Al-BayĀn – Journal of Qur ʾ Ān and

ḤadĪth Studies 13 (2015) 145-167

brill.com/jqhs

The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox: Challenges to

Qurʾanic Hermeneutics

Abdulla Galadari
Masdar Institute of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates,
Al-Maktoum College of Higher Education, Dundee, Scotland
aigaladari@gmail.com

Abstract

Ijtihād has been extremely important throughout Islamic history and seen as such by
many Muslim scholars, both Sunni and Shiʿi, in early, medieval, and contemporary
Islam. However, the phenomenon of ijtihad, in both traditional and contemporary
Islam, is restricted to a set of rules that were outlined by earlier mujtahids. This poses a
challenge in Qurʾanic hermeneutics as to whether contemporary mujtahids are per-
forming ijtihād or merely imitating (taqlīd) the method of ijtihād. The purpose of this
study is to investigate the following question: is ijtihād in the Qurʾanic Sciences today
merely an imitation (taqlīd) of ijtihād? The paper opens with defining imitation
(taqlīd) according to classical Muslim scholars, starting with the arguments that
accepts imitation in Islam and then compares it with various scholars’ stances on
ijtihād. The paper employs arguments from the Qurʾan, prophetic tradition (ḥadīth),
and acts of the Companions (ṣaḥābah) that are typically used by Muslim scholars to
argue in favor of ijtihād over imitation (taqlīd). It compares the stance of both Sunni
and Shiʿi scholars on the roles of both mujtahids and sources of jurisprudence (marājiʿ)
and muftīs. It shows that, in Qurʾanic Sciences, although the role of ijtihād is highly
recommended, it continues to be part of a larger paradox, in which ijtihād may only be
performed through a set of rules outlined by early scholars. This brings us to a paradox
that to be a mujtahid, one needs to imitate (taqlīd) rules outlined by earlier mujtahids,
which poses the challenging question on whether scholars today are truly performing
ijtihād, or simply taqlīd al-ijtihād.

Keywords

Qurʾan – imitation – ijtihād – exegesis – hermeneutics

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���5 | doi 10.1163/22321969-12340023

146 Galadari

1 Introduction

Modern Muslim scholars typically look at Western scholars of the Qurʾan with
suspicion, while Western scholars of the Qurʾan tend to be skeptical about the
traditional ideas surrounding the sources and interpretation of the Qurʾan.
While Muslim scholars tend to interpret the Qurʾan through a set system of
criteria as outlined by the Qurʾanic sciences, Western scholars remove them-
selves from the chains of a specific methodology for the interpretation of the
Qurʾan and are instead more open to all kinds of methods. In other words,
Western scholars attempt to perform ijtihād using their own methods that
Muslims would find unconventional. The question is, what is conventional
and what is unconventional when it comes to Qurʾanic hermeneutics? Are
Muslims attempting to carry out ijtihād in their interpretations of the Qurʾan
or are they simply imitating the method of ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād) that was
outlined by previous scholars (mujtahidīn) who provided the bases of the
Qurʾanic sciences? In this paper, ijtihād is not restricted to the definition of
extracting rulings from the Qurʾan (takhrij), but a more general method of
Qurʾanic interpretation.
Many scholars of Qurʾanic Studies, such as Angelika Neuwirth, use
Muḥammad’s biographies (sīra) in an attempt to interpret the Qurʾan, a method
that classical exegetes followed.1 Gabriel Reynolds convincingly suggests that
the sīra is just exegesis in disguise, a later extrapolation through storytelling,
an attempt to contextualize the Qurʾan and provide it with meaning,2 and sug-
gests that it is more appropriate to understand the Qurʾan through Biblical
literature.3 John Wansbrough revolutionized Qurʾanic studies by releasing it
from the shackles of historical contexts as presented by Muḥammad’s biogra-
phies or related by classical exegetes (mufassirūn).4 Taken together, this does
not necessarily say that post-Qurʾanic literature does not contain facts, but
that we should not take them for granted in every detail, as they may con-
tain more opinions than facts. Notably, classical exegetes (mufassirūn) such

1  See Angelika Neuwirth, “Qurʾan and History – A Disputed Relationship: Some Reflections on
Qurʾanic History and History in the Qurʾan,” Journal of Qurʾanic Studies 5 (2003): 1-18. Also see
Angelika Neuwirth, “Structure and the Emergence of Community,” in Andrew Rippin (ed.),
The Blackwell Companion to the Qurʾan (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 140-58.
2  Gabriel S. Reynolds, The Qurʾān and Its Biblical Subtext, (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011),
17-19.
3  Reynolds, The Qurʾān and Its Biblical Subtext, 36.
4  John Wansbrough, Qurʾanic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2004).

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 147

as al-Ṭabari (d. 923), al-Rāzī (d. 1209), and Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373), among many
others, gave various possible meanings and background stories for many parts
of the Qurʾan, suggesting that these narratives were more opinions than solid
facts of the actual meaning of any specific Qurʾanic passages.
The field of Qurʾanic studies has seen various theories on the authorship
of the Qurʾan. Some scholars attempt to make historical assumptions about
possible Jewish or Christian influences on the authorship of the Qurʾan,
while neglecting the literary analysis of the Qurʾanic discourse in its attempt
to interpret the Bible. Undoubtedly, Abraham Geiger (d. 1874) revolutionized
Islamic studies by showing how Muḥammad, who according to Geiger was a
pious religious man, borrowed much from Judaism to shape the community
of his believers.5 This not only started a new movement in the field of Islamic
Studies, but also a movement that viewed Muḥammad’s borrowing from other
sources. William St. Clair Tisdall (d. 1928) considered pagan myths as possible
sources for Muḥammad, who, he believed, borrowed their stories.6 Charles
Torrey, in The Jewish Foundation of Islam, tried to highlight the borrowings
that Muḥammad had made from the Jews.7 These are but a few examples of
the borrowing movement. However, the Qurʾan is not a mere borrowing from
other sources that was etched together to make a book that becomes a cen-
tral point of the making of a nation; instead the Qurʾan’s authorship seems far
more sophisticated than a simple borrowings as the text appears to be fully
engaging with the religions and faiths that surrounded it. In many ways, the
Qurʾan is actually attempting to interpret the Bible, as it so declares itself when
it states, “Verily this Qurʾan does explain to the Children of Israel most of the
matters in which they disagree” (Qurʾan 27:76). The Qurʾan is thus part of the
reception to the Bible, demonstrated by the fact that this verse makes a direct
claim that the book is fully engaging with the faith that is surrounding it, i.e.
Christianity.

2 Imitating (Taqlīd) Ijtihād

I will suggest that although the Qurʾanic Sciences have been studied for many
centuries, a different approach to Qurʾanic exegesis is necessary, although I am

5  Abraham Geiger, Judaism and Islam: A Prize Essay (London: Forgotten Books, 2012).
6  William Tisdall, The Original Sources of the Qurʾan: Its Origin in Pagan Legends and Mythology
(Alev Books, 2014).
7  Charles C. Torrey, The Jewish Foundation of Islam (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1967).

