SEC 5
stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
1. Aglipay v. Ruiz - 64 PHIL. 201
Alejandro, Ritz
Doctrine: The Court allowed for the issuance of religious commemorative stamps,
even if there were incidental benefits to the Church, since those benefits, if any,
were NOT the primary aim and purpose of the issuance of the stamps. The main
purpose being to generate profit and boost tourism.
Recit Ready
Director of Posts announced that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Mons. (Monsignor)
Gregorio Aglipay (Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church), seeks a writ
of prohibition to prevent Juan Ruiz (Director of Posts) from issuing and selling stamps
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. He contends that The
selling of these religious commemorative stamps are violative of the Constitution for
violating the separation of the Church and State.
Issue is W/N the selling of religious commemorative stamps are violative of the
Constitution.
The Court held that no it is not violative of the Constitution.
Act 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. Director of Posts is given the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would
be "advantageous to the Government.” The phrase "advantageous to the
Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize
the appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or
support of a particular sect or Church.
The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourists to this country." The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.
Thus, the petition was denied.
FACTS:
Date: March 13, 1937
Petitioner: Mons. Gregorio Aglipay (Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church)
Respondent: Juan Ruiz (Director of Posts)
Petition: Seeks writ of prohibition to prevent Ruiz from issuing and selling postage
May 1936
 Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the
issuance of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of
Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the
Roman Catholic Church.
o Aglipay, (considering it his civic duty) requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq. (Petitioner’s attorney), to denounce the matter to the
President of the Philippines.
o Despite the protest of Sotto, Ruiz proceeded and publicly
announce having sent to the United States the designs of the
postage stamps.
Stamps
 "In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border
design. The stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange,
1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50
centavos."
 issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold.
 The further sale is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein
Petitioner
 alleges this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section
13, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution
 "No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or
dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage, or leprosarium."
Respondent
 alleges the Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ
prayed for is granted.
 estimates the revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in
question at P1,618,179.10 and states that there still remain to be sold
stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
ISSUE: W/N the selling of religious commemorative stamps is violative of the
Constitution
HELD: NO
Principle of Separation of Church and State
 direct corollary to the mentioned constitutional provision
 recognized in the early stages of our Constitutional development and was
specifically inserted during the Treaty of Paris (=Dec. 10, 1989)
 what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere
religious toleration
Religious Freedom
 is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs
 Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to his Creator is recognized.
 In so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated.
 Preamble: "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy,”
o Filipinos manifested their intense religious nature and placed
unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men
and nations.
 The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here and
elsewhere:
o Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, ss.. 3, Art. VI, Const.
and sec. 1, ss. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law,
sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code).
o Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium
(sec. 13, ss. 3, Art. VI, Const.).
o Optional religious instruction in the public schools is by
constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Const. in relation
to sec. 928, Adm. Code).
o Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas
Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code)
because of the secular idea that their observance is conducive to
beneficial moral results.
o The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and
certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
Case at hand
 Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature
No. 4052 AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR
TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES
AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Sec. 1 60k appropriated and made immediately available out of any funds in the
Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the cost of plates and printing of
postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
Sec. 2 The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of
the amount herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government.
Act 4052
 contemplates no religious purpose in view
 Director of Posts is given the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous to the
Government.”
 But the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or Church.
Case at hand (continuation…)
 issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any
sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination
 stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church
 Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church.
 the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists to this country."
 The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered
of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people"
 the stamps' as actually designed and printed instead of showing a Catholic
Church chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and
the location of the City of Manila with inscription "Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 37, 1937.”
 Emphasis: not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of
the Philippines, as the seat of that congress
  while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be
inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the
aim and purpose of the Government
 Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of
incidental results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in
view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation.
 The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to
mere incidental results not contemplated.
Care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing
is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the
Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution.
We have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in
the case at bar. Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps
with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government.”
Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken,
a gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act
assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
2. Garces v. Estenzo - 104 SCRA 510
Chung, Lynnette E. date: May 25, 1981
Recit Ready:
Resolutions were adopted in a certain barangay in Ormoc city stating that they will buy
a wooden statue of a patron saint for the upcoming fiesta in their barangay. The statue
will be places in the church during the fiesta proper but will be kept by the hermano
mayor of the fiesta, as designated by the council, afterwards. The father of the church
doesn’t want to surrender the statue. He also questioned the constitutionality of the
resolutions. HELD: the resolutions are valid. The statue was bought using private
money (from selling tickets and donations) and the questioned resolutions do not
directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate
public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest, or clergyman. There is
nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the
barrio. then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint (such as
the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.
Parties:
Petitioner – Andres Garces is a member of Aglipayan Church
Respondent – Numeriano Estenzo is the presiding Judge in Ormoc Leyte
Petition:
The petitioners want to declare the Resolutions 5, 6, 10 and 12 Unconstitutional as it
violates, among others, Article III section 4 of the constitution.
Facts:
Barangay council of Ormoc Leyte adopted Resolution 5 which states “reviving the
traditional socio-religious celebration every April 5 as the feast day of Senor San
Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia”
The resolution also designated the members of 9 committees who would take charge
of the fiesta.
the resolution also provided for the following:
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
the construction of a waiting shed as one of the baranggay’s project.
the funds for the 2 projects mentioned above would be obtained through the selling of
tickets and cash donations. (so simply, a fund-raising will be held, the money is not
from the appropriation of the government. – so this is private money in a sense)
Resolution 6 – stipulates that the hermano mayor (the chairman of the feast) will be
the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image will remain in his
residence for one year until the election of his successor as chairman of the next
fiesta. Also, this resolution stated that on the day of the fiesta, the image will be put in
the Catholic parish church.
the issue started when after the mass, the parish priest (Father Sergio Marilao
Osmena) refused to return the image to the barangay council saying that the church
funds were used for its acquisition. (san kaya nya napulot to? HAHAHA)
Because of the refusal of Father Osmena to surrender the image to the barangay
council, the council enacted Resolution 10 authorizing the hiring of a lawyer to file a
replevin case against Father Osmena and for the recovery of the image. + Resolution
12 appointing Veloso (the barangay captain) as the representative in the replevin
case.
The replevin case was filed in Ormoc City against Father Osmena and the image was
surrendered subsequently (susuko naman pala eh! pero may huling hirit!) in Father’s
answer, he questioned the constitutionality of the said resolutions.
Later, pumasok na sa scene si Andres Garces (a member of the Aglipayan Church)
with 2 catholic laymen). They filed against the barangay council and its members a
complaint in the CFI at Ormoc City praying for the annulment of the said resolutions.
lower court dismissed the case. (the case discussed about the voting thing in the
barangay which is irrelevant to our topic)
ISSUE: WON Resolution 5, 6, 10, 12 are unconstitutional as they violate Art III Sec 4
of the Constitution?
Res 5 – they will but an image of a patron saint using money from selling of tickets
and donations.
Res 6 – designates who will keep the image (will not be kept in the church)
Res 10 – allows the council to hire a lawyer to file a replevin case against the father
who doesn’t want to surrender the image
Res 12 – Designates Veloso as the representative for the replevin case.
HELD: The resolutions are VALID.
The questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor
abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of
any sect, priest, or clergyman.
The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax money
the construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter.
the wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio
fiesta honoring the patron saint, and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor
interfering with religious matters or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents.
One of the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the
patron saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated.
there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint
for the barrio. then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint
(such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal.
The Barangay council designated a layman as the custodian of the wooden image in
order to forestall any suspicion that it is favoring the Catholic church.
There is no question that the image belongs to the barangay council. Father
Osmena’s claim that it belongs to his church is wrong. The barangay council, as the
owner of the image, has the right to determine who should have custody thereof.
Abad Santos concurring
Images of saints are not worshipped; they are venerated. There can be no doubt that
the statute was bought using private funds raised by the barangay council which also
decided who should have custody of it. How the cura parroco got it into his head that
he should have custody of the statue defied logic.
some notes:
Replevin, also known as "claim and delivery," is an action to recover personal property
that was wrongfully taken or detained. Unlike other forms of legal recovery, replevin
seeks the return of the actual thing itself, as opposed to money damages (the more
commonly-sought after remedy).
3. School District v. Schempp [374 U.S. 203 (1963)]
Tolentino, Hazel
Doctrine:
To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there must be (1) a secular
legislative purpose and (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Recit-Ready:
This is a consolidation of two cases. In the first case, the Schmepp family
assailed as unconstitutional a Pennsylvania law which required public schools to recite
verses from the Holy Bible, without comment, at the start of each school day since it
violated their freedom of religion. In the second case, Mrs. Murray and her son
questioned the constitutionality of a rule adopted by the Baltimore City Board of
School Commissioners which required the a reading of the Holy Bible and/or a
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer during morning exercises in all the city’s schools for,
again, violating the freedom of religion. The Court held that the Pennsylvania law and
the Baltimore rule were unconstitutional because they were partial towards a particular
religion and therefore failed the requisites of the Establishment Clause. This clause
stated that laws must have (1) a secular legislative purpose and (2) a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Facts:
The case is a consolidation of two cases which involved religious practices
in public schools. In the first case, Pennsylvania passed a law which required:
“At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at
the opening of each public school each day. Any child shall be excused
from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon written
request of his parent or guardian.”
The Schempp family, members of the Unitarian Church, contested that the law was
unconstitutional since it was contrary to their religious beliefs.
In the second case, the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore city
adopted a rule which provided for the holding of opening exercises in the city’s
schools. These exercises consisted of reading, without comment, a chapter in the
Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord’s Prayer. This was contested by Mrs. Madalyn
Murray and her son, who were both atheists.
Schmepp’s and Murray’s arguments were both essentially that the laws
violated their right to freedom of religion and the separation of church and state.
Issue:
WON the laws were violated the freedom of religion and the separation of church and
state.
Held: Yes.
The State must be neutral with regard to religion. The laws in the case at
bar, however, were violated the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause
prohibited the fusion of governmental and religious functions. It stated that to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there must be (1) a secular
legislative purpose and (2) a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
In the case at bar, the morning exercises of reading the Holy Bible and/or reciting the
Lord’s Prayer were religious in character – specifically Christian. The fact that students
could opt not to go if they had parental consent is immaterial since the law still worked
in favor of a religion. Hence, they fail both the first and the second requisites of the
Establishment Clause.

Moreover, though the Free Exercise Clause ensured the right of the
individual to freely choose their own religion free of any compulsion from the State,
this does not mean that the State can be used to practice people’s beliefs. As
mentioned above, the State must always be religion-neutral. The two assailed laws
therefore are unconstitutional because even though people are free to practice their
religion, the two laws served to benefit one particular religion.
4. Board of Education v. Allen - 392 US 236
Fellone, Mich
DOCTRINE:
1. Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function, perform the task of
secular education, and, on the basis of this meager record, the Court cannot
agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or
that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that secular
textbooks furnished to students are in fact instrumental in teaching religion.
2.
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general
program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the
request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the
State. Thus, no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the
financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.
SUMMARY:
 New York's Education Law [Sec 701], requires local public school
authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades seven
to 12, including those in private schools Appellant school boards sought a
declaration that the statutory requirement was invalid as violative of the
State and Federal Constitutions, an order barring appellee Commissioner of
Education from removing appellants' members from office for failing to
comply with it, and an order preventing the use of state funds for the
purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial students.
 The statute does not violate the Establishment or the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.
(1) The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of
educational opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes
available to all children the benefits of a general program to lend school
books free of charge, and the financial benefit is to parents and children,
not to schools.
(2) There is no evidence that religious books have been loaned, and it
cannot be assumed that school authorities are unable to distinguish
between secular and religious books or that they will not honestly
discharge their duties to approve only secular books.
(3) Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function, perform the
task of secular education, and, on the basis of this meager record, the
Court cannot agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian
school is religious or that the intertwining of secular and religious
training is such that secular textbooks furnished to students are in fact
instrumental in teaching religion.
(4) In the absence of specific evidence, and based solely on judicial
notice, it cannot be concluded that the statute results in unconstitutional
state involvement with religious instruction or violates the Establishment
Clause.
(5) Since appellants have not shown that the law coerces them in any
way in the practice of religion, there is no violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.
FACTS
 SEC 701 is a law of the State of New York which requires local public
school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grades
seven through 12 including students attending private schools. The law
authorizes the loan of textbooks to students attending parochial schools
o Sec. 701 of the Education law of New York State authorized public
school boards to designate textbooks for use in the public schools, to
purchase such books with public funds and to rent or sell the books to
public school students.
o In 1965, the legislature amended Sec. 701 based on the findings that
the public welfare and safety requires the state and local communities
to give assistance to educational programs.
o Beginning 1966-1967 schoool year, local school boards were required
to purchase textbooks and lend them without charge to all children
residing in the district who are enrolled in grades 7-12 of a public or
private school. The books now loaned are textbooks which are
designated for use in any public, elementary, or secondary schools of
the state or are approved by any boards of education which according
to the 1966 amendment , “a pupil required to use as a text for a
semester or more in a particular class in the school he legally attends.”
 Appellant Board of Education (BOE) of Central School District No. 1
brought suit in NY courts against James Allen (who was then
Commissioner of Education of the State of NY). The BOE allege that
Sec. 701 violated both State and Federal Constitution. BOE claims that the
law requires them to lend books as well to parochial schools students which
violates the first and fourteenth amendment.
 The situation complained by BOE was if BOE fails to lend books to
parochial school students within their counties, appellee Allen would remove
BOE from office. Hence,BOE sought that Sec. 701 was invalid and pleas to
bar Allen from removing BOE from office for failing to comply with the law
and to restrain Allen from apportioning state funds to school districts for
purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial students.
 The trial court held the law unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments and entered summary judgment for appellants on the
pleadings;
 The Appellate Division reversed and ordered the complaint dismissed since
appellant school boards had no standing to attack the statute
  The New York Court of Appeals held that appellants did have standing but
that the statute did not violate the State or Federal Constitution
 The Court of Appeals said that the law was to benefit all school children,
without regard to the type of school attended, that only textbooks approved
by school authorities could be loaned. Therefore, 701 was completely
neutral with respect to religion, merely making secular textbooks at the
request of the individual student regardless where he attends school. Sec.
701 is not a law which “establishes a religion or constitutes the use of public
funds to aid religious schools”
ISSUE: Whether the statute violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments? -
NO
HELD
 The court held in Everson v Board of Education, the Establishment Clause
bars a state from passing laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another and bars any tax in any amount, large or
small, levied to support any religious activities or institutions whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.
o In this case the New Jersey State reimbursed parents for expenses
incurred in busing their children to parochial schools.
o The Establishment Clause does not prevent a State from extending the
benefits of state laws to all citizens without regard for their religious
affiliation and does not prohibit "New Jersey from spending tax raised
funds to pay the bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a
general program under which it pays the fares of pupils attending
public and other schools. The statute was held to be valid even though
one of its results was that "children are helped to get to church schools
and some of the children might not be sent to church schools if parents
were compelled to pay children’s bus fares out of their own pockets.
 Everson and later cases have shown that the line between state neutrality
to religion and state support of religion is not easy to locate.
o However, the court fashioned a test to distinguish between forbidden
involvements of the State with religion and those contacts which
the Establishment Clause permits: (manifested by the law’s purpose
and primary effect)
1. Must not exceed the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution
2. there must be a secular legislative purpose
3. must have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion
 The statute upheld in Everson would be considered a law having "a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion." We reach the same result with respect to the New York law
requiring school books to be loaned free of charge to all students in
specified grades. The express purpose of Sec 701 was stated by the
New York Legislature to be furtherance of the educational
opportunities available to the young.
 BOE have shown us nothing about the necessary effects of the statute that
is contrary to its stated purpose
 The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general
program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at
the request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in
the State. Thus, no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools,
and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools
 The books loaned are those required by the parochial school for use in
specific courses, each book loaned must be approved by the public school
authorities; only secular books may receive approval.
o The law was construed by the Court of Appeals of New York as
"merely making available secular textbooks at the request of the
individual student,", and the record contains no suggestion that
religious books have been loaned.
o Absent evidence, we cannot assume that school authorities, who
constantly face the same problem in selecting textbooks for use in
the public schools, are unable to distinguish between secular and
religious books, or that they will not honestly discharge their
duties under the law. In judging the validity of the statute on this
record, we must proceed on the assumption that books loaned to
students are books that are not unsuitable for use in the public
schools because of religious content.
 Parochial schools, in addition to their sectarian function, perform the task of
secular education, and, on the basis of this meager record, the Court cannot
agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or
that the intertwining of secular and religious training is such that secular
textbooks furnished to students are in fact instrumental in teaching religion.
o Americans care about the quality of the secular education available to
their children. They have considered high quality education to be an
indispensable ingredient for achieving the kind of nation, and the kind
of citizenry, that they have desired to create. Considering this attitude,
the continued willingness to rely on private school systems, including
parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of informed
opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an
acceptable job of providing secular education to their students This
judgment is further evidence that parochial schools are performing, in
addition to their sectarian function, the task of secular education.
o we cannot agree with appellants either that all teaching in a sectarian
school is religious or that the processes of secular and religious
training are so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to students
by the public are, in fact, instrumental in the teaching of religion.
 In the absence of specific evidence, and based solely on judicial notice, it
cannot be concluded that the statute results in unconstitutional state
involvement with religious instruction or violates the Establishment Clause.
o Nothing in this record supports the proposition that all textbooks,
whether they deal with mathematics, physics, foreign languages,
 history, or literature, are used by the parochial schools to teach
religion. No evidence has been offered about particular schools,
particular courses, particular teachers, or particular books We are
unable to hold, based solely on judicial notice, that this statute results
in unconstitutional involvement of the State with religious instruction, or
that § 701, for this or the other reasons urged, is a law respecting the
establishment of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment.
 Since appellants have not shown that the law coerces them in any way in
the practice of religion, there is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
OPINIONS
CONCURRING
Justice Harlan
 The attitude of government toward religion must, as this Court has
frequently observed, be one of neutrality. Neutrality is, however, a coat of
many colors. It requires that government neither engage in nor compel
religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between
religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief."
 Realization of these objectives entails "no simple and clear measure” by
which this or any case may readily be decided, but these objectives do
suggest the principles which I believe to be applicable in the present
circumstances. I would hold that, where the contested governmental activity
is calculated to achieve nonreligious purposes otherwise within the
competence of the State, and where the activity does not involve the State
"so significantly and directly in the realm of the sectarian as to give rise to . .
. divisive influences and inhibitions of freedom, it is not forbidden by the
religious clauses of the First Amendment.
 In my opinion, § 701 of the Education Law of New York does not employ
religion as its standard for action or inaction, and is not otherwise
inconsistent with these principles.
DISSENTING
Justice Black
 I believe the New York law held valid is a flat, flagrant, open violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments which, together, forbid Congress or state
legislatures to enact any law "respecting an establishment of religion.
 upholding a State's power to pay bus or streetcar fares for school children
cannot provide support for the validity of a state law using tax raised funds
to buy school books for a religious school. The First Amendment's bar to
establishment of religion must preclude a State from using funds levied from
all of its citizens to purchase books for use by sectarian schools, which,
although "secular," realistically will in some way inevitably tend to propagate
the religious views of the favored sect. Books are the most essential tool of
education, since they contain the resources of knowledge which the
educational process is designed to exploit
 With respect to the case at bar, state financial support actively and directly
assists the teaching and propagation of sectarian religious viewpoints in
clear conflict with the First Amendment's establishment bar; with respect to
the Everson case, the State merely provides a general and
nondiscriminatory transportation service in no way related to substantive
religious views and beliefs.
Justice Douglas
 The Act provides an “individual request" for an eligible textbook (§ 701,
subd. 3), but the State Education Department has ruled that a pupil may
make his request to the local public board of education through a "private
school official.
 Local boards have accordingly provided for those requests to be made by
the individual or "by groups or classes." And forms for textbook requisitions
to be filled out by the head of the private school are provided. The role of
the local public school board is to decide whether to veto the selection
made by the parochial school. This is done by determining first whether the
text has been or should be "approved" for use in public schools, and,
second, whether the text is "secular," "nonreligious," or "nonsectarian.
 The local boards apparently have broad discretion in exercising this veto
power. Thus, the statutory system provides that the parochial school will ask
for the books that it wants. Can there be the slightest doubt that the head of
the parochial school will select
 If the board of education supinely submits by approving and
supplying the sectarian or sectarian-oriented textbooks, the struggle
to keep church and state separate has been lost. If the board resists,
then the battle line between church and state will have been drawn,
and the contest will be on to keep the school board independent or to
put it under church domination and control. The textbook loan program
"is that there is no reliable standard by which secular and religious
textbooks can be distinguished from each other.
Justice Fortas
 despite the transparent camouflage that the books are furnished to
students, the reality is that they are selected and their use is prescribed by
the sectarian authorities. The child must use the prescribed book. He cannot
use a different book prescribed for use in the public schools. The State
cannot choose the book to be used. It is true that the public school boards
must "approve" the book selected by the sectarian authorities, but this has
no real significance. The purpose of these provisions is to hold out promise
that the books will be "secular"
 This is not a "general" program. It is a specific program to use state funds to
buy books prescribed by sectarian schools which, in New York, are primarily
Catholic, Jewish, and Lutheran sponsored schools.
o It could be called a "general" program only if the school books made
available to all children were precisely the same - - the books selected
 for and used in the public schools. But this program is not one in which
all children are treated alike, regardless of where they go to school.
This program, in its unconstitutional features, is hand-tailored to satisfy
the specific needs of sectarian schools.
· of the sovereign in religious activity."
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman - 403 US 602
Reyes, Phoebe
RECIT READY: These two appeals raise questions as to Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary and secondary
schools. Both statutes are challenged as violative of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial support to
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.
Rhode Island has adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to teachers in
nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary. Under each
statute, state aid has been given to church-related educational institutions. The Court
held that both statutes are unconstitutional.
FACTS:
Appeal from US District Court raising question of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island
statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools.
Pennsylvania has adopted a statutory program that provides financial support to
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular subjects.
It is limited to secular subjects (math, science, PE, foreign language) and prohibits
reimbursement for any course that contains any matter relating to religious teaching. It
was passed in response to a crisis in State's nonpublic schools due to rapidly rising
costs. District Court held the Act violated neither the Establishment nor the Free
Exercise Clause. This Court reversed.
Rhode Island has adopted a statute under which the State pays directly to teachers in
nonpublic elementary schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary. A teacher
applying for a salary supplement must first agree in writing "not to teach a course in
religion for so long as or during such time as he or she receives any salary
supplements" under the Act. These should also be subjects taught in State public
schools. The District Court concluded that the Act violated the Establishment Clause,
holding that it fostered "excessive entanglement" between government and religion. In
addition, two judges thought that the Act had the impermissible effect of giving
"significant aid to a religious enterprise." This Court affirmed.
