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University of Essex
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Baruch Brody (MIT Press: Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1969), pp. 111-12 (sect. II.5). Although Reid 'defines' perception solely
in terms of conception and belief, and affirms that we might have been so designed that
we should perceive without experiencing any perceptual sensations, human perceptual
experience as we know it certainly involves sensation: 'The external senses have a
double province; to make us feel, and to make us perceive. They furnishus with a variety
of sensations..; at the same time they give us a conception, and an invincible belief of the
existence of external objects': ibid., p. 265 (sect. II.17).
2 'Berkeley and Descartes: Reflection on the Theory of Ideas', in Studies in Perception,
eds. Peter K. Machamer& Robert G. Turnbull(Ohio State University Press: Columbus,
1978), p. 288. Although Sellars, on occasion, can contrastperceptual 'taking' with belief
(e.g., 'CarusLectures', Monist 64 (1981), p. 89, n. 11), he can also talk of such takings as
,occurrentbeliefs', differing from ordinarybeliefs only in that they lack explicit subject-
predicateform, so that they are a matterof believing in ratherthan believing that: 'Sensa
or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception',Philosophical Studies 41 (1982),
pp. 84-87.
3 The Varietiesof Reference (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1982), p. 123.
4 'Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational
States', Mind & Language 10 (1995), p. 335.
284 A. D. SMITH
A Materialist Theory of Mind (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1968), p. 214. Arm-
strong, of course, makes this point in defence of his reductive belief analysis. A similar
move needs, however, to be made even on behalf of non-reductive accounts, since belief
is there seen to be consequent upon the occurrence of sensation.
6 Perception and the Physical World (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1961), p. 114.
Armstrong himself expresses reservations about this approach in his earlier work, and
does not mention it in his later one.
8 At one point Armstronghimself briefly mentions the acquisitionof 'a still more complete
assuranceof certain facts about our presentenvironment':ibid., p. 110.
9 A Theoryof Perception (PrincetonUniversity Press: Princeton, 1971), p. 72.
1( A MaterialistTheoryof Mind, p. 224.
At one point Armstrong speaks of perception without the acquisition of belief as being
'like a seal stamped on wax that already bears the impression of that seal. Nothing
286 A. D. SMITH
furtheris done, because the seal simply fits into an imprintalready made. Informationis
duplicated':ibid., p. 224.
12 Although Pitcher standardlyspeaks of 'causally-receiving' beliefs, he stresses that this is
a technical expression: 'receive' should not be taken to imply, as it standardly does,
receiving something not previously possessed.
13 Op. cit., p. 73.
14 Op. cit., p. 8 (sect. 1.1).
15 Ibid., p. 113 (sect. II.5).
288 A. D. SMITH
23
CompareA Materialist Theoryof Mind, pp. 221-23 and A Theoryof Perception, pp. 91-
93. Armstrongin fact allows afourth type of case: what he calls 'idle perceptions', which
involve 'informationthat is completely disregarded,but, incredibly, not because of any
other information that we already possess'. He adds, however, that such cases can only
be described 'by reference to the central cases where beliefs are acquired': op. cit.,
p. 225.
24 op. cit., p. 92.
25 A MaterialistTheoryof Mind,p. 223.
26 op. cit., p. 93n.
27 Even the sense-datum theorist H.H. Price can characterize perceptual awareness as
'soliciting' our belief: 'Appearingand Appearances',American Philosophical Quarterly
1 (1964), p. 13.
290 A. D. SMITH
28 Bermidez, p. 335.
II
So far we have considered problems for a belief analysis of perception that
concern the fact that information about the world that is present in perception
may be overridden by collateral beliefs. We must now address a quite distinct
challenge: the claim that one can perceive something, even innocently, and
yet thereby causally receive no belief, nor even a suppressed inclination to
have a belief, about the object at all. Although this claim is supposed to have
general application to all the senses, because the foremost proponent of the
view in question is Fred Dretske, who introduced the term 'non-epistemic
seeing' in his book Seeing and Knowing, the possibility of wholly belief-
independent perception has been extensively discussed in recent literature in
connection with sight."' So, for the succeeding discussion, I shall focus on
29 See, for example, ideen zu einer reinen Phdinomenologie und phdinomenologischen
Philosophie, Erstes Buch (hereafter, 'ideas I'), ed. K. Schumann, Husserliana 111/1
(Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1976) [English Translation: Ideas, tr. W.R. Boyce Gibson
(George Allen & Unwin: London, 1931)], ?104.
