Conflicts of Law Outline Reviewer Treatises and International Conventions

Judicial Decisions
Conflicts of Laws - That part of municipal law of a State International Customs
which directs its courts and administrative agencies,
when confronted with a legal problem involving a Indirect:
foreign element, whether or not they should apply a Natural Moral Law
foreign law/s (Paras). Work of Writers

(4) Elements Kilberg Doctrine

1. Conflict of laws is part of the municipal law of
a state;
2. There is a directive to courts and admin
agencies;
3. There is a legal problem involving foreign
element;
4. There is either an application or a non-
application of a foreign law or foreign laws.
Distinctions between Conflicts of Law and Public
International Law
It is a rule to the effect that the forum is not bound by
the law of the place of injury or death as to the
limitations on damages for wrongful act because such
rule is procedural and hence the law of the forum
governs on this issue. (Northwest Airlines vs. CA)
Center of Gravity Doctrine
Choice of law problems in conflicts of law are resolved
by the application of the law of the jurisdiction which
has the most significant relationship to or contact with
the event and parties to litigation and issue therein.

Bases COL PIL Forum Non Conveniens

As to nature Municipal in International in A forum may resist imposition upon its jurisdiction
character character even when jurisdiction is authorized by law on the
Persons Private Individuals Sovereign states; ground that the forum is inconvenient or the ends of
involved and other entities justice would be best served by trial in another forum
possessed of an or the controversy may be more suitably tried
international elsewhere tried elsewhere.
personality such as
the UN org It may be manifested in the following ways:
Transactions Private Generally affected 1. The evidence and the witness may not be
involved transactions by public interest; readily available;
between those in general 2. The court dockets of the forum may already
private are of interest only be clogged to permit additional cases would
individuals to sovereign inevitably hamper the speedy administration
States of justice;
Remedies Resort to -Peaceful 3. Evils of forum shopping;
and municipal (diplomatic 4. Forum has no particular interest in the case;
Sanctions tribunals negotiations, 5. The case may be better tried in other courts.
tender & exercise
of good office, The doctrine should generally apply only if the
mediation, defendant is a corporation
conciliation)
-Judicial Elements:
arbitration/settlem a. The forum State is one to which the parties
ent may conveniently resort to;
-Forcible b. It is in a position to make an intelligent
(severance of decision as to the law and the facts; and
diplomatic c. It has or is likely to have power to enforce its
relations, decision.
retorsions,
embargo, pacific Jurisdiction
blockade, war In international law, it is often defined as the right of a
State to exercise authority over persons and things
Sources within its boundaries, subject to certain exceptions.
Direct:
Constitutions Jurisdiction over the Person
Codifications 1. Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is
Special Laws acquired from the moment he invokes the aid of
International

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 the court and voluntarily submits himself by
institution of the suit through proper pleadings
2. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
acquired through:
a. Voluntary appearance or
b. Personal or Substituted service of summons
Jurisdiction over the Property
• Results either from seizure of the property under
a legal process or from the institution of legal
proceedings wherein the court’s power over the
property is recognized and made effective.
• This kind of jurisdiction of jurisdiction is referred
to as in rem jurisdiction. Another form of
jurisdiction is quasi in rem which affects only the
interests of particular persons in the thing.
• NOTE: Summons by publication is authorized in
three cases:
1. If the action is in rem;
2. quasi in rem; and when
3. Involves the personal status of the plaintiff
Philippine Trust Co. vs. Bohanan
GR L-12105, January 30, 1960
Facts: The testator C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska
and therefore a citizen of that state, or at least a citizen
of California where some of his properties were
located. Notwithstanding his long stay in the
Philippines, he continued to be a citizen of the US and
of the state of his particular choice, Nevada and
remained to be a citizen of that state until his death.
