total of P950,
believed to be stolen from the victim.4
JOEL MEDEL @ TITING followed on the witness stand. He testified that on
October 18, 1993, he saw appellant Lucio Alberto outside the store of
Teresa "Isang" Semic. Appellant stayed behind, said the witness, when he
went home at around 6:00 P.M. He was at the house of
the barangay captain of Gandiangan when he found out that Aling "Isang"
was already dead. He stated that the slippers found near the body of Aling
"Isang" were originally his, but he bartered them to Alberto for a necklace.
He was present when the police recovered several bloodied bills in the
amount of P950 from the shoes of appellant Lucio Alberto. 5
SPO1 FRANCISCO DELA CRUZ testified that he was in his house in the
evening of October 18, 1993 when he received a report that there was a
killing in Barangay Gandiangan. He immediately went to the place of the
incident and saw below the stairway of her kitchen outside her house the
body of Teresa covered in her own blood. He saw a pair of slippers about
three meters away from the body. He brought the slippers to their station.
The following day, October 19, 1993, he went back
to Barangay Gandiangan, talked with the barangay captain, and arrested
appellant on the request of the barangay captain. Upon reaching the police
station, he asked appellant to open the bag which he brought with him.
Inside was a pair of short pants with bloodstain near the zipper, a bandana,
and a medallion necklace. He then asked appellant to take off his shoes
wherein an envelope was found containing P950 in different blood-stained
denominations. Three days later, he also recovered a knife from a certain
Payna. Witness Dela Cruz admitted that he was not sure whether the
slippers he recovered really belonged to the person who killed Teresa.6
On June 26, 1996, the trial court issued an order dismissing the case for
failure of the prosecution to submit its formal offer of exhibits. The said order
was lifted after the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration on July 1,
1996. Thereafter, the prosecution continued to present its evidence.
ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA, of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO),
testified that he assisted appellant at the time he executed his extrajudicial
confession7 on January 14, 1994. He identified said extrajudicial
confession8which was placed into the record of the trial by the court.
The last witness for the prosecution, ERNESTO PAYNA, testified that he
was informed of the death of his aunt, Santiaga Theresa9 at around 7:00
P.M. of October 18, 1993. He saw the body of his aunt at the balcony near
the stairs of her kitchen. He also saw a pair of slippers about one meter from
the body of the victim.10
On March 26, 1997, the defense orally asked for leave to file demurrer to
evidence. On April 25, 1997, the demurrer was filed but it was denied on
May 13, 1997. On June 25, 1997, the trial court issued an order declaring
that the accused should be deemed to have waived his right to present
evidence for the defense, and that the case be considered submitted for
decision.
On August 21, 1997, the trial court promulgated its judgment, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. He is hereby sentence (sic) to the penalty of
1âwphi1
reclusion perpetua to death and to pay the private offended party as
indemnity the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal. In his brief, appellant assigns the following as errors:
I confession and the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REINSTATING THE CASE
AFTER JUNE 26, 1996 AFTER IT HAS DISMISSED THE CASE FOR
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO
SUBMIT ITS FORMAL OFFER OF EXHIBITS FOR ALMOST A YEAR
WHEN REQUIRED TO BY THE TRIAL COURT OVER THE
OPPOSITION/OBJECTION OF THE ACCUSED AS THE SAME HAD
PLACED THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT
FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.12
Appellant contends that he was placed in double jeopardy when the trial
court reconsidered its order dismissing the case against him. More
importantly, he contends that without the extrajudicial confession placed on
record,13 the evidence of the prosecution would not be able to meet the
needed quantum of proof to establish his guilt. He assails said extrajudicial
confession on the ground that it was not duly established that it was he who
signed it. He also argues that at the time said confession was executed, he
was not assisted by a competent counsel of his choice. 14
The Office of the Solicitor General, for the appellee, counters that there was
no violation of the right of appellant not to be placed in double jeopardy. The
OSG argues that the order of the trial court dismissing the case was illegal
and void for being issued with abuse of discretion. The trial court did not
afford any opportunity to the prosecution to be heard before it decided to
dismiss the case, contrary to Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Court.15 It did not even consider that even without the said formal offer of
exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case on the basis of the
testimonial evidence alone. Being void, the said order cannot have the effect
of terminating the trial and, hence, cannot serve as basis for the claim of
double jeopardy.
On the claim of the defense that the needed quantum of proof to convict
appellant has not been met, the OSG maintains that appellant’s extrajudicial
are more than enough to convict appellant.
However, the OSG recommends that the appellant should be convicted of
two distinct crimes of homicide and theft, not robbery with homicide, because
from the tenor of the extrajudicial confession, it was clear that the appellant
intended to kill the victim and that the taking of the P950.00 was a mere
afterthought.16
The pertinent issues for resolution in this case are: (1) whether or not
appellant was placed in double jeopardy when the trial court reconsidered its
order dismissing the case; (2) whether or not the extrajudicial confession
was admissible against appellant; and (3) whether or not the guilt of
appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The three requisites before double jeopardy can be invoked are: (1) the first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that in the first, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.17 As to the first
jeopardy, it only arises (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a competent
court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5)
when the defendant was acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed.
In our view, it is clear that no double jeopardy has attached in this case. We
agree with the Solicitor General that the dismissal order made by the trial
court was not valid and cannot be used as basis for a claim of double
jeopardy. The said right cannot be grounded on an error of law. As held
in People vs. Navarro: 18
The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be
given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The
Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution, and where the right
had been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action. We have
heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives
the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the
prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an
acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such dismissal
is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, that is, due process, and,
consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double
jeopardy…
We agree with the OSG’s contention that the trial court exceeded its
authority when it dismissed the case without giving the prosecution a right to
be heard, hence there was a violation of due process. Further, the failure of
the prosecution to offer its exhibits is not a ground to dismiss the case. Even
without any documentary exhibits, the prosecution could still prove its case
through the testimonies of its witnesses. Thus, we find that when the trial
court reconsidered its order of dismissal, it merely corrected itself.
On the second and third issues, appellant asks this Court to disregard the
extrajudicial confession which he had allegedly executed before and with the
assistance of Atty. Cimafranca, but which confession he denies. If
disregarded, he claims that the prosecution’s evidence would not be
sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
A counsel-assisted and voluntary confession is sufficient to establish the
guilt of the accused especially when it is corroborated on material points by
the prosecution witnesses.19 However, it is essential that the person making
the confession must be assisted by a "competent" counsel. The meaning
and standards of a "competent counsel" were explained in People vs.
Deniega20 as follows:
…[T]he lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as
far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing
questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the accused’s behalf, it is
important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as
distinguished from one who would be merely be giving a routine, peremptory
and meaningless recital of the individual’s constitutional rights. In People vs.
Basay,21 this Court stressed that an accused’s right to be informed of the
right to remain silent and to counsel ‘contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.’
Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial
investigation (if the latter could not afford one) ‘should be engaged by the
accused (himself), or by the latter’s relative or person authorized by him to
engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the accused or
person authorized by the accused to file such petition.’ Lawyers engaged by
the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.
…The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from
the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or
advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping
the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he
may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.
On this score, we are constrained to hold that the standards of "competent
counsel" elucidated in Deniega were not met in this case. In the first place, it
is clear that the appellant was not given the option to choose his own lawyer.
On its face, the preliminary statement in the extrajudicial
confession22 executed on January 14, 1994, bears this out:
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF LUCIO ALBERTO ASSISTED BY
ATTY. PACIFICO T. CIMAFRANCA, THIS JANUARY 14, 1994 AT
PAGADIAN CITY, PHILIPPINES.
Preliminary Statement – I am informing you that you are under investigation
in connection to (sic) the killing of one Teresa Semic, do you need the
assistance of a lawyer.
ANSWER: yes.
Additional preliminary statement – Atty. Pacifico T. Cimafranca, is a Lawyer
of the Public Assistance Office, do you need his legal services to assist you.
ANSWER: Yes.
(SGD.) Lucio Alberto
The appellant was not asked whether he wishes and can afford to retain his
own lawyer. He was just told that Atty. Cimafranca was a lawyer and asked
whether he needs his services. He was not made aware that he could
choose his own lawyer other than those assigned by the police or the
prosecutor. To all intents and purposes, Atty. Cimafranca can be described
as a lawyer engaged by the police since PAO lawyers are generally
assigned to police stations and prosecutor’s offices as part of their regular
duties. As such, it cannot be denied that the relationship of Atty. Cimafranca
with the police and the prosecutor could be symbiotic. In fact, we take note
that the office of Atty. Cimafranca was even located at the provincial capitol
where he was at the beck and call of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Aside from this, we are not satisfied that Atty. Cimafranca dutifully and
faithfully assisted appellant during the course of the investigation. This is
clear from his testimony in court, to wit:
Q: While in the course of taking confession you did not even give advice to
Lucio Alberto when not to answer the question and when to answer the
question propounded?
A: I did not give him anymore further advice before taking down the
confession into writing because I have already warned the accused of the
consequences of his confession.
Q: You did not advice Lucio Alberto?
A: No, I have warned the accused.
Q: You did not tell the accused which question are incriminating to him?
A: No more.23
It is clear from the above that Atty. Cimafranca was merely satisfied in just
warning appellant of the consequences of his confession. He did not take an
active part during the actual taking of said confession. Further, it was evident
that Atty. Cimafranca did not give appellant a complete picture of what may
befall him once he executed the confession:
Q: Did you tell him that the penalty impose (sic) would be death penalty?
A: I cannot remember unless it is included there in the affidavit. 24
In our view, the assistance rendered by Atty. Cimafranca during the custodial
investigation failed to meet the exacting tests laid down in People vs.
Deniega, supra. Thus, we must conclude that the so-called extrajudicial
confession of appellant is inadmissible as evidence for the prosecution.
Moreover, we find that the prosecution did not even take any effort to
establish that the person who executed the said confession was the
appellant. Atty. Cimafranca was not made to identify appellant in court. Nor
were the signatures or initials therein identified as appellant’s own.
Without said confession, the prosecution’s evidence is weak. It is insufficient
to sustain the conviction of appellant.
First, the ownership of the slippers found near the body of the victim was not
sufficiently established. The prosecution’s evidence seems to indicate that
the owner of the slippers was Joel Medel and not appellant. Medel testified
that he bartered the slippers for a necklace. However, he was not able to
satisfactorily explain why the necklace was still in the possession of
appellant and not with him at the time the former was apprehended. Second,
even the money allegedly found in the possession of appellant was not
established by the prosecution as belonging to the victim. Third, the blood
allegedly found on the money and the shorts of appellant was not examined
so that a comparison with the victim’s blood could be made. Fourth, the
prosecution also failed to establish the time and cause of death of Teresa
Semic. All in all, the prosecution miserably failed to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of appellant.
The fact that appellant was not able to use his turn to present evidence in his
defense and rebut the prosecution’s evidence should not be the sole
determinant of his guilt. Moreover, whether the accused decided to present
evidence on his behalf or not, the burden of the prosecution to prove its case
remains. Among the fundamental rights of an accused under the Bill of
Rights is to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to
overcome the presumption, the prosecution must establish his guilt with
proof beyond reasonable doubt.25 Even if the accused should choose to
remain silent, if the prosecution failed in discharging its burden, then it is not
only the accused’s right to be freed; it is, even more, the court’s
constitutional duty to acquit him.26 Where it was not properly and sufficiently
established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant was the one who killed
the victim, as in this case, his conviction could not be lawfully sustained. His
appeal should be considered favorably, and his conviction annulled.
Appellant should be freed forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City, Branch 18, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellant LUCIO
ALBERTO is ACQUITTED on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. His immediate release from New
Bilibid Prison is hereby ordered, unless there is another lawful cause for his
continued detention. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City, is directed to report compliance with this order within five (5) days from
notice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias
"Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other
"subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains
a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive"
organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted
a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co,
directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information.
The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer
and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of
force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal
 means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a
totalitarian regime and placing the government under the
control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training
school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military
arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or
with insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford
impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or
afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the
same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed,
which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State
Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to
collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to
the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby
accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA,
ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO
GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias
COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES,
whose identities are still unknown, for violation of
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-
Subversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior
thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the
Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as
offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as defined in
Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly,
willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a
member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not
only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of
the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist
Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named
accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the
aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit
subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating
and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and
tumultuously and take up arms against the government,
and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the
Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or
other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the
accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the
said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting
the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means;
and toward this end, the said accused organized, among
others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in
barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of
undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive
and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots
and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
 2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias
TABA, together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO
Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive
and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting
members for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating
and inciting the people to organize and unite for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit,
subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in
the Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or
persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or
disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the
statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it
embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it
denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill
of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the
informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We
resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder
or ex port facto law shall be enacted." 2 A bill of attainder is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The
constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the
principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the
judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were
employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition
is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a
burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as
a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a
quo as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party
of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of
the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped
"the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing
the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial."
Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is
whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is
still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of
organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof
for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to
be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the
purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued
solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization
having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S.
vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore
unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as
follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the
Communist
Party ... shall serve —
 (1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any
executive board or similar governing body, business
agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than
as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial
duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his
membership in the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso
facto disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the
governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the
United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly
constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly
possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keep from positions affecting
interstate commerce persons who may use of such
positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504,
however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it
by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a
generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who
commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics
(acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make
them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union
office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding
what persons have committed the specified acts or
possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it
designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess
the feared characteristics and therefore cannot hold union
office without incurring criminal liability — members of the
Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to
our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an
order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party
to register as a "Communist-action organization," under
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987,
50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of
"Communist-action organization" which the Board is to
apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is
substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the
foreign government or foreign organization controlling the
world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this
title, and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of
such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC
sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act
was a bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not
specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations
setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth
a general definition. Although the Board has determined in
1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action
organization," the Court found the statutory definition not
to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would always
come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of
Appeals has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist
Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages,
comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is once
registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate
means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more,
would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their
guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt
acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and
with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the
Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has
been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the
criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute
were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent
to further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically
required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific
intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful,
must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by
overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful
goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes
an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the
organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of
mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not
activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute
prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from
serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a
legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the
temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has
been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring
every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least
twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a
member of such society which fails to register or remains a member
thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to
apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace
Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor
affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they are not members of
the Communist Party and that they are not members of any
organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by
force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by this
Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of
attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which disqualified
those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of
the United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from
exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of
further compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of
a finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or which
made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an
officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills
of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature
may apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make
such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature
passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a
membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person
who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to
register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its
operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the
statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux
Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like
masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States
Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and
activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the
cases just cited and reached the conclusion that the
classification was justified by a difference between the two
classes of associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part
of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose
and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to
personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence
of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In
pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku
Klux Klan, the principal association in the included class:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization
functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods
and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into
the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class:
"These organizations and their purposes are well known,
many of them having been in existence for many years.
Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no
complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or
interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts
said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the
association or organization of which the relator is
concededly a member exercises activities tending to the
prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our
citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;"
and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a
recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders
mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already
received legislative scrutiny and have been granted
special privileges so that the legislature may well consider
them beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third
court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret
societies," and observing that "the danger of certain
organizations has been judicially demonstrated," —
meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor
unions and college fraternities have existed for many
years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have
on the whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such
information as was readily available including the
published report of a hearing, before a committee of the
House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to
the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan.
If so it was advised — putting aside controverted evidence
— that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an
earlier time with additional features borrowed from the
Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods;
that its memberships was limited to native-born, gentile,
protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed
creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full
adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in
another exacted of its member an oath to shield and
preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared
any person actively opposing its principles to be "a
dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and
an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that
it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and
Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race
prejudices; that it was striving for political power and
assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of
local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was
taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of
its members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object
of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party
of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found
that the objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine
Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a
communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and
Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30we noted the
growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the
organization of Communist fronts among youth organizations such
as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New
People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said:
"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable
group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the
government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion
against the Government of the Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it
may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also
necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features.
This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ...
Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But
if it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are
persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which
provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any
public office or employment in the service of the City of
Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either
elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to
the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or
taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective,
become a member of or affiliated with any group, society,
association, organization or party which advises,
advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5)
years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force
or violence of the Government of the United States of
America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the
Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the
charter provision insofar as it purported to apply
restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date.
We assume that under the Federal Constitution the
Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from
the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its
adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent
overthrow of the Government or who are or become
affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions
operating thus prospectively were a reasonable regulation
to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the
United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under
which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett
case did not declare general and prospectively operative
standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further
payment of compensationto named individuals or
employees. Under these circumstances, viewed against
the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby
assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute
claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect
to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of
attainderby the fact that the conduct which it regulates is
describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few
organizationswill come within the statutory terms.
Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard
as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is
found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So
long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons
who engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few,
can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their
own present activities, there can be no complaintof an
attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act.
Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to
acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who
"knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its
successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive
associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity
of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their
membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The
penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that
the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a
legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of
association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy
a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified
by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before
enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful
investigations and then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines
althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence
but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for
the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian
regime subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the
CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in
direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation
to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of
making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial
magistracy, the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction
between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund
elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore
than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of
legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement
problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating
beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require
supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of
adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is
intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the limits
on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of
course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan
ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and
oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those
facts which are relevant to the legislative judgment — will
not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative
enactment to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and
found according to the ordinarystandards prevailing for
judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a
court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements
this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action
organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the
worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court
said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of
theselegislative findings and reject them....They are the
productof extensive investigation by Committes of
Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot
dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if
we accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable
appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist
organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the
United States, but to the United States as asovereign,
independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of
Congress to regulate Communist organizations of
thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings
articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate
value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a
society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no
subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly
said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the
argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against
dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing
structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly
change. We rejectany principle of governmental
helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which
principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to
anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the
power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow
the government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly
described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that
"even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental
personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The
requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominal membership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for
penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has
been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and
encouragement to the organization; and when
membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that
the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the
one accepting or retaining membershipwith such
knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise
in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section
2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be
achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is
merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties
prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which
requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be
unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed,
the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is
"overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and
other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto
be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and
other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful
overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under
thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant
clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should
beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently
intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been
intended as referring to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective
franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused exhorted his audience to
useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the
sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the
appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow
the Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest
in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the
prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the
preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many
respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former
provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize
anysociety, group, or assembly of persons who teach,
advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any
such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or
assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned
notmore than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible
for emplymentby the United States or any department or
agencythereof, for the five years next following his
conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs.
United States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we
arehere concerned is not constitutionally protected
speech, and itwas further established that a combination
to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what
purports to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is
protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no
reason why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful
form of complicity in a group engagingin this same
forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of
protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof
accommodating the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty
are as complex and intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative
findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet
consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside
merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains
freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at
compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual
freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case
isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom
the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the
last proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with
anyother person to overthrow the Government of the
Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its
political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion
or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such
Government or political subdivisionunder the control and
domination of any lien power, shallbe punished by prision
correccionalto prision mayor with allthe accessory
penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well
"any conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local
governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha
totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to
place the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien
democratic power likethe United States or England or Malaysia or even an
anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party
of the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein,
and forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act
shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general
which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian
regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by
Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and
need not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in
broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the
proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction
isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin
order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-
Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we
cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its
enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to
be observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition
to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the
following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the
Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of
the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the
presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a
totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully
and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP
continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to
be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by
illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a
member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive
association: weleave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set
aside, and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial
on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the
decision reached upholding thevalidity of the Anti-Subversion Act. 1 It is to
be admittedthat the learned and scholarly opinbion of Justice Castro
hasthe impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe
constitutional issues raised. What is more, the stressin the
concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure in the
trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect for their
constitutional rights is to be commended.Nonetheless, my own
reading of the decisionscited, interpreting the bill of attainder
clause 2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-
latitudinarian constructionof the guarantees of freedom of belief and
expression 3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible
inroadsto which they may be exposed, compels a
differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.
1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing
concern of state safety and security shouldbe ignored. The political branches
of the governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment
fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation
against its sworn enemies. In a simplerera, where the overthrow of the
government wasusually through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless
sophisticated than those now in existence, there wasno constitutional issue
of the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met with force. It
was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as well as more subtlemethods
of inducing disloyalty and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced
complexities in coping withsuch problems. There must be then, and I am the
firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the governmentalresponde to
situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the Anti-
Subversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not
presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only perspectiveor that is the
most realistic, I feel that there was an insufficientappreciation of the
compulsion of the constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder and
abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought that evenhad my
view prevailed, all that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in
comformity to my way of thinkingto what is ordained by the fundamental law,
wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained thenthat a
setback would be occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of
subversive activities, in whateverform manifested.
2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder
clause is the meaning attachedto it by the Constitutional Convention of 1934
and by the people who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate,
later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the
Court: "A billof attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall. 277, 18 L ed 356). In
England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was
tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in
court, without hearing the witnesses againsthim and without regard to the
rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or corrupted, rendering him devoid
of allheritable quality — of acquiring and disposing property bydescent. (Ex
parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less
than death, the act wasknown as a 'bill of pains and penalties.' Bills of
attainder, like ex post facto laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression.
Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of attainder
presented to Parliament becauseof his reform activities." 5Two American
SupremeCourt decision were thus in the minds of the framers.They
are Cummings v. Missouri 6 and Ex parteGarland. 7 They speak
unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply
either to named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflicton them punishment amounting to a
deprivation ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8
Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest
for refusing to take the loyalty oath requiredby the state Constitution
of Missouri of 1865. Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors,
ministers, and otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever,
"by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the success of the
nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil
War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of perjury.If they engaged
in their professions without theoath, they were criminally liable. The
United States Supreme Court condemned the provision as a bill of
attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting punishment
withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any right, civil orpolitical,
previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why such a
conclusion was unavoidable was explained inthe opinion of Justice
Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa legislative act, which inflicts
punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than
death, the actis termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the
meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and
penalties. In these cases the legislative body, inaddition to its
legitimate functions, exercises the powersand office of judge; it
assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it
pronounces upon theguilt of the party, without any of the forms or
safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs
produced,whether conformable to the rules of evidence orotherwise;
and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordancewith its own
notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d
article of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we have referred, had
in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be
heldguilty, of having been in armed hostility to the UnitedStates, or of
having entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the
military service of the UnitedStates, and, therefore, should be
deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to
teach inany institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe
clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within themeaning of the
Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his
name, had declared that all priestsand clergymen within the state of
Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty of them,
and hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would
beequally open to objection. And further, it these clauseshad
declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty,
and be thus deprived, provided they didnot, by a day designated, do
certain specified acts, theywould be no less within the inhibition of
the Federal Constitution.In all these cases there would be the
legislativeenactment creating the deprivation, without any of
theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe citizen
in the administration of justice by the establishedtribunales." 10
On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex
parte Garland 11 was also decided. Thatwas a motion for leave to
practrice as an attorney beforethe American Supreme Court.
Petitioner Garland wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of
1860. Underthe previous rules of such Court, all that was
necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the
statecourts to which he belonged. In March 1865, the rule
waschanged by the addition of a clause requiring that an oathbe
taken under the Congressional acts of 1862 and 1865to the effect
that such candidate for admission to the barhad never voluntarily
borne arms against the UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in
conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a
presidentialpardon extended on July 15, 1865. With such actof
clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue inpractice
contending that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a
bill of attainder and that at any rate,he was pardoned. The same
ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus:
"In the exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a
punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not
punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the
actsit adds a new punishment to that before prescribed, andit is thus
brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the
passage of an ex post facto law. Inthe case of Cummings v.
Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to consider at length
the meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post factolaw in the
clauseof the Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and it
is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like prohibition is
contained in the Constitution againstenactments of this kind by
Congress; and the argumentpresented in that case against certain
clauses of the Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to the act
ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12
There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United
States v. Lovett, 13 decided in 1946.There it was shown that in 1943
the respondents, Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for
several yearsworking for the government. The government
agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully satisfiedwith
the quality of their work and wished to keep thememployed on their
jobs. Over their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of the
Urgent Deficiency AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an
amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943,
no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent out of any
moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for services as jurorsor
members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November
15, 1943, again appointed to jobs bythe President with the advide
and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional
enactment, and thefailure of the President to reappoint the
respondents, theagencies, kept all the respondents at work on their
jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their
compensationwas discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought
this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto which they felt
entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus
confined to whether theaction in the light of proper construction of
the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether
Section304 is a bill of attainder insofar as the respondents
wereconcerned.
After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court
in an opinion by Justice Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section
304 fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional actionswhich the
Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall
be passed.' InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If
the punishment be lessthan death, the act is termed a bill of pains and
penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainderinclude bills
of pains and penalties.' ... On the sameday the Cummings case was
decided, the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same
grounds anAct of Congress which required attorneys practicing beforethis
Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases has ever been overruled.
They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their
form,that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to inflictpunishment on
them without a judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution.
Adherenceto this principle requires invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere
to it." 14
United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a
conviction under the Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, making it a crimefor a member of the Communist Party
to serve as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions,
anemployee of a labor union. Respondent Brown, a longshoremanon
the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist, for
more than a quarter of a centurywas elected to the Executive Board
of Local 10 of theInternational Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959,
1960, and 1961.On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-
countindictment returned in a district court of California withservicing
as a member of an executive board of a labororganization while a
member of the Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above
provision. The question ofits validity under the bill of attainder clause
was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While convicted in thelower
court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was
sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted in the opinion by
Chief Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect
of ante-Constitutionbills of attainder indicates that the properscope of
the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance tocontemporary
problems, must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the
reasons for its inclusion in theConstitution, and the evils it was
desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the
architectsof our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill
ofAttainder Clause was inteded not as a narrow, technical(and
therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but ratheras an
implementation of the separation of powers, ageneral safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicialfunction, or more simply —
trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland, and
Lovett,Chief Justice Warren continued: "Under the line of casesjust
outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reportingand
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under theCommerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate
commerce persons whomay use such positions to bring about
political strikes. In Sec. 504, however, Congress has exceeded the
authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth
a generally applicable rule decreeing that any personwho commits
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics whhich, in Congress'view, make them likely to initiate
political strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts and
juries thejob of deciding what persons have committed the
specifiedacts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead,it
designates in no uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec
characteristics and therefore cannothold union office without
incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party." 17
Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, 18
where the
provision of the Subversive ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the
Communist Party ofthe United States to register was sustained, the
opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-
manmajority, did indicate adherence to the Cummingsprinciple. Had
the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly
would have been different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It
attaches notto specified organizations but to described activities
inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of
an individual for legislatively prescribed punishmentconstitutes an
attainder whether the individualis called by name or described in
terms of conduct which,because it is past conduct, operates only as
a designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities
ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the registrationonly of
organizations which, after the date of the Act,are found to be under
the direction, domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to
operate primarily toadvance certain objectives. This finding must be
madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich
opens the record for the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the
administrative findings as tofact are supported by the preponderance
of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to
whichthe statute attaches legal consequences, not merely a pointof
reference for the ascertainment of particularly personsineluctably
designated by the legislature." 19
The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering
what appeared to be in the mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional
Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the Anti-SubversionAct falls
within the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three
subsequent cases upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were
likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation accorded to
themby my brethren is, of course, different but I am unable togo along with
them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett.
This is not to lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive such
aholding of its explicit character as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of
the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill of attainder it would be
totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without
more, would suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But the fact is
that their guilt still has to bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to
proveat the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive character
and with specific intentto further its objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
Governmentby force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the
control and domination of a foreign power. 20While not implausible, I find
difficulty in yielding acceptance.In Cummings, there was a criminal
prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again
in Brown, there was an indictment of the laborleader who, judging by his
membership in the CommunistParty, did transgress the statutory provision
subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If the constructionI
would place on theoff-repeated pronouncementof the American Supreme
Court is correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be
instituted wouldnot save the statute. It does seem clear to me that fromthe
very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to outlaw the Communist Party of the
Philippines and similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions,
the taintof invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the
judgment reached as the statute not suffering fromany fatal infirmity in view
of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.
3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-
Subversion Act to the intellectual libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in
terms of the free speechand free assocition guarantees. 21 It is to be
admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No.
1700,the threat that Communism, the Russian brand then, didpose
was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe then
President. Its shadow fell squarely across thelives of all. Subversion
then could neither be denied notdisparaged. There was, in the expert
opinion of those conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out
national existenceof no mean character. Nonetheless, the remedies
toward off such menace must not be repugnant to our
Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother way.
The apprehension justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard
fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to be, but not at the
expense of constitutional ideals.
One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to
dissent. One can differ, evenobject; one can express dissatisfaction with
things as theyare. There are timew when one not only can but must.Such
dissent can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging
remarks. They may give offense tothose in authority, to those who wield
powe and influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional
protection.Insofar as the content of such dissent is concerned, thelimits are
hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to such as are
devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things. Such
dissentmay, for those not so adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a
subversive tinge. Even those who oppose a democraticform of government
cannot be silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning where
scholars competentin their line may, as a result of their studies, assert thata
future is bleak for the system of government now favoredby Western
democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby some as to the lawfulness
of their exercisingthis right to dissent to the point of advocary of such
adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs
the risk of a penal sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this ringing
declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any among us who would wish
todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand
undisturbed as monuments of the safety withwhich error of opinion may be
tolerated where reason isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by
the philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right to
theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be absolute — for
even the right to non-heretical speech cannot beabsolute — it still
seems wise to tolerate the expression evenof Communist, fascist
and other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of
heresies, and deprive ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly
sounder ideasthan our own." 23
The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement
to commit the crime of seditionor rebellion. The state has been reached, to
follow theformulation of Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus is
loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the Constitution.
It does not bar the expressionof views affecting the very life of the state,
even ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not
require as a matter of fact, that unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully
heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.
Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple
"that even though the governmental purposesbe legitimate and substantial,
they cannot be pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental
personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision
of regulation is the touchstone in an areaso closely related to our most
precious freedoms." 24 This is so for "a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadlyand
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 25 It isindispensable
then that "an over breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be
avoided. If such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the
constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for me is the conclusion
to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice
Black in the Communist Party casediscussed above. What is to be kept in
view is that a legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment ofthe
admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this noted
jurist offensive to the FirstAmendment of the American Constitution
safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe First
Amendment it is that this Amendment was designedto guarantee the freest
interchange of ideas aboutall public matters and that, of course, means the
interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be viewed inother countries
and whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped
that these ideas willbring about. Now, when this country is trying to
spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world — ideals that are
revolutionary in many countries — seems to be aparticularly inappropriate
time to stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments
that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to
justify an outlawry of the ideas of democracyin other countries." 26 Further
he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the
internal securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot be made
todepend upon the use of force by Government to make allthe
beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any
single subject. Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only
to deprive our people of the boldspirit of adventure and progress
which has brought thisNation to its present greatness. The creation
of publicopinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and
partieshas been and is a necessary part of our democraticsociety.
Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican
Corresponding Societies, played a large part increating sentiment in
this country that led the people ofthe Colonies to want a nation of
their own. The Father ofthe Constitution — James Madison — said,
in speakingof the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson
Party,that had that law been in effect during the period beforethe
Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be
'miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke.'In my judgment,
this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending
upon the affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with
fear and dreadof the power of Government. The Communist Party
hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits
numbers had been dwindling even before the Governmentbegan its
campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was because a
vast majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's policies
and overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year after year. That is
the trueAmerican way of securing this Nation against
dangerousideas. Of course that is not the way to protect the
Nationagainst actions of violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a
distinction in our Constitution which we would bewise to follow. They
gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in
violation of valid lawsbut withheld any power to punish people for
nothing morethan advocacy of their views." 27
With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to
my way of thinking, I cannot sharethe conclusion reached by my breathren
as to the Anti-Subversion Act successfully meeting the test of validity onfree
speech and freedom of association grounds.
4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises
from an appraisal of the challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an
interpretationthat it does represent a defeatist attitude on thepart of those of
us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic state. That
certainly could not havebeen the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such
an assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme
measure susceptible as it is to what apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on
constitutional grounds?Is this not to ignore what previously was accepted as
anobvious truth, namely that the light of liberalism sendsits shafts in many
directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if
difficult forme to accept the view then that a resort to outlawry
isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to whatis an admitted
evil. There could have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the
communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack of fealty to
reason,its inculcation of disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized
dictation that brooks no opposition. It is thus,in a realistic sense, a
manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better,
of course,is the propaganda of the deed. What the communists promise,this
government can fulfill. It is up to it then to takeremedial measures to alleviate
the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in a condition of destitution
andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should
take earnest steps in that direction.What is important for those at the bottom
of the economicpyramid is that they are not denied the opportunity for
abetter life. If they, or at least their children, cannot evenlook forward to that,
then a constitutional regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion.
Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of
thinning,if not completely eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of
ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would be more in accordance
with the basic propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a
doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of
a way of life so totally opposed to the deeply felt traditions of our people.
This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed,
with an expression of regret that it could not have been more impressively
set forth in language worthy of the subject.
It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to
yield concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Castro for the Court
sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
It is with regard that I find myself unable to join therest of my brethren in the
decision reached upholding thevalidity of the Anti-Subversion Act. 1 It is to
be admittedthat the learned and scholarly opinbion of Justice Castro
hasthe impress of conscientious and painstaking scrutiny ofthe
constitutional issues raised. What is more, the stressin the
concluding portion thereof on basic guidelines thatwill assure in the
trial of those prosecuted under suchAct respect for their
constitutional rights is to be commended.Nonetheless, my own
reading of the decisionscited, interpreting the bill of attainder
clause 2 coupled withthe fears, perhaps induced by a too-
latitudinarian constructionof the guarantees of freedom of belief and
expression 3 as well as freedom of association 4 as to impermissible
inroadsto which they may be exposed, compels a
differentconclusion. Hence this dissent.
1. There is to be sure no thought on my part that theequally pressing
concern of state safety and security shouldbe ignored. The political branches
of the governmentwould lay themselves oepn to a justifiable indictment
fornegligence had they been remiss in their obligation tosafeguard the nation
against its sworn enemies. In a simplerera, where the overthrow of the
government wasusually through the rising up in arms, with weapons farless
sophisticated than those now in existence, there wasno constitutional issue
of the magnitude that now confrontsus. Force has to be met with force. It
was as clearcutas that. Advances in science as well as more subtlemethods
of inducing disloyalty and weakening the senseof allegiance have introduced
complexities in coping withsuch problems. There must be then, and I am the
firstto recognize it, a greater understanding for the governmentalresponde to
situations of that character. It is inthat light that the validity of the Anti-
Subversion Act isto be appraised. From ny standpoint, and I am not
presumptuousenough to claim that it is the only perspectiveor that is the
most realistic, I feel that there was an insufficientappreciation of the
compulsion of the constitutionalcommands against bills of attainder and
abridgmentof free speech. I am comforted by the thought that evenhad my
view prevailed, all that it would mean is that anew legislation, more in
comformity to my way of thinkingto what is ordained by the fundamental law,
wouldhave to be enacted. No valid fear need be entertained thenthat a
setback would be occasioned to legitilate state effortsto stem the tide of
subversive activities, in whateverform manifested.
2. The starting point in any inquiry as to the significanceof the bill of attainder
clause is the meaning attachedto it by the Constitutional Convention of 1934
and by the people who adopted it. As was explained by the then Delegate,
later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on November19, 1934 as
Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of the
Court: "A billof attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
judicial trial. (Cummings v. United States, 4Wall. 277, 18 L ed 356). In
England, the Bill of Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was
tried, convictedand sentenced to death without a jury, without ahearing in
court, without hearing the witnesses againsthim and without regard to the
rules of evidence. His bloodwas attainted or corrupted, rendering him devoid
of allheritable quality — of acquiring and disposing property bydescent. (Ex
parteGarland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L ed. 366) If the penalty imposed was less
than death, the act wasknown as a 'bill of pains and penalties.' Bills of
attainder, like ex post facto laws, were favorite methods of Stuartoppression.
Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson was includedin a bill of attainder
presented to Parliament becauseof his reform activities." 5Two American
SupremeCourt decision were thus in the minds of the framers.They
are Cummings v. Missouri 6 and Ex parteGarland. 7 They speak
unequivocally. Legislative acts, no matter whattheir form, that apply
either to named individuals or easilyascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflicton them punishment amounting to a
deprivation ofany right, civil or political, without judicial trial are billsof
attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 8
Cummings v. Missouri 9 was a criminal prosecution ofa Catholic priest
for refusing to take the loyalty oath requiredby the state Constitution
of Missouri of 1865. Undersuch a provision, lawyers, doctors,
ministers, and otherprofessionals must disavow that they had ever,
"by act orword," manifested a "desire" for the success of the
nation'senemies or a sympathy" with the rebels of the AmericanCivil
War. If they swore falsely, they were guilty of perjury.If they engaged
in their professions without theoath, they were criminally liable. The
United States Supreme Court condemned the provision as a bill of
attainder,identified as any legislative act inflicting punishment
withoutjudicial trial. The deprivation of any right, civil orpolitical,
previously enjoyed, amounted to a punishment.Why such a
conclusion was unavoidable was explained inthe opinion of Justice
Field thus: "A bill of attainder isa legislative act, which inflicts
punishment without a judicialtrial. If the punishment be less than
death, the actis termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the
meaningof the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills ofpains and
penalties. In these cases the legislative body, inaddition to its
legitimate functions, exercises the powersand office of judge; it
assumes, in the language of thetextbooks, judicial magistracy; it
pronounces upon theguilt of the party, without any of the forms or
safeguardsof trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs
produced,whether conformable to the rules of evidence orotherwise;
and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordancewith its own
notions of the enormity of the offense. ... If the clauses of the 2d
article of the Constitutionof Missouri, to which we have referred, had
in termsdeclared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be
heldguilty, of having been in armed hostility to the UnitedStates, or of
having entered that state to avoid beingenrolled or drafted into the
military service of the UnitedStates, and, therefore, should be
deprived of the right topreach as a priest of the Catholic church, or to
teach inany institution of learning, there could be no question thatthe
clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within themeaning of the
Federal Constitution. If these clauses, insteadof mentioning his
name, had declared that all priestsand clergymen within the state of
Missouri were guiltyof these acts, or should be held guilty of them,
and hencebe subjected to the like deprivation, the clause would
beequally open to objection. And further, it these clauseshad
declared that all such priests and clergymen shouldbe so held guilty,
and be thus deprived, provided they didnot, by a day designated, do
certain specified acts, theywould be no less within the inhibition of
the Federal Constitution.In all these cases there would be the
legislativeenactment creating the deprivation, without any of
theordinary forms and guards provided for the security ofthe citizen
in the administration of justice by the establishedtribunales." 10
On the very same day that the ruling in Cummings washanded down, Ex
parte Garland 11 was also decided. Thatwas a motion for leave to
practrice as an attorney beforethe American Supreme Court.
Petitioner Garland wasadmitted to such bar at the December term of
1860. Underthe previous rules of such Court, all that was
necessarywas that the applicant have three years practice in the
statecourts to which he belonged. In March 1865, the rule
waschanged by the addition of a clause requiring that an oathbe
taken under the Congressional acts of 1862 and 1865to the effect
that such candidate for admission to the barhad never voluntarily
borne arms against the UnitedStates. Petitioner Garland could not in
conscience subscribeto such an oath, but he was able to show a
presidentialpardon extended on July 15, 1865. With such actof
clemency, he moved that he be allowed to continue inpractice
contending that the test oath requirement wasunconstitutional as a
bill of attainder and that at any rate,he was pardoned. The same
ruling was announced by theCourt again through Justice Field. Thus:
"In the exclusionwhich the statute adjudges, it imposes a
punishmentfor some of the acts specified which were not
punishableat the time they were committedl; and for other of the
actsit adds a new punishment to that before prescribed, andit is thus
brought within the further inhibition of the Consitutionagainst the
passage of an ex post facto law. Inthe case of Cummings v.
Missouri, just decided, ... wehave had occasion to consider at length
the meaning of abill of attainder and of an ex post factolaw in the
clauseof the Constitution forbidding their passage by the states,and it
is unnecessary to repeat here what we there said.A like prohibition is
contained in the Constitution againstenactments of this kind by
Congress; and the argumentpresented in that case against certain
clauses of the Constitutionof Missouri is equally applicable to the act
ofCongress under consideration in this case." 12
There was a reiteration of the Cummings and Garlanddoctrine in United
States v. Lovett, 13 decided in 1946.There it was shown that in 1943
the respondents, Lovett,Watson, and Dodd, were and had been for
several yearsworking for the government. The government
agencies,which had lawfully employed them, were fully satisfiedwith
the quality of their work and wished to keep thememployed on their
jobs. Over their protest, Congress providedin Section 304 of the
Urgent Deficiency AppropriationAct of 1943, by way of an
amendment attached to theHouse Bill, that after November 15, 1943,
no salary orcompensation should be paid respondent out of any
moneythen or thereafter appropriated except for services as jurorsor
members of the armed forces, unless they wereprior to November
15, 1943, again appointed to jobs bythe President with the advide
and consent of the Senate.Notwithstanding such Congressional
enactment, and thefailure of the President to reappoint the
respondents, theagencies, kept all the respondents at work on their
jobs forvarying periods after November 15, 1943, but their
compensationwas discontinued after that date. Respondentsbrought
this action in the Court of Claims for the salariesto which they felt
entitled. The Ameican Supreme Courtstated that its inquiry was thus
confined to whether theaction in the light of proper construction of
the Act presenteda justificiable controversy, and, if so, whether
Section304 is a bill of attainder insofar as the respondents
wereconcerned.
After holding that there was a juditiciable, view theAmerican Supreme Court
in an opinion by Justice Blackcategorically affirmed: "We hold that Section
304 fallsprecisely within the category of Congressional actionswhich the
Constitution barred by providing that 'No Billof Attainder or ex post Law shall
be passed.' InCummings v. State of Missouri, ... this Court said, 'Abill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishmentwithout a judicial trial. If
the punishment be lessthan death, the act is termed a bill of pains and
penalties.Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainderinclude bills
of pains and penalties.' ... On the sameday the Cummings case was
decided, the Court, in Exparte Garland, also held invalid on the same
grounds anAct of Congress which required attorneys practicing beforethis
Court to take a similar oath. Neither of thesecases has ever been overruled.
They stand for the propositionthat legislative acts, no matter what their
form,that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainablemembers of a group in such a way as to inflictpunishment on
them without a judicial trial are billsof attainder prohibited by the Constitution.
Adherenceto this principle requires invalidation of Section 304. Wedo adhere
to it." 14
United States v. Brown 15 a 1965 decision was the firstcase to review a
conviction under the Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, making it a crimefor a member of the Communist Party
to serve as anofficer ir, except in clerical or custodial positions,
anemployee of a labor union. Respondent Brown, a longshoremanon
the San Francisco docks, and an open andavowed Communist, for
more than a quarter of a centurywas elected to the Executive Board
of Local 10 of theInternational Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Unionfor consecutive one-year terms in 1959,
1960, and 1961.On May 24, 1961, respondent was charged in a one-
countindictment returned in a district court of California withservicing
as a member of an executive board of a labororganization while a
member of the Communist Party, inwillful violation of the above
provision. The question ofits validity under the bill of attainder clause
was thusproperly raised for adjudication. While convicted in thelower
court, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuitreversed. It was
sustained by the American SupremeCourt. As noted in the opinion by
Chief Justice Warren,"the wide variation in form, purpose and effect
of ante-Constitutionbills of attainder indicates that the properscope of
the Bill of Attainder Clause, and its relevance tocontemporary
problems, must ultimately be sought by attemptingto discern the
reasons for its inclusion in theConstitution, and the evils it was
desinged to eliminate.The best available evidence, the writings of the
architectsof our constitutional system, indicates that the Bill
ofAttainder Clause was inteded not as a narrow, technical(and
therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but ratheras an
implementation of the separation of powers, ageneral safeguard
against legislative exercise of the judicialfunction, or more simply —
trial by legislature." 16 Then after referring to Cummings, Garland, and
Lovett,Chief Justice Warren continued: "Under the line of casesjust
outlined, Sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reportingand
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under theCommerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keepfrom positions affecting interstate
commerce persons whomay use such positions to bring about
political strikes. In Sec. 504, however, Congress has exceeded the
authoritygranted it by the Constitution. The statute does not setforth
a generally applicable rule decreeing that any personwho commits
certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and
characteristics whhich, in Congress'view, make them likely to initiate
political strikes) shallnot hold union office, and leave to courts and
juries thejob of deciding what persons have committed the
specifiedacts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead,it
designates in no uncertain terms the personswho possess the fearec
characteristics and therefore cannothold union office without
incurring criminal liability — members of the Communist Party." 17
Even Communist Party v. Subversive Activities ControlBoard, where the
18
provision of the Subversive ActivitiesControl Act of 1950 requiring the
Communist Party ofthe United States to register was sustained, the
opinionof Justice Frankfurter for the Court, speaking for a five-
manmajority, did indicate adherence to the Cummingsprinciple. Had
the American Communist Party been outlawed,the outcome certainly
would have been different.Thus: "The Act is not a bill of attainder. It
attaches notto specified organizations but to described activities
inwhich an organization may or may not engage. The singlingout of
an individual for legislatively prescribed punishmentconstitutes an
attainder whether the individualis called by name or described in
terms of conduct which,because it is past conduct, operates only as
a designationof particular persons. ... The Subversive Activities
ControlAct is not of that king. It requires the registrationonly of
organizations which, after the date of the Act,are found to be under
the direction, domination, or controlof certain foreign powers and to
operate primarily toadvance certain objectives. This finding must be
madeafter full administrative hearing, subject to judicial reviewwhich
opens the record for the reviewing court'sdetermination whether the
administrative findings as tofact are supported by the preponderance
of the evidence.Present activity constitutes an operative element to
whichthe statute attaches legal consequences, not merely a pointof
reference for the ascertainment of particularly personsineluctably
designated by the legislature." 19
The teaching of the above cases, which I find highlypersuasive considering
what appeared to be in the mindsof the framers of the 1934 Constitutional
Conventionyields for me the conclusion that the Anti-SubversionAct falls
within the ban of the bill of attainder clause. Itshould be noted that three
subsequent cases upholding theCummings and Garland doctrine were
likewise cited in theopinion of the Court. The interpretation accorded to
themby my brethren is, of course, different but I am unable togo along with
them especially in the light of the categoricallanguage appearing in Lovett.
This is not to lose sightof the qualification that for them could deprive such
aholding of its explicit character as shown by this excerptfrom the opinion of
the Court: "Indeed, were the Anti-SubversionAct a bill of attainder it would be
totally unnecessaryto charge communists in court, as the law alone,without
more, would suffice to secure their conviction andpunishment. But the fact is
that their guilt still has to bejudicially estblished. The Government has yet to
proveat the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,willfully and by
overt acts, and that they joined the Partyknowing its subversive character
and with specific intentto further its objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
Governmentby force, deceit, and other illegal means and placeit under the
control and domination of a foreign power. 20While not implausible, I find
difficulty in yielding acceptance.In Cummings, there was a criminal
prosecution ofthe Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath.Again
in Brown, there was an indictment of the laborleader who, judging by his
membership in the CommunistParty, did transgress the statutory provision
subsequentlyfound offensive to the bill attainder clause. If the constructionI
would place on theoff-repeated pronouncementof the American Supreme
Court is correct, then the merefact that a criminal case would have to be
instituted wouldnot save the statute. It does seem clear to me that fromthe
very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to outlaw the Communist Party of the
Philippines and similar associations,"not to mention other specific provisions,
the taintof invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concurin the
judgment reached as the statute not suffering fromany fatal infirmity in view
of the Constitutional prohibitionagainst bills of attainder.
3. This brings me to the question of the alleged repugnancyof the Anti-
Subversion Act to the intellectual libertysafeguarded by the Constitution in
terms of the free speechand free assocition guarantees. 21 It is to be
admitted thatat the time of the enactment of Republic Act No.
1700,the threat that Communism, the Russian brand then, didpose
was a painful reality for Congressional leaders andthe then
President. Its shadow fell squarely across thelives of all. Subversion
then could neither be denied notdisparaged. There was, in the expert
opinion of those conversantwith such mattes, a danger to out
national existenceof no mean character. Nonetheless, the remedies
toward off such menace must not be repugnant to our
Constitution.We are legally precluded from acting in anyother way.
The apprehension justly felt is no warrant forthrowing to the discard
fundamental guarantees. Vigilantwe had to be, but not at the
expense of constitutional ideals.
One of them, certainly highly-prized of the utmost significance,is the right to
dissent. One can differ, evenobject; one can express dissatisfaction with
things as theyare. There are timew when one not only can but must.Such
dissent can take the form of the most critical andthe most disparaging
remarks. They may give offense tothose in authority, to those who wield
powe and influence.Nevertheless, they are entitled to constitutional
protection.Insofar as the content of such dissent is concerned, thelimits are
hardly discernible. It cannot be confined totrivial matters or to such as are
devoid of too much significance.It can reach the heart of things. Such
dissentmay, for those not so adventurous in the realm of ideas,possess a
subversive tinge. Even those who oppose a democraticform of government
cannot be silenced. This is trueespecially in centers of learning where
scholars competentin their line may, as a result of their studies, assert thata
future is bleak for the system of government now favoredby Western
democracies. There may be doubts entertainedby some as to the lawfulness
of their exercisingthis right to dissent to the point of advocary of such
adrastic change. Any citizen may do so without fear thatthereby he incurs
the risk of a penal sanction. That ismerely to affirm the truth of this ringing
declaration fromJefferson: "If there be any among us who would wish
todissolve this union or to change its republican form, letthem stand
undisturbed as monuments of the safety withwhich error of opinion may be
tolerated where reason isleft free to combat it." 22 As was so well put by
the philosopher,Sidney Hook: "Without holding the right to
theexpression of heresy at any time and place to be absolute — for
even the right to non-heretical speech cannot beabsolute — it still
seems wise to tolerate the expression evenof Communist, fascist
and other heresies, lest in outlawingthem we include other kings of
heresies, and deprive ourselvesof the opportunity to acquite possibly
sounder ideasthan our own." 23
The line is to be drawn, however, where the wordsamount to an incitement
to commit the crime of seditionor rebellion. The state has been reached, to
follow theformulation of Cardozo, where thought merges into action.Thus is
loyalty shown to the freedom of speech or pressordained by the Constitution.
It does not bar the expressionof views affecting the very life of the state,
even ifopposed to its fundamental presuppositions. It allows, ifit does not
require as a matter of fact, that unorthodoxideas be freely ventilated and fully
heard. Dissent is notdisloyalty.
Such an approach is reinforced by the well-settled constitutionalprinciple
"that even though the governmental purposesbe legitimate and substantial,
they cannot be pursuedby means that broadly stifle fundamental
personalliberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.For precision
of regulation is the touchstone in an areaso closely related to our most
precious freedoms." 24 This is so for "a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may
notbe achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadlyand
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." 25 It isindispensable
then that "an over breadth" in the applicabilityof the statute be
avoided. If such be the case, then theline dividing the valid from the
constitutionally infirm hasbeen crossed. That for me is the conclusion
to be drawnfrom the wording of the Anti-Subversion Act.
There is to my mind support for the stand I take inthe dissent of Justice
Black in the Communist Party casediscussed above. What is to be kept in
view is that a legislativemeasure certainly less drastic in its treatment ofthe
admittedly serious Communist problem was found inthe opinion of this noted
jurist offensive to the FirstAmendment of the American Constitution
safeguardingfree speech. Thus: "If there is one thing certain aboutthe First
Amendment it is that this Amendment was designedto guarantee the freest
interchange of ideas aboutall public matters and that, of course, means the
interchangeof all ideas, however such ideas may be viewed inother countries
and whatever change in the existing structureof government it may be hoped
that these ideas willbring about. Now, when this country is trying to
spreadthe high ideals of democracy all over the world — ideals that are
revolutionary in many countries — seems to be aparticularly inappropriate
time to stifle First Amendmentfreedoms in this country. The same arguments
that areused to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here couldbe used to
justify an outlawry of the ideas of democracyin other countries." 26 Further
he stated: "I believe with theFramers of the First Amendment that the
internal securityof a nation like ours does not and cannot be made
todepend upon the use of force by Government to make allthe
beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a commonmold on any
single subject. Such enforced conformity ofthought would tend only
to deprive our people of the boldspirit of adventure and progress
which has brought thisNation to its present greatness. The creation
of publicopinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and
partieshas been and is a necessary part of our democraticsociety.
Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty and theAmerican
Corresponding Societies, played a large part increating sentiment in
this country that led the people ofthe Colonies to want a nation of
their own. The Father ofthe Constitution — James Madison — said,
in speakingof the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jefferson
Party,that had that law been in effect during the period beforethe
Revolution, the United States might well have continuedto be
'miserable colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke.'In my judgment,
this country's internal security can betterbe served by depending
upon the affection of the peoplethan by attempting to instill them with
fear and dreadof the power of Government. The Communist Party
hasnever been more than a small group in this country. Andits
numbers had been dwindling even before the Governmentbegan its
campaign to destroy the Party by force oflaw. This was because a
vast majority of the Americanpeople were against the Party's policies
and overwhelminglyrejected its candidates year after year. That is
the trueAmerican way of securing this Nation against
dangerousideas. Of course that is not the way to protect the
Nationagainst actions of violence and treason. The Foundersdrew a
distinction in our Constitution which we would bewise to follow. They
gave the Government the fullest powerto prosecute overt actions in
violation of valid lawsbut withheld any power to punish people for
nothing morethan advocacy of their views." 27
With the sentiments thus expressed uppermost in mymind and congenial to
my way of thinking, I cannot sharethe conclusion reached by my breathren
as to the Anti-Subversion Act successfully meeting the test of validity onfree
speech and freedom of association grounds.
4. It could be that this approach to the constitutionalquestions involved arises
from an appraisal of the challengedstatute which for me is susceptible of an
interpretationthat it does represent a defeatist attitude on thepart of those of
us, who are devotees at the shrine of aliberal-democratic state. That
certainly could not havebeen the thought of its framers; nonetheless, such
an assumptionis not devoid of plausibility for why resort tothis extreme
measure susceptible as it is to what apparentlyare not unfounded attacks on
constitutional grounds?Is this not to ignore what previously was accepted as
anobvious truth, namely that the light of liberalism sendsits shafts in many
directions? It can illuminate, and itcan win the hearts and minds of men. It if
difficult forme to accept the view then that a resort to outlawry
isindispensable, that suppression is the only answer to whatis an admitted
evil. There could have been a greater exposureof the undesirability of the
communist creed, itscontradictions and arbitrarines, its lack of fealty to
reason,its inculcation of disloyalty, and its subservience tocentralized
dictation that brooks no opposition. It is thus,in a realistic sense, a
manifestation of the fear of freethought and the will to suppress it. For better,
of course,is the propaganda of the deed. What the communists promise,this
government can fulfill. It is up to it then to takeremedial measures to alleviate
the condition of our countrymenwhose lives are in a condition of destitution
andmisery. It may not be able to change matters radically.At least, it should
take earnest steps in that direction.What is important for those at the bottom
of the economicpyramid is that they are not denied the opportunity for
abetter life. If they, or at least their children, cannot evenlook forward to that,
then a constitutional regime is nothingbut a mockery and a tragic illusion.
Such a response,I am optimistic enough to believe, has the merit of
thinning,if not completely eliminating, the embattled ranksand outposts of
ignorance, fanaticism and error. That forme would be more in accordance
with the basic propositionof our polity. This is not therefore to preach a
doctrine of object surrender to the forces apparently bent on the adoption of
a way of life so totally opposed to the deeply felt traditions of our people.
This is, for me at least, an affirmation of the vitality of the democratic creed,
with an expression of regret that it could not have been more impressively
set forth in language worthy of the subject.
It is in the light of the views above expressed that I find myself unable to
yield concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Castro for the Court
sustaining the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act.
Footnotes
1 Rep. Act. No. 1700, 12 Laws & Res. 102 (1957). The
text of the statute is hereunder reproduced in full:
"AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE PHILIPPINES AND SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS
PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP THEREIN, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
"WHEREAS, the Communist Party of the Philippines,
although purportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines not only by force and violence
but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for
the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian
regime subject to alien domination and control;
"WHEREAS, the continued existence and activities of the
Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present and grave danger to the security of the
Philippines; and
"WHEREAS, in the face of the organized, systematic and
persistent subversion, national in scope but international in
direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines
and its activities, there is urgent need for special
legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the
freedom and security of the country: Now, therefore,
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
"Section 1. This Act shall be known as Anti-Subversion
Act.
"Section 2. The Congress hereby declares the Communist
Party of the Philippines to be an organized conspiracy to
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime and place the Government
under the control and domination of an alien power. The
said party and any other organization having the same
purpose and their successors are hereby declared illegal
and outlawed.
Section 3. As used in this Act, the term 'Communist Party
of the Philippines' shall me and and include the
organizations now known as the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its military arm, the Hukbong
Mapagpalayang Bayan, formerly known as
HUKBALAHAPS, and any successors of such
organizations.
"Section 4. After the approval of this Act, whoever
knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with,
becomes or remains a member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive
association as defined in section two hereof shall be
punished by the penalty of arresto mayor and shall be
disqualified permanently from holding any public office,
appointive and elective, and from exercising the right to
vote; in case of a second conviction, the principal penalty
shall be prision correccional, and in all subsequent
convictions the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed;
and any alien convicted under this Act shall be deported
immediately after he shall have served the sentence
imposed upon him: Provided, That if such member is an
officer or a ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines or of any subversive association as defined in
section two hereof, or if such member takes up arms
against the Government he shall be punished by prision
mayor to deal with all the accessory penalties provided
therefor in the Revised Penal Code: And provided, finally,
That one who conspires with any other person to
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines or the government of any of its political
subdivisions by force, violence, deceit, subversion or other
illegal means, for the purpose of placing such Government
or political subdivision under the control and domination of
any alien power, shall be punished by prision
correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory
penalties provided therefor in the same Code.
"Section 5. No prosecution under this Act shall be made
unless the city or provincial fiscal, or any special attorney
or prosecutor duly designated by the Secretary of Justice
as the case may be, finds after due investigation of the
facts, that a prima facie case for violation of this Act exists
against the accused, and thereafter presents an
information in court against the said accused in due form,
and certifies under oath that he has conducted a proper
preliminary investigation thereof, with notice, whenever it
is possible to give the same, to the party concerned, who
shall have the right to be represented by counsel, to
testify, to have compulsory process for obtaining witness
in his favor, and to cross-examine witnesses against
him: Provided, That the preliminary investigation of any
offense defined and penalized herein by prision mayor to
death shall be conducted by the property Court of First
Instance.
"Section 6. Any person who knowingly furnishes false
evidence in any action brought under this Act shall be
punished by prision correccional.
"Section 7. No person shall be convicted of any of the
offenses penalized herein with prision mayor to death
unless on the testimony of at least two witnesses to the
same overt act or on confession of the accused in open
court.
"Section 8. Within thirty days after the approval of this Act,
any person who is a member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines or of any such association or conspiracy,
who desires to renounce such membership may do so in
writing and under oath before a municipal or city mayor, a
provincial governor, or a person authorized by law to
administer oaths. Such renunciation shall exempt such
person or persons from the penal sanction of this Act, but
the same shall in no way exempt him from liability for
criminal acts or for any violation of the existing laws of the
Republic of the Philippines committed before this Act takes
effect.
"Section 9. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a
restriction to freedom of thought, of assembly and of
association for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed
by the Constitution.
"Approved, June 20, 1957."
2 Delegate Jose P. Laurel (of the 1934 Constitutional
Convention) referred to the Anglo-American origin of this
right thus:
"No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.
This provision is found in the American Federal
Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 9) and is applicable to the States
(id. Sec. 10). An ex post facto law is a law which makes an
act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable
when committed. It creates or aggravates the crime or
increases the punishment, or changes the rules of
evidence for the purpose of conviction. The prohibition
against the passage of ex post facto laws is an additional
bulwark of personal security — protecting the citizen from
punishment by legislative act which has a retrospective
operation.
"The phrase ex post facto has a technical meaning and
refers to crimes and criminal proceedings. It is in this
sense that it was used in England. It was in this sense that
the convention of 1787 understood it. (Calder v.
Bull, supra; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 110; Suterlee v.
Mathewson, 2 Peters, 380; Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S.
221.) This interpretation was upheld by our Supreme Court
(U.S. vs. Ang Ken Ko, 6 Phil. 376.).
"A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without judicial trial. (Cummings vs. United
States, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. ed. 356.) In England, the Bill of
Attainder was an act of Parliament by which a man was
tried, convicted and sentenced to death without a jury,
without a hearing in court, without hearing the witnesses
against him and without regard to the rules of evidence.
His blood was attained or corrupted, rendering him devoid
of all heritable quality — of acquiring and disposing
property by descent. (Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.
ed 366.) If the penalty imposed was less than death, the
act was known as a "bill of pains and penalties." Bills of
attainder, like ex post factolaws, were favorite methods of
Stuart oppression. Once, the name of Thomas Jefferson
was included in a bill of attainder presented to Parliament
because of his reform activities.
"Often, such bills were 'stimulated by ambition or personal
resentment, and vindictive malice.' (Calder v. Bull, supra.)
A well known case illustrating the ruthless manner in which
a bill of attainder was resorted to was that of Thomas
Wentworth, chief adviser of Charles I. He was brought to
impeachment charged with attempting to subvert the
liberties of England. He defended himself so ably that his
enemies, fearing his acquittal, withdrew the impeachment
and a bill of attainder was passed instead. Wentworth was
beheaded. Bills of attainder were also passed in the
Colonies (North, The Constitution of the U.S., its Sources
and Applications, p. 85.) The prohibition in the Bill of
Rights, therefore, seeks to present acts of violence and
injustice brought about the passage of such bills." (3 J.
Laurel, Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention 661-
663 [1966]).
3 Cummings vs. United States, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277
(1867); accord, Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333
(1867). This definition was adopted by this Court in People
vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 544 (1947) and in People vs.
Montenegro, 91 Phil. 883,885 (1952).
4 De Veau vs. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); United
States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 615, (1946).
5 Chief Justice Warren referred to the Bill of Attainder
Chause as an implementation of the separation of powers,
"a general safeguard against legislative exercise of judicial
function, or more simply, trial by legislature." United States
vs. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1964).
6 "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe
general rules for the government of society; the application
of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be
the duty of other departments." Fletcher vs. Peck, 6
Cranch (10 U.S.)87, 136 (1810).
7 "The legislative body in enacting bills of attainder
exercises the powers and office of judge, it pronounces
upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or
safeguards of trial...it fixes the degree of punishment in
accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the
offense." Cummings vs. Missouri, supra note 3.
8 Bills of this sort, says Mr. Justice Story, have been most
usually passed in England in times of rebellion or gross
subserviency to the crown, or of violent political
excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable
(as well as free as the enslabe) to forget their duties, and
to trample upon the rights and liberties of others." Comm.
sec. 1344, in re Young Sing Hee, 36 Fed. 347, 440. During
the American revolution legislative punishments had been
continued by state legislatures, when numerous bills of
attainder were enacted against the Torries. 1C.
Antieu, Modern Constitutional Law, 425.
9 C. Antieu, supra note 8 at 423.
10 The Supreme Court of the United States said in
Fleming vs. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1960):
"In determining whether legislation which bases a
disqualification on the happening of a certain past event
imposes a punishment, the Court has sought to discern
the objects on which the enactment in question was
focused. Where the source of legislative concern can be
thought to be the activity or status from which the
individual is barred, the disqualification is not punishment
even though it may bear harshly upon one affected."
11 73 Stat. 536, 29 U.S.C. sec. 504 (1958 ed. Supp. IV).
12 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (5-4 vote).
13 Keyishian vs. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967);Elfbrandt vs. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
14 Cf . Scales vs. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961);
Noto vs. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
15 During the Senate deliberations on the bill, Senator
Cea remarked: "I have inserted the words 'overt acts'
because we are punishing membership in the Communist
Party. I would like that membership to be proved by overt
acts, by positive acts, because it may happen that one's
name may appear in the list of members." Senate Cong.
Rec. May 22, 1957, p. 1900.
16 Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System vs.
Agnew, 329 U.S. 441.
17 New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 278 U.S.
63(1928).
18 Repealed by Rep. Act 4241.
19 Philippine Ass'n of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of
Labor, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 40.
20 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
21 Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1867).
22 Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 333 (1867).
23 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
24 United States vs. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
25 The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested
Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L. J. 330,
351-54(1962).
26 278 U.S. 63 (1928).
27 Id. at 75-77.
28 People vs. Evangelista, 57 Phil. 375 (1932); see
also People vs. Evangelista, 57 Phil., 372 (1932); People
vs. Capadocia, 57 Phil. 364 (1932); People vs.
Evangelista, 57 Phil. 354 (1932); People vs. Feleo, 57
Phil. 451 (1932); People vs. nabong, 57 Phil. 455 (1932).
29 People vs. Lava, L-4974-78, May 16, 1969.
30 L-33864, Dec. 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448.
31 United States vs. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946).
32 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
33 Communist Party vs. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1960).
34 Sec. 8.
35 E. g., Kovacs vs. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Vera vs.
Arca, L-25721, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 351.
36 Freund, Review of Facts in Constitutional Cases, in
Supreme Court and Supreme Law 47-48 (Cahn ed. 1954).
