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THIRD DIVISION
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL G.R. No. 175587
INTERNATIONAL BANK,
Petitioner, Present:
YnaresSantiago, J. (Chairperson),
versus AustriaMartinez,
ChicoNazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 21, 2007
x x
DECISION
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:
[1]
This petition for review assails the May 31, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA
[2]
G.R. CV No. 78200 affirming the August 30, 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, which granted respondent Joseph Anthony M. Alejandros claim for damages arising
from petitioner Philippine Commercial International Banks (PCIB) invalid garnishment of
respondents deposits.
[3]
On October 23, 1997, petitioner filed against respondent a complaint for sum of money
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Said complaint alleged that
on September 10, 1997, respondent, a resident of Hong Kong, executed in favor of petitioner a
promissory note obligating himself to pay P249,828,588.90 plus interest. In view of the
fluctuations in the foreign exchange rates which resulted in the insufficiency of the deposits
assigned by respondent as security for the loan, petitioner requested the latter to put up
additional security for the loan. Respondent, however, sought a reconsideration of said request
pointing out petitioners alleged mishandling of his account due to its failure to carry out his
instruction to close his account as early as April 1997, when the prevailing rate of exchange of
[4]
the US Dollar to Japanese yen was US$1.00:JPY127.50. It appears that the amount of
P249,828,588.90 was the consolidated amount of a series of yen loans granted by petitioner to
[5]
respondent during the months of February and April 1997.
In praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Section 1 paragraphs (e)
and (f) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, petitioner alleged that (1) respondent fraudulently
withdrew his unassigned deposits notwithstanding his verbal promise to PCIB Assistant Vice
President Corazon B. Nepomuceno not to withdraw the same prior to their assignment as
security for the loan; and (2) that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines. The
[6]
application for the issuance of a writ was supported with the affidavit of Nepomuceno.
[7]
On October 24, 1997, the trial court granted the application and issued the writ ex parte
after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P18,798,734.69, issued by Prudential
Guarantee & Assurance Inc., under Bond No. HO4676497. On the same date, the bank
deposits of respondent with Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) were garnished.
On October 27, 1997, respondent, through counsel, filed a manifestation informing the court
[8]
that he is voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction.
[9]
Subsequently, respondent filed a motion to quash the writ contending that the withdrawal of
his unassigned deposits was not fraudulent as it was approved by petitioner. He also alleged
that petitioner knew that he maintains a permanent residence at Calle Victoria, Ciudad Regina,
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, and an office address in Makati City at the Law Firm Romulo
[10]
Mabanta Buenaventura Sayoc & De los Angeles, where he is a partner. In both addresses,
petitioner regularly communicated with him through its representatives. Respondent added
that he is the managing partner of the Hong Kong branch of said Law Firm; that his stay in
Hong Kong is only temporary; and that he frequently travels back to the Philippines.
On December 24, 1997, the trial court issued an order quashing the writ and holding that the
withdrawal of respondents unassigned deposits was not intended to defraud petitioner. It also
found that the representatives of petitioner personally transacted with respondent through his
home address in Quezon City and/or his office in Makati City. It thus concluded that petitioner
misrepresented and suppressed the facts regarding respondents residence considering that it
has personal and official knowledge that for purposes of service of summons, respondents
residence and office addresses are located in the Philippines. The dispositive portion of the
courts decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the URGENT MOTION TO QUASH, being meritorious, is hereby
GRANTED, and the ORDER of 24 October 1997 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET
ASIDE and the WRIT OF attachment of the same is hereby DISCHARGED.
[11]
SO ORDERED.
[12]
With the denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration, it elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals (CAG.R. SP No. 50748) via a petition for certiorari. On May 10, 1999, the
petition was dismissed for failure to prove that the trial court abused its discretion in issuing
[13]
the aforesaid order. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on
[14]
October 28, 1999. On petition with this Court, the case was dismissed for late filing in a
[15]
minute resolution (G.R. No. 140605) dated January 19, 2000. Petitioner filed a motion for
[16]
reconsideration but was likewise denied with finality on March 6, 2000.