In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with
reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to afford protection: "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement
Three tests: First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion."
Both the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes had no legislative intent to advance
religion, but was intended to enhance secular education. However, they have also
recognized that church-related elementary and secondary schools have a significant
religious mission, and that a substantial portion of their activities is religiously oriented.
We conclude that the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and
religion.
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between
government and religious organizations is inevitable. The line of separation, far from
being a "wall," is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship.
The entanglement in the Rhode Island program arises because of requirement to
continue state surveillance to ensure that the statutory restrictions are obeyed and the
First Amendment otherwise respected. Furthermore, under the Act, the government
must inspect school records to determine what part of the expenditures is attributable
to secular education, as opposed to religious activity, in the event a nonpublic school's
expenditures per pupil exceed the comparable figures for public schools.
Similarly, the Pennsylvania program also arises from the restrictions and surveillance
necessary to ensure that teachers play a strictly non ideological role and the state
supervision of nonpublic school accounting procedures required to establish the cost
of secular, as distinguished from religious, education. Historically, governmental
control and surveillance measures tend to follow cash grant programs, and here the
government's post-audit power to inspect the financial records of church-related
schools creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.
Douglas, concurring:
There is entanglement here. The surveillance or supervision of the States needed to
police grants involved in these three cases, if performed, puts a public investigator into
every classroom and entails a pervasive monitoring of these church agencies by the
secular authorities. Moreover, when taxpayers of many faiths are required to
contribute money for the propagation of one faith, the Free Exercise Clause is
infringed. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. The taxpayers' forced contribution to the parochial
schools in the present cases violates the First Amendment.
6. Tilton v. Richardson - 403 US 672
Ignacio, Quina
(maiksi lang to PRAMIS. hehe.)
Doctrine: Criterion for legislative acts regarding religion
1. Does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose?
3. Does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion?
4. Does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion?
This is a case questioning the constitutionality of the Higher Education Facilities
Act, 1963: which authorizes federal grants and loans to “institutions of higher
education” for the construction of a wide variety of academic facilities. Under the Act
no part of the project may be used for sectarian instruction, religious worship, or the
programs of a divinity school, pursuant to the provision § 751(a)(2) in the Act which
excludes such from being beneficiaries. The US retains a 20-year interest in any
facility constructed with Act's funds, and can recover should any of the recipients
violate statutory conditions.
Appellants in this case are citizens & taxpayers, and residents of Connecticut,
questioning several schools that have availed the benefits under the Act. The schools
and facilities in question are:
library – Sacred Heart University
music, drama & arts building – Annhurst College
science building – Fairfield University
library – Fairfield University
language laboratory – Albertus Magnus College
Defendant schools have shown that they have complied with statutory conditions and
that their religious affiliations do not interfered in the performance of their secular
education functions.
The Court held that the Act itself specified that it authorizes federal grants and loans
to “institutions of higher education,” which does not exclude schools which have
religious affiliation or schools which are sponsored by religious bodies. What it
prohibits is the use of such facilities for religious purposes. Since the Act itself only
says “institutions of higher education,” it must be construed to include church-related
colleges and universities.
FOUR QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED: (please take note)
1. Does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose? YES, Congress’ objective of
providing more opportunity for college education is a legitimate secular goal entirely
appropriate for governmental education
2. Is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit religion? YES, the 20-year
period prevents the Act from advancing religion, but after it expires it virtually leaves
no limit to the schools with what purpose the facilities could be used for.
3. Does the administration of the Act foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion? NO, these schools are not concerned with religious indoctrination, nor is
it a substantial purpose for any of these schools. In fact, students and faculty who are
not part of the religious sect have been accepted into the following universities. There
is no possibility of the government unintentionally advancing religion, where intensive
government surveillance will not be needed.
4. Does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise of religion? NO,
appellants were unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of
their religious beliefs.
COURT RULING: Not violative of Religious Clauses in the First Amendment, but the
20-year period does. Case remanded to district court for judgment.
7. Country of Allegheny v. ACLU - 57 LW 504
Serpa Juan, Dustine
Doctrine: a practice which touches upon religion, if it is to be permissible under the
Establishment Clause, must not, inter alia, advance or inhibit religion in its principal or
primary effect
Recit Ready:
The US Supreme Court in this case is considering the constitutionality of two recurring
holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh. The first, a nativity
scene (crèche), was placed on the grand staircase of the Allegheny County
Courthouse. The second of the holiday display in question was an 18-foot (5.5 m)
public Hanukkah menorah, which was placed just outside the City-County Building
next to the city's 45-foot (14 m) decorated Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty.
The legality of the Christmas tree display was not considered in this case.
Respondents, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
and seven local residents, filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin the county from
displaying the creche and the city from displaying the menorah on the ground that the
displays violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable
to state governments by the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court denied relief,
relying on Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, which held that a city's inclusion of a
creche in its annual Christmas display in a private park did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals reversed, distinguishing Lynch v.
Donnelly and holding that the creche and the menorah in the present case must be
understood as an impermissible governmental endorsement of Christianity and
Judaism under Lemon v. Kurtzman. The Court held that the The Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from appearing to take positions regarding religious
belief, as established in the First Amendment. This seeks to prevent the State from
promoting and established religion. The government must remain secular; it may
recognize the holiday’s secular aspects but it cannot go as far as to suggest that the
people praise the Christian God for the birth of Jesus Christ. The judgment is affirmed
in part and reverse in part, thus the cases are remanded. The Court held that the the
County of Allegheny violated the Establishment Clause as far as the creche is
concerned. n a 5-to-4 decision,, the majority the held that the County of Allegheny
violated the Establishment Clause by displaying a creche in the county courthouse,
because the “principle or primary effect” of the display was to advance religion within
the meaning of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), when viewed in its overall context.
Moreover, in contrast to Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), nothing in the crèche’s setting
detracted from that message. The Court also held, however, that not all religious
celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause. Six of the
justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was constitutionally
legitimate given its "particular physical setting.” A different majority held that the
menorah display did not have the prohibited effect of endorsing religion, given its
"particular physical setting". Its combined display with a Christmas tree and a sign
saluting liberty did not impermissibly endorse both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but
simply recognized that both Christmas and Hanukkah are part of the same winter-
holiday season, which, the Court found, had attained a secular status in U.S. society.
CRECHE = UNCONSTITUTIONAL EFFECT | MENORAH = CONSTITUTIONAL
Facts: (This is a long case with different majorities and dissentings, attached at the
end is a table summary)
Since 1981, the Holy Name Society of Pittsburgh had placed a crèche on the grand
staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse. In 1986, the county also placed
poinsettia plants and two Christmas trees around the crèche. The creche was donated
by the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, and bore a sign to that effect. Its
manger had at its crest an angel bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis
Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the Highest.”
The Pittsburgh City-County Building (serving as City Hall) is separate from the
courthouse, and is jointly owned by the city and county. The city had placed a 45-foot
Christmas tree in front of the building "for a number of years." In 1986, the city placed
a plaque beneath the tree with the mayor's name, entitled "Salute to Liberty." Below
the title, the sign stated: "During this holiday season, the city of Pittsburgh salutes
liberty. Let these festive lights remind us that we are the keepers of the flame of liberty
and our legacy of freedom." Since 1982, the city had also placed a menorah with the
Christmas tree in front of the City-County Building. The city did not own the menorah,
but placed, removed, and stored it each year. The menorah was owned by Chabad
House, Pittsburgh's Lubavitch Center.
On December 10, 1986, the Greater Pittsburgh Chapter of the ACLU and seven local
residents sued the city of Pittsburgh and the county of Allegheny. The lawsuit sought
to enjoin the county from displaying the crèche in the courthouse, and the city from
displaying the menorah in front of the city-county building. Chabad was allowed to
intervene to defend the menorah. The plaintiffs argued that the displays violated the
Establishment Clause, applicable via the Fourteenth Amendment. On May 8, 1987,
the District Court denied the injunction to remove either the crèche or the menorah.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling, stating
that the two displays each violated the Establishment Clause. The county, city, and
Chabad all subsequently filed petitions for certiorari.
The US Supreme Court in this case considered the constitutionality of two recurring
holiday displays located on public property in downtown Pittsburgh. The first, a creche
depicting the Christian nativity scene, was placed on the Grand Staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse, which is the "main," "most beautiful," and "most public"
part of the courthouse. The creche was donated by the Holy Name Society, a Roman
Catholic group, and bore a sign to that effect. Its manger had at its crest an angel
bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the
Highest." The second of the holiday displays in question was an 18-foot Chanukah
menorah or candelabrum, which was placed just outside the City-County Building next
to the city's 45-foot decorated Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign
bearing the mayor's name and containing text declaring the city's "salute to liberty."
The menorah is owned by Chabad, a Jewish group, but is stored, erected, and
removed each year by the city.
Issue/s: WON the displays (creche and menorah) violated the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment
Ruling: CRECHE = UNCONSTITUTIONAL EFFECT | MENORAH =
CONSTITUTIONAL
The Court held that the the County of Allegheny violated the Establishment Clause as
far as the creche is concerned. In a 5-to-4 decision, the majority the held that the
County of Allegheny violated the Establishment Clause by displaying a creche in the
county courthouse, because the “principle or primary effect” of the display was to
advance religion within the meaning of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), when viewed in its
overall context. Moreover, in contrast to Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), nothing in the
crèche’s setting detracted from that message. The Court also held, however, that not
all religious celebrations on government property violated the Establishment Clause.
Six of the justices concluded that the display involving the menorah was
constitutionally legitimate given its "particular physical setting."
A different majority held that the menorah display did not have the prohibited effect of
endorsing religion, given its "particular physical setting". Its combined display with a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty did not impermissibly endorse both the
Christian and Jewish faiths, but simply recognized that both Christmas and Hanukkah
are part of the same winter-holiday season, which, the Court found, had attained a
secular status in U.S. society.
Justine Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-A, IV,
and V, concluding that:
1. Under Lemon v. Kurtzman, a "practice which touches upon religion, if it
is to be permissible under the Establishment Clause," must not, inter alia, "advance
[or] inhibit religion in its principal or primary effect." Although, in refining the definition
of governmental action that unconstitutionally "advances" religion, the Court's
subsequent decisions have variously spoken in terms of "endorsement," "favoritism,"
"preference," or "promotion," the essential principle remains the same: the Clause, at
the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief or from "making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community."
2. When viewed in its overall context, the creche display violates the
Establishment Clause. The creche angel's words endorse a patently Christian
message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ. Moreover, in contrast to Lynch,
nothing in the creche's setting detracts from that message. Although the government
may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, it may not observe it as a
Christian holy day by suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.
3. Justice Kennedy's reasons for permitting the creche on the Grand
Staircase and his condemnation of the Court's reasons for deciding otherwise are
unpersuasive.
(a) History cannot legitimate practices like the creche display that
demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular sect or creed.
(b) The question whether a particular practice would constitute
governmental proselytization is much the same as the endorsement inquiry, except to
the extent the proselytization test requires an "obvious" allegiance between the
government and the favored sect. This Court's decisions, however, impose no such
burden on demonstrating that the government has favored a particular sect or creed,
but, to the contrary, have required strict scrutiny of practices suggesting a
denominational preference.
(c) The Constitution mandates that the government remain secular, rather
than affiliating itself with religious beliefs or institutions, precisely in order to avoid
discriminating against citizens on the basis of their religious faiths. Thus, the claim that
prohibiting government from celebrating Christmas as a religious holiday discriminates
against Christians in favor of nonadherents must fail, since it contradicts the
fundamental premise of the Establishment Clause itself. In contrast, confining the
government's own Christmas celebration to the holiday's secular aspects does not
favor the religious beliefs of non-Christians over those of Christians, but simply
permits the government to acknowledge the holiday without expressing an
impermissible allegiance to Christian beliefs.
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Stevens, concluded in Part III-B that the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Lynch v. Donnelly set forth the proper
analytical framework for determining whether the government's display of
objects having religious significance improperly advances religion.
Justice Blackmun concluded in Part VI that the menorah display does not have the
prohibited effect of endorsing religion, given its "particular physical setting." Its
combined display with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty does not
impermissibly endorse both the Christian and Jewish faiths, but simply recognizes that
both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter holiday season, which has
attained a secular status in our society. The widely accepted view of the Christmas
tree as the preeminent secular symbol of the Christmas season emphasizes this point.
The tree, moreover, by virtue of its size and central position in the display, is clearly
the predominant element, and the placement of the menorah beside it is readily
understood as simply a recognition that Christmas is not the only traditional way of
celebrating the season. The absence of a more secular alternative to the menorah
negates the inference of endorsement. Similarly, the presence of the mayor's sign
confirms that, in the particular context, the government's association with a religious
symbol does not represent sponsorship of religious beliefs, but simply a recognition of
cultural diversity. Given all these considerations, it is not sufficiently likely that a
reasonable observer would view the combined display as an endorsement or
disapproval of his individual religious choices.
Justice O’Connor also concluded that the city's display of a menorah, together with a
Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, does not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Christmas tree, whatever its origins, is widely viewed today as a secular symbol
of the Christmas holiday. Although there may be certain secular aspects to Chanukah,
it is primarily a religious holiday, and the menorah its central religious symbol and
ritual object. By including the menorah with the tree, however, and with the sign
saluting liberty, the city conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during
the holiday season, which, in this particular physical setting, could not be interpreted
by a reasonable observer as an endorsement of Judaism or Christianity or disapproval
of alternative beliefs.
Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice, Justice White, and Justice Scalia,
concluded that both the menorah display and the creche display are permissible
under the Establishment Clause
(a) The test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, -- which prohibits the "principal
or primary effect" of a challenged governmental practice from either advancing or
inhibiting religion -- when applied with the proper sensitivity to our traditions and case
law, supports the conclusion that both the creche and the menorah are permissible
displays in the context of the holiday season. The requirement of neutrality inherent in
the Lemon formulation does not require a relentless extirpation of all contact between
government and religion. Government policies of accommodation, acknowledgment,
and support for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage, and
the Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in recognizing the central
role of religion in society. Any approach less sensitive to our heritage would border on
latent hostility to religion, as it would require government in all its multifaceted roles to
acknowledge only the secular, to the exclusion, and so to the detriment, of the
religious. Thus, this Court's decisions disclose two principles limiting the government's
ability to recognize and accommodate religion: it may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to a religion in such a degree that
it, in fact, establishes a state religion or tends to do so. In other words, the government
may not place its weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a
particular religion. On the other hand, where the government's act of recognition or
accommodation is passive and symbolic, any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to
present a realistic risk of establishment. To determine whether there exists an
establishment, or a tendency toward one, reference must be made to the other types
of church-state contacts that have existed unchallenged throughout our history or that
have been found permissible in our case law.
(b) In permitting the displays of the menorah and the creche, the city and
county sought merely to "celebrate the season," and to acknowledge the historical
background and the religious as well as secular nature of the Chanukah and
Christmas holidays. This interest falls well within the tradition of governmental
accommodation and acknowledgment of religion that has marked our history from the
beginning. If government is to participate in its citizens' celebration of a holiday that
contains both a secular and a religious component, enforced recognition of only the
secular aspect would signify the callous indifference toward religious faith that our
cases and traditions do not require; for by commemorating the holiday only as it is
celebrated by nonadherents, the government would be refusing to acknowledge the
plain fact, and the historical reality, that many of its citizens celebrate the religious
aspects of the holiday as well. There is no suggestion here that the government's 8. Zobrest v. Catalina - No. 92-94 June 18, 1993
power to coerce has been used to further Christianity or Judaism, or that the city or Aragon, Jyn E.
the county contributed money to further any one faith or intended to use the creche or DOCTRINE:
the menorah to proselytize. Thus, the creche and menorah are purely passive Lemon test states that if any of the requirements are violated by government, the
symbols of religious holidays, and their use is permissible under Lynch, supra. If action is deemed to be unconstitutional under the Establishment clause of the First
Marsh, supra, allows Congress and the state legislatures to begin each day with a Amendment to the U.S. constitution.
state-sponsored prayer offered by a government-employed chaplain, a menorah or To determine if parochial school aid is constitutional, the test asks if the aid is for a
creche, displayed in the limited context of the holiday season, cannot be invalid. The religious purpose, promotes a religion, or requires excessive entanglement between
facts that, unlike the creche in Lynch, the menorah and creche at issue were both government and religion. The importance of using the Lemon test to determine the
located on government property and were not surrounded by secular holiday constitutionality of parochial school aid can be seen in the impact that the result has
paraphernalia are irrelevant, since the displays present no realistic danger of moving on the large number of U.S. citizens who send their children to private schools.
the government down the forbidden road toward an establishment of religion. The Lemon Test:
1. The government's action must have a secular legislative purpose;
2. The government's action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or
Justice CRECHE MENORAH inhibiting religion; and
3. The government's action must not result in an "excessive government
entanglement" with religion.
RECIT READY
Blackmun violation constitutional Petitioners, a deaf child and his parents, filed this suit after respondent school district
refused to provide a sign language interpreter to accompany the child to classes at a
Roman Catholic high school. They alleged that the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Cause of the First Amendment required
O'Connor violation constitutional
respondent to provide the interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar
such relief. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment on the ground
that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby
Brennan violation violation promoting his religious development at government expense in violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause does not prevent respondent
from furnishing a disabled child enrolled in a sectarian school with a sign language
Stevens violation violation interpreter in order to facilitate his education. Government programs that neutrally
provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are
not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian
Marshall violation violation institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit
FACTS:
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on
June 18, 1993, ruled (5–4) that under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
Kennedy constitutional constitutional (IDEA), a public school board was required to provide the on-site services of a sign-
language interpreter to a hearing-impaired student in a private religious school.
The case centred on James Zobrest, a deaf student in Tucson, Arizona. For several
grades he had attended public school, and during that time the Catalina Foothills
White constitutional constitutional School District board, in compliance with the IDEA, had provided a sign-language
interpreter. However, in the ninth grade he switched to a private Roman Catholic high
school. When Zobrest’s parents asked public officials to continue to supply their son
Scalia constitutional constitutional with a sign-language interpreter, the school board refused the request, believing that it
was a violation of the First Amendment’s establishment clause, which generally
prohibits the government from establishing, advancing, or giving favour to any religion.
After the parents filed suit, the federal district court in Arizona held that furnishing a
Rehnquist constitutional constitutional sign-language interpreter was in violation of the First Amendment because the
interpreter—who would have been required to sign religious doctrine—would have
had the effect of “promoting James’s religious development at government expense.”
A divided Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that
providing a sign-language interpreter would have failed the so-called Lemon test. In
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) the Supreme Court established a three-rule test for laws
that involved religious establishment, one of which forbids advancing or inhibiting a
religion. The Ninth Court decided that the interpreter would have been the
instrumentality conveying the religious message and that by placing the interpreter in
the religious school, the local board would have appeared to be sponsoring the
school’s activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IDEA violates the right to free exercise of religion?
HELD:
The court pointed out that although denying the interpreter placed a burden on
the parents’ right to free exercise of religion, the denial was justified because
the government had a compelling state interest in ensuring that the First
Amendment was not violated.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist authored the majority’s opinion, in which he ruled that
the service of a sign-language interpreter in that case was “part of a general
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as
disabled under the IDEA,” without regard to whether the school attended was
sectarian or nonsectarian, public or private. Rehnquist added that by giving the
parents the freedom to choose a school, the IDEA ensured that a state-funded
interpreter would be in a parochial school only because of the parents’ decision. His
opinion thus determined that because “the IDEA creates no financial incentive for
parents to choose a sectarian school, an interpreter’s presence there cannot be
attributed to state decision making.”
Rehnquist’s opinion further held that the only economic benefit the religious school
might have received would have been indirect and that would have occurred only if
the school made a profit on each student, if the student would not have attended the
school without the interpreter, and if the student’s seat would have remained unfilled.
In addition, Rehnquist decided that aiding the student and his parents did not amount
to a direct subsidy of the religious school because the student, not the school, was the
primary beneficiary of the IDEA. Moreover, Rehnquist was convinced that the task of a
sign-language interpreter was different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor
insofar as an interpreter would not add or subtract from the pervasively sectarian
environment in which the student’s parents had chosen to place him. The Supreme
Court thus ruled that there was no violation of the establishment clause, and the
decision of the Ninth Circuit was reversed.
1. The prudential rule of avoiding constitutional questions if there is a
nonconstitutional ground for decision is inapplicable here, since respondent did not
urge upon the District Court or the Court of Appeals any of the nonconstitutional
grounds it now raises in this Court.
2. The Establishment Clause does not prevent respondent from furnishing a
disabled child enrolled in a sectarian school with a sign language interpreter in order
to facilitate his education. Government programs that neutrally provide benefits to a
broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion are not readily subject to
an Establishment Clause challenge just because sectarian institutions may also
receive an attenuated financial benefit.
a. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388; Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for
Blind, 474 U.S. 481.
i. The same reasoning used in Mueller and
Witters applies here. The service in this case is part of a general government program
that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as disabled under the IDEA,
without regard to the sectarian nonsectarian, or public nonpublic nature of the school
the child attends. By according parents freedom to select a school of their choice, the
statute ensures that a government paid interpreter will be present in a sectarian
school only as a result of individual parents' private decisions. Since the IDEA creates
no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, an interpreter's
presence there cannot be attributed to state decisionmaking.
ii. The fact that a public employee will be physically
present in a sectarian school does not by itself make this the same type of aid that
was disapproved in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, and School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373. In those cases, the challenged programs gave direct
grants of government aid--instructional equipment and material, teachers, and
guidance counselors--which relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would
have borne in educating their students. Here, the child is the primary beneficiary, and
the school receives only an incidental benefit. In addition, an interpreter, unlike a
teacher or guidance counselor, neither adds to nor subtracts from the sectarian
school's environment but merely interprets whatever material is presented to the class
as a whole. There is no absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian
school.
3. The test used was the Lemon Test.
a. The court in Lemon v. Kurtzman ruled three requirements for government
concerning religion, they are :
1.The government's action must have a secular legislative purpose;
2.The government's action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or
inhibiting religion; and
3.The government's action must not result in an "excessive government
entanglement" with religion.
b. Lemon test states that if any of the requirements are violated by
government, the action is deemed to be unconstitutional under the Establishment
clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. constitution.
9.1 Agostini et al v. Felton et al [117 S.CT. 1997,
Domasig, Rein
DATE/GR NO/SCRA: June 23, 1997 / 117 S.C.T. 1997, 138 L.ED.2D 391 / 521 US
203 PETITIONER: Rachel Agostini, et al.
RESPONDENT: Betty Louise Felton et al.