37 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
38 L-33964, Dec. 11, 1971, 41 SCRA 448.
39 Communist Party vs. S.A.C. Board, 367 U.S. 94 (1961).
40 Dennis vs. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
41 Id. at 501.
42 Shelton vs. Tucker, 364 U.s. 479 (1960).
43 Scales vs. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); see
also Noto vs. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
44 Frankfeld vs. United States, 198 F. 2d 879 (4th Cir.
1952).
45 People vs. nabong, 57 Phil. 455, 458 (1932).
46 18 U.S.C. sec. 2385. (emphasis added).
47 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
48 Communist Party vs. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
49 P. A. Freud, The Supreme Court of the United States
75 (1961).
50 Const., art VI, Sec. 21 (1).
51 Government vs. Hongkong & Shaihai Banking Corp.,
66 Phil. 483 (1938).
52 Lindasan vs. Commission on Elections, L-28089, Oct.
25, 1967, 21 SCRA 496.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1 Rep. Act No. 1700 (1957)..
2 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 11: "No ex post
facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted."
3 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 8: "No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,
or the right of the people peacebly to assemble and
petition the Government for redress of grievances."
4 According to Art. III, Sec. 1 par. 4: "The liberty of abode
and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired."
5 Footnote 2, p. 9 of Opinion of the Court.
6 4 Wall. 277 (1867). peacebly to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances."
7 4 Wall. 333 (1867).
22 Jefferson's First Instance Address, March 4, 1801, in
8 Cf. United States v. A Lovett, 328 US 303 )1946). Padover, ed., The Complete Jefferson, 385 (1943).

9 4 Wall. 277 (1867). 23 Hook, Heresy, Yes-Conspiracy, No. 71 (1953).

10 Ibid, 323, 325. 24 Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, 27 SCRA

835,871(1969) citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479
(1960) and NAACP v. Button, 371 US 415 (1963).
11 4 Wall. 333 (1867).
25 NAACP vs. Alabama, 377 US 288 (1964).
12 Ibid, 377-378.
26 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
13 328 US 303. Board, 367 US 1, 148

14 Ibid, 315-316. RELOVA, J.:

15 381 US 437. Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in
more than one hundred (100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
16 Ibid, 442. Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges stemmed from
his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the Commission on
17 Ibid, 449-450. Audit assigned to the Ministry of Education and Culture, together with
some officers/employees of the said Ministry, the Bureau of Treasury
18 367 US 1 (1961). and the Teachers' Camp in Baguio City, in the preparation and
encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for non-existent obligations of the
Teachers' Camp resulting in damage to the government of several
19 Ibid, 86-87.
million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1976.

20 Opinion of the Court, p. 15.

21 According to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 6: "The right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged." Paragraph 8 of this section reads
as follows: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of
Amadeo, Cavite in the local elections held in January 1980. He was
elected.
On May 30, 1980, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting
herein petitioner and some of his co-accused in all but one of the thirty-
two (32) cases filed against them. Whereupon, appeals were taken to
this Court and the cases are now pending review in G. R. Nos. L-54645-
76.
However; on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 was passed
amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019. The said
section, as amended, reads -
"Sec. 13. Suspension of and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
and offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the
meantime administrative proceedings had been filed against him."
Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which
herein petitioner is one of the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to
suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite from their
respective offices or any other public office which they may be occupying
pending trial of their cases.
On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order directing the
suspension of all the accused including herein petitioner "from their
public positions or from any other public office that they may be holding x
x x " (p. 26, Rollo).
Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that "to apply
the provision of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 to the herein accused would
be violative of the constitutional guarantee of protection against
an ex post facto law" (p. 28, Rollo). The motion was denied by
respondent court in a resolution dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
It is the submission of petitioner that respondent court acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in suspending petitioner from office as
Mayor of Amadeo, Cavite, pendente lite because -
1. Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, is a penal
statute in which case the provision of said Act must be strictly construed
in favor of the accused and against the State;
2. A close perusal of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, as well as the
proceedings therein of the Batas Pambansa is absent of the legislative
intent to have said Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 applied retroactively;
3. In the supposition that Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied
retroactively, its application would violate the Constitutional provision
against enactment of ex post facto law; and,
4. Petitioner cannot be suspended to the position of which he was duly
elected by the people of Amadeo, Cavite, based on an act which has
nothing to do with his present position.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that Section 13 of Republic
Act 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the
crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document as among the
crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension
from office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates
the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that
suspension from the employment or public office during the trial or in
order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not
a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In
fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of said
Article 24 are merely preventive measures before final judgment. Not
being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from office, pending
trial of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the
amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the
constitutional provision on expost facto law. Further, the claim of
petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently
occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is
untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud
upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or
as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus,
by the use of the word "office" the same applies to any office which the
officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he was charged.
ACCORDINGLY, instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
clipped coin was used. The coins in question were genuine
copper cents and bore their original designs and inscriptions.
The defendant did not make employee of Black Mountain.
Thereafter, he left the PAL premises. “When Gigantoni was no
longer around, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr.,
inquired from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni’s purpose in securing
copies of PAL records. They then became suspicious of the
accused’ real identity prompting them to conduct verification
from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from
General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS
agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the
service for gross misconduct x x x brought about by the
extortion charges filed against him and his final conviction by
the Sandiganbayan for the said offense. x x x Upon
discovering the foregoing, Atty. Puno immediately alerted the
NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to the PAL office the
following day. “On May 15, 1981,or attempt to make any
alteration in the designs and inscriptions of the said coins. All
that he did was to give them the appearance of silver pieces
for the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent coins. He did
not, however, attempt to imitate the peculiar design of such
coins. The acts committed by the defendant for the purpose of
defrauding third persons by deceiving them as to the real
value of the coins in question constitute the crime of estafa
and not that of counterfeiting money. There were no legal
grounds upon which a charge for this latter offense could be
based.The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and
the defendant acquitted of the charge of counterfeiting money
contained in the complaint, and the Attorney-General is
directed to present another complaint against him for the crime
of estafa. It is ordered that the Mexican and Japanese coins
found in the possession of the defendant be returned to him.
The costs of both instances are declared de oficio. After the
expiration of ten days from the date of final judgment, let this
case be remanded to the Court of First Instance from whence
it came for proper procedure. So ordered.
when Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, he was
brought by Atty. Puno to their conference room while awaiting
for the arrival of the NBI agents who were earlier contacted. In
the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni was
confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real identity. He later
admitted that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was
working for the Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that
he was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their
employees who had travelled. x x x “Upon the arrival of NBI
agents Teodoro Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and Dante Crisologo,
Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person of Gigantoni to
the NBI. They also submitted a complaint-affidavit against
Gigantoni x x x. On that same day, after the investigation,
arrest and booking conducted by the NBI, Gigantoni was
charged before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, thru
its office in Makati, with the crime of Usurpation of
Authority.”The petitioner-accused raised substantially the
same errors on appeal to respondent appellate court, to wit:
1 1.
 The appellate court erred in interpreting that presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed, its
applicable in the case at bar;
2 2.
 The appellate court erred in its interpretation of the
difference between suspension and dismissal.
The gist of petitioner’s contention is that he could not be guilty
of the crime charged because at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, he was still a CIS agent who was
merely suspended and was not yet informed of his termination
from the service. Furthermore, he avers that the receipt by him
of the notice of dismissal, if there was any, could not be
established on mere presumption of law that official duty has
been regularly performed.Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under
which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a)
who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be an officer,
agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b)
who, under pretense of official position, performs any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The
former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under
which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act
constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.
The question before us is—did petitioner knowingly and falsely
represent himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine
Constabulary? Petitioner admits that he received a notice of
his suspension from the CIS effective June 20, 1980. This
admission is supported by the record (Annex “D”) which shows
the letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June
23, 1980, regarding said action. Said official letter was also
sent to the Commissioner of the Merit Systems Board, Civil
Service Commission, the Minister of National Defense and the
Commanding General of the CIS. However, as to petitioner’s
alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies having
been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or
proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal
was actually conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in
convicting him, relied on the disputable presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed, that is, that it is
presumed that he was duly notified of his dismissal.
The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly
notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge
that he “knowingly and falsely” represented himself to be a CIS
agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only
be overturned by competent and credible proof and never by
mere disputable presumptions, as what the lower and
appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was
duly notified of his dismissal by applying the disputable
presumption “that official duty has been regularly performed.”
It was not for the accused to prove a negative fact, namely,
that he did not receive the order of dismissal. In criminal
cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on
the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to establish by positive evidence the allegation
that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS agent,
by presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS
agent, having been duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential
to present proof that he actually knew at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense that he was already
dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption
that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient.
The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it
makes no difference whether the accused was suspended or
dismissed from the service, “for both imply the absence of
power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform
acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was
deprived of.” (Italics supplied). The observation of the Solicitor
General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation
of official function (second part of Article 177), but not if he is
charged merely with usurpation of authority (first part of Article
177). The information charges the accused with the crime of
usurpation of authority for “knowingly and falsely representing
himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine Government.”Petitioner
is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not
been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused
was confidential and was given to him only because he was
entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He
was not charged in the information for such an offense. In fact,
it appears from the record of the case that the information,
which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was
readily made available to the accused because PAL officials
believed at the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was the
only offense with which he was charged in the information, that
he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS
agent.Premises considered, the decision of the respondent
Appellate Court affirming the judgment of conviction of the
Regional Trial Court is reversed and set aside. Petitioner-
accused, Melencio Gigantoni y Javier is hereby aquitted of the
crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Balmores
No. L-1896. February 16, 1950.
Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded
guilty to the following information filed against him in the Court
of First Instance of Manila: “The undersigned accuses Rafael
Balmores y Caya of attempted estafa through falsification of a
security, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 22nd day of September, 1947, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission
of the crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly
by overt acts, to wit: by then and there tearing off at the bottom
in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the
true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and
writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the
figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the
said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29, 1947, and
presenting the said ticket so falsified on said date, September
22, 1947, in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the
purpose of exchanging the same for the corresponding cash
that said number had won, fraudulently pretending in said
office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the
corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on said date, June 29,
1947, but the said accused failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of estafa
through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason
of some causes other than his spontaneous desistance, to wit:
one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused
presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said
accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for
a policeman who apprehended and arrested the said accused
right then and there. "Contrary to law.
(Sgd.) "LORENZO RELOVA
"Assistant City Fiscal"
and was sentenced by Judge Emilio Peña to suffer not less
than 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor and not more than
12 years and 1 day of reclusión temporal, and to pay a fine of
P100 and the costs.
From that sentence he appealed to this court, contending (1)
that the facts charged in the information did not constitute an
offense and (2) that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict
him on a plea of guilty because, being illiterate, he was not
assisted by counsel.
In support of the first contention, counsel for the appellant
argues that there could be no genuine 1/8 unit Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes ticket for the June 29, 1947, draw; that
this court has judicial notice that the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office issued only four 14 units for each ticket
for the said draw of June 29, 1947; that the information does
not show that the true and real unidentified number of the
ticket alleged to have been torn was not and could not be
074000; that the substitution and writing in ink of the said
number 074000 was not falsification where the true and real
number of the ticket so torn was 074000.
This contention is based on assumptions not borne out by the
record. The ticket alleged to have been falsified is before us
and it appears to be a 1/8 unit. We cannot take judicial notice
of what is not of common knowledge. If relevant, it should
have been proved. But if it is true that the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office did not issue 1/8 but only ¼ units of
tickets for the June 29, 1947, draw, that would only strengthen
the theory of the prosecution that the 1/8 unit of a ticket which.
appellant presented to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office was spurious. The assumption that the true and real
unidentified number of the ticket alleged to have been torn was
the winning number 074000, is likewise not supported by the
record. The information to which appellant pleaded guilty
alleged that the appellant removed the true and real
unidentified number of the ticket and substituted and wrote in
ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or
number 074000. It is obvious that there would have been no
need of removal and substitution if the original number on the
ticket was the same as that which appellant wrote in ink in lieu
thereof.
The second contention appears to be based on a correct
premise but wrong conclusion. The fact that appellant was
illiterate did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to convict
him on a plea of guilty although he was not assisted by
counsel. The decision expressly states that appellant waived
the right to be assisted by counsel, and we know of no law
against such waiver. It may be that appellant was either
reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as
that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but
the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not
make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2,
article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code.
Examples of an impossible crime, which formerly was not
punishable but is now so under article 59 of the Revised Penal
Code, are the following: (1) When one tries to kill another by
putting in his soup a substance which he believes to be
arsenic when in fact it is common salt; and (2) when one tries
to murder a corpse. (Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised
Penal Code, 4th ed., page 15; decision, Supreme Court of
Spain, November 26, 1879; 21 Jur. Crim., 343.) Judging from
the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not
prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the
appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification
of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for payment
had not exercised due care.
The penalty imposed by article 166 for the forging or
falsification of "treasury or bank notes or certificates or other
obligations and securities" is reclusión temporal in its minimum
period and a fine not to exceed P1 0,000, if the document
which has been falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an
obligation or security of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands. This being a complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of an obligation or security of the
Philippines, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum
period in accordance with article 48. Taking into consideration
the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be
lower than prisión mayor in its maximum period, which is 10
years and 1 day to 12 years. It results, therefore, that the
penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.
The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing sweepstakes
ticket could cause no harm to anyone and would not constitute
a crime were it not for the attempt to cash the ticket so altered
as a prize-winning number. So in the ultimate analysis
appellant's real offense was the attempt to commit estafa
(punishable with eleven days of arresto menor); but technically
and legally he has to suffer for the serious crime of falsification
of a government obligation. We realize that the penalty is too
severe, considering all the circumstances of the case, but we
have no discretion to impose a lower penalty than that
authorized by law. The exercise of clemency is vested by the
Constitution in the Chief Executive and not in this court.
We are constrained to affirm the sentence appealed from, with
costs against the appellant.
Clemente vs. People
G.R. No. 194367. June 15, 2011
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed
the November 3, 2008 Judgmentof the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 7, convicting petitioner of illegal
possession and use of false bank notes under Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Also assailed is
the CA Resolution dated October 14, 2010 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article
168 of the RPC under an Informationwhich reads:
That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, with intent to use, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four
(24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with Markings [] IIB-1 to IIB-24,
respectively and specifically enumerated, to wit:
SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT
PX626388 1 P500.00 CC077337 1 P500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
BB020523 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
UU710062 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
Which are false and falsified.
 Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued.The version of the prosecution and the
defense, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses,
namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1) Michael Michelle Passilan,
the Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo
David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant
Manager of the Cash Department of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.Their testimonies established the
following:]
Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On
August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant in the
person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s
Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The
informant narrated that he received a counterfeit
P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle
of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The
bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a
fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently,
JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant,
proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection.
Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the
cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in bed.
The informant returned to appellant the latter's
P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and
announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked
appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back
pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces
of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be
counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked
them sequentially with IIB-2 to II-B24. They likewise
marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant
to appellant with IIB-1. Appellant was consequently
arrested and brought out of his cell into the office of
the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the
Manila City jail for interrogation.Meanwhile, the twenty-
four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were
turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for
analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7,
2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and
found the following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1)
P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6)
P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9)
P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5)
P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1)
P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two
(2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152.For
the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented
on the stand.Appellant simply raised the defense of
frame-up. He testified that in the afternoon of August
5, 2007, he was inside his room located at Dorm 1 of
the Manila City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael
Passilan entered appellant's room while JO1 Domingo
David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any
warning, JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and
confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00
bill. JO1s David and Passilan left immediately
thereafter. Appellant was left with no other choice but
to follow them in order to get back his wallet. Appellant
followed the jail officers to the Intelligence Office of the
Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan place the
P500.00 bills inside the confiscated black wallet.
Appellant was then told that the P500.00 bills were
counterfeit and that he was being charged with illegal
possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that
JO1 Passilan bore a grudge against him. This was
because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1
Passilan because the latter cannot offer any collateral
therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan treated him
severely, threatening him and, at times, putting him in
isolation.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC gave
credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the
counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's possession
during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the
counterfeit money were planted to incriminate petitioner was
almost nil considering the number of pieces involved. The RTC
also did not find that the jail officers were motivated by
improper motive in arresting petitioner, and applied in their
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties considering the absence of contrary evidence.
As to petitioners defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the
purported frame-up allegedly staged by JO1 Passilan would
not affect the prosecution's evidence since the testimony of
JO1 David could stand by itself. The RTC likewise found that it
was strange that petitioner did not remonstrate despite the fact
that he was allegedly being framed. As to the elements of the
crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found
in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by the
certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, which was testified into by Acting
Assistant Manager Loida A. Cruz. RTC also ruled that
petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his
conduct during the surprise search and his possession of the
bills. As to the element of intention to use the false bank notes,
the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner intended to use the
bills was confirmed by the information received by the jail
officers from another inmate. Aggrieved, petitioner sought
reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner argued that the
evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Petitioner also argued that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of the non-
presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who
could have corroborated the testimonies of the jail officers.
Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. The RTC, however, only ruled that there was
no violation of petitioners constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures because the seizure was
done pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of the
RPC. The trial court pointed out that prior to the search, a
crime was committed and the criminal responsibility pointed to
petitioner. On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the
RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one
of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the
counterfeit bills was not established because the informant
Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand. The CA,
however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied
petitioners appeal. The appellate court found that the fact the
petitioner was caught in possession of twenty-four (24) pieces
of fake P500.00 bills already casts doubt on his allegation that
he was merely framed by the jail guards. The CA agreed with
the RTC that even without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the
testimony of JO1 David was already sufficient to establish
petitioners guilt since petitioner did not impute any ill motive on
the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1
Passilans friend.Regarding the element of intent to use, the
CA found that there are several circumstances which, if taken
together, lead to the logical conclusion that petitioner intended
to use the counterfeit bills in his possession. The CA pointed
out that jail officers were informed by inmate Francis dela Cruz
that he received a fake P500.00 bill from petitioner who told
him to buy soft drinks from the Manila City jail bakery. After
Francis dela Cruz identified petitioner as the person who gave
him the fake money, the jail officers conducted a surprise
inspection. Said inspection yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of
counterfeit P500.00 bills inside petitioner's black wallet, which
was taken from his back pocket. The CA further held that the
non-presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect the
prosecution's case because even without his testimony,
petitioners intent to use the counterfeit bills was established.
The CA added that the matter of which witnesses to present is
a matter best left to the discretion of the prosecution. Petitioner
sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution dated October 14, 2010. Hence, the present
appeal.
Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CONVICTING
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE AN
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS
SINCE THEY WERE DERIVED FROM
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE.
The petition is meritorious.
Generally, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight which the lower court has overlooked, misunderstood
or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would
alter the result of the case. The exception applies when it is
established that the trial court has ignored, overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and
circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome
of the case.Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had
overlooked certain substantial facts of value to warrant a
reversal of its factual assessments. While petitioner's denial is
an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, said
defense must be given credence in this case as the
prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.Article 168 of the
RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank
notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of
those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his
possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
[Emphasis supplied.]The elements of the crime charged for
violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or
certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or
any instrument payable to order or other document of credit
not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person;
(2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is
forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed
with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.
As held in People v. Digoro possession of false treasury or
bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal
offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the
RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false
treasury or bank notes.In this case, the prosecution failed to
show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to
whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy
soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail
officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz that
petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City
jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers
did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis
dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. Their account, however, is
hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.This Court,
of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of
presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the accused
or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court to dictate.
Discretion belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to
how the prosecution should present its case. However, in this
case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness
weakens the prosecution's evidence since he was the only one
who had knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's
intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every
opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in
fact such person existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the
trial court did not have before it evidence of an essential
element of the crime. The twenty-three (23) pieces of
counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient
to show intent, which is a state of mind, for there must be an
overt act to manifest such intent. WHEREFORE, the petition
for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 29, 2010 and Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are REVERSED
and SET-ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias
Emmanuel Dino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal
possession and use of falsebank notes defined and penalized
under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
With costs de oficio.SO ORDERED
Batulanon vs. People
G.R. No. 139857. September 15, 2006
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decisionof
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with
modification the April 15, 1993 Decisionof the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos.
3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the
July 29, 1999 Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration. Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative
Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its
Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982.
She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing
loans to the member of the cooperative. During an audit
conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning
the release of loans were discovered. Thereafter, four
informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 3625
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at
Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collections of, the same, and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of
her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud
the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A
of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and
there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda
Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine
Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line
thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing
that she received the loan, thus making it appear
that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan
and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth
and in fact the said person was never granted a
loan, never received the same, and never signed the
cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in
furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent
design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same and received the
loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and
convert to her own use and benefit the said amount,
and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of
PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,160,
Philippine Currency
Criminal Case No. 3626
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at
Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collections of, the same, and
paying out loans to members taking advantage of
her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud
the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A
of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then
and there making an entry therein that the said
Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00
and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the
signature of Gonafreda Oracion showing that she
received the loan, thus making it appear that the said
Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan, received the
loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said
person was never granted a loan, never received the
same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher
issued in her name, and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to
herself the same and received the amount of
P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert
to her own use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of
PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,000,
Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Criminal Case No. 3453
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at
Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collection of the same and paying
out loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document,
namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of
one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there
entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the
entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit
of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan
in the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it appear
that the said person made a fixed deposit on the
aforesaid date with, and was granted a loan by the
PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never
made such a deposit and was never granted loan
and after the document was so falsified in the
manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in
the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the
signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear
that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of
P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in
fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and
in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent
design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and
there release to herself the same, and received the
amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use
and benefit the said amount, and despite demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the
damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Criminal Case No. 3627
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at
Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit
Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of
managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving
payments to, and collection of, the same and paying
out loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the
cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a commercial document,
namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of
one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and
there entering on the appropriate column of the
ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had
a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was
granted a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus
making it appear that the said person made fixed
deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was granted
a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis
Batulanon never made such a deposit and was
never granted loan and offer the document was so
falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did
then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher
No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon
by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon,
thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon
received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in
fact said Dennis Batulanon never received the loan
and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did
then and there release to herself the same and
receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use
and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the
damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial
Court of General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627. Batulanon pleaded not guilty
to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto
Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the
posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the
preparation of cash vouchers testified that on certain dates in
1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing
varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On
June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30AP4,160.00 was released
to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher
No. 237A for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda Oracion;
P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A was released to
Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982,
P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash
Voucher No. 374A. Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion,
and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan
because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative.
Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the
cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan
with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her
membership in 1983. Medallo stated that pursuant to the
cooperatives by-laws, only bona fide members who must have
a fixed deposit are eligible for loans. Medallo categorically
stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and
Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made it appear in
the records that they were payees and recipients of the
amount stated therein. As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash
Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the
handwriting of appellant.Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI
since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979.
He corroborated Medallos testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo,
Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He
stated that Oracion is Batulanons sister-in-law while Dennis
Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He
averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors. Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of
Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until
1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao,
Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the
cooperatives Credit Committee and PCCIs Board of Directors
for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracions signature on
Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanons handwriting. Jayoma
also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in
Arroyos name was settled. The defense presented two
witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was
presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon. Medallo was
subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and
was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the
year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all
the financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she
was asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to
the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only
Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion.
She failed to identify the other vouchers because the Journal
had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the
entries. Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She
claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names of
Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by
the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she
personally released the money to them that the three were
members of the cooperative as shown by their individual
deposits and the ledger; that the board of directors passed a
resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the
correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become
an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release
loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of
his absence that she signed the loan application and voucher
of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she
clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the
documents to avoid suspicion of irregularitythat contrary to the
testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in
the cooperative provided they are children of regular
members. Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her
sons name because she is no longer qualified for another loan
as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started
paying off her sons loan but the cooperative refused to accept
her payments after the cases were filed in court. She also
declared that one automatically becomes a member when he
deposits money with the cooperative. When she was
Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative
did not have by-laws yet. On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that
PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the
cooperative had been registered since 1967. On April 15,
1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon
as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the
accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the
four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2
months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI
in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the
institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs. SO
ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court, thus: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from
is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private
Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum, AS
MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five
thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok
Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one
hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing
of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs. SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best
witness is the person whose signature was allegedly forged,
thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao,
Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the
testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as
Medallo. She avers that the crime of falsification of private
document requires as an element prejudice to a third person.
She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan
transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by
the cooperative. The petition lacks merit.Although the offense
charged in the information is estafa through falsification of
commercial document, appellant could be convicted of
falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that
it is the allegations in the information that determines the
nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the
preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no
concern to the accused what is the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a
defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should
be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be
most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not
did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and
specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body
of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The
real and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged? not, Did you commit a crime
named murder? If he performed the acts alleged, in the
manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime
is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused
performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he
ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may
be the name of the crime which those acts constitute.The
elements of falsification of private document under Article 172,
paragraph 2of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except
those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was
committed in any private document; and (3) that the
falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanons actof
falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing
it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is
because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and
Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A,
respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing in the
corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that
they obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did
not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected
in the cash vouchers.The prosecution established that
Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the
name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI
members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In
the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former
is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the
cooperative.Medallo categorically declared that she saw
Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the
vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein
were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of
Arroyo, Medallos credible testimony and her familiarity with the
handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter
who signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanons
contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the
persons whose signatures were forged as Medallos
eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover,
under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person.Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is
without basis. There is no evidence showing that Medallo was
prompted by any ill motive.The claim that Batulanons letter to
the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an
admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those
allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by
the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.There is no merit in Batulanons assertion
that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan
transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable.
It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona
fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged
borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they
eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn
Arroyos name was settled because her mother, Erlinda,
agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution with the
understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the
money is collected from Batulanon. The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private
documents and not commercial documents because they are
not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote
or facilitate trade or credit transactions nor are they defined
and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial
law, rather they are private documents, which have been
defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person
without the intervention of a public notary or of other person
legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is
proved, evidenced or set forth. In all criminal prosecutions, the
burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove
each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for
any other crime necessarily included therein. The prosecution
in this case was able to discharge its burden completely.As
there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of
private document, it is important to ascertain whether the
offender is to be charged with falsification of a private
document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private
document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the
proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be
committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the
proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v.
Reyes, the accused made it appear in the time book of the
Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21
days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had
worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the
Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days.
The accused misappropriated the wages during which the
laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification
of private document.In U.S. v. Infante, the accused changed
the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn
ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior
value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another
pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of
the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a
private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,the accused presented
a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas
Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150
sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents,
succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of
falsification of a private document.In view of the foregoing, we
find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents
in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.Article 172
punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with
the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and
twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten
(10) days. Taking into consideration the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which must be within the range of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months. Thus, in Criminal Case Nos.
3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed
the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable
penalty. Since Batulanons conviction was for 3 counts of
falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the
aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense
charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of
P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans
without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn
Arroyos mother as the same was settled with the
understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the
money is recovered. The amount shall earn interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on
November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the
time the decision becomes final and executory, the interest
rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction. However, in
Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is
estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the
following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to
be a copy of an original document when no such original
exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or
different from, that of the genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner
Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanons signature in the
cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing
the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however,
reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon
did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to
sign: by: lbatulanon to indicate that she received the proceeds
of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any
of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in
nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of
Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the
proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is
the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not
attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation
involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different
matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold
that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private
document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving
the cash voucher of Dennis. The elements of estafa through
conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received
by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended
party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not
necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla, the Court convicted the
appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer
of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00
out of the funds of the company and used it for personal
purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of
the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in
the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the
end of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of
appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts
as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed
that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the
afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with
the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a
judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:Fraudulent
intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very
evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here
discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion
or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent
and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave
as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust
funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases
the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the
defalcation is discovered. x x xApplying the legal principles
here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the
necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the money for which
the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him
for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be
disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the
corporation and as such had immediate control of the current
funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with
the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such
control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter
the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the
cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on his
own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same
funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.Neither can there
be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from
the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and substituting his
personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were
to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant
misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The
checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were
retained by the appellant or remained under his personal
control they were of no value to the corporation; he might as
well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his
subordinate with instructions to retain them.But it is argued in
the present case that it was the intention of the accused to
permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have
already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this
nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of
the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first
sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for
short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not
disposed to extend this interpretation of the law to cases
where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their
own use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation is
of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes no
distinction between permanent misappropriations and
temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case
why it should not be applied in its literal sense.The third
element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is
injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the only
injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the
Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld
by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former
adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property
rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary,
is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of
paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S.
vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.In the instant case, there is no doubt
that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for
administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no
longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the
name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan
from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained
from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount
received by Batulanon is reflected in the records as part of the
receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter
because the sum misappropriated by her could have been
loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other
productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in
property rights caused by Batulaonos misappropriation is in
itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article
315. Considering that the amount misappropriated by
Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is
paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which
imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period, where the amount
defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00.
There being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.WHEREFORE, the Decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila
Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of
private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each
count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994
until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per
annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found
GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok
Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994
until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per
annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its
satisfaction.SO ORDERED.
Giron, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 145357-59. August 23, 2006
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 promulgated on 9
May 1997 and the Resolution3 promulgated on 4 October 2000
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 17352, People of
the Philippines v. Felixberto B. Arreza, and Criminal Case No.
19675, People of the Philippines v. Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Leticia
Gujilde-Crizaldo, Orlando B. Cedro, and Emiliano T. Salang,
Jr., both for falsification of public documents.
In Criminal Case No. 19675, the Sandiganbayan initially found
petitioners Pedro S. Giron, Jr. (“Giron”), Leticia Gujilde-
Crizaldo (“Cri-zaldo”), and Orlando B. Cedro (“Cedro”) guilty of
falsification of public documents. The Sandiganbayan,
however, acquitted Emiliano T. Salang (“Salang”) based on
reasonable doubt. The Sandiganbayan also found petitioner
Felixberto B. Arreza (“Arreza”) guilty of falsification of public
documents in Criminal Case No. 17352. In Criminal Case No.
19676, decided jointly with Criminal Case Nos. 17352 and
19675, People of the Philippines v. Pedro S. Giron, Jr.,
Gertrude S. Sucias, Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G. Lala, and
Felixberto B. Arreza, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Giron,
Gertrude S. Sucias (“Sucias”), Cedro, Robert G. Lala (“Lala”)
and Arreza based on reasonable doubt.
On reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan also acquitted Cedro
in Criminal Case No. 19675. The Facts
The present petition involves alleged irregularities in the
construction of a two-kilometer road connecting Barangays
Kinayan and Kauswagan in Tandag, Surigao del Sur
(“Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project”). Contrary to what was
stated in the Monthly Status Report dated 25 January 1989
and the Physical Status Report dated 31 January 1989
(collectively, “Reports”), the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project
was not 100% complete as of 25 January 1989.
The Sandiganbayan established the following facts:
That in November 1988 the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) in Tandag, Surigao del Sur embarked on
an infrastructure undertaking known as Kinayan-Kauswagan
Road Project where a Barangay road in Barobo, Tandag,
Surigao del Sur will be constructed and/or rehabilitated
connecting barangays Kinayan and Kauswagan in the said
town. The project was implemented by the Office of the District
Engineer of Tandag, Surigao del Sur and the following
participated in the same—Engr. Pedro Giron[,] Jr. as District
Engineer, Engr. Felixberto Arreza as [P]roject [E]ngineer,
Engr. Orlando Cedro as Chief of the Construction section,
Engr. Emiliano Salang as Assistant District Engineer, Engr.
Leticia Crizaldo as Construction Foreman and Engr. Gertrude
Sucias as Civil Engineering Aide (both were only in the Office
and not at the site).
A Program of Work/Budget Cost was prepared duly approved
by Engr. Emiliano Salang[,] Jr.[,] then Asst. District Engineer
and based at DPWH Sub-office in Bislig, Surigao del Sur, and
Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr.[,] the District Engineer, which placed the
“No. of calendar days to complete” as “60 CD” with the
following phases of work with their respective Item nos.
“Excavation for Structure—106, Foundation Fill [-] 110,
Reprep. of Prev’ly Const Road—116, Soil Lime Base [-] 20,
and RCCP—413[,] the total cost of the project amounting to
P207,000.00” (Exhibit “I”). Subsequently, a revised Program of
Work/Budget was submitted by Engr. Orlando Cedro with the
Assistant District Engineer Emiliano Salang[,] Jr. as the
recommending authority, and which was approved by
Engineer Pedro Giron[,] Jr. as District Engineer. In this
document (Exhibit “2”), the “No. of calendar days to complete”
was changed to “70 CD” (Exhibit “2 -1”) and with the following
Item nos. as code or legend: clearing & grubbing—100,
Earthmoving—105, Excavation for Structure—106, Foundation
Fill—110, Soil Lime Base Course (Surfacing)—210, and Inst[.]
of Cross Drainage—413 while the total cost of Project was
increased to P227,225.70. In a communication dated January
25, 1989, District [Engr.] Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr. submitted to the
Regional Director of DPWH Regional Office No[.] XI (Davao
City) (Exhibit “B” also Exhibit “4”) the Monthly Status Report of
CY 1988 Infrastructure Program where it appeared under item
[n]o. 15 that Kauswagan-Kinayan Road was 100% complete
as of January 25, 1989 (Exhibit “B-15” and “B-15-A”).
