FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188124

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.

JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS AND JOEL

LORICA LABAD, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellants.
June 29, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals affirming the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque in Criminal Case No. 02-01426 convicting appellants Jonel Falabrica Serenas alias Joe-An (Joe-An) and Joel
Lorica Labad (Joel) of the crime of murder.

Appellants were charged under the following Information:

That on or about the 8th day of December 2002 in the City of Paraaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one John Doe, whose
true name and present whereabouts is still unknown, and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one Nino Noel Ramos, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wound, which
caused his death.[3]

The facts, as narrated by prosecution witnesses, follow

On 8 December 2002, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, Nio Noel Ramos (Nio) had just brought his girlfriend, Dianne
Charisse Gavino (Dianne), home in Sto. Nio, Paraaque City. On his way back to La Huerta, he passed by a bridge connecting
the barangays of Sto. Nio and La Huerta. Thereat, Nio was stabbed and mauled.[4]

Cesar Ramos (Cesar), Nios brother, was in the vicinity of N. Domingo Street in La Huerta when he heard a commotion on the
bridge. As he was about to proceed to the bridge, he met Nio and noticed that his brother was soaked in his own blood. Nio
relayed to Cesar that he was stabbed by Joe-An. Cesar immediately brought Nio to the hospital where the latter expired thirty
(30) minutes later.[5] At the police station, Cesar claimed that appellants told him that they merely took fancy on Nio.[6]
Dianne initially related in her affidavit executed at the police station that her cousin informed her of a commotion on the
bridge. Upon reaching the bridge, she met a friend who told her that her boyfriend, Nio, was stabbed and brought to the
hospital. She added that one day before the incident, she and Nio were walking along the bridge when they passed by the group
of appellants and heard Joe-An utter the words, Iyang mama na iyan, may araw din siya sa akin.[7] In her testimony during the
trial however, she narrated that she actually saw Joe-An stabbing Nio.[8]

PO3 Ramoncito Lipana (PO3 Lipana) was at the police station in La Huerta on 8 December 2002 when a woman named
Dianne came to report a stabbing incident involving her boyfriend. PO3 Lipana, together with PO2 Jesus Brigola (PO2 Brigola)
and PO3 Marlon Golfo, immediately proceeded to the crime scene. Upon arriving thereat, the police saw two men scampering
away upon seeing them. They chased the two men, later identified as Joe-An and Joel. The police managed to catch the
appellants while they were hiding near a bangka under the bridge. Appellants were brought to the police station where Dianne
identified them as the assailants of Nio.[9]

Dr. Valentin T. Bernales (Dr. Bernales), the medico-legal officer who issued the autopsy report, testified that the victim was
stabbed twice at the back and the assailant was situated within arms length.The victim succumbed from the stab wounds, both
of which, are fatal. Dr. Bernales also noted that there were contuse abrasions on different parts of the victims body.[10]

Appellants invoked denial and alibi as their defense. Joe-An, a resident of Wawa, Sto. Nio, alleged that he was at his house on 8
December 2002. While he was taking his dinner, he saw people running towards the bridge. He went out of the house to check
on what had happened. He approached a group of people talking about the commotion. Thereafter, he saw the police
and barangay tanods arrive.He was immediately handcuffed and asked to go with the police. Joe-An alleged that he was
physically forced by the police to admit the killing of Nio.[11] Joe-An denied knowing the victim or his girlfriend, Dianne, but
admitted that Joel is an acquaintance.[12]

Joel likewise denied his participation in killing Nio. He stated that he was sleeping at around 11 p.m. on 8 December
2002 when he was awakened by an argument involving his mother and four (4) men outside his room. He then got out of the room
and saw PO3 Lipana, PO2 Brigola, and two other police assets. The group invited him for questioning. When the two assets
suddenly grabbed him, Joel resisted but he was forcibly brought to the police station. He saw Dianne at the station but the
latter did not identify him as the culprit. Instead, Dianne even sought his help to identify the person who killed her boyfriend.
This fact notwithstanding, the police refused to let him go. He testified that he did not know the victim or Dianne personally.[13]

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellants, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of both accused beyond reasonable
doubt, accused JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS alias JOE-AN and JOEL LORICA LABAD are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to R.A. 9346 which repealed the death penalty
law. However, pursuant to Sec. 3 thereof, they are not eligible for parole.

Accused JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS alias JOE-AN and JOEL LORICA LABAD are jointly and severally
liable to pay the heirs of NIO NOEL RAMOS, the following amounts, to wit:

1. P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex-delicto;

2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P23,000.00 as actual damages;
4. P20,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and
5. To pay the cost of suit.[14]

Lending full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court concluded that the appellants conspired in
assaulting and stabbing Nio. It gave full weight to the dying declaration uttered by Nio to his brother, as well as the statement
of Dianne, who allegedly witnessed appellants threaten Nio the night before the incident. It also appreciated the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime. Furthermore, the trial court regarded
the uncorroborated testimonies of appellants to be full of inconsistencies and unworthy of weight and credence.[15]

On 13 September 2006, appellants filed a notice of appeal informing the RTC that they are appealing the decision to the Court
of Appeals.[16]
 The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC by awarding exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from, being in accordance with law and the
evidence, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of the victim. The Decision in all other respects STANDS.[17]

On 13 August 2008, a notice of appeal was filed assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals before this Court.[18]
On 26 October 2009, the parties were required to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs.[19] In two
(2) separate manifestations, both parties opted to adopt their briefs submitted before the Court of Appeals. [20]

Summarizing the arguments of both parties, the issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the testimonies of the witnesses are
sufficient to prove appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) whether the killing was qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation; (3) whether conspiracy has been adequately proven.

In convicting appellants, the lower courts relied heavily on the testimonies of witnesses Cesar and Dianne, which they deemed to
be credible. Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses,
and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded great respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued, or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances that, if considered, would change the outcome of the case. [21]

We respect the findings that Jonel Falabrica Serenas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder not by virtue of
identification by Dianne but as established by the dying declaration of the victim. Upon the other hand, we reverse the
conviction of Joel Lorica Labad.

The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, accorded full weight to the testimony of the prosecution witness,
Dianne, who declared on the witness stand that she actually saw appellants maul and stab the victim, thus:

Q Miss witness, do you know the person of Nio Noel Ramos?

A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know him?
A He was my boyfriend, sir.
Q And where is Nio Noel Ramos now?
A Hes dead already, sir.
Q Why do you know that he is dead?
A Because I saw that day when he was stabbed, sir.
Q You said that you know when he was stabbed. When was that?
A On December 8, 2002, sir.
Q What time was that?
A At around 10:00 in the evening, sir.
Q Where did it happen?
A It happened on a bridge between La Huerta and Sto. Nio, Paraaque City, sir.

Q Do you know the person who killed your boyfriend?

A Yes, sir.
Q If they are inside the courtroom, can you point to them?

COURT:
Witness pointing to the second and the third detention prisoners from among five (5) who when asked by the
Court, Anong pangalan mo, yong pangalawa? answered by the name of Joel Labad. IKaw? Jonel Serenas
po.[22] [emphasis supplied]

Appellants argue that Dianne gave conflicting statements regarding the identity of the assailants. In her affidavit, she
narrated that a friend informed her that Nio was stabbed and taken to the hospital. During trial however, Dianne testified that
she witnessed the actual stabbing incident.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) refutes the alleged inconsistencies in the statements made by Dianne in the
affidavit and during trial. It claims that Dianne was categorical in her testimony that she saw appellants stab her
boyfriend. Furthermore, her testimony in open court is superior to statements made in her affidavit, which statements may
have been made when she was not in her right mind.[23]

The Court of Appeals dismissed the alleged inconsistencies by giving greater weight to the statement made in court by
Dianne than that made in the affidavit she executed before the police.

We do not agree.

Diannes testimony is doubtful to say the least. This Court is mindful of the rule that if there is an inconsistency
between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex-
parte are usually incomplete and inaccurate. Corollary to this is the doctrine that, where the discrepancies are irreconcilable
and unexplained and they dwell on material points, such inconsistencies necessarily discredit the veracity of the witness'
claim.[24] The second rule is apt to the case at bar.

Nowhere in her affidavit did Dianne point to appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. From the tenor of her
affidavit, Diannes suspicion that appellants committed the crime merely arose from the alleged threats made by appellants on
the victim the day before the incident. The pertinent portion of her affidavit is hereby reproduced:

T: Mayroon ka bang natatandaan pagbabanta kay Nio Noel bago ito nangyari sa kanya?

S: Opo, naalala ko po kahapon ika 7 ng Disyembre 2002 humigit kumulang na alas 9:45 ng gabi noong kami ay
papauwi dahil hinatid niya ako sa bahay, pagdaan naming sa Wawa Sto. Nio may apat na kalalakihan, naka upo sa
may daanan malapit sa laruan ng pool, ang isa ay narinig ko nagsalita ng IYANG MAMA NA IYAN, MAY ARAW
DIN SIYA SA AKIN, hindi ko naman ito pinansin at tuloy tuloy po ang lakad namin.

T: Nakilala mo ba kong sino ang apat na kalalakihan?

S: Akin pong napag-alaman ang dalawang magkatabi na sina, Michael Baluyot at @Joe-An.

T: Sino naman ang iyong narinig nagsalita ng pagbabanta sa kanila kong natatandaan mo pa?

S: Opo, si @Joe-An po.

T: May ipapakita ako sa iyo, ano ang masasabi mo?

S: Opo, siya po ang nagsalita ng pagbabanta, affiant pointing to the person when asked identified himself as
JONEL SERENAS Y FALABRICA, @Joe-An, 23 yrs. old, single, jobless, residing at 5058 Wawa Sto. Nio, Pque
City.

T: Mayroon akong ihaharap sa iyo, ano naman ang iyong masasabi sa kanya?

S: Opo, siya po ang sumagot kay Joe-An ng Oo nga, Oo nga na umaayon sa nasabing pagbabanta, affiant pointing
to the person inside investigation when asked voluntarily identified himself as MICHAEL BALUYOT Y ALIC, 17
yrs old single of 117 Wawa, Sto. Nio, Pque City referred to this office by PO2 Ramoncito Lipana, et al. for
investigation.[25]

We cannot simply brush aside the fact that while Dianne pointed to the persons who threatened to do harm on the
victim, she failed to identify who the perpetrators of the crime are. To the mind of the Court, this omission in Diannes affidavit
is so glaring on a material point, i.e., the failure to attribute authorship to the crime. Therefore, the testimony of Dianne
altogether becomes suspect.

Nevertheless, the prosecutions case did not necessarily crumble. The victims dying declaration is a most telling
evidence identifying Joe-an.
 Appellants question the alleged dying declaration of the victim in that they were not sufficiently identified as the
persons responsible for Nios death. Appellants anchor their argument on the utterance of the word Joe-An when the victim was
asked on who stabbed him. Appellants advance that the victim may have been referring to some other person. Moreover, the
victim did not even mention Joel or Joel Labad, the other suspect.[26]

The OSG defends the victims dying declaration and insists that there was no mistake that the victim was indeed
referring to Joe-An, considering that the latter was familiar to him.[27]

As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the
highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless and false
accusation.[28]

In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first, the declaration must concern
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
must be under the consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and fourth, the
declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. [29]

Nios ante mortem statement was relayed to his brother Cesar, in this wise:

Q Cesar, will you please tell this Honorable court where were you on the night of December 8, 2002 at about
9:30?

A I was near the crime scene, sir.

Q Where is this place?
A In N. Domingo, La Huerta, Paraaque City, sir.
Q At that time, what did you notice?
A There was a commotion on top of the bridge, sir.
Q So, what did you do?
A We verified it, sir.
Q After that, what did you do?
A I saw my brother coming, sir.
Q Who is this brother of yours that you saw?
A Nio Noel Ramos, sir.
Q When you saw Nio Noel approaching, what did you do?
A I asked him what the commotion was all about, sir.
Q What did he answer?
A He told me that he was stabbed, sir.
Q What else did he tell you?
A I asked him who stabbed him, sir.
Q What was his answer?
A He answered [to] me that it was Joe-an, sir.
Q What else did he tell you?
A He asked me to bring him to the hospital, sir.
Q What did you do when he asked you to bring him to the hospital?
A I held him up and brought him to the hospital, sir.
Q Why? What was the condition of your brother at that time?
A He was bloodied, sir.[30]

All requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met by the statement of the victim communicated to
Cesar. First, the statement pertained to Nio being stabbed, particularly pin-pointing Joe-An as the perpetrator. Second, Nio
must have been fully aware that he was on the brink of death considering his bloodied condition when Cesar met him near the
bridge. Third, the competence of Nio is unquestionable had he survived the stabbing incident. Fourth, Nios statement was being
offered in a criminal prosecution for his murder.

Note however that based on the testimonies of witnesses, there was no direct evidence linking appellant Joel to the
crime. Cesar testified, thus:
 Q But you only knew that there was a stabbing incident when you were told by the victim that he was stabbed?

A Yes, sir.
Q And he told you that he was stabbed by a certain, who was that?

A Joe-an, sir.
Q Only Joe-an?
A Yes, sir.
Q And aside from this, he was not mentioning any other person?
A That is the only name he mentioned but there were three (3) or four (4) persons who mauled him, sir.

Q The accused in this case, of course, you do not know them?

A I know them by their faces, sir.
Q Why did you say so?
A Because I often pass by that place, sir.
Q But you did not see these persons at that time of the incident?
A I saw them but I cannot see their faces because it was quite far, sir.
Q And you only came to know about these persons at the police precinct, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.
Q Because Dianne and your brother told you so?
A Yes, sir.[31] [Emphasis supplied]

While the police officers caught Joel hiding under the bridge, this incident appears to be circumstantial and cannot
stand to prove Joels complicity without any corroborating evidence.Admittedly, Joels defense of denial and alibi are inherently
weak, however, it is doctrinal that the weakness of the defense cannot be the basis for conviction. The primary burden still lies
with the prosecution whose evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and who must establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused before there can be conviction.[32] At this juncture, we acquit appellant Joel.

With respect to Joe-An, the lower courts properly appreciated the presence of treachery in qualifying the crime to
murder.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms
in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make.[33]

The medical records support the finding of treachery. The nature and location of his wounds are indicative of the
positions of the victim and his assailant at the time the incident occurred. The trial court drew a better picture of how the
victim was stabbed, thus:

It is clear under the circumstances that the victim has no opportunity to retaliate the aggression of
the accused when he was stabbed because according to Dr. Valentin Bernales, Medico-Legal Officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation considering the locations of the wound which was sustained by the accused,
the assailant was about an arm [sic] length away and believed to be at the back of the victim who was standing
and almost in the same level when the first stab wound was inflicted. As to the second wound, according to Dr.
Bernales, the victim appears already lying face down on the ground when stabbed by the accused which to some
extent is consistent with the testimony of Cesar that his brother/victim was mauled by four (4) other
persons. This may be the reason why the victim sustained contuse abrasions on the different parts of his
body.[34]

The victim was suddenly attacked by appellant on his way home from his girlfriends house. He was stabbed twice from
behind. The mode of attack on the victim was clearly executed without risk to the attacker. We cannot discount the fact that
there were other participants to the crime. Appellant could not have acted alone based on the testimony of the witnesses and
the medico-legal report.However, the identity of the other assailants was not proven by the prosecution.

While affirming that treachery attended the commission of the crime, we however rule out the presence of evident
premeditation.
 In order for evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following requisites must be proven: (1) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act
and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. In the instant case, appellant uttered the words iyang mama na
iyan, may araw din siya sa akin. Even conceding that these utterances were in the form of a threat, it still cannot be presumed
that at the time they were made, there was indeed a determination to kill and that appellants had indeed clung to that
determination, planning and meditating on how to kill the victim.

Finally, appellants question the sufficiency of evidence to prove conspiracy. They aver that there was no concerted
action pursuant to a common criminal design between the appellants.Moreover, the manner by which appellants conspired with
one another in stabbing the victim was not discussed in the trial courts decision.[35]

The OSG submits that conspiracy may be deduced from the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. It recalled
that appellants waited by the bridge where the victim passes by whenever he visits his girlfriend. Upon seeing the victim, they
grabbed and mauled him. Moments later, Joe-Ann stabbed the victim. Thereafter, appellants escaped and hid under the bridge
where they were eventually apprehended. Clearly, they have performed overt acts in furtherance of the common design of
killing the victim.[36]

There is nothing on record that would prove that conspiracy existed. The circumstantial evidence cited by the OSG are not
sufficient to prove that appellant conspired with other individuals to perpetrate the crime. Further lending doubt to this claim
is the fact that the alleged co-conspirators identity was not established.

In sum, we find that the prosecution has proven that appellant Joe-An is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of murder. The acquittal of the other appellant, Joel, is in order on the ground of reasonable doubt.

As to appellants pecuniary liability, we find it proper to increase the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
to P75,000.00[37] each. The trial courts grant of P23,000.00 as actual damages is increased to P25,000.00, but as temperate
damages in line with the ruling in People v. Villanueva.[38] We uphold the grant of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, with the victims
mother having hired a private prosecutor to prosecute the case.[39] We increase the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.00
in line with recent jurisprudence.[40]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED.