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148 Galadari

not at all suggesting that the current methods currently utilized by Qurʾanic
Sciences are incorrect.
The Qurʾan has been studied in detail from the beginnings of Islam until
the modern day. There are various perspectives in the study of the Qurʾan,
which have been developed through the lenses of multiple traditions. A
whole array of studies, known as Qurʾanic Sciences, has been developed and
employed throughout the history of Islam in an attempt to provide a system-
atic methodology of interpretation. Early Christian polemicists often argued
that there were Jewish or Christian sources to the Qurʾan.8 Orientalists have
studied the Qurʾan in an attempt to gain a scholarly understanding of its ori-
gins from and roots in Judeo-Christian traditions. Within Qurʾanic Sciences
developed by early scholars, there developed a systematic set of methodolo-
gies for understanding the Qurʾan through a process known as ijtihād, which is
an umbrella term that encompasses Islamic Studies more widely, and not only
Qurʾanic Sciences.9
According to traditional Islamic Studies, a scholar (mujtahid) needs to
be qualified to perform Qurʾanic interpretation and to extract rulings from
it. A mujtahid needs to be competent in understanding the Arabic vocabu-
lary, terminology, literature, and philology in order to distinguish the differ-
ent morphologies of the same word (al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir), circumstances
of Qurʾanic revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), abrogating (nāsikh) and abrogated
(mansūkh) verses, general (ʿām) and specific (khāṣ) verses, comprehensive
(mujmal) and explicit (mubayyan) verses, along with clear (muḥkam) and
vague (mutashābih) verses. Besides the Qurʾanic Sciences, an exegete also
needs to possess sufficient knowledge of prophetic tradition or the sciences
of ḥadīth (ʿilm al-ḥadīth), including understanding the chains of narration
(isnād) and content (matn). A mujtahid also needs to have adequate knowl-
edge of various sources based on consensus (ijmāʿ), particularization (takhṣīṣ),
and restriction (taqyīd) of legal rulings, and proper methods of extracting rul-
ings from the evidence (takhrīj). It should be obvious that becoming a mujta-
hid is not an easy endeavor, and perhaps that is the reason it is called a struggle
(ijtihād). Even in Twelver Shiʿi Uṣūlī thought, to be a mujtahid a person must

8  Such as the Apology of al-Kindī. The work shows two pseudonymous individuals, ʿAbdul-
Masīḥ ibn Isḥāq al-Kindī, a Christian polemic exchanging letters with ʿAbdullah ibn Ismaʿīl
al-Hāshimī. Al-Hāshimī invites al-Kindī to become a Muslim, while the latter invites the for-
mer to become a Christian.
9  Ijtihād is the endeavor of a Muslim scholar to derive rules, theology, exegesis, etc.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 149

possess knowledge of Qurʾan, ḥadīth, Arabic language and grammar, logic, the-
ology, and rational reasoning.10
In this paper, I attempt to construct a different perspective of Qurʾanic exe-
gesis. I argue that although the majority of Muslim scholars, past and present,
favour ijtihād over imitation (taqlīd), there is unfortunately a paradox that is
created. If to perform ijtihād one needs to adhere to certain rules that were
developed by previous scholars, then are we actually performing ijtihad, or are
we merely imitating the method of ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād)? This argument is
the premise for introducing different methodologies for Qurʾanic interpreta-
tion, while not necessarily refuting the current established methods.
I argue that although the methods of Qurʾanic exegesis seem to be com-
prehensive and exhaustive, they are not necessarily Qurʾanic. By this, I mean
that the Qurʾan does not necessarily state that there are certain qualifications
required for people to understand it. It does, on the other hand, relate that
God teaches the Qurʾan (e.g. Qurʾan 55:2) and that the Arabic language is cen-
tral to the Qurʾan (e.g. Qurʾan 12:2, 13:37, 16:103, 20:113, 26:195, 39:28, 41:3, 41:44,
42:7, 43:3, 46:12). Linguistics, philology, and semantics are the major points that
seem to be sanctioned by the Qurʾan itself as keys to its own understanding. As
such, I emphasize understanding semantics and the nature of polysemy in the
Arabic language to further interpret the Qurʾan, without necessarily resorting
to other methods of exegesis, such as the circumstances of revelation (asbāb
al-nuzūl) or exegesis based on the reports of early companions or later indi-
viduals, known as tafsīr bi-l-ma‌ʾthūr. I am in no way suggesting, however, that
other methods of Qurʾanic exegesis are unfounded, as if one needs to study
Islamic history, then a historical understanding of the Qurʾan, such as the cir-
cumstances of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), internal chronology, and transmis-
sion history would be imperative.

2.1 The Case against Imitation

My argument is based on the notion of imitating ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād).
Interpretation comes in various forms, and there are many challenges when try-
ing to interpret the Qurʾan or understand the reasons that rituals or laws of the
Sharīʿa are prescribed as they are. Much of jurisprudence and interpretation,
whether in religious or even secular contexts, is based on imitation (taqlīd),
which in secular jurisprudence may be considered the role of precedent in legal

10  Al-Samāhijī (d. 1723), Munyat al-Mumārisīn, cited in Andrew J. Newman, “The Nature of
the Akhbārī Uṣūlī Dispute in Late Ṣafavid Iran. Part 1: ʿAbdallah al-Samāhijī’s ‘Munyat
al-Mumārisīn’,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 55 (1992), 27 and 33.

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150 Galadari

decisions.11 One of the arguments in favor of imitation is the prophetic tradi-

tion (ḥadīth) on the ritualistic method of prayers, in which, when asked how
to pray, Muḥammad told his companions, “Pray as you have seen me praying.”12
The basis of following the footsteps of Muḥammad’s sunna (tradition) is imita-
tion. However, I interpret this prophetic tradition differently, and do not regard
it as the basis of imitation. On the contrary, because it appears Muḥammad
did not want people to adhere to a specific set of rituals, he left the method
of prayer open. If the methodology of the prayer rituals were very important,
Muḥammad would have outlined how it is supposed to be done when he was
asked. Since he kept it open, this implies that Muḥammad meant the intention
of prayer is more important than the actual set of rituals. This is similar to how,
when Muḥammad was asked about the rituals of the Ḥajj, he was very open
about it and allowed variations, where people were not instructed to strictly
follow the method of rituals.13 Nonetheless, early Muslims attempted to pro-
tect themselves from religious innovation (bidʿa), which is frowned upon.
Ibn Waḍḍāḥ (d. 900) was one of the early Muslim scholars who wrote a book
against innovations in favor of following prophetic tradition and precedence
based on the traditions of those who followed Muḥammad.14 Islamic scholars
and jurists have subsequently used the method of precedence or imitation as a
means of protecting Islam against innovation.15
Nonetheless, this has to be taken in the full context of Islam. Islam started
its mission against Arab idolaters, who believed and did what they did because
they were imitating their forefathers. Their system was also based on prece-
dence. This shown many times in the Qurʾan, to not only highlight the men-
tality of the pre-Islamic Arabs, but also all the people to whom God had sent
messengers (e.g. Qurʾan 2:170, 5:104, 21:53, 26:74, 43:22-23). Such an argument

11  For more on the role of precedent in secular law, see D.N. MacCormick and R.S. Summers
(eds.). Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing
Co, 1997). See also R. Lupu, “Sources of Law – Judicial Precedent,” Contemporary Readings
in Law and Social Justice 5 (2013): 375-81 and J.J. Eisenhower, “Four Theories of Precedent
and Its Role in Judicial Decisions,” Temple Law Review 61 (1988): 871-78.
12  Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, ed. Muḥammad al-Nāṣir (Riyadh: Dār Ṭawq al-Najāh, 2002), 1: 128 (#631).
13  Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 2: 173 (#1721), 2: 173 (#1722), 2: 173 (#1723), 2: 175 (#1734), 2: 175 (#1735), 8:
135 (#6666).
14  Ibn Waḍḍāḥ (d. 900), al-Bidaʿ wa-l-nahy ʿanha, ed. ʿAmro ʿAbdul-Munʿim Salim (Cairo:
Maktabat Ibn Taymiyyah, 1996).
15  Ṭ.J. al-ʿAlwānī, “Taqlid and the Stagnation of the Muslim Mind,” The American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences 8 (1991): 513-24.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 151