He declared in his will that the same was executed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Nevada. On
April 24, 1950, the will which the testator executed in
Manila on April 23, 1944 was admitted to probate in
the CFI of Manila. The wife Magdalena C Bohonan and
her two children questioned the validity of the
testamentary provisions, claiming that they have been
deprived of the legitime that the laws of the
Philippines, concede them. The children were only
given legacies of P6,000 each, while the wife received
nothing.
Issues:
Is the wife entitled to any share in the estate?
Is the failure of the testator to give his children what
they are entitled to under Philippine laws valid?
Is it necessary to reintroduce the proved Nevada Law?
Held:
No. The laws of Nevada of which the deceased was a
citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties
without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate
to his wife. Since no right to share in the inheritance in
favor of a divorced wife exists to share in the
inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the
state of Nevada and since there was no conjugal
property between the testator and Magdalena C
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Bohanan, the latter can have no legal claim to any
portion of the estate left by the testator.
Yes. Art 10 para 2 of the CC (now par 2, Art 16 of NCC)
provides that legal and testamentary successions, in
respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights and the intrinsic
validity of their provisions. Shall be regularized by the
national law of the person whose succession is in
question, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. Pursuant to this article, the validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the
national law of the testator in this case, Nevada, which
allows a testator to dispose of all his property
according to his will. The testamentary provisions of
the will, therefore are valid.
Fleumer vs. Hix
54 Phil 610
Facts: The petitioner is a special administrator of the
estate of Edward Hix. He alleged that the latter’s will
was executed in Elkins, West Virginia on November 3,
1925 by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction,
and that the laws of that state govern. To this end, the
petitioner submitted a copy of Section 3868 of Acts
1882, c.84 as found in West Virginia Code, annotated
by Hogg, Charles E., vol.2 1914, p. 1690 and as certified
to by the Director of National Library.
The Judge of the First Instance however denied the
probate of the will on the grounds that Sec 300 and
301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied
with. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Is it necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the
existence of such law in West Virginia as a prerequisite
to the allowance and recording of said will.
Held: Yes. The laws of the foreign jurisdiction do not
prove themselves in our courts. The courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the laws of the various states of the American
Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. Here the
requirements of the law were not met. There was no
showing that the book from which an extract was
taken was printed or published under the authority of
the state of West Virginia, as provided in Sec 30 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the
law attested by the certificate of the officer having
charge of the original, under the seal of the State of
West Virginia as provided in Sec 301. No evidence was
introduced showing that the extract from the laws of
West Virginia was in force at the time alleged will was
executed.
The court therefore did not err in denying the probate
of the will. The existence of such law in West Virginia
must be proved.
In Re: Estate of Suntay
95 Phil 500
Facts:
Facts: Jose B Suntay, the testator is a Filipino Citizen
and a resident of the Philippines. On May 14, 1934, he
died in the City of Amoy, Fookien Province, Republic of
China, leaving properties both in China and the
Philippines and nine children by the first marriage and
1 child by the second marriage with Maria Natividad
Billian, who survived him. On Oct 15, 1934, the
surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan
for the probate of the last will and testament claimed
to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929.
This petition was denied because of the loss of said will
and of insufficiency of the evidence to establish the
loss of said will. The petition was remanded to the CFI
of Bulacan after the Court overruled the decision on
appeal. Subsequently, the petition was dismissed on
February 7, 1938.
After the war, Silvino Suntay claiming he had found
among the files and documents of his father a will in
Chinese characters executed and signed by the
deceased on January 4, 1931 and filed, recorded and
probated in the Amoy District Court a petition praying
for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines
on November 1929 or of the will executed in Amoy,
Fookien, China on January 4, 1931.
Issue:
1. Has the existence of the said law been
proved?
2. What is the effect of the absence of proof to
the existence of said law?
Held:
1. The order of the Municipal District court of
Amoy China does not purport to probate or
allow the will which was the subject of the
proceedings. In view thereof, the will ans the
alleged probate thereof cannot be said to
have been done in accordance with the
accepted basic and fundamental concepts and
principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held
in the municipal district court of Amoy, China
cannot be deemed and accepted as
proceedings leading to the probate or
allowance of a will.