Appellant JONEL FALABRICA SERENAS is found GUILTY of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Nio Noel Ramos the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages and P20,000.00
as attorney's fees.

For failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant JOEL LORICA
LABAD is ACQUITTED. The Director of Prisons is ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being held for some
other lawful cause, and to inform this Court of such action within five days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.

ROMERO, J.:

Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were
charged with the crime of kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 10, under
an information1 dated July 13, 1992, which reads as follows:

That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and cooperating together and helping
one another, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and
kidnapped one Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with his friends as Bolton Isla, this City and
was brought, handcuffed and carried away using the PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby
depriving the said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented four
witnesses.2 On the other hand, Theodore Bernal testified for his defense.

The materials facts and events as found by the court a quo are:

It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking
spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join them.

After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men
arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was "Payat."3 When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled out a
handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him "not to run because they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso"
or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and
informed the latter's mother of the abduction.

The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr.
had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is
still missing.

On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence,
was never kidnapped.4

On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding Bernal "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his mother Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her
mental anguish and moral suffering."6

Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution witnesses' allegedly illusory testimonies and
for convicting him when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.

The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does not preclude the Court
from ruling on the merits of the case. In Kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the
subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can
easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of their victim's bodies.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:

Art. 267. — Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —

Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill
him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of
the offense.

For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty, which is the essential element of the offense,
must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals "as
shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose." 7 Proof of conspiracy is perhaps
most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only.8 The circumstances present in this case sufficiently
indicate the participation of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.

The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal, together with his two companions, abducted
Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that he saw
Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to "Tarsing's
Store" to check if a certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after the
latter's presence was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by
the billiard hall with Bernal's companions.

Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both Bernal and the victim,
the former being his neighbor and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim were drinking at "Tarsing's Store" on that
fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two
men came to the store and asked for "Payat." When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed "Payat," hew was handcuffed and
taken away by the unidentified men.

Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr.
confided to him that he and Bernal's wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they
used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again because she (was) a married woman.9 Undoubtedly, his wife's
infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.

Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence of facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction.10 Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is
admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
 declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third persons.

With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration
against interest" has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.11

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the
declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify
and believed such declaration to be true."12

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a
declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence 13 because no sane
person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.14

In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarino's testimony. He alleges that the latter could not have seen
the actual handcuffing because "Tarsing's Store" could not be seen from the billiard hall. Sagarino's testimony shows that
after Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed.

Q The three of them together?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what about you, where did you stay?

A I just stayed in the billiard hall.

Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see next?

A The two came back.

Q Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back?

A The companions of Bernal.

Q And what did these two men do?

A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda.15

From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested. The lower court correctly
rejected this argument by holding that:

But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or Tarcing store. On the
contrary, he says that he had not known who the person was that Bernal referred to when he requested one of this two
companions to go see if that person was still there at the store, and that he came to know that he was Openda, Jr. only
after he saw Openda, Jr. pass by the billiard hall already handcuffed, with the two unidentified companions of Bernal
with him, on their way out to the main road.16

If one had a direct view of "Tarsing's Store" from the billiard hall, Bernal would not have requested his companion to check if
Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out by Bernal arose from the testimonies of
Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:

Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned (sic) with his child, is that correct?

A Yes, sir, because I was still in the store.17

On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:

Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you able to see him again?

A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back and proceeded to Tarcing
Store and arrested Jun-jun Openda. When these two men brought out Jun-jun Openda, fifteen
minutes later, Bernal came.

Q Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)

A He was coming from outside.

Q He has with him his son?

A He was with nobody, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A Yes, sir.

Q He was alone?

A Yes, sir.18

The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other as to be irreconcilable. Considering the
proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store, the
latter could have already brought home his son before proceeding alone to the billiard hall where he was seem by Segarino. 19

Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino's testimony by imputing revenge as his motive for testifying. He alleges that on
July 29, 1991, or six days before the alleged kidnapping, five policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car asking
for Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they were residents of the place
and staying at the billiard hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and went to the places he mentioned.

Q Minutes later do you know what happened?

A They came back.

Q What did you do after they came back?

A I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons they were looking (for) ?

Q What was their answer?

A They answered in the negative.

Q Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do ?

A I asked the police officers why they were looking for these persons.(?)

Q What was the answer of the policemen?

A The police officer said that those people were wanted by them because accordingly (sic) they were
marijuana pushers.20
Bernal's position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made by pursuing policemen. This
contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous.

The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any ill-motive against Bernal. If the latter's
allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in court. No such
arrest was, however, made.

The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal.
The court said that Sagarino's forthright answers to the questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish the
participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping or Openda, Jr. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself.21 This Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the established
rule that the findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and
cogent reason to the contrary, since it is in a better position to decided the question of credibility of witnesses. 22

We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to resurface. Considering the circumstances, it
is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is already dead.

Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, recommended to this Court the penalty of
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. The maximum penalty must be
determined in accordance with rules and provision of the Revised Penal Code. With respect to the minimum penalty, however, "it
is left entirely within the discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without
reference to the periods into which it may be subdivided."23 Consistent with this ruling, this Court imposes reclusion temporal,
in its maximum period, as the minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision dated November 18, 1993,
is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 138471 October 10, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

A rosebud that had been snuffed out of its fragrance long before it could even blossom into a flower. Such is the case of
Lizette Arabelle Gonzales (hereafter LIZETTE), who had been defiled at a very tender age. She was at the time voiding her
body waste at their neighbor’s backyard, but that did not deter herein appellant from imposing his lechery on her. Indeed, lust
is no respecter of time and place.1

On 27 January 1995, an information2 for rape was filed against accused-appellant Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y
Ramirez (hereafter PRUNA), the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused thru force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, a 3-year-old minor girl, against the will
and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.
Upon motion of PRUNA’s counsel, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), the Information was amended changing the name of the
accused from Manuel Pruna y Ramirez to Erman Pruna y Ramirez, which was the name reflected in his birth
certificate.3 However, when he testified in court, he stated that his name was Manuel Pruna; and in the minutes of the court
proceedings, he signed the name Manuel Pruna.

On 27 November 1995, upon the Motion to Put the Accused Under Psychiatric or Mental Examination 4 filed by PRUNA’s counsel
on the ground that he could not secure from PRUNA a coherent answer to even simple questions, the trial court ordered that
the accused be brought to the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong City for psychiatric or mental
examination.5 Accordingly, the trial was suspended, and PRUNA was sent to the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH),
Mandaluyong City.

On 28 June 1996, the trial court received a telegram6 from the NCMH stating that PRUNA was in "fair condition." The NCMH
later submitted to the trial court a report7 on the psychiatric evaluation of PRUNA with a recommendation to put him back to
jail for the resumption of court proceedings. The report also stated that PRUNA narrated that while he and his friends were
under the bridge sniffing rugby and drinking alcohol, they saw a 3-year-old girl defecating in the river bank; that they called
her; and, upon the order of his friends he placed her on his lap and attempted to caress her sensitive parts. Said report was
not, however, offered in evidence by the prosecution or the defense.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, whose testimonies can be summed up as follows:

Jacqueline Gonzales, the mother of LIZETTE, testified that on 3 January 1995, at 9:30 a.m., she was fetching water from the
artesian well located ten meters away from her house, while LIZETTE was defecating at the back of the house of their
neighbor Gloria Tolentino. Jacqueline then carried her pail of water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE was not home
yet, Jacqueline headed toward the place where the former was moving her bowel. She looked for LIZETTE but did not find her.
It was when Jacqueline was already returning to her house that she saw LIZETTE from behind -- red-faced, crying, and
appeared to be very frightened. When asked where she came from, LIZETTE answered that she was brought by a certain "Boy"
to the grassy area at the back of Gloria’s house where she was sexually molested (or "kinantot" in the Tagalog dialect).
LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led her to the house of PRUNA, which was about eight meters away from their house.
PRUNA, the only one known in their community as "Boy," was not there. Jacqueline forthwith requested her mother-in-law to
report the matter to the police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial Hospital. 8

Jacqueline further declared that at the time of the alleged rape, LIZETTE was 3 years old, but at the time Jacqueline testified
on 17 October 1995, LIZETTE was 4 years old. LIZETTE’s last birthday was on 19 April 1995. 9

LIZETTE testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called "Boy." She pointed to him inside the courtroom. According to her,
PRUNA laid her down in a grassy area and inserted his penis into her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether she
knew that it is a sin to tell a lie, she answered in the affirmative.10

Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an obstetrician and gynecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, testified that on 3 January 1995, she
conducted a complete physical examination on LIZETTE and took wet smear specimen from her vaginal wall through scraping.
The specimen was sent to the laboratory for analysis by a medical technologist. Further, she requested a urinalysis for
LIZETTE.11 The Medico-Legal Report12 prepared by Dr. Quiroz reveals the following findings:

Essentially normal PE-Findings

Infantile areola & nipples

Flat breasts (-) hematoma

(-) pubic hair

Labia minora and majora –well coaptated

Hymenal ring intact (+) hyperemia (-) laceration

 (Vaginal Opening)

LABORATORY RESULT:

WET SMEAR: KOH - Negative for T-Vaginalis

NSS- Negative for fungi

SPERM ANALYSIS -POSITIVE for sperm cells

Gram staining-few, epithelial cells seen, no other microorganism

URINALYSIS: RBC-3-7-/hpf epithelial cells –few.

WBC-0-2

Although not stated in the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Quiroz, the urinalysis report13 includes a positive finding for "sperm
cells." Dr. Quiroz explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse and
ejaculation had occurred on the person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there was hyperemia, which means
reddening of the tissue around the vaginal opening. Among the causes of hyperemia is the insertion of a hard object like penis
and finger.14

Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory examinations and prepared the corresponding
reports,15 testified that sperm cells were found in the wet smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE.16

SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, a member of the Philippine National Police assigned at the Pilar Municipal Station, testified that on 3
January 1995 the parent of the minor rape victim filed a complaint against PRUNA. He referred the matter to the desk officer
to have it blottered. Upon his advise, the minor was brought to the hospital for examination. When they returned from the
hospital, he took their statements. Later, he conducted an ocular inspection and investigation at the alleged place of the
incident and caused the place to be photographed, which showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the people
in the neighborhood, and one of them answered that he saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to the place where the minor
was found. When PRUNA was brought to their station by four barangay tanods of Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, SPO2 Bunsoy tried to
converse with him, but the former did not give any reply.17

On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand.

Carlito testified that on 3 January 1995, he fetched water at the public artesian well together with Jacqueline. After having
drawn water from the well, Jacqueline called her daughter, who was then defecating on the road near the river; and they both
went home. After a while, the parents of LIZETTE shouted that their daughter was raped, and then they proceeded to the
house of PRUNA and accused him of having raped the child. Carlito asserted that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE
because he (PRUNA) was in his house from the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that her mother went
to the house of PRUNA. Carlito knew that PRUNA was at home because the former was also in the latter’s house to have coffee.
Carlito and the Sulit family thereafter brought PRUNA to the barangay hall. Since the barangay captain was not around, they
brought PRUNA to the municipal building to prove that he was innocent.18

PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the morning of 3 January 1995, he was in his house preparing coffee
for Carlito. After Carlito left, several men arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latter’s friend
then brought him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTE’s father boxed him. He was thereafter brought to the Pilar Municipal
Jail. There, the mother of the child threw at him the lid cover of a kettle. He was also asked by the police to take off his
clothes and lie flat; then he was mauled. Thereafter, he was told to put his feet between the grills, and he was made to
masturbate. Worse, his testes were burned with cigarette butts. Every night, he was asked to kneel on a chair and was hit with
a 2"x 2" piece of wood.19

After trial, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its qualified form and sentenced to suffer the
supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the victim in the sum of P50,000, plus costs.20 Hence, this automatic review.
In his Appellant’s Brief,21 PRUNA attributed to the trial court the following errors:

… IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES, THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD, THAT THE LATTER
WAS THREE (3) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED WHEN THE BEST EVIDENCE THEREFOR IS THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF THE CHILD.

II

… IN RELYING ON THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF JACQUELINE S. GONZALES AS TO THE ALLEGED RAPE OF HER
CHILD.

III

… IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT[ ] CHILD WHO WAS ONLY THREE (3) YEARS
OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE OCCURRED EVEN AS SHE WAS ONLY FIVE (5) YEARS OLD WHEN SHE TESTIFIED.

IV

… IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON DUBIOUS EVIDENCE.

The Office of the Solicitor General (hereafter OSG) seeks the affirmation of the trial court’s decision with the modification
that an additional award of P50,000 as moral damages be granted in favor of the offended party.

As culled from the arguments of the parties, the issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

(1) Whether LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was allegedly only 3 years old when
the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she testified;

(2) Whether Jacqueline’s testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay;

(3) Whether the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is fatal;

(4) Whether appellant’s guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(5) Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to justify the imposition of the death
penalty.

We shall resolve these issues in seriatim.

I. LIZETTE’s Competency and Credibility as a Witness

Appellant disputes the competency of LIZETTE to testify by reason of her tender age. When LIZETTE was called to testify,
his counsel interposed a vigorous objection to the admission of her testimony because of her tender age. The trial court noted
the objection and allowed her to testify; thus:

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY

PROS. LUMABAS:

Do you know Manuel Pruna?

A Yes, sir.
Q How do you call Manuel Pruna?

A Boy, sir.

Q Where is he?

A There, sir. (Witness pointing to a person wearing blue T-shirt, who when asked, gave his name as Manuel Pruna)

PROS. LUMABAS:

What did Manuel Pruna or Boy do to you?

A "Inihiga niya ako" and inserted his penis to my vagina, sir.

Q And in what place did he do this to you?

A In the grassy area, sir.

Q After he inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened next?

ATTY. BALUYOT:

The witness for quite sometime could not answer the question.

PROS. LUMABAS:

I think that will be all for the witness.22

After which, the defense counsel manifested that he would not cross-examine her and that he intended to file a motion
for her disqualification as a witness.23 The court then proceeded to ask her a few questions, thus:

COURT :

Do you know what will happen to a child if she is not telling the truth?

A "Sa lupa."

Q Do you know that it is a sin to tell a lie?

A Yes, sir.

Q The witness is excused considering the manifestation of Atty. Baluyot that he will be filing a written motion for the
striking out of the testimony of the witness considering her tender age.24

No such motion is extant on the records. At the next hearing, the defense counsel cross-examined LIZETTE, as
follows:

ATTY. BALUYOT:

On January 3, 1995, in the morning where were you?

A I was in the grassy area, sir.

Q In that grassy area there were other children with you playing?

A None, sir.

Q You were then removing[sic] your bowel, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Then while removing your bowel you saw your mother pass[ ] by, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q She was then carrying a pail to fetch some water, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q The water from where she will fetch is [sic]… a few meter[s] away from you, is it not?

A Near, sir.

ATTY. BALUYOT:

Considering that the grassy place where you were then discharging your bowel is beside a street?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you saw your mother bringing a pail of water towards your house after her pumping from the well, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q When she passed by she likewise saw you, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Then how far were you from your house when you were discharging your bowel? Please demonstrate the distance?

A Up to that door, sir.

Q From that position you were at the grass you could see your house, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell the Honorable Court how long did it take you to discharge your bowel?

A For a short period of time, sir.

(Sandali lang po.)25

As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public policy, presumes that he is competent.
The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore, upon the party
objecting to the competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.26

Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are disqualified to be witnesses. Among those
disqualified are "[c]hildren whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and relating them truthfully."lawphil.net

No precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a
young child is the test of the competency as a witness.27 It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent
witness if he can perceive and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating
truthfully the facts for which he is examined.28

In determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified
to occurred such that he could receive correct impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to
relate those facts truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness.29 The examination should show that the child has
some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The requisite appreciation of consequences is
disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that
he uses language which is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing.30 A child can be disqualified only
if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts respecting which he is being examined and
of relating them truthfully.31

The question of competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so because the
trial judge sees the proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as
well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath.32 Since many of the witness’ manners cannot be photographed into the
record, the finding of the trial judge will not be disturbed or reversed unless from what is preserved it is clear that such
finding was erroneous.33

In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the ground of her age. He failed to
discharge the burden of showing her mental immaturity. From the above-quoted testimony, it can be gleaned that LIZETTE had
the capacity of observation, recollection, and communication34 and that she could discern the consequence of telling a lie. We,
therefore, sustain the trial court in admitting her testimony and according it great weight.

We are not persuaded by appellant’s assertion that LIZETTE should not be allowed to testify two years after the alleged rape
"when the interplay of frail memory combines with the imagination of earlier years." It must be noted that it is a most natural
reaction for victims of criminal violence to have a lasting impression of the manner in which the crime was committed and the
identity of the person responsible therefor.35

In a string of cases, we have said that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young or tender age is credible and deserves full
credit,36 especially where no motive is attributed to the victim that would make her testify falsely against the
accused.37 Indeed, a girl of such age as LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private
parts; and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in fact raped. 38

II. The Alleged Hearsay Testimony of Jacqueline Gonzales

Contrary to appellant’s contention, Jacqueline’s testimony that LIZETTE told her that appellant laid her in the grassy area and
inserted his penis into her vagina is not covered by the hearsay evidence rule, which finds application when the declarant does
not testify. This rule, as enunciated under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, provides that a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court.

