part of the building to which it is attached but to exclude it in measuring the distance would
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.]
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO, in his own
behalf and as guardian of the minors MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS,
CORAZON, CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD MAGNO, and the
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), Respondents.
DECISION
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother,
located on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a “media agua” said to be in a leaking
condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story. Standing on said
“media agua”, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet to
cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came
into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the
Company) strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his
death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to recover damages from the company.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in their favor — P10,000 as compensatory
damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as actual damages; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral and exemplary damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
P3,000 as attorney’s fees, with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the
judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with
costs. The electric company has appealed said decision to us.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are stated in the
following portions of its decision which we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles
on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before
Peñaloza’s house was constructed. The record shows that during the construction of said house
a similar incident took place, although fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece
of wood which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with the same wire,
producing some sparks. The owner of the house forthwith complained to Defendant about the
danger which the wire presented, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the wire farther
from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it was.
“At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises ordered by the trial court, the
distance from the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’ on which the deceased was making
repairs was only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires
be kept three feet from the building.’ Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the
case at bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the ‘media agua’ but from the side of
the house and that, thus measured, the distance was almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum
prescribed. This contention is manifestly groundless, for not only is a ‘media agua’ an integral
defeat the purpose of the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even assuming that
the distance, within the meaning of the city regulations, should be measured from the edge of
the ‘media agua’, the fact that in the case of the house involved herein such distance was actually
less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of said house, because the city authorities gave
him a permit to construct a ‘media agua’ only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but instead he
built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by the
authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the prescribed minimum
of 3 feet.
“It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in the permit given to him by the
city authorities for the construction of the ‘media agua’, and that if he had not done
so Appellantswire would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance of three feet
from the edge of the ‘media agua’. It is also a fact, however, that after the ‘media agua’ was
constructed the owner was given a final permit of occupancy of the house cralaw .
“ cralaw The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a load of 3,600 volts. There was,
according to Appellant, no insulation that could have rendered it safe, first, because there is no
insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand
secondly, because the only insulation material that may be effective is still in the experimental
stage of development and, anyway, its costs would be prohibitive… ”
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the Plaintiff is that although the owner
of the house in constructing the “media agua” in question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit,
still, after making that “media agua”, its construction though illegal, was finally approved
because he was given a final permit to occupy the house; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat it was
the company that was at fault and was guilty of negligence because although the electric wire in
question had been installed long before the construction of the house and in accordance with the
ordinance fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with the regulations does not satisfy the
requirement of due diligence nor avoid the need for adopting such other precautionary measures
as may be warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat negligence cannot be determined by a
simple matter of inches; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all that the city did was to prescribe
certain minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance required that primary electric
wires should be not less than 3 feet from any house, the obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled
by placing such wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless of other factors. The appellate
court, however, refrained from stating or suggesting what other precautionary measures could
and should have been adopted.
After a careful study and discussion of the case and the circumstances surrounding the same, we
are inclined to agree to the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was
primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the too close proximity of the
“media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of
the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of
the “media agua”. We fail to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as
lacking in due diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires
from any building, there was actually a distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around
side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution.
to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as a “media agua”, had the house
In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was liable for damages the Court of
owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his “media
Appeals cites the case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the case
agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said
is exactly applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated portion or top of the walls
“media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the
of Intramuros, Manila, just above the Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the Court, it was “a public
“media agua” the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet
place where persons come to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves”. The electric company was
between the wires and any portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner
clearly negligent in placing its wires so near the place that without much difficulty or exertion, a
disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving
person by stretching his hand out could touch them. A boy named Astudillo, placing one foot on
only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as illegally constructed and the electric
a projection, reached out and actually grasped the electric wire and was electrocuted. The person
wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval by the city
electrocuted in said case was a boy who was in no position to realize the danger. In the present
through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city
case, however, the wires were well high over the street where there was no possible danger to
ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or
pedestrians. The only possible danger was to persons standing on the “media agua”, but a
regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal
“media agua” can hardly be considered a public place where persons usually gather. Moreover,
construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and after
a person standing on the “media agua” could not have reached the wires with his hands alone.
finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the stringing or installation of its
It was necessary as was done by Magno to hold something long enough to reach the wire.
wires so as to preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty,
Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a person immature but the father of a family, supposedly
to be ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners
a tinsmith trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron roofs and “media agua”.
and to condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions. Of course, in the present case, the
Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, the court said that
violation of the permit for the construction of the “media agua” was not the direct cause of the
although it is a well- established rule that the liability of electric companies for damages or
accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said “media agua” been only one meter wide as allowed
personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence, nevertheless such companies are not
by the permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side
insurers of the safety of the public.
of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the edge of the “media agua” and the
yawning 2-story distance or height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the present case the Defendant electric
fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires. company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and
“media agua” in question, and in failing to properly insulate those wires (although according to
We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to the house or its “media agua”
the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of
was always a source of danger considering their high voltage and uninsulated as they were, but
wire), nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such
the claim of the company and the reasons given by it for not insulating said wires were unrefuted
supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the
as we gather from the findings of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to accept them as
accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet
satisfactory. Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in
with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not
due diligence in failing to insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be
recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the case of Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and
supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city
Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that case, the electric company was found negligent in leaving
such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have
scattered on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15- year old boy found and carried
increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be considered such as that the wires could
home. In the course of experimenting with said fulminating caps, he opened one of them, held it
not be strung or the posts supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle of the
out with his hands while another boy applied a lighted match to it, causing it to explode and
street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno
injure one of his eyes eventually causing blindness in said eye. Said this Tribunal in denying
himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media agua” just below the third
recovery for the injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so.
Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could “ cralaw, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But negligent act of the Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless Plaintiff’s
unfortunately, in the instant care, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.”
he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric
wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter’s length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause
with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because
of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate
cause.” (45 C.J. pp. 931-332.).
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600 volts), uninsulated and so close
to houses is a constant source of danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion
to be near said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But may be, the City of Manila
authorities and the electric company could get together and devise means of minimizing this
danger to the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city thoroughfares may
greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because drivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and
slow down or even stop and take other necessary precaution upon approaching said lanes, so, a
similar way may possibly be found. Since these high voltage wires cannot be properly insulated
and at reasonable cost, they might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of the city where
there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step-down to a voltage where the wires
carrying the same to the city could be properly insulated for the better protection of the public.
In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and
the complaint filed against the Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental 1 by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the evening
of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which
was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs.
As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms,
legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut
lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. 2
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent
spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held
responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor
which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit system. 3 Accordingly, PLDT
filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement,
PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence
or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees.4 In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not
aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied
with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard
signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red
lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of
excavations.5
On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, the
decretal part of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the defendant Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the plaintiff Gloria Esteban the sum of
P20,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 exemplary damages; to plaintiff Antonio Esteban
the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages and P500.00 as exemplary damages, with legal rate of
interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid. The defendant is hereby
ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
(B) The third-party defendant is hereby ordered to reimburse whatever amount the
defendant-third party plaintiff has paid to the plaintiff. With costs against the defendant. 6
From this decision both PLDT and private respondents appealed, the latter appealing only as to
the amount of damages. Third-party defendant Barte did not appeal.
On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in said appealed case, with Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava as ponente, reversing the decision of
the lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It held that respondent
Esteban spouses were negligent and consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for
damages.7 A copy of this decision was received by private respondents on October 10, 1979. 8 On
October 25, 1979, said respondents filed a motion for reconsideration dated October 24, 1979. 9 On
January 24, 1980, the Special Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals denied said motion for
reconsideration.10 This resolution was received by respondent spouses on February 22, 1980. 11
On February 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals received private respondents' motion for
leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration, dated February 27, 1980. 12 On March
11, 1980, respondent court, in a resolution likewise penned by Justice Agrava, allowed
respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration, within ten (10) days from notice
thereof. 13 Said resolution was received by private respondents on April 1, 1980 but prior thereto,
private respondents had already filed their second motion for reconsideration on March 7,
1980. 14
On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an opposition to and/or motion to dismiss said second
motion for reconsideration. 15 The Court of Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions on the
resolution of the second motion for reconsideration, designated two additional justices to form a
division of five.16 On September 3, 1980, said division of five promulgated its resolution, penned
by Justice Mariano A. Zosa, setting aside the decision dated September 25, 1979, as well as the
resolution dated, January 24,1980, and affirming in toto the decision of the lower court.17
On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a motion to set aside and/or for reconsideration of
the resolution of September 3, 1980, contending that the second motion for reconsideration of
private respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the decision of September 25, 1979
penned by Justice Agrava was already final. It further submitted therein that the relationship of
Barte and petitioner PLDT should be viewed in the light of the contract between them and, under
the independent contractor rule, PLDT is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor.18 On
May 11, 1981, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its resolution denying said motion to
set aside and/or for reconsideration and affirming in toto the decision of the lower court dated
October 1, 1974. 19
Coming to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assigns the following errors:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not denying private respondents' second motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the decision of the Special Second Division, dated September
25, 1979, and the resolution of the Special Ninth Division, dated January 24, 1980, are already
final, and on the additional ground that said second motion for reconsideration is pro forma.
2. Respondent court erred in reversing the aforesaid decision and resolution and in misapplying
the independent contractor rule in holding PLDT liable to respondent Esteban spouses.
A convenient resume of the relevant proceedings in the respondent court, as shown by the
records and admitted by both parties, may be graphically presented as follows:
(a) September 25, 1979, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals with Justice
Agrava asponente;
(b) October 10, 1979, a copy of said decision was received by private respondents;
(c) October 25, 1979, a motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents;
(d) January 24, 1980, a resolution was issued denying said motion for reconsideration;
(e) February 22, 1980, a copy of said denial resolution was received by private respondents;
(f) February 29, 1980, a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration was
filed by private respondents
(g) March 7, 1980, a second motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondents;
(h) March 11, 1980, a resolution was issued allowing respondents to file a second motion
for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt; and
(i) September 3, 1980, a resolution was issued, penned by Justice Zosa, reversing the
original decision dated September 25, 1979 and setting aside the resolution dated January
24, 1980.
From the foregoing chronology, we are convinced that both the motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration and, consequently, said second motion for reconsideration itself were
filed out of time.
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, which had procedural governance at the time, provided
that a second motion for reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the first motion has been pending. 20 Private
respondents having filed their first motion for reconsideration on the last day of the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so, they had only one (1) day from receipt of the
order denying said motion to file, with leave of court, a second motion for reconsideration. 21 In
the present case, after their receipt on February 22, 1980 of the resolution denying their first
motion for reconsideration, private respondents had two remedial options. On February 23, 1980,
the remaining one (1) day of the aforesaid reglementary period, they could have filed a motion
for leave of court to file a second motion for reconsideration, conceivably with a prayer for the
extension of the period within which to do so. On the other hand, they could have appealed
through a petition for review on certiorari to this Court within fifteen (15) days from February
23, 1980. 22 Instead, they filed a motion for leave to file a second motion 'for reconsideration on
February 29, 1980, and said second motion for reconsideration on March 7, 1980, both of which
motions were by then time-barred.
Consequently, after the expiration on February 24, 1980 of the original fifteen (15) day period, the
running of which was suspended during the pendency of the first motion for reconsideration,
the Court of Appeals could no longer validly take further proceedings on the merits of the case,
much less to alter, modify or reconsider its aforesaid decision and/or resolution. The filing of the
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration by herein respondents on February
29, 1980 and the subsequent filing of the motion itself on March 7, 1980, after the expiration of
the reglementary period to file the same, produced no legal effects. Only a motion for re-hearing
or reconsideration filed in time shall stay the final order or judgment sought to be re-examined. 23
The consequential result is that the resolution of respondent court of March 11, 1980 granting
private respondents' aforesaid motion for leave and, giving them an extension of ten (10) days to
file a second motion for reconsideration, is null and void. The period for filing a second motion
for reconsideration had already expired when private respondents sought leave to file the same,
and respondent court no longer had the power to entertain or grant the said motion. The
aforesaid extension of ten (10) days for private respondents to file their second motion for
reconsideration was of no legal consequence since it was given when there was no more period
to extend. It is an elementary rule that an application for extension of time must be filed prior to
the expiration of the period sought to be extended. 24 Necessarily, the discretion of respondent
court to grant said extension for filing a second motion for reconsideration is conditioned upon
the timeliness of the motion seeking the same.
No appeal having been taken seasonably, the respondent court's decision, dated September 25,
1979, became final and executory on March 9, 1980. The subsequent resolutions of respondent
court, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing private respondents to file a second
motion for reconsideration and reversing the original decision are null and void and cannot
disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction to respondent court. This is but in line
with the accepted rule that once a decision has become final and executory it is removed from
the power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further alter or amend, much less
revoke it.25 The decision rendered anew is null and void. 26 The court's inherent power to correct
its own errors should be exercised before the finality of the decision or order sought to be
corrected, otherwise litigation will be endless and no question could be considered finally settled.
Although the granting or denial of a motion for reconsideration involves the exercise of
discretion,27 the same should not be exercised whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but
prudently in conformity with law, justice, reason and equity.28
Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into the substantive merits of the case, we find
no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which
befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and
was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Such findings were
reached after an exhaustive assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record, as evidenced
by the respondent court's resolution of January 24, 1980 which we quote with approval:
First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on
that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND.
Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep
swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused the swerving is not
disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages
suffered by plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the
unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-
husband's insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran
into it.
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT
MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the
ACCIDENT MOUND.
It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson Street had already been covered except the 3
or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was located. Exhibit B-1 shows that the ditches
on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered, but not in such
a way as to allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to vehicles. The
situation could have been worse to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason
no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken.
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-husband claimed.
