TIROL, MARK JASON S.

ELECTION LAW

JOSE L. ATIENZA et al. vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 188920. February 16, 2010]
Facts:
Drilon, President of the Liberal Party announced the party’s withdrawal of support for the
Macapagal’s administration. But Atienza, LP Chairman, and a number of party members
denounced Drilon’s move. Atienza then hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local
autonomy and party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all
positions in the LP’s ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
nullify the elections. The COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting respondent Drilon’s
petition. It annulled the elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC
supervision. Both sides of the dispute came to Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On
April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilon’s petition and
denying that of petitioner Atienza. A meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as
the new LP president. Atienza filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction before
the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary
general. On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners
Atienza, et al.’s petition.
Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over intra-party disputes
Held:
The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket
authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are
generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its
constitutional functions.
The validity of respondent Roxas’ election as LP president is a leadership issue that the
COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing
authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It
is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination
for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the
official standard bearer of the party. The law also grants a registered political party certain rights
and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It imposes, too, legal
obligations upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders.
The resolution of the leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and
orderly conduct of the elections.
To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas’ election as
LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the party.
While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELEC’s performance of its
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue
pertaining to Atienza, et al.’s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue
of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited
scope of its power over political parties.

MANUEL B. JAPZON, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY.

[G.R. No. 180088. January 19, 2009.]

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules 64 1 and 65 2 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution 3 dated 31 July 2007 of the First Division of
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Resolution 4 dated 28
September 2007 of COMELEC en banc, in SPA No. 07-568, for having been laid down with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Japzon and respondent Ty were candidates for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, in the local elections (4 May 2007). Japzon initiated the
disqualification of Ty’s Candidacy. He further claimed that Ty is still an American citizen and has
not adhered to the residence requirement. Ty gave the defense that he already complied with
the requirement. Pending the compliance by the parties of their Position Papers, the 14 May
2007 elections were already held. Ty received the highest number of votes and was proclaimed
Mayor. Later on, the COMELEC First Division rendered its Resolution in favor of Ty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not TY complied with the residence requirement when he ran for Mayor.
HELD:
Yes. Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no adverse
effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not
necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again prove his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his new domicile of choice. The duration of his
residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it
shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
Furthermore, Ty has also been bodily present in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. The Court found that Ty did come back to the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and showed his clear intent of animus manendi
and animus revertendi.

LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS et al. vs. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 162759. August 4, 2006.]

Facts:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225.
Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and
certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the
United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September
23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year
residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not those who retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
Held:
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals"
to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are
most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that
granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims,
in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope
of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now
exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded
thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This
may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which
reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. – The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen
(18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of
"duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under
Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other
present day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee
voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation.

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMELEC Executive Secretary HON. ALBERTO ROMULO
and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the DBM.
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.]

FACTS:
The court is to resolve a petition for certiorari and prohibition applied by Macalintal, asking for a
declaration that some provisions of RA No. 9189 which is “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003” is unconstitutional. Claiming that he has valid interest in the case in making sure that the
public funds are validly and reasonably used,petitioner filed this petition as a taxpayer and as a
member of the bar.
ISSUE:
(1)Whether or not, Sec 5 (d) of RA 9189 is unconstitutional as it fails to comply with the
residency requirement?
(2) Whether or not the Legislative has the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the COMELEC, may issue and not transgress the
independence of another constitutional body (COMELEC)?

HELD:
(1) No. R.A. No. 9189 was adopted to give due course to the 1st paragraph of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall supply a system for voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad. It is good to point out that Section 2 does not give the
limits of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Thus, without strict
restrictions, Congress is presumed to have properly exercised its function as
expressed in Article VI of the Constitution. In our election law, it is very significant to
know that the fact that residence for election purposes is used similarly with
domicile.

(2) No. Congress run over the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC.
However, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in
declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.