2. In the absence of proof that the municipal
district court of Amoy is a probate court and
on Chinese law of procedure in probate
matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or
allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the
same as those provided for in our laws on the
subject.
Theories Why We Should Apply Foreign Laws
Theory of Comity – foreign law is applied because of its
convenience & because we want to give protection to
our citizens, residents, & transients in our land.
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>Hilton vs. Guyot
Facts: Defendants Henry Hilton and William Libbey,
residents of New York and trading as co-partners in
Paris under the firm name of A.T. Stewart & Co. were
sued in France for debts due to a French firm, Charles
Fortich & Co. Gustave Guyot, liquidator of the French
firm, sued Hilton and Libbey on the French judgment in
the US Circuit Court for the Southern Distrtict of New
York seeking an amount totaling over $195,000. The
court held the judgment conclusive and entered a
decree in favor of the French firm without examination
anew the merits of the case.
Defendants question this decree on many grounds,
foremost of which that French courts gave no force
and effect to the duly rendered judgments of US courts
against French citizens.
Summary of ruling:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the
limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is
derived. The extent to which one nation shall be
allowed to operate within the dominion of another
nation, depends upon the "comity of nations."
"Comity" , in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, nor of mere courtesy and good
will. It is a recognition which one nation allows within
its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to int'l duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.
"The comity thus extended to other nations is no
impeachment of sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of
the nation by which it is offered, and is inadmissible
when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its
interests. But it contributes so largely to promote
justice between individuals, and to produce a friendly
intercourse between the sovereignty to which they
belong, that courts of justice have continually acted
upon it, as a part of the voluntary law of nations."
"It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of
the nation, which is administered and ascertained in
the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by
which all other principles of municipal law are
ascertained and guided."
Notes:
· Comity is a general principle of international law that
US Supreme Court has a long history of acknowledging.
· A respect of reciprocity between jurisdictions Respect
- we will not demean the laws and policies of other
countries, because we expect other ountries to
respect ours as well
Theory of Vested Rights – we seek to enforce not
foreign law itself but the rights that have been vested
under such foreign law; an act done in another State
may give rise to the existence of a right if the laws of
that State crated such right.
Theory of Local Law- we apply foreign law not because
it is foreign, but because our laws, by applying similar
rules, require us to do so; hence, it is as if the foreign
law has become part & parcel of our local law.
Theory of Harmony of Laws – we have to apply the
foreign laws so that wherever a case is decided, that is,
irrespective of the forum, the solution should be
approximately the same; thus, identical or similar
solutions anywhere & everywhere. When the goal is
realized, there will be “harmony of laws”
Theory of Justice – the purpose of all laws, including
Conflict of Laws, is the dispensing of justice; if this can
be attained in many cases applying the proper foreign
law, we must do so.
Nature and Proof of Foreign Judgment
Nature of foreign judgment – It is imperative that it be
proved in accordance with our prescribed rules on the
matter.
A foreign judgment is recognized when it is given the
same effect that it has in the state where it was
rendered with respect to the parties, the subject
matter of the action and the issues involved. Where
the foreign judgment is being presented as a defense
to the claim of the plaintiff, what is involved is the
recognition of a foreign judgment.
A foreign judgment is enforced when, in addition to
being recognized, a party is given affirmative relief to
which the judgment entitles him. When a plaintiff asks
the court of one state to carry out and make effective a
judgment obtained by him in another state, what is
involved is the enforcement of a foreign judgment.
Conditions for Recognition of Foreign Judgment
1. Foreign judgment was rendered by a judicial or a
quasi-judicial tribunal which had competent
jurisdiction over the parties and the case in the proper
judicial proceedings in which the defendant shall have
be given reasonable notice and the opportunity to be
heard;
2. It must be a judgment on civil and commercial
matters;
3. The judgment must be valid according to the
court that delivered it; and,
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4. Judgment must be final and executory to constitute
res judicata in another action;
ELEMENTS: The judgment must be:
a. Final;
b. Rendered by a competent court;
c. On the Merits Involve the same parties,
subject matter; and, cause of action.