At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT
MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated
by the tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had been
braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiff's would not have been thrown against the
windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries.
Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside
lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over
the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights,
but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT
MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim
lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was negligence on
his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and
1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen
any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND,
having seen it many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep
on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND.29
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of
the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover
damages.30 The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private
respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could
have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some
alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the
site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the
lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the
accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing
of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the
doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. 31 It is basic that private
respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should
exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was
his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the
consequences of his imprudence.
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court of Appeals in its original decision
that there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We have for
consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and the unverified
photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report of the
incident and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where private respondents
were allegedly treated have not even been satisfactorily explained.
As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited extended resolution of January 24, 1980
— not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to
(a) There was no third party eyewitness of the accident. As to how the accident occurred, the
Court can only rely on the testimonial evidence of plaintiffs themselves, and such evidence
should be very carefully evaluated, with defendant, as the party being charged, being given
the benefit of any doubt. Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to plaintiffs,
another person could have deliberately engineered a similar accident in the hope and
expectation that the Court can grant him substantial moral and exemplary damages from the
big corporation that defendant is. The statement is made only to stress the disadvantageous
position of defendant which would have extreme difficulty in contesting such person's claim.
If there were no witness or record available from the police department of Bacolod, defendant
would not be able to determine for itself which of the conflicting testimonies of plaintiffs is
correct as to the report or non-report of the accident to the police department.32
A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence
of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence.33 Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause
of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested,
otherwise his action must fail.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 11, 1980 and
September 3,1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its original decision, promulgated on September
25,1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989
GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Mario D. Ortiz for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. No. 09949-CR, dated
October 10, 1974, affirming the conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless
imprudence.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are:
On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped
an old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at the right side of T. Padilla Market.
The appellant's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. The old woman started
to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast
overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a
consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The appellant continued to drive on, but a by-
stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store in market in order to celebrate the
coming of the New Year, and who saw the incident right before him, shouted at the appellant
to stop. He ran after appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant,
Mangyao asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old
woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the old woman was
struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and the food and viands she was carrying
were scattered on her body. The victim was then loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital
where she died three hours later (Exh. C). The findings after an autopsy are as follows:
Contusion with Hematoma Left, Frontal and Occipito-Parietal Regionas Fracture Occipito-
Parietal Bone Cerebral Hemorrhage.
The deceased was an eighty-one-year old woman named Rita B. Cabrera. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Crim. Case No. V7855). The trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged and
sentenced him to "suffer an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum,
to indemnify the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty and to pay the costs" (p. 3,
Appellant's Brief, p. 56, Rollo).
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 09949-CR)which,on October
10,1974,conviction of the accused but increased his civil liability to P12,000. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from except in the amount of
indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased, Rita B. Cabrera, which is the sum of
P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency which should be raised to
P12,000.00 (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468) but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed in
all other respects with costs. (P. 37, Rollo.)
After his motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision was denied, he filed a
petition for review in this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the
accident which led to her death;
2. in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt; and
3. in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the petitioner from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00,
although the circumstances of the victim and the accused (petitioner) do not warrant such
increase.
It is quite evident that all the issues raised in the petition for review are factual. Well-entrenched
in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are binding upon us (Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 101 SCRA 351; Vda. De Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA
77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The
defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own
negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,1947)." (People vs. Quinones, 44 O.G.
1520).
The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil liability to
P12,000, is devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for
death in homicide or murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente, [1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs.
Centeno, 130 SCRA 198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to P30,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the civil liability of the
petitioner which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC
COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
A. D. Gibbs for appellant.
F. G. Waite, & Thimas Kepner for appellee.
TRACEY, J.:
This is an action for damages. The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the
employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to
the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used
in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one another,
upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the
rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to
prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either
in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the
car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee.
This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the accident happened through the
negligence of the defendant. The detailed description by the defendant's witnesses of the
construction and quality of the track proves that if was up to the general stranded of tramways
of that character, the foundation consisting on land of blocks or crosspieces of wood, by 8 inches
thick and from 8 to 10 feet long laid, on the surface of the ground, upon which at a right angle
rested stringers of the same thickness, but from 24 to 30 feet in length. On the across the stringers
the parallel with the blocks were the ties to which the tracks were fastened. After the road reached
the water's edge, the blocks or crosspieces were replaced with pilling, capped by timbers
extending from one side to the other. The tracks were each about 2 feet wide and the two inside
rails of the parallel tracks about 18 inches apart. It was admitted that there were no side pieces or
guards on the car; that where no ends of the rails of the track met each other and also where the
stringers joined, there were no fish plates. the defendant has not effectually overcome the
plaintiff's proof that the joints between the rails were immediately above the joints between the
underlying stringers.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the tie, which was the immediate
occasion of the accident, is not clear in the evidence, but is found by the trial court and is admitted
in the briefs and in the argument to have been the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under
the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon. The superintendent of the
company attributed it to the giving way of the block laid in the sand. No effort was made to
repair the injury at the time of the occurrence. According to plaintiffs witnesses, a depression of
the track, varying from one half inch to one inch and a half, was therafter apparent to the eye,
and a fellow workman of the plaintiff swears that the day before the accident he called the
attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it and asked by simply straightening out the crosspiece,
resetting the block under the stringer and renewing the tie, but otherwise leaving the very same
timbers as before. It has not proven that the company inspected the track after the typhoon or
had any proper system of inspection.
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on
its part in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to vehicles transporting it, or to
skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and
repair the roadway as soon as the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the
defendant to repair the weakened track, after notice of its condition, that the judge below based
his judgment.
This case presents many important matters for our decision, and first among them is the standard
of duty which we shall establish in our jurisprudence on the part of employees toward
employees.
The lack or the harshness of legal rules on this subject has led many countries to enact designed
to put these relations on a fair basis in the form of compensation or liability laws or the institution
of insurance. In the absence of special legislation we find no difficulty in so applying the general
principles of our law as to work out a just result.
Article 1092 of the Civil Code provides:
Civil obligations, arising from crimes or misdemeanors, shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
And article 568 of the latter code provides:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that if done with malice would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished.
And article 590 provides that the following shall be punished:
4. Those who by simple imprudence or negligence, without committing any infraction of
regulations, shall cause an injury which, had malice intervened, would have constituted
a crime or misdemeanor.
And finally by articles 19 and 20, the liability of owners and employers for the faults of their
servants and representatives is declared to be civil and subsidiary in its character.
It is contented by the defendant, as its first defense to the action, that the necessary conclusion
from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal
action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his
employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have
procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the tract,
and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and
secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the
Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to
the provisions of Chapter 11 of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused
by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damages.
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that
nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe
appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one "not punished by the law " and falls
under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should
be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes, such
as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would shut out
litigants their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon
the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by
reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always
stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their
meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal), which, though n ever in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory
or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might
be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be
sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by
him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a
crime that could be enforced by only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should
be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal
Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citations of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to
be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided by law. Where an individual is civilly liable
for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the inured party should seek out a third
person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of
the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are process of
prosecution, or in so far as they determinate the existence of the criminal act from which liability
arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal in question, the
provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary
to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions survived the laws
that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now
in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs
before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence
not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and
590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his
relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence
punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1092 and 1093. More than this, however, it
can not be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequences of which
are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are
applicable are understood to be those and growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one
another. But were relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract
or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104, of the
same code. A typical application of the distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway
accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee
would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
passage. while that to that injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself. This
distinction is thus clearly set forth by Manresa in his commentary on article 1093.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may be understood
in two difference senses; either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of
its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other
obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed,
which can not be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability
arising from the already exiting obligation.
Of these two species of culpa the first one mentioned, existing by itself, may be also
considered as a real source of an independent obligation, and, as chapter 2, title 16 of this
book of the code is devoted to it, it is logical to presume that the reference contained in
article 1093 is limited thereto and that it does not extend to those provisions relating to
the other species of culpa (negligence), the nature of which we will discuss later. (Vol. 8,
p. 29.)
And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two species of negligence
may be somewhat inexactly described as contractual and extra-contractual, the letter being
the culpa aquiliana of the Roman law and not entailing so strict an obligation as the former. This
terminology is unreservedly accepted by Sanchez-Roman (Derecho Civil, fourth section, Chapter
XI, Article II, No. 12), and the principle stated is supported be decisions of the supreme court of
Spain, among them those of November 20, 1896 (80 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 151), and June 27,
1894 (75 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 182). The contract is one for hire and not one of mandate.
(March 10, 1897, 81 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 107.)
Spanish Jurisprudencia prior to the adoption of the Working Men's Accident Law of January 30,
1900, throws uncertain light on the relation between master and workman. Moved by the quick
industrial development of their people, the courts of France early applied to the subject the
principles common to the law of both countries, which are lucidly discussed by the leading
French commentators.
The original French theory, resting the responsibility of owners of industrial enterprises upon
articles 1382, 1383, and 1384 of the Code Napoleon, corresponding in scope to articles 1902 and
1903 of the Spanish Code, soon yielded to the principle that the true basis is the contractual
obligation of the employer and employee. (See 18 Dalloz, 196, Title Travail, 331.)
Later the hardships resulting from special exemptions inserted in contracts for employment led
to the discovery of a third basis for liability in an article of he French Code making the possessor
of any object answerable for damage done by it while in his charge. Our law having no
counterpart of this article, applicable to every kind of object, we need consider neither the theory
growing out of it nor that of "professional risk" more recently imposed by express legislation, but
rather adopting the interpretation of our Civil Code above given, find a rule for this case in the
contractual obligation. This contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so
inherent in its nature to be invariable by the parties, binds the employer to provide safe
appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely corresponding to English and American Law.
On these principles it was the duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its track in
reasonably sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger. It is plain
that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the accident could not have
occurred; consequently the negligence of the defendant is established.
Another contention of the defense is that the injury resulted to the plaintiff as a risk incident to
his employment and, as such, one assumed by him. It is evident that this can not be the case if
the occurrence was due to the failure to repair the track or to duly inspect, it for the employee is
not presumed to have stipulated that the employer might neglect his legal duty. Nor may it be
excused upon the ground that the negligence leading to the accident was that of a fellow-servant
of the injured man. It is not apparent to us that the intervention of a third person can relieve the
defendant from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the plaintiff the consequences of an
act or omission not his own. Sua cuique culpa nocet. This doctrine, known as "the fellow-servant,
rule," we are not disposed to introduce into our jurisprudence. Adopted in England by Lord
Abinger in the case of Prescott vs. Fowler (3 Meeson & Welsby, 1) in 1837, it has since been
effectually abrogated by "the Employers' Liability Acts" and the "Compensation Law." The
American States which applied it appear to be gradually getting rid of it; for instance, the New
York State legislature of 1906 did away with it in respect to railroad companies, and had in hand
a scheme for its total abolition. It has never found place in the civil law of continental Europe.
(Dalloz, vol. 39, 1858, Title Responsibilite, 630, and vol. 15, 1895, same title, 804. Also more recent
instances in Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Civile, 710.)
The French Cour de Cassation clearly laid down the contrary principle in its judgment of June 28,
1841, in the case of Reygasse, and has since adhered to it.
The most controverted question in the case is that of the negligence of the plaintiff, contributing
to the accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two
particulars is he charged with carelessness:
First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards,
either before or behind it.
As to the first point, the depression in the track night indicate either a serious or a rival difficulty.
There is nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did or could see the displaced timber
underneath the sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a conclusion drawn from what is
assumed to have been a probable condition of things not before us, rather than a fair inference
from the testimony. While the method of construction may have been known to the men who
had helped build the road, it was otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this job less
than two days. A man may easily walk along a railway without perceiving a displacement of the
underlying timbers. The foreman testified that he knew the state of the track on the day of the
accident and that it was then in good condition, and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant,
working on the same job, swore that he never noticed the depression in the track and never saw
any bad place in it. The sagging of the track this plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in
his hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor refused to repair it. His lack of caution in
continuing at his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature
as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. On this point
we accept the conclusion of the trial judge who found as facts that "the plaintiff did not know the
cause of the one rail being lower than then other" and "it does not appear in this case that the
plaintiff knew before the accident occurred that the stringers and rails joined in the same place."
Were we not disposed to agree with these findings they would, nevertheless, be binding upon
us, because not "plainly and manifestly against the weight of evidence," as those words of section
497, paragraph 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure were interpreted by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the De la Rama case (201 U. S., 303).
In respect of the second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the finding that the car was
pulled by means of a rope attached to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the
circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary to operate the car could not
walk upon the plank between the rails and that, therefore, it was necessary for the employees
moving it to get hold upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding upon the instruction
given by the defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity of
the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car. Therefore
the findings of the judge below leave the conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of the
loaded car, upon the open ties, over the depressed track, free to our inquiry.
While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in
this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made known to
all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears that he repeated the
prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that
the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order
being made known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
This conclusion presents sharply the question, What effect is to be given such an act of
contributory negligence? Does it defeat a recovery, according to the American rule, or is it to be
taken only in reduction of damages?
While a few of the American States have adopted to a greater or less extent the doctrine of
comparative negligence, allowing a recovery by a plaintiff whose own act contributed to his
injury, provided his negligence was slight as compared with that of the defendant, and some
others have accepted the theory of proportional damages, reducing the award to a plaintiff in
proportion to his responsibility for the accident, yet the overwhelming weight of adjudication
establishes the principle in American jurisprudence that any negligence, however slight, on the
part of the person injured which is one of the causes proximately contributing to his injury, bars
his recovery. (English and American Encyclopedia of law, Titles "Comparative Negligence" and
Contributory Negligence.")