Meanwhile, on May 20, 1998, respondent filed a claim for damages in the amount of P25
[17]
Million on the attachment bond (posted by Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc., under
JCL(4) No. 01081, Bond No. HO4676497) on account of the wrongful garnishment of his
deposits. He presented evidence showing that his P150,000.00 RCBC check payable to his
counsel as attorneys fees, was dishonored by reason of the garnishment of his deposits. He
also testified that he is a graduate of the Ateneo de Manila University in 1982 with a double
degree of Economics and Management Engineering and of the University of the Philippines in
1987 with the degree of Bachelor of Laws. Respondent likewise presented witnesses to prove
that he is a well known lawyer in the business community both in the Philippines and in Hong
[18]
Kong. For its part, the lone witness presented by petitioner was Nepomuceno who claimed
[19]
that she acted in good faith in alleging that respondent is a resident of Hong Kong.
On August 30, 2000, the trial court awarded damages to respondent in the amount of P25
Million without specifying the basis thereof, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, and defendant having duly established his
claim in the amount of P25,000,000.00, judgment is hereby rendered ordering Prudential
Guarantee & [Assurance] Co., which is solidarily liable with plaintiff to pay defendant the full
amount of bond under Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. JCL(4) No. 01081, [Bond No.
HO4676497], dated 24 October 1997 in the amount of P18,798,734.69. And, considering that
the amount of the bond is insufficient to fully satisfy the award for damages, plaintiff is hereby
ordered to pay defendant the amount of P6,201,265.31.
[20]
SO ORDERED.
[21]
The trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on October 24, 2000.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the
trial court. It held that in claiming that respondent was not a resident of the Philippines,
petitioner cannot be said to have been in good faith considering that its knowledge of
respondents Philippine residence and office address goes into the very issue of the trial courts
jurisdiction which would have been defective had respondent not voluntarily appeared before
it.
The Court of Appeals, however, reduced the amount of damages awarded to petitioner
and specified their basis. The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the decision appealed from
is hereby MODIFIED. The award of damages in the amount of P25,000,000.00 is deleted. In
lieu thereof, Prudential Guarantee & [Assurance, Inc.], which is solidarily liable with appellant
[herein petitioner], is ORDERED to pay appellee [herein respondent] P2,000,000.00 as
nominal damages; P5,000,000.00 as moral damages; and P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees, to be
satisfied against the attachment bond under Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. JCL (4)
No. 01081.
[22]
SO ORDERED.
Both parties moved for reconsideration. On November 21, 2006, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration but granted that of respondents by ordering petitioner to
[23]
pay additional P5Million as exemplary damages.
Hence, the instant petition.
At the outset, it must be noted that the ruling of the trial court that petitioner is not entitled to a
writ of attachment because respondent is a resident of the Philippines and that his act of
withdrawing his deposits with petitioner was without intent to defraud, can no longer be
passed upon by this Court. More importantly, the conclusions of the court that petitioner bank
misrepresented that respondent was residing out of the Philippines and suppressed the fact that
respondent has a permanent residence in Metro Manila where he may be served with
summons, are now beyond the power of this Court to review having been the subject of a final
and executory order. Said findings were sustained by the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No.
50784 and by this Court in G.R. No. 140605. The rule on conclusiveness of judgment, which
obtains under the premises, precludes the relitigation of a particular fact or issue in another
action between the same parties even if based on a different claim or cause of action. The
judgment in the prior action operates as estoppel as to those matters in issue or points
controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or judgment was rendered. The
previous judgment is conclusive in the second case, as to those matters actually and directly
[24]
controverted and determined. Hence, the issues of misrepresentation by petitioner and the
residence of respondent for purposes of service of summons can no longer be questioned by
petitioner in this case.
The core issue for resolution is whether petitioner bank is liable for damages for the
improper issuance of the writ of attachment against respondent.
We rule in the affirmative.
Notwithstanding the final judgment that petitioner is guilty of misrepresentation and
suppression of a material fact, the latter contends that it acted in good faith. Petitioner also
contends that even if respondent is considered a resident of the Philippines, attachment is still
proper under Section 1, paragraph (f), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court since he (respondent) is a
resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines upon whom service of summons may be
effected by publication.
Petitioners contentions are without merit.