(I got this from the net and minions. Refer to the case’s syllabus for a complete
summary. Thanks)
RECIT READY:
This suit was brought by a New York parochial school board, and some of its student's
parents, as a challenge to a District Court ruling upholding the twelve-year-old
decision set out in Aguilar v. Felton (473 US 402). The decision in Aguilar prohibited
public school teachers from teaching in parochial schools as a violation of the
Establishment Clause. On appeal from the Second Circuit's affirmance of a District
Court's denial of the parent's challenge, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
W/N the establishment clause was violated when public school teachers instruct in
parochial schools?
No. The Court overruled its decision in Aguilar v. Felton. The Court held that there was
no evidence to support its former presumption that the entrance of public school
teachers into parochial schools will inevitably lead to the indoctrination of state-
sponsored religion. The New York program under which public school teachers were
sent into parochial schools did not provide parochial schools with any incentive,
financial or other, to establish religion in order to attract public school teachers. The
Court added that under its new view, only those policies which generate an excessive
conflict between church and state will be deemed to violate the Establishment Clause.
As such, one should no longer find that all entanglements between church and state
have a distinctly positive or negative impact on religion.
FACTS:
Petition:
Petition to challenge a district court’s ruling upholding the decision in Aguilar v. Felton
(473 U.S. 402, 413) prohibiting public school teachers from teaching in parochial
schools for disadvantaged children as a violation of the 1st amendment’s
Establishment Clause.
New York City had a program that sent public school teachers into parochial
schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children pursuant to
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1995.
In Aguilar v. Felton (473 U.S. 402, 413) it was ruled that the said program was an
excessive entanglement of the church and the state which violated the 1st
amendment’s Establishment Clause
10 years after the ruling, it was challenged by the petitioners thus the case at bar.
Statute Involved:
1st amendment – Establishment Clause
o One of the “Religion Clauses” of the 1st amendment o Generally been interpreted to
prohibit:
1. Establishment of a national religion by Congress
2. Preference by the U.S. government of one religion over another
Position of Petitioner/s:
They emphasized on the significant cost of complying with Aguilar v.
Felton (473 US 402, 413)
5 justices in Board of ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet asserted that
the jurisprudence set by Aguilar should be reconsidered because it cannot be
harmonized with the other intervening jurisprudence set by the Supreme Court
therefore it is no longer a good law.
ISSUE:
W/N the New York City’s program is violative of the 1st amendment’s Establishment
Clause
HELD/RATIO:
NO, the program is NOT violative of the 1st amendment’s Establishment Clause
A federally funded program providing supplemental, remedial
instruction to disadvantaged children on a neutral basis is NOT invalid under the
Establishment Clause when: (1) such instruction is given on the premises of
sectarian schools by government employees, (2) under a program containing
adequate safeguards
The jurisprudence stated in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball and Aguilar
v. Felton are no longer good law because of subsequent cases decided by the
Supreme Court.
o Contrary to Aguilar’s conclusion, placing full time government employees on parochial
school campuses does not have the impermissible effect of advancing religion
o Ball’s presumption that public employees placed on parochial school grounds will
inevitably inculcate religion or that their presence constitutes a symbolic union
between the government and religion has already been abandoned.
There was no evidence that shows that New York City instructors teaching in parochial
schools tried to inculcate religion in their students.
o Furthermore, Ball’s rule that “all government aid that directly aids the educational
function of religious schools is invalid” is NO longer applied.
The program does not give aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious beliefs or
practices in order to obtain program services.
The Aguilar court made an error in concluding that the program resulted in excessive
entanglement between the church and the state.
The program would require “pervasive monitoring by public authorities” to ensure that
employees did not inculcate religion = The jurisprudence set by Zobrest abandoned
the presumption that public employees will inculcate religion simply because they
happened to be in a sectarian environment. Therefore pervasive monitoring is NO
longer required
The program required administrative cooperation between the government and
parochial schools = Insufficient to create excessive entanglement
The program might increase the dangers of political divisiveness = Insufficient to
create excessive entanglement
Therefore, the program is NOT in violation of the 3 primary criteria used by the court
which are it should not:
o Result in governmental indoctrination
o Define its recipients by reference to religion o Create excessive entanglement
NOTE: The doctrine of stare decisis does not stop the court from recognizing
changes in law and overruling previous decisions which are contrary to more recent
jurisprudence.
Final Ruling
Petition is GRANTED. Ruling in Aguilar v. Felton is reversed and set aside.
DISSENTING OPINION:
JUSTICE SOUTER contends that Zobrest did not undermine the "presumption of
inculcation" erected in Ball and Aguilar, and that our conclusion to the contrary rests
on a "mistaken reading" of Zobrest. In his view, Zobrest held that the Establishment
Clause tolerates the presence of public employees in sectarian schools "only ... in ...
limited circumstances"-i. e., when the employee "simply translates for one student the
material presented to the class for the benefit of all students." The sign-language
interpreter in Zobrest is unlike the remedial instructors in Ball and Aguilar because
signing, JUSTICE SOUTER explains, " [cannot] be understood as an opportunity to
inject religious content in what [is] supposed to be secular instruction." He is thus able
to conclude that Zobrest is distinguishable from-and therefore perfectly consistent
withBall and Aguilar.
9.2 Agostini et al v Felton 138 L.ED.2D 391 (1997)]
Lu, Kyle [Same case as 9.1, obligation extinguished]
10. Mitchell et al. v. Helms [530 U.S. 793 (2000)]
Rosales, Andrew
DOCTRINE: “Materials and educational aids” (valid neutral aid; principle of private
choice)
Just because some of the beneficiaries of the program are religiously-affiliated, it does
not automatically make it a law respecting an establishment of religion. It passes the
Agostini test; it does not result in governmental indoctrination (religious indoctrination
attributable to governmental action), it is made available neutrally and equally among
beneficiaries regardless of religious affiliation, and it neither impairs nor promotes the
same, and it allocates aid based on the private choices of the students as to which
school to attend.
RR:
Facts. Chapter 2 Aid to schools can be given to both public and private schools, with
the restriction that the private schools use the funds for non-religious activities. The
Respondent brought suit alleging that allotment of Chapter 2 funds in Jefferson Parish
Louisiana was unconstitutionally invalid because many of the schools receiving the
funds were parochial in nature and thus Chapter 2 violated the provisions of the
Establishment Clause. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found the statute to be
invalid and the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted writs.
Issue. The issue in this case is whether the allotment of state aid to religious-based
schools is necessarily a violation of the Establishment Clause, when those funds are
ear marked for non-religious purposes.
Held. Reversed.
Based on its holding in Agostini, the Supreme Court held that it is not facially
unconstitutional to allot funds to religious schools, provided there is no indication that
the funds will be used for a purpose other than that which is intended.
Dissent. Justice David Souter (J. Souter) dissented, holding to the underlying
principal of the Establishment Clause, that any funding or appearance of funding a
religious-based activity is facially unconstitutional.
Concurrence. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor (J. O’Connor) concurred, noting that the
Establishment Clause claims must fall because the Respondent has not prevented
any evidence of misuse of funds.
Discussion. This case furthers the Supreme Court’s holding in Agostini, that it is
overly burdensome to subject a private school to Establishment Clause criteria at the
expense of the children.
(Jech Tiu)
The EDUCATION CONSOLIDATION AND IMPROVEMENT ACT channels federal
funds to schools lending educational, media, and library materials including software
and computers to implement “secular, neutral, and non-ideological” programs.
Since 30% of the funds spent have benefited religiously-affiliated schools, the
program was challenged for violating the non-establishment clause
The US SC held that 3 primary criteria are considered to determine if
governmental aid has the effect of advancing religion:
o If the aid results in governmental indoctrination
 Whether or not any indoctrination that occurs could
reasonably be attributed to governmental action
 In other words, whether or not the governmental aid
program subsidizes religion
o If the aid defines its recipients by reference to religion
o If the aid creates an excessive entanglement
The US SC further held that under the Neutrality Principle, aid that is offered to a
broad range of groups or persons without regard to religion are valid
o And one way to assure the said neutrality is through the Principle
of Private Choice, wherein the government is not considered
to have provided any support of religion when aid to
schools, even if direct, is a) neutrally available and b) before
reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes
through the hands of numerous private citizens who are free
to direct the aid elsewhere
 In this case, there is no basis to conclude that the ECIA
advances religion because the aid is allocated on the
basis of neutral criteria and is made available to both
religious and secular beneficiaries on a non-
discriminatory basis
 Under the ECIA, eligibility for aid is based on school
enrollment and the private choices of parents as to
which schools to send their children to
  Thus, just because some beneficiaries of governmental
aid are religiously- affiliated does not automatically
mean that the said program respects an establishment
of religion
FACTS:
Petition:
� Petition to reverse the decision of the CA Fifth Circuit declaring Chapter 2 of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 as unconstitutional
Factual Antecedents:
� Chapter 2 of the Educational Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981:
o Channels federal funds via state educational agencies to Local
Educational Agencies (LEA’s)
o The LEA’s lend educational materials and equipment to public
and private elementary and secondary schools to implement “secular,
neutral, and nonideological” programs
o The enrollment of each school determines the amount of Chapter 2 aid it
receives
� In Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, 30% of the Chapter 2 funds are allocated for private
schools, most of which are Catholic or otherwise religiously affiliated
� Helms et al. filed a suit alleging that Chapter 2 violated the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause
� The District Court ruled in favor of the respondents, saying that Chapter 2 had the
primary effect of advancing religion because the materials and equipment loaned to
the Catholic schools were direct aid and the schools were pervasively sectarian
o The DC relied on Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter, in which
programs providing many of the same sorts of materials and equipment as
does Chapter 2 were struck down
o The DC Judge issued an order to prevent pervasively sectarian schools in
Jefferson Parish from receiving Chapter 2 materials
o However, another DC judge reversed such order, basing his decision on
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist.
o While the respondent’s appeal was pending, the SC decided Agostini v.
Felton, which approved a the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965 that provided public employees to teach remedial classes at religious
and other private schools
� The Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the respondents, hence this
appeal
Statute Involved:
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause- “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion...”
Position of Respondents:
� Direct, non-incidental aid to religious schools is always impermissible
� Provisions which grant to religious schools aid that is divertible to religious use is
always impermissible
 � Provisions which grant to religious schools aid that is divertible to religious use CAN
ISSUE: W/N Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981
violates the establishment clause?
HELD/RATIO: No
� To reach its decision, the SC used the 3 primary criteria established in Agostini for
determining whether Government aid has the effect of advancing religion:
o Results in governmental indoctrination
o Defines its recipients by reference to religion o Creates an excessive
entanglement
NOTE: Only the first 2 are discussed because the DC’s holding that
Chapter 2 does not create an excessive entanglement is not challenged
� Chapter 2 does not result in governmental indoctrination, nor does it define its
recipients by reference to religion
o In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State
and indoctrination that is not, the Court has consistently turned to the
neutrality principle: upholds aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or
persons without regard to their religion
o As a way of assuring neutrality, the Court has consistently considered
whether any governmental aid that goes to a religious institution results from
the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals (private choice
principle) o If private choices dictate distribution of aid, government cannot
easily grant favors that might lead to a religious establishment
o Private choice also guarantees neutrality by mitigating preference for pre-
existing recipients that is inherent in any aid program
o Financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination is not present
where aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria, and is made
available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a non-discriminatory
basis (such as this one)
� Direct, non-incidental aid to religious schools can be allowed
o If the aid (even if “direct”) is neutrally available and first passes
through the hands (literally or figuratively) of private citizens who are free to
direct the aid elsewhere, the government has NOT provided any support of
religion
o There is NO reason why the Establishment Clause requires that aid pass
literally through the hands of the citizens first (as provided in Agostini)
o The respondent’s reasoning on “literal” passing breaks down in the
application of real-world programs
o Whether a program is labeled “direct” or “indirect” is an
arbitrary choice that does not further the constitutional analysis
BE ALLOWED
 o The issue is not divertibility, but whether the aid itself has an
impermissible content (the aid should be secular, neutral, and non-
ideological)
o In this case, the record indicates that Louisiana SEA and Jefferson Parish
have complied with the aid requirements
o Where the aid would be suitable for use in a public school, it is also
suitable for use in any private school
o A concern for divertibility is misplaced because it is boundless, enveloping
all aid no matter how trivial, and does not bring about any realistic concern
for preventing the establishment of religion
o Based on its past decisions, the Court has not accepted the argument that
all aid is forbidden because aid to one aspect of an institution frees it to
spend its other resources on religious ends
� Meek and Wolman are overruled Final Ruling
� The judgment of the (CA) Fifth Circuit is reversed.
11. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris et al. [No. 00—1751. Decided June 27, 2002]
Alfaro, Aileene
Doctrine: Where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who direct government aid to
religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private
choice, the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause.
Facts:
-majority of the children enrolled in the Cleveland City School District are from low-
income and minority families. Only a few have the means to send their children to a
school other than an inner-city public school.
-However, Cleveland’s public schools have been among the worst performing public
schools in the Nation.
-The district failed to meet any of the 18 state standards for minimal acceptable
performance. Only 1 in 10 ninth graders could pass a basic proficiency examination.
More than two-thirds of high school students either dropped or failed out before
graduation. Of the students who reached their senior year, 1 out of 4 still failed to
graduate. Of those students who did graduate, few could read, write, or compute at
levels comparable to their counterparts in other cities.
-Thus, Ohio enacted, among other initiatives, its Pilot Project Scholarship Program
- The program provides financial assistance to families in any Ohio school district that
is “under federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the
district by the state superintendent.” Cleveland is the only Ohio school district that falls
within that category.
- The program has two kinds of assistance. (1) the program provides tuition aid for
students in kindergarten through third grade, to attend a participating public or private
school of their parent’s choosing (2) tutorial aid for students who choose to remain
enrolled in public school
- The tuition aid portion’s purpose is to provide educational choices to parents who
reside in a covered district. Any private school, whether religious or nonreligious, may
participate in the program and accept program students so long as the school is
located within the boundaries of a covered district and meets statewide educational
standards. Participating private schools must agree not to discriminate on the basis of
race, religion, or ethnic background,.
-Any public school located in a school district adjacent to the covered district may also
participate in the program.
-All participating schools, whether public or private, are required to accept students in
accordance with rules and procedures established by the state superintendent.
-Tuition aid is distributed to parents according to financial need. For example, families
with incomes below 200% of the poverty line are given priority and are eligible to
receive 90% of private school tuition
-For tutor aid, parents arrange for registered tutors to give assistance to their children
and then submit bills for those services to the State for payment. Students from low-
income families receive 90% of the amount charged. All other students receive 75% of
that amount.
-In the 1999—2000 school year, 56 private schools participated in the program, 46 (or
82%) of which had a religious affiliation. 96% of the students who participated enrolled
in religiously affiliated schools.
-Respondents, a group of Ohio taxpayers, filed this action in United States District
Court, seeking to enjoin the program on the ground that it violated the Establishment
Clause
-District Court granted summary judgment for respondents
-Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court, finding that the program
had the “primary effect” of advancing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Issue: W/N the Pilot Project Scholarship Program offends the Establishment Clause of
the United States Constitution.
Held: No. SC reversed the Court of Appeals.
-The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prevents a State from enacting
laws that have the “purpose” or “effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion.
-the program here was enacted for the valid secular purpose of providing educational
assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system. Thus, the
question is whether it nonetheless has the forbidden “effect” of advancing or inhibiting
religion.
-It was held in Mueller that, “because the class included “all parents,” including
parents with children who attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private
schools, the program was not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause. That public funds were made available to religious schools “only as a result of
numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children. Thus, no
imprimatur of state approval can be deemed to have been conferred on any particular
religion, or on religion generally.”
-Witters held that “any aid that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as
a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients.”
-Where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and provides
assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who direct government aid to religious
schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice,
the program is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.
-The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of
a religious message, is attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government,
whose role ends with the disbursement of benefits.
- the Ohio program is neutral in all respects toward religion. It confers educational
assistance directly to a broad class of individuals defined without reference to religion,
i.e., any parent of a school-age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District.
The program permits the participation of all schools within the district, religious or
nonreligious. Program benefits are available to participating families on neutral terms,
with no reference to religion. The only preference stated anywhere in the program is a
preference for low-income families.
-There are no financial incentives that skew the program toward religious schools. It in
fact creates financial disincentives for religious schools, with private schools receiving
only half the government assistance given to community schools. Families too have a
financial disincentive to choose a private religious. Parents that choose to enroll their
children in a private school (religious or nonreligious) must copay a portion of the
school’s tuition. Families that choose a community school or traditional public school
pay nothing.
- It is true that 82% of Cleveland’s participating private schools are religious schools,
but it is also true that 81% of private schools in Ohio are religious schools.
-Thus, the US SC holds that the program does not offend the Establishment Clause.
12. Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette & KKK– U.S. No. 94-780 June 29,
1995
Sarte, Ross
DOCTRINE
Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely
private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced
and open to all on equal terms..
FACTS:
Capitol Square is a 10-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding the statehouse in
Columbus, Ohio. Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-402(A) (1994) makes the square
available "for use by the public ... for free discussion of public questions, or for
activities of a broad public purpose," and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 105.41 (1994), gives
the Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board (Board) responsibility for regulating
public access. To use the square, a group must simply fill out an official application
form and meet several criteria, which concern primarily safety, sanitation, and
noninterference with other uses of the square, and which are neutral as to the speech
content of the proposed event.
It has been the Board's policy "to allow a broad range of speakers and other
gatherings of people to conduct events on the Capitol Square and it has also
previously permitted a variety of unattended displays on Capitol Square.
Board received an application from respondent Donnie Carr, an officer of the Ohio Ku
Klux Klan, to place a cross on the square from December 8, 1993, to December 24,
1993 which the board denied.
Two weeks later, having been unsuccessful in its effort to obtain administrative relief
from the Board's decision, the Ohio Klan, through its leader Vincent Pinette, filed the
present suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
seeking an injunction requiring the Board to issue the requested permit. The Board
defended on the ground that the permit would violate the Establishment Clause since
the unattended display of the religious symbol will give appearance of state
endorsement.
The District Court determined that the Klan's cross was entirely private expression
entitled to full First Amendment protection; and that the Board had failed to show that
the display of the cross could reasonably be construed as endorsement of Christianity
by the State. On appeal by the Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether a private, unattended display of a religious symbol in a public forum violates
the Establishment Clause.
HELD: NO.
Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely
private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced
and open to all on equal terms. Those conditions are satisfied here, and therefore the
State may not bar respondents' cross from Capitol Square.
Private Religious Expression in Public Forum & the Establishment Clause
Respondents' religious display in Capitol Square was private expression. Our
precedent establishes that private religious speech, far from being a First Amendment
orphan, is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private
expression.
The court has twice previously addressed the combination of private religious
expression, a forum available for public use, content-based regulation, and a State's
interest in complying with the Establishment Clause. Both times, we have struck down
the restriction on religious content.
In both cases, the respective areas were open to a wide variety of uses, and there
was no showing that by allowing the expression, the state directly sponsored the
religious group's activity, and "any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been
no more than incidental.
In case at bar, The State did not sponsor respondents' expression, the expression
was made on government property that had been opened to the public for speech,
and permission was requested through the same application process and on the same
terms required of other private groups.
Transferred Endorsement
"[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the
Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.
Petitioners assert, in effect, that that distinction disappears when the private speech is
conducted too close to the symbols of government. But that, of course, must be
merely a subpart of a more general principle: that the distinction disappears whenever
private speech can be mistaken for government speech. That proposition cannot be
accepted, at least where, as here, the government has not fostered or encouraged the
mistake.
Court rejected the concept of transferred endorsement and held that there must be an
actual endorsement of religious activity on part of the state. Test would also disrupt
the settled principle that policies providing incidental benefits to religion do not
contravene the Establishment Clause.
13. Islamic Da’wah v. Executive Secretary – GR 153888, July 9, 2003
Hermoso, JJ
DOCTRINE:
Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the standards used
are drawn from the Quran and Islamic beliefs
RECIT-READY:
IDCP, an NGO, has been certified to issue halal certifications. It had begun such with
a fee. However, EO 46 was issued and tasked OMA with the exlusive authority to
issue halal certifications. IDCP lost revenues as OMA warned Muslim consumers
against products without offical halal certification by OMA.
The Court held that classifying a food product as halal is a religious function as
standards are derived from the Quran and Islamic beliefs. The State must not intrude
purely religious matters.
FACTS:
 IDCP is an NGO that extends voluntary services especially to Muslim
communities. It conducts seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food, and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. It
claims to be a federation of national Islamic organizations and an active
member of international organizations The Regional Islamic Dawah Council
of Southeast Asia and the Pacific accredited IDCP to issue halal
certifications in the Philippines.
 In 1995, on the need to certify food products as halal and also due to halal
food producers’ request, IDCP formulated internal rules and procedures
for the analysis of food, inspection and issuance of halal certifications
based on the Quran and the Sunnah.
o IDCP issued, for a fee, certifications to qualified products
and food manufacturers. It also adopted for use on its halal
certificates a distinct sign or logo registered in the Philippine
Patent Office.
 In 2001, the Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme.
o It tasked the OMA (Office of Muslim Affairs) for the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities.
o Based on a 2002 article in Manila Bulletin, OMA warned Muslim
consumers to buy only products with its official halal
certification since those without said certification had not been
subjected to careful analysis and could contain pork or its
derivatives.
o OMA also sent letters to food manufacturers asking them to
secure the halal certification only from OMA lest they violate
EO 46 and RA 4109.
o As a result, IDCP lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped
securing certifications from it.
 IDCP filed for a prohibition on the following grounds: 1) That the EO violates
the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State; 2) That a
food product becomes halal only after the performance of Islamic religious
ritual and prayer which is not a function of a government agency; 3) That it
violates Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution concerning laws
impairing the obligation of contracts; 4) That it violates Sections 15 and 16
of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution for not consulting Muslim peoples
organizations.
ISSUE: WON the halal certification is a form of religious exercise?
HELD:
 OMA was created to ensure the integration of Muslim Filipinos into the
mainstream of Filipino society. It deals with the societal, legal, political and
economic concerns of the Muslim community as a national cultural
community and not as a religious group. The State must make sure
that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the
non-establishment clause and the free exercise of religion provision found in
Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution.
 Classifying a food product as halal is a religious function because the
standards used are drawn from the Quran and Islamic beliefs.
o By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products
are fit for Muslim consumption.
o By arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the
State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation
of the Quran and Sunnah on halal food.
  Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of
the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.
o There is no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations of their religious right to classify a
product as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim
Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA the
exclusive power to issue halal certifications.
 The protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos right to health are
already provided for in existing laws concerning food products released in
the market.
o NMIC: guarantees that the meat sold in the market has been
thoroughly inspected and fit for consumption. BFD: ensures that
food products are properly categorized and have passed safety
and quality standards. DTI: through the labeling provisions,
apprises of the products that contain substances or ingredients
that are not fit for human intake.
o With these regulatory bodies, the perceived danger against the
health of Muslim and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided.
 The halal certifications issued by IDCP and similar organizations come
forward as the official religious approval of a food product fit for
Muslim consumption.
o That the absence of a central administrative body to regulate halal
certifications might give rise to schemers who, for profit, will issue
certifications that are not actually halal is without basis.
o Muslim consumers can verify through the labels whether a
product contains non-food substances. They are discerning
enough to know who the reliable and competent certifying
organizations in their community are. They can easily avert this
perceived evil by a diligent inquiry on the reliability of the
concerned certifying organization.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. EO 46, s. 2001 is hereby
declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, respondents are prohibited from
enforcing the same.
SEPARATE OPINION (Vitug, J.)
The halal certification which IDCP and other similar organizations have been
accredited to issue is not taken as a compulsory requirement for Muslim food
manufacturers to secure. Adequate safeguards being already in place to ensure the
safety of all food products, food manufacturers would thus have the option, decided
solely on the basis of marketing advantage, whether or not to obtain the certification
on their food products. The acquisition of halal certificates should remain optional
or only on a voluntary basis on the part of manufacturers of Muslim food
products.
14. Taruc v. de la Cruz – 453 SCRA 123
Castigador, Niqui
RECIT READY:
Petitioners, members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) tired to organize an
open mass to be celebrated by Fr. Ambong. Bishop De La Cruz tried to dissuade the
petitioners because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of
Surigao and requested the petitioners to not do anything prejudicial to the best
interests of PIC. Petitioners however proceeded with the mass held by Fr. Ambong.
As a result, the bishop expelled/excommunicated the petitioners from the PIC.
Petitioners claim that their expulsion was done in violation of their right to due
process.
The court ruled that the expulsion/ex- communication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the
laws and canons, of said institution/organization. Thus the issue is not for the courts to
decide. However, since petitioners were forewarned of the consequences of their
actions, they should take full responsibility for the chaos they caused.
FACTS
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro,
Surigao
Petitioners led by Dominador Taruc clamored for the transfer of parish priest Fr.
Florano to another parish because the family of Fr. Florano’s wife belonged to a
political party opposed to petitioner Taruc’s, thus the animosity between the two
political factions. Bishop De La Cruz however denied their request.
Taruc then tried to organize an open mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Ambong
during the town fiesta. The bishop tried to dissuade him because Fr. Ambong was not
a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and appealed to the petitioners to
refrain from doing acts prejudicial to the best interests of the PIC. However Taruc and
his sympathizers proceeded to hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong
Because of that, bishop De La Cruz declared petitioners expelled/excommunicated
from the PIC for reasons of disobedience to the authority of the Church, inciting
dissension resulting in the division of the Church, and threatening to forcibly occupy
the parish church
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Bishop De La Cruz contending that
their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating due process
of law
ISSUE: WON the courts have jurisdiction to hear a case involving the
expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious institution
HELD: NO
Expulsion/ex-communication of members of a religious institution/organization is a
matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization
It is not for the courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of
their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/ organizations to conform to just church regulations.
In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals, we enunciated the doctrine that in
disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is one area which the
Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences
Regarding petitioner’s claim that they were not heard before they were expelled, the
records show that bishop De La Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to
commit acts inimical to the best interests of the PIC and warned of the conseuqneces
of their actions including the expulsion/excommunication from PIC
Yet petitioners went ahead with their plans to defy their bishop. They should take full d) It violates the “no religious test” clause, which determine the practice of civil
responsibility for the chaos they caused. rights based on religious affiliation
e) It violates equal protection clause
f) It violates social justice
g) Threat to unionism
15. Victoriano v. Elizalde, 53 SCRA 94 Issue: WN RA 3350 amending sec 4(a) of RA 875 is unconstitutional
Carlos, Von Held: No
a) On the right to form legal associations:
Doctrine: Ø RA 3350 does not prohibit such right. Inherent in the exercise of the right to form or
A statute is does not violate the establishment clause if it’s 1) a general law 2) for a join associations is the right to abstain such exercise. Rather, the statute seeks to give
non-secular purpose whose 3) primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion the option to abstain such right, without prejudice from employers.
Free exercise of religious expression or belief is greater than contract rights. b) On impairment of contract
Ø The prohibition on the impairment of contracts is not absolute. The reservation of
sovereign power is read into contracts. Legislation can be impaired if it involves the
Recit Ready: promotion of the general good of the people, and its means are reasonable. In this
Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union is assailing the validity of RA 3350, which amended sec case, the purpose of the statute is to promote freedom of religion and to prevent
4(a) of RA 875, exempting members of religious sects that prohibit affiliation with labor discrimination against members of such religious sects
organizations from the coverage of collective bargaining agreements. They assail that Ø Free exercise of religious expression or belief is greater than contract rights. Clear
the statute is violative of the non-establishment clause and the freed exercise clause. and present danger is applied for exemption.
The court held that the statute does not favor any particular religion nor does it c) It favors religious sects that ban association with labor organization
promote any spiritual doctrine. It is a general law that promotes expression of religious (ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE)
beliefs and protects such right from prejudice from unfair labor practice. The court also Ø A statute is does not violate the establishment clause if it’s a general law for a non-
held that it does not impair free exercise laws. The statute does not prevent members secular purpose whose primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion. In this
of such religious sects to join labor organizations, nor does it require religious case, the purpose of the law is to advance the free exercise of religion, by protecting
affiliations to be exempted from the agreement. It only gives employees the option to such exercise from prejudice in the pursuit of livelihood
withdraw from unions or join them, without prejudice from their employers. Ø It does not specifically name any religious sect, nor does it advance any spiritual
doctrine
Facts: d) It violates the “no religious test” clause, which determine the practice of civil
Ø Victoriano was an employee in Elizalde Rope Company (Company), and a member rights based on religious affiliation
of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union (Union). He is also a member of the Iglesia ni Ø The statute does not require religion to join any association. It does not compel
Cristo. anyone to do anything, rather it exempts a religious objector from coverage of closed
Ø The Union had a closed shop clause in their bargaining agreement with the shop agreements.
Company, which required membership to the Union as a condition for employment for e) It violates equal protection clause
those covered by the said agreement. Ø There is a distinction between non-members and members of religious sects that
Ø The bargaining agreement expired in March 3, 1964 but was renewed in March 4, prohibit association with labor organizations
1964 f) It violates social justice, threat to unionism
Ø On June 18, 1961, RA 3350 was enacted, modifying Sec 4(a) of RA 875 exempting Only speculative
from coverage of bargaining agreements the members of religious sects that prohibit
affiliations with labor organizations 16. Cantwell v. Connecticut - 310 US 296
Ø Victoriano presented his resignation in 1962, and reiterated it in 1974 Geraldez, Nico
Ø The Company notified Victoriano that they will be compelled to dismiss him if he
doesn’t achieve a satisfactory agreement with the Union.
Ø Victoriano filed for an injunction to the RTC, which was granted. Facts. Jesse Cantwell (Cantwell), a Jehovah’s Witnesses, was convicted on the
Ø The Union’s defense is that RA 3350 is unconstitutional on these grounds: charge of breach of the peace for playing a phonograph record sharply critical of the
a) It infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations Catholic religion to persons he encountered on the street. His intent was to proselytize
b) It impairs obligations in contracts, that it relieves Victoriano from the condition his listeners. Prior to his arrest, there was no evidence that Cantwell’s deportment was
provided in the bargaining agreement. Impairment of contract is when a law noisy or offensive. Moreover, although the message on the record was offensive, it
encroaches on the contract and absolves a party from performance was only played to persons who voluntarily agreed to listen.
c) It favors religious sects that ban association with labor organization
 Issue. Did the arrest and conviction of Cantwell for violating the common law offense
of breach of the peace violate his constitutional rights of free speech under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. Yes. The lower court is reversed.
Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated that while it is obvious that the principles of
freedom of speech and religion do not sanction incitement to riot or violence, it is
equally obvious that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views
under the guise of maintaining desirable conditions. With these considerations in
mind, we note that there was no evidence of assaultive behavior or threatening of
bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no profane, abusive, indecent remarks directed to
the person of the hearer. Thus, it cannot be said that Cantwell’s actions resulted in a
breach of the peace or an incitement to a breach thereof.
17. US. v. Ballard - 322 US 78 (good faith in believing)
Santos, Patrick
Facts
· Because of the charged of using the mail to defraud the public because of his religious
group
o He claimed that he had supernatural powers to heal the sick and
diseased even though he knew himself that he cannot
· He promoted his I Am movement through the use of mails
· They assailed the ruling on them, contending that the state was essentially attacking their
religious beliefs
Issue
· Can respondent be persecuted for his religious beliefs?
Ruling
· “At the time of making all of the afore-alleged representations by the defendants and each
of them well new that all of the said aforementioned representations were false and untrue”
· The court mentioned the fact that the respondents made improbable claims such as talking
to Jesus, shaking hands with him and etc.
o However the main thing to consider in this case is that “did these
defendants honestly and in good faith believe in those things?”
§ Because if they did, they should be acquitted
· However, if their claims were to be for the sole purpose of making money and donations,
they should be guilty
· “The question of the defendants’ good faith is the cardinal question in this case”
o However, the defendants are very much saying that their claims are valid
· The amendment embraces two concepts – the freedom to believe and to act
o While the first is absolute, the second cannot be absolute
§ If case was because of respondent’s sincere claim that what
they believe in is true, this will fall under the first concept –
which the court cannot touch
18. American Bible Society v. City of Manila - 101 PHIL. 386
Polinar, Cass
Key takeaway: The State may NOT require a license for dissemination of religious
literature, unless it is done as a business operation for profit.
Recit Ready (from Jech Tiu):
· The ACTING TREASURER OF MANILA informed the AMERICAN BIBLE
SOCIETY, which was selling bibles and pamphlets for 25¢ and 5¢ respectively, that it
was engaging in the business of general merchandise without the proper municipal
license and mayor’s permit and assessed certain taxes against the Society
· Plaintiff contended that the Ordinances are illegal because they provide for
religious censorship and restrain the free exercise clause
· The SC held that the guarantee of the free exercise clause carries with it the
right to disseminate religious information In this case, the sale of bibles and pamphlets
was not for business or commercial purposes, even if the prices were a bit higher, but
rather for the purpose of dissemination and, thus, the same cannot be subject to the
procurement of a license or permit
· The US also held that the power to impose a license tax on the exercise of
freedoms is as potent as the power of censorship
FACTS:
· American Bible Society is a foreign, nonstock, nonprofit, religious, missionary
corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines plaintiff's Philippine
agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except
during the Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same
into several Philippine dialects.
· In 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it
was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without
providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of
Ordinance No. 3000 and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the
corresponding permit and license fees.
· Plaintiff protested against this requirement, but the City Treasurer demanded
that plaintiff deposit and pay under protest the sum of P5,891.45.
· AMS alleged that the Municipal Ordinance No. 3000 was illegal and
unconstitutional in its complaint against the City of Manila.
· AMS claimed that it has been in existence in the Philippines since 1899, and
that its parent society is in New York, United States of America that its contiguous real
properties located at Isaac Peral are exempt from real estate taxes; and that it was
never required to pay any municipal license fee or tax before the war, nor does the
American Bible Society in the United States pay any license fee or sales tax for the
sale of bible therein.
o They further tried to establish that it never made any profit from the sale of its
bibles, which are disposed of for as low as one third of the cost, and that in order to
maintain its operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York office
and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches, both in the United States
and in the Philippines
· RTC dismissed the case filed by AMS.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Ordinance No. 3000 (as hereby amended) is constitutional and valid.
YES
2. W/N the provisions of the ordinance are inapplicable to the sale of bibles, etc. by
AMS, which tantamount to violation of their free exercise and enjoyment of the
religious profession and worship. YES.
RULING:
1. YES
· The records show that by letter of May 29, 1953, the City Treasurer required
plaintiff to secure a Mayor's permit in connection with the society's alleged business of
distributing and selling bibles, etc. and to pay permit dues in the sum of P35 for the
period covered in this litigation is an ordinance of general application and not
particularly directed against any institutions like the plaintiff.
· it does not contain any provisions whatsoever prescribing religious censorship
nor restraining the free exercise and enjoyment of any religious profession.
· The business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff involved in this case is not
particularly mentioned in Section 3 of the Ordinance, and the record does not show
that a permit is required therefor under existing laws and ordinances for the proper
supervision and enforcement of their provisions governing the sanitation, security and
welfare of the public and the health of the employees engaged in the business of the
plaintiff.
the license fees required to be paid quarterly in Section 1 of the said Ordinance are
not imposed directly upon any religious institution but upon those engaged in any of
the business or occupations therein enumerated, such as retail "dealers in general
merchandise" which, it is alleged, cover the business or occupation of selling bibles,
books, etc.
2. YES
· Article III, section 1, clause (7) of the Constitution of the Philippines
aforequoted, guarantees the freedom of religious profession and worship. "Religion
has been spoken of as 'a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates
man to its Creator.'
· The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
· Any restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom
of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent".
· In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Jehovah's witness members were engaged in
distribution of books and pamphlets at a lower price and sometimes even donated the
same when some persons were interested but without funds. On the above facts the
Supreme Court held that it could not be said that petitioners were engaged in
commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be described as
embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets.
· It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher and is
quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. Nor
could dissemination of religious information be conditioned upon the approval of an
official or manager even if the town were owned by a corporation as held in the case
of Marsh vs. State of Alabama.
· It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other
religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the
same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation
of selling said "merchandise" for profit.
· The Court believes that the provisions of the Ordinance cannot be applied to
appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
19. Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010)
Perez, Paolo
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgender individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a
Petition for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance.
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity. and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that
which refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual
attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender,
of the same gender, or more than one gender.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines
nuisance as “Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality.”
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that Contracts whose cause,
object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy are inexistent and void from the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and
indecent shows.
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration. The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and
speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed
Resolution, stating that:
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list
system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation
and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs
is elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still
males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by
the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim
religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious
groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are
possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and
these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s
application for accreditation. They argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of
a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
January 25, 2010.
Issue: W/N COMELEC violated the non-establishment clause of the Constitution
in denying Ang Ladlad’s application on religious grounds
Held: YES, COMELEC ruling was overturned
We find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
Our Constitution also provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the
non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the
party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.
CJ Puno, Concurring
COMELEC’s ruling is completely antithetical to the fundamental rule that
“[t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular[,] for in our
constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a religion,
including the morality it sanctions.”
The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad’s definition of the term “sexual
orientation,” as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex with
men, as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual individuals a
fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate exercise of personal liberty.
For, the “ability to [independently] define one’s identity that is central to any concept of
liberty” cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all depend on the “emotional
enrichment from close ties with others.”
It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in the
partylist system because it is not a “marginalized and underrepresented sector”
enumerated either in the Constitution or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. However, this
position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC,
where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented
sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive.
J Corona, Dissenting
In Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, the Court stressed that the partylist system
is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in the past (e.g.,
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and even
those in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate). They are
those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an opportunity
to participate in the formulation of national policy although their sectoral interests are
also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the national interest.
Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of
lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be
properly considered as marginalized under the partylist system. First, petitioner is not
included in the sectors mentioned in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
Section 5 of RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the
LGBT sector cannot establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed,
petitioner does not even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it
represents itself as an altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and
agenda.
The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to determine
“such other [marginalized] sectors” qualified to participate in the partylist system to
Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the LGBT and
other sectors in the partylist system, deference to Congress’ determination on the
matter is proper.
J Abad, Separate
I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad’s petition
for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has
never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it
to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed
this point.
A reading of Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court’s
reading, neither the Constitution nor Republic Act No. 7941 intends the excessively
limited coverage that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) now suggests.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral
party accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the
youth. Ang Ladlad represents a narrow definition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a
concrete and specific definition of a subgroup within the class (group of gay
beauticians, for example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a
national presence.
20.1 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent - 219 SCRA 256 and
Panaligan, Celina
March 1, 1993
Recit Ready:
Petitioners, comprised of elementary and high school students in public schools in
Cebu, come before the Court challenging their expulsion by their respective schools
due to their refusal to salute the Philippine flag, sing the national anthem, and recite
the patriotic pledge on account of their religious belief. The aforementioned acts are
required by RA 1265, the IRR of DECS Department Order 8, and the Admin. Code.
The Court overturned its 30-year-old doctrine laid down in Gerona, and ruled in favor
of petitioners, stating that compelling petitioners to act against their beliefs (or
punishing them for refusing to do so), violates Sec 5, Art 3 of the Const. The Court
believed that petitioners are validly exempt from saluting, singing or pledging because
it is guaranteed to them by Sec. 5 and also because there is no compelling state
interest that would allow the State to validly intrude into petitioners’ religious practices.
Facts:
 in two consolidated petitions, petitioners, who were groups of students
expelled from public schools in Cebu, come before the Court for an
overturning of its 30-year-old doctrine laid down in Gerona, which upheld
the expulsion of students who refused to salute the Philippine Flag
 Petitioners were expelled after they repeatedly refused to salute the
Philippine Flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge
because their religion, Jehovah’s Witness, forbids it
 According to petitioners, their religion forbids it since the acts of compulsory
saluting, singing, and pledging are acts constituting the worship of the
Philippine Flag, and their religion expressly forbids the worship of idols or
any god other than their own
 Their refusal to salute, sing, and pledge are prohibited by RA 1265 (An Act
Making Flag Ceremony Compulsory in all Educational Institutions), the IRR
of DECS Department Order 8 (Rules and Regulations for Conducting the
Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions), and the Administrative Code
of 1987. The Department Order also states that those refusing to salute,
sing, or pledge, after due notice and hearing, can be dismissed from the
school (as was the case with the expelled students)
 in the Gerona ruling, the Court upheld the expulsion of the students, ruling
that “the flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines,
an emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of
freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect.
Under a system of complete separation of church and state in the
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting
the flag does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute is no more
a religious ceremony than the taking of an oath of office by a public official
or by a candidate for admission to the bar.”
 the Petitioners are challenging the doctrine laid down in Gerona and asking
the Court to issue a preliminary injunction on their expulsions because they
were denied of their right to due process and their expulsions infringe on
their freedom of religious belief guaranteed by Sec. 5 of the Const.
Issue:
W/N the students, on account of their religious belief for being members of the
Jehovah’s Witness, can be validly exempted from saluting the Philippine flag, singing
the national anthem, and reciting the patriotic pledge
Held:
Yes. Compelling petitioners to commit acts that directly go against their religious
beliefs, infringe on their freedom of religion. The freedom to act on one’s belief may
only be validly interfered with by the State if there is a showing of a clear and present
danger that the State has the right to prevent. In this case, allowing petitioners not to
salute, sing, or pledge will not bring about a clear and present danger or “disrupt
patriotic exercises.” The fear expressed by the Court in Gerona, that “the flag
ceremony will become a thing of the past or perhaps conducted with very few
participants”, has not come to pass.
“We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the
flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, this religious group
which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population" will shake up
our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in
and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration
for national heroes.”
“After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony, not
exclusion from the public schools where they may study the Constitution, the
democratic way of life and form of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences,
Philippine history and culture but also receive training for a vocation of profession and
be taught the virtues of "patriotism, respect for human rights, appreciation for national
heroes, the rights and duties of citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2],
Art. XIV, 1987 Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the
petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court
had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the
law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities.”
Cruz, J., concurring:
“In my humble view, Gerona was based on an erroneous assumption. The Court that
promulgated it was apparently laboring under the conviction that the State had the
right to determine what was religious and what was not and to dictate to the individual
what he could and could not worship. In pronouncing that the flag was not a religious
image but a symbol of the nation, it
was implying that no one had the right to worship it or — as the petitioners insisted —
not to worship it. This was no different from saying that the cult that reveres Rizal as a
divinity should not and cannot do so because he is only a civic figure deserving honor
but not veneration.
It seems to me that every individual is entitled to choose for himself whom or what to
worship or whether to worship at all. This is a personal decision he alone can make.
The individual may worship a spirit or a person or a beast or a tree (or a flag), and the
State cannot prevent him from doing so. For that matter, neither can it compel him to
do so. As long as his beliefs are not externalized in acts that offend the public interest,
he cannot be prohibited from harboring them or punished for doing so.”
Padilla, J., concurring:
“I concur in the Court's decision penned by Madame Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino
that school teachers and students who cannot salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the pledge of loyalty to the country, on grounds of religious belief or
conviction, may not on this ground alone be dismissed from the service or expelled
from the school.”
“At the same time, I am really concerned with what could be the
far-reaching consequences of our ruling in that, we may in effect be sanctioning a
privileged or elite class of teachers and students who will hereafter be exempt from
participating, even when they are in the school premises, in the flag ceremony in
deference to their religious scruples. What happens, for instance, if some citizens,
based also on their religious beliefs, were to refuse to pay taxes and license fees to
the government? Perhaps problems of this nature should not be anticipated. They will
be resolved when and if they ever arise. But with today's decision, we may have
created more problems than we have solved.”
“In fine, the flag ceremony is a legitimate means to achieve legitimate (and noble)
ends. For a select few to be exempt from the flag ceremony and all that it represent
seven if the exemption is predicated on respect for religious scruples, could be
divisive in its impact on the school population or community.”
20.2 Ebralinag v Division Superintendent - (MR) December 29, 1995
Fulache, Dece
(MR of the Case ONLY; REFER TO ORIGINAL CASE IN 20.1 FOR FACTS AND
SUMMARY)
SUMMARY: MR IS DENIED
PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.:
The State moves for a reconsideration decision dated March 1, 1993 granting private
respondents' petition for certiorari and prohibition and annulling the expulsion orders issued
by the public respondents therein on the ground that the said decision created an
exemption in favor of the members of the religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses, in
violation of the "Establishment Clause" of the Constitution.