Thereafter, in a letter dated January 31, 1989[,] Engr. Roberto
G. Lala[,] for and in the absence of the District Engineer[,]
submitted the Physical Status Reports of Project Costing P2.0
M and below under C.Y. 1988 Infra Program to the same
Regional Office of the DPWH (Exhibit “G”) wherein it appeared
that the Kauswagan-Kinayan Road, Barobo[,] Surigao del Sur
is 100% complete. (Exhibit “G-20” and “G-20-a”).
Exhibit B—the Monthly Status Report was prepared by Leticia
Gujilde-Crizaldo, checked by Orlando B. Cedro and submitted
by Pedro S. Giron[,] Jr. (Exhibit “B-40”) while Exhibit “G”—the
Physical Status Report of Project was prepared by Gertrude S.
Sucias, checked by Orlando B. Cedro and submitted by
Robert G. Lala (exhibit “G-69”).4
Contrary to the Reports, the road was not finished by 25
January 1989. On 30 June 1989, the Barangay Council of
Kinayan, Barobo, Surigao del Sur resolved to request the
Ombudsman to make an immediate investigation on the
irregularities of the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project.5
The Ombudsman, through the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao, ordered the Provincial Auditor to conduct an
investigation. On 19 June 1990, in a report addressed to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Min-danao, State Auditor III Eusebia
Gamulo of the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del
Sur wrote that:
3. Actual implementation of the project was very much
delayed. In an interview made it was disclosed that while the
road opening started in No-vember 1988, spreading of the
delivered soil lime base course was done in October 1989
only[,] which was contrary to the DPWH report that said project
was 100% completed as of January 25, 1989.Special
Prosecution Officer Erdulfo Querubin (“Prosecution Officer
Querubin”) was then authorized by the Ombudsman to
conduct a preliminary investigation on the involvement of
Giron, District Engineer of Surigao del Sur; Salang, OIC
District Engineer, DPWH Sub-Office, Manggagiy, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur; Cedro, Chief, Construction Section; Crizaldo,
General Construction Foreman; Sucias, C.E. Aide II; Lala,
Supervising Civil Engineer; and Arreza, Project Engineer of
the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road Project. Prosecution Officer
Querubin recommended the filing of informations against the
accused.
In Criminal Case No. 19675, the Information against Giron,
Cri-zaldo, Cedro and Salang read:
“That on or about January 25, 1989, in the Municipality of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Pedro S. Giron, Jr., District
Engineer; Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo, Gen. Construction
Foreman; Orlando B. Cedro, Chief, Construction Section, and
Emil-iano T. Salang, Jr., Assistant District Engineer, all of the
District Engi-neer[’]s Office of Surigao del Sur, conspiring and
confederating with one another and with Felixberto B. Arreza,
also an engineer in the same office who is accused in Criminal
Case No. 17352 (SB) for the same offense charged herein,
taking advantage of their official positions and committing the
crime herein charged in relation to their office, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Monthly Status
Report of CY 1988 Infrastructure program for the month of
January 1989, an official document required for submission to
the XIth DPWH Regional Office, by reflecting on page 16
hereof that the Kinayan-Kauswagan barangay road project at
Barobo, Suri-gao del Sur was fully completed as of January
25, 1989, a matter the truth of which accused were under
obligation to disclose, when in truth and in fact, as accused
fully well knew, the said road project as of said date was not
yet finished, as the road surfacing materials for use therein
were not yet delivered then and were delivered only on March
18-21, 1989, thereby making an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Manila, Philippines, August 17, 1993.”7
In Criminal Case No. 19676, the Information against Giron,
Sucias, Cedro, Lala and Arreza alleged: “That on or about
January 25, 1989, in the Municipality of Tandag, Surigao del
Sur, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Gertrude S. Sucias, Orlando B. Cedro,
Robert G. Lala, all public officers being then District Engineer,
Civil Engineer Aide II, Chief, Construction Section, and
Supervising Civil Engineer I, respectively, of the Office of the
District Engineer of Surigao del Sur, conspiring together and
with accused Felixberto B. Arreza, of the same office who was
the project engineer of the road project treated herein, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the crime
herein charged in relation to their office, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Physical Status
Report of Projects costing P2.0M and Below under CY 1988
Infrastructure Program as of January 1989, an official
document required for submission to the XIth DPWH Regional
Office, by stating on page 14 thereof that the Kinayan-
Kauswagan barangay road project at Barobo, Surigao del Sur,
was fully completed as of January 25, 1989, a matter the truth
of which accused was under obligation to disclose, when in
truth and in fact, as accused fully well knew, the said road
project as of said date was not yet finished as the road
surfacing materials for use therein were not yet delivered then
and were only delivered on March 18-21, 1989, thereby
making an untruthful statement in a narration of facts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, August 16, 1993.”8
Before the informations quoted above were filed, Arreza had
been charged with malversation in Criminal Case No. 17351
and with falsification of a public document in Criminal Case
No. 17352. The charges in Criminal Case Nos. 17351 and
17352 were based on the same set of facts as Criminal Case
Nos. 19675 and 19676. The information for Criminal Case No.
17352 read:
“That in January 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer being then the duly appointed
[P]roject Engineer of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), taking advantage of his official position did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify his
report on the Status of Project Implementation on the repair of
the Kinayan-Kauswagan Road at Barobo, Surigao del Sur, by
causing it to appear that the same was 100% complete as of
January 25, 1989, when in fact and in truth, as the accused
knows fully well, it is not yet complete on the said date, the
same having been completed in October 1989.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, November 27, 1991.”9
The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 17352 were suspended
pending the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The
preliminary investigation resulted in the filing of Criminal Case
Nos. 19675 and 19676. In the meantime, Arreza’s trial in
Criminal Case No. 17351 for mal-versation continued, with the
Sandiganbayan’s First Division acquit-ting him of the charge.
The Sandiganbayan’s Second Division resolved to consolidate
Criminal Case Nos. 17352, 19675 and 19676 on 20 October
1993. All the accused interposed separate pleas of not guilty,
and joint trial ensued shortly thereafter.
The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
In its decision promulgated on 9 May 1997, the
Sandiganbayan’s First Division found Giron, Crizaldo, Cedro
and Arreza guilty and sentenced them accordingly. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
3 1.
 In Criminal Case No. 19676, accused Pedro S. Giron[,]
Jr., Gertrude S. Sucias, Orlando B. Cedro, Robert G.
Lala, and Felixberto B. Arreza are all ACQUITTED on
the basis of reasonable doubt.
4 2.
 In Criminal Case No. 19675, the guilt of accused Pedro
S. Giron[,] Jr., Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo and Orlando B.
Cedro having been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
they are hereby found guilty as principals, and
accordingly this Court sentences each one of them in
default of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances
to an indeterminate prison term of SIX (6) MONTHS
and ONE DAY of Prision Correccional as minimum to
 SIX (6) YEARS[,] EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) each without any
subsidiary liability in case of insolvency.
Accused Emiliano T. Salang is hereby ACQUITTED on the
basis of reasonable doubt[.] [H]is participation [is] seemingly
limited to the acts before the actual construction of the
project[.]
1 3.
 In Criminal Case No. 17352[,] the prosecution having
established the guilt of accused Felixberto B. Arreza
beyond reasonable doubt for having conspired with
accused Pedro Giron[,] Jr.[,] Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo
and Orlando B. Cedro[,] [this Court] hereby finds him
guilty as principal for violation of Article 172 of the
Revised Pe-nal Code, and accordingly sentences him,
in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, to an indeterminate prison term of
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of ARRESTO
MAYOR as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS[,] NINE (9)
MONTHS and TEN (10) DAYS of Prision Correccional
as maximum and to pay a fine of FIVE THOUSAND
pesos (P5,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
All those found guilty shall pay the costs proportionately.
The facts from which civil liability could have arisen not having
been adequately established[,] there is no pronouncement as
to the same.
SO ORDERED.”10 (Emphasis in the original)
Giron, Crizaldo, Cedro, and Arreza filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on 23 May 1997 and a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration on 13 June 1997 with regard to the
Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case Nos. 19675 and
17352. In a resolution promulgated on 4 October 2000, the
appellate court reconsidered its previous decision and ruled
thus:
5 “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated
March 10, 1997, only insofar as the criminal aspects of
Criminal Cases No[s]. 19675 and 17352 are
concerned, is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and
a new one entered as follows: 1.
 In Criminal Case No,
19675, accused ORLANDO B. CEDRO is hereby
ACQUITTED by reason of reasonable doubt. As for
accused PEDRO S. GIRON, JR. and LETICIA
GUJILDE-CRIZALDO, their guilt having been
established beyond reasonable doubt, taking into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, they are hereby sentenced to: (a) suffer an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum; (b) suffer all the appropriate
accessory penalties consequent thereto, including
perpetual special disqualification; and (c) pay a fine of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) each.
6 2.
 In Criminal Case No. 17352, accused FELIXBERTO B.
AR-REZA, his guilt having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, taking into account the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, is hereby
sentenced to: (a) suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
maximum; (b) suffer all the appropriate accessory
penalties consequent thereto, including perpetual
special disqualification; and (c) pay a fine of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
All those adjudged guilty are likewise hereby ordered to
proportionately pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.”11
The Issues
Petitioners Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza come before this Court
to question the Sandiganbayan’s rulings. They raise the
following issues:
First Ground
It is settled jurisprudence that an intention to injure a third
person is an essential element of the offense of falsification of
a public document by making an untruthful statement of facts.
In these cases, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners
had intended to injure the government or a third person
through the Monthly Status Report. Likewise, the Joint
Decision and Resolution pointed to no evidence of an actual
injury to the government or a third person.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established
jurisprudence by convicting petitioners on the basis of its
erroneous ruling that the existence of a wrongful intent to
injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified
document is a public document, and that criminal intent is
presumed to exist from the knowledge of the falsity of the entry
in [the] Monthly Status Report on the status of the road project
and did not need to be established by the prosecution.
Second Ground
Jurisprudence is settled that in offenses of falsification of a
public document by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, the accused is not liable if the acts imputed
to him are consistent with good faith. The prosecution did not
prove that petitioners had acted in bad faith. Likewise, the
Joint Decision and Resolution failed to cite any evidence of
bad faith on the part of petitioners.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established
jurisprudence and grievously erred by not holding that
petitioners had acted in good faith that negates the existence
of a criminal intent to commit falsification.
Third Ground
It is a settled doctrine that the offense of falsification is not
deemed to have been committed if the statements are not
altogether false or if these statements have colorable truth.
The defense proved that the road project was almost eighty
percent (80%) complete, less the delivery of the limestone as
of the submission date of the Monthly Status Report on 25
January 1989. The delivery of the limestone was suspended
due to heavy rains, as the delivery trucks would only destroy
the road that was already prepared for the limestone surfacing.
The limestone was delivered to and spread at the project site
in March 1989.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established
jurisprudence and grievously erred by not ruling that the
statement in the Monthly Status Report regarding the 100%
completion of the road project was not absolutely false.
Fourth Ground
Petitioner Arreza did not prepare, and was not a signatory to,
the Monthly Status Report. In fact, the Sandiganbayan found
that this petitioner “had no participation in the preparation and
execution” of the report. Conspiracy in the preparation of the
report was ruled out. The Honorable Sandi-ganbayan
grievously erred and departed from the established
jurisprudence [in] not acquitting petitioner Arreza.
Fifth Ground
Petitioner Giron, the District Engineer, did not prepare the
Monthly Status Report, which was submitted [by] Asst. Dist.
Engr. Emiliano T. Salang in lieu of petitioner Giron whose
facsimile signatures were merely stamped in the covering
latter and the last page of the report. The respondent court
ruled out the existence of conspiracy in the preparation of the
report.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established
jurisprudence and grievously erred [in] not acquitting petitioner
Giron.
Sixth Ground
Petitioner Crizaldo was the construction foreman merely
assigned to type the report at the Office of the District
Engineer. She never went to the project site and was not
shown to have had personal knowledge about the Kinayan-
Kauswagan road project, which was only one of the more than
100 projects mentioned in the report.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from the established
jurisprudence and grievously erred [in] not acquitting petitioner
Crizaldo.
Seventh Ground
The Honorable Sandiganbayan departed from established
jurisprudence and grievously erred by convicting petitioners
notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that these petitioners had committed the
crime of falsification of the Monthly Status Report.12
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
The main issue in this appeal is whether Giron, Crizaldo and
Ar-reza are indeed guilty of falsification of documents under
Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code. The Crime of
Falsification of Documents
under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code
Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesi-astic minister.—The penalty of prision mayor and a fine
not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public
officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x.
There are three elements in the crime of falsification of
documents under Article 171(4). First, the offender is a public
officer, employee, or notary public. Second, the offender takes
advantage of his official position. Third, the offender falsifies a
document by making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts.
Let us examine whether the charges against Giron, Crizaldo
and Arreza satisfy these three essential elements. There is no
doubt that all three are public officials, as they were
employees of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) at the time of the questioned act.
There is serious doubt, however, as to whether anyone among
Gi-ron, Crizaldo and Arreza actually took advantage of his
official position. The offender takes advantage of his official
position when he has the duty to make or to prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of the document, or
he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.13
According to the Sandiganbayan, Giron testified that:
In preparing these reports, the project engineer reports to the
Construction Section the degree of work they had
accomplished with respect to the project assigned to them.
The reports of the project engineers were to be consolidated
into one hence arriving at a Monthly Status Report. These
reports were being submitted every 25th of the month and it
takes the Office of the District Engineer three (3) to five (5)
days to prepare the said report.14
The Monthly Status Report was typed by Crizaldo, checked by
Cedro, and submitted by Salang in lieu of Giron. Engr. Cedro,
who supervised the preparation of the Monthly Status Report
and checked the same, was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan
because “he never signed the subject reports.”15 Salang was
also acquitted by the Sandi-ganbayan because “his
participation [was] seemingly limited to the acts before the
actual construction of the project.”16
Crizaldo’s item was that of a General Construction Foreman
but she was not assigned to the project site.17 Crizaldo was
assigned in the office and was tasked to type the Monthly
Status Report. The prosecution never proved that Crizaldo had
knowledge of the actual status of the Kinayan-Kauswagan
Road Project at the time she prepared the Monthly Status
Report. Crizaldo could have merely relied on field reports
submitted to her, precluding her from making, on her own,
untruthful statements at the time she prepared the Monthly
Status Report. Crizaldo could not have conspired with any
other party because the Sandiganbayan found that “there is
reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy on the part
of the accused herein to falsify the subject reports.”18 The
Sandiganbayan ruled that “any criminal liability should be
based on their individual participation in the questioned act.”19
Giron’s testimony as to the usual procedure cannot be used
against him because he did not sign the Monthly Status
Report. Giron’s fac-simile signature was merely stamped on
the Monthly Status Report. The stamped facsimile signatures
of Giron do not establish his personal participation in the
preparation of the Monthly Status Report. To use this portion
of Giron’s testimony to establish his personal participation is to
extrapolate and speculate. This will not suffice in a criminal
action, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for
conviction.20
Arreza was the Project Engineer of the Kinayan-Kauswagan
Road Project. However, like Giron and Crizaldo, the
prosecution was unable to prove his actual participation in the
questioned reports. The Sandiganbayan found that Arreza
“had no participation in the preparation and execution of the
said document[s].”21 The Sandiganbayan also found that
Arreza “did not take advantage of his public posi-tion,”22 and
thus Arreza is liable under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
code for falsification of a private document. In the dispositive
portion of its Decision of 9 May 1997, however, the
Sandiganbayan adjudged Arreza guilty as charged in Criminal
Case No. 17352, which was for falsification of a public
document.
In sum, we acquit Giron, Crizaldo and Arreza for failure of the
prosecution to satisfy the requisites for the conviction of the
crime of falsification of public documents. All are public
officers, however, the prosecution has failed to prove their
criminal culpability beyond reasonable doubt. There is no
moral certainty that Giron, Crizaldo, and Arreza took
advantage of their positions to make a false statement in a
narration of facts in a public document.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
promulgated on 9 May 1997 and the Resolution promulgated
on 4 October 2000 of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE.
Pedro S. Giron, Jr., Leticia Gujilde-Crizaldo, and Felixberto B.
Arreza are ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Siquian vs. People
G.R. No. 82197. March 13, 1989
The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the
then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of
falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial
Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1975, in the Municipality
of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L.
Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan,
Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such Municipal
Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to
wit. An official communication to the Civil Service
Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in
order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B.
Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal
Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and
making it appear in said document that there was such a
position existing and that funds therefore were available.
When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic),
there was no such position or item and no funds were
available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan
for 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said
position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor.
x x x
[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows: It appears
from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa
Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela,
went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the
Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for
employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her
friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask
information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed
that there was, she went to see the accused in his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he
accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary,
Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even
so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the
following day and that she should be included in the budget.
The accused then acompanied her to the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung. The Treasurer agreed that
she could report for work.
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of
the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the
accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to
work for her appointment papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the
Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the
accused.
x x x
Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among
others, of the availability of funds (C.S. Form No. 203) dated
July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian,
pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5,
Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil
Service, Manila (Exh. “C”).
x x x
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. “A-1”) on July 1,
1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her
monthly salary was P120.00. She rendered services for the
months of July, August, September, October, November and
December 1975 (Exhibits “B”, “B-1” to “B-5”). She was not,
however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the
Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told
that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she went to
see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer.
She went to the Treasurer who told her that there was no
money. Because of this, she went to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask
(sic) information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was
interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosio, Provincial Administrator.
Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment
papers. Thereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April
20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint isaddressed to
Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit “G” and “G-1”).
It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of
Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. “H”, “H-1”,
and “H-2”). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the
annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was
deemed re-enacted (Exh. “H-1”). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla
of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the
Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No
supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of
Angadanan.
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed
reenacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new
item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of
the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new
position of clerk in the office of the Municipal Council
appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit “H-
2”) for 1974-1975, was filled -up as early as October 16, 1974
by the accused when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that
position (Exhibits “J” and “J-2”). With respect to the new
position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the
Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the
appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by
the accused (Exhibits “K” and “K-4”). As early as June 28,
1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion
who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs.
“K” and “K-1”).
x x x trial in his absence despite a pending petition for
[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]
After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
document as charged in the information, the Court hereby
sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of
prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE
THOUSAND (P3,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance
with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA
decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian.
Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a
question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence
when it affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting him of
the crime of falsification despite the following.:
7 A.
 The evidence on record which consists of the testimony
of the prosecution’s principal witness, shows the
absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused.
8 B.
 There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of
his position as Municip[al Mayor when he made the
allegedly falsified certification.
9 C.
 The statement that “Funds for the position are available”
is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.
10 D.
 The petitioner was deprived of his right to due
process of law when the trial court proceeded with the
change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p.13.]
Petitioner’s arguments, however, are bereft of any merit. The
offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code is committed by “any public officer,
employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements in a
narration of fact; . . .” It is settled that in this fourth kind of
falsification, the following requisites must concur:
2 (a)
 That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
3 (b)
 That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; and
(c)
 That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false
[Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA
18.]
All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar.
Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the
municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful
statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification
which he issued in connection with the appointment of
complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been
issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his
office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765
(1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service
Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed
received the document issued by petitioner. Since the
certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the
standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the
Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification
was invested with the character of a public document [People
v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)]
falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was
committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available
for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when
he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist
and no funds had been appropriated therefor.
Petitioner’s stance that the certification which he issued
contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is
not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor
General’s arguments, correctly ruled as follows:
“Conclusion of law” is defined as a proposition not arrived at
by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination
of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law
to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p.
161; Black’s Law Dict., p. 362].
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the
certification by the appellant that “funds for the position are
available” does not require the application of the artificial rules
of law. To certify that funds are available for the position what
one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget and plantilla of
personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such
item exists and funds are allocated therefor. In the present
case, despite the presence of the records which shows that
there is no position and funds therefor referred to in the
certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by
the records, certified falsely that “funds for the position are
available” [Rollo, p. 41].
It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed
to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last
fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D.
No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. “B-2”)
accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of
Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no
such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office
of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa
Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation
made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for
such position, thus rendering petitioner’s statement in his
certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the
statement made in the document is met when there exists not
even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the
narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this
case. From the foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third
requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully
satisfied.
The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under
the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the
Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original
Appointment (Exhs. “D” and “D-3”), a certification of the
availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to
be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been
delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law
to issue this certification which is designated as Civil Service
Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation
to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said
certification which includes information as to the availability of
the funds for the position being filled up.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the existence of a wrongful
intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the
falsified document is a public document. This has already
been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po
Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the aforementioned
case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the
accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of
the crime of falsification of public document. The rationale for
this principal distinction between falsification of public and
private documents has been stated by the Court in this wise:
“In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by
public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there
be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed” [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People
v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public
documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public
character of a document and the existence of any prejudice
caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such
damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].
Petitioner’s plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence
for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his
part must be denied. While this Court has declared good faith
as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v.
San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to
exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has
not clearly been shown to exist in the case at bar.
Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal
mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the
municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative
Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the
municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative
Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget
for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the
Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the
Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal
Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were
no funds tary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the
fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the
correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and
Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. “H-1” and “H-2”,
Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in
issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the
questioned position since at the time he issued such
certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975-1976 had
already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new
position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been
enacted by the municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held
criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false
certification as to the availability of funds for the subject
position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to
an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in a public
document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal
intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on
the part of the person who executes an act which the law
punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v.
Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that
petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which
arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands
unrebutted.
Petitioner’s claim that there was no showing that he took
advantage of his official position in falsifying the document
should likewise be rejected. This essential element of
falsification of a public document by public officer requires that
the offender “abuse his office or use the influence, prestige or
ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the
crime” [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of
public office is considered present when the offender falsifies a
document in connection with the duties of his office which
consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening
in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto, 20 Phil.
376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in
the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing
the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa
Carreon.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by
the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the
absence of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change
of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A
careful and thorough review of the record reveals that
petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court,
in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to
enable the defense to present its evidence although the
prosecution had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978.
[See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]
It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due
process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-
48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence,
this Court laid down this criterion to determine whether an
accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due
process of law:
“x x x (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly
processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a
constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. x x x”
[People v. Muit, G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117
SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Italics
supplied.]
Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is
afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due
to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings,
the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon
the evidence presented by the prosecution. For under such
circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to
be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the
Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on
his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]
It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the
Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of
the petitioner’s urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in
the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of
venue, he also failed to appear [See Order dated January 18,
1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto,
one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial
court that he was withdrawing as counsel for his client for the Sometime in October 1996, Remedios wanted to buy a car
reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already thinking that she already had a substantial amount in her
went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial account. Thus, she went to BPI to withdraw two hundred
court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis thousand pesos (PhP 200,000). To her surprise, however, she
solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution. found out that her money had already been withdrawn. The
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity withdrawals were effected through 18 encashment slips
with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED bearing her forged signatures reaching the amount of eight
and the instant petition is hereby DENIED. hundred thirty-eight thousand pesos (PhP 838,000).
SO ORDERED. Shedenied having affixed her signatures on the encashment
Domingo vs. People slips used.
G.R. No. 186101. October 12, 2009 Testimonies showed that on several occasions beginning
The Case September 18, 1995 until October 18, 1996, petitioner
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 24, 2008 presented a number of encashment slips of various amounts
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158 entitled to BPI, and by virtue of which she was able to withdraw huge
People of the Philippines v. Gina A. Domingo, which affirmed amounts of money from the checking account of the
the Decision2 dated May 21, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-98- complainant. She deposited the bigger portion of these
75971-87 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 80 in amounts to her own account and pocketed some of them,
Quezon City. The RTC convicted petitioner Gina Domingo while also paying the rest to Skycable. The transactions were
(petitioner) of 17 counts of Estafa through Falsification of processed by four tellers of BPI, namely: Regina Ramos, Mary
Commercial Document. Antonette Pozon, Sheila Ferranco, and Kim Rillo who verified
The Facts the signatures of the complainant on the questioned
Private complainant, Remedios D. Perez (Remedios), is a encashment slips.
businesswoman and a valued depositor of the Bank of the As synthesized by the trial court, the transactions are as
Philippine Islands (BPI), Aurora Boulevard branch. Petitioner, follows:
on the other hand, is a dentist who had a clinic in Remedios’ Date of Amount withdrawn Amount Amount paid to Name of Teller who
encashment via encashment slip deposited to Skycable (PS) processed the
compound. slip accused’s or Pocketed transaction
Being the wife of the best friend of Remedios’ son, petitioner account (Po) by the
had a close relationship with Remedios and her family. accused
1. Sept. 8, 1995 P10,000.00 P8,000.00 P2,000.00 (Po) Regina Ramos
On June 15, 1995, Remedios accompanied petitioner to BPI 2. Sept. 18, 1995 30,000.00 20,000.00 10,000.00 (Po)
because the latter wanted to open an account therein. 3. Feb. 12, 1996 30,000.00 28,550.00 1,450.00 (PS) Shiela Ferranco
Remedios then introduced petitioner to the bank’s staff and 4. Feb. 15, 1996 20,000.00 20,000.00 none Mary Antonette
Pozon
officers. Soon thereafter, petitioner frequented Remedios’ 5. March 21, 1996 40,000.00 30,000.00 10,000.00 (Po) Shiela Ferranco
office and volunteered to deposit her checks in her bank 6. April 8, 1996 40,000.00 35,000.00 5,000.00 (Po) Regina Ramos
7. April 10, 1996 30,000.00 30,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco
account at BPI.
8. April 29, 1996 40,000.00 34,500.00 5,500.00 (PO) Regina Ramos
said bank sometime in June 1995. She had been maintaining
9. May 13, 1996 40,000.00 38,550.00 1,450.00 Shiela Ferranco
(PS) said account until she was arrested in 1998. She used to
10. May 24, 1996 50,000.00 50,000.00 none Mary Antonette Pozonfrequent the bank three times a week or as the need arose for
11. June 7, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco her bank transactions, for which reason, she and the bank
12. June 26, 1996 45,000.00 45,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco
13. July 5, 1996 25,000.00 25,000.00 none Mary Antonette Pozontellers had become familiar with each other. She knows that,
14. July 17, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Mary Antonette Pozonlike her, Remedios was also a depositor of BPI Aurora
15. Aug. 5, 1996 50,000.00 48,550.00 1,450.00 Shiela Ferranco
(PS)
Boulevard branch, but there was no occasion that they met
16. Sept. 17, 1996 35,000.00 35,000.00 none Shiela Ferranco each other in the bank.
17. Oct. 4, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Kim P. Rillo Remedios and BPI filed a complaint before the prosecutor’s
18. Oct. 18, 1996 40,000.00 40,000.00 none Kim P. Rillo
office.
After having been apprised of the illegal transactions of The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971 reads as
petitioner on complainant’s account, the latter complained to follows:
the bank for allowing the withdrawal of the money with the use “That on or about the 18th day of October 1996, in Quezon
of falsified encashment slips and demanded that the amount City, Philippines, the above-named accused, a private
illegally withdrawn be returned. She was required by BPI to individual, by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts
submit checks bearing her genuine signature for examination executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory. fraud and by means of falsification of commercial document
After examination, Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
Laboratory came up with a finding that complainant’s Remedios D. Perez and/or the Bank of the Philippine Islands
signatures on the questioned encashment slips had been represented in the following manner, to wit: said accused
forged. Only then did the bank agree to pay her the amount of falsified or caused to be falsified an encashment slip of Bank
PhP 645,000 representing a portion of the amount illegally of the Philippine Islands dated October 18, 1996 for
withdrawn with the use of the forged encashment slips. P40,000.00, Philippine Currency, by then and there filling up
In her defense, petitioner testified that she is a dentist, said encashment slip and signing the name of one Remedios
practicing her profession in her house at No. 21, Alvarez D. Perez, a depositor of said bank under Account No. 3155-
Street, Cubao, Quezon City. She further stated that she knew 0572-61, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that said
Remedios as the owner of the house that she and her encashment slip is genuine in all respect, when in truth and in
husband were renting at No. 3 New Jersey Street, New fact said accused well knew that Remedios D. Perez never
Manila, Quezon City. She declared that she never used signed the said encashment slip; that once said encashment
“Perez” as an alias or nickname and that the signatures slip was forged and falsified in the manner set forth, accused
appearing on the questioned encashment slips were not hers. pretending to be the said Remedios D. Perez used it to
Petitioner, however, admitted that she was once a depositor of withdraw the aforesaid sum of P40,000.00 from the latter’s
BPI Aurora Boulevard branch, having opened an account in account, and once, in possession of the said amount of money
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her
own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of Ruling of the Trial Court
the offended party. CONTRARY TO LAW.”3 On May 21, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision, the
The allegations in the Information in Criminal Case Nos. Q-98- dispositive portion of which reads:
75972-87 are all substantially the same as those in Criminal “WHEREFORE, premises considered, joint judgment is hereby
Case No. Q-98-75971, except for the dates of the commission rendered finding the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable
of the crime or dates of the BPI encashment slips and the doubt of the crimes charged in Criminal [Case] Nos. Q-98-
amounts involved, to wit: 75971; Q-98-75972; Q-98-75973; Q-98-75974; Q-98-75975;
Criminal Case Date of the commission of the Q-98-75976; Q-98-75977; Q-98-75978; Q-98-75979; Q-98-
Amount
No. crime/encash- 75980; Q-98-75981; Q-98-75982; Q-98-75983; Q-98-75984;
Involved
ment slip Q-98-75985; Q-98-75986 and Q-98-75987. Accordingly, and
1. Q-98-75972 October 4, 1996 applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby
P40,000.00
2. Q-98-75973 September 4, 1996 35,000.00
3. Q-98-75974 August 54, 1996 sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment, as follows:
50,000.00
4. Q-98-75975 July 17, 1996 1. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75971—Two (2) Years, Eleven
40,000.00
5. Q-98-75976 July 5, 1996 25,000.00 (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
6. Q-98-75977 June 26, 1996 45,000.00
7. Q-98-75978 June 7, 1996 40,000.00 correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
8. Q-98-75979 May 24, 1996 50,000.00 Days of prision mayor;
9. Q-98-75980 May 13, 1996 40,000.00
10. Q-98-75981 April 29, 1996
2.
40,000.00
In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75972—Two (2) Years, Eleven
11. Q-98-75982 April 10, 1996 30,000.00 (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
12. Q-98-75983 April 8, 1996 40,000.00 correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
13. Q-98-75984 March 21, 1996 40,000.00
14. Q-98-75985 February 15, 1996 20,000.00 Days of prision mayor;
15. Q-98-75986 February 12, 1996 3. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75973—Two (2) Years, Eleven
30,000.00
4
16. Q-98-75987 September 18, 1996 30,000.00
(11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision] correccional to
Upon motion by the prosecution, the 17 cases were Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of prision mayor;
consolidated and tried jointly by the trial court. When 4. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75974—Two (2) Years, Eleven
arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the crimes (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
charged in the 17 Informations. Trial on the merits ensued with correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21)
the prosecution presenting seven witnesses, namely: Days of prision mayor;
Remedios; Arturo Amores, General Manager of BPI, Aurora 5. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75975—Two (2) Years, Eleven
Blvd. Branch; Regina Ramos, Mary Antonette Pozon, Sheila (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
Ferranco, and Kim P. Rillo, all bank tellers of BPI, Aurora Blvd. correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
Branch; and Josefina Dela Cruz, a Document Examiner III of Days of prision mayor;
the PNP Crime Laboratory. On the part of the defense, it 6. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75976—Two (2) Years, Eleven
presented petitioner herself and Carmelita Tanajora, (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
petitioner’s house helper. correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21)
 Days of prision mayor;
7. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75977—Two (2) Years, Eleven
(11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
8. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75978—Two (2) Years, Eleven
(11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
9. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75979—Two (2) Years, Eleven
(11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Eight (8) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
10. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75980—Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
11. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75981—Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
12. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75982—Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21) Days of
prision mayor;
13. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75983 – Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
14. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75984—Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Seven (7) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
15. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75985—Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
16. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75986—Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
17. In Criminal Case No. Q-98-7598[7]—Two (2) Years,
Eleven (11) Months and Eleven (11) Days of [prision]
correccional to Six (6) Years and Twenty One (21)
Days of prision mayor;
Further, the accused is hereby ordered to pay BPI and/or
Remedios Perez the total sum of Six Hundred Thirty Five
Thousand Pesos (P635,000.00), as civil indemnity, plus six
percent (6%) interest per annum from the time of the filing of
these cases, until fully paid.
The bond posted by the accused for her provisional liberty is
hereby canceled.