While the final order of the trial court which quashed the writ did not categorically use the
word bad faith in characterizing the representations of petitioner, the tenor of said order
evidently considers the latter to have acted in bad faith by resorting to a deliberate strategy to
mislead the court. Thus
In the hearings of the motion, and oral arguments of counsels before the Court, it
appears that plaintiff BANK through its contracting officers Vice President CORAZON B.
NEPOMUCENO and Executive Vice President JOSE RAMON F. REVILLA, personally
transacted with defendant mainly through defendants permanent residence in METRO
MANILA, either in defendants home address in Quezon City or his main business address at
the ROMULO MABANTA BUENAVENTURA SAYOC & DELOS ANGELES in MAKATI
and while at times follow ups were made through defendants temporary home and business
addresses in Hongkong. It is therefore clear that plaintiff could not deny their personal and
official knowledge that defendants permanent and official residence for purposes of service of
summons is in the Philippines. In fact, this finding is further confirmed by the letter of Mr.
JOHN GOKONGWEI, JR. Chairman, Executive Committee of plaintiff BANK, in his letter
dated 6 October 1997 on the subject loan to defendant of the same law firm was addressed to
the ROMULO LAW FIRM in MAKATI.
[Anent the] second ground of attachment x x x [t]he Court finds that the amount
withdrawn was not part of defendants peso deposits assigned with the bank to secure the loan
and as proof that the withdrawal was not intended to defraud plaintiff as creditor is that
plaintiff approved and allowed said withdrawals. It is even noted that when the Court granted
the prayer for attachment it was mainly on the first ground under Section 1(f) of Rule 57 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, that defendant resides out of the Philippines.
On the above findings, it is obvious that plaintiff already knew from the beginning the
deficiency of its second ground for attachment [i.e.,] disposing properties with intent to defraud
his creditors, and therefore plaintiff had to resort to this misrepresentation that defendant was
residing out of the Philippines and suppressed the fact that defendants permanent residence is
in METRO MANILA where he could be served with summons.
On the above findings, and mainly on the misrepresentations made by plaintiff on the
grounds for the issuance of the attachment in the verified complaint, the Court concludes that
defendant has duly proven its grounds in the MOTION and that plaintiff is not entitled to the
[25]
attachment.
Petitioner is therefore barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment from again
invoking good faith in the application for the issuance of the writ. Similarly, in the case of
[26]
Hanil Development Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, the Court debunked the claim of good
faith by a party who maliciously sought the issuance of a writ of attachment, the bad faith of
said party having been previously determined in a final decision which voided the assailed
writ. Thus
Apropos the Application for Judgment on the Attachment Bond, Escobar claims in its
petition that the award of attorneys fees and injunction bond premium in favor of Hanil is
[contrary] to law and jurisprudence. It contends that no malice or bad faith may be imputed to
it in procuring the writ.
Escobars protestation is now too late in the day. The question of the illegality of the
attachment and Escobars bad faith in obtaining it has long been settled in one of the earlier
incidents of this case. The Court of Appeals, in its decision rendered on February 3, 1983 in
C.A.G.R. No. SP14512, voided the challenged writ, having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. Escobars bad faith in procuring the writ cannot be doubted. Its Petition for the
Issuance of Preliminary Attachment made such damning allegations that: Hanil was already
able to secure a complete release of its final collection from the MPWH; it has moved out some
of its heavy equipments for unknown destination, and it may leave the country anytime. Worse,
its Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Petition alleged that after personal verification by (Escobar) of
(Hanils) equipment in Cagayan de Oro City, it appears that the equipments were no longer
existing from their compound. All these allegations of Escobar were found to be totally
baseless and untrue.
Even assuming that the trial court did not make a categorical pronouncement of
misrepresentation and suppression of material facts on the part of petitioner, the factual
backdrop of this case does not support petitioners claim of good faith. The facts and
circumstances omitted are highly material and relevant to the grant or denial of writ of
attachment applied for.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that respondent can be considered a
resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines upon whom service of summons may be
effected by publication, and therefore qualifies as among those against whom a writ of
attachment may be issued under Section 1, paragraph (f), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
(f) In an action against a party x x x on whom summons may be served by
publication.