The term "hearsay" as used in the law on evidence, signifies evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the
witness from whom it is elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the
confidence which the court may have in him; its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third person not
sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-examination.39If one therefore testifies to facts which
he learned from a third person not sworn as a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.40
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the hearsay testimony is presented is deprived
of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements are attributed.41Moreover, the court is
without opportunity to test the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanor of the person who made
them.42lavvphil.net

In the instant case, the declarant (LIZETTE) herself was sworn as a witness to the fact testified to by Jacqueline. The
appellant even cross-examined her (LIZETTE). Moreover, the trial court had the opportunity to observe her manner of
testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s testimony on the incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay
evidence.

Even assuming that the aforementioned testimony of Jacqueline is hearsay, its non-admission would not save the day for the
appellant. Such testimony is not indispensable, as it merely serves to corroborate LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA laid her
down in the grass and inserted his private organ into hers. As discussed earlier, LIZETTE’s testimony, which was found to be
credible by the trial court, is sufficient basis for conviction.

At any rate, Jacqueline’s testimony is proof of the victim’s conduct immediately after the rape. It shows that LIZETTE
immediately revealed to her mother the rape incident and the identity of her defiler. As will be discussed later, such conduct is
one of the earmarks of the truth of the charge of rape.

III Non-Presentation of Gloria Tolentino as a Witness

Appellant harps on the prosecution’s failure to put on the witness stand Gloria Tolentino, who was listed as a witness and
executed an affidavit on 4 January 1995 that she saw the appellant carrying and bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back
of her house.

It is undisputed that at the time the case was called for trial, Gloria had already moved out of her residence in Panilao, Pilar,
Bataan, and could not be found anymore. In any event, as opined by the OSG, her intended testimony could be dispensed with, as
it would only be corroborative of LIZETTE’s testimony that Pruna brought her to a grassy area.

IV. Sufficiency of the Prosecution’s Evidence Against Appellant

When LIZETTE was put in the witness stand, she unhesitatingly identified PRUNA, their neighbor, as the one who defiled her.
A rape victim can easily identify her assailant especially if he is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to
her assailant that enables her to have a good look at the latter’s physical features.43

LIZETTE testified that on 3 January 1995 PRUNA, whom she called Boy, laid her in a grassy area and inserted his penis into
her genitalia. When a girl or a woman says that she has been raped she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape
was truly committed.44 She is not expected to remember all the ugly details of the outrage committed against her.45 And when
her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof, for in most cases it is the only
evidence that can be offered to establish his guilt.46

Likewise, LIZETTE’s mother testified that right after the incident LIZETTE disclosed what happened to her and readily
identified PRUNA as the culprit. She even led her mother to the house of PRUNA.47 Thereafter, the two went to the police
authorities to report the incident, and then to the hospital for LIZETTE’s medical examination.

By and large, the medical evidence lends credence to LIZETTE’s testimony that PRUNA inserted his penis into her vagina. The
Medico-Legal Report shows that there was hyperemia or reddening of the vaginal opening of LIZETTE. As opined by Dr. Quiroz,
who was presented as an expert witness, hyperemia can be caused by the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.48 The
presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal and urine of LIZETTE is also a mute testimony of the sexual contact that further
strengthens LIZETTE’s claim of rape.

This Court is not oblivious of the finding that no laceration was found in LIZETTE’s organ despite the fact that she was
examined immediately after she was raped. We have already ruled, however, that the absence of fresh lacerations does not
preclude the finding of rape,49 especially when the victim is of tender age.50 Well- settled is the rule that rape is consummated
by the slightest penile penetration of the labia or pudendum of the female.51 The presence of hyperemia in LIZETTE’s vaginal
opening and the existence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine are clear indications that PRUNA’s organ indeed touched
the labia or pudendum of LIZETTE.

In a nutshell, the following overwhelmingly establish the truth of the charge of rape: (a) the spontaneity of the identification
by LIZETTE of PRUNA as the rapist; (b) her immediate revelation to her mother of the dastard act committed against her; (c)
her act of leading her mother to appellant’s house right after the incident; (d) the prompt filing of the complaint before the
authorities; (e) LIZETTE’s submission to medical examination; (f) the hyperemia in her private part; and (g) the presence of
sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine.

The trial court correctly disregarded the defense of alibi raised by the accused. We have consistently held that for alibi to
prosper, it must be proved that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense; and unless supported by clear
and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the victim.52 We have also held that when alibi
is established only by the accused, his relatives, or close friends, the same should be treated with strictest scrutiny. 53

Carlito, who was admittedly a close friend of appellant’s parents, corroborated PRUNA’s testimony that he (PRUNA) was in his
house during the time that LIZETTE was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the place where the rape occurred was
just a few meters away from the house of PRUNA. Thus, there was no physical impossibility for PRUNA to be in the grassy area
to consummate the crime of rape.

The defense, through Carlito, attempted to impute motive to Jacqueline in filing against PRUNA the charge of rape. According
to him, LIZETTE’s grandparents, the Sulits, wanted to buy the place of the PRUNA family, but the latter refused. 54 Aside from
the fact that such testimony was not corroborated, said motive, if at all, is too flimsy to be even considered. No mother in her
right mind would use her offspring as an engine of malice. She would not subject her child to the humiliation, disgrace, and even
the stigma attendant to a prosecution for rape unless she is motivated by the desire to bring to justice the person responsible
for her child’s defilement.55

V. Sufficiency of Evidence of LIZETTE’s Minority and Propriety of the Imposition of the Death Penalty

The commission of the crime of rape by PRUNA having been duly established by the prosecution, we now come to the question
of the penalty to be meted upon him.

Article 335, seventh paragraph, no. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that the death
penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a "child below seven (7) years old." We have held that in such
a case the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. The failure to
sufficiently establish the victim’s age is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.56

A person’s age is best proved by the birth certificate. But is the presentation of the victim’s birth certificate a sine qua non
requirement to prove her age for the appreciation of minority either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance?
Recent jurisprudence has conflicting pronouncements.

In the following cases, no birth certificate was presented and this Court ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved by
the prosecution:

1. In People v. Vargas,57 the testimonies of the victim and her aunt that the former was 10 years old at the time of the
rape were not considered proof of her age for being hearsay. This Court also observed that the victim could easily be
mistaken for a child below 12 years of age, and hence it was not correct to judge the victim’s age by her appearance.
We held: "The difference of two or three years in age may not always be readily apparent by mere physical
manifestations or appearance."

2. In People v. Javier,58 the victim was alleged to be 16 years old, and the accused did not contest her age. Ratiocinating
that in this age of modernism, there is hardly any difference between a 16-year-old girl and an 18-year-old one insofar
as physical features and attributes are concerned, this Court held that an independent proof of the actual age of a
rape victim is vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to
fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 7659.
3. In People v. Brigildo,59 aside from the failure of the prosecution to present the offended party’s birth certificate or
other equally acceptable official document concerning her age, the testimonies on record were not clear as to her exact
age. The victim declared that she was 11 years old when she testified in court a year after the incident, while her
mother claimed that she was around 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The informations even
alleged a different age. Hence, this Court refused to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of minority because of the
uncertainty regarding her age.

4. In People v. Tipay,60 the offended party was alleged in the information to be under 16 years of age. No "independent"
evidence was presented to prove it. This Court recognized that the minority of a victim who may be below the age of 10
is quite manifest and may be taken judicial notice of by the court. But when the victim is between the crucial years of
15 and 17 where minority may seem to be dubitable due to one's physical appearance, the prosecution should prove the
fact of minority with certainty. The lack of objection on the part of the accused concerning the victim’s age does not
excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden.

5. In People v. Cula,61 the victim was alleged in the complaint to be 16 years old when the rape was committed, but no
evidence at all was presented to prove her age. We held that the failure of the accused to deny such allegation cannot
make up for the failure of the prosecution to prove with certainty the victim’s minority. Because of the lacuna in the
prosecution’s evidence, coupled with the trial court’s failure to make a categorical finding of minority of the victim, we
declined to consider the qualifying circumstance of minority.

6. In People v. Veloso,62 the victim was alleged to be 9 years of age when she was raped. Citing People v. Vargas, 63 this
Court refused to consider the testimonies of the victim and her father as sufficient proof of her age.

7. In People v. Pecayo,64 the victim simply stated during the beginning of her direct examination that she was 14 years
old and that she was born on 13 January 1983. We held that the victim’s casual testimony as to her age is not enough,
and that the lack of denial on the part of the accused does not excuse the prosecution from proving her age through
competent evidence such as a duly certified certificate of live birth, baptismal certificate, or some other authentic
document showing her age.

8. In People v. Tundag,65 the victim testified that she was 13 years of age when she was raped, but she did not know
exactly when she was born. Unable to secure a copy of her birth certificate, the prosecution moved that judicial notice
be taken of the fact that she was below 18 years old at the time of the rape. Despite the admission by the defense of
such fact, this Court held that the age of the victim is not a matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory or
discretionary. Under Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence, a hearing is required before such fact can be taken
judicial notice of by courts.

9. In People v. Geraban,66 the victim’s testimony was categorical in declaring that she was 15, but her mother’s
testimony regarding her age was not clear. We thus declared that the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of
proving minority.

10. In People v. Liban67 and People v. Llandelar,68 the only evidence adduced to prove the minority of the victims was the
victims’ bare testimony that they were 10 and 16 years old, respectively. This Court held that while the declaration of a
victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree,
the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is another matter. The prosecution should present the
victim’s birth certificate or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school
records, and documents of similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence that can help establish the age of the victim.
Neither the obvious minority of the victim nor the absence any contrary assertion from the defense can exonerate the
prosecution from its burden. Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule
129 of the Rules on Evidence would not be sufficient compliance with the law.

11. In People v. Alvarado,69 the victim testified that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape, and this was
confirmed by the accused, who was victim’s father. The victim’s mother, however, testified as to her date of birth
which showed that she was 13 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. For this doubt as to the victim’s
age, the accused was held guilty of simple rape only and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.
On the other hand, in the following cases, we ruled that the age of the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the
failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended party to prove her age:

1. In People v. Rafales,70 the testimony of the victim and her mother that the former was only 10 years old when she was raped,
which was not denied by the accused, was deemed sufficient to prove her age for the purpose of determining whether the
accused could be held guilty of statutory rape, which is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age.

2. In People v. De la Cruz,71 the testimony of the mother alone that her two daughters were both 14 years old at the time of the
rape incidents was deemed sufficient because there was no reason to doubt the testimony of the mother, who had personal
knowledge of the ages of her children. Moreover, said testimony was never challenged by the accused and stood unrebutted by
any other evidence.

3. In People v. Bali-balita,72 the victim’s testimony as to her age, which was corroborated by her half-sister, was deemed
sufficient. We noted that the victim testified in court four months after the rape, and hence it was not difficult for the trial
court to take judicial notice that she was under 18 years of age.

4. In People v. Velasco,73 the minority of the victim was deemed established by (a) the complainant herself, who was held to be
competent to testify on her age, as it constituted family tradition; (b) the open admission of the accused that the victim was a
12-year-old minor; and (c) the categorical finding of the trial court that she was "a minor of a little over twelve years."

5. In People v. Remudo,74 the trial court appreciated the qualifying circumstance of minority on the strength of (a) the offended
party’s testimony as to the date of her birth, which showed that she was 13 years old at the time of the rape, and (b) the
admission of said date of birth by the accused who was the victim’s brother.

6. In People v. LLanita75 the only evidence presented by the prosecution to establish that the victim was below 7 years old at
the time of the alleged rape was the victim’s own testimony. Although hearsay because she could not have personal knowledge of
the date of her birth but could only acquire knowledge thereof from her parents or relatives, said testimony was held
admissible for being an assertion of family tradition regarding pedigree. Her testimony and the accused’s admission that she
was 5 years old during the commission of the crime were held sufficient to establish her age.

7. In People v. Agustin,76 the victim’s testimony that she was 14 years old at the time of the rape incidents, coupled with the
express admission of her age by the accused who was her father, sufficiently proved her minority.

8. In People v. Esuela,77 the testimony of the victim’s mother that the victim was 13 years of age at the time of the rape was
held sufficient to establish minority for the reason that as a mother she was in the best position to know when she delivered
her child. Also considered were the victim’s own testimony regarding her age, as well as the observation of the trial court that
she could not have been more than 18 years old when she testified.

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
 b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.78

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In the present case, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was
presented to prove her age. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court ratiocinated in this wise:

In the instant case, the victim, Lizette Arabelle Gonzales, was a 3-year-old minor girl as alleged in the information and the
defense did not contest her age and as a matter of fact was questioning her qualification to testify because of her tender age
when she testified two (2) years later in Court. The victim’s Medico-Legal Certificate date[d] January 3, 1995 … established the
fact that at the time of the commission of the rape on January 3, 1995, the child was only 3 years old. 79

It thus appears that the trial court’s finding that LIZETTE was 3 years old when she was raped was based on the Medico-Legal
Report prepared by Dr. Quiroz, as well as on the fact that the defense did not contest her age and even questioned her
qualification to testify because of her tender age.

However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is
nothing therein which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTE’s age. Her mother,
Jacqueline, testified on 17 October 1995 as follows:

Q. Now, on January 3, 1995 at about 9:30 in the morning, do you still recall where you were?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you at that particular date and time?

A. I was fetching water from an artesian well beside the house of my neighbor, sir.

Q. Where was this daughter of yours then when you were fetching water?

A. My daughter was discharging her bowel who was then at the back of the house of our neighbor, sir.

How old is your daughter Lizette Arabelle Gonzales?

A. Three years old, sir.

Q. At the time that she was discharging her bowel, how old [was] she?

A. Three years old, sir. She is four years old now.

Q. When was her last birthday?

 A. April 19, 1995, sir.80

Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old. 81 However,
when the defense counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5
years old. Upon further question as to the date she was born, she could not answer.82

For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with
certainty that LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the
severity of the death penalty, especially its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in
capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.83

In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence84 in order that the qualifying circumstance of "below seven
(7) years old" is appreciated against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse
the prosecution from discharging its burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTE’s tender age for purposes of questioning her
competency to testify is not necessarily an admission that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January
1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.

However, conformably with no. 3(b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTE’s mother that she was 3 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl
below 12 years of age. Under the second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first
paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the
penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua, and not death penalty.

As regards the civil liability of PRUNA, the indemnity in the amount of P50,000 awarded by the trial court is not sufficient. In
accordance with recent jurisprudence, LIZETTE should also be awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 without need
of pleading or proof because the mental, physical and psychological trauma suffered by her is too obvious.85

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, in Criminal Case No. 6044 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that accused Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez is held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of statutory rape, and not qualified rape, and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim
Lizette Arabelle Gonzales the sum of P50,000 as moral damages in addition to the indemnity of P50,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124853. February 24, 1998]

FRANCISCO L. JISON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the 27 April 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860[1] which reversed the decision of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City in Civil
Case No. 16373.[2] The latter dismissed the complaint of private respondent Monina Jison (hereafter MONINA) for recognition
as an illegitimate child of petitioner Francisco Jison (hereafter FRANCISCO).
 In issue is whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error, which, in this instance,
necessitates an inquiry into the facts. While as a general rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court,
nevertheless, in light of the conflicting findings of facts of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, this case falls under an
exception to this rule.[3]

In her complaint[4] filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that FRANCISCO had been married to a certain
Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar
(who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in
Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by his
acts and that of his family. MONINA further alleged that FRANCISCO gave her support and spent for her education, such that
she obtained a Master's degree, became a certified public accountant (CPA) and eventually, a Central Bank examiner. In view of
FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.

In his answer,[5] FRANCISCO alleged that he could not have had sexual relations with Esperanza Amolar during the period
specified in the complaint as she had ceased to be in his employ as early as 1944, and did not know of her whereabouts since
then; further, he never recognized MONINA, expressly or impliedly, as his illegitimate child. As affirmative and special
defenses, FRANCISCO contended that MONINA had no right or cause of action against him and that her action was barred by
estoppel, laches and/or prescription. He thus prayed for dismissal of the complaint and an award of damages due to the
malicious filing of the complaint.

After MONINA filed her reply,[6] pre-trial was conducted where the parties stipulated on the following issues:

1. Did Francisco Jison have any sexual relation[s] with Esperanza Am[o]lar about the end of 1945 or the start of
1946?

2. Is Monina Jison the recognized illegitimate daughter of Francisco Jison by the latters own acts and those of his
family?

3. Is Monina Jison barred from instituting or prosecuting the present action by estoppel, laches and/or prescription?

4. Damages.[7]

At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven (11) witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr., Adela
Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma, Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz
and Lope Amolar.

Ruben Castellanes, Sr., a 63-year old resident of Iloilo City, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO for a total of
six (6) years at Nelly Garden, FRANCISCO's Iloilo residence. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation, FRANCISCOs wife
suffered a miscarriage or abortion, thereby depriving FRANCISCO of consortium; thereafter, FRANCISCOs wife managed a
nightclub on the ground floor of Nelly Garden which operated daily from 6:00 p.m. till 3:00 a.m. of the following day, thereby
allowing FRANCISCO free access to MONINAs mother, Esperanza Amolar, who was nicknamed Pansay.