SO ORDERED.5
Ruling of the Appellate Court
On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated November 24, 2008,
disposed of the case as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the challenged Joint Decision of the Court a
quo is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. The CA held that petitioner was the one who
authored the crimes of which she was convicted reasoning
that she was the only person who stood to be benefited by the
falsification of the document in question; thus, the presumption
that she is the material author of the falsification is present.
Moreover, petitioner’s theory that the crimes committed were
perpetrated by the bank tellers or is an inside job cannot be
sustained because of the lack of any evidence showing that
the tellers harbored any ill motive against her. The CA
emphasized that the defense of denial, unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
and merits no weight in law; it cannot be given greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who
testified on affirmative matter.
On March 4, 2009, petitioner filed a timely appeal before this
Court.
The Issues
Petitioner interposes in the present appeal the following
assignment of errors:
I The contentions are flawed.
ERROR IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE,
DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL, WERE COMMITTED
BY THE LOWER COURT IN THE PROMULGATION AND
ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT DECISION;
II
ERROR IN THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW,
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL, WERE COMMITTED IN
THE PROMULGATION OF THE SUBJECT DECISION.
Our Ruling
The appeal has no merit. Substantially, the issues raised boil
down to the question of whether or not the evidence adduced
by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of
petitioner beyond reasonable doubt.
Elements of Falsification of Commercial
 Documents are
Present
Petitioner contends that the decision of the lower court is not
supported by the evidence on record and that this evidence
cannot sustain in law the requirements of proof beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime for which she was charged.
Specifically, petitioner claims that, as a matter of policy, the
bank personnel verified the signature cards of private
complainant Remedios before any encashment can be drawn
against the account of Remedios. Thus, petitioner contends
that the signatures in the encashment slips are genuine as
found by the staff and manager of BPI and that the cases filed
against her are the products of inside jobs. Further, she
argues that the results of the examinations conducted by
Josefina dela Cruz of the PNP Crime Laboratory lack
evidentiary value, since the report only stated that the
signatures on the Encashment/Withdrawal Slips were different
from the genuine signatures of Remedios based on the
checks, which contained the genuine signatures of Remedios,
but did not state that the signatures belong to petitioner.
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) punishes any
private individual who commits any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Art. 171 of the Code in any public or official
document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document. The acts of falsification enumerated in
Art. 171 are:
“Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary
or ecclesiastic minister.—The penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of
the following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or
rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
 document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to
be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine
original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official
book.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of
Commercial Document under Art. 172 are: (1) that the
offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender
committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that
the act of falsification is committed in a commercial
document.
As borne by the records, all the elements of the crime are
present in the instant case. Petitioner is a private individual
who presented to the tellers of BPI 17 forged encashment slips
on different dates and of various amounts. The questioned
encashment slips were falsified by petitioner by filling out the
same and signing the name of the private complainant,
thereby making it appear that Remedios signed the
encashment slips and that they are genuine in all respects,
when in fact petitioner knew very well that Remedios never
signed the subject encashment slips. In her testimony,
Remedios categorically denied having filled out and signed
any of the subject encashment slips on the dates indicated on
them. Her testimony is further strengthened by the testimonies
of the bank manager and the bank tellers, who facilitated the
banking transactions carried out by petitioner with their branch.
Their testimonies were coherent and consistent in narrating
that it was indeed petitioner who presented the encashment
slips, received the proceeds of the transactions, and/or caused
the transfer of the money to her own bank account.
Moreover, the testimony of Josefina dela Cruz (dela Cruz)
bolsters the findings of the trial court that the alleged
signatures of Remedios in the encashment slips are forged, to
wit:
Q: Using the method you employed in the examination of
questioned and standard signatures of Remedios Perez, will
you please elaborate the study you made?
A: After conducting the examination, I reduced my
examination to writing and my findings are as follows:
‘Scientific comparative examination and analysis of the
questioned documents and the submitted standard signature
reveals significant divergences in handwriting movement,
stroke structure and other individual handwriting
characteristics.’
Q: You mentioned divergences in handwriting movement, will
you please point to this Honorable Court this significant
divergences of differences in the strokes of handwriting?
A: First of all the manner of execution. The manner of
execution is slow while in the execution of the standard, it is
moderate. The line quality in the questioned signature, there is
presence of tremors in the strokes while in the standard
signatures, all the strokes are smooth. In the capital ‘R’ in the
questioned signature, there is presence of re-trace strokes
while in the standard signature, there is no re-trace strokes. In
the downward portion of the letter ‘R’ in the questioned
signature, the direction is downward while in the standard it is
horizontal. Now theangular strokes following the capital ‘R’ is
traced in the middle part of the letter ‘R’, the downward portion
while in the standard, it is found in the last stroke of capital ‘R’.
In the middle name letter ‘D’, the shape is more rounded on
the questioned signature but in the standard it is more
elongated. In the loop of the family name, it is more rounded in
questioned signature[;] while in the standard, it is more
elongated. With that, I was able to conclude that the
questioned signatures Remedios D. Perez marked ‘Q-1’ to ‘Q-
36’ standard signatures of Remedios Perez marked ‘S-1’ to ‘S-
27’ inclusive were not written by one and the same person.7
Typically, such inconspicuous divergences noted by dela Cruz
on the questioned signatures could not be easily detected by
untrained eyes or by one who had no formal training in
handwriting examination; thus, resort to the opinion of an
expert is imperative. This explains why the bank tellers who
processed the illegal transactions entered into by the petitioner
on the account of Remedios failed to notice the forgery or
falsification. As a result, they allowed the encashment by
petitioner. The training or skill, if any, of the tellers in detecting
forgeries is usually minimal or inadequate and their opinion is
generally unreliable. It was, therefore, prudent on the part of
the bank to seek the opinion of an expert to determine the
genuineness of the signatures in the encashment slips.
As found by the trial court, the totality of the testimonies of
Remedios, dela Cruz, the handwriting expert, and the bank
tellers bears the earmarks of truth that the questioned
encashment slips had been falsified by petitioner and that they
were presented to the bank in order to defraud the bank or
holder of the account.
Additionally, the Court has held that in gauging the relative
weight to be given to the opinion of handwriting experts, the
following standards are adhered to: “We have held that the
value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon
his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false,
but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and
between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer. The test of genuineness ought to be the
resemblance, not the formation of letters in some other
specimens but to the general character of writing, which is
impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of
constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore
itself permanent.”8
Moreover, it cannot be said that since none of the prosecution
witnesses saw the falsification actually done by petitioner, she
cannot be held liable. The bank tellers who processed the
illegal transactions of petitioner involving the account of
Remedios were consistent in their testimonies that it was
petitioner herself who presented the encashment slips and
received the proceeds of the slips. In such a situation, the
applicable rule is that if a person has in his possession a
falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of
it and profiting from it, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification.9 In the instant case,
petitioner has failed to overthrow the presumption.
Furthermore, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the
questioned encashment slips are commercial documents.
Commercial documents are, in general, documents or
instruments which are used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade.10 An encashment slip necessarily
facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose
name and signature appears thereon to encash a check and
withdraw the amount indicated therein.
Even more, petitioner would have this Court believe that the
crime of falsification of a commercial document did not exist
because Remedios and BPI did not suffer any damage. Such
argument is specious. It has been ruled that damage or intent
to cause damage is not an element in falsification of a
commercial document, because what the law seeks to repress
is the prejudice to the public confidence in such documents.11
Therefore, the acts of petitioner clearly satisfy all the essential
elements of the crime of Falsification of Commercial
Document.
 Crime of Falsification was a Necessary Means
 to Commit
Estafa
It has been held that whenever a person carries out on a
public, official, or commercial document any of the acts
enumerated in Art. 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to
perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or malversation, a
complex crime is formed by the two crimes.12
Under Art. 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to: (1) the
commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that
must both (or all) be the result of a single act; or (2) one
offense must be a necessary means for committing the other
(or others).
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document
may be a means of committing estafa, because before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage
or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official, or commercial document. In other
words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually
utilizing that falsified public, official, or commercial document
to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document.
Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit estafa.13
In general, the elements of estafa are: (1) that the accused
defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence or (b) by means
of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person. Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact,
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive
another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
In the case before us, all the elements of estafa are present.
Once petitioner acquired the possession of the amounts she
encashed by means of deceit, she misappropriated,
misapplied, and converted the same to her own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the private
complainant and BPI.
Without a doubt, the falsification of the encashment slips was
a necessary means to commit estafa. At that time, the offense
of falsification is already considered consummated even
before the falsified document is used to defraud another.
Therefore, the trial court aptly convicted petitioner for the
complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Document.
Defense of Denial Is Untenable
It is a hornbook doctrine that the defense of denial,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative
and self-serving, and merits no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.14
In the instant case, petitioner’s defense of denial crumbles in
the face of the positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses during trial. As enunciated by this Court, “[p]ositive
identification where categorical and consistent and not
attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial.”15
The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely
testify against her.
Thus, between the categorical statements of the prosecution
witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials of the accused,
on the other hand, the former must, perforce, prevail.16
We accord the trial court’s findings the probative weight it
deserves in the absence of any compelling reason to discredit
its findings. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the findings
of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal, except
when it overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would have
materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the
trial court did not err in convicting petitioner of the crime of
Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for failure to sufficiently
show reversible error in the assailed decision. The Decision
dated November 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 31158
is AFFIRMED.No costs. SO ORDERED
People vs. Estrada
G.R. Nos. 164368-69. April 2, 2009
On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as
Crim. Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan
against respondent Estrada, among other accused. A separate
Information for illegal use of alias, docketed as Crim. Case No.
26565, was likewise filed against Estrada. The Amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
“That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then President of the Republic of the
Philippines, without having been duly authorized, judicially or
administratively, taking advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to office, i.e., in order to
CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED during his
tenure and his true identity as THE President of the Republic
of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE VELARDE’ IN
SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the SAID
alias “Jose Velarde” which IS neither his registered name at
birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently
consolidated for joint trial. Still another Information, this time
for perjury and docketed as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed
with the Sandiganbayan against Estrada. This was later
consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and 26565.
Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant
of arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.
On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special
Division in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the
charges of plunder and related cases (illegal use of alias and
perjury) against respondent Estrada.3
At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for
plunder, illegal use of alias, and perjury. The People’s
evidence for the illegal alias charge, as summarized by the
Sandiganbayan, consisted of:
A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank (PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty.
Manuel Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on
February 4, 2000, Estrada opened a numbered trust account
(Trust Account C-163) with PCIB and signed as “Jose Velarde”
in the account opening documents; both Ocampo and Curato
also testified that Aprodicio Lacquian and Fernando Chua
were present on that occasion;
B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager
Teresa Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza
(Ortaliza) transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza
deposited several checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-
62502-5 under the account name “Jose Velarde” on the
following dates (as evidenced by deposit receipts duly marked
in evidence):
a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. “MMMMM”)
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. “LLLLL”)
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. “NNNNN”)
d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. “OOOOO”)
f. 25 November 1999 (Exh. “PPPPP”)
g. 20 December 1999 (Exh. “QQQQQ”)
h. 21 December 1999 (Exh. “RRRRR”)
i. 29 December 1999 (Exh. “SSSSS”)
j. 4 January 2000 (Exh. “TTTTT”)
k. 10 May 2000 (Exh. “UUUUU”)
l. 6 June 2000 (Exh. “VVVVV”)
m. 25 July 2000 (Exh. “WWWWW”)
(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that
Lucena Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice
President and, later on, in the Office of the President when
Estrada occupied these positions and when deposits were
made to the Jose Velarde Savings Account No. 0160-62502-
5.”
The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the
consolidated cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted into
evidence in a Resolution dated October 13, 2003.4 The
accused separately moved to reconsider the Sandiganbayan
Resolution;5 the People, on the other hand, filed its
Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.6 The
Sandiganbayan denied the motions in its Resolution dated
November 17, 2003.7
After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved
to be allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases.8 In
its Joint Resolution dated March 10, 2004,9 the
Sandiganbayan only granted the defense leave to file
demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of alias) and
26905 (perjury). Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence
for Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26905.10 His demurrer to
evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565 (illegal use of alias) was
anchored on the following grounds:11
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the
prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa Ocampo and
Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one occasion (4 February
2000), they saw movant use the name “Jose Velarde”;
2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal and
was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned from
Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001, dated 11
October 2001;
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as the
documents offered by the prosecution are banking documents
which, by their nature, are confidential and cannot be revealed
without following proper procedures; and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.
The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated
Opposition that presented the following arguments:12
1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction was
not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no moment
considering that as early as Commonwealth Act No. 142, the
use of alias was already prohibited. Movant is being
prosecuted for violation of C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular
No. 302;
2. Movant’s reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256
SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;
3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended,
requires publication of the alias and the habitual use thereof,
the prosecution has presented more than sufficient evidence in
this regard to convict movant for illegal use of alias; and 4.
Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant case of
illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder.
Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through a
Consolidated Reply Opposition.
The Assailed Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the
Resolution now assailed in this petition. The salient points of
the assailed resolution are:
First—the coverage of Estrada’s indictment. The
Sandiganbayan found that the only relevant evidence for the
indictment are those relating to what is described in the
Information—i.e., the testimonies and documents on the
opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4, 2000. The
Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the disjunctive
“or” between “on or about 04 February 2000” and “sometime
prior or subsequent thereto” means that the act/s allegedly
committed on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken
place prior to or subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive
was simply the prosecution’s procedural tool to guard against
any variance between the date stated in the Information and
that proved during the trial in a situation in which time was not
a material ingredient of the offense; it does not mean and
cannot be read as a roving commission that includes acts
and/or events separate and distinct from those that took place
on the single date “on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto.” The Sandiganbayan ruled that
the use of the disjunctive “or” prevented it from interpreting the
Information any other way.
Second—the People’s failure to present evidence that proved
Estrada’s commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan
found that the People failed to present evidence that Estrada
committed the crime punished under Commonwealth Act No.
142, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142),
as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v. Court of
Appeals.13It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the
context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and
habitual. In Estrada’s case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the
application of the principles was not as simple because of the
complications resulting from the nature of the transaction
involved—the alias was used in connection with the opening of
a numbered trust account made during the effectivity of R.A.
No. 1405, as amended,14 and prior to the enactment of
Republic R.A. No. 9160.15
Estrada did not publicly use the alias “Jose Velarde”:
a. Estrada’s use of the alias “Jose Velarde” in his dealings
with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not
relevant in light of the conclusion that the acts imputed to
Estrada under the Information were the act/s committed on
February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the phrase, “Estrada did…
represent himself as ‘Jose Velarde’ in several transactions,”
standing alone, violates Estrada’s right to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very
general and vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by
the succeeding phrase—“and use and employ the said alias
‘Jose Velarde’ ”—which “is neither his registered name at birth
nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.” Thus, Estrada’s
representations before persons other than those mentioned in
the Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not
fall within the “Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities” specified in the Information. Estrada’s representations
with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not therefore covered by the
indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the
principle in the law of libel that mere communication to a third
person is publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of
publicity is not limited to the way it is defined under the law on
libel; additionally, the application of the libel law definition is
onerous to the accused and is precluded by the ruling in Ursua
that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed
strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled
that the definition under the law on libel, even if it applies,
considers a communication to a third person covered by the
privileged communication rule to be non-actionable. Estrada’s
use of the alias in front of Ocampo and Curato is one such
privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan said:
“Movant’s act of signing “Jose Velarde” in bank documents
being absolutely confidential, the witnessing thereof by bank
officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy by the same law
cannot be considered as ‘public’ as to fall within the ambit of
CA 142 as amended. On account of the absolute
confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said that movant
intended to be known by this name in addition to his real
name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate publicity. Ursua
instructs:
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name
belonging to another person in a single instance without any
sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not
fall within the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.”
c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention not to
be publicly known by the name “Jose Velarde” is shown by the
nature of a numbered account—a perfectly valid banking
transaction at the time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The
opening, too, of a numbered trust account, the Sandiganbayan
further ruled, did not impose on Estrada the obligation to
disclose his real identity—the obligation R.A. No. 6713
imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and
liabilities.16 Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No.
6713 together, Estrada had the absolute obligation to disclose
his assets including the amount of his bank deposits, but he
was under no obligation at all to disclose the other particulars
of the bank account (such as the name he used to open it).
Third—the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.17 The
Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No.
9160 against the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under
fictitious names, and all other similar accounts, is a legislative
acknowledgment that a gaping hole previously existed in our
laws that allowed depositors to hide their true identities. The
Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July
7, 2000—another confirmation that the opening of a numbered
trust account was perfectly legal when it was opened on
February 4, 2000.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No.
142, as interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized
with the provisions of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under
the principle that every statute should be construed in a way
that will harmonize it with existing laws. A reasonable scrutiny,
the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation to the
present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias within
the context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a
numbered account made before bank officers) is protected by
the secrecy provisions of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside
the coverage of CA No. 142 until the passage into law of R.A.
No. 9160. The Petition
The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding
that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias “Jose
Velarde” was not public despite the presence of Messrs.
Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4 February 2000;
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in holding
that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his alias “Jose
Velarde” was allowable under banking rules, despite the clear
prohibition under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in applying
R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use of alias
punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142;
4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application made
by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and Commonwealth Act
No. 142 were proper;
5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended Information
in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the alias “Jose Velarde”
by respondent Joseph Estrada on February 4, 2000;
6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in departing from its earlier final finding on the non-
applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and forcing its
application to the instant case.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read: “Section
1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema,
television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different
from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office
of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered
in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons whose births have not been registered
in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized,
have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The
name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two
surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for
authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to
obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person
shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than
one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person’s
baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant’s name, if an alien, and his
pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or
real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired
alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian
name and the alien immigrant’s name shall be recorded in the
proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or
names other than his original or real name unless the same is
or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.”
How this law is violated has been answered by the Ursua
definition of an alias—“a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he
is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute
name authorized by a competent authority.” There must be, in
the words of Ursua, a “sign or indication that the user intends
to be known by this name (the alias) in addition to his real
name from that day forth… [for the use of alias to] fall within
the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended.” Ursua
further relates the historical background and rationale that led
to the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:
“The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily to curb
the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of
different names and aliases which created tremendous
confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered
on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious
reasons could not be successfully maintained against the
Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act
of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized
by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil
register.”19
Following the doctrine of stare decisis,20 we are guided by the
Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142
may be committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other
words, is unavoidable in the application of and the
determination of criminal liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the
application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estrada’s
position in the government; at the time of the commission of
the offense, he was the President of the Republic who is
required by law to disclose his true name. We do not find this
argument sufficient to justify a distinction between a man on
the street, on one hand, and the President of the Republic, on
the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first
place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or
impliedly, that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142
as applied to Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or
screen name of Joseph Estrada, which name he has used
even when he was already the President of the Philippines.
Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the use of the screen
name of the accused, as shown by the title of the present
petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on the
People’s claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by
the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should
be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the
accused.21 The mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the
same whoever the accused may be. The People also calls our
attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan ruling (Resolution dated
February 6, 2002) denying Estrada’s motion to quash the
Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the
application of Ursua under the following tenor:
“The use of the term “alias” in the Amended Information in
itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the ruling in
the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA 147 [1996]),
on which the accused heavily relies in his motion to quash.
The term “alias” means “otherwise known as” (Webster Third
New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 53). The charge of
using an “alias” logically implies that another name has been
used publicly and habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known
by such name. In any case, the amended information adverts
to “several transactions” and signing of documents with the
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the
above-mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the
accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly different from
facts established in the Ursua case where another name was
used by the accused in a single instance without any sign or
indication that that [sic] he intended to be known from that day
by this name in addition to his real name.”22
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final
ruling on its non-applicability—a ruling that binds the parties in
the present case. The People thus claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred to the point of gravely abusing its
discretion when it resurrected the application of Ursua,
resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the
cited Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order—
a ruling denying a motion to quash23—that cannot be given the
attributes of finality and immutability that are generally
accorded to judgments or orders that finally dispose of the
whole, of or particular matters in, a case.24 The
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
because its effects would only be provisional in character, and
would still require the issuing court to undertake substantial
proceedings in order to put the controversy to rest.25 It is basic
remedial law that an interlocutory order is always under the
control of the court and may be modified or rescinded upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final
judgment.26Perez v. Court of Appeals,27albeit a civil case,
instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res
adjudicata effects. Says Perez:
“The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved only an
interlocutory matter, the principle of res judicata cannot be
applied in this case. There can be no res judicata where the
previous order in question was not an order or judgment
determinative of an issue of fact pending before the court but
was only an interlocutory order because it required the parties
to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this case, the
lifting of the restraining order paved the way for the possession
of the fishpond on the part of petitioners and/or their
representatives pending the resolution of the main action for
injunction. In other words, the main issue of whether or not
private respondent may be considered a sublessee or a
transferee of the lease entitled to possess the fishpond under
the circumstances of the case had yet to be resolved when the
restraining order was lifted.”28
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan
solely looked at the allegations of the Information to determine
the sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any
evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present
demurrer to evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller
view of the prosecution’s case, and was faced with the issue of
whether the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to prove the
allegations of the Information. Under these differing views, the
Sandiganbayan may arrive at a different conclusion on the
application of Ursua,the leading case in the application of CA
142, and the change in ruling is not per se indicative of grave
abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law is
strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan
ruling on the application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursua’s jurisprudential binding
effect, the People also argues in its petition that Estrada’s
case is different from Ursua’s for the following reasons: (1)
respondent Estrada used and intended to continually use the
alias “Jose Velarde” in addition to the name “Joseph Estrada”;
(2) Estrada’s use of the alias was not isolated or limited to a
single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias “Jose Velarde”
was designed to cause and did cause “confusion and fraud in
business transactions” which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the
evidence it presented more than satisfied the requirements of
CA No. 142, as amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or
established that Estrada’s use of the alias was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties’
expressed positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua
framework the assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting
the demurrer to evidence. The prosecution has the burden of
proof to show that the evidence it presented with the
Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements, particularly
on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an
aliasWhat is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and
abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estrada’s use of the
alias “Jose Velarde” on February 4, 2000. It posits that there
was a main transaction—one that took place on February 4,
2000—but there were other transactions covered by the
phrase “prior to or subsequent thereto; the Information
specifically referred to “several transactions”… “with Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.” To the People, the
restrictive finding—that the phrase “prior to or subsequent
thereto” is absorbed by the phrase “on or about 04 February
2000”—drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on
the constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both
the transactions involved and the documents signed with
various entities; there is the undeniable essential relationship
between the allegations of the multiplicity of transactions, on
one hand, and the additional antecedent of “prior to or
subsequent thereto,” on the other. It argues that the
Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase “prior to or subsequent
thereto” into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a
convenient and totally unwarranted escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the
least exacting in satisfying the constitutional requirement that
the accused has to be informed of the accusation against him.
Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that an allegation of the approximate date of the commission
of the offense will suffice, while Section 11 of the same Rule
provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or
information the precise date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This liberality
allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the “time”
given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the
time of the commission of the offense does not need to be
proven as alleged, and that the complaint will be sustained if
the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time
within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action (citing People v. Bugayong [299
SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil. 20, 22]).
Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are
liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in disregarding the additional
clause “prior to or subsequent thereto”; under the liberality
principle, the allegations of the acts constitutive of the offense
finally determine the sufficiency of the allegations of time. The
People thus claims that no surprise could have taken place
that would prevent Estrada from properly defending himself;
the information fully notified him that he was being accused of
using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature—the right of
Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of
Court implementing this constitutional right, a complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense in the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed.29 As to the cause of accusation, the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know the offense charged
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances, and for the
court to pronounce judgment.30 The date of the commission of
the offense need not be precisely stated in the complaint or
information except when the precise date is a material
ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have
been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission.31
The information must at all times embody the essential
elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and
circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the
accused so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his
defense.32 In short, the allegations in the complaint or
information, as written, must fully inform or acquaint the
accused—the primary reader of and the party directly affected
by the complaint or information—of the charge/s laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that “… on or about 04
February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did]… willfully,
unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS ‘JOSE
VELARDE’ IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and
employ the SAID alias “Jose Velarde” which IS neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing
documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities.”
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayan’s reading of
the Information, as this was how the accused might have
similarly read and understood the allegations in the
Information and, on this basis, prepared his defense. Broken
down into its component parts, the allegation of time in the
Information plainly states that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2)
ORbefore February 4, 2000; (3) ORsometime prior or
subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City of Manila, Estrada
represented himself as “Jose Velarde” in several transactions
in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the
signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other
corporate entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000;
they were all made on or about or prior or subsequent to that
date, thus plainly implying that all these transactions took
place only on February 4, 2000 or on another single date
sometime before or after February 4, 2000. To be sure, the
Information could have simply said “on or about February 4,
2000” to capture all the alternative approximate dates, so that
the phrase “sometime prior or subsequent thereto” would
effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately
from the “on or about” already expressed. This consequent
uselessness of the “prior or subsequent thereto” phrase
cannot be denied, but it is a direct and necessary
consequence of the use of the “OR” between the two phrases
and the “THERETO” that referred back to February 4, 2000 in
the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been
very different (and would have been clearly in accord with the
People’s present interpretation) had the Information simply
used “AND” instead of “OR” to separate the phrases; the intent
to refer to various transactions occurring on various dates and
occasions all proximate to February 4, 2000 could not be
disputed. Unfortunately for the People, the imprecision in the
use of “OR” is the reality the case has to live with. To act
contrary to this reality would violate Estrada’s right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him;
the multiple transactions on several separate days that the
People claims would result in surprise and denial of an
opportunity to prepare for Estrada, who has a right to rely on
the single day mentioned in the Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation
of time in the Information, another issue that the allegation of
time and our above conclusion raise relates to what act or
acts, constituting a violation of the offense charged, were
actually alleged in the Information.
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the
People’s case, as it deals a fatal blow on the People’s claim
that Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our
mind, the repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot
be deemed “habitual,” as it does not amount to a customary
practice or use. This reason alone dictates the dismissal of the
petition under CA No. 142 and the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts,
and the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No.
1405, and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo
and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law,
the presence of two other persons who are not bank officers—
Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua—when Estrada’s
signed the bank documents as “Jose Velarde” amounted to a
“public” use of an alias that violates CA No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to
premise the validity of Estrada’s prosecution for violation of CA
No. 142 on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous,
improper, and constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no
banking law provision allowing the use of aliases in the
opening of bank accounts existed; at most, it was allowed by
mere convention or industry practice, but not by a statute
enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estrada’s
prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302
dated October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada
stands charged with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since
1936, and not with a violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the
use of alias in bank transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302
is allowed is inconsequential because as early as CA No. 142,
the use of an alias (except for certain purposes which do not
include banking) was already prohibited. Nothing in CA No.
142 exempted the use of aliases in banking transactions, since
the law did not distinguish or limit its application; it was
therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have done so.
Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances
cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting
and enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its
relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142
excuses the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an
exception to CA No. 142’s coverage. Harmonization of laws,
the People posits, is allowed only if the laws intended to be
harmonized refer to the same subject matter, or are at least
related with one another. The three laws which the
Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to
one another; they each deal with a different subject matter,
prohibits a different act, governs a different conduct, and
covers a different class of persons,33 and there was no need to
force their application to one another. Harmonization of laws,
the People adds, presupposes the existence of conflict or
incongruence between or among the provisions of various
laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to
trust transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it
applies only to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust
account, according to the People, may not be considered a
deposit because it does not create the juridical relation of
creditor and debtor; trust and deposit operations are treated
separately and are different in legal contemplation; trust
operation is separate and distinct from banking and requires a
grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not covered by
deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayan’s
conclusion that the transaction or communication was
privileged in nature was erroneous—a congruent interpretation
of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 shows that a person who
signs in a public or private transaction a name or alias, other
than his original name or the alias he is authorized to use,
shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank
employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank
transactions except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A.
No. 1405. At most, the People argues, the prohibition in R.A.
No. 1405 covers bank employees and officers only, and not
Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada from disclosing and
making public his use of an alias to other people, including
Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit
and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that
the use of an alias before bank officers does not violate CA
No. 142 effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing
and the concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it
sustains an anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law
to silence bank officials and employees from reporting the
commission of crimes. The People contends that the law—
R.A. No. 1405—was not intended by the Legislature to be
used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the commission of
crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only be
interpreted, understood and applied so that right and justice
would prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the
Sandiganbayan position that the rule in the law of libel—that
mere communication to a third person is publicity—does not
apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of
Ursua—particularly, the requirement that there be intention by
the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited
above—tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is
more than mere communication to a third person; the use of
the alias, to be considered public, must be made openly, or in
an open manner or place, or to cause it to become generally
known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA No. 142,
the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person
who shall publicly be known under that other name. In other
words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when
Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account
No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be
publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to
Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of the public who
had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the confidential
matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as
President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he
shared matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while
Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties
of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of
his affairs. Thus, Estrada could not be said to have intended
his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public consumption by
the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the
room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged
representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the
evidence for these representations to be admissible. All of
Estrada’s representations to these people were made in
privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment
rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as
the alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust
account—a transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers
absolutely confidential in nature.34 We previously rejected, in
Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,35 the People’s nitpicking argument
on the alleged dichotomy between bank deposits and trust
transactions, when we said:
“The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the
term “deposits,” as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact that
they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the
trustor and the bank, does not lie. An examination of the law
shows that the term “deposits” used therein is to be
understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give
rise to a creditor-debtor relationship between the depositor and
the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
Government to give encouragement to the people to
deposit their money in banking institutions and to
discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist
in the economic development of the country.
(Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be used by
bank for authorized loans to third persons, then such
account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-
debtor relationship between the depositor and the
bank, falls under the category of accounts which the
 law precisely seeks to protect for the purpose of
boosting the economic development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account.
The Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban
Bank provides that the trust account covers “deposit,
placement or investment of funds” by Urban Bank for
and in behalf of petitioner. The money deposited
under Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended
not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested
by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not
protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private
hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by
bank in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind
the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that
the term “deposits” was intended to be understood
broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with bank or
banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be
examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon
written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials, or in cases where the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase “of whatever nature” proscribes any restrictive
interpretation of “deposits.” Moreover, it is clear from the
immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies
not only to money which is deposited but also to those which
are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended
to apply only to “deposits” in the strict sense of the word.
Otherwise, there would have been no need to add the phrase
“or invested. Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to
cover Trust Account No. 858.”36
We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No.
1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily
protected or recognized zones of privacy.37 Given the private
nature of Estrada’s act of signing the documents as “Jose
Velarde” related to the opening of the trust account, the
People cannot claim that there was already a public use of
alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We
need not even consider here the impact of the obligations
imposed by R.A. No.1405 on the bank officers; what is
essentially significant is the privacy situation that is necessarily
implied in these kinds of transactions. This statutorily
guaranteed privacy and secrecy effectively negate a
conclusion that the transaction was done publicly or with the
intent to use the alias publicly.
The enactment of R.A. No. 9160, on the other hand, is a
significant development only because it clearly manifests that
prior to its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous
accounts were permitted banking transactions, whether they
be allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be
sure, an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent
law cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.
We hasten to add that this holistic application and
interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt to
harmonize these laws. A finding of commission of the offense
punished under CA No. 142 must necessarily rest on the
evidence of the requisites for culpability, as amplified in Ursua.
The application of R.A. No. 1405 is significant only because
Estrada’s use of the alias was pursuant to a transaction that
the law considers private or, at the very least, where the law
guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties
to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405
tangentially interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this
light, there is no actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and
R.A. No. 1405 that requires harmonization. Each operates
within its own sphere, but must necessarily be read together
when these spheres interface with one another. Finally, R.A.
No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to the
indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an
influencing factor in his indictment.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply
looked at the totality of the circumstances obtaining in
Estrada’s use of the alias “Jose Velarde” vis-à-vis the Ursua
requisites. We do not decide here whether Estrada’s use of an
alias when he occupied the highest executive position in the
land was valid and legal; we simply determined, as the
Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made liable for the
offense charged based on the evidence the People presented.
As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of
criminal liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this
burden, as they did fail in this case, the rule of law requires
that we so declare. We do so now in this review and
accordingly find no reversible error of law in the assailed
Sandiganbayan ruling WHEREFORE, premises considered,
we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 162187. November 18, 2005.
The Antecedents
On April 2, 1996, the Refractories Corporation of the
Philippines (RCP) filed a protest before the Special Committee
on Anti-Dumping of the Department of Finance against certain
importations of Hamburg Trading Corporation (HTC), a
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. The matter involved 151.070 tons of magnesite-
based refractory bricks from Germany.2The case was
docketed as Anti-Dumping Case No. I-98. The protest was
referred to the Bureau of Import Services (BIS) of the
Department of Trade and Industry, to determine if there was a
prima facie case for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7843,
the Anti-Dumping Law. Sometime in February 1997, the BIS
submitted its report to the Tariff Commission, declaring that a
prima facie case existed and that continued importation of
refractory bricks from Germany would harm the local industry.