against imitation is also used by Manṣūr al-Bahūti (d. 1641), where he states
that at some points the Qurʾan forbids imitation.16
Al-Bāqillāni (d. 1013) argues that the imitation of one scholar by another is
not allowed.17 He gives as an example the case of the first two caliphs, Abu Bakr
and ʿUmar; neither imitated the other, but both resorted to ijtihād.18 However,
it seems evident from the opinions of early scholars that among this group
ijtihād is important, while the general masses are to imitate those scholars. Ibn
Ḥazm (d. 1064) cites al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 820) opposition to imitation, considering
it forbidden by early scholars of Islam. Al-Baghdādī (d. 1071) does not permit
taqlīd in the sources (uṣūl), but allows it in the branches ( furūʿ), as he says that
it is not reasonable for a person to be fully knowledgeable in the branches of
religion ( furūʿ al-dīn).19 The general consensus of both Sunni and Shiʿi jurists
is that a layperson who is imitating (muqallid) a jurist must be knowledgeable
in the fundamentals of belief (uṣūl al-dīn).20 Imām al-Ḥaramayn, al-Juwayni
(d. 1085), defined the imitator as someone who simply imitates without hav-
ing knowledge of the evidence behind it. Such type of imitation is, he states,
not permissible.21 He also reports that taqlīd in branches of religion ( furūʿ
al-dīn) depends on whether or not the scholar is imitating someone who is
more knowledgeable than he himself is,22 and reports that al-Shāfiʿī did not
allow one scholar to imitate (taqlīd) another.23 Abu al-Muẓaffar al-Samʿānī
(d. 1096) also agrees with al-Juwayni’s understanding of the impermissibility
of imitation.24
Moving along the same lines of Imām al-Shāfiʿī and prominent Shāfiʿī schol-
ars, al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) also did not permit one scholar to imitate another.25

16  Manṣūr al-Bahūti (d. 1641) Kashshāf al-qināʿ ʿan matn al-iqnāʿ, ed. M.A. al-Ḍinnāwī,
(Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyyah, n.d.), 6: 306-7.
17  Al-Bāqillāni (d. 1013), Tamhīd al-awāʾil fī Takhlīṣ al-Dalāʾil, ed. I.A. Ḥaydar, (Beirut:
Muʾassassat al-kutub al-thaqāfiyya, 1987), 515-6.
18  Ibid.
19  Al-Baghdādī (d. 1071), Al-Faqīh wa-l-mutafaqqih, ed. A. al-Gharāzī, (Dammam: Dār Ibn
al-Jawzī lil-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ, 2001), 2: 131.
20  L. Clarke, “The Shīʿī Construction of Taqlīd,” Journal of Islamic Studies 12 (2001), 40-64.
21  Al-Juwayni (d. 1085), al-Ijtihād – from Kitāb al-talkhīṣ, ed. A. Abu Zanīd (Damascus: Dār
al-qalam, 1988), 95-105. Also see the main book, al-Juwayni, Kitāb al-talkhīṣ fī uṣūl al-fiqh,
ed. A.J. al-Nibāli and B.A. al-ʿAmri (Beirut: Dār al-bashāʾir al-Islāmiyyah), 3: 424-56.
22  Ibid., 105-21.
23  Ibid., 108
24  Abu al-Muẓaffar al-Samʿāni (d. 1096), Qawāṭiʿ al-adillah fi-l-uṣūl, ed. M.H. al-Shafiʿi (Beirut:
Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyyah, 1999), 2: 340-5.
25  Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), al-Mustaṣfa (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyyah, 1993), 368-72.

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152 Galadari

He allows imitation for the general public, as long as the things imitated are
dependent on the verifiable evidence of a scholar (mujtahid), an approach
similar to al-Juwayni’s.26 According to al-Ghazālī, any member of the general
population who does not have the knowledge to perform ijtihād is permitted to
imitate a scholar, as long as the matter being imitated (tuqallad) includes evi-
dence and argument based on the opinions of Imām al-Shāfiʿī and his school’s
scholars.27 Many scholars have argued such a\\gainst imitation in Islamic
jurisprudence. Al-Ghazālī had the concept of not believing in something just
because of what others do or say, which is known as imitation, in favor of a
logical rationale known as ʿaql.28 He even specifically argues against the imita-
tion of parents and teachers in his al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl.29 In al-Mankhūl,
al-Ghazālī states that knowledge from narrations (samʿiyyāt) is the final kind
of knowledge, and equated it with imitation.30
Al-Rāzī agrees with al-Juwayni’s arguments against imitation (taqlīd).31 Ibn
Qudāma al-Maqdisi (d. 1223), in his refutation of philosophers, stated that the
general public is not expected to perform ijtihād, but is instead expected to imi-
tate the scholars.32 In one of his arguments, he suggests that imitation (taqlīd)
is sanctioned by the Qurʾan: “. . . ask the people of the remembrance, if you
know not” (Qurʾan 16:43, 21:7).33 This Qurʾanic passage is prominent among
traditional and contemporary scholars who also argue the same.34 However,
there is a paradox while using this verse to affirm imitation (taqlīd) of scholars.
In its context, this verse is describing the people of remembrance (ahl al-dhikr)

26  Ibid., 372-3.

27  ʿAbdul-Salām ibn Taymiyya (d. 1254) (first author), ʿAbdul-Ḥalīm ibn Taymiyya (d. 1283)
(added to it), and Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) (completed it), al-Muswaddah fī uṣūl al-
fiqh, ed. M.M. Abdul-Ḥamīd (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabi), 458-60.
28  Q. Maḥmūd, Madhhab al-Ghazālī fi-l-ʿaql wa-l-Taqlīd: Muḥāḍarah ʿāmma (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat
Mkhaymer, 1967).
29  Al-Ghazālī, al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl wa-l-mūṣil ila dhil-ʿizzati wa-l-jalāl, ed. A. Maḥmūd,
(Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-ḥadīthah, n.d.), 110.
30  Al-Ghazālī, al-mankhūl min taʿlīqāt al-uṣūl, ed. M.Ḥ. Hītu (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-muʿāṣir,
1998), 105.
31  Al-Rāzī (d. 1209), al-Maḥṣūl, ed. Ṭ. al-ʿAlwāni (Damascus: Muʾassassat al-risala, 1997), 6: 84.
32  Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī (d. 1223), Taḥrīm al-naẓar fī kutub al-kalām, ed. ʿAbdulrahmān
Dimashqiyya (Riyadh: ʿĀlim al-kitāb, 1990), 49.
33  Ibid. See also Ibn Qudāmh al-Maqdisī, Rawḍat al-nāẓir wa jannat al-munāẓir fī uṣūl al-fiqh
ʿala madhhab al-Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (Beirut: Muʾassassat al-rayyān lil-ṭibāʿah wa-l-
nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ, 2002), 2: 383.
34  Al-Rāzī (d. 1209) discusses the use of this verse by those debating the permissibility
of a scholar imitating another scholar; see al-Rāzī. Mafātīḥ al-ghayb (Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ
al-turāth al-ʿarabī, 2000) (Qurʾān 16:43), 20: 210.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 153

as a reference to the People of the Book.35 I doubt that Muslim scholars would
therefore infer from this verse that they are to imitate (taqlīd) the People of the
Book, although the context refers to them. If the apparent interpretation of
this verse does not suggest the imitation of anyone, I wonder why it continues
to be used to suggest Muslim scholars should be imitated.
A movement against imitation is not a contemporary issue within Islam.
In the past, conservative Islamic scholars, such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and
Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350), argued against imitation, considering it to be unau-
thorized and harmful.36 Like Ibn Ḥazm and al-Ghazālī, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭi
(d. 1505) also cites al-Shāfiʿī’s stance against imitation.
Although Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdulwahhāb (d. 1792), founder of the Salafi
movement, preferred ijtihād to imitation, he still allowed those who cannot
otherwise perform ijtihād themselves to resort to imitation, as long as there is a
mujtahid available.37 He is, nonetheless, adamant that imitation is not at all pref-
erable, and not permissible for those who can do ijtihād. However, from a Salafi