In Grant Trunk Railway Company vs. Ives (144 U. S., 408, at page 429) the Supreme Court of the
United States thus authoritatively states the present rule of law:
Although the defendant's' negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury
complained of, yet an action for such injury can not be maintained if the proximate and
immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in
the person injured; subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years
(having been first enunciated in Davies vs. Mann, 10 M. & W., 546) that the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences
of the injured party's negligence.
There are may cases in the supreme court of Spain in which the defendant was exonerated, but
when analyzed they prove to have been decided either upon the point that he was not negligent
or that the negligence of the plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty or that the accident
was due to casus fortuitus. Of the first class in the decision of January 26, 1887 (38 Jurisprudencia
Criminal, No. 70), in which a railway employee, standing on a car, was thrown therefrom and
killed by the shock following the backing up of the engine. It was held that the management of
the train and engine being in conformity with proper rules of the company, showed no fault on
its part.
Of the second class are the decision of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and the 7th of
March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year; and of the third class the decision of the 4th
of June, 1888 (64 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 1), in which the breaking down of plaintiff's dam by the
logs of the defendant impelled against it by the Tajo River, was held due to a freshet as a
fortuitous cause.
The decision of the 7th of March, 1902, on which stress has been laid, rested on two bases, one,
that the defendant was not negligent, because expressly relieved by royal order from the common
obligation imposed by the police law of maintaining a guard at the road crossing; the other,
because the act of the deceased in driving over level ground with unobstructed view in front of
a train running at speed, with the engine whistle blowing was the determining cause of the
accident. It is plain that the train was doing nothing but what it had a right to do and that the
only fault lay with the injured man. His negligence was not contributory, it was sole, and was of
such an efficient nature that without it no catastrophe could have happened.
On the other hand, there are many cases reported in which it seems plain that the plaintiff
sustaining damages was not free from contributory negligence; for instance, the decision of the
14th of December, 1894 (76 Jurisprudencia Civil, No. 134), in which the owner of a building was
held liable for not furnishing protection to workmen engaged in hanging out flags, when the
latter must have perceived beforehand the danger attending the work.
None of those cases define the effect to be given the negligence of a plaintiff which contributed
to his injury as one of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left to seek the theory
of the civil law in the practice of other countries.
In France in the case of Marquant, August 20, 1879, the cour de cassation held that the carelessness
of the victim did not civilly relieve the person without whose fault the accident could not have
happened, but that the contributory negligence of the injured man had the effect only of reducing
the damages. The same principle was applied in the case of Recullet, November 10, 1888. and
that of Laugier of the 11th of November, 1896. (Fuzier-Herman, Title Responsibilite Cirile, 411,
412.) Of like tenor are citations in Dalloz (vol. 18, 1806, Title Trail, 363, 364, and vol. 15, 1895, Title
Responsibilite, 193, 198).
In the Canadian Province of Quebee, which has retained for the most part the French Civil Law,
now embodied in a code following the Code Napoleon, a practice in accord with that of France
is laid down in many cases collected in the annotations to article 1053 of the code edited by
Beauchamps, 1904. One of these is Luttrell vs. Trottier, reported in La Revue de Jurisprudence,
volume 6, page 90, in which the court of Kings bench, otherwise known as the court of appeals,
the highest authority in the Dominion of Canada on points of French law, held that contributory
negligence did not exonerate the defendants whose fault had been the immediate cause of the
accident, but entitled him to a reduction of damages. Other similar cases in the provincial courts
have been overruled by appellate tribunals made up of common law judges drawn from other
provinces, who have preferred to impose uniformally throughout the Dominion the English
theory of contributory negligence. Such decisions throw no light upon the doctrines of the civil
law. Elsewhere we find this practice embodied in legislation; for instance, section 2 of article 2398
of the Code of Portugal reads as follows:
If in the case of damage there was fault or negligence on the part of the person injured or
in the part of some one else, the indemnification shall be reduced in the first case, and in
the second case it shall be appropriated in proportion to such fault or negligence as
provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 2372.
And in article 1304 of the Austrian Code provides that the victim who is partly changeable with
the accident shall stand his damages in proportion to his fault, but when that proportion is
incapable of ascertainment, he shall share the liability equally with the person principally
responsible. The principle of proportional damages appears to be also adopted in article 51 of the
Swiss Code. Even in the United States in admirality jurisdictions, whose principles are derived
from the civil law, common fault in cases of collision have been disposed of not on the ground of
contradictor negligence, but on that of equal loss, the fault of the one part being offset against
that of the other. (Ralli vs. Troop, 157 U. S. 386; 97.)
The damage of both being added together and the sum equally divided, a decree is entered in
favor of the vessel sustaining the greater loss against the other for the excess of her damages over
one-half of the aggregate sum. (The Manitoba, 122 U. S., 97)
Exceptional practice appears to prevail in maritime law in other jurisdictions. The Spanish Code
of Commerce, article 827, makes each vessel for its own damage when both are the fault; this
provision restricted to a single class of the maritime accidents, falls for short of a recognition of
the principle of contributory negligence as understood in American Law, with which, indeed, it
has little in common. This is a plain from other articles of the same code; for instance, article 829,
referring to articles 826, 827, and 828, which provides: "In the cases above mentioned the civil
action of the owner against the person liable for the damage is reserved, as well as the criminal
liability which may appear."
The rule of the common law, a hard and fast one, not adjustable with respects of the faults of the
parties, appears to have grown out the original method of trial by jury, which rendered difficult
a nice balancing of responsibilities and which demanded an inflexible standard as a safeguard
against too ready symphaty for the injured. It was assumed that an exact measure of several
concurring faults was unattainable.
The reason why, in cases of mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an
action against the other, is, not the wrong of the one is set off against the wrong of the
other; it that the law can not measure how much of the damage suffered is attributable
to the plaintiff's own fault. If he were allowed to recover, it might be that he would obtain
from the other party compensation for hiss own misconduct. (Heil vs. Glanding, 42 Penn.
St. Rep., 493, 499.)
The parties being mutually in fault, there can be no appointment of damages. The law
has no scales to determine in such cases whose wrongdoing weighed most in the
compound that occasioned the mischief. (Railroad vs. Norton, 24 Penn. St. 565, 469.)
Experience with jury trials in negligence cases has brought American courts to review to relax
the vigor of the rule by freely exercising the power of setting aside verdicts deemed excessive,
through the device of granting new trials, unless reduced damages are stipulated for, amounting
to a partial revision of damages by the courts. It appears to us that the control by the court of the
subject matter may be secured on a moral logical basis and its judgment adjusted with greater
nicety to the merits of the litigants through the practice of offsetting their respective
responsibilities. In the civil law system the desirable end is not deemed beyond the capacity of
its tribunals.
Whatever may prove to be the doctrine finally adopted in Spain or in other countries under the
stress and counter stress of novel schemers of legislation, we find the theory of damages laid
down in the judgment the most consistent with the history and the principals of our law in these
Islands and with its logical development.
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be between the
accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no
accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing
under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced
the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the
iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of
place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where
he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover
the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum
deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
Accepting, though with some hesitation, the judgment of the trial court, fixing the damage
incurred by the plaintiff at 5,000 pesos, the equivalent of 2,500 dollars, United States money, we
deduct therefrom 2,500 pesos, the amount fairly attributable to his negligence, and direct
judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the resulting sum of 2,500 pesos, with cost of
both instances, and ten days hereafter let the case be remanded to the court below for proper
action. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J. Torres and Mapa, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-87584 June 16, 1992 Abrasions:
GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GLORIA E. CHATTO and back lumbar region, horizontal, across midline, from left to right; hand right, palm, near
LINA DELZA CHATTO, respondents. wrist; hand left, index finger, dorsum, proximal phalanx.
DAVIDE. JR., J.: Conclusion, cerebral.
X-Ray — Skull; Thoraco-lumbar
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are both the region — All negative.
Decision 1 promulgated on 27 July 1988 and the Resolution dated 14 March 1989 2 of the CONCLUSIONS
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09699 which, respectively affirmed in toto the
decision of Branch XXI of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-22567 1. Physical injuries rioted on the subject.
entitled "Gloria Chatto, et al. versus Gotesco Investment Corporation", and denied petitioner's
motion to reconsider the same. 2. That under normal condition in the absence of complication, said physical injuries will
require medical attendance and/or incapacitate the subject for a period of from two to
The trial court ordered the defendant, herein petitioners to pay the plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto four weeks.
the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages and the plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto the sum of P49,050.00
as actual and consequential damages, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as attorney's On the other hand, the findings on plaintiff Gloria Chatto per Medico Legal Certificate
fees, plus the cost of the suit. These awards, except for the attorney's fees, were to earn interest at (Exh. "D") of Dr. Brion are as follows:
the rate of twelve per cent (12%) per annum beginning from the date the complaint was filed, 16
November 1982, until the amounts were fully paid. xxx xxx xxx

The antecedent facts, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the respondent Court, are Physical injuries:
summarized by the latter in the challenged decision as follows:
Lacerated wounds:
The evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 4, 1982 plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto, and her 15-
year old daughter, plaintiff Lina Delza E. Chatto went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at
scalp vertex, running across suggittal line, from left to right, 3.0 cm sutured;
Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought
balcony tickets but even then were unable to find seats considering the number of people
Contusion, forearm right, anterior aspect, upper third.
patronizing the movie. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of its
balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued.
Shocked and hurt, plaintiffs managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were Abrasions:
able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined
and treated for one (1) day. Shoulder and upper third, arm right, posterior aspect, linear; backright, scapular region,
two in number, linear; elbow right, posterior aspect; forearm right, anterior aspect,
The next day, they transferred to the UST hospital. Plaintiff Gloria Chatto was treated in said middle third.
hospital from June 5 to June 19 and plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto from June 5 to 11. Per Medico
Legal Certificate (Exh, "C") issued by Dr. Ernesto G. Brion, plaintiff Lina Delza Chatto suffered Concusion (sic), cerebral.
the following injuries:
X-Ray — Skull — Negative.
Physical injuries: Cervical spines Straightening of cervical spine, probably to muscular spasm.

Contusions: CONCLUSIONS:
forehead and drental region, scalp left with hematoma; chest anterior upper bilateral;
back right, scapular region; back, mid-portion, thoraco-lumbar regions, bilateral 1. Physical injuries noted on subject.
 2. That under normal condition, in the absence of complication, said physical injuries will
require medical attendance and/or incapacitate the subject for a period of from two to
four weeks.
Due to continuing pain in the neck, headache and dizziness, plaintiff went to Illinois, USA in
July 1982 for further treatment (Exh "E"). She was treated at the Cook County Hospital in
Chicago, Illinois. She stayed in the U.S. for about three (3) months during which time she had
to return to the Cook County Hospital five (5) or, six (6) times.
Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was
done due to force majeure. It maintained that its theater did not suffer from any structural or
construction defect. (Exh. 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5) 3
In justifying its award of actual or compensatory and moral damages and attorney's fees, the
trial court said:
It has been established thru the uncontradicted testimony of Mrs. Chatto that during the chaos
and confusion at the theater she lost a pair of earrings worth P2,500 and the sum of P1,000.00
in cash contained in her wallet which was lost; and that she incurred the following expenses:
P500.00 as transportation fare from Cebu City to Manila on the first leg of her trip to the United
States; P350.00 for her passport; and P46,978.00 for her expense relative to her treatment in the
United States, including the cost of a round-trip ticket (P11,798.00) hospital and medical bills
and other attendant expenses. The total is P51,328.00, which is more than the sum of
P49,050.00 claimed in the complaint, hence should be reduced accordingly.
The same testimony has also established that Mrs. Chatto contracted to pay her counsel the
sum of P20,000.00, which this court considers reasonable considering, among other things, the
professional standing of work (sic) involved in the prosecution of this case. Such award of
attorney's fees is proper because the defendant's omission to provide the plaintiffs proper and
adequate safeguard to life and limb which they deserved as patrons to (sic) its theater had
compelled the plaintiffs to hire the services of a counsel, file this case and prosecute it, thus
incurring expenses to protect their interest.
The plaintiffs are entitled to moral damages, which are the direct and proximate result of the
defendants gross negligence and omission. Such moral damages include the plaintiffs'
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright and serious anxiety. On the part of Mrs. Chatto,
who obviously suffered much more pain, anguish, fright and anxiety than her daughter Lina
Delza, such damages are compounded by the presence of permanent deformities on her body
consisting of a 6-inch scar on the head and a 2-inch scar on one arm. The court believes that
the sum of P75,000.00 for plaintiff Gloria E. Chatto and the sum of P10,000.00 for plaintiff Lina
Delza E. Chatto would be reasonable. 4
Petitioner submitted before the respondent Court the following assignment of errors:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING PATENTLY — INADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES AND IN GIVING LESS PROBATIVE
VALUE TO PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AND CERTIFICATIONS OF THE CONDITION OF THE
BUILDING, PARTICULARLY THE CERTIFICATE OF OCCUPANCY ISSUED BY THE CITY
ENGINEER'S OFFICE OF MANILA.
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT "THE CEILING OF THE BALCONY
COLLAPSED DUE TO SOME STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTION OR ARCHITECTURAL
DEFECT," AND NOT DUE TO AN ACT OF GOD OR FORCE MAJEURE.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT WAS GROSSLY
NEGLIGENT IN FAILING "TO CAUSE PROPER AND ADEQUATE INSPECTION
MAINTENANCE AND UPKEEP OF THE BUILDING." 5
In its decision, respondent Court found the appeal to be without merit. As to the first assigned
error, it ruled that the trial court did not err in admitting the exhibits in question in the light of
the ruling in Abrenica vs. Gonda 6 on waiver of objections arising out of failure to object at the
proper time Thus:
Exh. "A", the letter dated June 9, 1982 of Tina Mojica of defendant-appellant to the
Administrator of UST Hospital expressing their willingness to guaranty the payment of the
hospital bills of the plaintiffs-appellees was not objected to in trial court for lack of
authentication. It is too late to raise that objection on appeal.