It adopted the amount of DM 1,200 per metric ton as the
normal value of the imported goods.3
The HTC received a copy of the said report on February 14,
1997. However, before it could respond, the chairman of the
Tariff Commission prodded the parties to settle the matter
amicably. A conference ensued between RCP Senior Vice
President and Assistant General Manager Criste Villanueva
and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand, and HTC President and
General Manager Horst-Kessler Von Sprengeisen and Sales
Manager Dennis Gonzales, on the other. During the
conference, the parties agreed that the refractory bricks were
imported by the HTC at a price less than its normal value of
DM 1,200, and that such importation was likely to injure the
local industry. The parties also agreed to settle the case to
avoid expenses and protracted litigation. HTC was required to
reform its price policy/structure of its importation and sale of
refractory bricks from Germany to conform to the provisions of
R.A. No. 7843 and its rules and regulations. Jesus Borgonia
thereafter prepared and signed a compromise agreement
containing the terms agreed upon which Villanueva and
Borgonia signed.4 Bienvenido Flores, an Office Clerk of RCP,
delivered the agreement to HTC at the 9th Floor of Ramon
Magsaysay Center Building, 1680 Roxas Boulevard, Manila by
Von Sprengeisen’s approval.5
However, Von Sprengeisen did not sign the agreement.
Borgonia revised the agreement by inserting the phrase
“based on the findings of the BIS” in paragraph 1 thereof.
Villanueva and Borgonia signed the agreement and had the
same delivered to the office of HTC on April 22, 1997 by Lino
M. Gutierrez, a technical assistant of RCP. Gonzales received
the agreement and delivered the same to Von Sprengeisen.
After 20 minutes, Gonzales returned, with the agreement
already signed by Von Sprengeisen.6 Gonzales, who had also
signed, then gave it to Gutierrez. On the same day, Notary
Public Zenaida P. De Zuñiga notarized the agreement.7
Gonzales delivered a copy of the notarized Agreement to
HTC.8 RCP submitted the compromise agreement to the Tariff
Commission. During the May 9, 1997 hearing before the
Commission for the approval of the agreement, a
representative of HTC appeared. He offered no objection to
the Agreement. The Commission submitted its report to the
Special Committee which rendered a decision declaring that,
based on the findings of the BIS, the normal value of the
imported refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton. HTC
received a copy of the decision on March 4, 1998. Neither
RCP nor HTC appealed the decision to the Court of Tax
Appeals.
In the meantime, HTC imported refractory bricks from
Germany anew and noted that the normal value of the said
importation under the decision of the Special Committee
based on the BIS report was DM 1,200 per metric ton. On July
28, 1998, the HTC filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or
Vacate Judgment with the Special Committee on Anti-
Dumping, praying that such decision be declared null and void
on the following grounds:
11 1.
 THE FRAUD HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY THE
PROTESTANT DURING THE NEGOTIATION FOR
THE PREPARATION OF THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT.
12 2.
 THAT INSERTIONS AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF
THE FACTS NOT AGREED UPON WAS
DELIBERATELY AND SURREPTITIOUSLY MADE BY
THE PROTESTANT IN THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT OF THE PROTESTEE.9
The motion was verified by Von Sprengeisen. The HTC
averred therein that Villanueva violated Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code when he surreptitiously inserted the
phrase “based on the findings of the BIS” in the agreement
without the knowledge and consent of Von Sprengeisen and
despite their agreement to put behind them the findings of the
BIS. Appended to the motion was an Affidavit of Merit
executed by Von Sprengeisen in which he alleged, inter alia,
that sometime in February 1997, the BIS came out with its
Report declaring that the normal value of the magnesite-based
refractory bricks was DM 1,200 per metric ton; before HTC
could respond to the report, Villanueva invited him to a
conference for the purpose of finding the best solution to the
pending case before the Commission; he and Gonzales
attended the meeting during which it was agreed, by way of a
compromise, that the parties will accept the amount of DM
1,050 per metric ton as the normal value for all magnesite-
based refractory bricks from Germany; when he received the
draft of the compromise agreement prepared by Villanueva, he
approved the same; subsequently, Villanueva transmitted a
compromise agreement already signed by him to Von
Sprengeisen for his review, approval and signature; believing
that the compromise agreement reproduced the contents of
the first compromise agreement, he signed the second
agreement without reading it; when he received, on March 4,
1998, a copy of the decision of the Tariff Commission based
on the compromise agreement of the parties wherein the
committee adopted the findings and recommendations of the
BIS (that the normal value of the shipment was DM 1,200 per
metric ton), he was shocked because he never agreed to the
use of such findings for the reformation of its price policies;
there was, in fact, an agreement between him and Villanueva
to put behind them the findings of the BIS; he called up
Villanueva at his office but failed to contact him despite several
attempts; suspecting that something amiss happened, he had
the draft of the first compromise agreement retrieved but his
secretary failed to locate the same; it was only sometime later
that his secretary found the folder-file containing the draft and
was appalled to discover that Villanueva had substantially
altered the first draft of the compromise agreement; this made
him conclude and confirm his suspicion that Villanueva, thru
deceit and fraud, induced him to sign the compromise
agreement to the prejudice of the HTC.10
The RCP opposed the motion. But, in a parallel move,
Villanueva, in his capacity as Senior Vice President and
Assistant General Manager of RCP, filed a criminal complaint
for perjury against Von Sprengeisen in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila. Appended thereto was a complaint-
affidavit executed by Villanueva wherein he declared, inter
alia, that Von Sprengeisen made the following false
statements in the Urgent Motion, thus:
a.
 [Complainant] was the one who called up his office,
inviting him to a meeting for the purpose of finding the
best and most equitable solution to the case (p. 3,
Urgent Motion);
b.
 RCP and Hamburg Trading agreed to put behind
them the findings and recommendations of the Bureau
of Import Services (BIS) with respect to the anti-
dumping protest filed by RCP (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
c.
 The original version of the Compromise Agreement
sent to him was merely a draft (p. 3, Urgent Motion);
d.
 The phrase “based on the findings of the Bureau of
Import Services” was inserted in paragraph 1 of the
final Compromise Agreement without his knowledge
and consent (p. 3, Urgent Motion); and
e.
 [Complainant] was the one who surreptitiously
inserted the aforesaid phrase (p. 3, Urgent Motion).11
Villanueva also alleged that Von Sprengeisen made the
following false statements in his Affidavit of Merit:
a.
 [Complainant] invited him to a conference for the
purpose of finding the best solution to the case;
b.
 [Complainant and he] agreed to put behind [them]
the findings and recommendation of the BIS submitted
to the Secretary of Finance;
c.
 We agreed to the amount of DM 1,050/ton as the
normal value for all magnesite-based refractory bricks
from Germany;
d.
 The original version of the Compromise Agreement
sent to him was merely a draft; and
e.
 Through deceit and fraud, [complainant] induced
[respondent] to sign the final Compromise
Agreement.12
In his Counter-Affidavit, Von Sprengeisen averred that
whoever called the other for a conference was not a material
matter. Since the first draft of the Compromise Agreement
transmitted to him was by fax, he asked the complainant to
send to him the hard copy of the Agreement for his signature.
He further narrated that when he received the hard copy of the
compromise agreement, he did not bother to review since he
assumed that it contained the same provisions in the faxed
copy. He did not suggest that the phrase “based on the
findings of the BIS” be inserted in the hard copy of the
agreement because he and Villanueva were at odds on the
BIS finding the normal price of the goods was DM 1,200 per
metric ton. He insisted that it would have been senseless of
him to agree to such insertion; as such, he did not make any
willful and deliberate assertion of any falsehood as to any
material fact.13
Investigating Prosecutor Francisco G. Supnet found no
probable cause for perjury against the private respondent and
recommended the dismissal of the complaint. Second
Assistant City Prosecutor Leoncia Dimagiba reviewed the
resolution of Prosecutor Supnet and found probable cause for
perjury against the private respondent for alleging in his
Affidavit of Merit that he was induced to sign the compromise
agreement through fraud and deceit. According to the Second
Assistant City Prosecutor, the allegation of the private
respondent “thru deceit and fraud to sign the final Compromise
Agreement” was a deliberate assertion of a falsehood,
designed as it was merely to give the BIS the impression that
private respondent was misled into agreeing to the
compromise agreement. She further opined that the allegation
was perjurious, considering that the private respondent had
sufficient time to pass upon the Compromise Agreement and
could have availed the services of legal minds who could
review the terms and conditions thereof before signing the
same;14 hence, she recommended the reversal of Prosecutor
Supnet’s resolution and the filing of the information. The City
Prosecutor approved the recommendation of the Second
Assistant City Prosecutor. Accordingly, an Information for
perjury was filed against the private respondent with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.
The private respondent appealed the resolution to the
Secretary of Justice, who reversed the resolution of the City
Prosecutor on September 20, 2002. According to the Justice
Secretary, the complainant failed to establish the materiality of
the alleged false assertions and that the said assertions were
willful and deliberate. Moreover, the allegations in the Affidavit
of Merit are not altogether false since the intention of the
parties in executing the compromise agreement was precisely
to put behind the ruling of the BIS, despite which the
complainant inserted the condition that the parties would be
bound by such findings and recommendations.15 The decretal
portion of the resolution reads:
“WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the City Prosecutor
of Manila is hereby REVERSED. The City Prosecutor is
directed to withdraw the information for perjury against
respondent Horst-Kessler von Sprengeisen and to report the
action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED . Villanueva then filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA assailing the resolution of the Justice Secretary,
alleging therein that grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction, was committed in issuing the
said resolution.17 The private respondent, for his part, sought
the dismissal of the petition alleging that, as found by the
Justice Secretary, there was no probable cause against him
for perjury.18
On February 13, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition and
affirmed the resolution of the Justice Secretary.19
The CA declared that, as posited by the Office of the Solicitor
General in its comment on the petition, the parties had agreed
to put behind them the findings and recommendations of the
BIS with respect to the anti-dumping protest. The appellate
court stated that its finding is buttressed by the fact that the
amount of DM 1,050 was not mentioned in the first
compromise agreement and that, under such agreement, the
HTC obliged itself “to reform its pricing policy and structure
with respect to refractory products being imported to and sold
in the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
7843 and its implementing rules and requirements.” The CA
emphasized that it was inclined to believe that there was no
meeting of the minds of the parties when the petitioner
inserted the phrase “based on the findings of the BIS” in the
revised compromise agreement; hence, there could not have
been perjury when the private respondent executed the
Affidavit of Merit and the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or
Vacate Judgment. The CA also agreed with the findings of the
Secretary of Justice that the insertion of the condition in the
compromise agreement that the parties would be bound by the
BIS findings and recommendation gave the private respondent
reason to believe that he was deceived by the petitioner into
signing the Agreement; as such, the private respondent’s
allegation in his Affidavit of Merit, that he was induced to
signing the Compromise Agreement through fraud and deceit,
was not altogether false. Consequently, the CA ruled, the
private respondent did not make any willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.20 The appellate court conformed to
the disquisitions of the Secretary of Justice in the assailed
resolution and concluded that the private respondent did not,
in the Affidavit of Merit, make a willful and deliberate assertion
of a falsehood.21
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court against private respondent Von Sprengeisen
and the Secretary of Justice, insisting that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed
resolution.
The petitioner maintains that, during the preliminary
investigation, he adduced substantial evidence to prove
probable cause for perjury against the private respondent. He
maintains that probable cause does not mean actual and
positive causes; nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. He avers that, contrary to the
claim of the private respondent in his Affidavit of Merit, the
meeting between him and Jesus Borgonia, on the one hand,
and the private respondent and HTC Sales Manager Dennis
Gonzales, on the other, was arranged by the latter and not by
him. As gleaned from the draft and final copies of the
compromise agreement, the parties made express reference
to the prima facie findings of the BIS that the actual export
price of HTC was below the fair market value. By agreeing that
such findings of the BIS be included in the Compromise
Agreement, the said private respondent impliedly agreed to
such findings as basis of the price for which HTC would sell
the German-made magnesite-based refractory bricks in the
Philippines. The petitioner avers that the fact that the amount
of DM 1,050 per metric ton was not specifically mentioned in
the compromise agreement was of no importance, considering
the parties’ acceptance of such findings is based on R.A. No.
7843. He points out that the private respondent could not have
failed to notice the difference between the first draft and the
final copy of the agreement before signing it because, as
alleged by Lino Gutierrez in his reply affidavit, it took the
private respondent twenty minutes or so after receiving the
agreement to review the final draft before signing it. Moreover,
the Urgent Motion to Set Aside and/or Vacate Judgment
signed by the private respondent was filed more than 15
months from the execution of the compromise agreement and
after four months from the Tariff Commission’s approval
thereof.
The petitioner argues that it is incredible that during the
interregnum of 19 months, the private respondent failed to
discover the revisions/insertions in the final draft of the
compromise agreement. Considering the premises, the
petitioner submits, the private respondent’s filing of the Urgent
Motion for and in behalf of HTC was merely an afterthought, to
enable the latter to escape compliance with the terms and
conditions of the Agreement.
The petitioner further insists that the insertion of the contested
phrase in the final draft of the compromise agreement was
necessary although it may not be in the best interest of HTC.
He posits that the falsehoods made by the private respondent
in his Urgent Motion and Affidavit of Merit were material to the
proceedings in the Anti-Dumping Office of the Tariff
Commission because these were used to set aside the
compromise agreement executed by the parties.
In his Comment on the petition, the private respondent avers
that the issues raised by the petitioner are factual, hence,
improper in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The determination of the existence of a
probable cause is primarily an administrative sanction of the
Secretary of Justice. He insists that the findings of the Justice
Secretary should be accorded great respect, especially since
the same were upheld by the CA. He asserts that the
petitioner failed to establish in the CA and in this Court that the
Justice Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in her resolution.
The petition has no merit.
The pivotal issue in this case is factual—whether or not, based
on the records, there was probable cause for the private
respondent’s indictment for perjury.
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of
fact may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.
Findings of facts of a quasi-judicial agency, as affirmed by the
CA, are generally conclusive on the Court, unless cogent facts
and circumstances of such a nature warranting the
modification or reversal of the assailed decision were ignored,
misunderstood or misinterpreted. Thus, the Court may delve
into and resolve factual issues in exceptional cases. The
petitioner has failed to establish that any such circumstance is
present in the case at bar. The Court finds that the public
respondent did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed resolution, and that the CA did not commit any
reversible error in its assailed decision and resolution. If at all
the public respondent erred in issuing the assailed resolution,
such is merely an error in the exercise of jurisdiction,
reversible by a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court especially so where, as in this case, the issues before
the CA were factual and not legal. The absence or existence
of probable cause in a given case involves a calibration and a
reexamination of the evidence adduced by the parties before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila and the probative
weight thereof. The CA thus ruled correctly when it dismissed
the petition before it.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information,
has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that
the private respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a
state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion that a thing is so. The
term does not mean “actual or positive cause;” nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act
or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the
prosecution in support of the charge.”23
The determination of its existence lies within the discretion of
the prosecuting officers after conducting a preliminary
investigation upon complaint of an offended party.24 The
Resolution of the Secretary of Justice declaring the absence or
existence of a probable cause affirmed by the CA is accorded
high respect. However, such finding may be nullified where
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction is established.25
Perjury is defined and penalized in Article 183 of the Revised
Penal Code, thus:
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn
affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful
statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make an affidavit
upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu
of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in
this and the three preceding articles of this section shall suffer
the respective penalties provided therein.
Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may affect
the earnest concerns of the parties before a tribunal. The
felony is consummated when the false statement is made.26
The seminal modern treatment of the history of perjury
concludes that one consideration of policy overshadows all
others—the measures taken against the offense must not be
so severe as to discourage aggrieved parties from lodging
complaints or testifying.27 As quoted by Dean Wigmore, a
leading 19th Century Commentator, noted that English law,
“throws every fence round a person accused of perjury, for the
obligation of protecting witnesses from oppression or
annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having made
false testimony is far paramount to that of giving even perjury
its deserts.”28
Perjury is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under
oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a
material matter.29The elements of the felony are:
13 (a)
 That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
14 (b)
 That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer
oath.
15 (c)
 That in that statement or affidavit, the accused
made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
16 (d)
 That the sworn statement or affidavit containing
the falsity is required by law or made for a legal
purpose.30
A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not
enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful.31 Perjury
being a felony by dolo, there must be malice on the part of the
accused.32 Willfully means intentionally; with evil intent and
legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged
perjurious statement is false with the intent that it should be
received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is
equivalent to “knowingly.” “Deliberately” implies meditated as
distinguished from inadvertent acts.33It must appear that the
accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously
ignorant of its truth.34
Perjury cannot be willful where the oath is according to belief
or conviction as to its truth. A false statement of a belief is not
perjury. Bona fide belief in the truth of a statement is an
adequate defense.35A false statement which is obviously the
result of an honest mistake is not perjury.
There are two essential elements of proof for perjury: (1) the
statement made by the defendants must be proven false; and
(2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe those
statements to be true.36
Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an
internal act. It may be proved by his admissions or by
circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may
be determined by the things he says and does, from proof of a
motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself, and from other
facts tending to show that the accused really knew the things
he claimed not to know.37
A conviction for perjury cannot be sustained merely upon the
contradictory sworn statements of the accused. The
prosecution must prove which of the two statements is false
and must show the statement to be false by other evidence
than the contradicting statement.38 The rationale of this
principle is thus: “… Proof that accused has given
contradictory testimony under oath at a different time will not
be sufficient to establish the falsity of testimony charged as
perjury, for this would leave simply one oath of the defendant
as against another, and it would not appear that the testimony
charged was false rather than the testimony contradictory
thereof. The two statements will simply neutralize each other;
there must be some corroboration of the contradictory
testimony. Such corroboration, however, may be furnished by
evidence aliunde tending to show perjury independently of the
declarations of testimony of the accused.”39
The term “material matter” is the main fact subject of the
inquiry, or any circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or
any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or
strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry,
or which legitimately affects the credence of any witness who
testified. In this case, a matter is material if it has a material
effect or tendency to influence the Commission in resolving the
motion of HTC one way or the other. The effects of the
statement are weighed in terms of potentiality rather than
probability.40The prosecution need not prove that the false
testimony actually influenced the Commission.41
The private respondent did err when he declared, in the
motion of the HTC and his affidavit, that it was the petitioner
who invited him to a conference. The truth of the matter is that
it was Gonzales who did so. Nonetheless, the issue of who
called for a conference is of de minimis importance because,
after all, the parties agreed to meet after having been prodded
by the Chairman of the Commission to settle the case instead
of going through the tribulations and expenses of a protracted
litigation. No adverse inference (related to the merits of their
respective contention in this case) can be ascribed as to
whoever called the conference. After all, parties are even
urged to settle cases amicably. Besides, as correctly declared
by the Second Assistant City Prosecutor in her resolution:
“The allegation that it was complainant who invited respondent
to the meeting may not be a deliberate lie. Respondent may
not have known who arranged the meeting, but as he was able
to talk to complainant, he presumed that it was complainant
who extended the invitation. Moreover, the identity of the one
who initiated the meeting is not material considering that there
was a meeting of the minds of the Parties.”42
The Court also agrees with the contention of the private
respondent that the copy of the first agreement transmitted to
him was a fax copy of the draft, and that, contrary to the
allegations of the private respondent, such agreement was
prepared by Borgonia and not by the petitioner. As gleaned
from page two of the agreement, the particulars of the
residence certificates of the petitioner and the private
respondent were not typewritten, hence, cannot as yet be
notarized. As claimed by the private respondent, a copy was
transmitted to him for his personal review, and if he found it to
be in order, the petitioner and Borgonia would prepare and
sign the agreement and give it back to him for review and
signature, with the particulars of his community tax certificate
indicated in the final copy.
Undeniably, the identity of the person who prepared or caused
to prepare the compromise agreement subsequently signed by
the petitioner and the private respondent was of prime
importance because only such person should be charged for
perjury. The private respondent erroneously stated in his
Affidavit of Merit and Urgent Motion that it was the petitioner
who prepared the agreement that was signed by the parties. It
turned out that it was Borgonia who prepared the first and the
second copies. However, the private respondent cannot be
held liable for perjury since it was Borgonia who prepared the
agreement and not the petitioner. The Court agrees with the
following contention of the private respondent in his counter-
affidavit:
“4.6 While complainant claims that it was not he but Mr.
Borgonia who made the insertions, there is no doubt that,
indeed, the insertions were made into the document. Since
complainant is the signatory to the Compromise Agreement, it
is but natural for one to presume that he had made the
insertions. At the same time, I can not be expected to know
that it was Mr. Borgonia, as claimed by complainant, who
made such insertions.”43
Indeed, Borgonia was merely the Manager of the Management
Information Group of RCP, whereas the petitioner was no less
than its Senior Vice President and Assistant General Manager,
Borgonia’s superior. Unless and until approved by the
petitioner, any agreement prepared by Borgonia was merely a
piece of paper, barren of any legal effect. In this case, the
compromise agreement prepared by Borgonia had the
petitioner’s imprimatur. Borgonia was merely a witness to the
agreement. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner
had the compromise agreement prepared under his
supervision and control. It cannot thus be concluded that the
private respondent made a deliberate falsehood when he
alleged that the agreement was prepared by the petitioner.
The Court is not persuaded by the petitioner’s claim that,
during the conference, he and the private respondent agreed
that, based on the BIS report, the normal value of the imported
refractory bricks per metric ton was DM 1,200, and that such
report would be used as basis for the revision of the price
policy and structure of HTC.
It bears stressing that, during the conference, the petitioner
and the private respondent had agreed on three aspects of the
case: (1) based on the prima facie findings of the BIS, the
normal value of the goods per meter ton was DM 1,200 and
that the actual export price of HTC was below the fair market
value; (2) to terminate the case, HTC will have to adjust and
revise its price policy and structure for imported refractory
bricks to conform to R.A. No. 7843 and rules and regulations
implementing the law; and (3) if HTC fails or refuses to comply
with its undertaking, RCP will be entitled to a writ of execution
without need of demand. However, the petitioner and the
private respondent could not have agreed on such base price;
the petitioner insisted on the amount recommended by the BIS
(DM 1,200) while the private respondent insisted on DM 950.
There was an impasse. By way of a compromise, the parties
agreed to do away with the BIS recommended base value and
agreed for HTC to base the normal value of the importation
per metric ton under R.A. No. 7843 and the rules issued
implementing the law. This is gleaned from the affidavit of
Borgonia:
13. During the meeting, Mr. von Sprengeisen suggested that
the value of DM 1,050/ton be applied as the price at which
Hamburg Trading would sell German-made magnesite-based
refractory bricks in the Philippines. Mr. Villanueva did not
agree to the suggested value, as we considered it low. In the
end, both parties decided to base the determination of the
price on the provisions of Republic Act No. 7843 and its
implementing rules and regulations. …44
Borgonia prepared the first compromise agreement and
incorporated therein the agreement of the petitioner and the
private respondent arrived at during the conference, thus:
1.
 For the purpose of buying peace and by way of concession
in order to end litigation, the SECOND PARTY undertakes and
commits to reform its pricing policy and structure with respect
to refractory products being imported interest sold in the
Philippines in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
7843 and its implementing rules and regulations.4
If, as claimed by the petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint, he
and the private respondent had agreed that HTC will use as
basis for its price policy and structural revision, the BIS report,
for sure, Borgonia would have incorporated the said
agreement in the first compromise agreement. He did not, and
Borgonia has not offered any explanation for such failure. The
petitioner signed the draft of the agreement without any plaint
or revision. It was only in the second compromise agreement
that was later signed by the petitioner and the private
respondent that Borgonia incorporated the phrase “based on
the findings of the BIS.” Borgonia and the petitioner made the
insertion on their own, without the a priori consent of the
private respondent.
The Court is not convinced by the petitioner’s contention (and
that of Borgonia in his Affidavit) that the petitioner and the
private respondent had agreed to leave the final determination
of the base value or price of importation per metric ton to a
third party (BIS). The private respondent could not have
agreed to the use of the BIS report because, as mentioned, he
had strenuously objected to its use as basis for the revision of
its price policy and structure. For HTC to admit that the BIS
finding of DM 1,200 per metric ton was the normal value of the
refractory bricks from Germany for the purpose of resolving the
anti-dumping case is one thing; but for HTC to agree to be
bound by the BIS recommendation for the purpose of revising
its price policy and structure is completely a different matter.
With the petitioner and the private respondent’s admission of
the prima facie findings of the BIS, the Commission can
prepare its recommendation to the Special Committee on the
protest of the RCP to the HTC importation subject of the case.
Thereafter:
“D. The Special Committee shall, within fifteen (15) days after
receipt of the report of the Commission, decide whether the
article in question is being imported in violation of this section
and shall give due notice of such decision. In case the
decision of dumping is in the affirmative, the special committee
shall direct the Commissioner of Customs to cause the
dumping duty, to be levied, collected and paid, as prescribed
in this section, in addition to any other duties, taxes and
charges imposed by law on such article, and on the articles of
the same specific kind or class subsequently imported under
similar circumstances coming from the specific country.
In the event that the Special Committee fails to decide within
the period prescribed herein, the recommendation of the
Commission shall be deemed approved and shall be final and
executory.”46
On the matter of the revision or adjustment of the price policy
and structure of HTC, the parties had agreed to accomplish
the same in due time. It goes without saying that the RCP
retained the right to object to or protest to the price policy and
structure revision of HTC.
The agreement of the petitioner and the private respondent not
to be bound by the base value in the BIS report for the revision
of its price policy and structure is not unexpected because: (1)
the findings of the BIS are only prima facie, meaning to say,
not conclusive, and HTC was accorded a chance to base its
price policy and structure on evidence and informations other
than those contained in the BIS report; (2) the normal value of
the imported refractory bricks may fluctuate from time to time,
hence, the need for any importer to revise its price policy and
structure from time to time; and (3) the base value to be used
by HTC in revising its price policy would be scrutinized and
resolved initially by the Commission, by the Special Committee
and by the Court of Tax Appeals on appeal.
The process agreed upon by the petitioner and the private
respondent was not only practical and fair, but in accord with
law as well.
In fine, the private respondent did not commit any falsehood in
the Urgent Motion and his Affidavit of Merit when he declared
that he and the petitioner put behind them the BIS report, and
agreed to use R.A. No. 7843 and the rules and regulations
implementing the same to determine the base price for the
revision of the price policy and structure of HTC.
Admittedly, the respondent did not object to the offending
phrase before and after signing the agreement and for a
considerable stretch period until HTC filed its motion.
However, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioner
that such failure of the respondent to object to the offending
phrase for such period of time amounted to an admission that,
indeed, the private respondent was aware of the offending
phrase in the Agreement, and to his agreement thereto; and
estopped the private respondent from alleging that he was
deceived by the petitioner into signing the Compromise
Agreement. In his appeal to the DOJ, the private respondent
declared that:
17 “3.9
 True, respondent-appellant may have been
remiss and lacking in circumspect in failing to review
the hard copy Compromise Agreement and notice the
insertion. Being in the trading business, respondent-
appellant personally handles hundreds of documents
daily and is on the telephone for most of the day
communicating with suppliers and customers. And he
had no reason to believe that either complainant-
appellee or Mr. Borgonia would make such an
insertion, especially after respondent-appellant had
accepted the fax Compromise Agreement wording and
conveyed such acceptance to complainant-appellee’s
office. Respondent-appellant also had to reason to
even think that such a surreptitious insertion would be
made; after all, he had a very warm and friendly
meeting with complainant-appellee and Mr. Borgonia
and came out of it with a feeling that he could trust
complainant-appellee (p. 4, Annex “C”).
18 3.10
 Hence, when respondent-appellant alleges that
he was induced to sign the hard copy Compromise
Agreement through fraud and deceit, respondent-
appellant honestly believes that he was misled into
signing it. He was misled by the fact that he had been
sent the fax Compromise Agreement by complainant-
appellee, that he had conveyed its acceptability to
complainant-appellee and now requested for the hard
copy for execution, that he had been led to trust that
the findings and recommendation of the BIS were
being put behind them and that complainant-appellee
had agreed to such a compromise. The transmittal of
the hard copy Compromise Agreement, without any
notice or mention by complainant-appellee or
complainant-appellee’s office that it contained
insertions or wording different from the fax
Compromise Agreement, and on respondent-
appellant’s understanding that the wording of the hard
copy Compromise Agreement would be exactly the
same as the fax Compromise Agreement, constitutes
the fraud or deceit allegedly by respondent-
appellant.”47
In his rejoinder-affidavit, the private respondent explained that:
“2. Again, contrary to the allegations in the Reply-Affidavits, I
was unable to review the Compromise Agreement delivered by
Mr. Gutierrez on 22 April 1997 as I was busy with numerous
calls and business at the time it was delivered. Also, I had
been led to believe in our meetings with Mr. Villanueva and
Mr. Borgonia that I could trust them. So, after having seen the
fax Compromise Agreement and being amenable to it, I
trusted that they would send a genuine hard copy. As it turned
out, I was mistaken.”48
Moreover, even before filing the Urgent Motion and signing the
Affidavit of Merit, the private respondent tried for several times
to contact the petitioner, but the latter failed to return his calls.
This reinforced the suspicion of the private respondent that the
insertion of the offending phrase was not, after all, inadvertent
but deliberate, calculated to deceive him to the prejudice of
HTC. The private respondent may be blamed for putting too
much trust and confidence on the petitioner, but he certainly
cannot be indicted for perjury for lack of probable cause.
The petitioner failed to append to his petition records of the
Commission that the private respondent appeared for HTC, on
May 9, 1997, before the Commission for the hearing on the
Compromise Agreement; and showing that the private
respondent did not object thereto.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76999 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.SO ORDERED
United States vs. Manuel
No. 1099. December 27, 1906
The accused in this case is charged with "unfair competition,"
as defined and penalized in Act No. 666 of the Philippine
Commission.
On the 30th day of September, and for many years prior
thereto, A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, a corporation duly
organized under the laws of Great Britain and registered in the
Mercantile Register of the Philippine Islands, was extensively
engaged in the city of Manila and the Philippine Islands in the
business of manufacturing and selling soda water, lemonade,
ginger ale, and other aerated waters.
On August 14, 1903, the said A. S. Watson & Co., Limited,
registered with the Bureau of Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-
marks of the Philippine Islands a trade-mark consisting of the
words "A. S. Watson & Company, Limited," together with the
figure of a unicorn and dragon on either side of a Chinese
pagoda, which had been adopted and appropriated by said A.
S. Watson & Co., Limited, as their trade-mark for many years
prior to its registry.
The soda water, lemonade, and other aerated waters
manufactured by A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, were sold in
bottles, specially made for the purpose, with their trademark
blown on the' side in large raised letters and figures, these
letters and figures being so strikingly and prominently
displayed that they forcibly attract the attention of the eye and
arouse the sense of touch on the most superficial examination.
On these bottles labels were pasted also bearing the said
trade-mark, and in addition the name of the particular variety
of aerated water contained therein.
It was the custom of the said A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, to
give the purchaser of its aerated waters what was called a
deposit slip with each case of such goods sold, obligating
themselves to refund a stipulated amount on the return of the
empty bottles together with this deposit slip.
On and about the 30th of September, 1903, the defendant,
Vicente Manuel, manufactured and sold a number of bottles of
aerated waters in bottles identical in form and appearance with
those used by A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, with the trade-
mark of that firm blown on the side in the same manner in
which it is blown on their bottles, there being no reasonable
doubt that the bottles used by the defendant were bottles
which had been formerly used by A. S. Watson & Co., Limited,
in their business as manufacturers and vendors of aerated
waters. On the bottles sold by the defendant there were
pasted labels with his name and the kind of aerated water
contained therein, the printed matter contained in these labels
being different from that contained in the bottles sold by A. S.
Watson & Co., Limited, and the general appearance of the
respective labels not being strikingly similar or dissimilar,
though a comparative examination develops a number of
points of difference in size, shape, and color. It does not
expressly appear on either label whether the name printed
thereon is that of the manufacturer of the aërated water
contained therein or that of a dealer engaged in the business
of buying and selling such waters.
The evidence tended to prove that the aerated waters sold by
A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, have a wide reputation for
excellence 111 the Philippine Islands, and that great care and
attention to detail are exercised in their manufacture, with a
view to the production of a wholesome and pleasant beverage,
and that to this end distilled water is used exclusively in their
preparation; and there is evidence in the record which tends to
prove that the aërated waters sold by the defendant were
unwholesome and of inferior quality, and that undistilled water
had been used in their manufacture.
On this evidence the trial court convicted the accused of
"unfair competition," and sentenced him to pay a fine of $50,
gold, and the costs of the trial, and to subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and nonpayment of the fine.
