G.R. No.
L-33592 March 31, 1931 three or four times, the first visit having occurred between 6 and 7 p.
Estate of the deceased Victorina Villaranda.
EUSEBIA LIM, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JULIANA CHINCO, oppositor-appellee.
This is a contest over the probate of a paper writing purporting to be
the will of Victorina Villaranda y Diaz, a former resident of the
municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, who died in the
Hospital of San Juan de Dios, in the City of Manila, on June 9, 1929.
The deceased left no descendants or ascendants, and the document
produced as her will purports to leave her estate, consisting of
properties valued at P50,000, more or less, chiefly to three collateral
relatives, Eusebia, Crispina, and Maria, of the surname of Lim. This
instrument was offered for probate by Eusebia Lim, named in the
instrument as executrix Opposition was made by Juliana Chinco, a full
sister of the deceased. Upon hearing the cause the trial court
sustained the opposition and disallowed the will on the ground that
the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the time the
instrument purports to have been executed by her From this
judgment the proponent of the will appealed.
The deceased was a resident of Mercauayan, Province of Bulacan, and
was about 80 years of age at the time of her death. On the morning
of June 2, 1929, she was stricken with apoplexy, incident to cerebral
hemorrhage, and was taken in an unconscious condition, seated in a
chair, to her room. Doctor Geronimo Z. Gaanan, a local physician of
Meycauayan, visited the old lady, with whom he was well acquianted,
m. of June 3d. Upon examining the patient, he found her insensible
and incapable of talking or controlling her movements. On the same
day the parish priest called for the purpose of administering the last
rites of the church, and being unable to take her confession, he
limited himself to performing the office of extreme unction. Doctor
Isidoro Lim, of Manila, was also called upon to visit the patient and he
came to see her two or three times. With his approval, it was decided
to take the woman to the hospital of San Juan de Dios in Manila, and
on the morning of June 5, 1929, the ambulance from this hospital
arrived, in charge of Doctor Guillermo Lopez del Castillo, a resident
physician of the hospital. At about 11 c'clock a.m. on that day she was
embarked on the ambulance and taken to the hospital, where she
died four days later.
The purported will, which is the subject of this proceeding, was
prepared by Perfecto Gabriel, a practicing attorney of Manila, whose
wife appears to be related to the chief beneficiaries named in the will.
This gentlemen arrived upon the scene at 9 o'clock on the forenoon
of June 5, 1929. After informing himself of the condition of the
testatrix, he went into a room adjacent to that occupied by the
patient and, taking a sheet from an exercise book, wrote the
instrument in question. He then took it into the sick room for
execution. With this end in view Gabriel suggested to Doctor Lopez
del Castillo that he would be pleased to have Doctor Castillo sign as a
witness, but the latter excused himself for the reason that he
considered the old lady to be lacking in testamentary capacity.
Another person present was Marcos Ira, a first cousin of the
deceased, and attorney Gabriel asked him also whether or not he was
willing to sign as one of the witnesses. Ira replied in a discouraging
tone, and the attorney turned away without pressing the matter. In
the end three persons served as witnesses, all of whom were in
friendly relations with the lawyer, and two relatives of his wife. The
intended testatrix was not able to affix her signature to the document,
and it was signed for her by the attorney.
The vital question in the case is whether the supposed testatrix had
testamentary capacity at the time the paper referred to was signed.
Upon this point we are of the opinion, as was the trial judge, that the
deceased, on the morning of June 5, 1929, was in a comatose
condition and incapable of performing any conscious and valid act.
The testimony of Doctor Gaanan and Doctor Lopez del Castillo is
sufficient upon this point, and this testimony is well corroborated by
Paciana Diaz and Irene Ahorro. The first of these witnesses was the
one who chiefly cared for the deceased during her last illness in
Meycauayan until she was carried away to the hospital in Manila; and
the second was a neighbor, who was called in when the stroke of
apoplexy first occurred and who visited the patient daily until she was
removed from Meycauayan.
The testimony of these witnesses is convincing to the effect that the
patient was in a continuous state of coma during the entire period of
her stay in Meycauayan, subsequent to the attack, and that on the
forenoon of June 5, 1929, she did not have sufficient command of her
faculties to enable her to do any valid act. Doctor Lim, the physician
from Manila, testified for the proponent of the will. His testimony
tends to show that the patient was not suffering from cerebral
hemorrhage but from uræmic trouble, and that, after the first attack,
the patient was much relieved and her mind so far cleared up that
she might have made a will on the morning of June 5th. The attorney
testified that he was able to communicate with the deceased when
the will was made, and that he read the instrument over to her clause
by clause and asked her whether it expressed her wishes. He says that
she made signs that enabled him to understand that she concurred in
what was written. But it is clear, even upon the statement of this
witness, that the patient was unable to utter intelligent speech. Upon
the authority of Perry vs. Elio (29 Phil., 134), the paper offered for
probate was properly disallowed.
The judgment appealed from will therefore be affirmed, and it is so
ordered, with costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-5263 February 17, 1954
AGUSTIN BARRERA, ET AL., proponents-appellants,
vs.
JOSE TAMPOCO, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
Olivia Villapaña died in Tarlac, Tarlac, on December 13, 1948. On
December 31, 1948, a petition was filed by Agustin Barrera in the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the probate of the will executed
by Olivia Villapaña on July 17, 1948, and for the appointment of the
petitioner as executor. According to the petition the properties left by
the testatrix are worth P94,852.96, and the heirs instituted are
nephews and nieces and grandchildren in the collateral line. Jose
Tampoco and Victoriano Tampoco, alleged grandchildren of the
testatrix in the direct line, filed an opposition, claiming that the will
was not executed and attested in accordance with the law, that the
testatrix lacked testamentary capacity, that there was undue influence
and pressure in its execution, that the signature of Olivia Villapaña
was obtained by fraud and trickery, and that the testamentary
provisions are illegal. Consorcia Lintang, Nemesio Villapaña, Marcos
Villapaña, Jesus Villapaña, Vicente Villapaña, Ursulo Villapaña, Avelina
Villapaña, and Rosario Villapaña, alleged nephews and nieces, also
filed an opposition on substantially the same grounds on which the
opposition of Jose and Victoriano Tampoco was based. After
protracted trial, and more than a year after submission of the case, a
decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on
August 11, 1951, disallowing the will. The court found that Olivia
Villapaña had testamentary capacity, that there was no forgery, fraud,
trickery or undue influence in the execution of the will, and that
petition of forced heirs is not a ground for denying probate; but the
will was disallowed because it was not the personal last will and
testament of the deceased and it was not based on the finding that
Olivia Villapaña did not furnish the names of the persons instituted as
heirs and that the will was not read to her before she signed it. The
second ground is premised on the conclusion that attesting witness
Laureano Antonio was not present when Olivia Villapaña and
attesting witness Honorio Lacson signed the will; that Antonio only
partially saw the signing by attesting witness Modesto Puno; and that
Olivia Villapaña saw Antonio sign only two or three times. From this
decision the petitioner has appealed.