5. Foreign judgment must not be contrary to the
public policy or the good morals of the State.
Querubin vs. Querubin
47 OG 316
Facts: A Filipino married an American lady with whom
he subsequently had a daughter. The man later
obtained a Californian divorce on account of his wife’s
adultery with another man. The custody of the
daughter was awarded to the innocent husband.
However, the court said that the child could not be
brought out of California without judicial permission. A
year later, the Filipino came back to the Philippines
with the child. In the meantime, the wife had married
her former paramour and had been able to obtain an
amendment for the divorce decree, this time granting
the custody of the child to her. To obtain enforcement
of this amendment in the Philippines, she brought a
petition for the will of habeas corpus in Ilocos Sur.
Issue: May she be awarded with the custody of the
child?
Held: No, under the Philippine law, two important
things stand out:
a. Preference in parental authority is given to
the father, not to the mother (Old Civil Code);
b. The guilty spouse generally loses parental
authority except if the child is under 7, there
should be no separation from the mother
unless there be compelling reasons therefore
(New Civil Code).
Kinds of Conflict Rules
 One-sided rule – when Philippine internal law
will apply.
Art 15, CC:
Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
 All-sided rule –when foreign law will apply.
Art 16, CC:
Real property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is
stipulated.
 However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said
property may be found.
Composition of Conflict Rules
Factual situation - set of facts presenting a conflicts
problem. Ex. Capacity to succeed
Point of contract – law of the country with which the
factual situation is most ultimately connected. Ex. Law
of the nation of the decedent
Status and Capacity
Silverio vs. Republic
When God created man,He made him in the likeness of
God;He created them male and female.
(Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by
Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the
bamboo.“Oh North Wind!North Wind!Please let us
out!,” the voices said.She pecked the reed once,then
twice.All of a sudden,the bamboo cracked and slit
open.Out came two human beings;one was a male and
the other was a female.Amihan named the man
“Malakas ”(Strong)and the woman “Maganda ”
(Beautiful).(The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman?
In particular,does the law recognize the changes made
by a physician using scalpel,drugs and counseling with
regard to a person ’s sex? May a person successfully
petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the
birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex
reassignment surgery?
Facts: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel
Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of
his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the RTC
of Manila, Branch 8,alleging that he is a male
transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female ” and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling
trapped in a man ’s body, he consulted several doctors
in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
“woman ” culminated on January 27,2001 when he
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. From then on,petitioner lived as a female and
was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to
have his name in his birth certificate changed from
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“Rommel Jacinto ” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male ”
to “female.”
On June 4,2003, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner, stating that granting the petition
would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity; that with his sexual re- assignment,
petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like
a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body
is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no
harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-
awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and
her fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari
in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law
allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by
reason of sex alteration. On February 23,2006, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the
Republic, and set aside the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the change of petitioner ’s name
and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court and RA
9048.
Held: No, RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Under the
said law, a petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
1. The petitioner finds the first name or
nickname to be ridiculous tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the
community;
3. Or the change will avoid confusion.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he
must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name.
Republic vs. Cagandahan
565 SCRA 72
Facts: Respondent Jennifer B. Cagandahan was
registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. In
her early years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy
and was found out that her ovarian structures had
minimized. Respondent Cagandahan also alleged that
she has no breasts or menstrual development.
Consequently, she was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)a condition where persons
thus afflicted possess secondary male characteristics
because of too much secretion of male hormones
(androgen).She then alleged that for all interests and
appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person.