Section 7 of Act No. 666, which defines unfair competition,
provides that "Any person who in selling his goods shall give
them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either in the wrapping of the packages
in which they are contained or the devices or words thereon,
or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be
likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered
are those of a manufacturer or dealer other than the actual
manufacturer or dealer, and who clothes the goods with such
appearance for the purpose of deceiving the public and
defrauding another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent
vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in
selling such goods with a like purpose, shall be guilty of unfair
competition * * *, and in order that the action shall lie
under this section, actual intent to deceive the public and
defraud a competitor shall affirmatively appear on the part of
the person sought to be made liable, but such intent may be
inferred from similarity in the appearance of the goods as
packed or offered for sale to those of the complaining party."
We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, in selling his aerated waters in bottles with the
design blown on the side as described above, gave his goods
the general appearance of aërated waters manufactured by A.
S. Watson & Co., Limited, in the devices and words used on
the bottles in which they were contained, in a way which would
be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods
offered were those of A. S. Watson & Co., Limited; and that
the similarity in appearance of the goods offered for sale by
the defendant to those of A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, was
such as to justify the inference that the defendant actually
intended to deceive the public and defraud the said A. S.
Watson & Co., Limited.
Counsel for defendant insist that the use of different labels
pasted on the bottles forbids the inference of an intent to
deceive the public or defraud A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, but
an ocular examination of the labels and the device blown on
the bottles does not sustain his contention; for while it is true
that a cautious purchaser who was acquainted with the
English language need not have been deceived if hef took the
pains to read the printed matter on the label, nevertheless the
difference in the general appearance of the labels is not
sufficient to protect from mistake the ordinary purchaser who is
unacquainted with the English language, unless he took the
extraordinary precaution of having with him a sample of the
label of A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, with which to make a
direct comparison, on each occasion when he bought a bottle
of aërated water; by far the most striking and noticeable
characteristic of the bottles of aërated waters sold by A. S.
Watson & Co., Limited, is the device blown on the side, upon
seeing which the ordinary purchaser might well be excused
from a too careful scrutiny of the wording of the much less
noticeable and less easily remembered label, printed in a
language known to but a small percentage of the residents in
Manila and the Philippine Islands. (Glen Cove Mfg. Co. vs.
Ludeling, 22 Fed. Rep., 823; Cook vs. Ross, 73 Fed. Rep.,
203.)
The true test of unfair competition is whether certain goods
have been clothed with an appearance which is likely to
deceive the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care, and
not whether a certain limited class of purchasers with special
knowledge not possessed by the ordinary purchaser could
avoid mistake by the exercise of this special knowledge.
In the case of R. Heinisch's Sons Co. vs. Boker et al. (86 Fed.
Rep., 765) the court held that:
"In a suit to restrain unfair use of a trade name, the criterion of
unfair competition is whether ordinary purchasers, as
distinguished from members of the particular trade, are
deceived."
In the case of Shaver et al. vs. Heller & Merz Co. (108 Fed.
Rep., 821) the court used the following language at page 833:
"Counsel for appellants maintain that the fact that they have
placed their names and residence in conspicuous places on
their packages, and have otherwise distinguished them from
those of the appellee, should relieve them from the injunction.
But the 'American Ball Blue' and the 'American Wash Blue'
were articles well known to the trade and to the public as the
manufactures of the appellee before the appellants entered
upon the business of selling bluing. These articles, and the
names by which they were known, had an established
reputation, and commanded a lucrative trade. To the dealers
in bluing the appellants were unknown. The only effect of
placing their unfamiliar names and residence upon the
packages of bluing under the names of the appellee's well-
known articles was to give to the appellants the benefit of the
established reputation of the appellee's articles, and thus to
enable them to derive greater benefit from their fraud. 'That is
an aggravation, and not a justification, for it is openly trading in
the name of another upon the reputation acquired by the
device of the proprietor.' (Menendez vs. Holt, 128 U. S., 514,
521, 9 Sup. Ct, 143, 32 L. Ed., 526; Gillot vs. Esterbrook, 48
N. Y., 374, 378, 8 Am. Rep., 553.)"
It is also contended that since A. S. Watson & Co., Limited,
sold the bottles containing their aerated waters, these bottles
became the property of the purchaser, who could not be
deprived of the privilege of doing what he pleased with his own
property. A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, deny that they ever sold
bottles of the kind used by the defendant, and insist that the
transaction whereby they received from each purchaser of
their bottled goods a certain sum of money which they
obligated themselves to return in exchange for the empty
bottles was not intended as a sale of these bottles and did not,
in fact, represent such a sale. We are satisfied, however, that
since the purchaser at his discretion could either retain or
return these bottles, the transaction must be regarded as a
sale of the bottles when the purchaser actually exercised that
discretion, and decided not to return them to the vendor.
In the case of People vs. Cannon (139 N. Y., 49) the court
said:
"The evidence is that the drivers of the beer or soda water
carts who take out the liquors for the owners or manufacturers
take them in these bottles, and that they deliver the beer, soda
water or other liquor in the bottles to the customers. They (the
drivers) then give a receipt to the customers for the deposit
given by the customers to the drivers for the safe return of the
bottles. This deposit is taken to the manufacturers and they
credit the customer with its amount, keeping what is termed a
separate deposit account, and when they return the bottles,
the manufacturers refund the money, and if the bottles are not
returned, the manufacturers keep the money. That a deposit
was given as security for the safe return of the bottles does not
prove there was an agreement to return them. The evidence
here shows, as it seems to us; the existence of an
understanding that the party may return the bottles and get
back his money, or keep the bottles and regard the deposit as
a payment, just as he might elect. This construction is
strengthened by proof of the fact that the manufacturer acted
on the theory that if the bottles were not returned he was to
keep the money. The case is barren of any evidence proving
an obligation to return the bottles.
"* * * Taking of security for the return of the bottles from
the party to whom they were delivered, so long as there is no
evidence of an agreement and the party is under no legal
obligation to return them if he choose to leave the money
deposited as a payment for the bottles, amounts in law to a
sale of them, at the election of the party to whom they were
delivered."
We have no doubt that the purchasers of aerated waters from
A. S. Watson & Co., Limited, who paid the so-called "deposit"
but never demanded or received the refund guaranteed in the
deposit slips, became the absolute, unconditional owners of
such bottles, with the right to do with them as they pleased,
but the right of ownership does not carry with it the right to use
the thing owned for the purpose of deceiving the public and
defrauding third parties. The defendant might have
manufactured these bottles himself, in which case there could
have been no doubt as to his right of ownership, and
nevertheless, he would have had no moral or lawful right to
use them as he did.
It is said that if the provisions of Act No. 666 deprive the
defendant of the right to use these bottles for the' sale of his
goods, that act is unconstitutional in that it takes from the
defendant rights of property without due process of law.
It is not true, however, that the right of ownership carries with it
the right to use one's property as we hold this defendant used
these bottles—that is, for the purpose of deceiving the public
and defrauding one's neighbors—and Act No. 666, by
expressly prohibiting unfair competition, does not deprive
anyone of a right of property which justly belonged to him prior
to its enactment, its only effect being to define and penalize a
wrong which already existed but for which no adequate
punishment had been provided by law. (Evans vs. Van Laer,
32 Fed. Rep., 153; Sawyer Crystal Blue Co. vs. Hubbard, 32
Fed. Rep., 388.)
The evidence of record sustains the findings of the trial court
and we find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights
of the accused, except that the sentence includes subsidiary
imprisonment in the event of insolvency and nonpayment of
the fine imposed, for which there is no authority in the act of
the Commission defining and penalizing "unfair competition."'
The sentence imposed by the trial court is therefore modified
by reversing so much thereof as prescribes subsidiary
imprisonment, and thus modified said sentence is affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After
expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance
herewith and ten days thereafter the record be remanded to
the court below for proper action. So ordered.
People vs. Sanchez
G.R. No. 175832. October 15, 2008
Antecedent Facts
The prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC with
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 under an
Information that states:
“x x x
That on or about the 6th day of April 2003 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous
drug, did, then and there, willfully and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the
said transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) grams of white
crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4The
prosecution presented its lone witness—SPO2 Levi Sevilla
(SPO2 Sevilla)—in the trial on the merits that followed. The
appellant and his witness, Nida Detera (Nida), took the stand
for the defense.
The RTC summarized the material points of the testimony of
SPO2 Sevilla as follows:
“x x x while he was on Station 3 duty at Talipapa, Novaliches,
Quezon City on April 6, 2003 a confidential informant arrived
at around 4:30 noon and reported that there is a person who
has been selling shabu. An entrapment team was formed
consisting of himself as poseur buyer, SPO1 Brigido An, PO3
Virgilio Bernardo, PO2 Manny Paulilis and PO1 Cecil Collado.
A pre-operational report was submitted of the undertaking. At
5:00 p.m., the team was dispatched to the target area—at the
far end Lualhati Street, Manotok Subd., Baesa, Quezon City.
PO Sevilla put his initial “LS” on the money given to him to be
used at the entrapment.5
At the place, which is a squatter’s colony located at the edge
or side of Lualhati St., PO Sevilla and his informant walked
towards the place pointed by the informant and met the drug
pusher. The informant introduced PO Sevilla to the pusher.
The informant and the pusher talked for a while. Thereafter,
PO Sevilla talked to the latter. He told him that he badly needs
shabupara pumayat.x x x PO Sevilla then gave the pusher
P100.00 (the marked money) and in return the pusher gave
him a plastic sachet of shabu.6
After receiving the plastic sachet, PO Sevilla scratched his
head as a pre-arranged signal to his colleagues who were
deployed nearby. Said other policemen rushed to the crime
scene while PO Sevilla grabbed the right hand of the accused
and introduced himself as a cop. The accused was frisked and
PO Sevilla recovered the P100.00 marked money bill (Exh.
“G”) in the right side pants pocket of the accused who was
later brought to Station 3. PO Sevilla identified the transparent
plastic sachet on which he placed his initial “LS” and the initial
“SS” of the accused (Exh. “E”).7
On cross examination, PO Sevilla reiterated his testimony
adding that whenever he is tasked as a poseur buyer he
always gives as reason that he wanted to be thinner and drug
pushers never questioned him about that. PO Sevilla, who was
wearing a crew cut in court said that when he bought shabu
from the accused his hair style was different. It was his first
time to entrap at that place as a poseur buyer. Their marked
Anfra van was parked along Quirino Highway, Quezon City
from where he and the informant walked to Lualhati Street for
about 10 minutes as the target scene was about 100 meters
away. He reiterated that their Pre-op Report was sent to PDEA
and given a control number.”8[Italics and footnotes referring to
the pertinent parts of the records supplied.]
The RTC dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Chemist
John Paul Puentespina after the parties stipulated that “the
items allegedly confiscated from the accused were submitted
to the crime laboratory for examination and the findings were
put into writing.”9
In the hearing of December 4, 2003, the prosecution offered
the following as exhibits:
Exhibit “A”—the request for laboratory examination of the
specimen confiscated from the appellant;
Exhibit “B”—the Initial Laboratory Report prepared by Forensic
Chemist Paul Jerome Puentespina;
Exhibit “C”—the Confirmatory or Final Chemistry Report No.
D-366-03 prepared by Forensic Chemist Paul Jerome
Puentespina;
Exhibit “D”—sworn Certification to show that the Chemistry
Report was subscribed and sworn to before an Administering
Officer;
Exhibits “E,” “E-1” and “E-2”—the specimen taken from the
appellant; the initials of Forensic Chemist Puentespina; and
the initials of the police officer who arrested the accused and
who received the specimen in exchange for the buy bust
money, respectively;
Exhibit “F”—the brown envelope where the seized evidence
was placed after it was examined by Forensic Chemist
Puentespina;
Exhibits “G” and “G-1”—the buy bust money and the initials
written therein of the poseur buyer, respectively;
Exhibits “H” and “H-1”—the Joint Affidavit of the entrapment
team and the signature therein by SPO2 Sevilla, respectively.”
The defense objected to Exhibits “E,” “E-1,” “E-2,” “G” and “H,”
contending that the appellant “had nothing to do with the
specimen presented before the court,” and that the confiscated
specimen resulted from an illegal arrest. On Exhibit “G,” the
defense argued that no evidence of powder was ever
presented by the prosecution witness. The defense likewise
objected to the presentation of Exhibit “H” on the ground that
its contents were self-serving.
The appellant gave a different version of the events in his
testimony of January 30, 2005. He narrated that at around
5:25 in the afternoon of April 6, 2003, he was in his house
putting his children to sleep when three (3) police officers
suddenly barged into his house, searched the premises,
frisked him, and forced him to come with them.10 He
recognized one of the policemen as “Sir Levi,” a former
colleague of his uncle, Sonny Catiis, at the police station. The
police officers then handcuffed him and asked him to get into a
police vehicle. He begged them and shouted, “Sir you already
frisked me in the house and you did not find anything, you
might just plant evidence in my pocket, please do not do
so.”The police brought him to Police Station 3, Talipapa,
Quezon City, and placed him in a detention cell without an
investigation being conducted.11
While inside his cell, the police showed him a plastic sachet
and said that it was the shabu taken from him. SPO2 Sevilla
asked him to call his uncle, but he refused to do so; he feared
that his uncle would think that the confiscated shabu was
really taken from him.12
Nida testified that she was at the kitchen of the appellant’s
house doing the laundry between 2:00-3:00 in the afternoon of
April 6, 2003, when she heard loud knocks on the door. The
appellant, who was in bed, stood up and opened the door.13A
person entered, pushed the appellant backwards, and
handcuffed him. This person then ordered the appellant to sit
down so he (the appellant) could be asked questions. A total
of four persons, all male, entered the house. Afterwards, the
appellant and she were frisked; a lighter was taken from her,
but nothing was seized from the appellant.14
The RTC primarily considered the reputation of SPO2 Sevilla
in giving weight to his testimony, and held that “PO Sevilla has
been a frequent witness in drugs cases and he has already
established his credibility before this court.” Its decision of April
14, 2005 found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. It imposed
on him the penalty of life imprisonment and ordered him to pay
a fine of P50,000.00.
The appellant appealed to the CA, with the appeal docketed
as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01095. In its decision of September
11, 2006, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
In his brief15 on appeal, the appellant contends that the court a
quo gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of R.A. No. 9165. He maintains that the
court’s order of conviction was merely based on the good
reputation SPO2 Sevilla has established with the court based
on the many drug cases he had handled. The trial court, too,
wrongly interpreted the appellant’s appearance and demeanor
because “his head was bowed and his eyes were dreamy and
sad.”16
The defense harps, too, on the prosecution’s failure to prove
that the sachets allegedly recovered from the appellant were
the ones submitted to the forensic chemist for examination, as
well as its failure to follow the proper chain of custody in
handling the seized evidence. It was only the arresting officer
who testified that he confiscated the sachet from the accused.
The police officer who conducted the subsequent investigation
and to whom the confiscated sachet was allegedly turned over
was not identified nor presented as witness. Hence the identity
of the evidence presented against the appellant is doubtful.17
The prosecution counters with the argument that the trial
court’s findings on the credibility of SPO2 Sevilla and the lack
of it with respect to the appellant and his witness Nida, should
be given great weight and respect, as the trial court had the
chance and the prerogative to hear and appreciate these
matters at the trial. SPO2 Sevilla described in a clear and
unwavering manner how the police team planned for and
conducted the buy-bust operation, and how he marked the
plastic sachet of shabu he bought from appellant immediately
after the latter’s arrest. Even the statement regarding the
credibility of SPO2 Sevilla, a frequent witness before the trial
court in drug cases, does not mean that the trial court was
biased. If at all, it only meant that the trial court had known
SPO2 Sevilla and had often observed his demeanor as a
witness.
The prosecution further argues that the evidence for the
defense is incredible and doubtful judging from the testimonies
of the appellant and his witness Nida. While the appellant
testified that his alleged unlawful arrest transpired at 5:25 p.m.
of April 6, 2003, his witness Nida testified with certainty that
she witnessed the arrest take place on the same date between
2:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. as she saw the time on the wall clock.
Moreover, the appellant himself admitted that he had no
knowledge of any adverse reason or ill motive that would
induce the arresting police officers to falsely implicate him. To
the prosecution, this lack of ill motive supports the view that
SPO2 Sevilla testified to the truth and his acts should enjoy
the presumption of regularity.
As to the corpus delicti, the prosecution stresses that it fully
proved that the item recovered from the appellant is positive
for shabu. The request for laboratory examination of the
specimen confiscated from the appellant; the initial laboratory
report showing that the item bought and/or seized from
appellant is positive for shabu; and the final chemistry report
were all formally offered in evidence, without any objection
from the appellant. The defense, in fact, agreed to stipulate on
the contents and the veracity of the forensic examinations
made relative to the item recovered from the appellant. The
corpus delicti having been proven and even admitted by the
appellant, there was nothing more for the prosecution to
establish; it had proven beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, specifically—
(a) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the things sold and the
payment therefor.
The Court’s Ruling
After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for
the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Non-observance of the requirements
of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165
In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the
law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused—
in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the
charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.18 Thus, while the charge was laid after a preliminary
finding that a probable cause existed showing that a crime had
been committed and the accused was probably guilty thereof,
the criminal trial itself starts with the substantive presumption
of the innocence on the part of the accused, rebuttable only by
proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of such
proof rests with the prosecution which must rely on the
strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case
for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that
would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.19
To prove the legitimacy of the police buy-bust operation, the
prosecution presented the following: (a) a pre-operation report
bearing Unit Control Number 0504-03-07 signed by the desk
officer, police chief and team leader of the station drug
enforcement unit, which indicated the type, time and general
area of operation, the type of vehicles and firearms to be used,
and the respective names of the team leader, poseur-buyer
and members of the buy-bust team; (b) a photocopy of the
marked money; and (c) the joint affidavit of the entrapment
team signed by the poseur-buyer, SPO2 Sevilla, and PO1
Collado. The operation yielded a plastic sachet containing
shabu allegedly confiscated from the appellant.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by
peace officers to apprehend prohibited drug law violators in
the act of committing a drug-related offense.20 Because of the
built-in danger for abuse that a buy-bust operation carries, it is
governed by specific procedures on the seizure and custody of
drugs, separately from the general law procedures geared to
ensure that the rights of people under criminal investigation21
and of the accused facing a criminal charge22 are safeguarded.
We expressed this concern in People v. Tan,23 when we
recognized that “by the very nature of anti-narcotic operations,
the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in the pockets or
hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that
inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is
great. Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant
in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer
the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.”
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is
embodied in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. [Emphasis ours]
This is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165, which
reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.” [Emphasis supplied]
The records of the present case are bereft of evidence
showing that the buy-bust team followed the outlined
procedure despite its mandatory terms, as indicated by the
use of “shall” in its directives. The deficiency is patent from the
following exchanges at the trial:
FISCAL GIBSON ARAULA:
Q: Now after you received that shabu or transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu and gave the P100.00 bill to the
accused, what happened next?
SPO2 LEVI SEVILLA:
A: After I received [sic] I scratched my head.
Q: What is the purpose?
A: Pre-arrange[d] signal.
Q: After that what happened?
A: They swooped down in the scene.
Q: What happened after that?
A: I grab [sic] his right hand.
Q: When you grabbed his right hand what did you tell him?
A: I introduced myself as Police Officer.
Q: Then after that what happened next?
A: I grabbed the accused and informed him of his
constitutional right.
Q: After informing of his constitutional right what happened
Mr. Witness?
A: We brought him to our station.
Q: How about the transparent plastic sachet, where is it?
A: It is in my possession.
Q: How about the buy-bust money in the amount of
P100.00?
A: I recovered it from the right pants pocket.
Q: Now you said that you brought the accused to the Police
Station, what happened to the Police Station?
A: We turn [sic] him over to the Desk Officer.
Q: What did you turn over?
A: The accused and the evidences, the plastic shabu sir.
Q: Before you turn over that plastic sachet Mr. Witness, what
did you put there? A: I put my initial and initial of the
accused.
Q: If that transparent plastic sachet is shown to you, can you
identify that Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Showing to you this plastic sachet Mr. Witness, what can
you say to that transparent plastic sachet?
A: This was the one I purchased from the accused because I
have here my initial and the initial of the accused, sir.
x x x x24 [Emphasis ours]
Other than the markings that SPO2 Sevilla alleged, it is clear
that no physical inventory and no photograph of the seized
items were taken in the presence of the accused or his
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and an elective official. Based on the above
testimony, SPO2 Sevilla—the prosecution’s lone witness—
also did not mark the plastic sachet of shabu immediately
upon seizure; it was only marked upon arrival at the police
station. Thus, other than the stipulation regarding the handling
and results of the specimen at the forensic laboratory, SPO2
Sevilla’s testimony and the evidence he identified constitute
the totality of the evidence for the prosecution on the handling
of the allegedly seized items.
We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements
of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible
under field conditions; the police operates under varied
conditions, many of them far from ideal, and cannot at all times
attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the handling of
confiscated evidence. The participation of a representative
from the DOJ, the media or an elected official alone can be
problematic. For this reason, the last sentence of the
implementing rules provides that “non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.”
Thus, non-compliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s
case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated
evidence may still have some lapses, as in the present case.
These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in
terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be shown to
have been preserved.
In the present case, the prosecution apparently did not want to
accept that the police had committed lapses in the handling of
the seized materials and thus did not bother to present any
explanation to justify the non-observance of the prescribed
procedures. It likewise failed to prove that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items adduced were not tainted as the
discussions below will show. The non-observance by the
police of the required procedure cannot therefore be excused.
The “chain of custody” over the
confiscated items was not proven
Under Section 5, Article II25 of R.A. No. 9165, the elements
necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu
are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and
the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. Implicit in all these is the need for proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court
25 SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—The
penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all
species of opium poppy, regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
of evidence of corpus delicti—the body of the crime whose
core is the confiscated illicit drug.26
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering
exactitude be observed in establishing the corpus delicti: every
fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established.27
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in
buy-bust operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.28 In a long line of cases,
we have considered it fatal for the prosecution to fail to prove
that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was
the same one allegedly seized from the accused.29
Black’s Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:
“In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as
narcotics in a trial of drug case, must account for the custody
of the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his
custody until the moment in which it is offered in evidence, and
such evidence goes to the weight not to admissibility of
evidence. Com. V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.”
Likewise, Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation
No. 1, Series of 200230 which implements R.A. No. 9165
defines “chain of custody” as follows:
“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation
to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.”
Although this regulation took effect on October 18, 2002 (or
after the commission of the crime charged), it is nonetheless
useful in illustrating how the process of preserving the integrity
of the chain of custody of the seized drugs is ensured and
maintained. That the police failed to approximate these
safeguards and the prosecution failed to prove the identity of
the specimen allegedly seized and the specimen submitted as
evidence during the trial is evident from SPO2 Sevilla himself
who testified as follows:
FISCAL GIBSON ARAULA:
Q: After informing [the accused] of his constitutional right
what happened Mr. Witness?
SPO2 LEVI SEVILLA
A: We brought him to our station.
Q: How about the transparent plastic sachet, where is it?
A: It is in my possession.
Q: How about the buy-bust money in the amount of
P100.00?
A: I recovered it from the right pants pocket.
Q: Now you said that you brought the accused to the Police
Station, what happened to the Police Station?
A: We turn him over to the Desk Officer.
Q: What did you turn over?
A: The accused and the evidences, the plastic shabu sir.
Q: Before you turn over that plastic sachet Mr. Witness, what
did you put there?
A: I put my initial and initial of the accused.
xxxx
Q: By the way Mr. Witness after you turned over to the
investigator the plastic sachet, did you happen to know where
the investigator brought the plastic sachet?
A: I gave that plastic sachet first to the table of the Desk
Officer and the Desk Officer gave it to the investigator.
FISCAL GIBSON ARAULA:
That would be all for the witness.
x x x x31
Significantly, this was the only testimony in the case that
touched on the chain of custody of the seized evidence. It
failed to disclose the identities of the desk officer and the
investigator to whom the custody of the drugs was given, and
how the latter handled these materials. No reference was ever
made to the person who submitted the seized specimen to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Likewise, no one
testified on how the specimen was handled after the chemical
analysis by the forensic chemist. While we are aware that the
RTC’s Order of August 6, 2003 dispensed with the testimony
of the forensic chemist because of the stipulations of the
parties, we view the stipulation to be confined to the handling
of the specimen at the forensic laboratory and to the analytical
results obtained. The stipulation does not cover the manner
the specimen was handled before it came to the possession of
the forensic chemist and after it left his possession. To be
sure, personnel within the police hierarchy (as SPO2 Sevilla’s
testimony casually mentions) must have handled the drugs but
evidence of how this was done, i.e., how it was managed,
stored, preserved, labeled and recorded from the time of its
seizure, to its receipt by the forensic laboratory, up until it was
presented in court and subsequently destroyed—is absent
from the evidence adduced during the trial. To repeat an
earlier observation, even the time and place of the initial
marking of the alleged evidence are not at all certain as the
testimony on this point varies.
The recent case of Malillin v. People32 is particularly instructive
on how we expect the chain of custody or “movement” of the
seized evidence to be maintained and why this must be shown
by evidence: “As a method of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the
standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and
is not really identifiable, or when its condition at the time of
testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in
case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other
words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility,
alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in
the application of the chain of custody rule.” [Emphasis ours]
That the prosecution offered in evidence the request for
laboratory examination (Exh. “A”), the initial laboratory report
(Exh. “B”), and final Chemistry Report No. D-366-03 (Exh. “C”),
to which the defense did not object, has no bearing on the
question of whether the specimen submitted for chemical
analysis and subsequently presented in court was the same as
that seized from the appellant. All that these exhibits proved
were the existence and authenticity of the request for
laboratory examination and the results of this examination, not
the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of the
evidence. Evidently, the prosecution has not proven beyond
reasonable doubt the indispensable element of corpus delicti
of the crime. In People v. Orteza,33 the Court had the occasion
to discuss the implications of the failure to comply with Section
21, paragraph 1, to wit:
“. . . In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark
the confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension
of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced
doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the
Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where
the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized
marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to
observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the
material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory
on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the
identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the
accused due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show
the identity of the shabu.” [Emphasis supplied]
We reached the same conclusion in People v. Nazareno34 and
People v. Santos,35 where we again stressed the importance
of complying with the prescribed procedure.
Physical inventory and photograph
requirement under Section 21 vis-a-
vis “marking” of seized evidence
While the first sentence of Section 21(a) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 states that “the
apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of
the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same,” the second
sentence makes a distinction between warrantless seizures
and seizures by virtue of a warrant, thus:
“(a) x x x Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items.” [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the venues of the physical inventory and photography of
the seized items differ and depend on whether the seizure was
made by virtue of a search warrant or through a warrantless
seizure such as a buy-bust operation.
In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory
and photograph must be conducted in the place where the
search warrant was served. On the other hand, in case of
warrantless seizures such as a buy-bust operation, the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable; however, nothing
prevents the apprehending officer/team from immediately
conducting the physical inventory and photography of the
items at the place where they were seized, as it is more in
keeping with the law’s intent of preserving their integrity and
evidentiary value.
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do
not expressly specify is the matter of “marking” of the seized
items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence
seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to
inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of
arrest. Consistency with the “chain of custody” rule requires
that the “marking” of the seized items—to truly ensure that
they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence—should be done (1)in
the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately
upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting
innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and
of protecting as well the apprehending officers from
harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section
2936 and on allegations of robbery or theft.37
For greater specificity, “marking” means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the item/s seized. If the physical inventory and
photograph are made at the nearest police station or office as
allowed by the rules,38 the inventory and photography of the
seized items must be made in accordance with Sec. 2 of
Board Resolution No. 1, Series of 2002,39 but in every case,
the apprehended violator or counsel must be present. Again,
this is in keeping with the desired level of integrity that the
handling process requires.Thereafter, the seized items shall
be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type
and quantity of the seized items require a different type of
handling and/or container. The evidence bag or container shall
accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned over
to the next officer in the chain of custody.
Conclusion
The evidentiary gap in identifying the specimen that the
forensic laboratory analyzed brings us back to where we
started in analyzing the case—to the presumption of
innocence that the Constitution accords the appellant. To
reiterate, starting from this point, the prosecution must proceed
to establish the guilt of the accused by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. To do this, the prosecution presented its
lone witness, SPO2 Sevilla, whom the lower court believed
because the witness had testified before the court before.
Thus, rather than look at the merits of his testimony, the lower
court simply considered his person and past performance, and
decided on this basis that he was a credible witness. This, by
itself, is a major error—a violation of due process—on the part
of the lower court that the appellate court apparently did not
fully appreciate. A court must always decide on the basis of
the evidence presented, not on the basis of any other
extraneous consideration not before the court.
The court apparently banked also on the presumption of
regularity in the performance that a police officer like SPO2
Sevilla enjoys in the absence of any taint of irregularity and of
ill motive that would induce him to falsify his testimony.
Admittedly, the defense did not adduce any evidence showing
that SPO2 Sevilla had any motive to falsify. The regularity of
the performance of his duties, however, leaves much to be
desired given the lapses in his handling of the allegedly
confiscated drugs as heretofore shown.
An effect of this lapse, as we held in Lopez v. People,40 is to
negate the presumption that official duties have been regularly
performed by the police officers. Any taint of irregularity affects
the whole performance and should make the presumption
unavailable. There can be no ifs and buts regarding this
consequence considering the effect of the evidentiary
presumption of regularity on the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
People v. Santos41 instructively tells us that the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself
overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof
beyond reasonable doubt.42 In People v. Cañete,43 we also
said:
“While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties,
this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of
the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellant’s
conviction because “First, the presumption is precisely just
that—a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as
in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of
innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.” The presumption also cannot prevail over
positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional
rights of the accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt.”
Without the presumption of regularity, the evidentiary gap in
identifying the seized evidence from its turnover by the poseur-
buyer,its handling and custody, until its turnover to the forensic
laboratory for analysis, stands out in bold relief. This gap
renders the case for the prosecution less than complete in
terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
From the perspective of the defense, we cannot help but note
that the evidence for the defense is far from strong; the
appellant merely denied that a buy-bust operation took place
and claimed that the evidence against him was a planted
evidence. In this jurisdiction, the defense of denial or frame-up,
like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted and is a common defense ploy in most
prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.44
Likewise, the testimony of the other defense witness, Nida,
fails to fully corroborate the appellant’s testimony due to
inconsistencies in their respective statements. These
weaknesses, however, do not add any strength nor can they
help the prosecution’s cause. If the prosecution cannot
establish, in the first place, the appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the need for the defense to adduce
evidence in its behalf in fact never arises. Thus, however weak
the defense evidence might be, the prosecution’s whole case
still falls. To hark back to the well-entrenched dictum in
criminal and constitution law: the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Thus, we
return to the conclusion that we should acquit the accused for
failure of the prosecution—due the gap-induced weaknesses
of its case—to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the September 11,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01095 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 103, Quezon City is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant Salvador Sanchez y Espiritu is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other
lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to
IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the
action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Soriaga
G.R. No. 191392. March 14, 2011
This is an appeal from the November 27, 2009 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03108, which
affirmed the finding of guilt by the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 64 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 03-4031,
convicting accused Rolly Soriaga (Soriaga) of Violation of
Section 5, Article II, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.2 The
Information filed against him reads: “That on or about the 15th
day of October, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, distribute and
transport Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, weighing zero
point zero five (0.05) gram, which is a dangerous drug, in
consideration of one hundred (P100.00) pesos, in violation of
the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”3
In the afternoon of October 15, 2003, Barangay Captain
Manuel Adao of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council—Cluster
2 (MADAC) received an information about Soriaga’s unbridled
selling of illegal drugs on Arellano and Bautista Streets,
Barangay Palanan, Makati City. Consequently, a joint buy-bust
operation was conducted by the police headed by PO3 Henry
Montes (PO3 Montes) and the MADAC represented by
Herminia Facundo (Facundo) and Leovino Perez (Perez).
Facundo was designated as the poseur-buyer.
Thereafter, the team proceeded to the target area
accompanied by their informant. Facundo and the informant
met Soriaga at the corner of Arellano and Bautista Streets.
Soriaga asked the informant, “Okay ba yan, pre?” The
informant assured Soriaga, “Barkada ko yan, okay ‘to.”
Soriaga then asked Facundo how much she was going to buy,
and the latter replied, “Piso lang.” Thereafter, Soriaga took the
P100.00 marked-money from Facundo and placed it in his
front pocket. Instantaneously, Soriaga took out a plastic sachet
with crystalline substance from his left pocket and handed it
over to Facundo. The latter immediately gave the pre-arranged
signal by throwing a lighted cigarette and the rest of the buy-
bust team rushed to the scene. PO3 Montes ordered Perez to
empty the pockets of Soriaga and recovered the P100.00
marked-money. Facundo marked the plastic sachet that
Soriaga gave her with the letters “RSD.” Facundo placed the
same initials on the recovered money.