Solicitor General, on behalf of the public respondent, furthermore contends that:
o The accommodation by this Honorable Court to a demand for special
treatment in favor of a minority sect even on the basis of a claim of
religious freedom may be criticized as granting preference to the
religious beliefs of said sect in violation of the "non-establishment
guarantee" provision of the Constitution.
o Decision constitutes a special favor which immunizes religious believers
such as Jehovah's Witnesses to the law and the DECS rules and
regulations by interposing the claim that the conduct required by law
and the-rules and regulation (sic) are violative of their religious beliefs.
o Susceptible to the very criticism that the grant of exemption is a violation
of the non-establishment" provision of the Constitution.
o To grant an exemption to a specific religious minority poses a risk of
collision course with the "equal protection of the laws" clause in
respect of the non-exempt, and, in public schools, a collision course
with the "non-establishment guarantee."
· Public respondent insists that this Court adopt a "neutral stance" by reverting to its holding
in Gerona declaring the flag as being devoid of any religious significance.
o Stresses that the issue here is not curtailment of religious belief but
regulation of the exercise of religious belief.
o HE maintains that the State's interests in the case at bench are
constitutional and legal obligations to implement the law and the
constitutional mandate to inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism and to encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs, referring to the test devised by the United States Supreme
Court in U.S. vs. O'Brien. 1
II
o All the petitioners in the original case 2 were minor schoolchildren, and members of the sect,
Jehovah's Witnesses (assisted by their parents) who were expelled from their classes by
various public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of July 11,
1955 and by Department Order No. 8, dated July 21, 1955 issued by the Department of
Education.
o Aimed primarily at private educational institutions, which did not observe the flag ceremony
exercises, Republic Act No., 1265 penalizes all educational institutions for failure or refusal
to observe the flag ceremony with-public censure on first offense and cancellation of the
recognition or permit on second offense.
o Immediately pursuant to these orders, school officials in Masbate expelled children belonging
to the sect of the Jehovah's Witnesses from school for failing or refusing to comply with the
flag ceremony requirement.
o Sustaining these expulsion orders, this Court in the 1959 case of Gerona
vs. Secretary of Education 3 held that:
§ The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines, an emblem of national sovereignty, of national
unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and
the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering the
complete separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious
significance. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve
any religious ceremony. . . ..
o After all, the determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a
religious ceremony must rest with the courts.
o Upholding religious freedom as a fundamental right deserving the
"highest priority and amplest protection among human rights,"
o From our decision of March 1, 1993, the public respondents filed a motion for reconsideration
on grounds hereinabove stated.
o After a careful study of the grounds adduced in the government's Motion For Reconsideration
of our original decision, however, we find no cogent reason to disturb our earlier ruling.
o Members of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the basis of religious convictions, refuse to perform an
act (or acts) which they consider proscribed by the Bible, they contend that such refusal
should not be taken to indicate disrespect for the symbols of the country or evidence that
they are wanting in patriotism and nationalism.
o They point out that as citizens, they have an excellent record as law abiding members of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED.
society even if they do not demonstrate their refusal to conform to the assailed orders by
overt acts of conformity.
o On the contrary, they aver that they show their respect through less
demonstrative methods manifesting their allegiance, by their simple
obedience to the country's laws, by not engaging in antigovernment
activities of any kind, and by paying their taxes and dues to society
self-sufficient members of the community. 9 While they refuse to salute
the flag, they are willing to stand quietly and peacefully at attention,
hands on their side, in order not to disrupt the ceremony or disturb
those who believe differently.
III
The ostensible interest shown by petitioners in preserving the flag as the symbol of the nation
appears to be integrally related to petitioner's disagreement with the message conveyed by
the refusal of members of the Jehovah's Witness sect to salute the flag or participate
actively in flag ceremonies on religious grounds.
Where the governmental interest clearly appears to be unrelated to the suppression of an
idea, a religious doctrine or practice or an expression or form of expression, this Court will
not find it difficult to sustain a regulation. However, regulations involving this area are
generally held against the most exacting standards, and the zone of protection accorded by
the Constitution cannot be violated, except upon a showing of a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil which the state has a right to protect.
THE view that the flag is not a religious but a neutral, secular symbol expresses a
majoritarian view intended to stifle the expression of the belief that an act of saluting the
flag might sometimes be - to some individuals - so offensive as to be worth their giving up
another constitutional right - the right to education.
o Individuals or groups of individuals get from a symbol the meaning they
put to it. Compelling members of a religious sect to believe otherwise
on the pain of denying minor children the right to an education is a
futile and unconscionable detour towards instilling virtues of loyalty and
patriotism which are best instilled and communicated by painstaking
and non-coercive methods.
o Coerced loyalties, after all, only serve to inspire the opposite. The
methods utilized to impose them breed resentment and dissent. Those
who attempt to coerce uniformity of sentiment soon find out that the
only path towards achieving unity is by way of suppressing dissent.
In the end, such attempts only find the "unanimity of the graveyard." more demanding
standard is applied.
The responsibility of inculcating the values of patriotism, nationalism, good citizenship, and
moral uprightness is a responsibility shared by the State with parents and other societal
institutions such as religious sects and denominations.
The manner in which such values are demonstrated in a plural society occurs in ways so
variable that government cannot make claims to the exclusivity of its methods of inculcating
patriotism so all-encompassing in scope as to leave no room for appropriate parental or
religious influences.
Provided that those influences do not pose a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to
society and its institutions, expressions of diverse beliefs, no matter how upsetting they
may seem to the majority, are the price we pay for the freedoms we enjoy.
21. Employment Division v. Smith [494 U.S. 872 (1990)]
Erbon, Roni
Doctrine: The right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes.
Recit Ready: Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired because they ingested peyote
for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which
both are members. When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division for
unemployment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits
because they had been discharged for work-related "misconduct". Respondents
claimed that it is a violation of their rights under the First Amendment. The Court ruled
that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes.
Facts:Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black were fired from their jobs with a
private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental
purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which both are members.
When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division for unemployment
compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had
been discharged for work-related "misconduct". The Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed that determination, holding that the denial of benefits violated respondents'
free exercise rights under the First Amendment.
Oregon Supreme Court reasoned, however, that the criminality of respondents' peyote
use was irrelevant to resolution of their constitutional claim -- since the purpose of the
"misconduct" provision under which respondents had been disqualified was not to
enforce the State's criminal laws, but to preserve the financial integrity of the
compensation fund, and since that purpose was inadequate to justify the burden that
disqualification imposed on respondents' religious practice.
Issue: W/N the denial of the respondent’s benefits is a violation of the First
Amendment
Held: Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation
of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of physical acts solely because of
their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a law that incidentally forbids the performance of an act that his religious
belief requires if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is
otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for
nonreligious reasons.
Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes.
Respondents' claim for a religious exemption from the Oregon law cannot be
evaluated under the balancing test set forth in the line of cases following Sherbert v.
Verner, whereby governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice
must be justified by a "compelling governmental interest." That test was developed in
a context -- unemployment compensation eligibility rules -- that lent itself to
individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. The
test is inapplicable to an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of
conduct. A holding to the contrary would create an extraordinary right to ignore
generally applicable laws that are not supported by "compelling governmental interest"
on the basis of religious belief. Nor could such a right be limited to situations in which
the conduct prohibited is "central" to the individual's religion, since that would enmesh
judges in an impermissible inquiry into the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to
a faith.
22. Wisconsin v. Yoder - 406 US 205
Sebastian, Lui
Doctrine: Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served
can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. However strong the
State’s interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the
exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
Recit Ready:
Members of the Amish Community were charged under a Wisconsin Law on
compulsory school attendance for refusing to send their children to school after
graduating from the 8th grade. They claimed that doing so would violate their beliefs
and endanger their salvation, as the Amish believe in seclusion from the modern life
and recourse to the simple country life, and they have sufficiently established their
sincerity towards such beliefs over the years. They contended that the said law
violates their right to free religious exercise for being in sharp contrast with their
religious tenets. The Wisconsin SC held that the State’s interest in universal education
is not free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights. In this
case, the State’s claim of parens patriae cannot prevail over the free exercise claim of
the Amish Community in the absence of a compelling state interest. Also, the Amish
have established that there is no apparent danger to the welfare of their children, even
if they are deprived of the 2 years of additional education contemplated under the law.
Respondents (residents of Green County, Wisconsin):
Jonas Yoder & Wallace Miller – members of the Old Order Amish religion
Adin Yutzy – member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church
Facts
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law required them to send their children to
public/private school until age 16, but they declined to send their children (14&15 y/o)
to public school after they completed the 8th grade.
On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents
were charged, tried, and convicted of violating the said law, and were fined.
Respondents argued that the said law violated their First and Fourteenth Amendments
rights.
They believed that it would expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the
church community, and endanger their own salvation and that of their children.
History shows that Old Order Amish communities today are characterized by a
fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and
apart from the world and worldly influence.
A related feature of these communities is their devotion to a life in harmony with The Wisconsin SC sustained respondents' claim under the Free Exercise Clause of
nature and the soil – members of the Amish community are required to make their the First Amendment, and reversed the convictions.
living by farming or closely related activities.
The Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines the entire mode of life of its
Wrt the first issue:
adherents. Their conduct is regulated in great detail by the Ordnung, or rules, of the
Majority opinion: the State had failed to make an adequate showing that its interest in
church community.
"establishing and maintaining an educational system overrides the defendants' right to
High school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-
the free exercise of their religion."
distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students.
The State, having a high responsibility for its citizens’ education, has a power to
Amish society emphasizes informal "learning through doing;" a life of "goodness,"
impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.
rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge; community
Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.
welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration with,
However, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing and education of
contemporary worldly society.
their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.
Formal high school education places children in an environment hostile to Amish
A State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free
beliefs, with increasing emphasis on competition (class work & sports) and with
from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, and
pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of peers.
the parents’ traditional interest with respect to the religious upbringing of their children
It also takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the
so long as they "prepare them for additional obligations."
crucial and formative adolescent period of life.
For Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the 8th grade against a claim that
Children must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work, self-reliance, and the
such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must
specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer/housewife. They
appear either that:
must learn to enjoy physical labor.
(1) the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or
High school attendance w/ teachers who are not of the Amish faith – and may even be
(2) that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
hostile to it – interposes a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into their
claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause
religious community.
Long before there was general acknowledgment of the need for universal formal
Experts on Amish society testified the ff. about the Amish society:
education, the Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly fixed the right to free
- the modern high school is not equipped, in curriculum or social environment, to
exercise of religious beliefs.
impart the values promoted by Amish society
Buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition
- compulsory high school attendance could result in great psychological harm to
against the establishment of any religion by government.
children, because of the conflicts it would produce.
These values relating to religion have been zealously protected, sometimes even at
- it would also result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community
the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance.
as it exists in the United States today.
Only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
- they succeed in preparing their high school age children to be productive
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.
members of the Amish community, and that their system of learning through doing the
However strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no
skills directly relevant to their adult roles in their community is "ideal," and perhaps
means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests.
superior to ordinary high school education.
- they have an excellent record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient
members of society. Wrt the second issue:
The Amish do not object to elementary education through the first 8 grades because A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to
their children must have basic skills to read the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens, reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular
and to be able to deal with non-Amish people. considerations.
To have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief.
Issues
This case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is
WON the Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law interfere with the freedom of
not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, and
the Defendants (respondents) to act in accordance with their sincere religious belief –
intimately related to daily living.
YES
Respondents' religious beliefs and attitude toward life, family, and home have
WON the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable
remained constant or even static in a period of progress in human knowledge and
and interdependent (something that must be proven to be protected by the First
great changes in education.
Amendment) – YES
The values and programs of the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict w/ the
fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion; modern laws requiring
Held compulsory secondary education have engendered great concern and conflict.
The impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish If the parents in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to
religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for it compels them, under threat of impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children.
criminal sanction, to perform acts at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious Where the child is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be
beliefs. an invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his
Nor is the impact of the said law confined to grave interference with important Amish views.
religious tenets from a subjective point of view, it also carries with it the kind of As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this litigation that his rights should be
objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was considered.
designed to prevent. If an Amish child desires to attend high school, and is mature enough to have that
desire respected, the State may well be able to override the parents' religiously
motivated objections.
Other discussions in the case:
I think the children should be entitled to be heard. While the parents, absent dissent,
There are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
normally speak for the entire family, the education of the child is a matter on which the
Amendment, and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under
child will often have decided views.
regulations of general applicability.
It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and of the right of students to
constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
be masters of their own destiny.
exercise of religion.
If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him, and if his
An exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run
education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed. The child,
afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any
therefore, should be given an opportunity to be heard.
exception, no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the
The Court (in the Pierce case) implicitly held that the custodian had standing to assert
right of free exercise.
alleged freedom of religion; rights of the child that were threatened in the very
The State attacks respondents' position as one fostering "ignorance" from which the
litigation, and that the child had no effective way of asserting herself.
child must be protected by the State. But the Amish community has been a highly
A significant number of Amish children do leave the Old Order. The court brushed
successful social unit – they are self-sufficient, productive and law-abiding citizens
aside the students' interests with the offhand comment that, "when a child reaches the
The State, according to the Prince case, argues that a decision exempting Amish
age of judgment, he can choose for himself his religion."
children from the State's requirement fails to recognize the Amish child’s substantive
But there is nothing in this record to indicate that the moral and intellectual judgment
right to a secondary education, and fails to give due regard to the State’s power as
demanded of the student by the question in this case is beyond his capacity – children
parens patriae to extend the benefit of secondary education.
far younger than the 14&15y/o are regularly permitted to testify in custody and other
However, the Court was not confronted in Prince with a situation comparable to that of
proceedings.
the Amish as revealed in this record.
Moreover, there is substantial agreement among child psychologists and sociologists
The Court has also rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to
that the moral and intellectual maturity of the 14-year-old approaches that of the adult.
governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or
principles, for 'even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, it is
not totally free from legislative restrictions.' 23. Pamil v. Teleron - 86 SCRA 413
This case is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or Olivarez, Shannin
to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or inferred. (November 20, 1978) (Ponente: Justice Fernando)
Note: the majority of the opinion explains the reasons why there are
constitutional objections to the effectivity of Section 2175 of the Revised
Dissenting Opinion (Justice Douglas):
Administrative Code (concerning ecclesiastics)
I agree with the Court that the religious scruples of the Amish are opposed to the
*Please take note of the date of the case. The 1973 Constitution is the one that
education of their children beyond the grade schools, yet I disagree with the Court's
is being used
conclusion that the matter is within the dispensation of parents alone.
*Please read the opinions carefully
The Court's analysis assumes that the only interests at stake are those of the Amish
1.) Key Takeaway:
parents and those of the State.
· What is the “no religious test?” (according to Justice Aquino)
The difficulty with this approach is that, despite the Court's claim, the parents are
i. The “no religious test” provisions means that
seeking to vindicate not only their own free exercise claims, but also those of their
a person or citizen may exercise a civil right (like the right to acquire property) or a
high-school-age children.
political right (the right to vote or hold office, for instance) without being required to
The right of the Amish children to religious freedom is not presented by the facts of the
belong to a certain church or to hold particular religious beliefs
case, as the issue involves only the Amish parents' religious freedom to defy the
ii. The historical background of the “no religious
Wisconsin law.
test” provision clearly shows that it is consistent with the disqualification of all
clergymen from holding public office and that it cannot be invoked to invalidate the
statutory provision on disqualification
iii. The “no religious test” provision is a reaction
against the Test Acts which once upon a time were enforced in England, Scotland and
Ireland
iv. The Test Acts provided that only those who
professed the established religion were eligible for public office; those laws
discriminated against recusants or Roman Catholics and nonconformists
2.) Recit-Ready:
This case is about Father Gonzaga, who was elected as the municipal mayor of
Albuquerque, Bohol. Petitioner Pamil, who was one of the aspirants for the mayoral
position during the elections filed a case against Father Gonzaga, assailing that
Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code is still in effect. Section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code prohibits priests, AFP members and the like, from
running and holding a position in the local government. This provision therefore,
prohibits Father Gonzaga, from assuming his office as the mayor of Albuquerque.
Petitioner Father Gonzaga assailed that Section 2175 no longer applies since it was
already repealed by Section 23 of the Omnibus Election Code of COMELEC. The
RTC, through the decision of Judge Teleron, affirmed petitioner Father Gonzaga’s
argument. Although, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the RTC, declaring
that Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code is still effective. Therefore,
Father Gonzaga needed to vacate his position as the mayor of Alburquerque.
3.) Facts:
· Main question of the case: eligibility of an ecclesiastic to an elective
municipal position
· Private respondent Father Margarito R. Gonzaga was in 1971, elected to
the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol
· A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner Pamil, who is an aspirant
for the office, praying for Father Gonzaga’s disqualification based on this
Administrative Code provision: In no case shall there be elected or appointed to
a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving
salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for
public works of the municipality
· The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge Teleron sustaining the right of
Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor; he ruled that such statutory
ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971
· The matter therefore, was elevated to the Supreme Court by petitioner
Pamil; it is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in
full force and effect
· On the part of the Supreme Court, there is no clear-cut answer; the Court
is divided on the issue. Seven members of the Court are of the view that the
judgment should be affirmed as the challenged provision is no longer operative
either because it was superseded by the 1935 Constitution or repealed
· Six other Justices (Teehankee Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr., Santos,
Fernandez, and Guererro): the overriding principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution or, at the very least, the repeal of such provision bars a reversal
· Remaining five Justices (CJ Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and
Aquino): hold the position that such prohibition against an ecclesiastic running
for elective office is NOT TAINTED with any constitutional infirmity
· The vote is thus undecisive; while five members of the Court constitute a
minority, the vote of the remaining seven does not suffice to render the challenged
provision ineffective. Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, as far as
ecclesiastics are concerned, must be accorded respect. It calls for the
application of presumption of validity
4.) Issue:
· Whether or not Section 2715 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) is still in
effect? – Yes.
5.) Held/Ruling:
· Reversal of RTC decision; and declare ineligible respondent Father
Margarito R. Gonzaga for the office of municipal mayor
The Revised Administrative Code; A brief History:
· The Revised Administrative Code (RAC), was enacted in 1917; in the 1935
Constitution, it is explicitly declared: No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights; The principle paramount character of the
fundamental law comes into play
· The ban imposed by the Administrative code CANNOT SURVIVE
· This is to conform to this provision of the 1935 Charter: All laws of the
Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter such laws shall remain operative,
unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or
repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to
the government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution
· 1 Jurisprudence: This provision was first applied in People v. Linsañgan,
st
decided in December 1935, barely a month after that Constitution took effect; the SC
held that Section 2718 of the RAC that would allow the prosecution of a person who
remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, was no longer in force, since it was
inconsistent with section 1, clause 12 of Article II of the Constitution
· 2 Jurisprudence: De los Santos v. Mallare; The President, under the RAC,
nd
could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City
of Baguio
· 3 Jurisprudence: Martinez v. Morfe; In the light of the cited provision of the
rd
1935 Constitution, Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code was found to be inoperative.
The penalty of prision correccional is imposed on any public officer or employee who,
while the Congress was in regular or special session, would arrest or search a
member thereof, except in case he had committed a crime punishable by a penalty
higher than prision mayor
Article 2715 of the Revised Administrative Code:
· The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares
ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, on its face, inconsistent
with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution; to exclude them is to
impose a religious test
· Jurisprudence: Torcaso v. Watkins (U.S. case); vwhat was there involved
was the validity of a provision in the Maryland Constitution, prescribing that “no
religious test ought ever to be required as a disqualification for any office or profit or
trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God”; such a
constitutional requirement was assailed as contrary to the First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution by an appointee to the office of notary public in Maryland, who was
refused a commission as he would not declare a belief in God. He failed in the
Maryland Court of Appeals but prevailed in the U.S. SC, which reversed the state
court decision. Justice Black stated that “this Maryland religious test for public office
unconstitutionally invades appellant’s freedom of belief and religion and therefore
cannot be enforced against him”
· In the present case, being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a
religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office; there is thus an
incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by
petitioner Pamil and an express constitutional mandate
· Opinion of Justice Moreland in the leading U.S. case of McGirr v. Hamilton:
“Relative to the theory that Act No. 1627 has stood so long and been silently
acquiesced in for so great a length of time that it should not be disturbed, it may be
said that the fact that certain individuals have, by ignorance or neglect, failed to claim
their fundamental rights, furnishes no reason why another individual, alert to his rights
and their proper enforcement, should be prevented from asserting and sustaining
those rights . . .”