35  Al-Ṭabari (d. 923), Jāmiʿ al-bayān fī ta‌ʾwīl al-Qurʾān, ed. Aḥmad Shākir (Damascus:
Muʾassassat al-risāla, 2000), (Qurʾān 16:43), 17: 206-7; al-Zamakhshari (d. 1144), al-Kashshāf
ʿan ḥaqāʾiq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl (Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabi, 1987), 2: 607-8; al-Qurṭubi
(d. 1273), al-Jāmiʿ li-Aḥkām al-Qurʾān (Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1964), 10: 108. Ibn
Kathīr (d. 1373) suggests the possibility that al-dhikr could be interpreted as People of the
Book, as suggest by Ibn ʿAbbās (d. 687), or interpreted as people of the Qurʾan. It must be
noted that Ibn Kathīr is somewhat biased against using Israelite traditions (isrāʾīliyyāt) in
his exegetical works, and perhaps as such attempts to reduce the importance of under-
standing this verse as a reference to the People of the Book; see Ibn Kathir, Tafsīr al-Qurʾān
al-ʿaẓīm, ed. M.H. Shams-ul-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1999), 4: 492. Ibn Kathīr
also implies that Abu Ja‌ʾfar (Imām al-Bāqir, the fifth Imam of Shiʿi Islam) suggested that
the household of the Prophet (ahl al-Bayt) are the ahl al-dhikr. This is also related by the
Shiʿi Qurʾanic exegete al-Ṭabarsi (d. 1153), in Majmaʿ al-bayān li-ʿulūm al-Qurʾān (Beirut:
Muʾassassat al-aʿlami lil-maṭbūʿāt, 1995), 6: 158-9. Another Shiʿi discussion in which ahl
al-dhikr is taken to be a reference to ahl al-Bayt, as claimed by Imām al-Bāqir, is found in
Nāṣir Makārim al-Shīrāzī, al-Amthal fī tafsīr kitāb Allāh al-munazzal (Madrasat al-Imām
Amīr al-Muʾminīn), 8: 199-201.
36  S.W. Akhtar, “The Islamic Concept of Knowledge,” al-Tawhid 12/3 (1991), (online: http://
www.al-islam.org/printpdf/book/export/html/22999, accessed 24 Sept. 2015).
37  Muḥammad ibn ʿAbdulwahhāb (d. 1792), Uṣūl al-Īmān, ed. B. al-Jawābreh (Riyadh:
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, 2000), 139. He states that ijtihād is a conditional obligation
( farḍ kifāyah); as long some are doing ijtihād then the remaining public, who cannot
learn and verify for themselves, do not need to. This concept is also similar to that stated
by Abu al-Ḥasan al-Māwardi (d. 1058) in his commentary to Imām al-Shāfiʿī in al-Ḥāwī
al-kabīr fī fiqh madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī, ed. A.M. Muʿawwaḍ and A.A. ʿAbdul-Mawjūd
(Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1999), 1: 20.

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154 Galadari

point of view, there is greater tendency to limit the scholarly process (ijtihād)
and reason (ʿaql) in favor of adherence to the text and transmitted tradition
(naql) or, in other words, imitation.38 Although Ibn Taymiyya and Muḥammad
ibn ʿAbdulwahhāb both favored ijtihād over taqlīd, in Salafi ideology the doors
of ijtihād remain open only to jurists who meet demanding requirements.39
Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-ʿUthaymīn (d. 2001),40 a prominent recent Saudi scholar,
conceptualized the qualifications he believed a scholar must possess. In his
idea, the qualifications for a mujtahid must include Qurʾanic sciences (ʿulūm
al-Qurʾan) and knowledge of prophetic tradition or ʿilm al-ḥadīth. Al-Atawneh
argues that this qualification in today’s Salafi’s ideology differs from that por-
trayed by Ibn Taymiyya, who encouraged ijtihād of the laymen.41 Al-Shawkāni
(d. 1834), a strong opponent of imitation, also narrates earlier scholars’ stance
on imitation, showing that the majority have preferred ijtihād.42
During the reformation period of Islamic thought in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries there was a resurgence of many Islamic scholars calling
for the abandonment of imitation. This ideology was heavily influenced by
Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī’s (d. 1897) reformation.43 Abu Zayd gives examples
of the reformation process that took place during that period,44 stating that
the ideology of Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1905), who was himself a student of
al-Afghānī, inspired the publication of the journal al-Manār, along with other
reformist journals, such as al-Imām and al-Munīr, which emphasized the need
to reinterpret the Qurʾan and sunna and purify it from the taint of imitation.45

38  M. al-Atawneh, “Wahhābī Legal Theory as Reflected in Modern Official Saudi Fatwās:
Ijtihād, Taqlīd, Sources, and Methodologies,” Islamic Law and Society 18 (2011): 327-55.
39  W. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” International Journal of Middle East Studies 16
(1984): 3-41.
40  Muḥammad S. al-ʿUthaymīn, al-Uṣūl min ʿilm al-uṣūl. (Cairo: al-Maktaba al-Islāmiyya,
2001), 97-104.
41  Al-Atawneh, “Wahhābī Legal Theory”.
42  Al-Shawkāni (d. 1834), Irshād al-fuḥūl ila taḥqīq al-ḥaqq min ʿilm al-uṣūl, ed. A. ʿInāyah
(Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabi, 1999), 2: 243-6; al-Shawkāni, al-Qawl al-mufīd fī adillat
al-ijtihād wa-l-taqlīd, ed. A. ʿAbdul-Khāliq (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1976); al-Shawkāni,
Al-sayl al-jirār al-mutadaffiq ʿala hadāʾiq al-azhār (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, n.d.).
43  C.J. Christie, Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-75 (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001),
11-12.
44  Naṣr Abu Zayd. Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis. (Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press, 2006), 41-2.
45  A. Al-ʿAjlān. Ḥarakat al-tajdīd wa-l-iṣlāḥ fī Najd fi-l-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīth (Riyadh: unknown pub-
lisher, 1989), 173.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 155

In the early stages of Shīʿī jurisprudence, there was significant emphasis

placed on imitation over ijtihād for the simple reason that the Imāms were
interpreting Islamic law for the laypeople, and there were no notions of muj-
tahids, as the Imāms are considered infallible and the source of all jurispru-
dence. However, for Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence, this had to be changed during
the occultation period of the Twelfth Imām, as there was no source of jurispru-
dence to make recourse to beyond the jurists (ʿulamāʾ). As such, Twelver Shīʿī
jurisprudence had to evolve in the same way that Sunnī jurisprudence did after
the death of Muḥammad. In nineteenth century Iran, the Shīʿī community
witnessed the transformation of an institution known as marjaʿiyyat al-taqlīd,
where the mujtahid is considered the deputy of the Imām, and the laypeople
would imitate them.46 Although taqlīd existed early in Shīʿī jurisprudence, in
that people were imitating Muḥammad or the Imāms, it became further sys-
tematically institutionalized in nineteenth century Iran as laypeople became
imitators (muqallidīn) of jurists.
Although Uṣūlī Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence emphasizes the use of logical
rationale (ʿaql) and encourages ijtihād over imitation, it still is common to per-
mit the imitation of scholars (mujtahidīn) in the various branches of religion.
In Twelver Shīʿī Uṣūlī principles, a jurist who is socially renowned by his peers
and allowed to have followers becomes what is known as a source of jurispru-
dence (marjiʿ) and his followers would imitate (taqlīd) that form of it.
Akhbārī Twelver Shīʿī jurisprudence, on the other hand, as promulgated
by Muḥammad Amīn al-Astarābādī (d. 1627), denounces ijtihād. To Akhbārīs,
the gates of ijtihad were closed by the occultation of the Twelfth Imām. They
purely use the Qurʾan and ḥadīth for jurisprudence, and avoid all kinds of ratio-
nalistic reasoning. This idea is taken so far that even the Qurʾan is not always
considered a source of jurisprudence unless passages from it were interpreted
by the Imāms, as Akhbārīs only consider the Imāms to have the authority to
interpret the Qurʾan.47 As Uṣūlīs divide people between mujtahid and muqallid
(imitator), Akhbārīs consider everyone a muqallid of the Imāms and so no one
may claim to be a mujtahid or the deputy of the Imām.48 To Akhbārīs, a mujta-
hid follows conjecture, which may certainly be fallible, while a muqallid of the

46  For more information on the history of the institution of marjaʿiyyat al-taqlīd and wilāyat
al-faqīh see A.K. Moussavi, “The Establishment of the Position of Marjaʿiyyat-i Taqlid in
the Twelver-Shiʿi Community,” Iranian Studies 18 (1985), 35-51.
47  Al-Samāhijī, Munyat al-mumārisīn, cited in Newman, “The Nature of the Akhbārī Uṣūlī
Dispute”, 25 and 29.
48  Ibid., 26.