Thus, she filed with the Regional Trial Court of Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate
such that her gender or sex be changed from female to
male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to
Jeff. The trial court granted the petition. Hence, this
instant petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering
the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent Cagandahan
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
In deciding this case, the Court considers the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various
degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial. “It has been suggested that
there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-
man’s land’ for those individuals who are neither truly
‘male’ nor truly ‘female’.”The current state of
Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person
be classified either as a male or as a female, but this
Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification.
The Court is of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the
individual, like Cagandahan, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Cagandahan here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the
gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like
Cagandahan, is fixed.
Respondent Cagandahan here has simply let nature
take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to
arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a
male. He could have undergone treatment and taken
steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body
into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He
chose not to do so.
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Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent
Cagandahan’s development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will
not dictate on Cagandahan concerning a matter so
innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due
to CAH. The Court will not consider Cagandahan as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in
order to become or remain as a female. Neither will
the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and
to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female,
as society commonly currently knows this gender of
the human species. Cagandahan is the one who has to
live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of
what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an “incompetent “and in
the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under
the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondent Cagandahan’s position and his personal
judgment of being a male.
In so ruling the Court do no more than give respect to
(1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, the Court respects Cagandahan’s congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court
cannot but respect how respondent Cagandahan deals
with his unordinary state and thus help make his life
easier, considering the unique circumstances in this
case
Characteristics of Status
1. Status is conferred principally by the state not
by the individual.
2. Status is a matter or public or social interest.
3. Status being a concept of social order cannot
easily be terminated at the mere will or desire
of the parties concerned.
4. Status is generally supposed to have a
universal character: when a certain status is
created by law of one country, it is
GENERALLY judicially recognized all over the
world.
Kinds of Capacity
Capacity to act – (active) power to do acts with legal
effects.
Juridical capacity – (passive) fitness to be the subject of
legal relations.

JURIDICAL CAPACITY CAPACITY TO ACT
fitness to be subject of Power to do acts with
legal relations (PASSIVE) legal effects (ACTIVE)
Inherent in every natural acquired
person
Lost only through death May be lost
Personal Law is the law that attaches to an individual
wherever he may go.
Theories of Personal Law
Nationality Theory - by virtue of which the status and
capacity of an individual are generally governed by the
law of his nationality. This is principally adopted in the
RP.
Domiciliary Theory - in general, the status, condition,
rights, obligations, & capacity of a person should be
governed by the law of his domicile.
Situs Theory - law of the place where property is
situated; the general rule is that real property is
governed by the law of the State where it is situated.
Nationality and Citizenship
Nationality – membership in an ethnic, social, racial
and cultural group.
Citizenship – membership in a political society.
Citizens of the Philippines
IN RP: 1987 CONSTI: ARTICLE 4: WHO ARE FILIPINO
CITIZENS?
1. Citizens of the Philippines at the time of adoption of
the 1987 Constitution (ratification on Feb 2, 1987;
effective Feb 11?)
2. Fathers and mothers are Filipino citizens
3. Born before January 17, 1973 + Filipino mothers +
elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching age of
majority
4. Naturalized according to law
*note: #s 1-3 are considered NATURAL-BORN Citizens
1. NATURAL BORN CITIZENS
-those who are citizens of a particular state w/o having
to perform any act to acquire or perfect citizenship
Jus soli principle Jus sanguinis principle
Looks to the law of the Rule of descent or blood
place of one's birth
You're a citizen of the Your citizenship depends
place of your birth on your parents
Followed in common law Followed in the Philippines
countries
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*most of the cases involved are with regards elections
because elective public officials from the President
down to Governor are required to be natural-born
citizens
TALAROC V. UY: JUS SOLI APPLIED BEFORE 1935
CONSTI
-Uy was born of Chinese father but of Filipino mother
in RP. His nationality was contested for election
purposes. Court held that Uy was a Filipino citizen by
virtue of being born in the Philippines, and the
adoption of the Jus Sanguinis principle did not effect
the exclusion of those who were already
considered citizens. Besides, he already exercised
rights which are only attributable to Filipino citizens.