Adela Casabuena, a 61-year old farmer, testified that she served as the yaya (nanny) of Lourdes from July 1946 up to
February 1947. Although Pansay had left Nelly Garden two (2) weeks before Adela started working for the
Jisons, Pansay returned sometime in September 1946, or about one month after she gave birth to MONINA, to ask
FRANCISCO for support. As a result, Pansay and Lilia Jison, FRANCISCO's wife, quarreled in the living room, and in the course
thereof, Pansay claimed that FRANCISCO was the father of her baby. To which, Lilia replied: I did not tell you to make that
baby so it is your fault. During the quarrel which lasted from 10:30 till 11:00 a.m., FRANCISCO was supposedly inside the house
listening.

Arsenio Duatin, a 77-year old retired laborer, testified that from 1947 until 1977, he worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy
at the latters house on 12th Street, Capitol Subdivision, Bacolod City. Arsenio met MONINA in 1967, when Felipe Lagarto, the
bookkeeper at Nelly Garden, informed Arsenio that MONINA, FRANCISCOs daughter, would arrive at Bacolod City with a
letter of introduction from Lagarto.

Initially, Arsenio identified seven (7) black-and-white photographs (Exhs. X-5 to X-11) of MONINA,[8] and as he paid for
the telephone bills, he likewise identified six (6) telephone cards (Exhs. G to L). Arsenio then declared that when MONINA
arrived in Bacolod City, she introduced herself to him as FRANCISCOs daughter. She stayed at FRANCISCOs house, but when
the latter and his wife would come over, Arsenio would conceal the presence of MONINA because Mrs. Jison did not like to see
her face. Once, Arsenio hid MONINA in the house of FRANCISCOs sister, Mrs. Luisa Jison Alano, in Silay City; another time,
at the residence of FRANCISCOs cousin, Mrs. Concha Lopez Cuaycong. Finally, Arsenio declared that the last time he saw
MONINA was when she left for Manila, after having finished her schooling at La Salle College in Bacolod City.

On re-direct and upon questions by the court, Arsenio disclosed that it was FRANCISCO who instructed that MONINA be
hidden whenever FRANCISCO and his wife were around; that although FRANCISCO and MONINA saw each other at the
Bacolod house only once, they called each other through long distance; and that MONINA addressed FRANCISCO as Daddy
during their lone meeting at the Bacolod house and were affectionate to each other. Arsenio likewise declared that MONINA
stayed at FRANCISCO's Bacolod house twice: first for a month, then for about a week the second time. On both occasions,
however, FRANCISCO and his wife were abroad. Finally, Arsenio recalled that FRANCISCO likewise bade Arsenio to treat
MONINA like his (FRANCISCOs) other daughters.

The testimony of Zafiro Ledesma, a 74-year old banker and former mayor of Iloilo City, initially touched on how he and his
wife were related to FRANCISCO, FRANCISCO's wife and MONINA. Zafiro first identified Exhibit R, a diagram of the family
trees of the Jison and Lopez families, which showed that former Vice-President Fernando Lopez was the first cousin of
FRANCISCOs wife, then told the court that the family of Vice-President Lopez treated MONINA very well because she is
considered a relative xxx by reputation, by actual perception. Zafiro likewise identified Exhibits X-13 to X-18, photographs
taken at the 14 April 1985 birthday celebration of Mrs. Fernando Lopez, which showed MONINA with the former Vice-
President and other members of the Lopez family.

Zafiro further testified that while MONINA lived with Mrs. Cuaycong, the latter paid for some of MONINAs school
needs and even asked MONINA to work in a hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong; and that another first cousin of FRANCISCOs
wife, a certain Remedios Lopez Franco, likewise helped MONINA with her studies and problems, and even attended MONINAs
graduation in 1978 when she obtained a masteral degree in Business Administration, as evidenced by another photograph (Exh.
X-12). Moreover, upon Remedios recommendation, MONINA was employed as a secretary at Merchant Financing Company, which
was managed by a certain Danthea Lopez, the wife of another first cousin of FRANCISCOs wife, and among whose directors
were Zafiro himself, his wife and Dantheas husband. In closing, Zafiro identified MONINAs Social Security Record (Exh. W),
which was signed by Danthea as employer and where MONINA designated Remedios as the beneficiary.

Danthea Lopez, a 58-year old housekeeper, declared that FRANCISCO was the first cousin of her husband, Eusebio D.
Lopez; and that she came to know MONINA in the latter part of 1965 when Remedios Franco recommended MONINA for
employment at Merchant Financing Co., which Danthea managed at that time. Remedios introduced MONINA to Danthea as
being reputedly the daughter of Mr. Frank Jison; and on several occasions thereafter, Remedios made Danthea and the latters
husband understand that MONINA was reputedly the daughter of [FRANCISCO]. While MONINA worked at Merchant
Financing, Danthea knew that MONINA lived with Remedios; however, in the latter part of 1966, as Remedios left for Manila
and MONINA was still studying at San Agustin University, Danthea and her husband invited MONINA to live with them. During
MONINAs 6-month stay with them, she was not charged for board and lodging and was treated as a relative, not a mere
employee, all owing to what Remedios had said regarding MONINAs filiation. As Danthea understood, MONINA resigned from
Merchant Financing as she was called by Mrs. Cuaycong, a first cousin of Dantheas husband who lived in Bacolod City.

Romeo Bilbao, a 43-year old seaman, testified that he had worked for FRANCISCO from 1969 up to 1980 at Nelly Garden
in various capacities: as a procurement officer, hacienda overseer and, later, ashacienda administrator. Sometime in May, 1971,
Romeo saw and heard MONINA ask her Daddy (meaning FRANCISCO) for the money he promised to give her, but FRANCISCO
answered that he did not have the money to give, then told MONINA to go see Mr. Jose Cruz in Bacolod City. Then in the
middle of September that year, FRANCISCO told Romeo to pick up Mr. Cruz at the Iloilo pier and bring him to the office of
Atty. Benjamin Tirol. At said office, Atty. Tirol, Mr. Cruz and MONINA entered a room while Romeo waited outside. When they
came out, Atty. Tirol had papers for MONINA to sign, but she refused. Atty. Tirol said that a check would be released to
MONINA if she signed the papers, so MONINA acceded, although Atty. Tirol intended not to give MONINA a copy of the
document she signed. Thereafter, Mr. Cruz gave MONINA a check (Exh. Q), then MONINA grabbed a copy of the document
she signed and ran outside. Romeo then brought Mr. Cruz to Nelly Garden. As to his motive for testifying, Romeo stated that he
wanted to help MONINA be recognized as FRANCISCOS daughter.

Rudy Tingson, a 45-year old antique dealer, testified that in 1963-1964, he was employed by FRANCISCOs wife at the
Baguio Military Institute in Baguio City; then in 1965, Rudy worked at FRANCISCOs office at Nelly Garden recording hacienda
expenses, typing vouchers and office papers, and, at times, acting as paymaster for the haciendas. From the nature of his work,
Rudy knew the persons receiving money from FRANCISCOs office, and clearly remembered that in 1965, as part of his job,
Rudy gave MONINA her allowance from FRANCISCO four (4) times, upon instructions of a certain Mr. Lagarto to give
MONINA P15.00 a month. Rudy likewise recalled that he first met MONINA in 1965, and that she would go to Nelly Garden
whenever FRANCISCOs wife was not around. On some of these occasions, MONINA would speak with and address FRANCISCO
as Daddy, without objection from FRANCISCO. In fact, in 1965, Rudy saw FRANCISCO give MONINA money thrice. Rudy
further declared that in April 1965, FRANCISCOs office paid P250.00 to Funeraria Bernal for the funeral expenses of
MONINAs mother. Finally, as to Rudy's motives for testifying, he told the court that he simply wanted to help bring out the
truth and nothing but the truth, and that MONINAs filiation was common knowledge among the people in the office at Nelly
Garden.

On re-direct, Rudy declared that the moneys given by FRANCISCOs office to MONINA were not reflected in the books
of the office, but were kept in a separate book, as Mr. Lagarto explained that FRANCISCOs wife and children should not know
[of] this. Rudy further revealed that as to the garden meetings between FRANCISCO and MONINA, Rudy saw MONINA kiss
FRANCISCO on the cheek both upon arriving and before leaving, and FRANCISCOs reaction upon seeing her was to smile and
say in the Visayan dialect: Kamusta ka iha? (How are you, daughter?); and that MONINA was free to go inside the house as the
household staff knew of her filiation, and that, sometimes, MONINA would join them for lunch.

Alfredo Baylosis, a 62-year old retired accountant, testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Central Santos-Lopez in
Iloilo from 1951 up to 1961, then at Nelly Garden from 1961 until 1972. Alfredo first served FRANCISCO as a bookkeeper, then
when Mr. Lagarto died in 1967 or 1969, Alfredo replaced Mr. Lagarto as office manager.

Alfredo knew MONINA since 1961 as she used to go to Nelly Garden to claim her P15.00 monthly allowance given upon
FRANCISCOs standing order. Alfredo further declared that MONINAs filiation was pretty well-known in the office; that he
had seen MONINA and FRANCISCO go from the main building to the office, with FRANCISCOs arm on MONINAs
shoulder; and that the office paid for the burial expenses of Pansay, but this was not recorded in the books in order to hide it
from FRANCISCOs wife. Alfredo also disclosed that the disbursements for MONINAs allowance started in 1961 and were
recorded in a separate cash book. In 1967, the allowances ceased when MONINA stopped schooling and was employed in Bacolod
City with Miller, Cruz & Co., which served as FRANCISCOs accountant-auditor. Once, when Alfredo went to the offices of
Miller, Cruz & Co. to see the manager, Mr. Atienza, and arrange for the preparation of FRANCISCOs income tax return, Alfredo
chanced upon MONINA. When Alfredo asked her how she came to work there, she answered that her Daddy,
FRANCISCO, recommended her, a fact confirmed by Mr. Atienza. Alfredo then claimed that Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller,
Cruz & Co., was the most trusted man of FRANCISCO.

Dominador Savariz, a 55-year old caretaker, testified that he worked as FRANCISCOs houseboy at Nelly Garden from
November 1953 up to 1965. One morning in April 1954, MONINA and her mother Pansaywent to Nelly Garden and spoke with
FRANCISCO for about an hour, during which time, Dominador was vacuuming the carpet about six (6) to seven (7) meters
away. Due to the noise of the vacuum cleaner, FRANCISCO and MONINA spoke in loud voices, thus Dominador overheard their
conversation. As FRANCISCO asked Pansay why they came, Pansay answered that they came to ask for the sustenance of his
child MONINA. FRANCISCO then touched MONINA's head and asked: How are you Hija?, to which MONINA answered: Good
morning, Daddy. After FRANCISCO told Pansay and MONINA to wait, he pulled something from his wallet and said to Pansay: I
am giving this for the child.

In May 1954, Dominador saw MONINA at Mr. Lagartos office where Dominador was to get the days expenses, while
MONINA was claiming her allowance from Mr. Diasnes. The next month, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly Garden and heard in
the office that MONINA was there to get her allowance from her Daddy. In December 1960, Dominador saw MONINA at Nelly
Garden, in the room of Don Vicente (father of FRANCISCOs wife), where she asked for a Christmas gift and she was calling
Don Vicente, Lolo (grandfather). At that time, FRANCISCO and his wife were not around. Then sometime in 1961, when
Dominador went to Mr. Lagartos office to get the marketing expenses, Dominador saw MONINA once more claiming her
allowance.

Dominador further testified that in February 1966, after he had stopped working for FRANCISCO, Dominador was at Mrs.
Francos residence as she recommended him for employment with her sister, Mrs. Concha Cuaycong. There, he saw MONINA,
who was then about 15 years old, together with Mrs. Francos daughter and son. Mrs. Franco pointed at MONINA and asked
Dominador if he knew who MONINA was.Dominador answered that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter with Pansay, and then
Mrs. Franco remarked that MONINA was staying with her (Mrs. Franco) and that she was sending MONINA to school at the
University of San Agustin.

Lope Amolar, a 50-year old resident of Dingle, Iloilo, and the younger brother of Esperanza Amolar (Pansay), testified that
he worked for FRANCISCO as a houseboy from March to November 1945 at Nelly Garden. Thereafter, FRANCISCO sent Lope
to work at Elena Apartments in Manila. By November 1945, Pansay was also working at Elena Apartments, where she revealed to
Lope that FRANCISCO impregnated her. Lope then confronted FRANCISCO, who told Lope dont get hurt and dont cause any
trouble, because I am willing to support your Inday Pansay and my child. Three (3) days after this confrontation, Lope asked for
and received permission from FRANCISCO to resign because he (Lope) was hurt.
 On 21 October 1986, MONINA herself took the witness stand. At that time, she was 40 years old and a Central Bank
Examiner. She affirmed that as evidenced by certifications from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and
baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D), she was born on 6 August 1946 in Barangay Tabugon, Dingle, Iloilo, to Esperanza Amolar
(who passed away on 20 April 1965) and FRANCISCO.[9] MONINA first studied at Sagrado where she stayed as a
boarder. While at Sagrado from 1952 until 1955 (up to Grade 4), her father, FRANCISCO, paid for her tuition fees and other
school expenses. She either received the money from FRANCISCO or from Mr. Lagarto, or saw FRANCISCO give money to her
mother, or Mr. Lagarto would pay Sagrado directly. After Sagrado, MONINA studied in different schools,[10] but FRANCISCO
continuously answered for her schooling.

For her college education, MONINA enrolled at the University of Iloilo, but she later dropped due to an accident which
required a week's hospitalization. Although FRANCISCO paid for part of the hospitalization expenses, her mother shouldered
most of them. In 1963, she enrolled at the University of San Agustin, where she stayed with Mrs. Franco who paid for
MONINA's tuition fees. However, expenses for books, school supplies, uniforms and the like were shouldered by
FRANCISCO. At the start of each semester, MONINA would show FRANCISCO that she was enrolled, then he would ask her
to canvass prices, then give her the money she needed. After finishing two (2) semesters at University of San Agustin, as
evidenced by her transcript of records (Exh. Z showing that FRANCISCO was listed as Parent/Guardian [Exh. Z-1]), she
transferred to De Paul College, just in front of Mrs. Francos house, and studied there for a year. Thereafter, MONINA
enrolled at Western Institute of Technology (WIT), where she obtained a bachelors degree in Commerce in April 1967. During
her senior year, she stayed with Eusebio and Danthea Lopez at Hotel Kahirup, owned by said couple. She passed the CPA board
exams in 1974, and took up an M.B.A. at De La Salle University as evidenced by her transcript (Exh. AA), wherein FRANCISCO
was likewise listed as Guardian (Exhs. AA-1 and AA-2).

MONINA enumerated the different members of the household staff at Nelly Garden, to wit: Luz, the household cook; the
houseboys Silvestre and Doming; the housemaid Natang; the yaya of the adopted triplets, Deling; the yaya of Lolo Vicente,
Adelina; and others. MONINA likewise enumerated the members of the office staff (Messrs. Baylosis, Lagarto, Tingson,
Diasnes, Jalandoni, Supertisioso, Doroy, and others), and identified them from a photograph marked as Exhibit X-2. She then
corroborated the prior testimony regarding her employment at Merchant Financing Co., and her having lived at Hotel Kahirup
and at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence in Bacolod City, while working at the hospital owned by Mrs. Cuaycong.

MONINA further testified that in March 1968, she went to Manila and met FRANCISCO at Elena Apartments at the
corner of Romero and Salas Streets, Ermita. She told FRANCISCO that she was going for a vacation in Baguio City with Mrs.
Francos mother, with whom she stayed up to June 1968. Upon her return from Baguio City, MONINA told FRANCISCO that she
wanted to work, so the latter arranged for her employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City. MONINA went to Bacolod City, was
interviewed by Mr. Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller & Cruz, who told her she would start working first week of
September, sansexamination. She resigned from Miller & Cruz in 1971 and lived with Mrs. Cuaycong at her Forbes Park
residence in Makati. MONINA went to see FRANCISCO, told him that she resigned and asked him for money to go to Spain, but
FRANCISCO refused as she could not speak Spanish and would not be able find a job. The two quarreled and FRANCISCO
ordered a helper to send MONINA out of the house. In the process, MONINA broke many glasses at the pantry and cut her
hand, after which, FRANCISCO hugged her, gave her medicine, calmed her down, asked her to return to Bacolod City and
promised that he would give her the money.

MONINA returned to Bacolod City by plane, using a Filipinas Orient Airways plane ticket (Exh. M) which FRANCISCO
gave. She called Mr. Cruz, then Atty. Tirol, as instructed by Mr. Cruz. These calls were evidenced by PLDT long distance toll
cards (Exhs. G to L), with annotations at the back reading: charged and paid under the name of Frank L. Jison and were signed
by Arsenio Duatin (Exhs. G-1 to L-1). PLDT issued a certification as to the veracity of the contents of the toll cards (Exh.
BB). Likewise introduced in evidence was a letter of introduction prepared by Mr. Cruz addressed to Atty. Tirol, on MONINA's
behalf (Exh. N).