30 Reference is also commonly made to an earlier paper by G.J. Warnock entitled 'Seeing'
(Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 55 (1954-55), repr., with added postscript, in
Perceiving, Sensing, and Knowing, ed. Robert J. Swartz (University of California Press:
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), pp. 49-67)-somewhat surprisingly, since Warnock
292 A. D. SMITH
does not in fact explicitly defend the strong thesis in question. ArthurW. Collins had also
earlier used the term 'epistemic' in connection with perception, and had denied that
perception was 'an epistemic concept': 'The Epistemological Status of the Concept of
Perception',Philosophical Review 76 (1967), pp. 436-59.
31 Seeing and Knowing(Routledge& Kegan Paul:London, 1969), p. 17 n. 2.
32 'Simple Seeing', in Body, Mind and Method,eds. D.F. Gustafson& B.L. Tapscott(Reidel:
Dordrecht, 1979), p. 14, n. 6.
33 As Dretske likes to put it, seeing a bug has as little implication for any belief concerning
the bug as stepping on a bug: see Seeing and Knowing,pp. 5-6 and 'Dretske's Replies', in
Dretske and his Critics, ed. BrianMcLaughlin(Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1991), p. 181.
34 That Dretske is concerned to show that even suppressedbeliefs are inessential to seeing
is clear in a passage where he speaks of what a subject 'believes, or is inclined to
believe, or is preparedto cautiously put it forward...': Seeing and Knowing, p. 20.
35 One commentator has deemed it worthwhile to point out (on two separate occasions) that
Dretske does not specify that the man was looking for the cufflink. Dretske has himself
confirmed (in a personal communication) two things that I had myself assumed: (a) he
had imagined the man to have been looking for the cufflink; (b) it is immaterial to the
philosophical issue whether he was or not. Any case of someone overlooking something
in plain view will serve. Still, the scenario in which the man is indeed searching makes
the central issues particularlyvivid, since in returningfrom the drawer, he not merely
lacks a belief that a cufflink was there, he positively disbelieves that there was. The
commentatoris Daryl Close: 'What is Non-Epistemic Seeing?', Mind 85 (1976), p. 168
and 'More on Non-EpistemicSeeing', Mind 89 (1980), p. 99.
36 Seeing and Knowing,p. 18.
37 Close, 'What is Non-EpistemicSeeing?', p. 169.
38 See Knowledge and the Flow of Information (Basil Blackwell: Oxford, 1981) and the
papers of his on perceptionwhich post-datethis work.
39 As he says on one occasion, 'It is quite true...that I am committed to something called
sense experience. I should have thought that, as philosophical commitments go, this one
involved a tolerable level of risk': 'Dretske's Replies', p. 181. See also 'The Role of the
Perceptin Visual Cognition', Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Perception
294 A. D. SMITH
4 Something that is hardly helped by Dretske himself subsequently allowing that the
relevant objects are 'seen' but not 'perceived': 'Simple Seeing, pp. 2-3. I shall not be
following this concessive use of 'perceive' in what follows.
5 '[T]he issue comes to a stalemate,' concludes Close: 'What is Non-Epistemic Seeing?',
p. 170. Many are even less concessive. Brian O'Shaughnessy, for example, can simply
write, without argument, and as if the view needed no defence, that 'perception is an
experience; of the kind of attentionor noticing...': 'The diversity and unity of action and
perception' in The Contents of Experience, ed. Tim Crane (CambridgeUniversity Press:
Cambridge, 1992), p. 222. Such a view has a long and distinguished ancestry: Aristotle,
you will recall, regardsperceiving as a species of discriminating(krinein).
296 A. D. SMITH
(0 (@4.
S.;**: *;*:*:
Figure I
46
Taken from Dretske's 'Conscious Experience', Mind 102 (1993), p. 273.
47 The passage from Reid cited earlier indicates a second ground for the possibility of
perception without belief: perceptions just above threshold level. I can be in doubt
whether I really just saw a very faint light or only imagined it. This can be the case even
if I did see such a thing. This, too, is not a matterof perceptualbelief being impeded: it
simply doesn't arise. I shall, however, focus on Dretske's line of attack.
48 'A Model for Visual Memory Tasks', HumanFactors 5 (1963), p. 20.
49 Sperling suggested that this is possible because subjects reportthat 'they can still "read"
the stimulus even when the instruction tone comes several hundred milliseconds after
terminationof the stimulus. In fact, naive subjects sometimes think that the physical light
source is a slowly fading one': E. Averbach & G. Sperling, 'Short Term Storage of
Informationin Vision', in Information Theory,ed. Colin Cherry(Butterworths:London,
1961), p. 200. (Because of this, the informational 'storage' in question was termed
'iconic' by Ulrich Neisser.) The idea that the availability of informationcan be equated
with such a persisting image has since been seriously questioned, however. For a good
discussion of the issues, see A.H.C. van der Heijden, 'Central Selection in Vision', in
Perspectives on Perception and Action, eds. Herbert Heuer & Andries F. Sanders
(Lawrence Erlbaum:Hillsdale, NJ, 1987), pp. 421-46.