CO V. HRET: CHILDREN OF FILIPINO MOTHERS
NEED NOT ELECT FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP IF THEY
HAD ALREADY ACQUIRED NATIONALITY WHEN
FATHER NATURALIZED
-Ong’s nationality contested, his father being Chinese.
Court held that since father was already naturalized
before he attained age of majority, he doesn’t have to
elect citizenship.
TECSON V. COMELEC: CONSTITUTION DOES NOT
QUALIFY CHILDREN TO LEGITIMATE OR
ILLEGITIMATE
-FPJ alleged to have followed nationality of mom. Since
he was allegedly born before parents were married, he
was deemed an illegitimate child. Court held that the
Constitution does not qualify children to legitimate or
illegitimate, as long as the child’s father is Filipino, then
he acquires citizenship of father which is Filipino
2. CITIZENS BY NATURALIZATION
NATURALIZATION
-confers to an alien a nationality
after birth
by any of the means provided by law (in RP: CA 473 as
amended)
QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPLICANTS OF
NATURALIZATION
1. AGE: Not less than 21 on date of HEARING the
petition (so could file while 20 y.o.)
2. RESIDENCE: resided in RP + Continuously + not less
than 10 years prior to application
3. Good moral character
Believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Consitution
Must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in RP in his relations w/ the constituted
government + community in which he is living
4. ECON: Own real estate + in RP + worth NOT LESS
THAN p5K
+ must have some lucrative trade/profession/lawful
occupation
5. LANGUAGE: able to SPEAK & WRITE
English/Spanish/any one of the principal Philippine
languages
6. CHILDREN & SCHOOL: enrolled minor children of
school age
…in any PUBLIC or PRIVATE SCHOOL recognized by the
Bureau of Private Schools
…where PHILIPPINE HISTORY
GOVERNMENT\
And CIVICS are taught or prescribed
as part of the school curriculum
…during the entire period of the residence required of
him (not less than 10 years)
…PRIOR TO HEARING of his PETITION for naturalization
as citizen
MORE DISCUSSION:
*On 10 yr-continuous residence requirement
Ratio: enable government to
*observe applicant's conduct
*ensure that applicant has imbibed the
principles and spirit of our Consti
When reduced to 5 years: Applicant… (Section 3, CA
473)
1. honorably held office under Gov't
2. Established a new industry or introduced a
useful invention in RP
3. Married to a Filipino woman
4. Engaged as a teacher (public or private - but
not int'l school) for 2 years
(note however YEE V. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, 7 SCRA 832: only Filipino citizens can be
public school teachers)
5. Born in RP
*On CHARACTER
-requires:
+Good Moral character
+conducted self in a PROPER + 1 ha (rural)
IRREPROACHABLE manner
Proper and Irreproachable conduct
-higher standard of morality than good moral character
-moral character of the highest degree, not enough to
be a law-abiding citizen (Dy Lam Go vs. Republic)
-EVIDENCE: testimony of 2 character witnesses
>well known in the community and enjoy such a high
reputation for probity (honesty/integrity), their word
may be taken on its face value
>can't be employees of the petitioner
>must have known applicant for the period prescribed
by law
>had opportunity to observe him personally
>can attest to the possession of the applicant of the
qualifications - e.g. proper and irreproachable conduct
during the entire period of residence
-on consti requirement: not merely recitation BUT
BELIEF!
*ON ECONOMIC REQUIREMENT
>REAL ESTATE worth P5k (min)
8
>lucrative trade, profession, lawful occupation
YU KIAN CHIE VS. REPUBLIC: PROOF OF
LUCRATIVE TRADE
-Chinese citizen applying for naturalization was held
not qualified because he failed to sufficiently prove
lucrative trade, he having only a small fixed income and
the rest of the amounts he allegedly received were all
depended on the profits made by the corporation.