6.) Opinions:
· Justice Fernando (opinion):
o Section 2175 of Revised Administrative Code prohibiting ecclesiastics from
holding public office is unconstitutional
o This is because the ban in Section 2175 already superseded by the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions on provision or non-religious test for exercise of civil or political
rights
· Chief Justice Castro (separate opinion):
o The thrust of section 23 of the Election Code of 1971 is simple: what is the effect
of the filing of certificates of candidacy by appointive, elective and other officials of the
government? The said section is therefore of no relevance (except to the extent
that it allows members of the Armed Forces to run for elective positions)
o Upon the other hand, section 2175 of the Administrative Code treats of a disparate
matter, which is the absolute disqualification of the classes of persons enumerated
therein; nor does the proscription contained in the said Section 2175 prescribe a
religious test for the exercise of civil or political rights
o I have searchingly analysed this provision, and I am unable to infer from it any
requirement of a religious test
o Since Section 2175 of the Administrative Code has not been superseded, and has
been neither expressly nor impliedly repealed in so far as the absolute disqualification
of ecclesiastics is concerned, it is perforce the controlling law in the case at bar
o Careful note must be taken that the absolute disqualification is couched in the
most compelling of negative terms; the law reads: “In no case shall there be elected or
appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics . . .”
o It is thus entirely possible that the election of ecclesiastics to municipal offices may
spawn small religious wars instead of promote the general community welfare and
peace – and these religious wars could conceivably burgeon into internecine
dimensions
o In my view, all ecclesiastics should essentially be pastors, immersing themselves
around the clock in the problems of the disadvantage and the poor; but they cannot
be effective pastors if they do not dissociate themselves completely from every
and all bane of politics
· Justice Teehankee (dissenting opinion):
o As a pure question of law on the sole issue joined by the parties, therefore, I hold
that the ban in section 2175 of the RAC against the election of ecclesiastics (and the
three other categories mentioned) to a municipal office has been repealed by the
provisions of the Election Code of 1971, which nowhere in its all-embracing and
comprehensive text mentions ecclesiastics (as well as the three other categories in
the aforesaid administrative Code provision) as among those ineligible or disqualified
to run for public office (national or local)
o On the constitutional dimension given motu proprio to the case in the main opinion
of Mr. Justice Fernando, by way of “constitutional objectives to the continuing force
and effectivity of Section 2175 as far as ecclesiastics are concerned”
o I concur with the main opinion, declaring that the archaic Administrative Code
provision declaring ecclesiastics ineligible for election or appointment to a municipal
office is inconsistent with and violative of the religious freedom guaranteed by the
1935 Constitution and that to so bar them from office is to impose a religious test of
the Constitutional mandate that “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights”
· Justice Barredo (concurring opinion):
o I agree with the Chief Justice and Justice Makasiar that the trial courts ruling,
following that of the Commission on Elections, to the effect that Section 2175 of the
RAC has been repealed by Section 23 of the Election Code of 1971 as not legally
correct
o More than merely declaring eccelsiastics ineligible to a municipal office, the
Administrative Code provisions enjoins in the most unequivocal terms their incapacity
to hold such office whether by election or appointment
o Indeed, the word “ineligible” in the title of the section is inappropriate; if the
Election Code provision has any incompatibility with the mentioned Administrative
Code provisions, it is only by implication and only insofar as members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines are concerned, in the sense that said army men are not
allowed to run for election to municipal offices provided that they shall be
deemed to automatically cease in their army positions upon the filing of their
certification of candidacies
o Section 23 DOES NOT DEFINE who are qualified to be candidates for public
elective positions, nor who are disqualified; it merely states what is the effect of
the filing of certificates of candidacy by those referred to therein, which do not
include ecclesiastics
o Thus, the inconsistency contemplated in Section 249 of the Code as productive of
repealing effect DOES NOT EXIST in the case of Section 23 thereof vis-à-vis Section
2175 of the RAC
o Accordingly, the only way respondent Father Gonzaga can legally hold to the
mayorship he is occupying is for Section 2175 to be declared as violative of the
constitutional injunction in Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines
which was in force in 1971 that “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights” as contended by him
o On this score, it is my considered view that there is no repugnancy at all between
Section 2175, on the one hand, and the freedom of religion provision of the Old
Constitution, which, incidentally, is reproduced textually in the New Charter, and the
principle of separation of church and state, on the other
o The “no religious test” provision is founded on the long cherished principle of
separation of church and state which the framers of the 1973 Constitution opted to
include as an express provision in the fundamental law by ordaining that such
separation “shall be inviolable”, not as a redundancy but in order to comprehend
situations which may not be covered by the provisions on religious freedom in the Bill
of Rights
o It simply means that no public office may be denied to any person by reason of his
religious belief, including his non-belief
o Whether he believes in God or not, or, believing in God, he expresses and
manifests his belief in one way or another, does not disqualify him; but when he
becomes a religious or an ecclesiastic, he becomes one who does not merely belong
to his church, congregation or denomination or one who entertains his own religious
belief; he becomes the official minister of his church with distinct duties and
responsibilities which may not always be compatible with the posture of absolute
indifference and impartiality to all religious beliefs which the government and all its
officials must maintain at all times, on all occasions and in every aspect of human life
and individual endeavour precisely because of the separation of church and state and
the full enjoyment of religious freedom by everyone
· Justice Makasiar (concurring opinion):
o It is patent that the two legal provisions are compatible with each other; Section 23
of the Election Code does not enumerate the persons disqualified for a public elective
or appointive office; but merely prescribes the effect of filing a certificate of
candidacy by an appointive public officer or employee or by active members of
the Armed forces of the Philippines or by an officer or employee in a
government-owned or controlled corporation Section 23 states that upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy, such appointive officer or employee or member of the
AFP shall “ipso facto” cease his office or position; the obvious purpose is to prevent
such candidate from taking advantage of his position to the prejudice of the opposing
candidates not similarly situated
o On the other hand, Section 2175 of the RAC provides for an absolute
disqualification and enumerates the persons who are so absolutely disqualified to run
for or be appointed to a municipal office which enumeration includes not only public
officers but also private individuals like contractors and ecclesiastics
o Section 23 of the Election Code of 1971 applies only to public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations and
members of the AFP, but not to private citizens, like contractors or ecclesiastics
o Hence, a contractor who is not employed in any government office or government-
owned or controlled corporation or in the AFP, need not vacate his private
employment, if any, upon his filing a certificate of candidacy
o Likewise, if he were qualified in the absence of the absolute disqualifications in
Section 2175 of the RAC, a priest or minister is no ipso facto divested of his position in
his church the moment he files his certificate of candidacy
o To allow an ecclesiastic to head the executive department of a municipality is to
permit the erosion of the principle of separation of Church and State and thus open
the floodgates for the violation of the cherished liberty of religion which the
constitutional provision seeks to enforce and protect
· Justice Antonio (concurring opinion):
o I likewise take exception to the view expressed in the majority opinion that the
supremacy of the Constitution supplies the answer to the issue of the eligibility of a
member of the clergy to an elective municipal position
o The application of Article XVI, Section 2 of the 1935 Constitution, with its
counterpart in Article XVII, Section 7 of the 1973 Constitution, concerning laws
inconsistent with the Constitution, is inaccurate
o Article 2175 of the RAC, in including ecclesiastics within the ambit of the
prohibition is not inconsistent with the explicit provision of the 1935 Constitution that
“no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” The
absence of inconsistency may be seen from the fact that the prohibition against
“religious tests” was not original to the 1935 Constitution
o It was expressly provided in the Jones Law that “no religious test shall be required
for the exercise of civil or political rights”; at the time of the passage of the Jones Law,
the original Administrative Code (Act 2657) was already in force, having been enacted
in February 1916
o In order to harmonize the Code with the Jones Law, the Code was amended in
October 1916, with the passage of Act 2711; the revision was made expressly “for the
purpose of adapting it to the Jones Law and the Reorganization Act.”
o Notwithstanding such stated purpose of the amendment, the prohibition against
the election of ecclesiastics to municipal offices, originally embodied in Section 2121
of Act 2657, was retained; this is a clear indication that it is not repugnant to the “no
religious test” doctrine which, as aforecited, was already expressly provided for in the
Jones Law
o Considering that Section 2175 of the RAC, which “cut off forever every pretense of
any alliance between Church and State,” is in conformity with Section 15 of Article XV
of the Constitution, which ordains that “the separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable,” it cannot, therefore, be said that such statute, in including ecclesiastics
among those ineligible to municipal office, is violative of the fundamental law
· Justice Muñoz Palma (dissenting opinion):
o Election of ecclesiastics to municipal office is not violative of separation of church
and state; entry of ecclesiastics in local government office is not necessarily an
involvement of political in religion
o What is sought to be achieved under the principle of separation of church and
state is that political process is insulated from religion and religion from politics; in
other words, government neutrality in religious matters
o Of course the religion of the man cannot be dissociated from his personality; in
truth, his religion influences his conduct, his moral values, the fairness of his
judgment, his outlook on social problems, etc.
· Justice Aquino (concurring opinion):
o The term “ecclesiastics” refers to priests, clergymen or persons in holy orders or
consecrated to the service of the church; broadly speaking, it may include nuns
o It is argued that the disqualification of priest was abrogated by section 1(7), Article
III of the 1935 which provides that “no religious tests shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights”
o It is assumed that the disqualification is “inconsistent with the religious freedom
guaranteed by the Constitution” = I disagree with that conclusion; there is no
incongruency between the disqualification provision and the “no religious test”
provision. The two provisions can stand together
o The disqualification provision does not impair the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship; it has nothing to do with
religious freedom
o The disqualification of priests from holding a municipal office is an
application of the mandate for the separation of church and state
o A priest, who is disqualified from becoming a municipal employee, is not denied
any part of his religious freedom or his political rights
o A priest may have the civil right to embrace the religious vocation but he does not
have the constitutional right to be a municipal employee; he can choose between
being a municipal employee and being a priest – he cannot be both; the
arrangement is good for himself and his church and for society
o On the other hand, the statutory provision that only laymen can hold municipal
offices or that clergymen are disqualified to become municipal officials is compatible
with the “no religious test” provision of the 1935 Constitution which is also found in
section 8, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and in section 3 of the Jones Law; they
are compatible because they refer to different things
o The “no religious test” provisions means that a person or citizen may exercise a
civil right (like the right to acquire property) or a political right (the right to vote
or hold office, for instance) without being required to belong to a certain church
or to hold particular religious beliefs
o The historical background of the “no religious test” provision clearly shows
that it is consistent with the disqualification of all clergymen from holding
public office and that it cannot be invoked to invalidate the statutory provision
on disqualification
o The “no religious test” provision is a reaction against the Test Acts which
once upon a time were enforced in England, Scotland and Ireland
o The Test Acts provided that only those who professed the established
religion were eligible for public office; those laws discriminated against
recusants or Roman Catholics and nonconformists
24. McDaniel v. Paty - 435 US 618 (April 19, 1978)
Mordeno, Gia
J. Burger:
Doctrine
 A statute that requires for the surrender of the right to free exercise of
religion in order to exercise another right is violative of the free exercise of
religion
Recit Ready
 McDaniel was an ordained minIster who filed as a candidate for delegate to
the constitutional convention. Paty, an opposing candidate sued to
disqualify McDaniel.
 Chancery Court ruled that he was qualified and § 4 of the ch. 848 violated
the First and Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
 Tennessee Supreme Court reversed Chancery Court decision. The
disqualification imposed no burden or religious belief and restricted religious
action only in lawmaking where such is absolutely prohibited.
 WON the statute violated the right to free exercise of religion. YES.
 The right to religious freedom encompasses the right to preach, proselyte,
and perform other similar religious functions. Tennessee also recognizes
the right of its adult citizens to seek and hold office as legislator and
delegates to the constitutional convention.
 Under the statute, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously.
One right must be surrendered in order to exercise the other.
 In doing so, the State has encroached McDaniel’s right to free exercise of
religion.
 The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on
ministers is that if elected to public office they will
 necessarily exercise their powers and influence to promote the interests of
one sect or thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one against the
others, contrary to the antiestablishment principle with its command of
neutrality.
 There is no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office
will be less careful of antiestablishment interests or less faithful to their
oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts.
Facts
 McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chattanooga,
Tennessee, filed as a candidate for delegate to the constitutional
convention.
 Paty, an opposing candidate, sued in the Chancery Court for a declaratory
judgment that McDaniel was disqualified from serving as a delegate and
striking his name form the ballot.
 Chancery Court declared § 4 of the ch. 848 violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and declared McDaniel
eligible for office of the delegate.
 Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court decision. The
disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon religious belief and
restricted religious action only in the lawmaking process of government
where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause.
The tendency to channel political activity along religious lines was
sufficiently weighty to justify the disqualification.
Issue
 WON the statute barring ministers of the gospel or priests of any
denomination from serving as delegates to the constitutional convention
violates the right to free exercise of religion. YES.
Held
 The purpose of disqualification of ordained ministers was to assure the
separation of the church and the state.
o Establishment clause – “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion” (not explicitly explained in the case
but referenced)
o Prior to disqualification, States had established or government-
sponsored churches. After the ratification of the First Amendment,
there were states that had pro-establishment provisions.
o Because of the undue influence in public and political affairs, one
way to assure disestablishment was to keep clergymen out of
office.
o Eventually, states abandoned disestablishment. The
disqualification was an “odious distinction” and was violative of
the free exercise of religion.
  The right to religious freedom encompasses the right to preach, proselyte,
and perform other similar religious functions. Tennessee also recognizes
the right of its adult citizens to seek and hold office as legislator and
delegates to the constitutional convention.
o Under the statute, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights
simultaneously. One right must be surrendered in order to
exercise the other.
o In doing so, the State has encroached McDaniel’s right to free
exercise of religion.
 Torcaso v. Watkins does not apply to this case.
o Torcaso v. Watkins – “"any office of profit or trust in this State"
declare their belief in the existence of God “ is declared
unconstitutional. The case focuses on the freedom of religious
belief.
o In this case, the disqualification operates against McDaniel
because of his status as a minister or a priest not in his belief.
 The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on
ministers is that if elected to public office they will necessarily exercise their
powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the
interests of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the
antiestablishment principle with its command of neutrality.
 There is no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office
will be less careful of antiestablishment interests or less faithful to their
oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts.
J. Brennan – concurring opinion
 The provision imposes a unique disability upon those who exhibit a defined
level of intensity of involvement in protected religious activity. Such a
classification as much imposes a test for office based on religious conviction
as one based on denominational preference.
 As construed, the exclusion manifests patent hostility toward, not neutrality
respecting, religion; forces or influences a minister or priest to abandon his
ministry as the price of public office; and, in sum, has a primary effect which
inhibits religion.
 The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is to reduce or
eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious discussion,
association, or political participation in a status less preferred than rights of
discussion, association, and political participation generally. The
Establishment Clause does not license government to treat religion and
those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as
subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities.
J. Stewart – concurring opinion
 Torcaso case is applicable.
 Except for the fact that Tennessee bases its disqualification not on a
person's statement of belief, but on his decision to pursue a religious
vocation as directed by his belief, that case is indistinguishable from this
one—and that sole distinction is without constitutional consequence.
J. White – concurring opinion
 I would hold ch. 848, § 4, of 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
 Although the State's interest is a legitimate one, close scrutiny reveals that
the challenged law is not reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of
that objective.
25. Goldman v. Weinberger - 54 LW 4298 (1986)
Hernandez, Justine
Doctrine:
Appropriate level of scrutiny of a military regulation that clashes with a constitutional
right is neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis. Instead, it held that a military
regulation must be examined to determine whether "legitimate military ends are
sought to be achieved and whether it is "designed to accommodate the individual right
to an appropriate degree.”
“Within the military community, there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as
there is in the larger civilian community."
RR: (https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1097)
Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force, an Orthodox
Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his yarmulke while on duty
and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation mandated that indoors, headgear
could not be worn "except by armed security police in the performance of their duties."
Did the Air Force Regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment?
The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. Justice
Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment challenges to military regulations
are examined with less scrutiny than similar challenges from civilian society, given the
need for the military to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de
corps." Since allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity
sought by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate.
In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and allowed
members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat and conservative"
manner.
Facts:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Petitioner S. Simcha Goldman contends that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution permits him to wear a yarmulke while in
uniform, notwithstanding an Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress for Air
Force personnel. The District Court for the District of Columbia permanently enjoined authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. The
the Air Force from enforcing its regulation against petitioner and from penalizing him military authorities have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with
for wearing his yarmulke. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit carrying out our Nation's military policy.
reversed on the ground that the Air Force's strong interest in discipline justified the
strict enforcement of its uniform dress requirements. We granted certiorari because of
"[J]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action under the
the importance of the question, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985), and now affirm.
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations
for their governance is challenged."
Petitioner Goldman is an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi. In 1973, he was accepted
into the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program and placed on
Petitioner Goldman contends that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
inactive reserve status in the Air Force while he studied clinical psychology at Loyola
requires the Air Force to make an exception to its uniform dress requirements for
University of Chicago. During his three years in the scholarship program, he received
religious apparel unless the accouterments create a "clear danger" of undermining
a monthly stipend and an allowance for tuition, books, and fees. After completing his
discipline and esprit de corps. He asserts that, in general, visible but "unobtrusive"
Ph.D. in psychology, petitioner entered active service in the United States Air Force as
apparel will not create such a danger, and must therefore be accommodated. He
a commissioned officer, in accordance with a requirement that participants in the
argues that the Air Force failed to prove that a specific exception for his practice of
scholarship program serve one year of active duty for each year of subsidized
wearing an unobtrusive yarmulke would threaten discipline. He contends that the Air
education. Petitioner was stationed at March Air Force Base in Riverside, California,
Force's assertion to the contrary is mere ipse dixit, with no support from actual
and served as a clinical psychologist at the mental health clinic on the base.
experience or a scientific study in the record, and is contradicted by expert testimony
that religious exceptions to AFR 35-10 are in fact desirable, and will increase morale
As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals determined that the appropriate level of by making the Air Force a more humane place.
scrutiny of a military regulation that clashes with a constitutional right is neither strict
scrutiny nor rational basis. Instead, it held that a military regulation must be examined
But whether or not expert witnesses may feel that religious exceptions to AFR 35-10
to determine whether "legitimate military ends are sought to be achieved," and
are desirable is quite beside the point. The desirability of dress regulations in the
whether it is "designed to accommodate the individual right to an appropriate degree."
military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no
Applying this test, the court concluded that "the Air Force's interest in uniformity
constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment. Quite
renders the strict enforcement of its regulation permissible."
obviously, to the extent the regulations do not permit the wearing of religious apparel
such as a yarmulke, a practice described by petitioner as silent devotion akin to
Petitioner argues that AFR 35-10, as applied to him, prohibits religiously motivated prayer, military life may be more objectionable for petitioner and probably others. But
conduct, and should therefore be analyzed under the standard enunciated in Sherbert the First Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices in
v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 406 (1963). But we have repeatedly held that "the the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress
military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society." regulations. The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious apparel
that is visible and that which is not, and we hold that those portions of the regulations
challenged here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the
"[T]he military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart
military's perceived need for uniformity. The First Amendment therefore does not
in civilian life," Schlesinger v. Councilman, supra, at 420 U. S. 757, in order to prepare
prohibit them from being applied to petitioner, even though their effect is to restrict the
for and perform its vital role.
wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs.

Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more
Issue:
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian
W/n the Air Force Regulation of preventing the petitioner from wearing his yarmulke
society. The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment? No.
such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accomplish
its mission, the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps. The essence of military service "is the subordination of the desires Held:
and interests of the individual to the needs of the service." The judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed.

“Within the military community, there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as The First Amendment does not prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied
there is in the larger civilian community." In the context of the present case, when to petitioner, even though its effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required
evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated by his religious beliefs. That Amendment does not require the military to
conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military accommodate such practices as wearing a yarmulke in the face of its view that they
would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations. Here, the Air Force has
drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible and that which is
not, and the challenged regulation reasonably and evenhandedly regulates dress in
the interest of the military's perceived need for uniformity
Concurring Opinion
As the Court demonstrates, the rule that is challenged in this case is based on a
neutral, completely objective standard -- visibility. It was not motivated by hostility
against, or any special respect for, any religious faith. An exception for yarmulkes
would represent a fundamental departure from the true principle of uniformity that
supports that rule. For that reason, I join the Court's opinion and its judgment.
Nevertheless, JUSTICE STEVENS is persuaded that a governmental regulation
based on any "neutral, completely objective standard," will survive a free exercise
challenge.
Dissenting Opinion
The Court rejects Captain Goldman's claim without even the slightest attempt to weigh
his asserted right to the free exercise of his religion against the interest of the Air
Force in uniformity of dress within the military hospital. No test for free exercise claims
in the military context is even articulated, much less applied. It is entirely sufficient for
the Court if the military perceives a need for uniformity.
Captain Goldman's military duties are performed in a setting in which a modest
departure from the uniform regulation creates almost no danger of impairment of the
Air Force's military mission."
In contrast, JUSTICE BRENNAN recognizes that the Court "overlooks the sincere and
serious nature of [the] constitutional claim." He properly notes that, even with respect
to military rules and regulations, the courts have a duty to weigh sincere First
Amendment claims of its members against the necessity of the particular application
of the rule. But JUSTICE BRENNAN applies no particular test or standard to
determine such claims.
26. Austria v. NLRC (G.R. No. 124382. August 16, 1999)
Batungbacal, Robie
Doctrine: Relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an employee
is purely secular in nature because it has no relation with the practice of faith, worship
or doctrines of the church, such affairs are governed by labor laws. The Labor Code
applies to all establishments, whether religious or not.
Facts:
The Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) is a religious corporation under Philippine law. The
petitioner was a pastor of the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his
services were terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991, Austria received several
communications from Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to
admit accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by
his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
The petitioner answered saying that he should not be made accountable since it was
Pastor Buhat and Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings
since he was very ill to be able to do the collecting.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate. The petitioner received a letter of
dismissal citing:
1) Misappropriation of denominational funds;
2) Willful breach of trust;
3) Serious misconduct;
4) Gross and habitual neglect of duties; and
5) Commission of an offense against the person of employer's duly authorized
representative as grounds for the termination of his services.
Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, and sued the
SDA for reinstatement and backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor
of petitioner.
SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered in favor of respondent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the termination of the services of the petitioner is an ecclesiastical
affair, and, as such, involves the separation of church and state.
2. Whether or not the Labor Arbiter/NLRC has jurisdiction to try and decide the
complaint filed by petitioner against the SDA.
Held/Ratio:
1. No. The matter at hand relates to the church and its religious ministers but what is
involved here is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as an
employee, which is purely secular because it has no relationship with the practice of
faith, worship or doctrines. The grounds invoked for petitioner’s dismissal are all based
on Art. 282 of Labor Code.
2. Yes. SDA was exercising its management prerogative (not religious prerogative) to
fire an employee which it believes is unfit for the job. It would have been a different
case if Austria was expelled or excommunicated from the SDA.
27. Centeno v. Villaon-Pornillos – 236 SCRA 197, 1994 case
Fabia, Johan
Recit ready:
 Petitioners are part of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay who
launched a fund drive for the renovating of their local chapel. They solicited from
a judge without a permit from DSWD which made the judge file a criminal case
under PD 1564 “Solicitation Permit Law”. It was alleged that they fall under those
having solicitation for charitable or public welfare without a permit. Petitioners
allege that religious is not under those provided and that crim laws should be
construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused and that
this law is abridging their freedom of religion. The court held that religious doesn’t
fall in charitable. It is true that religious may connote charitable but charitable
doesn’t always connote religious. There are laws like those regarding taxes in the
constitution and other statutes that differentiate them or speak of them
separately. It was also held that freedom of religion has two dimensions which
are freedom to believe and freedom to act. Freedom to act maybe regulated if
there is a legitimate government interest like solicitation in the interest of public
safety, peace, comfort or convenience. Thus in order to avoid people from
defrauding the generous people, the state may regulate such solicitation.
Petitioner is acquitted from the charges against him.
Facts:
 Petitioner is part of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng TIkay who is
initiating a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel. They solicited from a
judge which moved the judge to file a crim case PD 1564 “Solicitation Permit
Law” against them for they do not have a permit. Petitioner alleged that he
doesn’t fall under the classification of those having no permit for charitable or for
public welfare purposes. The accused was found guilty in the lower court and
was fined 200 but recommended for clemency. A higher court through Judge
Villaon Pornillos raised the fee to 1000.
Issue:
 WON religious falls under charitable purposes
 WON the law violated his freedom of religion
HELD:
 NO, both instances
1. It was alleged that religious was purposely left out by the legislators and that
what is not included is deemed excluded. The court found that in the
Constitution like those for tax exemptions in Article 6, it can be seen that
religious is different from charitable and other tax laws. They have made
explicit mentions of these words which deems that the legislators have
intended them to be different. Penal laws should be construed strictly
against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.