Exhibits "B", "C", "D", "F" to "F-13" are the hospital records at FEU, UST and Cook County
Hospital. It may be true that the doctors who prepared them were not presented as witnesses.
Nonetheless, the records will show that counsel for defendant-appellant cross examined
plaintiff-appellee Gloria Chatto on the matter especially the content of Exhibits "F" to F-13",
Consequently, defendant-appellant is estopped from claiming lack of opportunity to verify
their textual truth. Moreover, the record is full of the testimony of plaintiffs-appellees on the
injuries they sustained from the collapse of the ceiling of defendant-appellant's theater. Their
existence is crystal clear.
Exh. "E" is the flight coupon and passenger ticket (Northwest Orient) of plaintiff-appellee
Gloria Chatto from the Philippines to the U.S. (Manila-Chicago-Manila). Certainly, this is
relevant evidence on whether or not she actually travelled (sic) to the U.S. for further medical
treatment. Defendant-appellant's contention that the best evidence on the issue is her passport
is off the mark. The best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly
in issue. In any event, her passport is not the only evidence on the matter.
 Exh. "G" is the summary of plaintiff-appellee Gloria Chatto's expenses in the U.S in her own Q And do you personally inspect these buildings under your construction?
handwriting. Defendant-appellant's objection that it is self serving goes to the weight of the A Yes, whenever I can.
evidence. The truth of Exh. "G" could be and should have been tested by cross examination. Q In the case of Gotesco Cinema 1 and 2, had you any chance to inspect this building?
It cannot be denied however that such expenses are within the personal knowledge of the A Yes, sir.
witness. Q Particularly in the months of May and June of 1982?
A Yes, in that (sic) months.
Exh. "H" is the surgical neckwear worn by the plaintiff-appellee Gloria Chatto as part of her Q Now, you said also that sometime in June 1982 you remember that one of these theaters.
treatment in the U.S. Defendant-appellant objects to its admission because it is self-serving. Atty. Barcelona: continuing
The objection is without merit in view of the evidence on record that plaintiff-appellee Gloria particularly Superama 1 the ceiling had collapsed?
Chatto sustained head injuries from the collapse of the ceiling of defendant-appellant's A Yes, sir.
theater. In fact, counsel for defendant-appellant cross examined the said witness on the Q Did you conduct an investigation?
medical finding of Cook County Hospital that she was suffering from neck muscle spasm. A Yes, sir.
(TSN, April 17, 1984, p. 11) The wearing of a surgical neckwear has proper basis. Q What was your finding?
A There was really nothing, I cannot explain. I could not give any reason why the ceiling
Exh. "I" is the photograph of plaintiff-appellee Gloria Chatto in the U.S. showing the use of collapsed.
her surgical neckwear. Defendant-appellant objects to this exhibit its hearsay because the Q Could it not be due to any defect of the plant?
photographer was not presented as a witness. The objection is incorrect. In order that Atty. Florido:
photographs or pictures may be given in evidence, they must be shown to be a true and Already answered, Your Honor, he could not give any reason.
faithful representation of the place or objects to which they refer. The photographs may be COURT:
verified either by the photographer who took it or by any person who is acquainted with the
object represented and testify (sic) that the photograph faithfully represents the object. Objection sustained.
(Moran, Comments in the Rules of Court, Vol. V, 1980 ed., p. 80 citing New York Co vs. Moore,
105 Fed. 725) In the case at bar, Exh. "I" was identified by plaintiff appellee Gloria Chatto. 7 Atty. Barcelona:
Q When that incident happened, did the owner Gotesco Investment Corporation went (sic)
As to the, other assigned errors, the respondent Court ruled: to you to call your attention?
A Yes, sir.
The lower court did not also err in its finding that the collapse of the ceiling of the theater's Atty. Florido:
balcony was due to construction defects and not to force majeure. It was the burden Your Honor, we noticed (sic) series of leading questions, but this time we object.
defendant-appellant to prove that its theater did not suffer from any structural defect when it COURT:
was built and that it has been well maintained when the incident occurred. This is its Special Sustained.
and Affirmative Defense and it is incumbent on defendant-appellant to prove it. Considering Atty. Barcelona;
the collapse of the ceiling of its theater's balcony barely four (4) years after its construction, it Q What did the owner of Gotesco do when the ceiling collapsed, upon knowing that one
behooved defendant-appellant to conduct an exhaustive study of the reason for the tragic of the cinemas you maintained collopsed?
incident. On this score, the effort of defendant-appellant borders criminal nonchalance. Its A He asked for a thorough investigation.
witness Jesus Lim Ong testified: Q And as a matter of fact as asked you to investigate?
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Barcelona: Q Did you come out with any investigation report.
Q By the way, you made mention a while ago that your staff of engineer and architect used A There was nothing to report.
to make round inspection of the building under your construction the of these buildings is
Gotesco Cinema 1 and 2, subject matter of this case, and you also made a regular round up
or inspection of the theater. Is that right? Clearly, there was no authoritative investigation conducted by impartial civil and
A Yes, sir. structural engineers on the cause of the collapse of the theater's ceiling, Jesus Lim Ong is
not an engineer, He is a graduate of architecture from the St. Louie (sic) University in
 Baguio City. It does not appear he has passed the government examination for architects.
(TSN, June 14, 1985 p. 4) In fine, the ignorance of Mr. Ong about the cause of the collapse
of the ceiling of their theater cannot be equated, as an act, of God. To sustain that
proposition is to introduce sacrilege in our jurisprudence. 8
Its motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the respondent Court,
petitioner filed this petition assailing therein the challenged decision on the following grounds:
1. The basis of the award for damages stems from medical reports issued by private physicians
of local hospitals without benefit of cross-examination and more seriously, xerox copies of
medical findings issued by American doctors in the United States without the production of
originals, without the required consular authentication for foreign documents, and without
the opportunity for cross-examination.
2. The damage award in favor of respondents is principally, made depend on such unreliable,
hearsay and incompetent evidence for which an award of more than P150,000.00 in alleged
actual, moral and I "consequential" damages are awarded to the prejudice of the right of
petitioner to due process. . . .
3. Unfortunately, petitioners evidence of due diligence in the care and maintenance of the
building was not seriously considered by the Court of Appeals, considering that frequent
inspections and maintenance precautions had to be observed by hired engineers of petitioner,
which enjoys an unsullied reputation in the business of exhibiting movies in a chain of movie
houses in Metro Manila. 9
After the private respondents filed their Comment as required in the Resolution of 17 May 1989,
this Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective Memoranda. Subsequently, private respondents, in a motion, prayed for leave to
adopt their Comment as their Memorandum, which this Court granted on 6 December 1989.
Petitioner filed its Memorandum on 10 January 1990.
The petition presents both factual and legal issues. The first relates to the cause of the collapse of
the ceiling while the latter involves the correctness of the admission of the exhibits in question.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to it from the Court of
Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact
being conclusive, 10 except only where a case is shown as coming under the accepted
exception. 11 None of the exceptions which this Court has painstakingly summarized in several
cases 12 has been shown to exist in this petition. Petitioner's claim that the collapse of the ceiling
of the theater's balcony was due to force majeure is not even founded on facts because its own
witness, Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he could not give any reason why the ceiling
collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove that the collapse was
indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. That Mr. Ong could
not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure. As early as eighty-five (85) years ago, this
Court had the occasion to define force majeure. In Pons y Compañia vs. La Compañia Maritima 13 this
Court held:
An examination of the Spanish and American authorities concerning the meaning of force
majeure shows that the jurisprudence of these two countries practically agree upon the
meaning of this phrase.
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on English Law, defines it as —
Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is
irresistible; such as lightning. tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the
sudden illness or death of a person. (2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 122; Story in Bailments,
sec. 25.)
Escriche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, defines fuerza mayor as follows.
The event which we could neither foresee nor resist; as for example, the lightning stroke,
hail, inundation, hurricane, public enemy, attack by robbers; Vis major est, says Cayo, ea
quae consilio humano neque provideri neque vitari potest. Accident and mitigating
circumstances.
Bouvier defines the same as —
Any accident due to natural cause, directly exclusively without human intervention, such
as could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to
have been expected. (Law Reports, 1 Common Pleas Division, 423; Law Reports, 10
Exchequer, 255.)
Corkburn, chief justice, in a well considered English case (1 Common Pleas Division, 34, 432),
said that were a captain —
Uses all the known means to which prudent and experienced captains ordinarily have
recourse, he does all that can be reasonably required of him; and if, under such
circumtances, he is overpowered by storm or other natural agency, he is within the rule
which gives immunity from the effects of such vis major.
The term generally applies, broadly speaking, to natural accidents, such as those caused
by lightning, earthquake, tempests, public enemy ,etc.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force
majeure. To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that
either he did not actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court
impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the
government's examination. Verily, post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material
to the present proceedings. What is significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the
respondent Court, that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence
offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4) years prior to the
accident in question. It was not shown that any of the causes denominates as force
majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects
could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping
and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. His answers to the leading
questions on inspection disclosed neither the exact dates of said. inspection nor the nature and
extent of the same. That the structural designs and plans of the building were duly approved by
the City Engineer and the building permits and certificate of occupancy were issued do not at all
prove that there were no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering
that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.
It is settled that:
The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the
premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are
designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does
not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. 14
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing
that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have
happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits
of an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. 15
That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause
of the collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of
negligence, which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of
and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it,
he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
Turning now to the legal issue posed in this petition, the error lies not in the disquisitions of the
respondent Court, but in the sweeping conclusion of petitioner. We agree with the respondent
Court that petitioner offered no reasonable objection to the exhibits. More than this, however, We
note that the exhibits were admitted not as independent evidence, but, primarily, as part of the
testimony of Mrs. Gloria Chatto. Neither were the exhibits made the main basis for the award of
damages. As to the latter, including the award for attorney's fees, the testimonial evidence
presented is sufficient to support the same; moreover, petitioner was not deprived of its right to
test the, truth or falsity of private respondents' testimony through cross-examination or refute
their claim by its own evidence. It could not then be successfully argued by petitioner that the
admission of the exhibits violated the hearsay rule. As this Court sees it, the trial court admitted
such merely as independently relevant statements, which was not objectionable, for:
Where, regardless of the truth or the falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to
the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may
constitute a fact; in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. 16
Furthermore, and with particular reference to the documents issued in the United States of
America (Exhibits "F", "F-1" to "F-13", inclusive), the main objection thereto was not that they are
hearsay. In its written comment and/or opposition to documentary exhibits, petitioner objected
to their admission on the following grounds only:
. . . for being incompetent evidence considering that the same were not duly authenticated
by the responsible consular and/or embassy officials authorized to authenticate the said
documents. 17
All told, the instant petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant petition with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-36481-2 October 23, 1982
AMPARO C. SERVANDO, CLARA UY BICO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. PHILIPPINE STEAM
NAVIGATION CO., defendant-appellant.
Zoilo de la Cruz, Jr. & Associate for plaintiff-appellee Amparo Servando.
Benedicto, Sumbingco & Associate for appellee Clara Uy Bico.
Ross, Salcedo, del Rosario, Bito & Misa for defendant-appellant.
ESCOLIN, J.:
This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals, seeks to set aside the decision of the 1. In case No. 7354, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff Amparo C. Servando
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 7354 and 7428, declaring the aggregate sum of P1,070.50 with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for the loss of the appellees' cargoes complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.
as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental. 2. In case No. 7428, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff Clara Uy Bico the
aggregate sum of P16,625.00 with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the
The Court of Appeals certified the case to Us because only pure questions of law are raised complaint until fully paid, and to pay the costs.
therein.
Article 1736 of the Civil Code imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe extraordinary
The facts culled from the pleadings and the stipulations submitted by the parties are as follows: diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in their possession "until the
same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to the person
On November 6, 1963, appellees Clara Uy Bico and Amparo Servando loaded on board the who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738. "
appellant's vessel, FS-176, for carriage from Manila to Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, the
following cargoes, to wit: The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse of the Bureau
of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since the burning of the
Clara Uy Bico — warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the goods to the appellees, the loss
is chargeable against the appellant.
1,528 cavans of rice valued
It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in question,
at P40,907.50; the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or damage that may be
caused to the shipment by inserting therein the following stipulation:
Amparo Servando —
Clause 14. Carrier shall not be responsible for loss or damage to shipments billed
44 cartons of colored paper, 'owner's risk' unless such loss or damage is due to negligence of carrier. Nor shall
carrier be responsible for loss or damage caused by force majeure, dangers or
accidents of the sea or other waters; war; public enemies; . . . fire . ...
toys and general merchandise valued at P1,070.50;

We sustain the validity of the above stipulation; there is nothing therein that is contrary to law,
as evidenced by the corresponding bills of lading issued by the appellant. 1
morals or public policy.

Upon arrival of the vessel at Pulupandan, in the morning of November 18, 1963, the cargoes were
Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it was printed
discharged, complete and in good order, unto the warehouse of the Bureau of Customs. At about
in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign the same. This argument
2:00 in the afternoon of the same day, said warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin,
overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, promulgated June
destroying appellees' cargoes. Before the fire, however, appellee Uy Bico was able to take delivery
29, 1979, 3 where the same issue was resolved in this wise:
of 907 cavans of rice 2 Appellees' claims for the value of said goods were rejected by the appellant.

While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh. '12'), he
On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a decision, the decretal portion of
is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. 'Such provisions have been held
which reads as follows:
to be a part of the contract of carriage, and valid and binding upon the passenger
regardless of the latter's lack of knowledge or assent to the regulation'. It is what
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: is known as a contract of 'adhesion', in regards which it has been said that
contracts of adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract
on the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not entirely
 prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free to reject it
entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent." (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962
Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).
Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration of the basic
principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code:
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss,
the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. The Partidas, 4 the antecedent of Article
1174 of the Civil Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an event that takes place by accident and could
not have been foreseen. Examples of this are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck,
violence of robbers.'
In its dissertation of the phrase 'caso fortuito' the Enciclopedia Juridicada Espanola 5 says: "In a
legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a 'caso fortuito' presents the following
essential characteristics: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2) it
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible
for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from
any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor." In the case at bar, the
burning of the customs warehouse was an extraordinary event which happened independently
of the will of the appellant. The latter could not have foreseen the event.
There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in delay in the performance
of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified appellees of the arrival of their
shipment, but had demanded that the same be withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand,
appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of 907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of the goods in
the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees was undoubtedly made
with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse belonged to and was maintained by the
government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control
whatsoever over the same.
The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down in Yu Biao Sontua vs. Ossorio 6, where
this Court held the defendant liable for damages arising from a fire caused by the negligence of
the defendant's employees while loading cases of gasoline and petroleon products. But unlike in
the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the present case that the cause of the fire that broke
out in the Custom's warehouse was in any way attributable to the negligence of the appellant or
its employees. Under the circumstances, the appellant is plainly not responsible.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN
CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents..
PARAS, J.:
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the Decision * of the respondent Court of Appeals' First
Division, setting aside the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte,
with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set aside and another rendered in its stead
whereby defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs actual damages of P30,229.45;
compensatory damages of P50,000.00; exemplary damages of P10,000.00; attorney's fees of
P3,000.00; plus the costs of suit in both instances. (p. 27 Rollo)
Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence whereby both patties strive for the recognition of
their respective versions of the scenario from which the disputed claims originate. The
respondent Court of Appeals (CA) summarized the evidence of the parties as follows:
From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the evening of June 28 until the early
morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name "Gening" buffeted the
province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake.
Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the
floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana
Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero
Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters
Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to look after the merchandise
therein that might have been damaged. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the
deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned
by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was
partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between
5 and 6 meters behind the deceased, Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly
sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing
so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a
post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto
dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but
at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida
and Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building
which was four or five blocks away.
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been
electrocuted, he acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe
Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of
defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then
the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the
lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in
Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body was
recovered about two meters from an electric post.
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio
Juan, Power Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric
Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated such
abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out
of the Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines. Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could
not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office at the Life Theatre
on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and
Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters long strung across the street "and the other
end was seeming to play with the current of the water." (p. 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding
the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to the
NPC Compound.
At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the compound again on another inspection trip.
Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed by the house of the deceased at
the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken. Using
the resuscitator which was a standard equipment in his jeep and employing the skill he
acquired from an in service training on resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His
efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On the left palm of the deceased, Engr.
Juan noticed a hollow wound. Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on
the way. He told them about the grounded lines of the INELCO In the afternoon of the
same day, he went on a third inspection trip preparatory to the restoration of power. The
dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer
there.
Many people came to the house at the corner of Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar after learning
that the deceased had been electrocuted. Among the sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio
Castro, Municipal Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the request of the relatives
of the deceased, Dr. Castro examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967. The
skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution.
On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound" (Exh. C-1: p. 101, TSN,
Nov. 28, 1972) or a first degree burn. About the base of the thumb on the left hand was a
burned wound. (Exh. C-2, pp. 102-103, Ibid.) The certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro
stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution" (Exh. I; p. 103, Ibid.).
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and
employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electric engineer; Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector;
Fabico Abijero, lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO Through the
testimonies of these witnesses, defendant sought to prove that on and even before June 29,
1967 the electric service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area
No. 9 which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes at No. 18 Guerrero Street, did not
suffer from any defect that might constitute a hazard to life and property. The service lines,
devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly-installed prior to the
date in question. As a public service operator and in line with its business of supplying
electric current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid
injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods,
typhoons, fire and others. Defendant had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of making a
round-the-clock check-up of the areas respectively assigned to them.
Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the province of Ilocos Norte on
June 29, 1967, putting to streets of Laoag City under water, only a few known places in
Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the southern
approach of the Marcos Bridge which was washed away and where the INELCO lines and
posts collapsed; in the eastern part near the residence of the late Governor Simeon Mandac;
in the far north near the defendant's power plant at the corner of Segundo and Castro
Streets, Laoag City and at the far northwest side, near the premises of the Ilocos Norte
National High School. Fabico Abijero, testified that in the early morning before 6 o'clock
on June 29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and Guerrero Streets to switch off
the street lights in Area No. 9. He did not see any cut or broken wires in or near the vicinity.
What he saw were many people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by the defense to show that
the deceased could not have died of electrocution Substantially, the testimony of the doctor
is as follows: Without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not even a
medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of death. Cyanosis could not have
been found in the body of the deceased three hours after her death, because cyanosis which
means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the color of the skin purplish,
appears only in a live person. The presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the
 deceased (Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is not sufficient to establish her death by electrocution;
since burns caused by electricity are more or less round in shape and with points of entry
and exit. Had the deceased held the lethal wire for a long time, the laceration in her palm
would have been bigger and the injury more massive. (CA Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo)
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the
deceased with the aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p. 55,
Rollo), petitioner advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the deceased could have died
simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and
not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's
knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main
house to the iron gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current
whenever the switch is on. Petitioner then conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent
must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her
gate that early morning of June 29, 1967. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of
petitioner and dismissed the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in moral damages and
attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed with the CA which issued the controverted
decision.
In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors committed by the
respondent CA:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and error in
considering the purely hearsay alleged declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz as part of the res
gestae.
2. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion and error in
holding that the strong typhoon "Gening" which struck Laoag City and Ilocos Norte on
June 29, 1967 and the flood and deluge it brought in its wake were not fortuitous events
and did not exonerate petitioner-company from liability for the death of Isabel Lao Juan.
3. The respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and erred in not applying
the legal principle of "assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private respondents
from collecting damages from petitioner company.
4. That the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in
completely reversing the findings of fact of the trial court.
5. The findings of fact of the respondent Court of Appeals are reversible under the
recognized exceptions.
6. The trial court did not err in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees to defendant
corporation, now petitioner company.
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner company may be held liable from the death of the
late Isabel Lao Juan, the damages granted by respondent Court of Appeals are improper
and exhorbitant. (Petitioners Memorandum, p. 133, Rollo)
Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1) whether or not the deceased died of electrocution;
(2) whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death; and (3) whether or not
the respondent CA's substitution of the trial court's factual findings for its own was proper.
In considering the first issue, it is Our view that the same be resolved in the affirmative. By a
preponderance of evidence, private respondents were able to show that the deceased died of
electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily derived from the photographed burnt wounds
(Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the
fact that the deceased had clutched a live wire of the petitioner. This was corroborated by the
testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who actually examined the body of the deceased a few hours
after the death and described the said burnt wounds as a "first degree burn" (p. 144, TSN,
December 11, 1972) and that they were "electrically charged" (p. 102, TSN, November 28, 1972).
Furthermore, witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after the deceased
screamed "Ay" and sank into the water, they tried to render some help but were overcome with
fear by the sight of an electric wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the water in a snake-
like fashion (supra). The foregoing therefore justifies the respondent CA in concluding that "(t)he
nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no other conclusion
than that they were "burns," and there was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading
thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant company" (CA
Decision, p. 22, Rollo).
But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the deceased was
electrocuted, if such was really the case when she tried to open her steel gate, which was
electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent.
Petitioner suggests that the switch to said burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation,
not backed up with evidence. As required by the Rules, "each party must prove his own
affirmative allegations." (Rule 131, Sec. 1). Nevertheless, the CA significantly noted that "during
the trial, this theory was abandoned" by the petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23, Rollo).
Furthermore the CA properly applied the principle of res gestae. The CA said:
Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller, and Aida Bulong, a salesgirl, were with the deceased
during that fateful morning of June 29, 1967. This Court has not been offered any sufficient
reason to discredit the testimonies of these two young ladies. They were one in the
affirmation that the deceased, while wading in the waist-deep flood on Guerrero Street
 five or six meters ahead of them, suddenly screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water.
When they approached the deceased to help, they were stopped by the sight of an electric
wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Ernesto dela
Cruz also tried to approach the deceased, but he turned back shouting that the water was
grounded. These bits of evidence carry much weight. For the subject of the testimonies was
a startling occurrence, and the declarations may be considered part of the res gestae. (CA
Decision, p. 21, Rollo)
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be present: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; (3) that the statements made must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances (People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA
1151; People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 959). We do not find any abuse of discretion on the CA' part
in view of the satisfaction of said requisites in the case at bar.
The statements made relative to the startling occurrence are admitted in evidence precisely as an
exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness and necessity. "Trustworthiness"
because the statements are made instinctively (Wesley vs. State, 53 Ala. 182), and "necessity"
because such natural and spontaneous utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the
same person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31). Therefore, the fact that the declarant,
Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to testify does not make the testimony of Linda Alonzo
Estavillo and Aida Bulong hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res gestae. Similarly,
We considered part of the res gestae a conversation between two accused immediately after
commission of the crime as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs. Reyes, 82 Phil. 563).
While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide petitioner's Memorandum, p. 135, Rollo),
Ernesto de la Cruz was not an actual witness to the instant when the deceased sank into the waist-
deep water, he acted upon the call of help of Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo with the
knowledge of, and immediately after, the sinking of the deceased. In fact the startling event had
not yet ceased when Ernesto de la Cruz entered the scene considering that the victim remained
submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is undeniable that a state of mind characterized by
nervous excitement had been triggered in Ernesto de la Cruz's being as anybody under the same
contingency could have experienced. As such, We cannot honestly exclude his shouts that the
water was grounded from the res gestae just because he did not actually see the sinking of the
deceased nor hear her scream "Ay."
Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a mere opinion of Ernesto de la Cruz. While We
concede to the submission that the statement must be one of facts rather than opinion, We cannot
agree to the proposition that the one made by him was a mere opinion. On the contrary, his shout
was a translation of an actuality as perceived by him through his sense of touch.
Finally, We do not agree that the taking of Ernesto de la Cruz' testimony was suppressed by the
private respondents, thus, is presumed to be adverse to them pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule 131.
For the application of said Rule as against a party to a case, it is necessary that the evidence
alleged to be suppressed is available only to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18 May 1955,
97 Phil. 953). The presumption does not operate if the evidence in question is equally available
to both parties (StaplesHowe Printing Co. vs. Bldg. and Loan Assn., 36 Phil. 421). It is clear from
the records that petitioner could have called Ernesto de la Cruz to the witness stand. This,
precisely, was Linda Alonzo Estavillo's suggestion to petitioner's counsel when she testified on
cross examination:
Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far did he reach from the gate of the
house?
A. Well, you can ask that matter from him sir because he is here. (TSN,
p. 30, 26 Sept. 1972)
The foregoing shows that petitioner had the opportunity to verify the declarations of Ernesto de
la Cruz which, if truly adverse to private respondent, would have helped its case. However, due
to reasons known only to petitioner, the opportunity was not taken.
Coming now to the second issue, We tip the scales in the private respondents' favor. The
respondent CA acted correctly in disposing the argument that petitioner be exonerated from
liability since typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that typhoons and floods
are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said
eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of
petitioner's negligence that death took place. We subscribe to the conclusions of the respondent
CA when it found:
On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred liability for the electrocution and
consequent death of the late Isabel Lao Juan, defendant called to the witness-stand its
electrical engineer, chief lineman, and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary diligence
and to negate the charge of negligence. The witnesses testified in a general way about their
duties and the measures which defendant usuallyadopts to prevent hazards to life and
limb. From these testimonies, the lower court found "that the electric lines and other
equipment of defendant corporation were properly maintained by a well-trained team of
lineman, technicians and engineers working around the clock to insure that these
equipments were in excellent condition at all times." (P. 40, Record on Appeal) The finding
of the lower court, however, was based on what the defendant's employees were supposed
to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the
occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon.
 The lower court made a mistake in assuming that defendant's employees worked around
the clock during the occurrence of the typhoon on the night of June 28 and until the early
morning of June 29, 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation affirmed
that when he first set out on an inspection trip between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M. on June 29, 1967,
he saw grounded and disconnected electric lines of the defendant but he saw no INELCO
lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on Rizal Street was still closed. (pp. 63-64,
TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Even the witnesses of defendant contradict the finding of the lower
court. Conrado Asis, defendant's electrical engineer, testified that he conducted a general
inspection of the franchise area of the INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day following the
typhoon. The reason he gave for the delay was that all their vehicles were submerged. (p.
337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to Asis, he arrived at his office at 8:00 A.M. on June
30 and after briefing his men on what to do they started out. (p. 338, lbid) One or two days
after the typhoon, the INELCO people heard "rumors that someone was electrocuted" so
he sent one of his men to the place but his man reported back that there was no damaged
wire. (p. 385, Id.) Loreto Abijero, chief lineman of defendant, corroborated Engr. Juan. He
testified that at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 Engr. Juan came to the INELCO plant and
asked the INELCO people to inspect their lines. He went with Engr. Juan and their
inspection lasted from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. 28, 1975) Fabico
Abijero lineman of defendant, testified that at about 6:00 on June 29, 1967 the typhoon
ceased. At that time, he was at the main building of the Divine Word College of Laoag
where he had taken his family for refuge. (pp. 510-511, Ibid.)
In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28
until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier
of electricity to be in constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might
imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary,
evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor
even manning its office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm
is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the
measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to
the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of
petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the
victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs
with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the
case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased
to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo
Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept. 1972) and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept. 1972), the
deceased, accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see
to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, shall We punish her for exercising her right to
protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she
assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it has been held that a person is excused
from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by
the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril
(65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. 301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property
(Harper and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 1167). Clearly, an
emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place
where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect
her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering
damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166).