(econ requirement continued)
Lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
-substantial gainful employment or the obtaining of
tangible receipts
-appreciable margin of income over expenses in order
to provide for adequate support for himself and his
family in the event of sickness, unemployment or
disability to work
-his financial condition must be such as to permit him
and the members of his family to live with reasonable
comfort, in accordance with the prevailing standard of
living, and consistently with the demands of human
dignity, at this stage of our civilization
-regard w/ caution if family business
Real estate requirement
-at odds with Article XII, Section 7 of 1987 Consti: "Save
in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain"
GR: Aliens can't own lands
X:
1. Intestate succession (Section 2, BP 185, effective
1982): allowed natural-born citizen who had lost his
Filipino citizenship to be a transferee of a private land
for residential purposes
...as long as it did not exceed 1,000 m2 (urban)
Why intestate: if otherwise, it would allow aliens to
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a
Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a
piece of land
2. In pari delicto: vendor (who knew that he was
selling to an alien) cannot file suit to void sale to an
alien (who cannot own land, and must have known it)
3. Foreigner later naturalized as a Filipino: purpose of
prohibition is to prevent the patrimony of our nation
for future generations of Filipinos; since vendee
already a Filipino, end would not be frustrated
*ON LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS
-not enough that applicant understands
*ON MINOR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
Ratio: for the children to learn and imbibe customs and
traditions and ideals of Filipinos to prepare them for a
life of responsible and law abiding citizenship
-should be complied with and proven
-insufficient finances not an excuse for failing to
comply with this requirement
-initial failure to comply with this requirement is a BAR
TO SUBSEQUENT PETITION even if during 2nd petition,
child no longer of school age (meaning, nakapag-aral
na sa ibang school not under the law)
-not allowed if predominantly composed of children of
a specific race (e.g. Chiang Kai Shek mostly caters
Chinese children)
Tecson vs. COMELEC
Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of President of
the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X.
Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a
petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due
course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation
in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie
Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a
Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that
Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier
based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on
two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004,
the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his
motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on
6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the
COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary
injunction or any other resolution that would stay the
finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824,
would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had
original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic
issue on the case.
9
Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to
be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the
Philippines.
Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses that "No person may be elected President
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty
years of age on the day of the election, and a resident
of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth
of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history,
four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus
soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue.
Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
person to being a “natural-born” citizen of the
Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935
Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made
by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on
the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate
of his parents, the only conclusions that could be
drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them
on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4)
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At
the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo
Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan
F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ,
and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public
officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the
totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively
that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has
utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the
parties to present their position and evidence, and to
prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-
Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful. The petitions were
dismissed.

Kilosbayan Foundation vs. Ermita
Valles vs. COMELEC
Facts: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,
1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to
the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco (Filipino) and Theresa
Marquez (Australian). In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since
then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well.
She served as Provincial Board Member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992,
she ran for and was elected governor of Davao
Oriental. Her election was contested by her opponent,
Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, alleging as
ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship.
However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent
had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Comelec
en banc dismissed the petition.
In the 1995 local elections, Rosalind Lopez ran
for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her
opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, First Division,
contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition
was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC.
The citizenship of private respondent was
once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11,
1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the
herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles. the COMELEC’s First
Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the
petition.
The Commission on Elections ruled that
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office
because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino
citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis
she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby
making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Sec 4
of CA 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her
Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as
certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and
(4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions,
declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for
the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that
the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that: (a) In 1988, private
respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued
Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated
September 19, 1988; (b) On even date, she applied for
the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
10
(ICR), and (c) She was issued Australian Passport No.
H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Issue: WON Rosalind Lopez is a Filipino citizen and
therefore qualified to run for public office
Held: Yes
Ratio: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to
the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth. Rosalind
Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace,
Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines
Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what
served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of
July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August
29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were
deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects
on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the
United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the
Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s
father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879
in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a
certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births.