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156 Galadari

Imāms would find a more assured ruling that does not follow any ­conjecture.49
Although there might be similarities between Akhbārīs and Salafism, they do
differ on the issue of ijtihād, as Salafis do not denounce it, as has been shown.
Nonetheless, even in Uṣūlī jurisprudence, where a greater weight is laid on
rational reasoning (ʿaql), the concept of taqlīd of the mujtahids by laypeople
is emphasized.
Reda makes various arguments in favor of imitation, as it allows for more
consistency in society.50 He states that the role of jurists is important, espe-
cially in interpreting scriptures. He then argues that everyone needs to be a
jurist (mujtahid), but since this is not realistic, the jurists are doing the job of
an unwilling majority in society, who would prefer to imitate those who they
believe are more specialized in jurisprudence. Although jurists are fallible, fol-
lowers would still find that the likelihood of jurists’ errors is far less than the
likelihood of their own potential errors. Therefore, it is more probable that they
will be right if they simply imitate a jurist (marjiʿ). Interestingly, Reda looks at
it from an economic point of view, wherein there are many jurists engaged in a
popularity contest in order to collect tithes, known as sahm al-imām or khums,
from their followers. This raises the question of whether they are providing the
best religious interpretation or they are interpreting to appease the majority in
order to gain more followers, and therefore, more popularity and tithe collec-
tions? This is a case that Floor has reported in the practice of jurists during the
Persian Qajar era.51
Khomeini (d. 1989) wrote at length on the topic of ijtihād, where he goes
into detail of when imitation taqlīd is permissible and when it is not, as well as
including his opinions on the qualifications required by a scholar.52 It is appar-
ent from both Sunnī and Shīʿī discourses on the matter that the preference is
always on ijtihād over taqlīd, or interpretation over imitation, while a scholar is
not himself allowed to be an imitator.53 Also, in both schools of jurisprudence,
although ijtihād is preferred, it is not without specific qualifications.

49  Ibid., 25.

50  A. Reda, “The Economics of Religious Interpretation: The System of Taqlid,” Canadian
Social Science 7 (2001): 30-47.
51  W. Floor, “The Economic Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period,” in The Most Learned of
the Shiʿa: the Institution of the Marjaʿ Taqlid, ed. Linda S. Walbridge (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001).
52  Khomeini (d. 1989). Al-ijtihād wa-l-taqlīd, (Maṭbaʿat muʾassassat al-ʿurūj, 1998). For more
Shīʿī discourses on the matter, see M.S. al-Ḥakīm al-Ṭabṭabāʾī, Miṣbāḥ al-Minhāj (Qom:
al-Maṭbaʿa jawīd, 1994).
53  Many Sunnī sources had been referenced earlier. For some Shīʿī sources beyond those
already mentioned, see al-Ḥillī (d. 1325), Taḥrīr al-aḥkām al-sharʿiyya ʿala madhhab

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 157

Imitation is also a standard that many jurists use as a criterion for the law
and its interpretation.54 Although using an unconventional method, al-ʿAlwani
has firmly campaigned against the method of imitation in Islam in an attempt
to show that although it was initially used to protect Islam from innovation
(bidʿa), its method and technique is arguably in itself an innovation (bidʿa).55
In al-Ṭabari’s commentary on the Qurʾan for the verse, “And they have taken
their teachers of the law and priests as their lords . . .” (Qurʾan 9:31), he pres-
ents a case in which Muḥammad argues with a Christian convert to Islam,
ʿAdī ibn Ḥātim, about what it means to say that the Jews and Christians wor-
ship their teachers of the law and their priests. ʿAdī argues the following with
Muḥammad.

“Oh Messenger of Allah, we do not actually worship them.” The Prophet

replied, “Do they not make things unlawful what Allah had made lawful,
and you obey them and do they not make things lawful that Allah had
made unlawful and you obey them?” He said, “Yes.” So the Prophet
responded, “This is worshipping them.”56

From the above prophetic tradition (ḥadīth), it seems that Muḥammad is neg-
atively describing jurists or teachers of the law and the people who follow their
way. Followers of teachers of the law and priests may be presented today in
the Islamic context as those who follow jurists, muftīs, or marājiʿ, in which all
such cases are shown to be followers in the same manner as they were within
Judaism or Christianity, as they followed their rabbis or priests. Therefore,
the spirit of this verse may apply as much to Muslims and their acceptance
of some scholars’ verdicts as it does to the other religious traditions that this
verse criticizes, although this cannot be generalized, as the Qurʾan also some-
times attempts to not generalize its arguments against the Jews and Christians
(e.g. Qurʾan 3:113-5).
In recent years, there have been several Muslim scholars who have attempted
to reform Islamic thought by scrutinizing the Islamic method of interpretation

al-imāmiyya, ed. I. al-Bahādri (Qom: Iʿtimād, 2000), 1: 188; al-ʿĀmlī (d. 1811), Miftāḥ
al-karāma, ed. M.B. al-Khāliṣī (Qom: Muʾassassat al-nashr al-islāmī, 1999), 5: 368-83; and
al-Muẓaffar, ʿAqāʾid al-imāmiyya (Qom: Markaz al-abḥāth al-ʿaqāʾidiyyah), 14-19.
54  M. Fletcher, “Ibn Tūmart’s Teachers: The Relationship with al-Ghazālī,” al-Qantara 18
(1997), 305-30.
55  T.J. al-ʿAlwani, “Taqlid and the Stagnation of the Muslim Mind,” The American Journal of
Islamic Social Sciences 8 (1991), 513-24.
56  Al-Ṭabari, Jāmiʿ, (Qurʾan 9:31) (my translation), 14: 209-11.

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158 Galadari

and jurisprudence based on imitation. An example of that is Fazlur Rahman

(d. 1988), a Pakistani-American Muslim scholar, whom Saeed has cited as hav-
ing criticized the interpretation of the Qurʾan, especially from a theological
perspective.57 Fazlur Rahman has adamantly opposed the principles of taqlīd
in Islamic thought, advocating that the gates of ijtihād should remain open.58
Early scholars and jurists, both Sunnī and Shīʿī, have emphasized the roles of
reason (ʿaql) and scholarship (ijtihād) over imitation (taqlīd). But we remain at
the crossroads of what ijtihād is and how it can be produced. Does it depend on
methodologies set by previous scholars? If so, is it considered ijtihād or taqlīd?

2.2 The “Imitation of Ijtihād” Paradox

A paradox exists in Muslim thought on the methods of ijtihād and taqlīd.
Although Muslim scholars, both Sunnī and Shīʿī, predominantly value ijtihād
and ʿaql over taqlīd, there is one major problem. The methodology of ijtihād
is restricted to certain criteria that were built on the works of earlier scholars.
In other words, there exists today what would be called imitation of ijtihād,
meaning that people are imitating the methodology put forth for ijtihād by ear-
lier scholars. The purpose becomes somewhat self-defeating in this paradoxi-
cal loop. For example, al-Ṭabari produced an excellent work on the exegesis of
the Qurʾan. As part of his method of exegesis, he used the method of circum-
stances of or reasons for revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl), which today is consid-
ered a major part of Qurʾanic exegesis. Nonetheless, al-Ṭabari was a historian
who also wrote a comprehensive book called the History of Prophets and Kings
(Ta⁠ʾrīkh al-rusul wal-mulūk), also known as the History According to al-Ṭabari
(Ta⁠ʾrīkh al-Ṭabari). Since he was an expert in history, it was natural for him, in
his commentary on the Qurʾan, to use a historical methodology for its inter-
pretation, i.e. identifying the circumstances of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl).
However, this method of interpretation cannot be seen as absolutely necessary
for a scholar to understand and interpret the Qurʾan. Otherwise, someone who
engages in it cannot be called a mujtahid, but merely an imitator (muqallid) of
the method of ijtihād.