Soriaga was placed under arrest and brought to the office of
the Anti-illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force. The
evidence seized was turned over to police investigator PO2
Reynaldo Juan. An examination was conducted on the
contents of the plastic sachet which tested positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride.4
In addition to the above-mentioned charge, Soriaga was also
indicted for illegal use of dangerous drugs under Section 15,
Article II, also of R.A. No. 9165. On July 14, 2007, the RTC
rendered a decision acquitting Soriaga of this charge of illegal
use of dangerous drugs but finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegally selling dangerous
drugs. The fallo of said decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the premises considered, Judgment is
rendered in these cases as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 03-4031, finding accused Rolly
Soriaga y Sto. Domingo GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 5, Art. II, RA 9165, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of
P500,000.00. Said accused shall be given credit for
the period of his preventive detention.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-5007, acquitting the said accused
Rolly Soriaga y Sto. Domingo from the charge of
Violation of Section 15, Art. II, R.A. No. 9165, upon a
reasonable doubt.
It is further ordered that the dangerous drugs subject of
Criminal Case No. 03-4031 be transmitted to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the latter’s appropriate
disposition.
SO ORDERED.”
On appeal, the CA affirmed intoto the July 14, 2007 Decision
of the RTC.6
When the case was elevated to this Court, Soriaga, through
the Public Attorney’s Office, and the Office of the Solicitor
General, both manifested that they would no longer file their
respective supplemental briefs and, instead, they would adopt
all the arguments in their briefs filed before the CA. In his
Appellant’s Brief, Soriaga presented the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I present case. Soriaga sold and delivered the shabu for P100
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING
A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED SHABU.7
The Court finds no merit in the appeal.
“A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways
and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and
capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal
plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been
proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug
peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards is undertaken.”
Soriaga argues that the buy-bust team failed to comply with
the requisites of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules requiring the immediate inventory and
photograph of the items seized in the buy-bust operation.
Further, Soriaga proceeds to question the chain of custody of
the seized shabu.
First of all, what is material to the prosecution for illegal
sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, plus the presentation of
the corpus delicti as evidence. Thus, the elements essential to
the crime of illegal sale of prohibited or dangerous drugs are:
(i) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another;
and (ii) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a
prohibited drug.9
The RTC and the CA both found the above elements to
have been satisfactorily proved by the prosecution in the
to Facundo, the poseur buyer. Facundo herself testified that
there was an actual exchange of the marked-money and the
prohibited drug. Certainly, Soriaga was aware that what he
was selling was illegal and prohibited. Thereafter, the corpus
delicti or the subject drug was seized, marked and
subsequently identified as a prohibited drug. At the trial, the
same drug with the identifying marks intact was presented in
evidence. Coupled with the unwavering testimony of Facundo
who had no reason at all to falsely accuse Soriaga and who
was only doing her job, the prosecution convinced the RTC to
render a judgment of conviction.
In the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant
facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been
misapplied or overlooked, the Court can only accord full
credence to such factual assessment of the trial court which
had the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor and
conduct of the witnesses at the trial.10
Absent any proof of motive to falsely charge an accused of
such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court
with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over his
bare allegation.11
On the issue of non-compliance with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs, the rule is that it
does not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.12 The requirements
under R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) are not inflexible. What is essential is “the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”13 Thus,
in the case of People v. Domado,14 it was written:
“From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating
any new path by holding that the failure to undertake the
required photography and immediate marking of seized items
may be excused by the unique circumstances of a case. In
People v. Resurreccion, we already stated that “marking upon
immediate confiscation” does not exclude the possibility that
marking can be at the police station or office of the
apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana, People
v. Hernandez, and People v. Gum-Oyen, the apprehending
team marked the confiscated items at the police station and
not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained the
conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved. To
reiterate what we have held in past cases, we are not always
looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural
requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. We succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte
when we held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of
said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the
photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not
render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of
Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it
is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law
or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or
rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the
evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any
rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the
confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if
there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight—evidentiary merit or probative
value—to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by
the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.”15
Following the consummation of the sale and the arrest of
Soriaga, Facundo proceeded to mark the sachet received from
Soriaga with the initials “RSD” while still at the crime scene. At
the police station, the marked sachet was turned over to PO2
Reynaldo Juan. Thereafter, a letter request together with the
marked sachet was sent to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory of the Southern Police District for a
laboratory examination of the contents of the marked sachet.
Thereafter, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the Crime
Laboratory, Police Inspector Richard Allan S. Mangalip issued
his report confirming that the specimen from the sachet
marked “RSD” contained or tested positive for shabu.16
With the foregoing, the Court agrees with the RTC and the CA
that the chain of custody was unbroken thereby ensuring the
integrity of the corpus delicti. Necessarily, the conviction of
Soriaga must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
People vs. Cardenas
G.R. No. 190342. March 21, 2012.*
The Facts
On 07 January 2003, an Information was filed against accused
Cipriano Cardena y Gofrerica, alias Ope, for violation of
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 2003 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous
drug, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully sell,
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the
said transaction, zero point zero five (0.05) gram of white
crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride otherwise known as SHABU a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded Not guilty to the crime
charged.
Prosecutions Version of the Facts
The evidence for the prosecution shows that around 12 p.m. of
06 January 2003, the Detection and Special Operations
Division of the Criminal Investigation Division Group (DSOD-
CIDG) in Camp Crame received a report from its confidential
informant regarding the rampant selling of shabu by a certain
Cipriano Cardenas (a.k.a. Ope) at the Payatas Area in Quezon
City. Acting on the information, a team was organized to
conduct a buy-bust operation. Police Officer (PO) 3 Edgardo
Palacio was head of the team and PO3 Rene Enteria was
designated to act as the poseur-buyer.[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif]
They marked a ₱100 bill with the initials ERP on the lower
right portion of its dorsal side and used the money in the buy-
bust operation.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] The team agreed that upon
the consummation of the sale, PO3 Enteria would throw away
his cigarette to signal the moment at which the drug pusher
would be arrested.[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif]
The team proceeded to Lupang Pangako, Barangay Payatas,
Quezon City to conduct the buy-bust operation. At the site,
PO3 Enteria was guided by the confidential informant and
closely followed by PO3 Palacio and two other team members.
They chanced upon the accused wearing camouflage pants
and standing near a small house located on a pathway.[if
!supportFootnotes][8][endif]
Approaching the accused, the informant
introduced the police officer as the person interested to buy
shabu. PO3 Enteria was asked how much he wanted to buy,
and he answered ₱100. The accused then took out a clear
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance from his
pocket and handed it to PO3 Enteria. After handing the
marked ₱100 bill to the accused, the police officer threw away
his cigarette as a signal of the consummation of the buy-bust
operation.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]
PO3 Palacio and the rest of the team, who were just 15 meters
away from the scene, immediately approached, arrested the
accused, and frisked the latter. PO3 Palacio recovered two (2)
other clear plastic sachets from the accuseds right pocket. The
three sachets were marked CC-1, CC-2 and CC-3 CC
representing the initials of the accused, Cipriano Cardenas.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
He was then brought to Camp Crame,
where he was booked and investigated. The plastic sachets
recovered from him were transmitted to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for analysis upon the request of Police Chief
Inspector Ricardo N. Sto. Domingo, Jr. of the DSODCIDG.[if
!supportFootnotes][11][endif]
The results of the Initial Laboratory Report
dated 07 January 2003[if !supportFootnotes][12][endif] showed that the
white crystalline substance contained in the three (3) heat-
sealed plastic sachets tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu, with a total weight of 0.05 gram.
On 07 January 2003, an Information for violation of Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165, was filed against the accused.[if
!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
The case was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Judicial Capital Region of Quezon City,
Branch 103 and docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-03-114312.
The Accuseds Version of the Facts
The accused had a different version of the facts surrounding
his arrest. He claimed that around 3:00 p.m. of 06 January
2003, while he was walking home, four persons handcuffed
him and forced him to board a vehicle.[if !supportFootnotes][15][endif] He
was taken to the CIDG office at Camp Crame, where he was
informed that he was being arrested for selling shabu. While
inside the investigation room, one of the men who arrested
him gave the investigator a ₱100 bill. He claimed to have not
seen the alleged shabu at the time of his arrest or even during
the CIDG investigation or during the inquest at the public
prosecutors office.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
A full-blown trial was held by the RTC, before which were
presented PO3 Palacio and PO3 Enteria as witnesses for the
prosecution. For the defense, only the accused testified in his
defense. On 03 January 2007, the RTC promulgated a
Decision[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif] convicting him of the crime
charged. The trial court gave credence to the testimonies and
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution. It ruled that
the police operation had followed the normal course of a drug
entrapment operation, and that the arresting officers presented
as prosecution witnesses were credible based on their candid
and honest demeanor. The RTC considered as absurd the
allegation of the accused that he had been whimsically
arrested by the police officers during the operation. It found as
weak and inconceivable his uncorroborated denial of the
charge.
The dispostive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgement is hereby rendered finding the
accused CIRPIANO CARDENAS y GOFRERICA GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 5
of R.A. 9165 (drug pushing) as charged and he is hereby
sentenced to a jail term of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a
fine of ₱500,000.00.The 3 sachets of shabu involved in this
case are ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru the DDB for
proper care and disposition as required by R.A. 9165.SO
ORDERED.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The accused appealed his conviction to the CA, which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 2634. On 19
February 2009, the appellate court, through its Second
Division, promulgated a Decision[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif] affirming
the trial courts conviction of the accused. It ruled that the
prosecution was able to establish the necessary elements to
prove the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165. It also found that the prosecution witnesses were
credible when they testified on the custody and identity of the
drugs confiscated from the accused. Thus, it affirmed in toto
the RTCs Decision, which it found to be supported by the facts
and law. The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it
was denied by the appellate court for lack of merit.
The Issues
The accused elevated his appeal to this Court raising this lone
issue: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER CUSTODY OF
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER R.A. NO. 9165
The defense alleges that the arresting officers did
not follow the required procedure for the handling of seized
drugs in a buy-bust operation as stated in Section 21 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165.[if
!supportFootnotes][20][endif]
It points out that there is a dearth of
evidence to prove that the plastic sachets recovered from the
accused were marked at the crime scene in his presence
immediately upon confiscation thereof.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif]
Thus, the defense argues that due to the arresting officers
noncompliance with the correct procedure, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.[if !supportFootnotes][22][endif]
The Ruling of the Court
We DENY the appeal of the accused for lack of merit and
accordingly affirm the assailed Decision of the CA.Under
Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the elements that must be proven for
the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu are as
follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of
the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and its payment.[if !supportFootnotes][23][endif] The State has
the burden of proving these elements and is obliged to present
the corpus delicti in court to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the defense does not
raise any issue with regard the sale and delivery of the illegal
drugs for which the accused was arrested. The point of
contention pertains to the noncompliance by the arresting
officers with Section 21, Article II of the IRR implementing R.A.
9165 regarding the chain of custody of seized drugs. This is an
important matter because, if proven, substantial gaps in the
chain of custody of the seized drugs would cast serious doubts
on the authenticity of the evidence presented in court and
entitle the accused to an acquittal.In People v. Salonga,[if
!supportFootnotes][25][endif]
we held that it is essential for the
prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with
unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. Thus,
drug enforcement agents and police officers involved in a buy-
bust operation are required by R.A. 9165 and its implementing
rules to mark all seized evidence at the buy-bust scene.
Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR, states:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items;The defense wants to impress upon this Court that the
arresting officers did not conduct a physical inventory of the
items seized and failed to photograph them in the presence of
the accused and of other personalities specified by Section 21
(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. 9165.[if !supportFootnotes][26][endif] It
argues that this lapse on the part of the police officers involved
in the buy-bust operation raise uncertainty and doubts as to
the identity and integrity of the articles seized from the
accused whether they were the same items presented at the
trial court that convicted him. Based on this noncompliance by
the arresting officers, the defense prays for the acquittal of the
accused.We are not persuaded by these arguments.The chain
of custody is defined in Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs
Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements
R.A. No. 9165:b. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such
record of movements and custody of seized item shall include
the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping
and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition. To
protect the civil liberties of the innocent, the rule ensures that
the prosecutions evidence meets the stringent standard of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. We have held, however that
substantial compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain
of custody rule does not necessarily render the seized drug
items inadmissible. In People v. Ara,[if !supportFootnotes][27][endif] we
ruled that R.A. 9165 and its IRR do not require strict
compliance with the chain of custody rule:As recently
highlighted in People v. Cortez and People v. Lazaro, Jr., RA
9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) do not require strict compliance as to the chain of
custody rule. The arrest of an accused will not be invalidated
and the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the
sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA
9165. We have emphasized that what is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.Briefly
stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements
under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody,
photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons,
is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and
custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. (Emphasis
supplied.)In the instant case, we find that the chain of custody
of the seized prohibited drugs was not broken. The testimony
of PO3 Palacio shows that he was the one who recovered
from the accused the three plastic sachets of shabu, together
with the marked money. He also testified that he was the one
who personally brought the request for examination to the
PNP Crime Laboratory and had the plastic sachets examined
there. During the trial of the case, he positively identified the
plastic sachets that he had recovered from the accused and
had marked CC-1, CC-2 and CC-3. The pertinent portions of
the testimony of PO3 Palacio are as follows:
FIS. JURADO:
Q. And after you recovered the buy-bust money and
these three plastic sachets of
shabu, what did you do with the
accused?
WITNESS:A. We brought them to the office.
FIS. JURADO:Q. What happened to (sic) the office?
WITNESS:A. He was investigated.
FIS. JURADO:Q. How about the three plastic
sachets, what did you do with these three
plastic sachets.
WITNESS:A. We have examined it at the Crime
Laboratory.
FIS. JURADO:Q. How does (sic) it brought to the
Crime Laboratory?
WITNESS:We asked a request from our investigator.
FIS. JURADO:Q. Is this the same request for
laboratory examination that you are
referring to?
WITNESS:Yes sir.
FIS. JURADO:Q. Who brought this request to the
Crime Laboratory for examination?
WITNESS:A. I sir.
FIS. JURADO:Q. Where does it show the delivery?
WITNESS:Here your honor.
(Witness pointing in open court to the document the
request for laboratory examination the date when i
was delivered.)
xxx xxx xxx
FIS. JURADO:Q.May we request that the said
documents be marked as Exhibit F and if the said
plastic sachet would be shown to you, how will you
be able to identify the same?
WITNESS:A. I can identify it because it has a
marking sir CC-1, CC-2, and CC-3 your Honor.
FIS. JURADO:Q. You mean to say to this Honorable Court
that the three plastic sachets has (sic) a marking CC-1, CC-2,
and CC-3?
WITNESS:A. Yes your Honor.
FIS. JURADO:Q. What was (sic) CC stands for?
WITNESS:A. The name of our suspect Cipriano Cardenas
your Honor.
PO3 Rene Enteria, who had acted as the poseur-buyer in the
buy-bust operation, corroborated the testimony of PO3 Palacio
and indicated that the latter was in custody of the seized drugs
from the time the accused was arrested until these were sent
to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis. We quote the
relevant portions of PO3 Enterias testimony from the records:
FIS. ARAULA:After you said a while ago that you
made a pre-arranged signal, what
happened then after that?
WITNESS:PO3 Palacio approached us and arrested the
subject sir.
FIS. ARAULA:When PO3 Palacio arrested the accused,
where was (sic) you?
WITNESS:I was behind them sir.
FIS. ARAULA:Where is the buy bust money when Palacio
arrested the accused?
WITNESS:It was recovered to (sic) Ope sir.
FIS. ARAULA:After arresting the accused, what happened
then?
WITNESS:We returned to the police station sir.
FIS. ARAULA:What happened to the police station?
WITNESS:The suspect was investigated sir.
FIS. ARAULA:Who was in possession of that
transparent plastic sachet when you were
going to the police station?
WITNESS:I was the one sir.
xxx xxx xxx
FIS. ARAULA:If that transparent plastic sachet be
shown to you, can you identify that?
WITNESS:Yes sir.
FIS ARAULA:Showing to you this transparent plastic
sachet, what can you say about this?
WITNESS:This is the one that I purchased sir.
FIS. ARAULA:It appears that there are three (3)
transparent plastic sachets in this case, in fact this is
the one that you purchased, how about these two (2)
other transparent plastic sachets, where did it came
(sic) from?
WITNESS:It was recovered by Palacio after the arrest of the
suspect sir.
FIS. ARAULA:Why did you say that this is the
transparent plastic sachet containing shabu that you
purchased?
WITNESS:Because I remember the size sir.
 FIS. ARAULA:That is the only reason, due to the size of the
transparent plastic sachet?
WITNESS:I also has (sic) initial in the plastic sir.
FIS. ARAULA:What is the initial?
WITNESS:Palacio was the one who made the
marking sir.
xxx xxx xxx
FIS. ARAULA:How about the evidence that you
confiscated in relation to this Section 5, R.A. 9165
against the accused, where was that when there was
an investigation?
WITNESS:It was brought to the Crime Laboratory for
examination sir
CROSS EXAMINATION:
ATTY. CABAROS:Who actually recovered the shabu
from the accused?
WITNESS: Palacio sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:Why is it that it could (sic) seem that Palacio
was the one who marked the money and he marked
also all the three (3) plastic sachets? You never
mark with your initial the buy bust money and you
never mark with your initial that particular plastic
sachet you said that was given to you by the
accused, how come that it was always Palacio (who)
made the marking and you as poseur buyer did not
mark the items?
WITNESS:Because when we made (the) marking, we make
only one marking, your Honor
REDIRECT EXAMINATION:
FIS. ARAULA:When this Palacio placed this mark,
all the evidences that was confiscated from the
accused, where were you?
WITNESS:I was near Palacio sir.
FIS. ARAULA:So you noticed that Palacio placed his
markings to the evidences?
WITNESS: Yes sir.(Emphasis supplied.)
From these testimonies of the police officers, the prosecution
established that they had custody of the drugs seized from the
accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time he
was transported to the CIDG office in Camp Crame, and up to
the time the drugs were submitted to the crime laboratory for
examination. The said police officers also identified the seized
drugs with certainty when these were presented in court. With
regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no
conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would
cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and
scrutinized in court. To the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies
show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the
accused at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same
one tested, introduced, and testified to in court. In short, there
is no question as to the integrity of the evidence.Although we
find that the police officers did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of the IRR implementing
R.A. 9165, the noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary
weight of the drugs seized from the accused, because the
chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken
under the circumstances of the case. We held thus in
Zalameda v. People of the Philippines.Jurisprudence teems
with pronouncements that failure to strictly comply with Section
21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render
an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated
from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the present case, we
see substantial compliance by the police with the required
procedure on the custody and control of the confiscated items,
thus showing that the integrity of the seized evidence was not
compromised. We refer particularly to the succession of events
established by evidence, to the overall handling of the seized
items by specified individuals, to the test results obtained,
under a situation where no objection to admissibility was ever
raised by the defense. All these, to the unprejudiced mind,
show that the evidence seized were the same evidence tested
and subsequently identified and testified to in court. In People
v. Del Monte, we explained:
We would like to add that non-compliance with
Section 21 of said law, particularly the making
of the inventory and the photographing of the
drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render
the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under
Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court,
evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there
should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the
evidence must be admitted subject only to the
evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the
courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any
rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the
confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if
there is non-compliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value
to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts
on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in
each case. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the accused alleges that he did
not commit the crime he was charged with and claims to have
not seen the evidence presented by the prosecution. It was
established that he sold the seized drugs to PO3 Enteria
during the buy-bust operation, and that the sachets were found
in his possession. These facts establish the elements of
Section 5, R.A. 9165. The only issue the appellant raises
before us is the noncompliance by the police officer with the
correct procedure for the handling of the evidence seized from
him. We have no reason to doubt the police officers who gave
detailed accounts of what they did during the buy-bust
operation. Their testimonies have adequately established the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs and have led us
to affirm the conviction of the accused.
The credibility of witnesses is a matter best
examined by, and left to, the trial courts. The time-tested
doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations
on the witness stand is best and most competently performed
by the trial judge. Unlike appellate magistrates, it is the judge
who can weigh such testimonies in light of the witnesses
demeanor and manner of testifying, and who is in a unique
position to discern between truth and falsehood. Thus,
appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it,
accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses.
This is especially true when the trial courts findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court. For them the said findings are
considered generally conclusive and binding upon this Court,[if
!supportFootnotes][33][endif]
unless it be manifestly shown that the trial
court had overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and
circumstances of significance.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] Thus, we
affirm the assailed Decision of the appellate court and uphold
the conviction of the accused.WHEREFORE, the appeal is
DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 2634,
People of thePhilippines v. Cipriano Cardenas y Gofrerica
dated 19 February 2009, is AFFIRMED in all respects.SO
ORDERED.
People vs. Flores
G.R. No. 201365. August 3, 2015
The Information in Criminal Case No. 09-270069 charged
Flores with violating Section 11(3) or illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of July, 2009, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by
law to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control five [5] pcs. of heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance each containing the following weight, to wit: A –
“MF1” – ZERO POINT ZERO ONE FOUR [0.014] gram; B –
“MF2” – ZERO POINT ZERO ZERO EIGHT [0.008] gram; C –
“MF3” – ZERO POINT ZERO ONE FIVE [0.015] gram; D –
“MF4” – ZERO POINT ZERO ZERO SEVEN [0.007] gram; and
E – “MF5” – ZERO POINT ZERO ZERO EIGHT [0.008] gram
all containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride known as
“SHABU,” which is a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.6
A separate Information for violation of Section 5 or illegal sale
of dangerous drugs was filed in Criminal Case No.
09-270070, which provides:
That on or about the 28th day of July, 2009, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized
by law to sell, trade, deliver, or give away to another any
dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly sell one [1] heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing: ZERO POINT ZERO ONE TWO [0.012] gram of
white crystalline substance containing Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride known as “SHABU,” which is a dangerous drug.
Contrary to law.7
When arraigned, Flores pleaded not guilty to both charges.8
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the prosecution
witnesses during the trial, are as follows:
On July 28, 2009, an informant arrived at the District Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Group of the Manila
Police District and disclosed that a certain alias Wella was
selling illegal drugs at Basan Street, corner Palanca Street,
Quiapo, Manila. Later, alias Wella was identified as Manuela
Flores, herein accused. Acting on the report, Police
Superintendent Harris Ebes created a team to conduct a buy-
bust operation.
At around 8:30 p.m., the buy-bust team and the confidential
informant proceeded to the target area. When they reached
the corner of Palanca Street, a tomboy, later identified as
Flores, met them and asked, “Kukuha ba kayo?” The poseur-
buyer, PO3 Rodelio Salvador, answered, “Oo, kukuha kami,
pang-gamit,” then gave her the marked money. Thereafter,
Flores took out several pieces of sachet from her pocket,
chose one (1), and handed PO3 Salvador a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance. After receiving the
sachet, PO3 Salvador made the prearranged signal of
removing his cap, prompting the other police officers to arrest
Flores. They apprised her of her constitutional rights and
ordered her to surrender the remaining plastic sachets from
her pocket. PO3 Salvador marked the seized specimen from
the sale as “MFS,” while those remaining sachets found in her
possession were marked as “MF1” to “MF5.” They then
brought Flores to the police station where PO3 Salvador
turned over the seized plastic sachets and the buy-bust money
to PO3 Elymar Garcia, the precinct investigator. They likewise
prepared an inventory and took photographs of the seized
items. Afterwards, the buy-bust team executed a Joint Affidavit
of Apprehension.
Subsequently, PO3 Garcia requested for a laboratory
examination of the confiscated substance, which tested
positive for shabu.
On April 7, 2010, the RTC of Manila found Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. The
dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to
wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 09-270069, finding accused,
Manuela Flores y Salazar @ Wella, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, she is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and
1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months as maximum, to
pay a fine of P300,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
2. In Criminal Case No. 09-270070, finding accused,
Manuela Flores y Salazar @ Wella, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, she is hereby
sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
The specimens are forfeited in favor of the government
and the Branch Clerk of Court, accompanied by the Branch
Sheriff, is directed to turn over with dispatch and upon receipt
the said specimens to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) for proper disposal in accordance with the law
and rules. SO ORDERED.9
Aggrieved by the ruling of the trial court, Flores appealed
before the CA. On September 2, 2011, the appellate court
affirmed the lower court’s Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the
RTC, Branch 2, City of Manila, dated April 7, 2010, finding
accused-appellant MANUELA FLORES y SALAZAR @
WELLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5
and 11(3), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.10
Flores now seeks her acquittal before the Court. She contends
that the arresting officers failed to comply with the procedure
provided under Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165.11
The petition is unmeritorious.
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. 9165 provides:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.

However, failure to strictly comply with the above mentioned
procedure will not render an arrest illegal or the seized items
inadmissible in evidence.12 Substantial compliance is allowed
as provided for in Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165. This provision reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever
is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that noncompliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. Flores argues
that the arresting officers violated Section 21, Article II of the
IRR of R.A. 9165 and the chain of custody rule. The rule on
chain of custody expressly demands the identification of the
persons who handle the confiscated items for the purpose of
duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they are seized from
the accused until the time they are presented in court.
Moreover, as a method of authenticating evidence, the chain
of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the possession
of the witness, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the
item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. Also, crucial in proving the chain of
custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused.14 It
is settled that noncompliance with the procedure outlined in
Section 21, Article II of the IRR of R.A. 9165 shall not render
void and invalid such seizure as long as the apprehending
officers are able to successfully preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items.15
The records in the case at bar would show that the authorities
were able to maintain the integrity of the seized sachets and
that the links in the chain of custody of the same were clearly
established. PO3 Salvador, the poseur-buyer, testified that
the entrapment took place on Basan Street, corner Palanca
Street, Quiapo, Manila at around 8:30 p.m., on July 28, 2009.
When he received the sachet with white crystalline substance,
PO3 Salvador removed his cap as a signal for his fellow police
officers to apprehend Flores. They informed her of her
constitutional rights and ordered her to surrender the
remaining plastic sachets in her possession. PO3 Salvador
then marked the seized specimen from the sale as “MFS,”
while those remaining sachets recovered from her pocket were
marked as “MF1” to “MF5.” Thereafter, they brought Flores to
the police station for proper disposition. On their way, PO3
Salvador was the one who carried the confiscated sachets
while his companions guarded Flores. When they reached the
police station, PO3 Salvador turned over the seized plastic
sachets and the buy-bust money to PO3 Garcia, the precinct
investigator, who made an inventory and took photographs of
said items. PO3 Garcia likewise prepared the laboratory
request for examination and delivered the six (6) small
transparent sachets with white crystalline substance to PCI
Elisa G. Reyes at the crime laboratory on July 28, 2009, at
about 9:40 p.m. Chemistry Report No. D-556-09 revealed that
the marked items seized from Flores tested positive for
Methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Subsequently,
PO3 Salvador identified in court the marked items as the ones
he indeed confiscated from Flores during the arrest.
Verily, there is no showing that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were compromised in any way. Thus,
the Court holds that there was indeed compliance with the
requirements under R.A. 9165 and the prosecution has
sufficiently established that there was an unbroken chain of
custody over the seized illegal drugs.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Consequently, the
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated September 2, 2011 in C.A.-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04430, affirming the Decision of the Manila
Regional Trial Court Branch 2, dated April 7, 2010 in Criminal
Case Nos. 09-270069 and 09--270070, finding accused-
appellant Manuela Flores y Salazar @ Wella, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11(3), Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED. She is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and
1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months as maximum,
ORDERED to PAY a fine of P300,000.00, and pay the costs in
Criminal Case No. 09-270069. While in Criminal Case No. 09-
270070, she is sentenced to life imprisonment, ORDERED to
PAY a fine of P500,000.00, and pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among
other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
“SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories
or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two
(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine
the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test.
x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxxx
(c) of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those
found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject
to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.”
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v.
 Commission on
Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent
portions of the said resolution read as follows:
“WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory
drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they
are electing and they will be assured that only those who can
serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the
authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other
election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby
promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the
conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public
office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.—All candidates for public office,
both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug
test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed
with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two
(2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of
those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates.—Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates.
The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied
with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test.
xxx
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and
file drug test certificate.—No person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate
herein required.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic
and a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In
it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided
for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article
VI of the Constitution, which states:
“SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.”
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that
both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first
be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in
the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
 Drugs
Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer,
also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at
bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and
Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS
and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a
violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate
petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy which in
volves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the
presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may
refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite
standing to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish
that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as
a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure;
hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that
Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the
May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing
since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the
petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding
SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus
standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and
the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of
Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the
right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute
undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
 (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165
and 
 COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that,
subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate
for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in
Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2)
voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the
Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise
modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or
alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be,
are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in
Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
“Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however,
as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the
powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter,
and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is
the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of
legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.”10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is
subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12
and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of
a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably
requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug
clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a
certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until
he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in
its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free
bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state
that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the
drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those
covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate
ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not
adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision
deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that
the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office
of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the
mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon
without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms,
it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized
elections and the candidates running in that electoral event.
Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity
as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its
having infringed the constitutional provision defining the
qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
 (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of
RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA
9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and
private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out
illegal drug and safeguard in the process “the well being of
[the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs.” This statutory purpose, per the policy-
declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit
by the state of “an intensive and unrelenting campaign against
the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and
projects.”14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal
prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a
result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as
criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation.
Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
“Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.—A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act
may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close
relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and
rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application,
the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall
order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If
the examination x x x results in the certification that the
applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the
Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center
designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the
Voluntary Submission Program.—A drug dependent under the
voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under
Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
x x x x”
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most
vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects
of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more
critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this
jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art.
III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long
come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that
the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the
medium of mandatory random drug testing among students
and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point.
Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one
of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive
jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among
school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of
Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et
al.v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent
US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the
constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon
wanted to address the drug menace in their respective
institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by
school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they
required random urinalysis drug testing for the school’s
athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied
participation in the football program after he refused to
undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued,
claiming that the school’s drug testing policy violated, inter
alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues
raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand
in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while
not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have
less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than
non-athletes since the former observe communal undress
before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports
activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a
higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5)
requiring urine samples does not invade a student’s privacy
since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing;
and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the
dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US
Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared
the random drug-testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in
Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school
students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay
Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and
academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred
that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes
violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued,
unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations
and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes
are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the
constitutionality of drug testing even among non-athletes on
the basis of the school’s custodial responsibility and authority.
In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-
athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and
teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and
duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding
that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy,
the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which
even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two
cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision
of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-
being of their students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4)
schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for
admission that are fair, just, and non-discri-minatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of
the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students
are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of
the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who
usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a
random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary
schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if
the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and
protected. To borrow from Vernonia, “[d]eterring drug use by
our Nation’s schoolchildren is as important as enhancing
efficient enforcement of the Nation’s laws against the
importation of drugs”; the necessity for the State to act is
magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school
are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student
body and faculty.22 Needless to stress, the random testing
scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that
the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual
students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students,
the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The
Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,”23 has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to
privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner
Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous
and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he
wrote without elaboration:
“The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals
have made various rulings on the constitutionality of
mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The
US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the
mandatory drug tests violate a citizen’s constitutional right to
privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.”25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In
context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into
one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to
a person’s ordinary sensibilities.27 And while there has been
general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee
against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract
prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases
is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to
the state’s exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution
is couched and as has been held, “reasonableness” is the
touchstone of the validity of a government search or
intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the
reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
government-mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires
showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a
judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees––and
students for that matter––under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to in
Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary procedures,” the
probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable.
Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in
question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is
the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing,
which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of
the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace
serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug
testing requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an
office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s work
policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered
into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement
upon such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the
intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a
question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly
set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling
law authorizing a search “narrowly drawn” or “narrowly
focused”?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one,
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed
towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass
the employees or place them under a humiliating experience.
While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a
possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use
by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested.
And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself
prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by
providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to
“random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
work place.”
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken
under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the
employee’s privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the
test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two
testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory
test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by
trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard
against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides
that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know”
basis;34 that the “drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect
the confidentiality of the test results.”35 Notably, RA 9165 does
not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting
agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation
of the ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore,
the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out
illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the
citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the
medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a
national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to
at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to
override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises.
The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts
across gender, age group, and social-economic lines. And it
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or
trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an
investor’s dream were it not for the illegal and immoral
components of any of such activities. The drug problem has
hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a
notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a
laid back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge.
Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random
drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring
drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of
detection by random testing being higher than other modes.
The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and
enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited
context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government
officials and employees also labor under reasonable
supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law
and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the
more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who,
by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at
all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS’ next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power
hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its
position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn
as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly
provides how drug testing for students of secondary and
tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall
undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall
be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the
student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the
company’s work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected
to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way.
And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to
issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior
and Local Government, Department of Education, and
Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies,
the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme
shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore,
incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked
discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and
where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area
in the constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the increasing
complexity of the task of the government and the increasing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many
problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of
power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
 Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
 [f], right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the
and [g] of RA 9165) Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA forced to incriminate themselves.
9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870
from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are,
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec.
constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness SO ORDERED.
of the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons
charged before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug
testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless.
The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact
of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do
not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’