In so arguing, petitioner attempts to give the impression that although it erroneously
invoked the ground that respondent does not reside in the Philippines, it should not be made to
pay damages because it is in fact entitled to a writ of attachment had it invoked the proper
ground under Rule 57. However, even on this alternative ground, petitioner is still not entitled
to the issuance of a writ of attachment.
The circumstances under which a writ of preliminary attachment may be issued are set
forth in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. At the commencement of the
action or at any time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the
property of the adverse party attached as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may
be recovered in the following cases:
(a) In an action for the recovery of a specified amount of money or damages, other than
moral and exemplary, on a cause of action arising from law, contract, quasicontract, delict or
quasidelict against a party who is about to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud
his creditors;
(b) In an action for money or property embezzled or fraudulently misapplied or
converted to his own use by a public officer, or an officer of a corporation or an attorney,
factor, broker, agent, or clerk, in the course of his employment as such, or by any other person
in a fiduciary capacity, or for a willful violation of duty;
(c) In an action to recover the possession of personal property unjustly or fraudulently
taken, detained, or converted, when the property, or any part thereof, has been concealed,
removed, or disposed of to prevent its being found or taken by the applicant or an authorized
person;
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;
(e) In an action against a party who has removed or disposed of his property, or is about
to do so, with intent to defraud his creditors;
(f) In an action against a party who resides out of the Philippines, or on whom
summons may be served by publication.
The purposes of preliminary attachment are: (1) to seize the property of the debtor in
advance of final judgment and to hold it for purposes of satisfying said judgment, as in the
grounds stated in paragraphs (a) to (e) of Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; or (2) to
acquire jurisdiction over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those
instances where personal or substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be
[27]
effected, as in paragraph (f) of the same provision.
Corollarily, in actions in personam, such as the instant case for collection of sum of
[28]
money, summons must be served by personal or substituted service, otherwise the court
will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant. In case the defendant does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines (and hence personal and substituted service cannot be effected),
the remedy of the plaintiff in order for the court to acquire jurisdiction to try the case is to
convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the property of the
[29]
defendant. Thus, in order to acquire jurisdiction in actions in personam where defendant
resides out of and is not found in the Philippines, it becomes a matter of course for the court to
convert the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem by attaching the defendants
property. The service of summons in this case (which may be by publication coupled with the
sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to the last known
address of the defendant), is no longer for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction but for
[30]
compliance with the requirements of due process.
However, where the defendant is a resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines,
attachment of his/her property in an action in personam, is not always necessary in order for
the court to acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.
Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. When an action is commenced
against a defendant who ordinarily resides within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of
it, service may, by leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the preceding
section.
The preceding section referred to in the above provision is Section 15 which provides
for extraterritorial service (a) personal service out of the Philippines, (b) publication coupled
with the sending by registered mail of the copy of the summons and the court order to the last
known address of the defendant; or (c) in any other manner which the court may deem
sufficient.
[31]
In Montalban v. Maximo, however, the Court held that substituted service of
summons (under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court) is the normal mode of
service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over the person of residents
temporarily out of the Philippines. Meaning, service of summons may be effected by (a)
leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable
discretion residing therein, or (b) by leaving copies at the defendants office or regular place of
[32]
business with some competent person in charge thereof. Hence, the court may acquire
jurisdiction over an action in personam by mere substituted service without need of attaching
the property of the defendant.
The rationale in providing for substituted service as the normal mode of service for
[33]
residents temporarily out of the Philippines, was expounded in Montalban v. Maximo, in
this wise:
A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling
where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and
where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the
hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is
necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident
of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to
leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted
in the event a question that affects him crops up.
Thus, in actions in personam against residents temporarily out of the Philippines, the
court need not always attach the defendants property in order to have authority to try the case.
Where the plaintiff seeks to attach the defendants property and to resort to the concomitant
service of summons by publication, the same must be with prior leave, precisely because, if
the sole purpose of the attachment is for the court to acquire jurisdiction, the latter must
determine whether from the allegations in the complaint, substituted service (to persons of
suitable discretion at the defendants residence or to a competent person in charge of his office
or regular place of business) will suffice, or whether there is a need to attach the property of
the defendant and resort to service of summons by publication in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case and to comply with the requirements of due process.