According to appellant's evidence, two or three days before July 10,
1948, Pilar Tañedo called on Modesto Puno, a lawyer and justice of
the peace of Concepcion, Tarlac, and requested the latter to come to
Manila for a conference with Olivia Villapaña, aunt of Pilar. On July 10,
1948, Atty. Puno, complying with the request, went to the house of
Pilar Tañedo in Singalong Street where Olivia was staying. The latter,
after preliminary greetings and courtesies, informed Atty. Puno that
she wanted him to prepare her will, giving the names of the heirs and
the properties to be left. Olivia Villapaña asked Atty. Puno to get the
description of the properties from the herein appellant, Agustin
Barrera, husband of Pilar Tañedo. Atty. Puno noted the wishes of
Olivia, and, as there was then no available typewriter, he informed the
old woman that he would prepare the will in his office in Concepcion
and come back with it on the following Saturday. As promised, on or
July 17, 1948, Atty. Puno returned to the house of Olivia Villapaña in
Singalong, carrying with him one original and three copies, in
typewritten form, of the will he drafted in accordance with the
instructions of Olivia Villapaña. Atty. Puno arrived about noon. He
read the will to Olivia to find out whether it conformed to her wishes,
and she indicated that it was all right. After lunch Atty. Puno
manifested that two other witnesses were necessary, whereupon Pilar
Tañedo requested Honorio Lacson and Laureano Antonio, who were
then living in the first floor of the house, to come up. Lacson and
Antonio did as requested. Olivia Villapaña, Atty. Puno, Lacson and
Antonio were then seated around a small rectangular table in sala,
and at this juncture Atty. Puno gave a copy of the will to Olivia,
Lacson and Antonio, while he retained one. The Attorney again read
the will aloud, advising the rest to check their respective copies. As
Olivia Villapaña agreed to the will, she proceeded to sign all the four
copies, on the lines previously placed by Atty. Puno, followed
successively by Lacson, Atty. Puno and Antonio, all in the presence of
each other. After the signing, Atty. Puno gave the original and a copy
to Olivia, and retained the other two copies. Atty. Puno , Lacson and
Antonio stayed for a while even ate merienda prepared by the sisters
Pilar and Beatriz Tañedo. Olivia Villapaña delivered her will to Agustin
Barrera for safekeeping on October 17, 1948 when she was taken to
the U.S.T. Hospital where she remained until November 7, 1948. On
this date her doctors lost all hope for her recovery and Olivia
Villapaña was brought to Tarlac, Tarlac, her hometown, where, as
already stated, she died on December 13, 1948.
According to the evidence for the oppositors-appellees, the will
presented in the court by the petitioner was not executed in
accordance with law, in that attesting witness Laureano Antonio did
not see the testatrix and attesting witness Lacson sign the will or any
of its copies, that he saw Atty. Puno when the latter was already half
thru signing the document, and that the testatrix did not see Antonio
sign all the copies.
After a thorough study of the record and mature reflection on the
conflicting evidence, we are constrained to conclude that the trial
court erred in denying probate of the will.
Of the three attesting witnesses, namely, Atty. Modesto Puno,
Honorio Lacson, and Laureano Antonio, the first two testified
positively that the will was signed by the testatrix and the three
witnesses in the presence of each other, and that it was read to the
testatrix before being signed. In view of the opposition filed by the
two sets of oppositors , the third attesting witness, Laureano Antonio,
had to be presented by the petitioner but, contrary to expectations,
Antonio testified that he arrived at the scene of the execution of the
will after testatrix and Honorio Lacson had already signed and after
Atty. Puno was half through affixing his signatures, and that the
testatrix left before Antonio finished signing all the copies. By
numerical superiority alone, the weight of the testimony of Atty. Puno
and Honorio Lacson outbalances the probative value of the testimony
of Laureano Antonio. Intrinsically, we cannot state that Laureano
Antonio spoke the truth on the witness stand, since, in the first place,
the attestation clause signed by him contradicts his pretense and, in
the second place, there is enough evidence on the record to show
that in his conferences with Atty. Barrera before taking the witness
stand, Antonio never gave the slightest indication that he was not
present when the testatrix left before Antonio finished signing.
Modesto Puno is a lawyer and at the time a justice of the peace, and
it is improbable that he would unnecessarily risk his honor and
reputation. Indeed, the trial court gave the impression that Atty. Puno
was anxious to strictly meet the requirements of the law and in the
absence, as in the case at bar, of any reason for a hasty completion,
we do not believe that Atty. Puno would have allowed the signing of
the will to be proceeded with unless three attesting witnesses were
already present. On the other hand, we can fairly state that there was
in fact no hurry on the part of any of the participants in the will,
because the testatrix Olivia Villapaña was not dying (she died some
five months after the execution of the will) and the parties could
therefore take all the time that they wanted, Indeed, none of the
three witnesses, left the house of Olivia Villapaña and they even
stayed therein until after merienda time.
The fact that Atty. Puno id the brother of Jose Puno who is the
husband of Carmen Tañedo, one of the beneficiaries of the will, and
that Honorio Lacson is the husband of Bibiana Lacson who is a first
cousin of Agustin Barrera, herein petitioner and husband of Pilar
Tañedo, is not sufficient to make then biased witnesses. If Atty. Puno
had any material interest, this fact should have caused him to be
more careful in seeing to it that the formalities of the law were strictly
complied with, and this should be true with respect to Honorio
Lacson.
In deciding against the probate of the will, the trial court believed the
testimony of Laureano Antonio to the effect that he arrived at the
place of the signing at about 2:30 in the afternoon, and thereby
found that a greater part of the proceeding was finished, because
Atty. Puno declared in one place that "the signing of the testament
commenced around between one o'clock and two o'clock" and in
another place that the signing took place "around two and three
o'clock," and Honorio Lacson declared that he was called by Pilar
Tañedo to act as witness at around two o'clock or two thirty. From the
testimony of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson the court concluded that
the signing actually commenced between one and two o'clock. We
are of the opinion that the specification of the time of the signing
refers to an immaterial or unimportant detail which, in view of the
lapse of time, might have been a mistake by one or the other
participant in the execution of Oliva's will. What is important and
decisive — and this should be impressed in the mind of an attorney
preparing and taking charge of the signing of will, — is that the
testatrix and each of the three attesting witnesses must affix their
signatures in the presence of one another. In the case before us, Atty.
Puno and Honorio
Lacson both attesting witnesses, categorically affirmed that this
procedure was followed. At any rate, even under the testimony of
Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson, the signing could have taken place at
about or after two thirty, since the former declared that it took place
between two and three o'clock and Honorio Lacson stated that the
time was two or two thirty. another point invoked by the trial court
against the probate of the will is the circumstance that, while Atty.
Puno testified that he placed the lines on which the testatrix and the
witnesses were to sign before he read the document to the testatrix
whom he gave the original witness Lacson testify that Atty. Puno read
the original after giving a copy to the testatrix, and after reading Atty.