MONINA also declared that Atty. Tirol then told her that she would have to go to Iloilo and sign a certain affidavit,
before Mr. Cruz would turn over the money promised by FRANCISCO. She went to Atty. Tirols office in Iloilo, but after going
over the draft of the affidavit, refused to sign it as it stated that she was not FRANCISCOs daughter. She explained that all
she had agreed with FRANCISCO was that he would pay for her fare to go abroad, and that since she was a little girl, she knew
about her illegitimacy. She started crying, begged Atty. Tirol to change the affidavit, to which Atty. Tirol responded that he
was also a father and did not want this to happen to his children as they could not be blamed for being brought into the
world. She then wrote a letter (Exh. O) to FRANCISCO and sent it to the latters Forbes Park residence (Bauhinia Place) by JRS
courier service (Exhs. O-5 to O-7). MONINA subsequently met FRANCISCO in Bacolod City where they discussed the affidavit
which she refused to sign. FRANCISCO told her that the affidavit was for his wife, that in case she heard about MONINA
going abroad, the affidavit would keep her peace.
 MONINA then narrated that the first time she went to Atty. Tirols office, she was accompanied by one Atty. Fernando
Divinagracia, who advised her that the affidavit (Exh. P)[11] would boomerang against FRANCISCO as it is contrary to
law. MONINA returned to Bacolod City, then met with Atty. Tirol once more to reiterate her plea, but Atty. Tirol did not
relent. Thus, on the morning of 20 or 21 September 1971, she signed the affidavit as she was jobless and needed the money to
support herself and finish her studies. In exchange for signing the document, MONINA received a Bank of Asia check
for P15,000.00 (Exh. Q), which was less than the P25,000.00 which FRANCISCO allegedly promised to give. As Atty. Tirol
seemed hesitant to give her a copy of the affidavit after notarizing it, MONINA merely grabbed a copy and immediately left.

MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which purpose, she procured letters of introduction (Exhs. S and T) from a
cousin, Mike Alano (son of FRANCISCOs elder sister Luisa); and an uncle, Emilio Jison (FRANCISCOs elder brother), addressed
to another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilios daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S contained a statement (Exh. S-1)
expressly recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCOs daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not to go abroad, opting
instead to spend the proceeds of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board exam and graduate studies. After finishing
her graduate studies, she again planned to travel abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of introduction from former
Vice President Fernando Lopez addressed to then United States Consul Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).

As to other acts tending to show her filiation, MONINA related that on one occasion, as FRANCISCOs wife was going to
arrive at the latters Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO called Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide MONINA. Thus,
MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCOs wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew
Vice President Fernando Lopez and his wife, Mariquit, even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA asked for a
recommendation letter (Exh. U) from Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another
second cousin of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez expressly recognized MONINA as FRANCISCOs daughter. As
additional proof of her close relationship with the family of Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified photographs taken at a
birthday celebration on 14 April 1985.

MONINA finally claimed that she knew the three (3) children of FRANCISCO by wife, namely, Lourdes, Francisco, Jr.
(Junior) and Elena, but MONINA had met only Lourdes and Junior. MONINA's testimony dealt lengthily on her dealings with
Junior and the two (2) occasions when she met with Lourdes. The last time MONINA saw FRANCISCO was in March 1979, when
she sought his blessings to get married.

In his defense, FRANCISCO offered his deposition taken before then Judge Romeo Callejo of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 48. As additional witnesses, FRANCISCO presented Nonito Jalandoni, Teodoro Zulla, Iigo Supertisioso, Lourdes
Ledesma, Jose Cruz and Dolores Argenal.

FRANCISCO declared that Pansays employment ceased as of October, 1944, and that while employed by him, Pansay would
sleep with the other female helpers on the first floor of his residence, while he, his wife and daughter slept in a room on the
second floor. At that time, his household staff was composed of three (3) female workers and two (2) male
workers. After Pansay left in October 1944, she never communicated with him again, neither did he know of her
whereabouts. FRANCISCO staunchly denied having had sexual relations with Pansay and disavowed any knowledge about
MONINAs birth. In the same vein, he denied having paid for MONINAs tuition fees, in person or otherwise, and asserted that
he never knew that Mr. Lagarto paid for these fees. Moreover, FRANCISCO could not believe that Lagarto would pay for these
fees despite absence of instructions or approval from FRANCISCO. He likewise categorically denied that he told anyone, be it
Danthea Lopez, Zafiro Ledesma, Concha Cuaycong or Remedios Franco, that MONINA was his daughter.

FRANCISCO also disclosed that upon his return from the United States in 1971, he fired Alfredo Baylosis upon
discovering that Alfredo had taken advantage of his position during the formers absence.FRANCISCO likewise fired Rudy
Tingson and Romeo Bilbao, but did not give the reasons therefor.

Finally, FRANCISCO denied knowledge of MONINAs long distance calls from his Bacolod residence; nevertheless, when he
subsequently discovered this, he fired certain people in his office for their failure to report this anomaly. As regards the
caretaker of his Bacolod residence, FRANCISCO explained that since MONINA lived at Mrs. Cuaycongs residence, the
caretaker thought that he could allow people who lived at the Cuaycong residence to use the facilities at his (FRANCISCOs)
house.

Nonito Jalandoni, bookkeeper and paymaster at Nellys Garden from 1963 up to 1974, then from 1980 up to 1986, the
assistant overseer of Hacienda Lopez, testified that he did not know MONINA; that he learned of her only in June 1988, when
he was informed by FRANCISCO that MONINA had sued him; and that he never saw MONINA at Nellys Garden, neither did he
know of any instructions for anyone at Nellys Garden to give money to MONINA.

Teodoro Zulla, FRANCISCOs bookkeeper and paymaster from 1951 up to 1986, testified that FRANCISCO dismissed
Alfredo Baylosis due to certain unspecified discrepancies; and that he never saw MONINA receive funds from either Mr.
Lagarto or Mr. Baylosis. Upon questions from the trial court, however, Teodoro admitted that he prepared vouchers for only one
of FRANCISCOs haciendas, and not vouchers pertaining to the latters personal expenses.

Iigo Supertisioso testified that he worked for FRANCISCO at Nellys Garden from 1964 up to 1984 as a field inspector,
paymaster, cashier and, eventually, officer-in-charge (OIC). He confirmed Alfredo Baylosis dismissal due to these unspecified
irregularities, then denied that FRANCISCO ever ordered that MONINA be given her allowance. Likewise, Iigo never heard
FRANCISCO mention that MONINA was his (FRANCISCOs) daughter.

Lourdes Ledesma, FRANCISCOs daughter, testified that she saw (but did not know) MONINA at the Our Lady of Mercy
Hospital, on the occasion of the birth of Lourdes first son, Mark. Over lunch one day, Lourdes aunt casually introduced Lourdes
and MONINA to each other, but they were referred to only by their first names. Then sometime in 1983 or 1984, MONINA
allegedly went to Lourdes house in Sta. Clara Subdivision requesting for a letter of introduction or referral as MONINA was
then job-hunting. However, Lourdes did not comply with the request.

Jose Cruz, a partner at Miller, Cruz & Co., testified that MONINA worked at Miller & Cruz from 1968 up to 1971, however,
he did not personally interview her before she was accepted for employment.Moreover, MONINA underwent the usual screening
procedure before being hired. Jose recalled that one of the accountants, a certain Mr. Atienza, reported that MONINA
claimed to be FRANCISCOs daughter.Jose then told Mr. Atienza to speak with MONINA and see if he (Mr. Atienza) could stop
her from spreading this rumor. Mr. Atienza reported that he spoke with MONINA, who told him that she planned to leave for
the United States and needed P20,000.00 for that purpose, and in exchange, she would sign a document disclaiming filiation
with FRANCISCO. Thus, Jose instructed Mr. Atienza to request that MONINA meet with Jose, and at that meeting, MONINA
confirmed Mr. Atienzas report. Jose then informed Atty. Tirol, FRANCISCOs personal lawyer, about the matter.

Atty. Tirol told Jose to send MONINA and her lawyer to his (Atty. Tirols) office in Iloilo. Jose then wrote out a letter of
introduction for MONINA addressed to Atty. Tirol. Jose relayed Atty. Tirols message to MONINA through Mr. Atienza, then
later, Atty. Tirol told Jose to go to Iloilo with a check for P15,000.00. Jose complied, and at Atty. Tirols office, Jose saw
MONINA, Atty. Tirol and his secretary reading some documents. MONINA then expressed her willingness to sign the
document, sans revisions. Jose alleged that he drew the P15,000.00 from his personal funds, subject to reimbursement from
and due to an understanding with FRANCISCO.

Dolores Argenal, a househelper at Nelly Garden from May 1944 up to May 1946, testified that she knew that Pansay was
Lourdes nanny; that Lourdes slept in her parents room; that she had not seen FRANCISCO give special treatment
to Pansay; that there was no unusual relationship between FRANCISCO and Pansay, and if there was any, Dolores would have
easily detected it since she slept in the same room as Pansay. Dolores further declared that whenever FRANCISCOs wife was
out of town, Pansay would bring Lourdes downstairs at nighttime, and that Pansay would not sleep in the room where
FRANCISCO slept. Finally, Dolores declared that Pansay stopped working for FRANCISCO and his wife in October, 1944.

The reception of evidence having been concluded, the parties filed their respective memoranda.

It need be recalled that Judge Catalino Castaeda, Jr. presided over trial up to 21 October 1986, thereby hearing only the
testimonies of MONINAs witnesses and about half of MONINAs testimony on direct examination. Judge Norberto E. Devera,
Jr. heard the rest of MONINA's testimony and those of FRANCISCOs witnesses.

In its decision of 12 November 1990[12] the trial court, through Judge Devera, dismissed the complaint with costs against
MONINA. In the opening paragraph thereof, it observed:

This is a complaint for recognition of an illegitimate child instituted by plaintiff Monina Jison against defendant Francisco
Jison. This complaint was filed on March 13, 1985 at the time when plaintiff, reckoned from her death of birth, was already
thirty-nine years old. Noteworthy also is the fact that it was instituted twenty years after the death of plaintiffs mother,
Esperanza Amolar. For the years between plaintiffs birth and Esperanzas death, no action of any kind was instituted against
defendant either by plaintiff, her mother Esperanza or the latters parents. Neither had plaintiff brought such an action
against defendant immediately upon her mothers death on April 20, 1965, considering that she was then already nineteen years
old or, within a reasonable time thereafter. Twenty years more had to supervene before this complaint was eventually
instituted.

The trial court then proceeded to discuss the four issues stipulated at pre-trial, without, however, summarizing the
testimonies of the witnesses nor referring to the testimonies of the witnesses other than those mentioned in the discussion of
the issues.

The trial court resolved the first issue in the negative, holding that it was improbable for witness Lope Amolar to have
noticed that Pansay was pregnant upon seeing her at the Elena Apartments in November 1945, since Pansay was then only in her
first month of pregnancy; that there was no positive assertion that copulation did indeed take place between Francisco and
Esperanza; and that MONINAs attempt to show opportunity on the part of FRANCISCO failed to consider that there was also
the opportunity for copulation between Esperanza and one of the several domestic helpers admittedly also residing at Nellys
Garden at that time. The RTC also ruled that the probative value of the birth and baptismal certificates of MONINA paled in
light of jurisprudence, especially when the misspellings therein were considered.

The trial court likewise resolved the second issue in the negative, finding that MONINAs evidence thereon may either be
one of three categories, namely: hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving evidence." To the first category
belonged the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and Alfredo Baylosis, whose knowledge of MONINAs filiation was based, as to the
former, on utterances of defendants wife Lilia and Esperanza allegedly during the heat of their quarrel, while as to the latter,
Alfredo's conclusion was based from the rumors going [around] that plaintiff is defendants daughter, from his personal
observation of plaintiffs facial appearance which he compared with that of defendants and from the way the two (plaintiff and
defendant) acted and treated each other on one occasion that he had then opportunity to closely observe them together. To
the second category belonged that of Dominador Savariz, as:

At each precise time that Esperanza allegedly visited Nellys Garden and allegedly on those occasions when defendants wife, Lilia
was in Manila, this witness was there and allegedly heard pieces of conversation between defendant and Esperanza related to
the paternity of the latters child. xxx

The RTC then placed MONINAs testimony regarding the acts of recognition accorded her by FRANCISCOs relatives
under the third category, since the latter were never presented as witnesses, for which reason the trial court excluded the
letters from FRANCISCOs relatives (Exhs. S to V).

As to the third issue, the trial court held that MONINA was not barred by prescription for it was of the perception that
the benefits of Article 268 accorded to legitimate children may be availed of or extended to illegitimate children in the same
manner as the Family Code has so provided; or by laches, which is [a] creation of equity applied only to bring equitable results,
and addressed to the sound discretion of the court [and] the circumstances [here] would show that whether plaintiff filed this
case immediately upon the death of her mother Esperanza in 1965 or twenty years thereafter in 1985, xxx there seems to be
no inequitable result to defendant as related to the situation of plaintiff.

The RTC ruled, however, that MONINA was barred by estoppel by deed because of the affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2) which she
signed when she was already twenty-five years, a professional and under the able guidance of counsel.

Finally, the RTC denied FRANCISCOs claim for damages, finding that MONINA did not file the complaint with malice, she
having been propelled by an honest belief, founded on probable cause.

MONINA seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 32860) and sought reversal of the trial courts
decision on the grounds that:

THE TRIAL COURT WAS ERRONEOUSLY PREDISPOSED TO ADJUDGE THIS CASE AGAINST APPELLANT
DUE TO ITS MISPERCEPTION THAT APPELLANTS DELAY IN FILING HER COMPLAINT WAS FATAL TO HER
CASE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE TESTIMONIES OF APPELLANTS WITNESSES AS
TAILOR-MADE, INADEQUATE AND INCREDIBLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REJECTION OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CERTIFIED COPIES OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY APPELLANT AS PART OF HER EVIDENCE.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REQUIREMENT THAT A WITNESS TO THE ACTUAL ACT OF
COPULATION BETWEEN THE APPELLEE AND APPELLANTS MOTHER SHOULD HAVE POSITIVELY
TESTIFIED TO SAID EFFECT.

V
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE DULY IDENTIFIED NOTES AND
LETTER OF THE RELATIVES OF THE APPELLEE AS HEARSAY.

VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANTS AFFIDAVIT (EXH. P) SERVED AS A BAR
AGAINST HER CLAIM FOR RECOGNITION INSTEAD OF REINFORCING SAID CLAIM.[13]

Expectedly, FRANCISCO refuted these alleged errors in his Appellees Brief.[14]

In its decision of 27 April 1995,[15] the Court of Appeals initially declared that as no vested or acquired rights were
affected, the instant case was governed by Article 175, in relation to Articles 172 and 173, of the Family Code. [16] While the
Court of Appeals rejected the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle, Iloilo (Exhs. E and F) as FRANCISCO
did not sign them, said court focused its discussion on the other means by which illegitimate filiation could be proved, i.e., the
open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or, by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, such as the baptismal certificate of the child, a judicial admission, a family bible wherein the name of the child is
entered, common reputation respecting pedigree, admission by silence, testimonies of witnesses xxx. [17] To the Court of
Appeals, the bottom line issue was whether or not MONINA established her filiation as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter by
preponderance of evidence, as to which issue said court found:

[N]ot just preponderant but overwhelming evidence on record to prove that [MONINA] is the illegitimate daughter of
[FRANCISCO] and that she had continuously enjoyed such status by direct acts of [FRANCISCO] and/or his relatives.

In so ruling, the Court of Appeals observed that the testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz
were already sufficient to establish MONINAs filiation:

As adverted to earlier, the trial court discredited Lope Amolars testimony by saying that Lope could not have detected
Esperanzas pregnant state in November, 1945 since at that point in time [sic] she was still in the initial stage of
pregnancy. Apparently, the trial court paid more emphasis on the date mentioned by Lope Amolar than on the tenor and import
of his testimony. As xxx Lope xxx was asked about an incident that transpired more than 41 years back, [u]nder the
circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that Lope could still be dead right on the specific month in 1945 that [he] met and
confronted his sister. At any rate, what is important is not the month that they met but the essence of his testimony that his
sister pointed to their employer [FRANCISCO] as the one responsible for her pregnancy, and that upon being confronted,
[FRANCISCO] assured him of support for Esperanza and their child. It would appear then that in an attempt to find fault with
Lopes testimony, the trial court has fallen oblivious to the fact that even [FRANCISCO], in his deposition, did not deny that he
was confronted by Lope about what he had done to Esperanza, during which he unequivocally acknowledged paternity by assuring
Lope of support for both Esperanza and their child.

The Court of Appelas further noted that Casabuena and Savariz testified on something that they personally observed or
witnessed, which matters FRANCISCO did not deny or refute. Finally, said court aptly held:

Taking into account all the foregoing uncontroverted testimonies xxx let alone such circumstantial evidence as [MONINAs]
Birth Certificates xxx and Baptismal Certificates which invariably bear the name of [FRANCISCO] as her father, We cannot go
along with the trial courts theory that [MONINAs] illegitimate filiation has not been satisfactorily established.

xxx

Significantly, [MONINAs] testimony finds ample corroboration from [FRANCISCOs] former employees, Arsenio Duatin, Rudy
Tingson and Alfredo Baylosis. xxx

xxx

Carefully evaluating appellants evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-
vis [FRANCISCOs] controversion thereof, We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnesses xxx all bearing on [FRANCISCOs] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing that he had continuously acknowledged
[MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his
deposition, only casually dismissed [MONINAs] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with respect to those given by
[MONINAs] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired [them] from their employment. Needless to state,
[FRANCISCOs] vague denial is grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINAs] testimonial evidence.

Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does not hold sway in the face of
[MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact,
she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his
spouse xxx. Further, the testimony of Jose Cruz concerning the events that led to the execution of the affidavit xxx could not
have been true, for as pointed out by [MONINA], she signed the affidavit xxx almost five months after she had resigned from
the Miller, Cruz & Co. xxx

At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO]
or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit
at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx

In fine, We hold that [MONINAs] filiation as [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter has been conclusively established by the
uncontroverted testimonies of Lope Amolar, Adela Casabuena and Dominador Savariz to the effect that appellee himself had
admitted his paternity of the appellee, and also by the testimonies of appellant, Arsenio Duatin, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson and
Alfredo Baylosis unerringly demonstrating that by his own conduct or overt acts like sending appellant to school, paying for her
tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado Corazon de Jesus, defraying appellants
hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of appellants mother,
acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give
appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his
house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila
and also at his Forbes residence, allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to
AA-5, W & W-5), appellee had continuously recognized appellant as his illegitimate daughter. Added to these are the acts of
[FRANCISCOs] relatives acknowledging or treating [MONINA] as [FRANCISCOs] daughter (Exh U) or as their relative (Exhs T
& V). On this point, witness Zafiro Ledesma, former Mayor of Iloilo City, whose spouse belongs to the Lopez clan just like
[FRANCISCO], testified that [MONINA] has been considered by the Lopezes as a relative. He identified pictures of the
appellee in the company of the Lopezes (Exhs X-16 & X-17). Another witness, Danthea H. Lopez, whose husband Eusebio Lopez is
appellees first cousin, testified that appellant was introduced to her by appellees cousin, Remedios Lopez Franco, as the
daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, for which reason, she took her in as [a] secretary in the Merchants Financing Corporation
of which she was the manager, and further allowed her to stay with her family free of board and lodging. Still on this aspect,
Dominador Savariz declared that sometime in February, 1966 appellees relative, Ms. Remedios Lopez Franco pointed to appellant
as the daughter of appellee Francisco Jison.

Finally, the Certifications of the Local Civil Registrar of Dingle (Exhs E and F) as well as [MONINAs] Baptismal Certificates
(Exhs C & D) which the trial ocurt admitted in evidence as part of [MONINAs] testimony, may serve as circumstantial evidence
to further reinforce [MONINAs] claim that she is [FRANCISCOs] illegitimate daughter by Esperanza Amolar.

True it is that a trial judges assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect on appeal. But the rule admits
of certain exceptions. One such exception is where the judge who rendered the judgment was not the one who heard the
witnesses testify. [citations omitted] The other is where the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case. [citations
omitted] In the present case, both exceptions obtain. All of [MONINAs] witnesses xxx whose testimonies were not given
credence did not testify before the judge who rendered the disputed judgment. xxx

The Court of Appeals then decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is hereby entered for
appellant Monina Jison, declaring her as the illegitimate daughter of appellee Francisco Jison, and entitled to all rights and
privileges granted by law.

Costs against appellee.

SO ORDERED.
 His motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 29 March
1996,[18] FRANCISCO filed the instant petition. He urges us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, alleging that said
court committed errors of law:

I.

IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS THE
ILLEGITIMATE CHILD OF PETITIONER, CONSIDERING [THE] IMPOSSIBILITY OF SEXUAL CONTACT
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S MOTHER AT THE TIME CONCEPTION
WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE OCCURRED.

II.

IN REVERSING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF PATERNITY AND FILIATION IS NOT CLEAR AND CONVINCING.

III.

IN GIVING CREDENCE TO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AS

EVIDENCE OF FILIATION CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME ARE HEARSAY, SELF-SERVING AND CANNOT
BIND THE PETITIONER UNDER THE BASIC RULES OF EVIDENCE.

IV.

IN INTERPRETING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SWORN STATEMENT (EXH. P/EXH. 2) IN A MANNER

NOT IN CONSONANCE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

V.

IN NOT CONSIDERING THE LONG AND UNEXPLAINED DELAY IN THE FILING OF THE PRESENT
PATERNITY SUIT AS EQUIVALENT TO LACHES.

As regards the first error, FRANCISCO insists that taking into account the second paragraph of MONINAs complaint
wherein she claimed that he and Pansay had sexual relations by about the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, it was physically
impossible for him and Pansay to have had sexual contact which resulted in MONINAs birth, considering that:

The normal period of human pregnancy is nine (9) months. If as claimed by private respondent in her complaint that her mother
was impregnated by FRANCISCO at the end of 1945 or the start of 1946, she would have been born sometime in late
September or early October and not August 6, 1946 xxx. The instant case finds factual and legal parallels in Constantino vs.
Mendez,[19] thus: xxx

FRANCISCO further claims that his testimony that Pansay was no longer employed by him at the time in question was
unrebutted, moreover, other men had access to Pansay during the time of or even after her employment by him.

As to the second error, FRANCISCO submits that MONINAs testimonial evidence is shaky, contradictory and unreliable,
and proceeds to attack the credibility of her witnesses by claiming, in the main, that: (a) Lope Amolar could not have
detected Pansays pregnancy in November 1945 when they met since she would have been only one (1) month pregnant then; (b)
Dominador Savariz did not in fact witness the meeting between FRANCISCO, Pansay and MONINA; (c) Zafiro Ledesma had an
ulterior motive in testifying for MONINA as he owned a bank in Iloilo which was then under Central Bank supervision and
MONINA was the Bank Examiner assigned to Iloilo; and (d) Danthea Lopez was not related to him by blood and whatever
favorable treatment MONINA received from Danthea was due to the formers employment at Merchants Financing Company and
additional services rendered at Kahirup Hotel; besides, Danthea admitted that she had no personal knowledge as to the issue of
paternity and filiation of the contending parties, hence Sections 39 and 40 [20] of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court did not come
into play. FRANCISCO likewise re-echoes the view of the trial court as regards the testimonies of Adela Casabuena and
Alfredo Baylosis.

FRANCISCO further asserts that MONINAs testimony that he answered for her schooling was self-serving and
uncorroborated by any receipt or other documentary evidence; and assuming he did, such should be interpreted as a
manifestation of kindness shown towards the family of a former household helper.

Anent the treatment given by his relatives to MONINA as his daughter, FRANCISCO points to the fact that Pansay was
the former laundrywoman of Mrs. Franco; MONINA resided with the families of Eusebio Lopez and Concha Cuaycong because
she was in their employ at Kahirup Hotel and Our Lady of Mercy Hospital, respectively; MONINA failed to present Mrs. Franco,
Eusebio Lopez and Mrs. Cuaycong; and MONINAs employment at the accounting firm of Miller, Cruz & Co. was attributable to
her educational attainment, there being absolutely no evidence to prove that FRANCISCO ever facilitated her employment
thereat. Hence, in light of Baluyot v. Baluyot,[21] the quantum of evidence to prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence,
not merely a preponderance thereof, was not met.

With respect to the third assigned error, FRANCISCO argues that the Court of Appeals reliance on the certifications of
the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. E and F) and Baptismal Certificates (Exhs. C and D) as circumstantial evidence is
misplaced. First, their genuineness could not be ascertained as the persons who issued them did not testify. Second, in light
of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[22] the contents of the baptismal certificates were hearsay, as the data was based only on what
was told to the priest who solemnized the baptism, who likewise was not presented as a witness. Additionally, the name of the
father appearing therein was Franque Jison, which was not FRANCISCOs name. Third, in both Exhibits E and F, the names of
the childs parents were listed as Frank Heson and Esperanza Amador (not Amolar). FRANCISCO further points out that in
Exhibit F, the status of the child is listed as legitimate, while the fathers occupation as laborer. Most importantly, there was no
showing that FRANCISCO signed Exhibits E and F or that he was the one who reported the childs birth to the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar. As to MONINAs educational records, FRANCISCO invokes Baas v. Baas[23] which recognized that school
records are prepared by school authorities, not by putative parents, thus incompetent to prove paternity. And, as to the
photographs presented by MONINA, FRANCISCO cites Colorado v. Court of Appeals, [24] and further asserts that MONINA did
not present any of the persons with whom she is seen in the pictures to testify thereon; besides these persons were, at best,
mere second cousins of FRANCISCO. He likewise assails the various notes and letters written by his relatives (Exhs. S to V) as
they were not identified by the authors. Finally, he stresses that MONINA did not testify as to the telephone cards (Exhs. G
to L) nor did these reveal the circumstances surrounding the calls she made from his residence.

Anent the fourth assigned error, FRANCISCO contends that the Court of Appeals interpretation of MONINAs affidavit
of 21 September 1971 ran counter to Dequito v. Llamas,[25] and overlooked that at the time of execution, MONINA was more
than 25 years old and assisted by counsel.

As to the last assigned error, FRANCISCO bewails the Court of Appeals failure to consider the long and unexplained delay
in the filing of the case.

In her comment, MONINA forcefully refuted FRANCISCOs arguments, leading FRANCISCO to file his reply thereto.

On 20 November 1996, we gave due course to this petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda,
which they subsequently did.

A painstaking review of the evidence and arguments fails to support petitioner.

Before addressing the merits of the controversy, we first dispose of preliminary matters relating to the applicable law and
the guiding principles in paternity suits. As to the former, plainly, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209)
governs the present controversy. As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, Uyguangco[26] served as a judicial confirmation of
Article 256 of the Family Code[27] regarding its retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights, which does not
hold true here, it appearing that neither the putative parent nor the child has passed away and the former having actually
resisted the latters claim below.

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which
legitimate filiation is established, thus:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 This Article reproduces, with amendments, Articles 265, 266 and 267 of the Civil Code.

For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon
given that she has none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a high standard of proof [28] is required. Specifically,
to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of
the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only
the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life,
not accidentally, but continuously.[29]

By continuous is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of time.[30]

The foregoing standard of proof required to establish ones filiation is founded on the principle that an order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so
that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.[31]

The foregoing discussion, however, must be situated within the general rules on evidence, in light of the burden of proof in
civil cases, i.e., preponderance of evidence, and the shifting of the burden of evidence in such cases. Simply put, he who alleges
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffs prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor
of plaintiff.Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon,
with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The concept of
preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is offered in
opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.[32]

With these in mind, we now proceed to resolve the merits of the instant controversy.

FRANCISCOs arguments in support of his first assigned error deserve scant consideration. While it has been observed
that unlawful intercourse will not be presumed merely from proof of an opportunity for such indulgence, [33] this does not favor
FRANCISCO. Akin to the crime of rape where, in most instances, the only witnesses to the felony are the participants in the
sexual act themselves, in deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably redounds
to the victims or mothers word, as against the accuseds or putative fathers protestations. In the instant case, MONINAs
mother could no longer testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had, unfortunately, passed away long before the institution
of the complaint for recognition. But this did not mean that MONINA could no longer prove her filiation. The fact of her birth
and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother. The paramount question then is
whether MONINAs evidence is coherent, logical and natural.[34]

The complaint stated that FRANCISCO had carnal knowledge of Pansay by about the end of 1945. We agree with
MONINA that this was broad enough to cover the fourth quarter of said year, hence her birth on 6 August 1946 could still be
attributed to sexual relations between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother. In any event, since it was established that her
mother was still in the employ of FRANCISCO at the time MONINA was conceived as determined by the date of her birth,
sexual contact between FRANCISCO and MONINAs mother was not at all impossible, especially in light of the overwhelming
evidence, as hereafter shown, that FRANCISCO fathered MONINA, has recognized her as his daughter and that MONINA has
been enjoying the open and continuous possession of the status as FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter.

We readily conclude that the testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and
events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her
witnesses, overwhelmingly established the following facts:

1) FRANCISCO is MONINAs father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was in the employ of the former;

2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct which the Court of Appeals took pains
to enumerate, thus:

[L]ike sending appellant to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging at the Colegio
del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying appellants hospitalization expenses, providing her with [a] monthly allowance, paying
for the funeral expenses of appellants mother, acknowledging appellants paternal greetings and calling appellant his
Hija or child, instructing his office personnel to give appellants monthly allowance, recommending appellant for
employment at the Miller, Cruz & Co., allowing appellant to use his house in Bacolod and paying for her long distance
 telephone calls, having appellant spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also at his Forbes residence,
allowing appellant to use his surname in her scholastic and other records (Exhs Z, AA, AA-1 to AA-5, W & W-5)

3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years publicly, [35] spontaneously,
continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.[36]

Accordingly, in light of the totality of the evidence on record, the second assigned error must fail.

There is some merit, however, in the third assigned error against the probative value of some of MONINAs documentary
evidence.

MONINAs reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth (Exhs. E and F) is clearly
misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence as
to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificates,
and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a
third person.[37] Simply put, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information
himself, the inscription of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar
without the signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latters part. [38] In like manner,
FRANCISCOs lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates (Exhs. C and D) and school records (Exhs. Z
and AA) renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the
administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.[39] However, despite the inadmissibility of the school
records per se to prove paternity, they may be admitted as part of MONINAs testimony to corroborate her claim that
FRANCISCO spent for her education.

We likewise disagree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the certificates issued by the Local Civil Registrar and
the baptismal certificates may be taken as circumstantial evidence to prove MONINAs filiation. Since they are per
se inadmissible in evidence as proof of such filiation, they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the
same.

As to Exhibits S, T, U and V, the various notes and letters written by FRANCISCOs relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio
Jison, Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively, allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due execution and
authenticity are not in issue,[40] as MONINA witnessed the authors signing the documents, nevertheless, under Rule 130,
Section 39, the contents of these documents may not be admitted, there being no showing that the declarants-authors were
dead or unable to testify, neither was the relationship between the declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than the
documents in question.[41] As to the admissibility of these documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this requires further
elaboration.

Rule 130, Section 40, provides:

Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the
controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or
charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. (underscoring supplied)

It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2) parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause
which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the documents in question may not be admitted as the authors thereof did
not take the witness stand; and the section containing the second underscored phrase. What must then be ascertained is
whether Exhibits S to V, as private documents, fall within the scope of the clause and the like as qualified by the preceding
phrase [e]ntries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rights [and] family portraits.

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule
of ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly known as family possessions, or those articles which represent, in
effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as to the pedigree of a person.[42] These have been described as objects openly
exhibited and well known to the family,[43] or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded as giving a family
tradition.[44] Other examples of these objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree are inscriptions on tombstones,[45] monuments or coffin plates.[46]
 Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may not be
admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40. Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 41
regarding common reputation,[47] it having been observed that:

[T]he weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the
family, and not the common reputation in community, that is a material element of evidence going to establish pedigree. xxx
[Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the neighborhood or vicinity,
except where the pedigree in question is marriage which may be proved by common reputation in the community. [48]

Their inadmissibility notwithstanding, Exhibits S to V, inclusive, may, in like manner as MONINA's school records, properly
be admitted as part of her testimony to strengthen her claim that, indeed, relatives of FRANCISCO recognized her as his
daughter.

We now direct our attention to MONINAs 21 September 1971 affidavit (Exh. P/Exh. 2), subject of the fourth assigned
error, where she attests that FRANCISCO is not her father. MONINA contends that she signed it under duress, i.e., she was
jobless, had no savings and needed the money to support herself and finish her studies. Moreover, she signed Exhibit P upon the
advice of Atty. Divinagracia that filiation could not be waived and that FRANCISCOs ploy would boomerang upon him. On the
other hand, FRANCISCO asserts that full credence should be afforded Exhibit P as MONINA was already 25 years old at the
time of its execution and was advised by counsel; further, being a notarized document, its genuineness and due execution could
not be questioned. He relies on the testimony of Jose Cruz, a partner at the accounting firm of Miller & Cruz, who declared that
he intervened in the matter as MONINA was spreading rumors about her filiation within the firm, which might have had
deleterious effects upon the relationship between the firm and FRANCISCO.

On this issue, we find for MONINA and agree with the following observations of the Court of Appeals:

Even the affidavit (Exh 2) which [FRANCISCO] had foisted on the trial court xxx does not hold sway in the face of
[MONINAs] logical explanation that she at first did agree to sign the affidavit which contained untruthful statements. In fact,
she promptly complained to [FRANCISCO] who, however explained to her that the affidavit was only for the consumption of his
spouse xxx.

At any rate, if [MONINA] were not his illegitimate daughter, it would have been uncalled for, if not absurd, for [FRANCISCO]
or his lawyer to have secured [MONINAs] sworn statement xxx On the contrary, in asking [MONINA] to sign the said affidavit
at the cost of P15,000, [FRANCISCO] clearly betrayed his intention to conceal or suppress his paternity of [MONINA]. xxx

Indeed, if MONINA were truly not FRANCISCOs illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for him to have
gone to such great lengths in order that MONINA denounce her filiation. For as clearly established before the trial court and
properly appreciated by the Court of Appeals, MONINA had resigned from Miller & Cruz five (5) months prior to the execution
of the sworn statement in question, hence negating FRANCISCOs theory of the need to quash rumors circulating within Miller &
Cruz regarding the identity of MONINAs father. Hence, coupled with the assessment of the credibility of the testimonial
evidence of the parties discussed above, it is evident that the standard to contradict a notarial document, i.e., clear and
convincing evidence and more than merely preponderant,[49] has been met by MONINA.