2. Freedom of religion includes the freedom to believe and the freedom to
act. Freedom to act may be regulated by the state as long as there is
legitimate government interest that is to be protected. In this case, the
solicitation which may defraud the generous public is an interest that is to be
protected. Thus the state may regulate solicitations for religious purposes.
 Petitioner must be acquitted
Concurring Opinion: Mendoza
 The state may not regulate such solicitation, it is part of the propagation of
religious faith. To hold otherwise is like requiring the church to have permit before
getting Sunday collections. It is a form of prior restraint in the exercise of religion.
She said that it is for the same reason that religious rallies are exempted from
permit to use public parks etc. It would impose a condition on his exercise of his
right like in American Bible Society which would have to pay a license fee before
he can sell bibles.
28. Lee v. Weisman – U.S. No. 90-1014 June 24, 1992 (J. Kennedy)
Damasco Ty, Don
Recit Ready:
 It has been a practice to allow principals of public middle and high schools
in Providence to invite clergy members to give prayers at their graduation
ceremonies. Petitioner Principal Lee invited a rabbi to offer prayers at the
graduation ceremony for Deborah Weisman’s class, gave the rabbi a
pamphlet containing guidelines for the prayer, and advised the rabbi that the
prayers should be nonsectarian. Before the ceremony, the District Court
denied the motion of respondent Weisman, Deborah’s father, for a
temporary restraining order to prohibit school officials from including the
prayers in the ceremony.
 Thus, the prayers were recited during the ceremony.
 Subsequently, Weisman sought a permanent injunction barring Lee and
other petitioners from inviting clergy to deliver prayers at future graduations.
 District court ruled in favor of respondent this time; court enjoined petitioners
from continuing the invitation of clergy during graduation on the ground that
it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. CA affirmed.
SC affirmed
Doctrine:
 Including a clergy-led prayer within the events of a public high school
graduation violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Facts:
 For many years, the Providence School Committee and the Superintendent
of Schools has allowed principals to invite members of the clergy to say
prayers at school graduations.
 Respondent Daniel Weisman sought a TRO in the District Court to prohibit
school officials from including an invocation or benediction in the graduation
ceremony. District Court denied the motion.
 Petitioner Lee, school principal of Nathan Bishop Middle School (public
school in Providence) invited Rabbi Gutterman to deliver prayers at the
graduation exercises.
 Petitioner advised the rabbi that the prayer should be nonsectarian. He also
provided the rabbi with a pamphlet which recommend that public prayers at
nonsectarian civic ceremonies be composed with “inclusiveness and
sensitivity,” though they acknowledge that “prayer of any kind may be
inappropriate on some civic occasions.”
 The prayers were as follows:
Invocation
“God of the Free, Hope of the Brave:
“For the legacy of America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of
minorities are protected, we thank You. May these young men and women
grow up to enrich it.
“For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new graduates grow
up to guard it.
“For the political process of America in which all its citizens may participate,
for its court system where all may seek justice we thank You. May those we
honor this morning always turn to it in trust.
“For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of Nathan
Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it.
“May our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are
our hope for the future, be richly fulfilled.
AMEN”
Benediction
“O God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with the capacity for
learning which we have celebrated on this joyous commencement.
“Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve an important
milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and administrators who
helped prepare them.
“The graduates now need strength and guidance for the future, help them to
understand that we are not complete with academic knowledge alone. We
must each strive to fulfill what You require of us all: To do justly, to love
mercy, to walk humbly.
“We give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and
allowing us to reach this special, happy occasion.
AMEN”
 Respondent Weisman filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent
injunction barring petitioners from inviting clergy to deliver prayers at future
graduations.
 The District Court held that the practice of including prayers in a public
school graduation violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, and it enjoined petitioners from continuing the practice.
 The District Court relied on the Lemon test in holding that the practice
violated the Establishment Clause
To satisfy the Establishment Clause, a governmental practice mus (Lemon
test)t:
1. Reflect a clearly secular purpose;
2. Have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and
3. Avoid excessive government entanglement with
religion.
 The school failed to meet the second requirement according to the District
Court.
 CA affirmed. SC granted certiorari, and also affirms.
Issue: Whether or not a religious exercise may be conducted at a graduation
ceremony in circumstances where, young graduates who object are induced to
conform.
Held: No, a school cannot persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious
exercise as it is forbidden by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Ratio:
The government involvement with religious activity in this case is pervasive,
to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a
public school.

The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment
Clause. It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,
or otherwise act in a way which establishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends
to do so.
In this case, a school official, the principal, decided that an invocation and a
benediction should be given; this is a choice attributable to the State, and from a
constitutional perspective it is as if a state statute decreed that the prayers must
occur.
By providing the rabbi with a copy of the pamphlet and advising him that his
prayers should be nonsectarian, it is as if the state directed and controlled the content
of the prayers.
It is a cornerstone principle of our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that “it is no
part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a
Petitioners argue that the directions were advised in good faith to ensure
that sectarianism be removed from the graduation ceremony. The school’s
explanation, however, does not resolve the dilemma caused by its participation. The
question is not the good faith of the school in attempting to make the prayer
acceptable, but the legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all when the object
is to produce a prayer to be used in formal religious exercise which students, for all
practical purposes, are obliged to attend.
Jurisprudence has recognized that prayer exercises in public schools carry
a particular risk of indirect coercion. The undeniable fact is that the school district’s
supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public pressure,
as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least,
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction. This pressure,
though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion. (the act of
standing or remaining silent was an expression of participation in the rabbi’s prayer)
The school in effect required participation in a religious exercise. Though
the Court concedes that there was a stipulation that attendance at graduation is
voluntary; a student may not attend and still get one’s diploma. However, everyone
knows that in our society and in our culture high school graduation is one of life’s most
significant occasions. For absence would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits
which have motivated the student through youth and all her high school years.
29. Church of the Lukumi v. City of Hialeach - No. 91-948 June 11, 1993
Angeles, Hannah
KEY TAKE-AWAY: A law that burdens religious practice can only be justified if it is
neutral and is of general applicability. In such a case, it need NOT be justified by a
compelling governmental interest. However, here such a law is NOT characterized
by neutrality and general applicability it must be justified by a compelling
governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. In the
instant case, the ordinances are NOT NEUTRAL and there is likewise NO
compelling state interest to justify the restriction.
DATE: Argued – 1992, Decided – 1993
PONENTE: Kennedy, J.
RECIT-READY:
The LUKUMI CHURCH practices the Santeria religion, which employs animal sacrifices
After leasing some property in the HIALEAH CITY and signifying their intent to establish a
chapel therein, the City suddenly enacted ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifices or the
unnecessary and cruel slaughter of animals during rituals or for purposes other than for
food
Petitioners filed suit, alleging a violation of their free religious exercise
The US SC held that under the free exercise clause, a law that burdens religious practice
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest, if it is a) neutral and b) of
general applicability
o But when the law is not neutral or not of general application, the same
must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny:
§ It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest
§ It must be narrowly tailored to advance the said interest
In this case, the Ordinances, though seemingly neutral, were actually targeted
towards repressing the Santeria practices and worship and, hence, they violate the free
exercise clause
Also, animal killings for non-religious purposes are allowed
FACTS:
Petitioner church and its congregants practice the SANTERIA religion, which employs
ANIMAL SACRIFICE as one of its principal forms of devotion
o Animals are killed by cutting their carotid arteries and are cooked and
eaten following all Santeria rituals except healing and death rites
After the said church leased land in respondent city and announced plans to establish a
house of worship and other facilities there, the city council held an emergency PUBLIC
SESSION and passed, among other enactments, Resolution 87-66, which noted city
residents’ “concern” over religious practices INCONSISTENT with public morals, peace, or
safety, and declared the city’s commitment to prohibiting such practices
o Ordinance 87-40 – Florida animal cruelty laws and broadly punishes
"[w]hoever ... unnecessarily or cruelly ... kills any animal," and has
been interpreted to reach killings for religious reasons
o Ordinance 87- 52 – defines "sacrifice" as "to unnecessarily kill ... an
animal in a ... ritual ... not for the primary purpose of food
consumption," and prohibits the "possess[ion], sacrifice, or slaughter"
of an animal if it is killed in "any type of ritual" and there is an intent to
use it for food, but exempts "any licensed [food] establishment" if the
killing is otherwise permitted by law
o Ordinance 87-71 – prohibits the sacrifice of animals, and defines
"sacrifice" in the same manner as Ordinance 87-52
o Ordinance 87-72 – defines "slaughter" as "the killing of animals for food"
and prohibits slaughter outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses,
but includes an exemption for "small numbers of hog and/or cattle"
when exempted by state law.
· Petitioners filed suit, alleging violations of their rights, free exercise clause of the 1
st
film series discusses the Dr. Dobson’s views on the undermining influences of the
amendment. Although acknowledging that the foregoing ordinances are not religiously media that could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional Christian family
neutral, the District Court ruled for the city values instilled at an early age.
o It concluded that compelling governmental interests in preventing public
health risks and cruelty to animals fully justified the absolute prohibition
The district denied the first application, saying that this film does appear to be church
on ritual sacrifice accomplished by the ordinances, and that an
related and therefore the request must be refused. The second application was denied
exception to that prohibition for religious conduct would unduly
as well because it was using identical language.
interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest because any more
narrow restrictions would be UNENFOREAVLE as a result of the
Santeria secret nature. CA affirmed Issue:
· CA AFFIRMED W/N it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, to deny a church
ISSUES: access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and for religious purposes, a
WON the ordinances are void for violating the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE film dealing with family and child-rearing issues faced by parents today.
HELD:
HELD/RATIO:
Held:
· YES. The judgment is reversed. The ordinances in question were enacted contrary to
Yes, by a unanimous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two parts. First,
free exercise principles and are therefore VOID.
the District violated freedom of speech by refusing the Chapel's request to show
· Generally, a law that burdens religious practice need NOT be justified by a compelling
movies on school premises solely because such movies were religiously oriented.
governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability.
While non-public schools are permitted under New York law to restrict access to their
· However, where such a law is NOT characterized by neutrality and general applicability, it
premises based on subject matter or speaker identity, such restrictions must be
MUST be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to
reasonable and "viewpoint neutral." In this case, the District's restriction was neither
advance that interest.
reasonable nor viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views
o The ordinances demonstrate that they are NOT neutral.
about family values and child rearing - except those which were presented from a
o They also suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary to
religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use the District's
achieve their stated ends. There is NO compelling state interest to
premises would not have amounted to an establishment of religion. This is because
justify such restriction.
the showing of the films would neither be school-sponsored during school hours nor
· Failed to meet the Smith standard
closed to the public.
o They are NOT narrowly tailored to accomplish the asserted
governmental interests.
o All four ordinances are overbroad or underinclusive in substantial
respects because the submitted objectives are not pursued with
respect to analogous non-religious conduct and those interests could
be achieved by ordinances that are less burdensome to religion. 31. Long v. Basa, G.R. No. 134963-64, September 27, 2001
Yarra, Johan
30. Lamb’s Chapel v. School District - No. 91-2024 June 7, 1993
De Jesus, Mark DOCTRINE:
Although the absence of prior notice may sound objectionable to petitioner, it is really how
peculiar the nature of a religious corporation is vis-a-vis an ordinary corp organized for
Facts: profit. Must be stressed that the basis of relationship between a religious corp and its
Sec 414 of the New York Education Law authorizes local school boards to adopt members is the latter’s absolute adherence to a common religious belief. Once this
reasonable regulations for the use of school property for 10 specified purposes when ceases, membership must also cease. xxx. Recognizing the peculiarity of a religious
the property is not in use. Among the permitted uses is the holding of “social, civic and corp is the Corporation Code. Sec 91 thereof (made applicable by Sec 109 to religious
recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of corp) states: Membership shall be terminated in the manner and for the causes
the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. By becoming members of
and open to the general public”. Rule 7 provides that “the school premises shall not be CHURCH voluntarily, petitioners have entered into its covenant and subscribed to its
used by any group for religious purposes” rules. They are bound by their consent. Hence they have no reason to bewail the lack
of prior notice.
Petitioners are Lamb’s Chapel, an evangelical church in the community and its pastor,
John Steigerwald. Twice the church applied to the district for permission to use school FACTS:
facilities to show a 6-part film series containing lectures by Dr. James Dobson. The
• In 1973, a religious group known as “The Church In Quezon City, Inc.” located at Talayan
VIllage QC (CHURCH) was organized as an “entity of the brotherhood of Christ.” Its
Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, affairs and operation are managed by a Board
of Directors consisting of 6 members (also members of CHURCH). The CHURCH
embraced the “Principles of Faith” that “every member or officer” thereof “shall, without
mental reservation, adhere strictly to the doctrine, teachings and faith observed by
CHURCH. Such teachings, among others, include the belief of the Trinity of the God-
Head, which is God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and that Jesus Christ the
only begotten Son of God, conceived by Virgin Mary through the Holy Spirit, who died
on the cross to save mankind… etc.
• To ensure unity and uninterrupted exercise of their beliefs, the members vested upon the
Board of Directors the absolute power to admit and expel a member of the CHURCH.
The procedure for expulsion is prescribed in Article VII (par. 4) of its By-laws, which
reads: “If it is brought to the notice of the Board of Directors that any member has
failed to observe any regulations and By-laws of the Institution (CHURCH) or the
conduct of any member has been dishonorable or improper or otherwise injurious to
the character and interest of the Institution, the Board of Directors may by resolution
without assigning any reason therefor expel such member from such Institution…”
• As early as 1988, herein petitioners are already warned not to exhibit conduct which was
“dishonorable… injurious to the character and interest of CHURCH” by “introducing
doctrines and teachings which were not based on the Holy Bible” and Principles of
Faith of CHURCH, reminded them that CHURCH is only for worshipping the true God,
not to worship Buddha or men; that if they persist, they will be expelled from the
organization. But petitioners ignored these admonitions; until on Aug 30, 1993 during
a meeting held by the Board of Directors, membership was updated and some names
were removed from the list (e.g. herein petitioners Joseph Lim, Liu Yek See, Alfredo
Long and Felix Almeria among others) as formalized in a resolution issued by the
Board. Herein respondent Basa was part of that Board, and such resolution was
signed only by majority of the Board, not including Lim Che Boon and Tan Hon Koc
(herein petitioners).
• The updated membership list were duly filed with SEC on Sept 1993. Then days after,
petitioners Lim Che Boon, Tan Hon Koc, Joseph Lim and others questioned their
expulsion by filing with SEC a petition against herein respondents as the Directors,
seeking annulment of the resolution and reinstatement of the original list on ground
that the expulsion was made without prior notice and hearing, and also a prelim
injunction to enjoin the Board from holding any election of a new set of directors
among members named in the Aug 1993 list. This was eventually denied by SEC
Hearing Officer Perea ruling that the expulsion was in accordance with par. 4 Art. VII
of the By-laws. This ruling was affirmed by the SEC en banc also, dated July 1994,
and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
• Eventually on July 31, 1996 the SEC en banc issued an order setting aside the expulsion of
certain members of CHURCH approved by its Board on Aug 1993 for being void and
ordering reinstatement of petitioners as members. Promptly, herein respondents
appealed before the CA; and the latter on May 1998 promulgated its now assailed
decision granting respondents’ petitions, reversing the July 31 1996 SEC order.
Petitioners filed for MR but was denied. Hence this petition
ISSUE: w/n the expulsion of petitioners (Lim, See, Long, and Almeria) by the Board
through the Aug 1993 resolution is in accordance with law. Petitioners insist there was
no prior notice, no due process while respondents assert that it was in accordance
with the By-laws
RULING:: No, SC ruled against petitioners.
Remember that the issue of the validity of the expulsion had long been resolved and
declared valid by the SEC en banc in its decision dated July 1994, affirming Perea’s
ruling. Petitioners themselves did not appeal anymore from such decision, thereby
rendering the same to be FINAL and CONCLUSIVE, hence can no longer be modified
much less reversed. Hence the July 1996 order of SEC en banc (reversing its
previous decision) was in violation of the law of the case that was earlier laid down
with finality. Its issuance which reopened the very same issue of the validity of the
expulsion proceedings, completely reversing its final en banc decision, is certainly in
GROSS disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative, quasi-judicial, and judicial determinations. CA is therefore correct in
voiding the July 1996 order, thereby upholding the expulsion of petitioners and others
by the Board on Aug 1993. But let it not be said that the denial of the present
petitioners, even on this ground alone, is a mere technicality. In Fortich v. Corona, SC
held that once a case had been resolved with finality, vested rights were acquired by
the winning party. The rule on finality of decisions is not a question of technicality but
of substance and merit, underlying consideration therefor being the protection of the
substantive rights of the winning party.
Be that as it may, petitioners’ claim that the expulsion was without prior notice is baseless. In
the first place the By-laws, expressly adhered to by CHURCH’s members, DOES NOT
require the Board to give prior notice to dissident members in cases of expulsion (refer
to par. 4 Art VII). Pursuant thereto, the only requirements before a member can be
expelled are: (a) Board has been notified that a member has failed to observe any
regulations and By laws, or conduct of any member has been dishonorable…, and (b)
a resolution is passed by the Board expelling the member concerned, without
assigning any reason. It is clear that a member who commits any of the causes
enumerated in par. 4 may be expelled by the Board, through a resolution, without
giving that erring member any prior notice. It need not even state the reason. Although
the absence of prior notice may sound objectionable to petitioner, it is really how
peculiar the nature of a religious corporation is vis-a-vis an ordinary corp organized for
profit. Must be stressed that the basis of relationship between a religious corp and its
members is the latter’s absolute adherence to a common religious belief. Once this
ceases, membership must also cease. Generally, there is no room for dissension in a
religious corp. And also, the established doctrine in this jurisdiction is that such action
from church authorities is conclusive upon civil courts. In US v. Canete, “in matters
purely ecclesiastical the decisions of proper church tribunals are conclusive upon civil
tribunals… it is without remedy in the civil courts…”.
Recognizing the peculiarity of a religious corp is the Corporation Code. Sec 91 thereof (made
applicable by Sec 109 to religious corp) states: Membership shall be terminated in the
manner and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. By
becoming members of CHURCH voluntarily, petitioners have entered into its covenant
and subscribed to its rules. They are bound by their consent. Hence they have no
reason to bewail the lack of prior notice. Nevertheless as shown in the records the
expulsion was not tainted with any arbitrary treatment from the Board, they were give
sufficient notice when as early as 1988 they have been persistently reminded by
respondents to stop espousing doctrines, teachings opposed to the Principles of Faith.
There were warnings during Sunday worship gatherings, in meetings, and one-on-one
talk. When they ignored these exhortations, they should not now complain about their
expulsion. In fact, petitioners never specifically denied or disputed such reminders or
warnings. It is a well settled principle in law that what due process prohibits is not
absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof. A formal trial type
hearing is not at all times essential. Clearly, although the By Laws do not require prior
notice to dissident petitioners of their impending expulsion, more than sufficient notice
was given to them as stated above. Petition denied. CA affirmed.
MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Courts; Civil courts can review proceedings undertaken by religious
organizations and may interfere with the internal affairs thereof, as law and justice so
require, when the acts complained of contravene the basic law of the land and violate
the civil rights of its members.—As clearly stated in Lions Club International, the
general rule of noninterference admits of certain exception: The civil courts can review
proceedings undertaken by religious organizations and may interfere, so to speak,
with the internal affairs thereof, as law and justice so require, when the acts
complained of contravene the basic law of the land and violate the civil rights of its
members. More specifically, where there is fraud, oppression, or bad faith, and where
the action of the leaders of the organization is capricious, arbitrary, and unjustly
discriminatory, the civil courts may exercise judicial power. The courts will likewise
exercise jurisdiction to grant relief in case property or civil rights are invaded, although
it has also been held that involvement of property rights does not necessarily
authorize judicial intervention, in the absence of arbitrariness, fraud, and collusion.
32. INC v. CA, 259 SCRA 529
Bundalian, Albert
Doctrine:
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief
is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where
the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases concerning the hereafter.
He may indulge his own theories about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or
none at all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any
being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of his soul in
fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his
beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to the majority, he has
full freedom to believe as he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs
Freedom to Act on One’s Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions that affect
the public, his freedom to do so becomes subject to the authority of the State.As
great as this liberty may be, religious freedom, like all the other rights guaranteed in
the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others. It is
error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the
State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The inherent police
power can be exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to society.
We thus reject petitioners postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review
by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it
out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes
and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of religious freedom
can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of
some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment
to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A
laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but
history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be
a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the
bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences.
Recit Ready:
The controversy stems from the MTRCB’s action of x-rating TV program Series Nos.
116, 119, 121 and 128 of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious
organization, which has a television program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo aired on
Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday, on the ground that they
offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by
law. MTRCB’s basis for x-rating are the following:
a) that INC TV program attacks other religions using literal interpretations of
the
bible (series no.119),
b) that INC insists that Catholic’s veneration of Virgin Mary should not be
condoned based on literal interpretation of the bible (series no. 121)
c) that what the INC believes and teaches are the right way and those not
belonging to INC teachings and beliefs are wrong (series no. 128) among
others.
RTC in its initial decision, ordered respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo the necessary permit for
all the series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program.
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain from offending and attacking
other existing religions in showing Ang Iglesia ni Cristo program. Upon granting of
INC’s motion for reconsideration, RTC prohibited MTRCB from requiring petitioner
Iglesia ni Cristo to submit for review VTR tapes of its religious program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo and deleted the order to INC directing it to refrain from offending and attacking
other existing religions.
Court of Appeals then reversed the ruling of the RTC and ruled that: (1) the
respondent board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it
denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on
the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. It also
found the series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs.

The issue in this case is whether or not MTRCB has committed grave abuse of
discretion with lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they
constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law
and good customs.
Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Ang Iglesia ni Cristo
program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and
expression and in not holding that being an exercise of religious freedom, the program
is subject to the police power of the state only in extreme cases that it poses a clear
and present danger. Petitioner also alleged that religious programs should not be
classified as a television program subject to state regulation as such perspective is
violative of Section 5, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution. Citing the distinction made by
Justice Isagani Cruz regarding the two-fold aspect of religious freedom, the Supreme
Court rejected the view being proposed by INC. They ruled that religious practices
rooting from the freedom to act on one’s belief is subject to police power of the state,
especially when it comes to regulation (see doctrine).
For sure, the state shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the
free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but state shall not leave its
rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its
exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
Therefore, MTRCB has jurisdiction to such religious programs being television
programs, however, MTRCB committed GADLEJ when it censored the TV series of
INC. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints
on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is
hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. [19]
It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at
bar.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner
but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be.
Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by
protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are
often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards
any religion. (citing Cantwell v. Conneticut as support).