Puno placed the lines for signatures. The discrepancy again refers to a
minor detail which is not sufficient to negative the truthfulness of Atty.
Puno and Honorio Lacson on the main and important fact that the
will was signed by the testatrix and the three attesting witnesses in the
presence of each other.
Oppositors-appellees presented in corroboration of the testimony of
Laureano Antonio, Joaquin Villapaña and Consolacion del Mundo.
Joaquin Villapaña, a painter allegedly was then the maid of Oliva
Villapaña. Apart from the fact that there is evidence to show that both
Joaquin Villapaña and Consolacion del Mundo were not yet
employed in the house of Oliva when the latter's will was executed,
there is little or no reason for their version to prevail over the positive
testimony is even corroborated by two other witnesses, Bibiana
Lacson and Beatriz Tañedo. Certainly the story of Joaquin Villapaña
and Consolacion del Mundo can have no greater weight than that of
Laureano Antonio.
In the holding that the will was not that of Oliva Villapaña, the trial
court found that it was not read to her; and this finding was premised
on the alleged contradiction of Atty. Puno and Honorio Lacson
regarding the sequence of the reading of the will and the placing of
the lines for signatures, and regarding the question whether a copy or
the original was handed to the testatrix. As we have already observed,
the discrepancy relates to an insignificant matter which cannot vitally
detract from the credibility of Atty. Puno to the effect that upon
arrival at the house of Oliva Villapaña at about noon, he read the will
to her with a view to finding whether she was agreeable thereto. It is
not necessary that said will be read upon its signing and in the
presence of the witnesses.
The trial court also concluded that the testatrix could not have
furnished the names of the heirs instituted under the will, because (1)
Salvador Tañedo, one of such heirs, was long dead and (2) Marcelo
Villapaña, another instituted heir, was non-existent, since Oliva
Villapaña did not have a grandson by such name. It is true that
Salvador Tañedo was already dead and the testatrix knew about it,
but it is not uncommon for a woman of old age, confused by the big
number of her relatives, to commit the mistake of unwittingly
mentioning a dead one. With respect to the instituted heir, Marcelo
Villapaña, while it appears that Oliva did not have a grandson
answering to that name, there is evidence tending to show that
Pioquinto Villapaña, a child of Ruperta Pineda, must have been
reffered to, because Oliva, who was the child's god-mother, originally
wanted said child to be baptized as Marcelo, after his father.
Moreover, if Atty. Puno had supplied the names instituted as heirs, he
would have consulted all the interested parties and would be sure
that no mistake of the kind was made.
As a closing observation, it is not for us to discover the motives of
Oliva Villapaña in leaving her properties to the person named in the
will, and omitting therefrom the oppositors-appellees. Suffice it to
state that the trial court itself found the will to have been executed
free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence, with Oliva
having testamentary capacity; and in such a situation it becomes our
duty to give expression to her will.
Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the will executed by
Oliva Villapaña on July 17, 1948, is hereby allowed. So ordered without
costs.
G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988
THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals 1 promulgated August 29,1986 affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXII 2 dated
March 21, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the holographic
will marked in evidence as Exhibit "H" as one wholly written, dated,
and signed freely by the late Herminia Montinola in accordance with
law while in possession of full testamentary capacity, and allowing
and admitting the same to probate.
Upon the finality of the decision, let letters testamentary issue to the
executor, Eduardo F. Hernandez, as well as the certificate of probate
prescribed under Section 13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 3
This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty.
Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22, 1981 with the Court of First
Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate of
the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on
January 28, 1980. 4 The testatrix, who died single, parentless and
childless on March 29,1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will
several of her real properties to specified persons.
On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the
will filed an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. 5
With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix
except oppositor, the court in its order of May 5, 1981 6 appointed
private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate estate of
deceased.
On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only
surviving sister of the deceased but who was not named in the said
win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, 7 alleging inter alia: that
the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the
testatrix herself and the same was falsely dated or antedated; that the
testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to make
testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the
person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the
win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the
remainder of the estate.
After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence
presented in support of the petition to be conclusive and
overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
disputed will.
Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision. 8
On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a
motion for new trial. 9 Attached to her motion was the Affidavit of
Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that
witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as to
the ill health of the testatrix as well as undue influence exerted on the
latter.
The appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, 10 denied the
motion for new trial of petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the
Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that efforts were
exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision
was handed down, and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly
shed light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix as well as the
undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or
cumulative since these facts were brought to light during the trial.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27, 1986
11 was likewise denied by the appellate court in its resolution of
November 20, 1986 12 on the ground that the affidavit of one Patricia
Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative evidence
and the motion being in reality a second motion for reconsideration
which is prescribed by law.
In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the following
errors:
I was substituted by her heirs.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT
THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO BE PRESENTED IS MERELY CUMULATIVE.
II
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DENYING THE AFORESAID
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
III
AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN, DATED
AND SIGNED BY THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA.
IV
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED WILL
WAS FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED TO CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL DATE
OF EXECUTION AND TO SHIELD IT FROM PROBABLE DISPUTES AS
TO THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE ALLEGED
TESTATRIX AT THE TIME OF ITS ACTUAL EXECUTION.
V
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE HERMINIA
MONTINOLA WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO UNDUE PRESSURE AND
IMPROPERIMPORTUNINGS ON THE PART OF THOSE STANDING TO
BENEFIT FROM THE ALLEGED WILL.
VI
THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN
QUESTION TO PROBATE.
In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on November 3, 1986,
In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners maintain that the
appellate court erred in denying the motion for new trial insisting that
the new evidence sought to be presented is not merely corroborative
or cumulative.
On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that the
motion for new trial was a pro-forma motion because it was not in
accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. We find merit in
this contention.
Section 1, Rule 53 provides —
Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of appeals
becomes executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the
ground of newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered prior to the trial in the court below by the exercise of the
diligence and which is of such a character as would probably change
the result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing the
facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered
evidence.
The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola Sanson alleged
the following:
xxx xxx xxx
3. That in her plea for new trial in the said case, I have exerted efforts
to locate witnesses whose whereabouts were not known to us during
the trial in the lower court, but I have finally succeeded in tracking
them down;
4. That despite their initial reluctance to testify in this case,I am
convinced that they would testify under proper subpoena for
purposes of shedding light on the fact that the testatrix was gravely ill
at or but the time that the questioned will was allegedly executed;
5. That they had the clear opportunity to know the circumstances
under which the purported will was executed; and that they know for
a fact that there was 'undue influence' exerted by petitioner and other
relatives to procure improper favors from the testatrix;
xxx xxx xxx 13
Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the
requirements of Rule 53. The lone affidavit of a witness who was
already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the
holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed
without any certainty as, to their appearance before the court to
testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they would testify if and
when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations
in the affidavit as to the undue influence exerted on the testatrix are
mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite affidavits
must state facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they
are not valid. 14 The affidavits are required to avoid waste of the
court's time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to be
immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.
Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be
presented is new having been discovered only after the trial. It is
apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the
witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court
was handed down. The trial lasted for about four years so that
petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses who were
admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now
propose to present could have been discovered and presented
during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for
concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she
would not have been able to discover said evidence. 15
In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged
illness of the testatrix as well as the charges of undue influence
exerted upon her had been brought to light during the trial, and new
evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which
is generally not a ground for new trial. 16 Accordingly, such evidence
even if presented win not carry much probative weight which can
alter the judgment. 17
It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner
only for the purpose of delaying the proceedings. In fact, petitioners
son in his manifestation admitted that he had to request a new law
firm to do everything legally possible to meet the deadline for the
filing of a motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. 18 This
would explain the haphazard preparation of the motion, thus failing
to comply with the requirements of rule 53, which was filed on the
last day of the reglementary period of appeal so that the veracity of
the ground relied upon is questionable. The appellate court correctly
denied the motion for new trial.
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the
running of the period for appeal. 19 Since petitioner's motion was
filed on September 24,1986, the fifteenth or last day of the period to
appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on the
following day, September 25. And when the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October 30,1986, it was
obviously filed out of time.
Since the questioned decision has already become final and
executory, it is no longer within the province of this Court to review it.
This being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due
execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are
now conclusive. 20
At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on its
merits, the petition will also have to fail.
During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3)
close relatives of the testatrix presented but also two (2) expert
witnesses who declared that the contested will and signature are in
the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies more than satisfy
the requirements of Art. 811 of the Civil Code 21 in conjunction with
Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of Court, 22 or the probate of
holographic wills.
As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to
present competent proof that the will was actually executed
sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously ill and
dying of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the supposed
inconsistencies in the testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, niece and
constant companion of testatrix, which upon careful examination did
not prove such claim of antedating.
The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals
that the will in question was executed according to the formalities
required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when
supported by evidence. 23 We have examined the records of this case
and find no error in the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court
that the contested will was duly executed in accordance with law.
Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will
was without rhyme or reason, being the only surviving sister of the
testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus
demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix.
In the case of Pecson v. Coronel, 24 it was held —
The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are
very strongly knit and that the exclusion of a relative from one's
estate is an exceptional case. It is true that the ties of relationship in
the Philippines are very strong, but we understand that cases of
preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to
dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is
rendered sacred by the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since
1889...
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no
compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any part of it
in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who
is not a compulsory heir in her will. Nevertheless, per testimony of
Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two boxes of jewelry
worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's son Francis
was instituted as an heir in the contested will.
Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the
testatrix failed to dispose of all of her estate is an indication of the
unsoundness of her mind.
We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code
provides —
A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of
an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and
even though the person so instituted should not accept the
inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with
law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass
to the legal heirs.
Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only
eleven (11) of her real properties does not invalidate the will, or is it an
indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion of the
estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in
intestate succession.
Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other
than compulsory heirs have been omitted, for while blood ties are
strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard non-
compulsory heirs. 25 The fact that some heirs are more favored than
others is proof of neither fraud or undue influence. 26 Diversity of
apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament, otherwise,
the decedent might as well die intestate. 27
The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue
influence or improper pressure exerted by the beneficiaries of the will
cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is not
enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a
possibility that it may have been exercised. 28 The exercise of
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by
substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. 29
Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent
court —
There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject
Will. To Our minds, the most authentic proof that decreased had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the Will, is the
Will itself which according to a report of one of the two expert
witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3) reveals the existence of significant
handwriting characteristics such as:
1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing
xxx xxx xxx
3. good line quality.
4. presence of natural variation... (Exhibit X).
The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality
could not be achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was
indeed of unsound mind and/or under undue influence or improper
pressure when she the Will.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is
DENIED for lack of merit with costs against petitioner. The decision of
respondent court dated August 29, 1986 in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 21, 1985 is hereby
declared to be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the
dispositive portion of which reads;
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19,
1988 of the trial court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and the instrument submitted for
probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on
November 25, 1982.
In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners
Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent Clemente Sand,
Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S.
Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children.
On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for
allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the
time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not
acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every
respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither
the testament's body nor the signature therein was in decedent's
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not
duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners
through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was
likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in
the will of a house and lot located in Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte.
He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in
its entirety, as she was not its sole owner.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the
decedent's holographic will to probate. It found, inter alia:
Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide
only the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the
testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court finds no
reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply
with the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary
capacity of the testatrix.
For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question
is different from the will actually executed by the testatrix. The only
objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the will was not
written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the
question of its due execution, and not to the question of identity of
will. No other will was alleged to have been executed by the testatrix
other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the
evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must
be accepted, i.e., the will submitted in Court must be deemed to be
the will actually executed by the testatrix.
xxx xxx xxx
While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners,
however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will
in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have
convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix
have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified
the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was
written to be the genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix.
Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that
the holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testatrix has been complied with.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix,
(private respondent) Clemente Sand himself has testified in Court that
the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he visited her
during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the
holographic will in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of
sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix, at the time of making the
will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the proper object
of her bounty, and the character of the testamentary act . . . The will
itself shows that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the
nature of her estate. She even identified the lot number and square
meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her
bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she
had even written a nursing book which contained the law and
jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than sufficient
showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.
In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and
the testamentary capacity of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor
of the allowance of probate of the will submitted herein.
Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the
disallowance of herein holographic will. While it was alleged that the
said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence
adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or
influence was exerted on the testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente
Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the time of the
execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth
anniversary celebration in 1981. It was also established that she is a
very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her independence
of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has
been testified to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being
unduly influenced or improperly pressured to make the aforesaid will.
It must be noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in
question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the
specific testamentary provisions therein which is the proper subject of
another proceeding. Hence, under the circumstances, this Court
cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.
Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on
succession that in case of doubt, testate succession should be
preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no convincing
grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the
holographic will of the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted
herein must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations omitted.)
On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate
of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of Appeals found that,
"the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4
It held that the decedent did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of
the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:
Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic
will are signed without being dated, and the last disposition has a
signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it,
whatever be the time of prior dispositions.
Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a
holographic will, the testator must authenticate the same by his full
signature.
It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned
and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been
authenticated by decedent.
Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be
disallowed in any of the following cases:
(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;
(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make
a will, at the time of its execution;
(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;
(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,
on the part of the beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;
(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and
he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of
fixing his signature thereto.
In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:
Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of
making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence
of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,
on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.
These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only
issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; (2) whether said will
was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3)
whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the
time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will
and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6
In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will
of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil
Code, ante, were not complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate
of said will. This is erroneous.
We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479
(1919), that:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
last will, must be disregarded.
For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal
solemnities include the subscription, attestation, and
acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the
New Civil Code.
In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures
authenticity is the requirement that they be totally autographic or
handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of
the New Civil Code, thus:
A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is
subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten
by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its
requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the
holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and
date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions
cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the
whole testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In
the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will have not
been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated
as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased,
corrected or interlined. Manresa gave an identical commentary when
he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la
regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or
insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on
testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself.