Plainly then, the burden of evidence fully shifted to FRANCISCO.

Two (2) glaring points in FRANCISCOs defense beg to be addressed: First, that his testimony was comprised of mere
denials, rife with bare, unsubstantiated responses such as That is not true, I do not believe that, or None that I know. In
declining then to lend credence to FRANCISCOs testimony, we resort to a guiding principle in adjudging the credibility of a
witness and the truthfulness of his statements, laid down as early as 1921:

The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive
faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details,
he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his
demeanor the falsity of his message.

For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately related to the principal
fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers
not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expressions as I dont know or I dont remember. xxx [50]
 Second, the reasons for the dismissals of Tingson, Baylosis and Savariz were unspecified or likewise unsubstantiated,
hence FRANCISCOs attempt to prove ill-motive on their part to falsely testify in MONINAs favor may not succeed. As may be
gleaned, the only detail which FRANCISCO could furnish as to the circumstances surrounding the dismissals of his former
employees was that Baylosis allegedly took advantage of his position while FRANCISCO was in the United States. But aside
from this bare claim, FRANCISCOs account is barren, hence unable to provide the basis for a finding of bias against
FRANCISCO on the part of his former employees.

As to FRANCISCOs other witnesses, nothing substantial could be obtained either. Nonito Jalandoni avowed that he only
came to know of MONINA in June 1988;[51] that during his employment at Nelly Garden from 1963 up to 1974, he did not recall
ever having seen MONINA there, neither did he know of any instructions from FRANCISCO nor Mr. Lagarto (FRANCISCOs
office manager before passing away) regarding the disbursement of MONINAs allowance. [52] Teodoro Zulla corroborated
Jalandonis testimony regarding not having seen MONINA at Nelly Garden and MONINAs allowance; declared that Alfredo
Baylosis was dismissed due to discrepancies discovered after an audit, without any further elaboration, however; but admitted
that he never prepared the vouchers pertaining to FRANCISCOs personal expenses, merely those intended for one of
FRANCISCOs haciendas.[53] Then, Iigo Superticioso confirmed that according to the report of a certain Mr. Atienza, Baylosis
was dismissed by Mr. Jison for irregularities, while Superticioso was informed by FRANCISCO that Tingson was dismissed for
loss of confidence. Superticioso likewise denied that MONINA received money from FRANCISCOs office, neither was there a
standing order from FRANCISCO to release funds to her.[54]

It is at once obvious that the testimonies of these witnesses for FRANCISCO are likewise insufficient to overcome
MONINAs evidence. The former merely consist of denials as regards the latters having gone to Nelly Garden or having received
her allowance from FRANCISCOs office, which, being in the form of negative testimony, necessarily stand infirm as against
positive testimony;[55] bare assertions as regards the dismissal of Baylosis; ignorance of FRANCISCOs personal expenses
incapable of evincing that FRANCISCO did not provide MONINA with an allowance; or hearsay evidence as regards the cause
for the dismissals of Baylosis and Tingson. But what then serves as the coup de grce is that despite Superticiosos claim that he
did not know MONINA,[56] when confronted with Exhibit H, a telephone toll ticket indicating that on 18 May 1971, MONINA
called a certain Eing at FRANCISCOs office, Superticioso admitted that his nickname was Iing and that there was no other
person named Iing in FRANCISCOs office.[57]

All told, MONINAs evidence hurdled the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones
illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws; moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

The last assigned error concerning laches likewise fails to convince. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on
the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendants conduct as
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complaint would assert the right in which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.[58] The last element is the origin of the doctrine that stale demands
apply only where by reason of the lapse of time it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.[59]

As FRANCISCO set up laches as an affirmative defense, it was incumbent upon him to prove the existence of its
elements. However, he only succeeded in showing MONINAs delay in asserting her claim, but miserably failed to prove the last
element. In any event, it must be stressed that laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of
society, the discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and since it
is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud and injustice.[60] Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, MONINA filed her
action well within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of laches would
clearly be inequitable and unjust.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court
of Appeals of 27 April 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 32860 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
 [G.R. No. 136303. July 18, 2000]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTHONY MELCHOR PALMONES, ANTHONY BALTAZAR
PALMONES, accused-appellants.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is an appeal by accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones from the decision [1] of
Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan, Cotabato, 12th Judicial Region, convicting them of the crime of murder [2]

The information[3]dated June 4, 1997 charging accused-appellants of the crime of murder reads as follows:

That in the evening of April 27, 1997 at Barangay Magsaysay, Municipality of Kidapawan, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a gun, did then and there, willfully, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, unlawfully, feloniously and with treachery, attack, assault, and shot the person of SPO2 ASIM
MAMANSAL, thereby hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body which is the cause of
the death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Both accused were arraigned on July 15, 1997 and both pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. Thereafter, trial on
the merits commenced.

The prosecution first presented Sonny Boy Redovan, a 28 year-old farmer who was the nephew of the victim. He testified
that at around 10:00 in the evening of April 27, 1997, his mother and elder brother informed him that something had happened
to his uncle SP02 Asim Mamansal. They then rushed to the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital and proceeded to the emergency
room. Upon seeing his uncle, the witness went near him and asked him what had happened to him. His uncle answered that he had
been waylaid. The witness then asked the victim who the perpetrators were and the victim answered that it was Juany and Tony
Palmones which were the nicknames of the two accused-appellants.[4] He claimed that while he was talking with his uncle, there
were attendants, nurses, and other bystanders whom he did not know present inside the emergency room. A few minutes after
he talked with the victim, a certain Dr. Aguayo arrived and examined the wounds of his uncle. About and hour later, he saw
Police Inspector Alexander Tagum arrive and he heard him ask his uncle who had shot him. The witness then heard his uncle
positively answer the policeman that his assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones.[5]

On cross-examination, he testified that he was able to talk with his uncle for about one hour and that the most important
part of their conversation was the identification of his uncles assailants.[6] He stated that it did not occur to his mind to
immediately report to the police what his uncle had told him as his mind was troubled at that time. It was only after the burial
of his uncle on April 28, 1997 that he told Insp. Tagum that it was Tony and Juany Palmores who had shot his uncle.[7]

The prosecution next presented Dr. Hazel Mark Aguayo who testified that he was the surgeon-on-duty on the day that
SP02 Mamansal was shot. He stated that before he operated on the victim, he interviewed Mamansal and one of the questions
he asked is whether the victim had known who had shot him. He claimed that Mamansal told him that he did not know who had
shot him.[8] He did not pursue this line of questioning further as he was told by a companion of the victim that the area where
the victim was shot was dark.[9] He testified that he operated on the victim at around 12:00 in the evening. He operated for
around four (4) hours but the victim developed cardio respiratory arrest at around 8:30 the following morning and thereafter,
the victim died in the ward.[10]

On cross-examination, he stated that it was Sonny Boy Redovan who was with SP02 Mamansal at the time that he was
interviewing the victim and that it was Redovan who told him that the assailant could not be identified because the area where
the shooting happened was dark.[11] He likewise claimed that before he arrived at the hospital, a certain Dr. Caridad Jalipa was
already attending to the victim and that she told him that the victim remained silent when she asked him about the person who
shot him.[12]

The third witness for the prosecution was Police Inspector Alexander Camilon-Tagum. He testified that on the night of
April 27, 1997, he was at the Kidapawan, Cotabato Police Outpost. After receiving a radio report, he proceeded to Brgy.
Magsaysay, Kidapawan where he discovered that one of his men, SP02 Mamansal, was shot.[13] After conducting an initial
investigation of the crime scene, he sent his men towards different directions to look for suspects. He then proceeded to the
hospital together with another witness, Alice Villamor. On the way to the hospital, Alice Villamor pointed to a passing
motorcycle and told him that it was the motorcycle the assailants were riding. He chased the motorcycle but he was not able to
catch up with them as his car ran out of gas.[14] He was able to borrow a motorcycle and he proceeded to chase the other
motorcycle again. While riding on the borrowed motorcycle, a certain PO3 Aniceta called him on the radio and told him that the
assailants were Juany and Tony Palmones.[15] He and his men proceeded to the residence of the suspects where the brother of
the accused-appellants, Triny Palmones, met them. He asked Triny Palmones where his brothers were and the latter responded
that he didnt know. He then asked Triny Palmones whether his brothers owned a motorcycle and the latter admitted that they
owned a Kawasaki motorcycle which matched the description of the motorcycle he had been chasing. [16] He then told his men to
continue pursuing the assailants and after exhausting all efforts, he proceeded to the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital. He
confronted the victim in the emergency room and asked him about his assailants. The victim answered that it was Juany and
Tony Palmones.[17] At that time, he claimed that Dr. Aguayo and two other medical ladies were inside the room.

On cross-examination, he testified that he was able to speak with Alice Villamor about the incident but that she told him
that she was not able to identify the assailant even though she was right beside the victim because of darkness.[18] He admitted
that when he went to the hospital, he was already entertaining the idea that the suspects were Juany and Tony Palmones
because of the radio call he received earlier.He likewise admitted that the only question which he asked the victim was who shot
you? and that he was not able to reduce his findings to writing.[19]

The next witness for the prosecution was Mila Arimao Mamansal, the wife of the victim, who testified mainly on the
expenses she incurred because of the death of her husband. She also stated that she was able to talk with witness Sonny Boy
Redovan at the hospital but the latter did not tell her anything about the alleged assailants of her husband. It was only on April
29, 1997 that she heard Redovan tell the Chief of Police of Kidapawan that Juany and Tony Palmones were the ones who had
shot her husband.[20]

The prosecution next presented Asmyra Mamansal, the daughter of the victim. She testified that on the night of the
incident, she was at her aunts house where she was informed about the shooting of her father. She immediately proceeded to
the hospital where she saw her father lying on a bed calling her name. Her father then told her to take down the name Alice
Villamor whom she knew as the name of her fathers mistress.[21] She was able to talk with her father for about thirty minutes.

On cross-examination, she testified that in the course of her conversation with her father, her father did not tell her the
reason why he mentioned the name of Alice Villamor nor did he tell her about the persons who had shot him. [22]

The other two witnesses of the prosecution identified the death certificate [23] of SPO2 Mamansal and the extract of the
police blotter[24] where the shooting incident was recorded.

For their part, accused-appellants presented ten (10) witnesses to support their case.

The first witness, Alex Siago, a barangay kagawad, testified that he was one of the first persons to go to the victim after
the latter was shot.[25] He stated that a certain Patricio Fuertes and Samuel Angelio then brought the victim to the Kidapawan
Doctors Hospital. Thereafter, another kagawad, a certain Gregorio Lonzaga called up the police to report the incident.[26] A few
minutes later, Inspector Tagum arrived and proceeded to make an investigation of the incident. He also claimed that he was the
one who lent Insp. Tagum his motorcycle when the latter gave chase to another motorcycle bearing two
passengers.[27]Considering that he was only five (5) meters away from the motorcycle when it passed by, he was able to see the
faces of the passengers and he was certain that they were not the two accused-appellants.[28]

The next witness, Patricio Fuertes, testified that he was person who brought the victim to the hospital. [29] At the hospital,
he saw three policemen, whom he did not recognize, talking with the victim. He was about a meter away from the bed of the
victim when he heard a policeman, ask Mamansal whether he had recognized who had shot him. He then heard the victim reply
that he did not recognize his assailants.[30]He likewise told the court that while he was bringing the victim to the hospital, he
was not able to talk with Mamansal and neither did the victim identify his assailants.[31]

The next witness for the defense was Alicia Villamor, the alleged girlfriend of the victim and his companion at the time he
was shot. She testified that in the evening of April 27, 1997, she was in her store together with the victim. At around 10:00
p.m., she closed shop and went home together with Mamansal and her two helpers.[32] While they were already near her house in
Magsaysay, someone suddenly shot Mamansal. She was just at the side of Mamansal when the shooting happened but she claimed
that she was not able to identify the assailants as it was dark.[33] Patricio Fuertes then brought the victim to the hospital but
she did not accompany him as her clothes were stained with blood. After changing her clothes, a group of policemen arrived at
the crime scene. After conferring with the policemen, she then rode with Insp. Tagum in going to the hospital.[34] On the way,
Insp. Tagum tried to halt a passing motorcycle. When the passengers of the motorcycle kept on going, Insp. Tagum fired
warning shots and gave chase but the car they were riding in ran out of gas. He then saw Alex Siago provide Tagum with a
motorcycle and again the latter gave chase.[35] She claimed that she was not able to see the persons riding the motorcycle as it
was moving quite fast. When she finally arrived at the hospital, she saw that Insp. Tagum was already there. She was then able
to talk with the victim who told her that he did not see the person who had shot him.[36]

The next witness, Rommel Arambala, a 27 year old neighbor of Alive Villamor, corroborated the testimonies the three
previous witnesses.

The defense also called the two accused-appellants to support their defense of alibi.

Accused-appellant Anthony Melchor Palmones testified that at the time of the incident, he was in his house in Kisulan,
Sultan Kudarat, having a drinking session with friends. He estimated that Kisulan, Sultan Kudarat was at least two hours away
from the scene of the crime.[37] Their group started drinking at around 8:00 in the evening and they only finished drinking at
around 11:00 p.m. By 11:30, their group had already dispersed.[38] He admitted knowing the victim as a policeman in Kidapawan
but he denied having a quarrel or a grudge against him.[39]

The testimony of accused-appellant Anthony Melchor Palmones was corroborated by witnesses SPO1 Ramil Bahian and
Jolito Silva.

For his part, accused-appellant Anthony Baltazar Palmones claimed that at the time of the shooting of Mamansal, he was at
his house in Datu Piang St., Kidapawan, Cotabato, having a drink with a few friends.He stated that on the day of the incident, at
around 5:00 p.m. of April 27, 1997, he was resting inside his home as he had just come from work. While in his house, Rodolfo
Barrientos arrived to borrow some money from him.[40] After giving him the money, the accused asked Rodolfo Barrientos to
stay for dinner and to have some drinks. While they were drinking tuba, Jerry Barrientos arrived and joined them. They only
stopped drinking at around 11:00 p.m.[41] The accused likewise testified that he only knew the victims surname and that he did
not have any quarrel with or grudge against the victim in the past.[42]

On cross-examination, he denied that he drove a motorcycle to work. He admitted however, that during the drinking spree,
he went out of his house to buy tuba from a nearby store.[43] On re-direct, he stated that the store was only 10 to 15 meters
away from his home and that he was only gone for 2 to 5 minutes.[44]

Accused-appellant Anthony Baltazar Palmoness testimony was corroborated by Rodolfo Barrientos and Jerry Barrientos
who both claimed that they were drinking with accused-appellant at the latters home at the time of the incident.

On May 8, 1998, the trial court rendered its questioned decision finding accused-appellants guilty of the crime of
murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, prescinding (sic) from the foregoing facts and considerations, the Court finds both accused Anthony Melchor
Palmones and Anthony Baltazar Palmones guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of Murder, hereby sentenced
(sic) both accused each to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Asim Mamansal, the sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

Accused-appellants filed a Motion for Reconsideration[45] of this decision but the trial court, in an Order dated 26
October 1998[46], denied the same for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal where accused-appellants raise the following assignment
of errors:

I.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THEIR
DEFENSE.

III.

THE FACTS, AS ESTABLISHED BY ALL THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DO NOT SUPPORT THE LOWER COURTS
FINDING OF GUILT.
 IV.

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A PALPABLE ERROR AND HAD DEMONSTRATED CLEAR BIAS AND PREJUDICE IN
FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION AND AGAINST THE ACCUSED.

V.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF SONNY BOY
REDOVAN AND INSPECTOR ALEXANDER TAGUM.

VI.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VICTIM, ASIM MAMANSAL WAS ABLE TO IDENTIFY HIS
ASSAILANTS BEFORE HE DIED.

VII.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE ALLEGED DYING DECLARATION OF ASIM MAMANSAL AS AN
EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE.

VIII.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE ALLEGED DYING DECLARATION OF ASIM MAMANSAL AS PART
OF THE RES GESTAE RULE.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Brief [47] where it recommended
that the accused-appellants be acquitted of the crime charged against them. In this Manifestation, the OSG reasoned that the
identity of the assailants was not sufficiently established by the evidence of the prosecution and that the trial court erred in
admitting the alleged dying declaration of the victim as an exception to the hearsay rule.

From the records of the case, the conviction of the two accused-appellants was based largely on the alleged dying
declaration of the victim made to two witnesses of the prosecution and the apparent weakness of their defense of alibi. It
behooves us therefore to determine the admissibility of the alleged oral dying declaration of the deceased Asim Mamanal as
testified to by prosecution witnesses Sonny Boy Redovan and Police Investigator Alexander Tagum.

As a rule, a dying declaration is hearsay, and is inadmissible as evidence.[48] This is pursuant to Rule 130, section 30 of the
Rules of Court which states:

Sec. 30. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which
he knows of his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.