298 A. D. SMITH
300 A. D. SMITH
III
I believe that Dretske's stance against the suggestion that we relate to all
perceived objects in a doxastic manner cannot be gainsaid.58 Often there is,
indeed, simply too much to 'digest'. If, therefore, one thinks of philosophical
analyses only as the giving of strictly necessary and sufficient conditions,
then belief is no part of the 'analysis' of perceiving an object. Nevertheless,
an adequate account of perception, even of 'non-epistemic perception', is not
to be had without reference to epistemic factors-and this for two reasons.
In the first place, non-epistemic perceptions are dependent upon epistemic
perceptions. Note that all of Dretske's plausible cases of non-epistemic
perception are partial, in the sense that they occur in a wider perceptual
context that is epistemic (in the sense of being 'doxastic').59 The cufflink
was, we may suppose, wholly overlooked, but the drawer itself was not; and
we certainly take there to be two arrays of dots in Figure 1.6() If such is
universally and necessarily the case, epistemic perception will have primacy,
in so far as non-epistemic seeing will be possible only in the context of
actual epistemic seeing, and will be comprehensible as seeing at all only by
reference to epistemic seeing. So the question now is whether there could be a
wholly non-epistemic perceiver of the world: a creature who, as it were, over-
looked everything: who either could not be brought, or at least never is
brought, to notice anything. Dretske thinks there could.6" 'We would have a
much different world, of course, if no one was ever inspired to believe
anything as a consequence of their [non-epistemically seeing] things, if
nothing was seen in any other way than the fundamental way I
have.. .depicted,' he writes; 'but one of the differences would not be that no
one saw anything in this altered world.'62 This, I believe, is false: such a
58 As mentionedabove, the term 'doxastic' covers not only actual belief, but also inclination
to belief, whether suppressed or not, and potential belief. 'Small perceptions' remain,
however, wholly non-doxastic.
59 This has been pointed out by FrankSibley in his 'Analysing Seeing IF,in Sibley, op. cit.,
esp. pp. 102-5. The same may be said of the thresholdconditions that I mentionedearlier
as being anothersource of non-epistemic perception.
60 In discussing the cufflink case, Dretske claims that we say such things as 'But you must
have seen it!' whether or not the subject 'thoughthe saw anything at all' (my emphasis).
Interpretedliterally, this is most implausible. I take it that Dretske meant 'anything at all
of the object in question'.
61 This is not incompatiblewith Dretske's allowing that a subject who entirely lacked beliefs
might not qualify for such a 'mentalistic' notion as that of seeing. The possible total
absence of belief with which we are now dealing concerns beliefs that are specifically
about the objects of particularperceptions.
62 Seeing and Knowing,p. 29.
302 A. D. SMITH
63 Recall that I am not using the term 'perceive' in Dretske's concessive sense. The
disagreementwith Dretske here is not merely verbal.
64
Seeing and Knowing,pp. 40-41.
65
This, and what follows, is directed at George Pappas' attemptto give a fundamentalrole
to non-epistemic seeing: see 'Seeinge and Seeingn', Mind 85 (1976), esp. pp. 186-87.
66 Not conscious seeing at any rate-but the point carries over even to non-conscious
perception. Suppose that some insects are non-conscious, but that they are possessed of
inner 'visual' states (in the sense of being delivered by recognizably 'optical' structures
sensitive to light) that are informationallyindicative of their environment-but also that
such states are wholly dissociated from any possible behaviouron the insects' part.There
are surely no grounds for regardingsuch states as perceptualin any sense.
67 And here 'belief' really is the right word, since mere inclinations to believe and merely
potential beliefs require discursive intelligence.
304 A. D. SMITH
68 Husserl's growing appreciation of the primacy of the world arose precisely from a deep-
ening on his notion of horizon. See, for example, Ideas I, ??27-32, and Erste Philosophie
(1923/24), 2. Teil, ed. Rudolph Boehm, Husserliana VIII (Nijhoff: The Hague, 1959),
??47-5 1.
306 A. D. SMITH
IV
Dretske's influential use of the term 'epistemic' is such that a state is deemed
epistemic if it either involves belief or conceptualization. This is no mere
matter of sloppiness on his part: he is clearly of the opinion that the former
entails the latter.73Indeed, his advocacy of non-'epistemic'-i.e., non-doxas-
308 A. D. SMITH