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its discretion in completely reversing the trial
court's findings of fact, pointing to the testimonies of three of its employees its electrical engineer,
collector-inspector, lineman, and president-manager to the effect that it had exercised the degree
of diligence required of it in keeping its electric lines free from defects that may imperil life and
limb. Likewise, the said employees of petitioner categorically disowned the fatal wires as they
appear in two photographs taken on the afternoon of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and "E"), suggesting
that said wires were just hooked to the electric post (petitioner's Memorandum, p. 170, Rollo).
However, as the CA properly held, "(t)he finding of the lower court ... was based on what the
defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what they actually did or failed to do on the
date in question, and not on the occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon"
(CA Decision, p. 25, Rollo). And as found by the CA, which We have already reiterated above,
petitioner was in fact negligent. In a like manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of the several
wires cannot stand the logical conclusion reached by the CA when it held that "(t)he nature of
the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no other conclusion than
that they were 'burns', and there was nothing else in the street where the victim was wading thru
which could cause a burn except the dangling live wire of defendant company" (supra).
"When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to
discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that when
Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early morning of June
29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to
the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office
(vide, CA Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary
diligence under the circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of petitioner. To
aggravate matters, the CA found:
. . .even before June 28 the people in Laoag were already alerted about the impending
typhoon, through radio announcements. Even the fire department of the city announced
the coming of the big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN, March 13, 1975) At the INELCO
 irregularities in the flow of electric current were noted because "amperes of the switch volts
were moving". And yet, despite these danger signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan
to request that defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was done. Asked why the delay,
Loreto Abijero answered that he "was not the machine tender of the electric plant to switch
off the current." (pp. 467-468, Ibid.) How very characteristic of gross inefficiency! (CA
Decision, p. 26, Rollo)
From the preceding, We find that the CA did not abuse its discretion in reversing the trial court's
findings but tediously considered the factual circumstances at hand pursuant to its power to
review questions of fact raised from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, formerly the Court
of First Instance (see sec. 9, BP 129).
In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in private
respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and
P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory damages, computed in accordance
with the formula set in the Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as
average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees;
and costs of suit. Except for the award of P12,000 as compensation for the victim's death, We
affirm the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's fees. Pusuant to recent
jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA 196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We
increase the said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages to
P48,229.45.
The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the lower court was properly
made by the respondent CA, the charge of malice and bad faith on the part of respondents in
instituting his case being a mere product of wishful thinking and speculation. Award of damages
and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith; there should be no
penalty on the right to litigate (Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results from a person's
exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110).
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent, except for the slight modification that
actual damages be increased to P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104408 June 21, 1993
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
AND NENITA CUSTODIA, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
This appeal calls for a review of the legal validity and sufficiency of petitioner's invocation of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees as its defense against liability resulting
from a vehicular collision. With the facility by which such a defense can be contrived and our
country having reputedly the highest traffic accident rate in its geographical region, it is indeed
high time for us to once again address this matter which poses not only a litigation issue for the
courts but affects the very safety of our streets.
The facts of the case at bar are recounted for us by respondent court, thus —
At about six o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1979, plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio
boarded as a paying passenger a public utility jeepney with plate No. D7 305 PUJ Pilipinas
1979, then driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant Victorino
Lamayo, bound for her work at Dynetics Incorporated located in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, where she then worked as a machine operator earning P16.25 a day. While the
passenger jeepney was travelling at (a) fast clip along DBP Avenue, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila another fast moving vehicle, a Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC, for short) bus
bearing plate no. 3Z 307 PUB (Philippines) "79 driven by defendant Godofredo C.
Leonardo was negotiating Honeydew Road, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila bound for its
terminal at Bicutan. As both vehicles approached the intersection of DBP Avenue and
Honeydew Road they failed to slow down and slacken their speed; neither did they blow
their horns to warn approaching vehicles. As a consequence, a collision between them
occurred, the passenger jeepney ramming the left side portion of the MMTC bus. The
collision impact caused plaintiff-appellant Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of
the passenger jeepney and (she) was thrown out therefrom, falling onto the pavement
unconscious with serious physical injuries. She was brought to the Medical City Hospital
where she regained consciousness only after one (1) week. Thereat, she was confined for
twenty-four (24) days, and as a consequence, she was unable to work for three and one
half months (31/2).1
A complaint for damages2 was filed by herein private respondent, who being then a minor was
assisted by her parents, against all of therein named defendants following their refusal to pay the
expenses incurred by the former as a result of the collision.
Said defendants denied all the material allegations in the complaint and pointed an accusing
finger at each other as being the party at fault. Further, herein petitioner Metro Manila Transit
Corporation (MMTC), a government-owned corporation and one of the defendants in the court a
quo, along with its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, contrarily averred in its answer with cross-claim
and counterclaim3 that the MMTC bus was driven in a prudent and careful manner by driver
Leonardo and that it was the passenger jeepney which was driven recklessly considering that it
hit the left middle portion of the MMTC bus, and that it was defendant Lamayo, the owner of the
jeepney and employer of driver Calebag, who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees and should thus be held solidarily liable for damages caused to the
MMTC bus through the fault and negligence of its employees.
Defendant Victorino Lamayo, for his part, alleged in his answer with cross-claim and
counterclaim4 that the damages suffered by therein plaintiff should be borne by defendants
MMTC and its driver, Godofredo Leonardo, because the latter's negligence was the sole and
proximate cause of the accident and that MMTC failed to exercise due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employees.
By order of the trial court, defendant Calebag was declared in default for failure to file an
answer.5 Thereafter, as no amicable settlement was reached during the pre-trial conference,6 trial
on the merits ensued with the opposing parties presenting their respective witnesses and
documentary evidence.
Herein private respondent Nenita Custodia, along with her parents, were presented as witnesses
for the prosecution. In addition, Dr. Edgardo del Mundo, the attending physician, testified on
the cause, nature and extent of the injuries she sustained as a result of the vehicular mishap.7 On
the other hand, defendant MMTC presented as witnesses Godofredo Leonardo, Christian
Bautista and Milagros Garbo. Defendant Lamayo, however, failed to present any witness.
Milagros Garbo testified that, as a training officer of MMTC, she was in charge of the selection of
the company's bus drivers, conducting for this purpose a series of training programs and
examinations. According to her, new applicants for job openings at MMTC are preliminarily
required to submit certain documents such as National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) clearance,
birth or residence certificate, ID pictures, certificate or diploma of highest educational attainment,
professional driver's license, and work experience certification. Re-entry applicants, aside from
the foregoing requirements, are additionally supposed to submit company clearance for
shortages and damages and revenue performance for the preceding year. Upon satisfactory
compliance with said requisites, applicants are recommended for and subjected to a Preliminary
interview, followed by a record check to find out whether they are included in the list of
undesirable employees given by other companies.
Thereafter, she continued, if an applicant is found to be acceptable, a final interview by the Chief
Supervisor is scheduled and followed by a training program which consists of seminars and
actual driving and Psycho-physical tests and X-ray examinations. The seminars, which last for a
total of eighteen (18) days, include familiarization with assigned routes, existing traffic rules and
regulations, Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG) seminar on defensive driving,
preventive maintenance, proper vehicle handling, interpersonal relationship ,and administrative
rules on discipline and on-the-job training. Upon completion of all the seminars and tests, a final
clearance is issued, an employment contract is executed and the driver is ready to report for
duty.8
MMTC's Transport Supervisor, Christian Bautista, testified that it was his duty to monitor the
daily operation of buses in the field, to countercheck the dispatcher on duty prior to the operation
of the buses in the morning and to see to it that the bus crew follow written guidelines of the
company, which include seeing to it that its employees are in proper uniform, briefed in traffic
rules and regulations before the start of duty, fit to drive and, in general, follow other rules and
regulations of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as of the company. 9
The reorganized trial court, in its decision of August 1, 1989, 10 found both drivers of the colliding
vehicles concurrently negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and regulations
and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an intersection. As joint
tortfeasors, both drivers, as well as defendant Lamayo, were held solidarily liable for damages
sustained by plaintiff Custodio. Defendant MMTC, on the bases of the evidence presented was,
however, absolved from liability for the accident on the ground that it was not only careful and
diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but was also strict and diligent in
supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms, briefed in
traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, and that it checked its employees to
determine whether or not they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and regulations
and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation and of the company.
The trial court accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
complaint against the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and ordering defendants Agudo
P. Calebag, Victorino Lamayo and Godofredo C. Leonardo to pay plaintiffs, jointly and
severally, the following:
a) the sum of P10,000.00 by way of medical expenses;
b) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of expenses of litigation;
c) the sum of P15,000.00 by way of moral damages;
d) the sum of P2,672.00 by way of loss of earnings;
e) the sum of P5,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
f) the sum of P6,000.00 by way of attorney's fees; and
g) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 11
Plaintiff's motion to have that portion of the trial court's decision absolving MMTC from liability
reconsidered 12having been denied for lack of merit, 13 an appeal was filed by her with
respondent appellate court. After consideration of the appropriate pleadings on appeal and
finding the appeal meritorious, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's decision by
holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants for the damages awarded by the trial
court because of their concurrent negligence, concluding that while there is no hard and fast rule
as to what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove that an employer has exercised the due
diligence required of it in the selection and supervision of its employees, based on the quantum
of evidence adduced the said appellate court was not disposed to say that MMTC had exercised
the diligence required of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver,
Godofredo Leonardo. 14
The Court of Appeals was resolute in its conclusion and denied the motions for reconsideration
of appellee Custodio and appellant MMTC in a resolution dated February 17, 1982, 15 thus
prompting MMTC to file the instant petition invoking the review powers of this Court over the
decision of the Court of Appeals, raising as issues for resolution whether or not (1) the
documentary evidence to support the positive testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista are
still necessary; (2) the testimonies of witnesses Garbo and Bautista may still be disturbed on
appeal; and (3) the evidence presented during the trial with respect to the proof of due diligence
of petitioner MMTC in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly driver
Leonardo, is sufficient.
Prefatorily, private respondent questions the timeliness of the filing of the petition at bar in view
of the procedural stricture that the timely perfection of an appeal is both a mandatory and
jurisdictional requirement. This is a legitimate concern on the part of private respondent and
presents an opportune occasion to once again clarify this point as there appears to be some
confusion in the application of the rules and interpretative rulings regarding the computation of
reglementary periods at this stage of the proceedings.
The records of this case reveal that the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, dated October
31, 1991, was received by MMTC on November 18, 1991 16 and it seasonably filed a motion for
the reconsideration thereof on November 28, 1991. 17 Said motion for reconsideration was denied
by respondent court in its resolution dated February 17, 1992, which in turn was received by
MMTC on March 9, 1992. 18 Therefore, it had, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
fifteen (15) days therefrom or up to March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, for review
on certiorari. Anticipating, however, that it may not be able to file said petition before the lapse
of the reglementary period therefor, MMTC filed a motion on March 19, 1992 for an extension of
thirty (30) days to file the present petition, with proof of service of copies thereof to respondent
court and the adverse parties. The Court granted said motion, with the extended period to be
counted from the expiration of the reglementary period. 19Consequently, private respondent had
thirty (30) days from March 24, 1992 within which to file its petition, or up to April 23, 1992, and
the eventual filing of said petition on April 14, 1992 was well within the period granted by the
Court.
We digress to reiterate, in view of erroneous submissions that we continue to receive, that in the
case of a petition for review on certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals,
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which has long since been clarified in Lacsamana vs. The
Hon. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., 20 allows the same to be
filed "within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time to the corresponding docket fee."
In other words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the period of fifteen
(15) days begins to run all over again from notice of the denial resolution. Otherwise put, if a
motion for reconsideration is filed, the reglementary period within which to appeal the decision
of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court is reckoned from the date the party who intends
to appeal received the order denying the motion for reconsideration. 21Furthermore, a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review may be filed with this Court within said
reglementary period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee.
1. The first two issues raised by petitioner shall be correlatively discussed in view of their
interrelation.
In its present petition, MMTC insists that the oral testimonies of its employees were presented as
witnesses in its behalf sufficiently prove, even without the presentation documentary evidence,
that driver Leonardo had complied with all the hiring and clearance requirements and had
undergone all trainings, tests and examinations preparatory to actual employment, and that said
positive testimonies spell out the rigid procedure for screening of job applicants and the
supervision of its employees in the field. It underscored the fact that it had indeed complied with
the measure of diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees as enunciated in Campo,
et al. vs. Camarote, et al. 22 requiring an employer, in the exercise of the diligence of a good father
of a family, to carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, experience
and record service, and not merely be satisfied with the possession of a professional driver's
license.
It goes on to say since the testimonies of these witnesses were allegedly neither discredited nor
impeached by the adverse party, they should be believed and not arbitrarily disregarded or
rejected nor disturbed on appeal. It assiduously argues that inasmuch as there is no law requiring
that facts alleged by petitioner be established by documentary evidence, the probative force and
weight of their testimonies should not be discredited, with the further note that the lower court
having passed upon the relevancy of the oral testimonies and considered the same as unrebutted,
its consideration should no longer be disturbed on appeal. 23
Private respondent, on the other hand, retorts that the factual findings of respondent court are
conclusive upon the High Court which cannot be burdened with the task of analyzing and
weighing the evidence all over again. 24
At this juncture, it suffices to note that factual findings of the trial court may be reversed by the
Court of Appeals, which is vested by law with the power to review both legal and factual issues,
if on the evidence of record, it appears that the trial court may have been mistaken 25 particularly
in the appreciation of evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals. 26 The
general rule laid down in a plethora of cases is that such findings of fact by the Court of Appeals
are conclusive upon and beyond the power of review of the Supreme Court. 27 However, it is
now well-settled that while the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great
respect, and even finality at times, that rule is not inflexible and is subject to well established
exceptions, to wit: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well
as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents and (10) when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 28
When as in this case, the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contrary to each
other, this court may scrutinize the evidence on record, 29 in order to arrive at a correct finding
based thereon. 30
A perusal of the same shows that since there is no dispute as to the finding of concurrent
negligence on the part of the defendant Calebag, the driver of the passenger jeepney, and co-
defendant Leonardo, the bus driver of petitioner MMTC, both of whom were solidarily held
liable with defendant Lamayo, the owner of the jeepney, we are spared the necessity of
determining the sufficiency of evidence establishing the fact of negligence. 31 The contrariety is
in the findings of the two lower courts, and which is the subject of this present controversy, with
regard to the liability of MMTC as employer of one the erring drivers.