In the instant case, it must be stressed that the writ was issued by the trial court mainly
[34]
on the representation of petitioner that respondent is not a resident of the Philippines.
Obviously, the trial courts issuance of the writ was for the sole purpose of acquiring
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Had the allegations in the complaint disclosed that
respondent has a residence in Quezon City and an office in Makati City, the trial court, if only
for the purpose of acquiring jurisdiction, could have served summons by substituted service on
the said addresses, instead of attaching the property of the defendant. The rules on the
application of a writ of attachment must be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. For
attachment is harsh, extraordinary, and summary in nature; it is a rigorous remedy which
[35]
exposes the debtor to humiliation and annoyance. It should be resorted to only when
necessary and as a last remedy.
It is clear from the foregoing that even on the allegation that respondent is a resident
temporarily out of the Philippines, petitioner is still not entitled to a writ of attachment
because the trial court could acquire jurisdiction over the case by substituted service instead of
attaching the property of the defendant. The misrepresentation of petitioner that respondent
does not reside in the Philippines and its omission of his local addresses was thus a deliberate
move to ensure that the application for the writ will be granted.
In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals properly sustained the finding of the trial
court that petitioner is liable for damages for the wrongful issuance of a writ of attachment
against respondent.
Anent the actual damages, the Court of Appeals is correct in not awarding the same
inasmuch as the respondent failed to establish the amount garnished by petitioner. It is a well
settled rule that one who has been injured by a wrongful attachment can recover damages for
the actual loss resulting therefrom. But for such losses to be recoverable, they must constitute
actual damages duly established by competent proofs, which are, however, wanting in the
[36]
present case.
Nevertheless, nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right,
and not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Its award is thus not for the
purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. Indeed,
[37]
nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. They are recoverable where
some injury has been done but the pecuniary value of the damage is not shown by evidence
and are thus subject to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.
[38]
In this case, the award of nominal damages is proper considering that the right of
respondent to use his money has been violated by its garnishment. The amount of nominal
damages must, however, be reduced from P2 million to P50,000.00 considering the short
period of 2 months during which the writ was in effect as well as the lack of evidence as to the
amount garnished.
Likewise, the award of attorneys fees is proper when a party is compelled to incur
expenses to lift a wrongfully issued writ of attachment. The basis of the award thereof is also
the amount of money garnished, and the length of time respondents have been deprived of the
[39]
use of their money by reason of the wrongful attachment. It may also be based upon (1)
the amount and the character of the services rendered; (2) the labor, time and trouble involved;
(3) the nature and importance of the litigation and business in which the services were
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money and the value of the
property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and the
experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and the
social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured, it being a recognized rule that an
[40]
attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.
All the aforementioned weighed, and considering the short period of time it took to
have the writ lifted, the favorable decisions of the courts below, the absence of evidence as to
the professional character and the social standing of the attorney handling the case and the
amount garnished, the award of attorneys fees should be fixed not at P1 Million, but only at
P200,000.00.
The courts below correctly awarded moral damages on account of petitioners
misrepresentation and bad faith; however, we find the award in the amount of P5 Million
excessive. Moral damages are to be fixed upon the discretion of the court taking into
[41]
consideration the educational, social and financial standing of the parties. Moral damages
[42]
are not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of petitioners culpable action. Moral
damages must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered. Hence, the award of moral
damages is reduced to P500,000.00.
Considering petitioners bad faith in securing the writ of attachment, we sustain the
award of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for public good. This should
deter parties in litigations from resorting to baseless and preposterous allegations to obtain
writs of attachments. While as a general rule, the liability on the attachment bond is limited to
actual (or in some cases, temperate or nominal) damages, exemplary damages may be
[43]
recovered where the attachment was established to be maliciously sued out. Nevertheless,
the award of exemplary damages in this case should be reduced from P5M to P500,000.00.