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones
Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine
citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution
has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis
for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution
had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines
and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine
citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which
confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent,
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been
born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli,
then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the
assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino
citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine
citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner
cited private respondent’s application for an Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988,
and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on
March 3, 1988. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support
the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon
attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air
service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a
deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war,
unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by
renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioner’s contention that the application of private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and
her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue
was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in
the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that
the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of
a certificate stating that he is an American did not
mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was
not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship. And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and
COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent
Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was
11
holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a
year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-
mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American
nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that Rosalind Lopez was a
holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this
court in the case of Aznar, an application for an alien
certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s
citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and
her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of
her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private
respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian
and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the
fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in
another country has not been included as a ground for
losing one’s Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine
citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold
water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the
assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor
of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code
of 1991. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court
clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local
Government Code and reconciled the same with Article
IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of
different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a
disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance.
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had
dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her
from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was
ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is
enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the
filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing
of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in
the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is
a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an
effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed
her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone
terminated her Australian citizenship.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on
January 15 1992, private respondent executed a
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship,
duly registered in the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a
result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of
private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by
Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the
COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the
issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective,
petitioner’s claim that private respondent must go
through the whole process of repatriation holds no
water.
Petitioner maintains further that when
citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision
thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any
subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing
the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of
Immigration. He insists that the same issue of
citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule
is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of
citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,
an exception to this general rule was recognized. The
Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine
of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship,
the following must be present:
1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in
a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
representative took active part in the resolution
thereof, and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the
case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that
reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent
official findings, though not really binding, to make the
effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears
sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC
92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of
the herein private respondent. The evidence adduced
by petitioner is substantially the same evidence
presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to
show any new evidence or supervening event to
warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However,
the procedural issue notwithstanding, considered on
the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
12
Burca vs. Republic
Bengzon III vs. HRET (US Marines Corps, repatriation)
RE Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
(Ching)
Djumantan vs. Domingo (Marriage)
Mercado vs. Manzano (Edu Manzano)
Labo vs. COMELEC (Australian Citizenship)
RA 9225
AASJS vs. Datumanong (Secretary of Justice)
RA 9139
Common Wealth Act No 473
Legislative Naturalization
Domicile is that place where a person has certain
settled,fixed, legal relations because:
1. it is assigned to him by law at the MOMENT
OF BIRTH (domicile of origin).
2. It is assigned to him by law AFTER BIRTH on
account of legal disability caused for instance
by minority, insanity or marriage in the case of
a woman (constructive domicile or domicile
by operation of law).
3. he has a HOME there – that to which
whenever.
RA 9189
Macalintal vs. COMELEC
Rules on Domicile
1. No natural person must ever be without a
domicile
2. No person can have two or more domiciles at
the same time, except for certain purposes,
and from different legal viewpoints
3. Every sui juris may change his domicile
4. Once acquired, it remains the domicile unless
a new one is obtained:
a. By capacitated persons
b. With freedom of choice
c. With actual physical presence
d. And Provable intent that it should be one’s
fixed and permanent place of abode, there
should be animus manendi (intent to remain)
or animus nonrevertendi (intent not to
return).
5. The presumption is in favor of the
continuance of domicile. The burden of Proof
is on the one who alleges that a change of
domicile has taken place.
Romualdez, Marcos vs COMELEC
Aquino vs. COMELEC
Romualdez vs. RTC Tacloban
Renvoi
A procedure whereby a legal matter is referred by the
conflict of laws rules of the forum to a foreign state,
the conflict of laws rule of which, in turn refers the
matter back to the law of the forum (remission) or a
third state (transmission).

Bellis vs. Bellis

Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
Inter Country Adoption Law, RA 8043
Annulment, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Zamora vs. CA
Santos vs. CA
Republic vs. CA and Molina
Garcia-Recio vs. Recio
Perez vs. CA

13