The trial court, in absolving MMTC from liability ruled that —
On the question as to whether defendant MMTC was successful in proving its defense that
indeed it had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of defendant Leonardo, this Court finds that based on the evidence presented
during the trial, defendant MMTC was able to prove that it was not only careful and
diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings but also strict (and) diligent
in supervising its employees by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms,
briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, checked employees to
determine whether they were positive for alcohol and followed other rules and regulations
and guidelines of the Bureau of Land Transportation as well as its company. Having
successfully proven such defense, defendant MMTC therefore, cannot be held liable for
the accident.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court now, holds that defendant MMTC be totally
absolved from liability and that the complaint against it be dismissed. . . . 32
whereas respondent court was of the opinion that —
It is surprising though that witness Milagros Garbo did not testify nor present any
evidence that defendant-appellee's driver, defendant Godofredo Leonardo has complied
with or has undergone all clearances and trainings she referred to. The clearances, result
of seminars and tests which Godofredo Leonardo submitted and complied with, if any,
were not presented in court despite the fact that they are obviously in the possession and
control of defendant-appellee. Instead, it resorted to generalities. The Court has ruled that
due diligence in (the) selection and supervision of employee(s) are not proved by mere
testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company requirements
before one is admitted as an employee but without proof thereof. . . .
On the part of Christian Bautista, the transport supervisor of defendant-appellee, he
testified that it is his duty to monitor the operation of buses in the field; to countercheck
the dispatchers' duty prior to the operation of the buses in the morning; to see to it that bus
crew follows written guidelines of the company (t.s.n., April 29, 1988, pp. 4-5), but when
asked to present in court the alleged written guidelines of the company he merely stated
that he brought with him a "wrong document" and defendant-appellee's counsel asked for
reservation to present such written guidelines in the next hearing but the same was (sic)
never presented in court. 33
A thorough and scrupulous review of the records of this case reveals that the conclusion of
respondent Court of Appeals is more firmly grounded on jurisprudence and amply supported
by the evidence of record than that of the court below.
It is procedurally required for each party in a case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the
degree of evidence required by law. 34 In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in
order to support his claim is preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party
which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on
the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case. Corollarily, defendant must likewise prove
own allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable. 35
In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable
judgment. 36 It is entirely within each of the parties discretion, consonant with the theory of the
case it or he seeks to advance and subject to such procedural strategy followed thereby, to present
all available evidence at its or his disposal in the manner which may be deemed necessary and
beneficial to prove its or his position, provided only that the same shall measure up to the
quantum of evidence required by law. In making proof in its or his case, it is paramount that the
best and most complete evidence be formally entered. 37
Coming now to the case at bar, while there is no rule which requires that testimonial evidence,
to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence, or even subject evidence for that
matter, inasmuch as the witnesses' testimonies dwelt on mere generalities, we cannot consider
the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was observance of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees. 38 Petitioner's attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris
familias in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was
unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate
the apparent biased nature of the testimony. 39
Our view that the evidence for petitioner MMTC falls short of the required evidentiary quantum
as would convincingly and undoubtedly prove its observance of the diligence of a good father of
a family has its precursor in the underlying rationale pronounced in the earlier case of Central
Taxicab Corp. vs. Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Co., et al., 40 set amidst an almost identical
factual setting, where we held that:
. . . . This witness spoke of an "affidavit of experience" which a driver-applicant must
accomplish before he is employed by the company, a written "time schedule" for each bus,
and a record of the inspections and thorough checks pertaining to each bus before it leaves
the car barn; yet no attempt was ever made to present in evidence any of these documents,
despite the fact that they were obviously in the possession and control of the defendant
company.
xxx xxx xxx
Albert also testified that he kept records of the preliminary and final tests given him as
well as a record of the qualifications and experience of each of the drivers of the company.
It is rather strange, therefore, that he failed to produce in court the all important record of
Roberto, the driver involved in this case.
The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any "record" or other
documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding
the calls therefor by both the trial court and the opposing counsel, argues strongly against
its pretensions.
We are fully aware that there is no hard-and-fast rule on the quantum of evidence needed
to prove due observance of all the diligence of a good father of a family as would constitute
a valid defense to the legal presumption of negligence on the part of an employer or master
whose employee has by his negligence, caused damage to another. . . . (R)educing the
testimony of Albert to its proper proportions, we do not have enough trustworthy
evidence left to go by. We are of the considered opinion, therefore, that the believable
evidence on the degree of care and diligence that has been exercised in the selection and
supervision of Roberto Leon y Salazar, is not legally sufficient to overcome the
presumption of negligence against the defendant company.
Whether or not the diligence of a good father of a family has been observed by petitioner is a
matter of proof which under the circumstances in the case at bar has not been clearly established.
It is not felt by the Court that there is enough evidence on record as would overturn the
presumption of negligence, and for failure to submit all evidence within its control, assuming the
putative existence thereof, petitioner MMTC must suffer the consequences of its own inaction
and indifference.
2. In any event, we do not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to
prove the diligence of a good father of a family, which for an employer doctrinally translates into
its observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees but which
mandate, to use an oft-quoted phrase, is more often honored in the breach than in the observance.
Petitioner attempted to essay in detail the company's procedure for screening job applicants and
supervising its employees in the field, through the testimonies of Milagros Garbo, as its training
officer, and Christian Bautista, as its transport supervisor, both of whom naturally and
expectedly testified for MMTC. It then concluded with its sweeping pontifications that "thus,
there is no doubt that considering the nature of the business of petitioner, it would not let any
applicant-drivers to be (sic) admitted without undergoing the rigid selection and training process
with the end (in) view of protecting the public in general and its passengers in particular; . . .
thus, there is no doubt that applicant had fully complied with the said requirements otherwise
Garbo should not have allowed him to undertake the next set of requirements . . . and the training
conducted consisting of seminars and actual driving tests were satisfactory otherwise he should
have not been allowed to drive the subject vehicle. 41
These statements strike us as both presumptuous and in the nature of petitio principii, couched in
generalities and shorn of any supporting evidence to boost their verity. As earlier observed,
respondent court could not but express surprise, and thereby its incredulity, that witness Garbo
neither testified nor presented any evidence that driver Leonardo had complied with or had
undergone all the clearances and trainings she took pains to recite and enumerate. The supposed
clearances, results of seminars and tests which Leonardo allegedly submitted and complied with
were never presented in court despite the fact that, if true, then they were obviously in the
possession and control of petitioner. 42
The case at bar is clearly within the coverage of Article 2176 and 2177, in relation to Article 2180,
of the Civil Code provisions on quasi-delicts as all the elements thereof are present, to wit: (1)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (2) fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person
for whose act he must respond, and (3) the connection of cause and effect between fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by plaintiff. 43 It is to be noted that
petitioner was originally sued as employer of driver Leonardo under Article 2180, the pertinent
parts of which provides that:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
 Employers shall be liable for damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The basis of the employer's vicarious liability has been explained under this ratiocination:
The responsibility imposed by this article arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible under the article, derived from
their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent
them from causing damage. Negligence is imputed to them by law, unless they prove the
contrary. Thus, the last paragraph of the article says that such responsibility ceases if is
proved that the persons who might be held responsible under it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family (diligentissimi patris familias) to prevent damage. It is clear,
therefore, that it is not representation, nor interest, nor even the necessity of having
somebody else answer for the damages caused by the persons devoid of personality, but
it is the non-performance of certain duties of precaution and prudence imposed upon the
persons who become responsible by civil bond uniting the actor to them, which forms the
foundation of such responsibility. 44
The above rule is, of course, applicable only where there is an employer-employee relationship,
although it is not necessary that the employer be engaged in business or industry. Whether or
not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts
committed by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks. But, it is necessary first to
establish the employment relationship. Once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort
complained of was committed. It is only then that the defendant, as employer, may find it
necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees. 45 The diligence of a good father of a family required to be observed by employers to
prevent damages under Article 2180 refers to due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees in order to protect the public. 46
With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an
employer-employee relation between him and his co-defendant MMTC in this instance, the case
in undoubtedly based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180 47 When the employee causes damage
due to his own negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the juris
tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, 48 rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family. For failure to rebut such legal presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, the employer is likewise responsible
for damages, 49 the basis of the liability being the relationship of pater familias or on the employer's
own negligence. 50
As early as the case of Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 51 and thereafter, we have consistently held that
where the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the colliding vehicles, the
drivers and owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily, directly and solidarily liable for
damages and it is immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and the other on culpa
contractual, as the solidarily of the obligation is justified by the very nature thereof. 52
It should be borne in mind that the legal obligation of employers to observe due diligence in the
selection and supervision of employees is not to be considered as an empty play of words or a
mere formalism, as appears to be the fashion of the times, since the non-observance thereof
actually becomes the basis of their vicarious liability under Article 2180.
On the matter of selection of employees, Campo vs. Camarote, supra, lays down this admonition:
. . . . In order tat the owner of a vehicle may be considered as having exercised all diligence
of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of
a professional driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for
employment as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service. These steps
appellant failed to observe; he has therefore, failed to exercise all due diligence required of
a good father of a family in the choice or selection of driver.
Due diligence in the supervision of employees, on the other hand, includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper
instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has
relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures
upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. 53 To this, we add that actual
implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant
concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on
their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise
to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving
that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision
of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies,
without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "(t)he mere
formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its
employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring
driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were
followed." 54 Paying lip-service to these injunctions or merely going through the motions of
compliance therewith will warrant stern sanctions from the Court.
These obligations, imposed by the law and public policy in the interests and for the safety of the
commuting public, herein petitioner failed to perform. Respondent court was definitely correct
in ruling that ". . . due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee (is) not proved by
mere testimonies to the effect that its applicant has complied with all the company requirements
before one is admitted as an employee but without proof thereof." 55 It is further a distressing
commentary on petitioner that it is a government-owned public utility, maintained by public
funds, and organized for the public welfare.
The Court it is necessary to once again stress the following rationale behind these all-important
statutory and jurisprudential mandates, for it has been observed that despite its pronouncement
in Kapalaran Bus Line vs. Coronado, et al., supra, there has been little improvement in the transport
situation in the country:
In requiring the highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the recklessness of
their drivers. While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence
are, of course, the passengers and owners of the cargo carried by a common carrier, they
are not the only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if common carriers carefully
observe the statutory standard of extraordinary diligence in respect of their own
passengers, they cannot help but simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the owners and
passengers of other vehicles who are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our
roads and highways. The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of
people (whether passengers or not) and the destruction of property (whether freight or
not) on our highways by buses, the very size and power of which seem often to inflame
the minds of their drivers. . . .
Finally, we believe that respondent court acted in the exercise of sound discretion when it
affirmed the trial court's award, without requiring the payment of interest thereon as an item of
damages just because of delay in the determination thereof, especially since private respondent
did not specifically pray therefor in her complaint. Article 2211 of the Civil Code provides that
in quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may be awarded in the discretion of the court,
and not as a matter of right. We do not perceive that there have been international dilatory
maneuvers or any special circumstances which would justify that additional award and,
consequently, we find no reason to disturb said ruling.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-83524 October 13, 1989
ERNESTO KRAMER, JR. and MARIA KRAMER, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and TRANS-ASIA SHIPPING LINES, INC., respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue in this Petition for Review is whether or not a Complaint for damages
instituted by the petitioners against the private respondent arising from a marine collision is
barred by the statute of limitations.
The record of the case discloses that in the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a
fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its
way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat
figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private
respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea
sank, taking with it its fish catch.
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board
of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the
purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision.
On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the
M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made by the Board served as the basis
of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982
wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his
profession as a marine officer.1
On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent before Branch 117 of the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City.2 The suit was docketed
as Civil Case No. 2907-P.
The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
prescription. He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, 3 the prescriptive period for
instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four
years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years
from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime
collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted
beyond the four-year prescriptive period.
For their part, the petitioners contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and
characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of
the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the
running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their
cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the
negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year
prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date.
The petitioners concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint was filed on May 30, 1985, the same
was seasonably filed.
In an Order dated September 25, 1986,4 the trial court denied the Motion filed by the private
respondent. The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime
collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and that
the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules
and Regulations, which took effect on January 1, 1975 by virtue of Letter of Instruction No. 208
issued on August 12, 1974 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, precisely to answer the need.
The trial court went on to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of
the Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the
crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. The pertinent portions of the
Order of the trial court are as follows —
Considering that the action concerns an incident involving a collision at sea of two vehicles
and to determine negligence for that incident there is an absolute need to rely on highly
technical aspects attendant to such collisions. It is obviously to answer such a need that the
Marine Board of Inquiry (Sic) was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine
Rules and Regulations which became effective January 1, 1975 under Letter of Instruction(s)
No. 208 dated August 12, 1974. The relevant section of that law (Art. XVI/b/ provided as
follow(s):
1. Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) — Shall have the jurisdiction to investigate marine
accidents or casualties relative to the liability of shipowners and officers, exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate cases/complaints against the marine officers; and to review all
proceedings or investigation conducted by the Special Boards of Marine Inquiry.