57  A. Fazlur Rahman Saeed, “A Framework for Interpreting the Ethico-legal Content of the
Qurʾan,” in Modern Muslim Intellectuals and the Qurʾan, ed. Suha Taji-Farouki (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), 37-66.
58  Fazlur Rahman. Islamic Methodology in History (Karachi: Central Institute of Islamic
Research, 1965), 149.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 159

3 Interpretation according to the Qurʾan

In order to perform some sort of “ijtihād,” it is important to understand what

methods of exegesis have been qualified by scholars and what methods are
actually sanctioned by the Qurʾan itself. I argue in this paper that the Qurʾan
only sanctions two methods of Qurʾanic exegesis. The first is that God is the one
who teaches the meanings of the Qurʾan; the second is a linguistic approach.
For centuries, the Qurʾan was studied to understand its meanings. Many
schools of Qurʾanic exegesis have developed throughout history, ranging from
literal to symbolic interpretations, from exoteric to esoteric, and from legal-
istic to metaphorical.59 However, some of these methods are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. For example, a literal interpretation of the Qurʾan does not
necessarily mean that it disregards symbolism. This is because, looking at it
from a linguistic perspective, language holds meanings. The words themselves
are symbols, from which we derive meaning; they are not themselves the reali-
ties. For example, the word “apple” is just a symbol of what an apple actually
is. Language is a symbolic form of communication. Therefore, even if a literal
interpretation of the words is employed, since words are themselves symbols,
they can only be understood symbolically. The Aristotelian understanding of
language is defined as “spoken words are the symbols of mental experience
and written words are the symbols of spoken words.”60 As such, Aristotle
(d. 322 BCE) thus implies an arbitrariness in the relationship between the lin-
guistic symbol and the mental image formed by it; in Nature of the Linguistic
Sign, Saussure states that a linguistic sign does not truly give a relationship
between a thing and its name, but between a concept and its acoustic image.61
Identifying a word (symbol) with a specific meaning is not usually an easy
task. In linguistics, a word in isolation usually has no specific meaning unless
it is used within a definite context.62 However, in lexical semantics, words are
defined independent of their context. The purpose of lexicons and dictionar-
ies is to identify all the meanings that a word can be defined by regardless of its

59  For more information on various schools of Qurʾanic exegesis, see Hussein Abdul-Raof,
Schools of Qurʾanic Exegesis: Genesis and Development (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010).
See also Hussein Abdul-Raof, Theological Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis (Abingdon, UK:
Routledge, 2012).
60  From J. Derrida, “Linguistics and Grammatology,” SubStance 4 (1974): 130.
61  S. Weber, “Saussure and the Apparition of Language: The Critical Perspective,” MLN 91
(1976): 919.
62  M. Stubbs, Words and Phrases: Corpus Studies of Lexical Semantics (Oxford: Blackwell,
2001), 10.

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160 Galadari

context. However, even when having a specific context, this does not imply that
a word cannot have multiple meanings within that context. These concepts of
understanding how to derive meaning from language and lexical semantics are
important when analyzing any piece of literature, including the Qurʾan.

3.1 Qurʾanic Exegesis

As stated earlier, according to some Islamic religious scholars there are certain
qualifications that a scholar needs to possess in order to be considered capable
of exegesis.63 The qualifications required by scholars, both traditional and con-
temporary, may seem intriguingly excessive, and they do not necessarily have
a basis in the Qurʾan. According to the Qurʾan, there are two main criteria to
understand the Qurʾan, and only one of them is tangible. The first criterion
is that it is God who teaches the Qurʾan (e.g. Qurʾan 55:1-2), and this criterion
is not necessarily very tangible. The second criterion, that is repeated several
times in the Qurʾan, is that it is through a full understanding of its Arabic lan-
guage (e.g. Qurʾan 12:2, 13:37, 16:103, 20:113, 26:195, 39:28, 41:3, 41:44, 42:7, 43:3,
46:12); to give just one example, the Qurʾan states “we have sent it down as an
Arabic Qurʾan, in order that you may understand” (Qurʾan 12:2).
Many early methods of interpretation are heavily influenced by ḥadīth,
whether referring to the sayings of Muḥammad, his companions, or other early
individuals whom the author of the commentary deemed to have some knowl-
edge of Qurʾanic meanings. Most traditional commentaries of the Qurʾan
employ historical accounts of the circumstances of or reasons for revelation
(asbāb al-nuzūl) as part of understanding the context of the verses. However,
that method restricts the Qurʾan to a historic event. Although traditional
commentators of the Qurʾan use history to understand the social and textual
context of the Qurʾan, they not consider the Qurʾan as a history book,64 but a
religious book with history.65
Al-Ṭabari was an early Qurʾanic exegete who used the circumstances of rev-
elation (asbāb al-nuzūl) as a method of Qurʾanic exegesis. Since he himself was
a historian, it was natural for him to view the Qurʾan through the lens of his-
tory. Some scholars, such as John Wansbrough, have argued that the Qurʾan is

63  Al-ʿUthaymīn, al-Uṣūl min ʿilm al-uṣūl, 97-104.

64  Abu Zahrah (d. 1974), Zahrat al-tafāsīr (Cairo: Dār al-fikr al-ʿArabī), 8: 4105-6, 9: 4491, 9:
4877; M.M. al-Ḥijāzi. al-Tafsīr al-wāḍiḥ (Beirut: Dār al-jīl al-jadīd, 1993), 2: 168, 2: 355, 2: 814.
65  M.M. al-Shaʿrāwi (d. 1998), al-Khawāṭir: Tafsīr al-shaʿrāwi (Cairo: Maṭābiʿ akhbār al-yawm,
1997), 12: 7688; Ṣ.A. al-Khālidi, al-Qurʾān wa naqḍ maṭāʿin al-ruhbān (Damascus: n.p.,
2007), 166; F. al-Rūmi, Ittijāhāt al-tafsīr fi-l-qarn al-rābiʿ ʿqshr (Riyadh: Idārāt al-buḥūth
al-ʿilmiyyah wa-l-iftāʾ wa-l-daʿwah wa-l-irshād, 1986), 3: 971.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 161

not a reliable historic account, but one that which needs to be viewed as a liter-
ary discourse.66 He suggests that the circumstances of revelation were mainly
used by Muslim jurists to expound on juristic issues. Andrew Rippin attempts
to shed light on the usage of the Qurʾanic historical context as defined by
traditional scholars, where he argues that one of the fundamental usages of
the circumstances of revelation is not necessarily for juristic purposes, but is
rather connected to creating a narrative story around the Qurʾanic passages.67
Some early scholars of the Qurʾan, such as Muqātil ibn Sulaymān (d. 767),68
al-Wāḥidi (d. 1076),69 and al-Suyūṭi,70 wrote detailed accounts of the circum-
stances of revelation in their Qurʾanic exegesis, and these have provided an
understanding of the role of historic and social context in interpreting the
Qurʾan. However, anyone trying to extract historical meaning from the Qurʾan
would fall into the pitfalls of their own presuppositions. The reception of the
Qurʾan in post-Qurʾanic literature would not even provide us with an objective
understanding of the Qurʾan. As Rippin states,

A theory of the ʿhistory reception’ always presupposes most centrally that

any work needs a reader to create meaning and that each reader will
extract meaning appropriate to his own time, presuppositions and
expectations.71