10 The lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such
changes.
It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of
changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the
Spanish Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering
holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:
Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself
in the form and with the requisites required in Article 688.
Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full
age.
In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper
corresponding to the year of its execution, written in its entirety by
the testator and signed by him, and must contain a statement of the
year, month and day of its execution.
If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the
testator must identify them over his signature.
Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that
only the requirements of Article 810 of the New Civil Code — and not
those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential
to the probate of a holographic will.
The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could
not validly dispose of the house and lot located in Cabadbaran,
Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass
only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated.
However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do
what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain
provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself
indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran
property is in the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led
oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in
its entirety). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she cannot
validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her
father's other heirs.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of
the disposition of the entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del
Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988,
admitting to probate the holographic will of decedent Annie Sand, is
hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the
Cabadbaran property. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and
who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
Angeles, California, U.S.A.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the 4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and
deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees, no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA
vs. LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
xxx xxx xxx
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant. 7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN
CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
LABRADOR, J.: eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who,
Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No.
from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos,
622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX
the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse
HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen
to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen
Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy
with the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
exhausted..
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and
contains the following provisions:
 xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved
daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be
possessed at my death and which may have come to me
from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor
in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of
only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her
legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared
by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are
(a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto
insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged
natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that
should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be
the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because
several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the
Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section
946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of
the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged
that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes
legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of
the United States and of the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in
his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with
which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877,
176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in
page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen,
through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these
were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN
THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS,
ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION
OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY
THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE
SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS
CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO
ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the
United States and of the State of California at the time of his death.
But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was
domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted
by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the
facts of record show that the deceased Edward E. Christensen
was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed
school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army
Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in
the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United
States and stayed there for the following nine years until 1913,
during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of
the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed the
Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the
Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing
stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing
other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by
the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World
War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945.
Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as
Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to
California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.
Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-
3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the
Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that he was born in New
York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and
since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very
rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering
that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately
abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of
meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote
something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on
Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he
acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento, California from
1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter
was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the
deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California
by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he
was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This
conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
 The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But to the law of the country where it is situated.
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with

never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no respect to the order of succession and to the amount of

domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary

his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the

he went on business which would require his presence for person whose succession is under consideration, whatever

several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have may be the nature of the property and regardless of the

sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It country where said property may be found.

is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the
continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving
determination of the meaning of the term "national law"is used
up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New
therein.
Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the
exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence
There is no single American law governing the validity of
simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence,
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the
however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from
Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
the merest temporary presence to the most permanent
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the
abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only
private law of the State of California.
proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is
disposition of personal property? The decision of the court below,
defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as
sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
follows:
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes
the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its
owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and
is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is
there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is
correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law
thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of
Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of California of
which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists
that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity
of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to
the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors,
thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict
of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law
for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law
minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court
chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of
Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to
Michigan law. But once having determined the the Conflict of
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why
the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict
of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of
references" which has so often been criticized be legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi
or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical
reason why the original reference should be the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a
solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but those who
have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis
circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that
point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to
internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors
to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result from
adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is
the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-
of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws
form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept
the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the
choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have
been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment
would be for the woman. The same result would happen,
though the courts would switch with respect to which would
hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances:
where the title to land is in question, and where the validity of
a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict
of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the
parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any
further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the
domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in
France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England,
and France. The question arises as to how this property is to
be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court.
There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate succession
to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile
was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to
do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law,
however, would show that if a French court were called upon
to determine how this property should be distributed, it
would refer the distribution to the national law of the
deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts
court has open to it alternative course of action: (a) either to
apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to
resolve itself into a French court and apply the Massachusetts
statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-
called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus
applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which
the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign law,
the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter
back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the
narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is
'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be
resorted to as governing a particular case, the further
question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a
question which, while it has been considered by the courts in
but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine
involved has been descriptively designated by them as the
"Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the
question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the
foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning
the main controversy to be decided according to the law of
the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been
advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the
court of the forum, in determining the question before it,
must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction,
but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law
to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of
the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American
authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the
reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in
an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of
the conflict of laws are to be understood as incorporating not
only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According
to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its
law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the
following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards
the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists,
the court shall respect:
 (a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims
the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their
personal statute, and desires that said personal
statute shall be determined by the law of the
domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of
law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of
law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute
the personal estate of an Englishman who has died domiciled
in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute
personal property upon death in accordance with the law of
domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that
is the English law — he must accept this reference back to his
own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of
laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal
law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate
sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens
as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination
of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more
states, and leaves a will directing the manner of distribution
of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled
at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of
situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is
logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of
the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same
rules should determine the validity of an attempted
testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not
that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as
controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The
New York court has said on the point: 'The general principle
that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile
 of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal
application. It had its origin in that international comity which
was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical
wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of
California. But as above explained the laws of California have
prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein
and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason
demands that We should enforce the California internal law
prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the
law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in
Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California
in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above
explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to
the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of
the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the
provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in
the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference
or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California,
to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court
of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of
laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs.
Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock
Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government,
59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not
possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the
United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not
appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject
is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California
Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a
citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of
his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the
case returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be
made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.
hil Project - Arellano Law Founda
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-
appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964,
approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case
No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and
of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided,
in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first
wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children,
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of
First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all
the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form
of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from
time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial
advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia,
the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her
of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the
amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of
partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the
testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into
seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground
that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and,
therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof
of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on
April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order
overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by
the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to
this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss,
the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen
Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for
the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions,
with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount
of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of
the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the
new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph
of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate
and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills
— one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
— arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as
this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to
be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO,
respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still
be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her
estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977,
after Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate
of the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an
order admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did
not appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare
The Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and
issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued
declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of Alejandro
Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors Vicente
Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda Dorotheo Quintana as the only
heirs of the late spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes,
whose respective estates shall be liquidated and distributed according
to the laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due
to the government.1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to
some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his
death although she admitted that they were not married to each
other. Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for
failure to file appellant's brief within the extended period
granted.2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by
the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued
by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order.
Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late
Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private
respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for
issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas
setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as
well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on
the ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final
in character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said
Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased
spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which
nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and
February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the
case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a
petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed
orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because
he was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise
assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the
January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate
of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status quo or lease of the
premises thereon to third parties.3 Private respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate
since she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order
can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it
may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained
finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made
by the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot
reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do
so would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence
of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will,
albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time
from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality
by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final
and the question determined by the court in such order can no
longer be raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a
different motion. The matters of due execution of the will and the
capacity of the testator acquired the character of res judicata and
cannot again be brought into question, all juridical questions in
connection therewith being for once and forever closed.5 Such final
order makes the will conclusive against the whole world as to its
extrinsic validity and due execution.6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,7 particularly on
three aspects:
n whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedent's last will and
testament;
n compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of wills;
n the testamentary capacity of the testator; 8
n and the due execution of the last will and testament.9
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of
whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of
its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting
under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is
genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary
age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from
making a will. 11
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the
same may still be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 12
Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will
and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly
executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or
impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance
according to the laws on succession, 13 the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially
so when the courts had already determined in a final and executory
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such determination having
attained that character of finality is binding on this Court which will no
longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds the will to be
intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision of which the
party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals
must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of
the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the party
does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was
aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have
fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as
1918, it has been declared that public policy and sound practice
demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts
must at some point of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise
there will be no end to litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium
— the very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an
end to controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily,
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on
the slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he
is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which
circumstances do not concur herein.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the
intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order
of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the
only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the
alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res
judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for
relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It
should be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the
same issue had already been resolved adversely by some other court.
18 It is clear from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro
and his spouse should be distributed according to the laws of
intestate succession.
Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely
interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In
support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring
who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot
be the basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one
person to another particularly when no project of partition has been
filed." 19 The trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that
petitioner is not the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his
three legitimate children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it
nullified the will. But it should be noted that in the same Order, the
trial court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed
according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to
implement that order of intestate distribution and not to reopen and
again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the same will.
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law
of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But
before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of
his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually
onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give — Nemo
praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate can be
done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and
intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy
apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically
valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is
whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of
succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro
was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void.
Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in
the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his
"only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not
belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of
the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to
who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the
void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
spouse's estate.
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered
moot considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and,
therefore, is not an heir.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993
In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the
Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA.
ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO,
Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil
Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 19861 of the
First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court,
now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 19832
of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate
the last will and testament3 with codicil4 of the late Brigido Alvarado.
On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a
notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously
executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch
4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.
As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public
and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the
testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private
respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document,
read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed
the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished
them.
Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to
probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a
codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na
Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni
Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the
notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido
was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and
revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will,
the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil.
Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence
and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as
those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the
reading using their own copies.
A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed
upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as
executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of
Siniloan, Laguna.5 Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the
following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not
executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane
or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its
execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed
under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate;
and lastly, that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or
trick.
When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds
relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June
1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main
thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the
meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil
attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art.
808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of
the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.
On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under
review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind
at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his
blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially
complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator
with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public
following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments.
The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not
followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its
purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted
will was served.
The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado
blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its
codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of
said article complied with?
Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts:
Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil
were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of
"counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which
he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first
consultation with an eye specialist on
14 December 1977.
The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would
qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:
Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice;
once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary
public before whom the will is acknowledged.
Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind
when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered
within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his
stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate
issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of
Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute),6 the contents of
which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa,
whose expertise was admitted by private respondent.7 Dr. Roasa
explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three
(3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten
matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation.8
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical
testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the will
and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of
"poor eyesight."9 Since the testator was still capable of reading at that
time, the court a quo concluded that Art. 808 need not be complied
with.
We agree with petitioner in this respect.
Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was
still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared,
the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido
did not do so because of his "poor," 10 "defective," 11 or "blurred"12
vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual
reading for him.
The following pronouncement in Garcia vs. Vasquez 13 provides an
insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to
wit:
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when
he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so
that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes . . .
Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind
testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are
"incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was
incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the
separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or
"blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude
that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it
is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no
way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will
and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence, to consider
his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that
we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.
Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the
will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses
and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated
testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him
an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the
notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private
respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged
codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only
once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.
Private respondent however insists that there was substantial
compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the
law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid
compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that
neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the
contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will
and codicil should have been disallowed.
We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition
must be denied.
This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial
compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been
satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of
fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible
as to destroy the testamentary privilege. 14
In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and
codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental
witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the
testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read
corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and
acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner
does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not
sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the
contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution
was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and
authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted
testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged
that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even
prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's
residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the
draft. 15
Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on
5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three
instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently.
Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr.
Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and
the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of
the document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the
affirmative. 16 With four persons following the reading word for word
with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he
affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms
actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially
true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses
were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr.
Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him
since childhood.
The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will,
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator's will. 17
As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial
court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we
quote the following pronouncement in Abangan v. Abangan, 18 to
wit:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution
of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a way
as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to
restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's
will, must be disregarded (emphasis supplied).
Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and
unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached
thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that
a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed
strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the
fact that the purpose of the law, i.e., to make known to the
incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already
been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices
where the purpose has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED.
Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending,
this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr. and Quiason, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
18, RTC, Bulacan, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court to set aside the Order dated November 19, 1986 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by respondent
Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
We grant the petition.
II
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who
became American citizens, established a successful medical practice
in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896 Citation Drive,
Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18;
Jacqueline, 16; and Josephine, 14.
On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament,
bequeathing to his wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal
property at the time of his death "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35).
In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed all his property
to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as
trustee. He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and
testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as substitute executor.
Article VIII of his will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that I predeceased her,
and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in
accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41).
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her
own last will and testament containing the same provisions as that of
the will of her husband. Article VIII of her will states:
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such
circumstances that there is not sufficient evidence to determine the
order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he predeceased
me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all
respects, in accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31).
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when
they were trapped by fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr.
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute executor of the two
wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7,
these two wills were admitted to probate and letters testamentary
were issued in his favor.
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn
P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan,
and petitioner herein, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary to the
probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be
appointed the special administratrix of the estate of the deceased
couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San Miguel, Bulacan.
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan,
presided by Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing
the issuance of letters of special administration in favor of petitioner
upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, petitioner
posted the bond and took her oath as special administration.
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying
that the Philippine Life Insurance Company be directed to deliver the
proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the life insurance policy
taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their
daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion.
Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then
filed a manifestation, stating that said company then filed a
manifestation, stating that said company had delivered to petitioner
the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life
insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company
passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and the Family Savings
Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as
counsel for the heirs of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan Ignacio,
Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs).
He also manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May
19, 1983, his clients were unaware of the filing of the testate estate
case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair play," they should be
notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment
of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.
Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983,
asserting: (1) that the "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor
creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and therefore, they had "no
legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene";
(2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-
Cunanan, being American citizens, were executed in accordance with
the solemnities and formalities of New York laws, and produced
"effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art.
816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was
presumed that the husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the
Cunanan collaterals are neither distributees, legatees or beneficiaries,
much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution" under a will or by
operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19,
1983. However, on July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify
the proceedings and to set aside the appointment of, or to disqualify,
petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that
being the "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had been "deliberately excluded" in the
petition for the probate of the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses
thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was
the sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived
them of their right to "due process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of
the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr., the
executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not
notified of the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the
"misrepresentation and concealment committed by" petitioner
rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. Rafael G.
Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized
his father,
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr.
Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is qualified to be a regular administrator "as
practically all of the subject estate in the Philippines belongs to their
brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, they
prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void;
(2) that the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set
aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular
administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses.
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to
submit an inventory or accounting of all monies received by her in
trust for the estate.
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and
only heir" of her daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion
of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence they were complete strangers to
the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that she could
not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan,
Jr. because his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two
wills but also in the decrees of the American surrogate court; (3) that
the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, because it
involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and
that nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice
being given to the executor who, by the same provision, should
himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this country; (4) that
even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing
to his brothers and sisters; and (5) that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had
unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs,
misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets
of the estates to his American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160).
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982,
petitioner and the Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in
the United States "to settle and divide equally the estates," and that
under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place for the
hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original
will presented for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185).
Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt
of court for failure to comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for
appropriating money of the estate for his own benefit. She also
alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982
before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a
decision on April 13, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr.
Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then distributed pursuant to
EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped
from claiming that they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally
the estates. They asserted that by virtue of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the
Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76 on the
requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees
must be complied with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the
proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that petitioner be disqualified
as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an
inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received
and to surrender the same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator.
Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13,
1983 decision of the American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made
"unauthorized disbursements from the estates as early as July 7, 1982"
(Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the suspension of
the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings"
of the estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242).
The Cunanans heirs opposed this motion and filed a manifestation,
stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00 "from the Surrogate’s
Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of
November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing
the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner
as special administratrix, requiring the submission of petitioner of an
inventory of the property received by her as special administratrix and
declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana
reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on
procedure and allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling
whether the wills were executed in accordance with the law of New
York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is that the law
of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the
Philippines. However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to
the wills of the Cunanan spouses and the Philippine law requires three
witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each and every page,
a requirement of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order dated February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven
the applicable laws of New York governing the execution of last wills
and testaments.
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying
the motion of petitioner for the suspension of the proceedings but
gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on
the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second
portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel
for petitioner, the Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of
the objectionable portion of the said order so that it would conform
with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 and the Interim Rules of Court.
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional
Trial Court, Malolos, to which the reprobate case was reassigned,
issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last will and testament . . .
was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all
orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order
amended the February 21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn
over to the estate the inventoried property. It considered the
proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records,
p. 302).
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on
account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases
in New York. Three days later, petitioner filed a motion praying for the
reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength of the
February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival
in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills
of the Cunanan spouses. On August 19, respondent Judge granted
the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985.
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her
daughter, Natividad, filed a motion praying that since petitioner was
ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore incapacitated to
act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named
substitute special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the Order of February 21, 1984, denying probate to
the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that respondent Judge
"failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits . . .
which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills
of the Cunanan spouses including all procedures undertaken and
decrees issued in connection with the said probate" (Records, pp.
313-323).
Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order of August 19, 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was
reassigned denied the motion for reconsideration holding that the
documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the wills of the
testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and
sufficient to possess real and personal property; that letters
testamentary were issued; and that proceedings were held on a
foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who inquired
into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his
findings issued a decree admitting to probate the wills in question."
However, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish
the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills
(Records, p. 381).
On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present
further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion
on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he
conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was
not a fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence.
He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional
evidence, respondent Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986
that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31,
1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate
proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second
motion for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit
further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and
praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on
what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and
allowance of wills" (Records, p. 393).
On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow
the probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure
from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition
takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where
the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt
with in separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration
of the Order of July 18, 1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, which provides that no party may institute more than one suit
for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate
proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the
same provisions as they even named each other as a beneficiary in
their respective wills, would go against "the grain of inexpensive, just
and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-
407).
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion
for reconsideration, citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932)
(Records,
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed
out of time and that the adverse party had not been furnished with a
copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner stated that she had
furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs
and reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental
motion" (Records, p. 421).
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that
"the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if
they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition"
(Records, pp. 376-378).
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the
evidence offered at the hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved
the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that
the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in
separate proceedings.
II
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had
submitted before respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the
allowance of the wills:
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn
and Jose by the Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and
"G");
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and
Custodian of the Great Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan
is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga which is a court of
record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the
Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of
Evelyn and Jose
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
(c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore
stating that they have in their records and files the said wills which
were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and "G-2");
(d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh.
"G-3" — "G-6");
(e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the
genuineness and authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two
wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
(f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the
Philippines in New York (Exh. "H" and "F").
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly
authorized to grant exemplified copies of the decree of probate,
letters testamentary and all proceedings had and proofs duly taken
(Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters
testamentary were issued to Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-
2");
(i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge
Reagan that a decree admitting the wills to probate had been issued
and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3"
and
"I-10");
(j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings
were held and proofs duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly
executed, genuine and valid and that the said instruments were
admitted to probate and established as wills valid to pass real and
personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the
genuineness and authenticity of each other’s signatures in the
exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters testamentary and
proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-
16).
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the
Surrogate Court’s Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings
were terminated on November 29, 1984.
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American
citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with
the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by
New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the
due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country;
(4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the
laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III
Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429;
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
[1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner
submitted all the needed evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which
the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that
our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial
and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for
more time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New
York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed over.
While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts
should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best
evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is
probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81
SCRA 393 [1978]).
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the
Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s
view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms
and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be
separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is
too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the
provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only
result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987]; Roberts v.
Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for
the testator’s reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 818). In the case at bench, the
Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain
essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate
their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation
(Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a
very glaring fact — petitioner has always considered herself the sole
heir of
Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself
an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs
of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she
only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon
v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will
shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2)
means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should
be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for
probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3
and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or
personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the
petitioner, are required.
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to
petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for
proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and
place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge
shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence
needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and
see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given
all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006
FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by
ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly
executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo (decedent), who died on 16 December
1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the due
execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to
assert a few important doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills,
all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages
on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation
clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective.
And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of
these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three
defects is just aching for judicial rejection.
There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a
comprehensive catalog of imperatives for the proper execution of a
notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed
requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as
to the validity in the due execution of the notarial will. Article 806
likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills —
that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. A notarial will executed with indifference to these two
codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The petition filed by
petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of
Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is
the son of the cousin of the decedent.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular
Pilipino, read in full:
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:
AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc,
Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-
unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin
at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang
habilin o testamento:
Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La
Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at patakaran ng simbahang katoliko
at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng
bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;
Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan
sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa
mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero
28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din
ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa
inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten
Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan
sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24,
Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay
walang pasubali’t at kondiciones;
Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang
nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na
kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng
Hunyo, 1981.
(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)
PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling
dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana
na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang
nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng
lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa
harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa
amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at
bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito.