Finally, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the instant case for damages by reason of the
invalid issuance of the writ, survives the dismissal of the main case for sum of money. Suffice
it to state that the claim for damages arising from such wrongful attachment may arise and be
[44]
decided separately from the merits of the main action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The May 31, 2006
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 78200 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, petitioner Philippine Commercial International Bank is
ordered to pay respondent Joseph Anthony M. Alejandro the following amounts: P50,000.00
as nominal damages, P200,000.00 as attorneys fees; and P500,000.00 as moral damages, and
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, to be satisfied against the attachment bond issued by
[45]
Prudential Guarantee & Assurance Inc., under JCL (4) No. 01081, Bond No. HO46764
97.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICONAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 199220. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C. Del Castillo.
[2]
Record on appeal, vol. 1, pp. 357365.
[3]
Id. at 1316.
[4]
Id. at 40.
[5]
Id. at 3435.
[6]
Id. at 17.
[7]
Id. at 2228.
[8]
TSN, vol. II, set I, pp. 633639.
[9]
Record on appeal, vol. I, pp. 3038.
[10]
Also spelled as Delos Angeles in some parts of the records and rollo.
[11]
Id. at 6769. Penned by Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.
[12]
Id. at 128.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 328334. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofilea and concurred in by Associate Justices
Bernardo P. Abesamis and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this Court).
[14]
Id. at 335336.
[15]
Id. at 337.
[16]
Id. at 338.
[17]
Record on appeal, vol. I, pp. 7378.
[18]
Id. at 359361.
[19]
Id. at 362.
[20]
Id. at 365. Penned by Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr.
[21]
Id. at 392394.
[22]
Rollo, p. 220.
[23]
Id. at 223225.
[24]
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142401, August 20, 2001, 363 SCRA 444, 445 and 449450.
[25]
Record on appeal, Vol. II, pp. 6768.
[26]
G.R. Nos. 113176 & 113342, July 30, 2001, 362 SCRA 1, 15.
[27]
Herrera, Remedial Law, vol. III, pp. 2 and 8; Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. I, ninth revised edition, p. 678.
[28]
Obaa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78635, April 27, 1989, 172 SCRA 866, 874.
[29]
Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. v. Breva, G.R. No. L82811, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 589, 593594; Obaa v. Court
of Appeals, supra at 874.
[30]
Sahagun v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78328, June 3, 1991, 198 SCRA 44, 54.
[31]
131 Phil. 154, 165166 (1968).
[32]
The pronouncement of the Court in Castillo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch IV (G.R. No. L55869, February 20,
1984, 127 SCRA 632) that with respect to residents temporarily out of the Philippines, noncompliance with the modes of service
under Section 17 (now Section 15, i.e., service of summons out of the Philippines by personal service, or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation), is a denial of due process and renders the proceedings void, does not mean that said modes of
service are exclusive. Substituted service of summons is still the normal mode of service for residents temporarily out of the
Philippines. The declaration of nullity of the proceedings in the said case was by reason of the defective substituted service of
summons to a person not authorized to receive the same being a mere overseer of the lessee in the conjugal property of the
defendant, and not because substituted service of summons per se is not among the valid modes of service upon a resident
temporarily out of the country.
[33]
Supra at 164165.
[34]
The pertinent portion of the December 24, 1997 Order of the trial court, provides:
It is even noted that when the Court granted the prayer for attachment it was mainly on the first ground under Section 1(f) of Rule
57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, that defendant resides out of the Philippines.
[35]
JardineManila Finance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55272, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 636, 645.
[36]
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73610, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 29,
3637.
[37]
Almeda v. Cario, G.R. No. 152143, January 13, 2003, 395 SCRA 144, 149150.
[38]
RobesFrancisco Realty & Development Corporation v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, (Branch XXXIV), G.R. No. L41093,
October 30, 1978, 86 SCRA 59, 64; Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118680, March 5, 2001, 353 SCRA 620, 630631.
[39]
Carlos v. Sandoval, G.R. No. 135830, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 266, 300.
[40]
Prudential Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125536, March 16, 2000, 328 SCRA 264, 272.
[41]
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra at 3839.
[42]
Filinvest Credit Coporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L65935, September 30, 1988, 166 SCRA 155, 165166.
[43]
Hanil Development Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 26 at 16.
[44]
Carlos v. Sandoval, supra at 290291.
[45]
The surety, Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc., was duly notified of respondents application for damages (Record on
appeal, p. 78) pursuant to Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.