Traditional methods of Qurʾanic exegesis, known as tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr, was the

most common method of interpretation in early and medieval Islam. It usually
depended on a related prophetic tradition (ḥadīth) or sayings of the prophet’s
companions for an interpretation of the Qurʾan.72 Although t­raditional

66  Wansbrough. Qurʾanic Studies.

67  See Andrew Rippin’s article on John Wansbrough’s Qurʾanic Studies: Sources and Methods
of Scriptural Interpretation. Also see Andrew Rippin, “The Function of Asbāb al-Nuzūl in
Qurʾanic Exegesis,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 51 (1988), 1-20.
68  See Muqātil ibn Sulayman (d. 767), Tafsīr Muqātil ibn Sulaymān, ed. A.M. Shaḥāteh
(Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth, 2003).
69  See al-Wāḥidi (d. 1076), Asbāb al-nuzūl, ed. ʿI al-Ḥumaydān (Dammam: Dār al-iṣlāḥ, 1992).
70  See al-Suyūṭi (d. 1505), al-Itqān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾan, ed. M.A. Ibrahīm (Cairo: al-Hayʾah
al-miṣriyya al-ʿāmma lil-kitāb, 1974).
71  Andrew Rippin, “The Qurʾan as Literature: Perils, Pitfalls and Prospects,” British Society for
Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin, 10 (1983): 44.
72  Abdul-Raof, Theological Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis, 10-27.

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162 Galadari

e­ xegesis is considered mainstream, it still faces certain challenges, as the fol-

lowing show:73

1. Although the Ashʿari and Muʿtazili theological schools of thought

argued over whether the Qurʾan was created or is eternal, they both agree
that, in its entirety, it existed in heaven in the Preserved Tablet (al-lawḥ
al-maḥfūẓ) before its piecemeal revelation to Muḥammad.74 If, theologi-
cally, that is the case, it brings into question whether the circumstances
of revelation are even an integral part of the Qurʾan. However, it can be
argued by Muslim theologians that God, in His foreseeing knowledge of
the future, already knew the circumstances in which the Qurʾan would
be revealed and this is part of the Qurʾan. However, it is equally possible
that the circumstances of revelation are not an integral part of the Qurʾan
and therefore not absolutely necessary for its interpretation. From an
academic point of view, the reliability of the sources, which narrate
the circumstances of revelation, must always be brought into question,
whether or not this should be taken into account. If, to the early Muslim
community, the circumstances of revelation were important, we have
no extant evidence that either Muḥammad or his immediate compan-
ions requested the community to always remember the circumstances of
revelation. The circumstances of revelation apparently later became an
integral part of Qurʾanic exegesis. As such, the early Muslim community
seemingly did not consider them important in the process of Qurʾanic
interpretation.
Therefore, the circumstances of revelation may not be an integral part
of Qurʾanic exegesis. It may be used to understand the context, but it
should not be taken for granted. The accuracy of the narrations may be
brought into question. John Wansbrough and Gabriel Reynolds have sug-
gested that the sīra corpus is exegesis in disguise.

73  Part of this list is based on the list published in A. Galadari, “The Role of Intertextual
Polysemy in Qurʾanic Exegesis,” International Journal on Quranic Research, 3 (2013): 35-56.
74  See al-Shahrastāni (d. 1153), al-Milal wa-l-niḥal, ed. A.M. Al-Wakīl (Cairo, Egypt: Muʾas­
sassat al-Ḥalabī, 1982), 1: 70, 1: 107; the footnotes of Yaḥya ibn Abī al-Khayr al-Shafiʿī
(d. 1163), al-Intiṣār fi-l-radd ʿala al-muʿtazila al-qadariyya al-ashrār, ed. S. al-Khalaf
(Riyadh: Aḍwāʾ al-salaf, 1999), 1: 160, 2: 544, 2: 571; citation from Muqātil ibn Sulaymān
in al-Nawawī (d. 767) Juzʾ fīh dhikr iʿtiqād al-salaf fi-l-hurūf wa-l-aṣwāt, ed. A. al-Dimyāṭī
(Cairo: Maktabat al-anṣār lil-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ), 36; Shams al-Dīn al-Safārīnī al-Ḥanbalī
(d. 1774), Lawāmiʿ al-anwār al-bahiyya wa sawāṭiʿ al-asrār al-athariyyah li-sharḥ al-durra
al-muḍiyya fī ʿaqd al-firqah al-maraḍiyya (Damascus: Muʾassassat al-khāfiqīn wa makta-
batha, 1982), 1: 136, 1: 164, 1: 167-8, and 2: 288.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 163

2. One of the tenets of Muslim belief regarding the Qurʾan is that it is

for all times and places (li-kulli zamān wa makān),75 even though such a
tenet has no Qurʾanic basis. If it is for all times, then it cannot be confined
within a specific temporal context, and if it is for all places, then it cannot
be confined within a specific social context.
Some contemporary Muslim scholars have already responded to this
challenge by attempting to interpret the Qurʾan as if it were written for the
present-time; one example of such is Muhammad Shahrur. Academically,
we may look at what the Prophet Muḥammad intended with the Qurʾan; if
Muḥammad intended that the Qurʾan be used by future generations, then
perhaps he believed that the historical and social contexts were not
important.
3. The Qurʾan may have meanings that are not always obvious. It spe-
cifically describes itself as a veiled book (kitābin maknūn) (Qurʾan 56:78)
and states that some people do not comprehend it (e.g. Qurʾan 6:25, 17:46,
18:57). Therefore, it cannot be assumed that Muḥammad explained the
vague parts of the Qurʾan and any parts unexplained are to be assumed to
have clear and direct meanings. If the Qurʾan was clear, then it would not
describe itself as veiled. Also, if the Qurʾan was clear, this would imply
that no-one would have difficulty in comprehending it. Historically, the
main use of prophetic interpretation is for the juridical purposes of the
sharīʿa. The prophetic traditions used for Qurʾanic interpretation do not
always refer to a specific Qurʾanic verse, but usually expound on the
theme of rituals or legal rulings, such as the method of prayer, almsgiving,
marriage and divorce, etc.
This challenge is what gave birth to esoteric exegeses of the Qurʾan.
The plurality of meanings that can be considered in esoteric exegeses is
what in itself gave birth to different esoteric (bāṭini) schools and the vari-
ous symbolic meanings found in Sufi exegesis. Orthodox Islam usually
views these symbolic and esoteric interpretations with suspicion because
they may be based on the presuppositions of the exegete, and so the exe-
gete may be influenced by the teachings of his/her school. However, this
may be true of any exegete, who, even within orthodoxy, would be influ-
enced by the presuppositions of his/her school of thought or theology.
Therefore, there needs to be ijtihād in understanding the symbolic mean-
ings (tafsīr ishārī) of the Qurʾan that could differ from traditional
approaches. There is no doubt that the Qurʾan alludes to the possibility of