MTRCB tried to justify its censorship by citing section 3 of PD 1986, which prohibits
the showing of motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials which are
contrary to law and Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishes anyone
who exhibits shows which offend any race or religion. SC disagreed with MTRCB for
it is plain that the word attack is not synonymous with the word offend and Article 201
(2) (b) (3) of the Revised Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishment of a show which offends any religion. It cannot be utilized to justify prior
censorship of speech. It must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD
1986, included attack against any religion as a ground for censorship. The ground was
not, however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it.
The respondents (MTRCB) failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In
American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The constitutional guaranty
[22]
of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the
right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified
like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and
present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
Presently in the United States, the clear and present danger test is not applied to
protect low value speeches such as obscene speech, commercial speech and
defamation.
The test is applied to four types of speech:
 speech that advocates dangerous ideas,
 speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction,
 out of court contempt and
 release of information that endangers a fair trial.
Hence, even following the drift of American jurisprudence, there is reason to apply the
clear and present danger test to the case at bar which concerns speech that attacks
other religions and could readily provoke hostile audience reaction. It cannot be
doubted that religious truths disturb and disturb terribly.
It is also opined that it is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to
the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time,
place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact
cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil
apprehended cannot be established. The contention overlooks the fact that the case
at bar involves videotapes that are pre-taped and hence, their speech content is
known and not an X quantity. Given the specific content of the speech, it is not
unreasonable to assume that the respondent Board, with its expertise, can determine
whether its sulphur will bring about the substantive evil feared by the law.
The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1995 is affirmed
insofar as it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners
TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and is reversed and set aside insofar as it
sustained the action of the respondent MTRCB x-rating petitioners TV Program Series
Nos. 115, 119, and 121. No costs.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is whether or not MTRCB has committed grave abuse
of discretion with lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner’s religious program, series Nos. 115, 119 and 121, for the reason that they
constitute an attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to law
and good customs.
HELD: YES. MTRCB’s action went in excess of its jurisdiction.
FACTS:
 Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
 PD 1986, Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The BOARD shall have the
following functions, powers and duties:
o a) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or
proper for the implementation of this Act, and the accomplishment
of its purposes and objectives, including guidelines and standards
for production, advertising and titles. Such rules and regulations
shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following their publication in
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines;
o b) To screen, review and examine all motion pictures as herein
defined, television programs, including publicity materials such as
advertisements, trailers and stills, whether such motion pictures
and publicity materials be for theatrical or non-theatrical
distribution, for television broadcast or for general viewing,
imported or produced in the Philippines, and in the latter case,
whether they be for local viewing or for export;
o c) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from
and/or prohibit the importation, exportation, production, copying,
distribution, sale, lease, exhibition and/or television broadcast of
the motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials
subject of the preceding paragraph, which, in the judgment of the
board applying contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard,
are objectionable for being immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of
the Philippines or its people, or with a dangerous tendency to
encourage the commission of violence or of wrong or crime, such
as but not limited to:
 i) Those which tend to incite subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or sedition against the State, or otherwise
threaten the economic and/or political stability of the
State;
 ii) Those which tend to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government and/or the
duly constituted authorities;lawphil.net
 iii) Those which glorify criminals or condone crimes;
 iv) Those which serve no other purpose but to satisfy
the market for violence or pornography;
 v) Those which tend to abet the traffic in and use of
prohibited drugs;
 vi) Those which are libelous or defamatory to the good
name and reputation of any person, whether living or
dead; and
 vii) Those which may constitute contempt of court or of
any quasi-judicial tribunal, or pertain to matter which
are sub-judice in nature.
 d) To classify motion pictures, television programs and similar shows into
categories such as "G" or "For General Patronage" (all ages admitted), "P"
or "Parental Guidance Suggested", "R" or "Restricted" (for adults only), "X"
or "Not for Public Viewing", or such other categories as the BOARD may
determine for the public interest;
 petition for review of the Decision dated March 24, 1995 of the respondent
Court of Appeals affirming the action of the respondent Board of Review for
Motion Pictures and Television which x-rated the TV Program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo.
 Justice Puno ponente
33.1 and 33.2 Estrada v. Escritor, AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 and Estrada v
Escritor 429 SCRA 1
Bernas, Claud and Bautista, Paolo
(same facts, in the admin case [2003] the court said that the case should be
remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator and ordered the OSG to show a
compelling state interest for why they should override the religious beliefs of escritor,
in the 2006 decision, case was dismissed due to the failure of the OSG to show any
compelling state interest)
RECIT-READY: (Jech Tiu)
 Escritor was the Clerk of Court for the Las Pinas RTC, who was charged
administratively for immoral conduct for co-habiting with Quilapio without the
benefit of marriage over the last 20 years
 At the time they started co-habiting, Escritor was still married, but at the time
she entered the judiciary, she was already a widow
 Escritor and Quilapio were members of the Jehovah’s Witness
 They secured a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness”, signifying their
church’s approval of their union in accordance with their religious beliefs
 The SC held that jurisprudence has held that not every moral wrong is
foreseen and punished by law, criminal or otherwise and that is why the New
Civil Code has provided for a remedy with Articles 19 and 21
 The SC also held that using the compelling state interest test from a
benevolent neutrality stance:
o Whether or not the right to religious freedom has been burdened
  In this case, she has undoubtedly been burdened
because she has to give up either her religious beliefs or her
employment
o Whether or not respondent is sincere in his religious belief
 In this case, she has procured the certificate 10 years
after the union began, which is years before she entered the judiciary
 The SC further held that under compelling state interest test:
 The State undertakes the burden of presenting evidence of its compelling
interest to override respondent’s religious belief
 The State has to show that the means it has adopted in pursuing the said
interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s freedom
 The case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator to
 determine the case based on the above considerations
 Consolidated Dissents:
o Escritor’s conduct constitutes the felony of concubinage, which is
clearly within the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
o Religious beliefs, no matter how sincere, cannot exempt one from
liability for criminal acts under the RPC
FACTS:
 Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas
City.
 Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes,
presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an
investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a
man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son.
 Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before
she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married
to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not
a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. Nevertheless, he filed the charge
against Escritor as he believes that she is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
 Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal
arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
 Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,
she was already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that
she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for
twenty years and that they have a son. But as a member of the religious sect
known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract
Society, their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs.
 Respondent further states that after ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was
approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
 Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and
has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of
and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office. Insofar as the congregation is
concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between
Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the
congregation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritor’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from
the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are
held administratively liable.
HELD:
 In a catena of cases, the Court has ruled that government employees
engaged in illicit relations are guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for which
he/she may be held administratively liable. Respondent Escritor does not claim
that there is error in the settled jurisprudence that an illicit relation constitutes
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a government employee is held liable.
 However, there is a distinguishing factor that sets the case at bar
apart. As a defense, respondent involves religious freedom since her
religion, the Jehovah’s witness allowed her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio based on the church’s religious beliefs and practices.
Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the Compelling State Interest Test
 The case at bar being one of first impression, we now subject the
respondent’s claim of religious freedom to the “compelling state interest” test
from a benevolent neutrality (accommodation of religious practices under certain
circumstances) standpoint – i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondent’s
claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the Civil
Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be unavailing
should the government succeed in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest.
 In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether
respondent’s right to religious freedom has been burdened. In this case,
Escritor was burdened because she has to choose between keeping her
employment or her religious beliefs and family.
 The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity
in her religious belief. The declaration of pledging faithfulness was issued to
Escritor even prior to entering the judiciary. Ministers from her congregation
testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing
a declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice.
Respondent showed that she is a sincere practicing member of Jehovah’s
Witness.
  The burden of evidence should then be discharged by the government
through the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue, the
government should be given opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state
interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s stance that her conjugal
arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of the
free exercise protection.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court
Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it
will be given the opportunity to (a) examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent’s calimed religious belief and practice; (b) present evidence on the
state’s “compelling interest” to override respondent’s religious belief and practice;
and (c) show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.
THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS (2006 Ruling; 426 SCRA 1)
 After the termination of further proceedings with the OCA, and with the
transmittal of the Hearing Officer’s report, along with the evidence submitted by
the OSG, this case is once again with us, to resolve the penultimate question of
whether respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of
"disgraceful and immoral conduct." It is at this point then that we examine the
report and documents submitted by the hearing officer of this case, and apply the
three-step process of the compelling state interest test based on the evidence
presented by the parties, especially the government.
 On the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General categorically
concedes that the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief
and practice are beyond serious doubt. Thus, having previously established the
preliminary conditions required by the compelling state interest test, i.e., that a
law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of respondent’s religious
beliefs, and there being no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of her faith to
claim the exemption based on the free exercise clause, the burden shifted to the
government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a compelling secular
objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
 A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate "the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override
respondent’s fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the government
exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate state
objective is the least intrusive means.
 Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated
as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most
inalienable and sacred of human rights," in the words of Jefferson. Hence,
it is not enough to contend that the state’s interest is important, because
our Constitution itself holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The
State must articulate in specific terms the state interest involved in
preventing the exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to
religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free Exercise
Clause as a source of right by itself.
 Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in "protecting the institutions of
marriage and the family," or even "in the sound administration of justice" that
must be weighed against respondent’s claim, but the State’s narrow interest in
refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which respondent’s faith finds
moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the objectives
at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what extent those
objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This, the Solicitor
General failed to do.
 As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that respondent should be
held administratively liable as the arrangement she had was "illegal per se
because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very nature
bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience, the Solicitor General
failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
 Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest,
it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties. Again,
the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test.
 Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized
as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her
fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests
must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest
sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very
fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing
that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint is dismissed.
YNARESSANTIAGO, J., Dissenting:
 The degree of morality required of every employee or official in the public
service has been consistently high. The rules are particularly strict when the
respondent is a Judge or a court employee.
 Never, however, has this Court justified, condoned, or blessed the
continuation of an adulterous or illicit relationship such as the one in this case,
after the same has been brought to its attention.
 Those who choose to tolerate the situation where a man and a woman
separated from their legitimate spouses decide to live together in an “ideal” and
yet unlawful union state—or more specifically, those who argue that respondent’s
cohabiting with a man married to another woman is not something which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless—show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
 good and respectable members of the community in a manner prejudicial to the
public service.
 The issue in this case is legal and not philosophical. It is a limited one. Is
respondent Soledad S. Escritor guilty of “disgraceful and immoral” conduct in the
context of the Civil Service Law? Are there any sanctions that must be imposed?
We cannot overlook the fact that respondent Escritor would have been convicted
for a criminal offense if the offended party had been inclined and justified to
prosecute her prior to his death in 1998. Even now, she is a co-principal in the
crime of concubinage. A married woman who has sexual intercourse with a man
not her husband, and the man who has carnal knowledge of her knowing her to
be married, commit the crime of adultery. Abandonment by the legal husband
without justification does not exculpate the offender; it merely mitigates the
penalty.
 We must be concerned not with the dogmas or rules of any church or
religious sect but with the legal effects under the Civil Service Law of an illicit or
adulterous relationship characterized by the facts of this case. There is no
conflict in this case between the dogmas or doctrines of the Roman Catholic
Church and those of the Jehovah’s Witnesses or any other church or
denomination. The perceived conflict is non-existing and irrelevant. The issue is
legal and not religious. The terms “disgraceful” and “immoral” may be religious
concepts, but we are concerned with conduct which under the law and
jurisprudence is proscribed and, if perpetrated, how it should be punished.
 Respondent cannot legally justify her conduct by showing that it was morally
right by the standards of the congregation to which she belongs. Her defense of
freedom of religion is unavailing. Her relationship with Mr. Quilapio is illicit and
immoral, both under the Revised Administrative Code and the Revised Penal
Code, notwithstanding the supposed imprimatur given to them by their religion.
The peculiar religious standards alleged to be those of the sect to which
respondent belongs can not shield her from the effects of the law.
 The Court cannot be the instrument by which one group of people is
exempted from the effects of these laws just because they belong to a particular
religion. Moreover, it is the sworn mandate of the Court to supervise the conduct
of an employee of the judiciary, and it must do so with an even hand regardless
of her religious affiliation.
 A clear and present danger of a substantive evil, destructive to public
morals, is a ground for the reasonable regulation of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession. In addition to the destruction of public morals,
the substantive evil in this case is the tearing down of morality, good order, and
discipline in the judiciary. Jurisprudence on immoral conduct of employees in the
civil service has been consistent. There is nothing in this case that warrants a
departure from precedents.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion:
 The compelling state interest test espoused in Sherbert has been
abandoned more than 15 years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
Employment Division v. Smith cases. In the Smith cases, the U.S. Supreme
Court set aside the balancing test for religious minorities laid down in Sherbert.
Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled categorically in the Smith cases that the
guarantee of religious liberty as embodied in the Free Exercise Clause does not
require the grant of exemptions from generally applicable laws to individuals
whose religious practice conflict with those laws.
 U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that religious beliefs do not
excuse any person from liability for violation of a valid criminal law of general
application. The majority opinion simply refuses to face and accept this reality.
 While the majority opinion only mentions separation and benevolent
neutrality, a close reading of the major U.S. Supreme Court opinions specifically
relating to the religion clauses presents three principal theories at play, namely,
(a) the strict separation or “no aid” theory, (b) the governmental neutrality theory,
and (c) the accommodation or benevolent neutrality theory.
 The strict separation or “no aid” theory holds that the establishment clause
viewed in conjunction with the free exercise clause requires a strict separation of
church and state and that government can do nothing which involves
governmental support of religion or which is favorable to the cultivation of
religious interests
 Under the governmental neutrality theory, the establishment clause requires
government to be neutral on religious matters… This test as stated by Mr. Justice
Clark embodies a theory of strict neutrality—thus, the government may not use
the religious factor as a basis for classification with the purpose of advancing or
inhibiting religion: The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved
through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable
citadel of the individual heart and mind. However, the concept of governmental
neutrality can be interpreted in various ways—to some, anything but total
neutrality is anathema; to others, “neutrality can only mean that government
policy must place religion at neither a special advantage nor a special
disadvantage.”
 The accommodation theory provides that any limitation derived from the
establishment clause on cannot be rigidly applied so as to preclude all aid to
religion and that in some situations government must, and in other situations
may, accommodate its policies and laws in the furtherance of religious freedom.
 The majority opinion vigorously argues the merits of adopting the theory of
accommodation in the interpretation of our Constitution’s religion clauses.
However, the majority opinion fails to mention that a distinction is often drawn by
courts and commentators between mandatory accommodation and permissive
accommodation. Mandatory accommodation is exemplified by the key idea in
Sherbert that exemptions from generally applicable laws are required by force of
the Free Exercise Clause,which the majority opinion adheres to in granting
Escritor’s claim of free exercise exemption. Permissive accommodation refers to
exercises of political discretion that benefit religion, and that the Constitution
neither requires nor forbids.
 Even assuming that the theory of benevolent neutrality and the compelling
state interest test are applicable, the State has a compelling interest in exacting
from everyone connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest
magistrate to the lowest of its personnel, the highest standard of conduct. This
Court has repeatedly held that “the image of a court of justice is necessarily
mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat.”
  By choosing to turn a blind eye to Escritor’s criminal conduct, the majority is
in fact recognizing and according judicial imprimatur to a practice, custom or
agreement that subverts marriage, albeit one that is sanctioned by a particular
religious sect. The majority’s opinion here bestows “a credibility and legitimacy
upon the religious belief in question simply by its being judicially recognized as
constitutionally sacrosanct.” This is another problem that arises in free exercise
exemption analysis—the benevolent neutrality approach fails to take into account
the role that equality plays in free exercise theory. While the text of the Free
Exercise Clause is consistent with protecting religion from discrimination, it does
not compel discrimination in favor of religion. However, the benevolent neutrality
approach promotes its own form of inequality when under it, exemptions are
granted only to religious claimants like Escritor, whose religiously sanctioned but
otherwise illegal conjugal arrangement with Quilapio acquires a veneer of
“special judicial reinforcement.”
 If this Court condones Escritor’s act of concubinage on religious grounds,
then it will have to condone acts of concubinage by Catholics who have secured
church annulment of their marriage even without a final annulment from a civil
court—the majority pushes their opinion on a slippery slope
 It may well be asked how, under a well-meaning but overly solicitous grant
of exemption based on the Freedom of Exercise Clause of our Constitution, an
individual can be given the private right to ignore a generally applicable, religion-
neutral law. For this is what the majority opinion has effectually granted Escritor
in dismissing the administrative complaint against her. The accommodation of
Escritor’s religious beliefs under the benevolent neutrality approach is too high a
price to pay when weighed against its prejudicial effect on the sound
administration of justice and the protection of marriage and the family as basic
social institutions.
 There is even no claim here that concubinage is central to the religious
belief of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, or even a part of the religious belief of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Escritor merely claims that her live-in arrangement with a
married man is, in the words of the majority opinion, “in conformity with her and
her partner’s religious belief.” This case is not an issue of a statute colliding with
centrally or vitally held beliefs of a religious denomination, as in the case of
Sherbert. This case is about a religious cover for an obviously criminal act
 while there are times when government must adapt to, or acquiesce to meet
the needs of religious exercise, there are also times when the exercises a
religion wishes to pursue must be adapted or even prohibited in order to meet the
needs of public policy. For indeed, even religious liberty has its limits. And
certainly, “there is a price to be paid, even by religion, for living in a constitutional
democracy.”
34. Perfecta v. Esidra (763 SCRA 323)
Reyes, Meg
Doctrine: Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides the
administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court’s supervision. At best,
religious morality weighs only persuasively on us.
Recit-ready: Petitioner filed an administrative case against respondent Judge
Desales-Esidera for falsification of public documents and dishonesty. Petitioner
alleged that respondent made it appear that she married Renato Esidero in March 18,
1990 and that her daughter with him was legitimate although the civil registrar
produced a certification that no marriage existed at that date. Based on the records,
they were married on June 3, 1992. Respondent contends that their union on 1990
was a valid but only recognized under Catholic rites. The issue to be resolved is
whether or not the respondent is guilty of immoral conduct under the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The Court held that on issues of immorality, the Court
looks at the conduct of the lawyer and not on religious morality. The Court did not find
the respondent judge’s second marriage and alleged affair with her second husband
of such depravity as to reduce the confidence in the Rule of Law. However, the Court
still found respondent liable for misconduct under Canon 1 because she knowingly
had sexual relations with Renato Esidera while her first marriage was subsisting.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative complaint against
respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera for falsification of public
documents and dishonesty
 Petitioner alleged that respondent Judge was first married to Richard Tang
Tepace on May 7, 1987. Her marriage was then declared void on January 27,
1992. Pending the declaration of the first marriage void ab initio, on October 3,
1990, respondent gave birth to a daughter with Renato Verano Esidera. Based
on the records, respondent married Renato on June 3, 1992.
o Petitioner alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera falsified her
daughter’s birth certificate to make it appear that she and Renato Esidera
were married on March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate
child. No marriage took place on that date based on a certification of no
marriage issued by the Civil Registrar of Paranaque City.
o Petitioner prays for Judge Desales-Esidera’s dismissal from office
for her alleged dishonesty.
 Respondent contends that everything she did was legal and in accordance
with her religious beliefs. She was, indeed, married to her second husband in
1990 but only recognized under Catholic rites. The priest who officiated their
marriage had no authority to solemnize marriages under civil law. She further
argued that while her religious marriage was done prior to the declaration of
nullity of her first marriage, the prevailing jurisprudence at that time was “there
was no need for a judicial decree to establish the invalidity of void marriage.”
 The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that we find respondent
judge guilty of immoral conduct based on, among others, her alleged affair and
her failure to comport herself according to the Roman Catholic faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Desales-Esidera is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct
under the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
No. However, she was still held liable for misconduct under our laws.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera guilty of
violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent Judge
Desales-Esidera is SUSPENDED from judicial service for one (1) month with a
warning that repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
 The nonestablishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws
and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions against
immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of religious
beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be
secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular purpose.
 In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of
morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on
secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality,
courts should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and
religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
 There is the danger of “compelled religion” and, therefore, of negating the
very idea of freedom of belief and nonestablishment of religion when religious
morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies.
 We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it involves
conduct that affects the public or its interest. Thus, for purposes of determining
administrative liability of lawyers and judges, “immoral conduct” should relate to
their conduct as officers of the court. To be guilty of “immorality” under the Code
of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to
reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not
binding whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and
persons under this court’s supervision. At best, religious morality weighs only
persuasively on us.
 Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of
contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first
marriage and having an alleged “illicit” affair are “immoral” based on her
Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of religious morality.
Test of benevolent neutrality:
Do the respondent’s acts constitute immorality for the purposes of administrative
liability?
 Under the circumstances, respondent judge’s second marriage and her
alleged affair with her second husband were not of such depravity as to reduce
confidence in the Rule of Law.
 We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative liability,
respondent judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and her second
husband conducted a marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990.
 Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental
marriage entered into only to comply with the requirements of their religious
beliefs. It was valid only under the Roman Catholic Church but has no legal
effect. Their solemnizing officer was not licensed to solemnize marriage from
the National Archives or from the civil government.
 Article 349 (bigamy) of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or
subsequent marriage before the legal dissolution of a first marriage. The second
or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is the marriage
entered into under the law.
 Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as
governed only by the rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law against
bigamy. What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a subsisting
marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage that would have
been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage. Under our law,
respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing
officer’s lack of authority.
 The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s
marriage in 1990 renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our law.
Hence, no second marriage can be imputed against respondent judge while her
first marriage subsisted.
 However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article
350 of the Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting
marriages against the provisions of laws. Respondent judge knew that the
solemnizing officer during her and her husband’s marriage in 1990 had no civil
authority to solemnize marriages. It is clear from her Comment that she and her
husband’s only consideration for their 1990 marriage was the recognition from
the Roman Catholic Church.
 However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to
religious exercise and expression insofar as it prescribes upon individuals and
religious communities formal requirements for the conduct of their religious
ceremonies. It puts a burden upon the exercise of beliefs by criminalizing
marriages performed in accordance with those beliefs, but lacks some or all the
requisites of a valid marriage under the law. Thus, unless respondent judge’s
act of participating in a marriage ceremony according to her religious beliefs
violates other peoples’ rights or poses grave and imminent danger to the
society, we cannot rule that respondent judge is administratively liable for her
participation in her religious marriage ceremony.
 We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent
judge’s right to participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are
nonviolative of other people’s rights and with no legally binding effect. She had
sexual relations with her second husband while her first marriage was
subsisting.
 However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot
shield respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our laws.
Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with
another person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her
religious expression. Legal implications and obligations attach to any
person who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless of how
civil marriages are treated in that person’s religion.