2. Special Board of Marine Inquiry. — Shall have original jurisdiction to investigate marine
casualties and disasters which occur or are committed within the limits of the Coast Guard
District concerned or those referred by the Commandant.
The Court finds reason in the argument of the plaintiff that marine incidents have those
'peculiarities which only persons of special skill, training and exposure can rightfully decipher
and resolve on the matter of the negligence and liabilities of parties involved and inasmuch
as the report of the Board of Inquiry (sic) admittedly came out only on April 29, 1982, the
prescriptive period provided x x x under Art. 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only
from that date. The complaint was filed with this Court on May 10, 1985, hence the statute of
limitations can not constitute a bar to the filing of this case.5
The private respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, alleging therein that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Complaint filed by the petitioners. The case was assigned to
the Second Division of the appellate court and was docketed as Case No. CA-G.R. SP No. 12032.6
In a Decision dated November 27, 1987,7 and clarified in a Resolution dated January 12, 1988,8 the
Court of Appeals granted the Petition filed by the private respondent and ordered the trial court
to dismiss the Complaint. The pertinent portions of the Decision of the appellate court are as
follows —
It is clear that the cause of action of private respondent (the herein petitioners Ernesto Kramer,
Jr. and Marta Kramer) accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because that is the precise
time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the aggrieved party and from
which relief from the court is presently sought. Private respondents should have immediately
instituted a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said
marine incident because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the
collision. For this reason, he (sic) could cite the negligence on the part of the personnel of the
petitioner to exercise due care and lack of (sic) diligence to prevent the collision that resulted
in the total loss of their x x x boat.
We can only extend scant consideration to respondent judge's reasoning that in view of the
nature of the marine collision that allegedly involves highly technical aspects, the running of
the prescriptive period should only commence from the finality of the investigation
conducted by the Marine Board of Inquiry (sic) and the decision of the Commandant,
Philippine Coast Guard, who has original jurisdiction over the mishap. For one, while it is
true that the findings and recommendation of the Board and the decision of the Commandant
may be helpful to the court in ascertaining which of the parties are at fault, still the former
(court) is not bound by said findings and decision. Indeed, the same findings and decision
could be entirely or partially admitted, modified, amended, or disregarded by the court
according to its lights and judicial discretion. For another, if the accrual of a cause of action
will be made to depend on the action to be taken by certain government agencies, then
necessarily, the tolling of the prescriptive period would hinge upon the discretion of such
agencies. Said alternative it is easy to foresee would be fraught with hazards. Their
investigations might be delayed and lag and then witnesses in the meantime might not be
available or disappear, or certain documents may no longer be available or might be mislaid.
... 9
The petitioners filed a Motion for the reconsideration of the said Decision but the same was
denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated May 27, 1988. 10
Hence, the instant Petition wherein the arguments raised by the petitioner before the trial court
are reiterated.11 In addition thereto, the petitioner contends that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals 12 The private respondent filed its Comment on the Petition seeking therein the dismissal
of the same.13 It is also contended by the private respondent that the ruling of the Court in
Vasquez is not applicable to the case at bar because the said case involves a maritime collision
attributable to a fortuitous event. In a subsequent pleading, the private respondent argues that
the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations cannot have the effect of repealing the
provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of actions.14
On September 19,1988, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition. 15 After the parties
filed their respective memoranda, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a
quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day
the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia,16 this Court ruled that in an action for
damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being based on a quasi-delict, the
four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision.
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 17 this Court held as follows-
The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements,
namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when
the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen
... .
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last
element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative
of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the
four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved
party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry,
that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an
action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the
collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault
of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the action of petitioner has prescribed. The
collision occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for damages was filed iii court only on May
30, 1 985, was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and
NESTOR S. FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR.,
CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S. FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S.
FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children LINDA, ROMEO, ANTONIO JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL
MARTINEZ and TOMAS MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children JOSE, ESTELA, JULITA SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children EDNA, GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her
minor children EDITHA, ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO,
JR. all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor
children JOSE, LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed
ISLA, petitioners, vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE,
Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
dated December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba,
Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the
mine. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection
of the lives of its men working underground. Portion of the complaint reads:
xxx xxx xxx
 9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28,1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and
reckless negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions
for the due protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter
violation of the laws and the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government
pursuant thereto, allowed great amount of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area
at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped through and saturated the 600 ft. column of
broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous pressure on the working spaces at
its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, with
the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure, approximately
500,000 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface boulders,
blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)
minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials,
machines and equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its
tunnels of all its men above referred to, including those named in the next preceding
paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs herein;
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on
the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within
the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7
hereinabove, were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a
great many of them were still alive, entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued
due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its
bounden legal and moral duties in the premises;
xxx xxx xxx
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above
referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed
completely to provide its men working underground the necessary security for the protection
of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had vast financial resources, it having made,
during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after
taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966,
and with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of December 31, 1966;
xxx xxx xxx
(pp. 42-44, rec.)
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said
motion to dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, particularly:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
(b) Art. 1173—The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad
faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27,
1968 dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said
order, respondent Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27,
1968 and allowed Philex to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the
aforesaid order which was opposed by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled
that in accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation
Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-
connected deaths or injuries of workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the
employer was negligent, adding that if the employer's negligence results in work-connected
deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the compensation fixed in the Act.
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS- PETITIONERS'
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION
BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR
COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
A voluntarily paid the compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the
cause of action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages,
particularly Articles 2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the
part of Philex in failing to take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its
employees working underground. They also assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to
dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their complaint including those contained in the
annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and
the claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out
that workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury,
disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to
the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which
petitioners pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton
negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively
under the provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.—The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives,
dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws
because of said injury ...
SEC. 46. Jurisdiction.— The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, ...
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all
claims of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of
employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the
exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A
of the Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the
requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex
in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are
entitled to a greater amount of damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo
Angara, now President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate
counsel and Assistant General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and
Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared
as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is:
Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death
under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say,
whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation
provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection
or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral
and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of
his other employees or whether they may avail cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the
limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for
damages in the regular courts.
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee
or worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of
negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes
otherwise. He submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or
accident is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while
Atty. Bacungan's position is that the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee
in case of his death have a right of choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in the regular court under the Civil Code for higher
damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same
as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect the remedy provided for under the
Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy provided for under the Civil
Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the
resolution of September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid
petitioners are connected, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case,
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the
total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not
invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation
thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died from
accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges
gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its
workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees
working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action
is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the
provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres
vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100).
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual
relationship. The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad
faith on the part of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for
damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or
bad faith, read:
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in
good faith is able shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach
of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at
the time the obligation was constituted.
In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as
assessed by the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from
that in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of
compensation distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being
made as compensation and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the
harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer
is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act
is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits
for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated,
even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil.
689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion
of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his
person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered.
While under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased
or injured employee that the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the
employer has the burden to prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs.
WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that
unlike in the Civil Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of
the heirs to claim limited compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00)
pesos plus burial expenses of two hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred
(Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only
50% if the complaint alleges failure on the part of the employer to "install and maintain safety
appliances or to take other precautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease"
(Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that
which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act and which cannot be granted by
the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of
his employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil
Code, the liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's
Compensation Act was specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It
is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an
accident causing his death or ailment or injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC,
54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death
have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code
for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue
in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against
the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
In Pacaña WE said:
In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third- party tortfeasors
in the regular courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that
the injured worker has the choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously and thus balanced the relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's
Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.
As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against
the respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation
Commission) was being processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance.
It is argued for petitioner that as the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much
more extensive than the amounts that may be awarded under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, they should not be deemed incompatible. As already indicated, the injured laborer was
initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for
higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the first
course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal
connection between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to
establish the extent of the damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish
satisfactorily. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation
Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section 6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin
Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater
than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the excess accrues to the latter.
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-
party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been
dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by
Philex and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May
14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra,
Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and
claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of
them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided
that they be paid in installments (pp. 106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein
petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in
the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen's
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to
investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex,
and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then Executive Secretary Rafael
Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.).
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may
be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant
case. The Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice
then secured by Section 5 of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and
now by Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Article 11 of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178,
1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the
people should be the concern of the State (Art. II).
Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors,
and shall regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital
in industry and in agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people "... regulate the use ... and disposition of private property and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services
in, the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee the
enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution);
"... afford protection to labor, ... and regulate the relations between workers and employers ..., and assure
the rights of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973 Constitution,
emphasis supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article
11 of the 1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New
Labor Code, thus:
Art. 3. Declaration of basic policy.—The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
(emphasis supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the
New Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the
New Labor Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R.A.
No. 772 on June 20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded
by the aforestated provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on
August 30, 1950, which obey the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do
the rights of the workers as against their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to
diminish the rights of the workers and therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the
Constitution and the liberal provisions of the New Civil Code.
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973
Constitution are statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr.
Justice Robert Jackson in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with
characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections
(319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L.ed. 1638, emphasis supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the
New Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the
workers and employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides
that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including
its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all
labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living
of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said
injury (emphasis supplied).
Employers contracting laborecsrs in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may
stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively
to injuries received outside the Islands through accidents happening in and during the
performance of the duties of the employment; and all service contracts made in the manner
prescribed in this section shall be presumed to include such agreement.
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation.- The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an
employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said
injury.
Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall
stipulate with such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries
received outside the Island through accidents happening in and during the performance of
the duties of the employment. Such stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to
the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Law of the place where the accident occurs,
should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by section 5 of Republic Act No.
772).
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable
provisions of the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability.- Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the
employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages
on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title
shall bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred eighty- six, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred Sixty-four, as
amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System during the period
of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely (emphasis supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the
Revised Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No.
610, as amended, R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered
by the System (referring to the GSIS or SSS).
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as aforequoted, Article 173 of the New
Labor Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions
heretofore quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from
negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable
under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor
Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or
the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part
of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera ruled:
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment
of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry
into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute
itself (Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The aforequoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it
was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in
favor of the deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said
Section 5 was not accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of
Pacana vs. Cebu Autobus Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a
choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's
Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for greater
damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. Said Pacana case penned
by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil Code as against the Workmen's
Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs. Manila Yacht Club (28
SCRA 724, June 30,1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), both
penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacana case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even
refer, neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same
interpretation adopted in the cases of Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the
doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice guarantees
enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American
Federal Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently,
the restrictive nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot
limit the range and compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of
the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article
II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer.
The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve
the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or
failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the
dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his
heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent
loss to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore
encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal
obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker.
Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-
making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the
implementing legislation aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are
retrogressive; because they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith
enunciated in 1776 in his treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964),
which has been discarded soon after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution
that generated the machines and other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton
gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are
dangerous to life, limb and health. The old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-
live is now superdesed by the benign Christian shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those
who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's selfish affirmation that he is not his
brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our brother's keeper. No man is an
island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the 1837 case of Prisley vs.
Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent, The Prisley case was decided in 1837
during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless, unfeeling
capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine.
The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the
lowly worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs
man of his inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE
only have to restate the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the
servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant
than he may reasonably be expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked
the American Civil War which generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on
American plains and valleys from 1861 to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law
killeth; its spirit giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge
or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in
certain instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in
the gaps in the law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and
therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may apply Nor has the human mind
the infinite capacity to anticipate all situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the
American Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to
legislate to supply the omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and
the statutes.
'Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but
denies that the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The
Federalist, Modern Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that
the court is even independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335
US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief
Justice Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department
to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison I Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief
Justice Hughes when he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is (Address on May
3, 1907, quoted by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by
Justice Cardozo who pronounced that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He
legislates only between gaps. He fills the open spaces in the law. " (The Nature of the Judicial
Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "The only limit to the judicial
legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1 Dissenting Opinion, p. 79),
which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert Jackson. In the rhetoric
of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert pages of the
Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury
caused by the nature of the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly
termed no fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article
173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by
his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety devices required by the law for
the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173,
the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee whose death, ailment
or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently furnished all the
safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr.
Justice Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word
was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88;
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the
conservatism of judges has threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. ...
Precedents established in those items exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound,
Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although
with a cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially they are confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs.
Jensen, 244 US 204 1917). And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188,
210-212, 72 L.ed. 845, 852- 853), Justice Holmes pronounced:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.
Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from
one extreme to the other. x x x. When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more
obvious that they must be received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is
to legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of
policy shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words
we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever
so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but
grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the
courts of such law-making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They
include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David
Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said
Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-
between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of
the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and application of
the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or oppression or that such judicial
legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers
or the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among
them is the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright
(372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial
investigation his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even
as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These
rights are not found in the American Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical
of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of Identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was
developed by American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double
jeopardy (see Justice Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial
decisions have been re-stated in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly
second offense is the same as the first offense if the second offense is an attempt to commit the vest in the Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative
first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense. enactment or executive act.

The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also
developed by judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs.
Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537)
as securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case
of Brown vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause
means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites-equal
facilities in the same school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A
GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS,
THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

De-segregation, not segregation, is now the governing principle.

Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar
(46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to
working women-according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs.
Pomar is no longer the rule.

As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice
Holmes had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due
process to protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man.
The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally
in 1936 in the case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the
American Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed
minimum wage for women and minors, working hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and
maternity leave for women employees.

The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on
political questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial
decisions (Marbury vs. Madison, supra Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer
vs. Government, 277 US 210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).

It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate
concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political
question as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and
Philippine Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the
principle of separation of powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous
cases in Philippine jurisprudence applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political
questions and invoking American precedents.