75  M. al-Saḥīm, al-Islām uṣūluhu wa-mabādiʾuhu (Riyadh: Ministry of Islamic Affairs,
2001), 136.

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164 Galadari

having symbolic meanings and, as such, there needs to be ijtihād on this

sort of exegesis. A good example of such exegesis is that of Ibn ʿArabī.
4. On numerous occasions the Qurʾan asks people to ponder its mean-
ings. If the interpretation of the Qurʾan was readily available or clear,
there would be no reason to contemplate its meanings (e.g. Qurʾan 4:82,
47:24). Since the Qurʾan often states that people should try to understand
it using reason,76 it opens the doors to multiple interpretations, some of
which may not always be obvious.
As with the preceding point, there needs to be ijtihād on a multiplicity
of meanings, which may or may not necessarily be symbolic. However,
what is important in this case is that a methodology for contemplating or
pondering the Qurʾan is not mentioned, suggesting that there is no need
for a situation where certain qualifications and/or criteria need to be met
by an exegete. Therefore, any person may perform ijtihād in trying to
understand the meanings of the Qurʾan.
5. One very important point is that many of the traditions employed in
classical Qurʾanic exegesis is not even prophetic, but related to
Muḥammad’s companions or later followers. Interpretation through nar-
ratives of tradition assumes the interpreters are knowledgeable on the
parts of the Qurʾan that they are explaining. Ibn ʿAbbās, for example, is a
widely celebrated companion who interpreted the Qurʾan. However, it
must be important to recognize that the interpretation of the prophet’s
companions or early successors may still be viewed as their own personal
opinions, and should not necessarily carry any specific authoritative
weight. As stated in the previous chapter, al-Bāqillāni showed that even
the first two Caliphs, Abu Bakr and ʿUmar, disagreed with each other on
many occasions.77 As such, it is important to understand that the com-
panions never considered the things they said anything more their own
personal opinions, which could certainly be fallible. Although some
Muslims may claim that the prophet’s companions had firsthand knowl-
edge of the Qurʾan from Muḥammad and, therefore, perhaps understood
the Qurʾan better than anyone else, such a claim is unfounded. The com-
panions still disagreed with each other many times, proving that what-
ever opinions they had were just that, opinions. They cannot be taken for
granted as “the interpretation” of the Qurʾan, but only their opinion of

76  The Qurʾan uses terms such as taʿqilūn, yafqahūn, yatadabbarūn, among others, many
times as a way to ask people to use reason and contemplation in an attempt to under-
stand the meanings of Godly signs and/or the Qurʾan.
77  Al-Bāqillāni, Tamhīd al-awāʾil fī takhlīṣ al-dalāʾil, 515-16.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 165

what they thought the interpretation was. Accordingly, their interpreta-

tion is as fallible as that of any other scholar. Here, to provide a contrast,
it will be useful to highlight Shīʿī dogma, which states the infallibility of
their Imams; however, if this doctrine is accepted, there still exists the
problem that the narrators themselves were not infallible, and therefore
there could always be some doubt on the correctness of the narrations.
Besides, the Muslims doctrine of infallibility of the prophets is not in
itself necessarily Qurʾanic. The Qurʾan, as well as prophetic traditions,
show that prophets have erred and committed sins.78
If the narrations that come from traditional approaches are problema-
tized, then this opens the doors of ijtihād. A good example of this is John
Wansbrough’s method of ijtihād, where traditional exegesis of the Qurʾan
would not necessarily be taken into account in defining the literary his-
tory of the Qurʾan. From this, perhaps it is necessary to consider whether
the Qurʾan’s initial audience even were the Arabs of Mecca or Medina, as
John Wansbrough has done.
6. The reliability of prophetic tradition is also brought into question.79
James Robson argues that prophetic tradition was not central to the early
Muslim community at the time of Muḥammad. He suggests that though
the tradition is presented as if it were preserved from early Islam, it actu-
ally grew when the Qurʾan gave no or insufficient guidance about the
various new issues that arose within the community.80 In this circum-
stance, tradition developed to become an authority to the Muslim

78  The Qurʾan shows various example of sins and mistakes done by prophets, including
disobedience to God’s commandments, such as the story of Jonah (Qurʾan 21:87). Other
examples include the killing of a man by Moses (Qurʾan 28:15), Abraham declaring lords
besides God (though some exegetes consider this to be part of Abraham teaching his peo-
ple) (Qurʾan 6: 76-8), Abraham lying about not breaking the idols (though some exegetes
also consider this to have been for the purpose of teaching his people) (Qurʾan 21:62-7),
and in a prophetic tradition, Abraham lying about Sarah calling her his sister instead of
wife, similar to the story in the Torah (though Shiʿi tradition would consider this as evi-
dence of taqiyya or lying for the purpose of avoiding harm). Nonetheless, even the Qurʾan
shows examples of mistakes done by the Prophet, such as his ignoring of a blind man
(Qurʾan 80:1) or attempting to trick his wives (Qurʾan 66:1). In my opinion, if the doc-
trine of infallibility has any legal standing, then perhaps it needs to be redefined. Possibly,
prophets do err and commit sin, but that they are forgiven. In that sense they could be
considered “infallible,” not that they never sin or make mistakes.
79  See J. Burton, “Notes towards a Fresh Perspective on the Islamic Sunna,” Bulletin of the
British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 11 (1984): 3-17.
80  J. Robson, “Tradition: Investigation and Classification,” The Muslim World 41 (1951): 98-112.

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166 Galadari

c­ ommunity, something which was, perhaps, not even the intention of the
authors who compiled the books on these traditions.81 Robson suggests
that the traditions do not portray Muḥammad for what he truly was, but
portray how his followers perceived him.82
Like the previous point, when the reliability of tradition and its narra-
tions is brought into question, then the reliability of traditional exegesis
becomes questionable as well. However, to respond to this challenge does
not necessarily mean that we should completely dispense with tradition,
as has been done by the Qurʾanists.83 However, the consideration of pro-
phetic tradition (ḥadīth) for Qurʾanic interpretation need to be further
scrutinized.

The Muslim community, facing challenges to traditional interpretations, has

developed several schools of Qurʾanic exegesis beyond the mainstream, con-
ventional approach, which have become known as rational approaches, and
which include esoteric, linguistic, and scientific approaches.84 Although there
are various methods of Qurʾanic interpretation, for the most part it is based
on methods developed by scholars in the past, while contemporary scholars
typically imitate the framework through which these exegeses are to be made.
What this means is that although contemporary scholars may develop a new
exegesis, they are still supposed to have the necessary qualifications set out
by earlier scholars. As such, modern exegesis of the Qurʾan would continue to
be held by the chains of older exegesis. If an exegete continues to require spe-
cific qualifications in order to have any sort of exegetical authority, then that
exegete may not be considered a scholar, but merely an imitator of the method
of ijtihād (taqlīd al-ijtihād).
There needs to be further ijtihād in Qurʾanic interpretation. For example,
when the Qurʾan makes allusions to other books, such as the Torah, the Psalms,
and the Gospel(s), it will be important to find these allusions and their con-
texts within the Bible, and to understand the Biblical sub-text of these allu-
sions without taking the traditional interpretation of such verses at face value.
For ijtihād in Qurʾanic interpretation to be truly formalize, there needs to be an
open mind over the nature of exegesis.

81  J. Robson, “Tradition, the Second Foundation of Islam,” The Muslim World 41 (1951): 22-33.
82  J. Robson, “The Material of Tradition I,” The Muslim World 41 (1951): 166-80.
83  Quranists are those who hold the Qurʾan to be the only source of Islamic faith and reject
ḥadīth.
84  Abdul-Raof. Theological Approaches to Qurʾanic Exegesis, 28-9.

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The Taqlīd al-Ijtihād Paradox 167

4 Conclusion

Throughout Islamic history, scholars give higher preference to ijtihād over imi-
tation (taqlīd). However, in order for scholars to perform ijtihād, they needed
to have certain qualifications and to adopt particular criteria in their method
of Qurʾanic exegesis. Neither these criteria nor qualifications are sanctioned by
the Qurʾan, and were instead invented by earlier scholars (mujtahidīn). As such,
following these qualifications and criteria in performing any kind of Qurʾanic
exegesis does not determine whether the scholar is making any form of ijtihād.
As such, we are living in a paradox, where in one hand there needs to be ijtihād,
but only by imitating the rules and regulations set for ijtihād. As such, we may
only conclude that there is no ijtihād, but only taqlīd al-ijtihād. Thus, Western
scholars of the Qurʾan may be seen to be more attentive in resorting to ijtihād,
rather than simply imitating ijtihād. Hence, Muslim scholars need to also
remove themselves from the shackles of inherited knowledge and exegesis and
start to look at Qurʾanic exegesis with new eyes and innovative techniques in
order to perform ijtihād, instead of simply imitating it.

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