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365 The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo),
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981 who represented herself as the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate
LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7, forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res. be utilized as a defense in several court cases filed by oppositor
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981 against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real
JUANITO ESTRERA property, all centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties
address: City Court Compound, of the decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary to the representations
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829 of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981. heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per
Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of
Lungsod ng Maynila. Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a legitimate
(Sgd.) child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA months.5
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981 and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed out that
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will,
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81 and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments
The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the are among the central matters to this petition.
left-hand margin of both pages of the will, but not at the bottom of After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order
the attestation clause. dated 10 August 1992.6 The RTC favorably took into account the
The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava,
devisees of the decedent, namely: petitioner himself, and one Irene Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the
Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a
prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague. expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted
oppositor’s arguments that the will was not properly executed and
attested to in accordance with law.
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the
testimonies of the subscribing and attesting witnesses, and having in
mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the
law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in view of giving
the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is
persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been
executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at
the end of the will after the signature of the testatrix, the following
statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling
dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia N. Igsolo,
tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng
Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng
kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon,
sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay
lumagda sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at
bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang
panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito."
The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement and is considered by this Court as a substantial
compliance with the requirements of the law.
On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was not
signed by the subscribing witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court
is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left
margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation
clause and acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof,
substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of
the will.
With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not
numbered correlatively in letters placed on upper part of each page
and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it
is worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The
first page contains the entire text of the testamentary dispositions,
and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation
clause and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a
serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the same reason, the
failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the
second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation
clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the testatrix
on the will is a forgery, the testimonies of the three subscribing
witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of
the will.8
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo,
who had substituted his since deceased mother-in-law, Geralda
Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for
probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted that the attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering
the will void and undeserving of probate.10
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil
Code that "the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in
the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and
thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance
rule."11
The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and
806 of the Civil Code, which we replicate in full.
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed
at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and
all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every
page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under
his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses,
and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages
thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it
shall be interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by
the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required
to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk
of Court.
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the
failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages of the
will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more
deficiencies.
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state
the number of pages of the will.12 There was an incomplete attempt
to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the
insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the
blank was never filled in; hence, the requisite was left uncomplied
with.
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial
court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In re:
Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the
defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause
to state the number of pages contained in the will.15 In ruling that the
will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following
consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose
of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in the attestation
clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the
removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary
dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total
number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the
sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the following sheets or
pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in
the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the
inserting of new pages and the forging of the signatures of the
testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much
greater difficulty."16
The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation
clause of which failed to state the number of sheets or pages used.
This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare
"unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the
attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further observed that "it cannot be
denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against
the danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature
has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be considered
material."18
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and
Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein the Court allowed probate to the
wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did
not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself
considered the import of these two cases, and made the following
distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt
with approval:
Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show
that the attestation does not state the number of pages used upon
which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of
probate.
We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in
"Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and
Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195,"
to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does
not contain the number of pages used upon which the Will is written.
However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in
the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case
of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although
the attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages
used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the
body of the Will:
"x x x
The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as
amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause
shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is
written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an
effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission
of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom
the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42
Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs.
Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs.
Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to
be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the
number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is
missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if
the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a
consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is
different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part
of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of
eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of
the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar
cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to
prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely
technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring
supplied)
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the
notarial acknowledgement in the Will states the number of pages
used in the:
"x x x
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in writing
the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact
that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really
and actually composed of only two pages duly signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which
contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the
testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina
dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament
consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra)
(Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the
will is not stated in any part of the Will. The will does not even contain
any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the
will should be stated.21
Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of
the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when the statutory provision
governing the formal requirement of wills was Section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains
apropos, considering that the requirement that the attestation state
the number of pages of the will is extant from Section 618.23
However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a
rule of interpretation of the requirements of wills, at least insofar as
the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the
philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil
Code states: "In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue
and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in
the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed
and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
article 805."
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code
Commission, which stated that "the underlying and fundamental
objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this
project consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution
with the end in view of giving the testator more [freedom] in
[expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the
[modern tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of
wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the qualification
offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites
from their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient
safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and
the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator."25
Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made
by Justice Regalado, speaking for the Court on the conflicting views
on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in
the execution of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and
Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as examples
of the application of the rule of strict construction.28 However, the
Code Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction
through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A
cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how
Article 809 should be applied:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can
be supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages
are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each
and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the
will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and
defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause
can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and
whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each
other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the
only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in its assailed decision, considering that the failure to state the
number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the
defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the
Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose attestation clause
failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other,30 the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his
estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.
Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now
stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of
the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will
not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance
to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which
cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the
testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact
can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s
presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the
only textual guarantee of compliance.32
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on
which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The
purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of
pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent
any increase or decrease in the pages.33 The failure to state the
number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the
part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted
the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and
subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with
this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is
comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However,
in this case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the
attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of
pages which comprise the will.
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to
comply with the formal requirements as enumerated under Article
805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code
Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they
saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal requisites as
enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced
that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or
intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance with these requirements,
however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of
comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey
property post mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The
transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited
comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the testator’s
incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to
probate.
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals.
However, an examination of the will itself reveals a couple of even
more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental
witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear
on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom
of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments
before the notary public.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the
signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While
three (3) Justices38 considered the signature requirement had been
substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through
Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly
signed, rendering the will fatally defective.
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although
the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-
hand margin.
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is
correct. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by
the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the
witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof
negatives their participation.
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three
witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the law
and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This
is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal
mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its
pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add
such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of
the testator and any or all of the witnesses.39
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805
particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental
witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be
"attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The
respective intents behind these two classes of signature are distinct
from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every
page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the
page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the
signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are
referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself.
Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the
disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an
unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-
hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause,
such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in
the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this
case signed the attestation clause itself, but not the left-hand margin
of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of
the instrumental witnesses’ signatures on each and every page, the
fact must be noted that it is the attestation clause which contains the
utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required
under Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every
page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. The
only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental
facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly
attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the
attestation clause.
Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this
petition should also hinge. The requirement under Article 806 that
"every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The
importance of this requirement is highlighted by the fact that it had
been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance
of Article 806 in this case is equally as critical as the other cited flaws
in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent
import.
In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista,
wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic),
1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation
can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act
or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor
actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has
attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though
it does not hew to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part of
an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily,
the language of the jurat should avow that the document was
subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the
notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the
document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized"
encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the
document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a
jurat, the will would nonetheless remain invalid, as the express
requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual
proof, much less one under oath, that the decedent and the
instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free
act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another
all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or those made
beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not
an empty meaningless act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the
testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer of
the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own
free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of
perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons who
participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed
without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further
degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making
the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had
designated in the will.
It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-
evident as it is under Article 806. A notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public.
There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not
fully satisfied by the will in question. We need not discuss them at
length, as they are no longer material to the
disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and
the instrumental witnesses sign each and every page of the will on the
left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this
case, the decedent, unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of
the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-
called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is
not numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has Associate Justice
disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as Chairperson, Third Division
mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may CERTIFICATION
not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they need Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
executed the will. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers Chief Justice
from makes the probate denial inexorable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA
Associate Justice
CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.