There are several exceptions however to the rule of inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, the first one of which is the
admissibility of dying declarations given under the circumstances specified in Section 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 31. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under a consciousness of an impending death, may be
received in a criminal case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death

As such, the requirements for the admissibility of an ante mortem statement are: (a) it must concern the crime and the
surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of
impending death; (c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration was offered in a criminal case for
murder, murder or parricide win which the decedent was the victim.[49]

As testified to by prosecution witness Sonny Boy Redovan, the supposed dying declaration of the victim was made as
follows:

PROS. DE GUZMAN:
 Q: Did you reach the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital, Inc.?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you discover?

A: Upon arrival, I immediately proceeded to the emergency room.

Q: What did you do in the emergency room?

A: I saw my uncle there lying.

Q: Are you referring to SPO2 Asim Mamansal?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you do after that?

A: Upon seeing his condition I went near him and whispered Ano ba ang nangyari sa yo? meaning What happened to you?

Q: What was the answer, if any?

A: His answer (sic) that he was waylaid.

Q: What else did he tell you?

A: I was worried after saying those words, I asked him who are the perpetrators.

Q: What was the answer?

A: And he said Its Juany and Tony Palmones.

Q: When those words uttered to you (sic) where there other persons inside the room?

A: Attendants, nurses, ususero, I do not know the others.[50]

In a similar vein, Police Investigator Alexander Tagum likewise testified that the victim named the two accused as his
assailants prior to the victims death. Thus:

Q: What did you do at the Kidapawan Doctors Hospital?

A: I immediately went to the room wherein SPO1 Mamansal was lying.

Q: What did you do while you were inside the room where SPO1 Mamansal was lying?

A: I immediately confronted him sir and immediately asked the question: Who shot you?

Q: What was the answer?

A: SPO1 Mamansal answered sir, it is Juany and Tony Palmones.

XXX

Q: Can you remember who were your companions (sic) inside the room where SPO2 Mamansal was lying?

A: I noticed two (2) ladies medical orderly (sic) and Dr. Aguayo.[51]

In cases where an alleged dying declaration is sought to be admitted, it must be proven that that the declaration was made
under a consciousness of impending death which means simply that the declarant is fully aware that he is dying or going to die
from his wounds or injuries soon or imminently, or shall have a complete conviction that death is at hand, or there must be a
settled hopeless expectation.[52]

In the instant case, it was not established by the prosecution that the statements of the declarant concerning the cause
and surrounding circumstances of his death were made under the consciousness of impending death. No proof to this effect was
ever presented by the prosecution. It was not shown whether Sonny Boy Redovan or Inspector Alexander Tagum ever asked the
victim whether he believed that he was going to die out of his injuries or any other similar question. Sonny Boy Redovan claimed
that he was able to talk with the victim for around an hour but the only thing he revealed of their conversation was the alleged
identification of the victim of his two assailants.[53] For his part, Inspector Tagum admitted that the only question he asked of
the victim was if the victim knew who had shot him.[54]
 While it is true that the law does not require that the declarant explicitly state his perception that he has given up the
hope of life[55], the circumstances surrounding his declaration must justify the conclusion that he was conscious of his impending
death.[56] In the instant case, it was not proven that the victim was ever aware of the seriousness of his condition. As testified
to by Dr. Mark Aguayo, the vital signs of the victim, prior to his operation, were quite stable.[57] Moreover, from the time the
victim was brought to the hospital at 10:30 p.m. until his operation at 12:00 midnight, he was still able to talk intelligently with
at least four (4) other persons on various matters. The fact that his vital signs were strong and that he still had strength to
converse with these four (4) witnesses belie the conclusion that the victim was under the consciousness of death by reason of
the gravity of his wounds.

Neither may the alleged statements attributed to the victim be admissible as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to
those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during, or immediately after the commission of a crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to
deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.[58]

In order to admit statements as evidence part of the res gestae, the element of spontaneity is critical. The following
factors have generally been considered in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have
been made spontaneously: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the
statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4)
the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature
and circumstances of the statement itself.[59]

Tested against these factors to test the spontaneity of the statements attributed to the victim, we rule that these
statements fail to qualify as part of the res gestae. When Mamansal allegedly uttered the statements attributed to him, an
appreciable amount of time had already elapsed from the time that he was shot as the victim was shot at around 10:00 p.m. but
he only uttered the statements attributed to him about 30 minutes to an hour later. Moreover, he allegedly made these
statements not at the scene of the crime but at the hospital where he was brought for treatment. Likewise, the trip from the
scene of the crime to the hospital constituted an intervening event that could have afforded the victim opportunity for
deliberation. These circumstances, taken together, indubitably show that the statements allegedly uttered by Mamansal lack
the requisite spontaneity in order for these to be admitted as part of the res gestae.

Finally, after a thorough reading of the testimonies presented by both sides, it is even doubtful that the victim ever
uttered these alleged ante mortem statements in the first place. We note that the testimonies of Sonny Boy Redovan and
Investigator Alexander Tagum are contradicted not only by the witnesses for the defense but also by the prosecutions own
witnesses.

Dr. Mark Aguayo, the doctor who performed the operation on the victim and who is an impartial and disinterested witness,
categorically stated that the victim told him that he did not recognize those who had shot him. [60] He likewise testified that
witness Sonny Boy Redovan told him in the emergency room that the victim was not able to recognize his assailants because of
darkness.[61] Similarly, the wife and the daughter of Asim Mamansal, who were also able to talk with the victim prior to his
death, likewise denied that the victim ever told them the identity of his assailants. We fail to see why the victim should choose
to tell some people the identity of his assailants and deny his knowledge of the same to others.

With respect to the witnesses for the defense, Alex Siago and Patricio Fuertes, who were both present at the site of the
shooting immediately after the incident, testified that they did not hear the victim identify his assailants. Patricio Fuertes
even stated that at the hospital, he heard Mamansal tell the police officers present that he did not recognize those who had
shot him. Most importantly, Alice Villamor, who was the lover of the victim and who was with him during the shooting,
categorically stated that it was not possible to recognize the assailants as the area where the shooting happened was
dark. Moreover, she was able to talk with Mamansal at the hospital where he told her that he did not see the persons who had
shot him. This testimony of Villamor is quite significant and we fail to see why the trial court failed to consider the same in its
decision. Alice Villamor, as the lover of the victim, had no motive to lie for the defense and had all the reason to speak the
truth in order to seek justice for the death of her lover.

As previously stated, the trial court based its judgment of conviction on the alleged ante mortem statements of the victim
and the apparent weakness of the defense put up by the two accused-appellants. As it now stands however, the weakness of the
alibi of the two accused-appellants cannot be held against them in view of the absence of a clear and positive identification of
them as the perpetrators of the crime. And while their alibi may not have been proven so satisfactorily as to leave no room for
doubt, such an infirmity can not strengthen the weakness of the prosecutions evidence, the reason being that in a criminal
prosecution, the State must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. [62]
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment dated 8 May 1998 of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of
Kidapawan, Cotabato is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Anthony Melchor Palmones and Anthony
Baltazar Palmones are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are being held for some other legal
grounds.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 139211 February 12, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
GORGONIO VILLARAMA alias "Baby", appellant.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

On November 2, 1996, the spouses Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak went to the cemetery to light candles for the dead, leaving
behind their three young children, Arthel (8 years old), Bernadeth (6 years old) and Elizabeth (4 years old), playing inside their
house without adult supervision. That perhaps was the biggest mistake of their lives and one the couple will always regret. On
that fateful day, their youngest child fell prey to the rapacious desires of a beast in the person of the child’s own uncle,
appellant Gorgonio Villarama.

Approximately between five to six o’clock in the afternoon, appellant, 35-year-old Gorgonio Villarama, elder brother of the
victim’s mother Merlita, arrived at the Tumulaks’ house and found the three children by themselves. 1

Thereupon, appellant ordered the two older children, Arthel and Bernadeth, to pasture the goats, leaving the youngest,
Elizabeth, with him.2 Once alone, appellant undressed Elizabeth and made her lie down while he pulled down his pants and briefs
to his knees, and thereafter mounted his niece Elizabeth.3

This was the scene which greeted the prosecution’s eyewitness, Ricardo Tumulak, younger brother of Elizabeth’s father
Rosendo, when he arrived at his brother’s house to return the bolo he borrowed from the latter.4 Ricardo peeped through the
open window to check why his niece was crying and saw appellant, with briefs and pants slipped down to the knees, on top of
Elizabeth who was naked.5 When appellant noticed Ricardo’s presence, he hurriedly stood up and scurried away through the
backdoor.6 Ricardo immediately entered the house and dressed up the crying child. Ricardo then called his mother, the victim’s
paternal grandmother, who was in the house nearby.7The grandmother asked Elizabeth what happened but the child did not
answer and just continued crying.8

Rosendo and Merlita Tumulak got home at about six o’clock in the evening. They were met by Rosendo’s parents who told them
what happened.9 1a\^/phi1.net

Merlita immediately went to her daughter who had not stopped crying and asked Elizabeth what happened and why was she
crying.10 It was then that Elizabeth spoke and told her mother that her uncle Baby, herein appellant, removed her panties, made
her lie down and then inserted his penis inside her vagina.11

That same evening, the Tumulak family, including Rosendo’s father, who was a barangay tanod, looked for appellant. They found
him at a party in a neighbor’s house half a kilometer from theirs.1awphi1.nét They apprehended appellant and delivered him,
first, to the barangay captain and later on, to the Merida Police.12 Appellant allegedly admitted the commission of the crime and
said that he only did it out of drunkenness.13

On November 4, 1996, Elizabeth was brought to Dr. Jane Grace Solaña, a physician at the Rural Health Center of Merida, for
examination. Dr. Solaña found the girl complaining of pain in her vagina and detected contusions in her labia minora. The doctor
wrote her findings in the following medical report:
Reddish discoloration w/ tenderness (contusion), medial aspect (R) & (L) labia minora.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The above described physical injuries are found in the body of he subject, the age of which is compatible to the
alleged date of infliction.

2. Under normal circumstances, without subsequent complication and/or deeper involvement present, but not clinically
apparent at the time of the examination, the above described physical injuries is expected to improve in 7 to 10 days. 14

Appellant was charged with rape as then defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659,15 in the following information:

That on or about the 2nd day of November 1996, at Sitio Capasanan, Barangay Casilda, Municipality of Merida, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the herein offended party
ELIZABETH V. TUMULAK, who is 4 years old, against her will and without her consent, while inside their residential house of
the victim, the accused who is her uncle, held her hand, remove her short pants and was made to lie down and was made to
spread her legs, lay on top of her and insert his penis over (sic) the victim’s genital organ to accomplish his lewd design, to her
damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.16

Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented four witnesses: eyewitness Ricardo Tumulak, Dr. Jane Grace Solaña, the physician who examined the
victim, and the victim’s parents Merlita and Rosendo Tumulak.

The defense presented two witnesses: appellant Gorgonio Villarama and Bernaldo Claros, cousin of appellant.

Appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed that at about five o’clock in the afternoon of November 2, 1996, he was
in the house of his aunt, Patricia Claros, butchering a pig. He, however, admitted that at 6 o’clock that same evening, he went to
the victim’s house about a kilometer away from his aunt’s house, after a 30-minute walk. Upon reaching the place, he discovered
that his sister Merlita and her husband were not home, but their three children were playing inside the house. Appellant then
told the children to tell their mother that he was going to spend the night in their house because it was already late and he
could not find any means of transportation to go to Ormoc City where he lived.17

Thereafter he smoked a cigarette in the balcony and admitted having cradled the victim because the child allegedly clung to his
shoulder. Appellant claims that it was that cradling which eyewitness Ricardo Tumulak chanced upon when the latter arrived to
borrow the bolo of his brother Rosendo. According to appellant, they were not able to find the bolo so Ricardo left. Not long
after, appellant also left, heeding the invitation of a friend to attend the birthday party of the latter’s wife.18 Upon arriving at
the friend’s house, appellant helped in grating coconut and joined the celebrations. It was then that he was arrested by the
victim’s paternal grandfather, a barangay tanod, and brought before the barangay captain who informed him of the accusation
against him. The Mayor of Merida thereafter arrived with police officers and brought him to the Merida jail. 19

On cross examination and in response to questions propounded by the trial court, appellant also admitted ordering the victim’s
two older siblings to pasture the goats, leaving him alone with the victim Elizabeth.20

Appellant’s cousin, Bernaldo Claros, corroborated appellant’s testimony that they butchered a pig together. However, Claros also
testified that he left appellant at about 5:30 in the afternoon to go to the house of his elder brother Oligario Claros, Jr. where
he spent one hour before going back to his mother’s house, and, upon his return, he found appellant still there. Thereafter, they
attended a friend’s birthday party. They arrived at the party at 6:30 in the evening and stayed there until the barangay tanod
arrested appellant.
On April 30, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35, Eighth Judicial Region, in Criminal Case No. 50630-0
rendered a decision21 finding accused-appellant Gorgonio Villarama guilty as charged and imposing the death sentence on him.
The trial court disposed thus:

Wherefore, for all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds the accused Gorgonio Villarama alias "Baby" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, and hereby sentences him, it being proven that the crime of rape was committed under
the attendant circumstance of the victim being under eighteen (18) years of age and the accused, the offender being an uncle
and therefore relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree, to the penalty of DEATH pursuant to Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659.

The accused is also penalized to pay the private offended party the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity.

SO ORDERED.22

Appellant now questions said conviction in this automatic review before us and anchors his appeal on the general catch-all
argument that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant makes much capital of the non-presentation of the victim Elizabeth on the witness stand and invokes the doctrine of
willful suppression of evidence which raises the presumption that such evidence was adverse to the prosecution.

This argument is utterly without merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that it is the prosecution which controls the presentation of its witnesses.23

Unlike countless other rape cases perpetrated in relative isolation and secrecy, where only the victim can testify on the forced
coitus, the offense here was providentially witnessed by another person, an adult, who was definitely more articulate in
describing the sensitive details of the crime.

Moreover, Dr. Jane Solaña’s testimony sealed the case for the prosecution when she testified on the presence of a contusion on
the victim’s genital organ, specifically the labia minora. Thus, the prosecution deemed the evidence sufficient to overwhelm the
constitutional presumption of innocence of appellant.

While the victim’s testimony of the assault would have added support to appellant’s conviction, the same was not indispensable.
As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the intent of the prosecution was to spare the victim from further trauma which
could have resulted from being placed on the witness stand. The prosecution’s apprehension in presenting the victim can be
inferred from the records:

TESTIMONY OF ROSENDO TUMULAK

PROS. BELETA

/continuing

Q Now, since that incident up to this time, do you notice of (sic) any physical changes in her?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court.

A Right after the incident, she was sick, she seemed to be, she cannot sleep and she seemed to be scared. 24

TESTIMONY OF MERLITA TUMULAK

Q Prior to that incident, could your child talk intelligently?

 A Yes, she could talk intelligently.

Q After the incident, how did you observe her speech? Could she also talk intelligently the way she talked prior to the
incident?

A No longer.25

PROS. BELETA

Q After this incident of November 2, 1996, can you tell this court the behavior of your child Elizabeth Tumulak. Did
you find any unusual behavior?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q Can you tell this Court, what is that unusual behavior?

A We can no longer hear her speak, she used to have fever, and she was so sickly. If you talk to her, it would seem
nothing and she would easily cry.

Q Before the incident, do you find her to be jolly?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q Would you consider her very sick?

A Yes, ma’am.26

The Court is not convinced that the prosecution suppressed any evidence. The victim was present in the court room a few times
during the trial. The defense could have called Elizabeth to the stand as a hostile witness but it did not.

Time and again, the Court has held that the non-presentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a sufficiently
plausible defense.27 There should thus be no unfavorable inferences from the failure of the prosecution to present Elizabeth. If
appellant believed that her testimony would have exculpated him, then he should have presented Elizabeth. And the coercive
processes of the court would have been at his disposal had Elizabeth refused to testify.28

Appellant likewise asserts that the testimonies of the victim’s parents were hearsay since they did not witness the actual rape
and were only relating the rape as allegedly told to them by Elizabeth.

This too fails to convince us.

There are several well-entrenched exceptions to the hearsay rule under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Pertinent to the case at bar is Section 42 which provides:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of
the res gestae.

To be admissible as part of res gestae, a statement must be spontaneous, made during a startling occurrence or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto, and must relate to the circumstance of such occurrence. 29

In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the victim was subjected to a startling occurrence when she pointed to appellant as
her assailant. It is evident from the records that the statement was spontaneous because the time gap from the sexual assault
to the time the victim recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of appellant was very short. Obviously, there was
neither capability nor opportunity for the 4-year-old victim to fabricate her statement.
The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her age, the victim could not have had the
sophistication, let alone the malice, to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took off her panties and inserted his
penis inside her vagina.

The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old child. Such a brutal
experience constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was still crying when her parents arrived reinforces the
conclusion that she was still in a traumatic state when she made the statements pointing to appellant.

In People vs. Moreno,30 the Court, sustaining the conviction of an accused for robbery with rape, ruled that the affidavit of the
accused who was not available for trial was properly admitted in evidence as part of res gestae:

This exception is based on the belief that such Statements are trustworthy because made instinctively, ‘while the declarant’s
mental powers for deliberation are controlled and stilled by the shocking influence of a startling occurrence, so that all his
utterances at the time are the reflex products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective mental action’. Said
natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness
stand.

Immediately after the three accused left the house where the crime was committed, and the threatening presence of the
accused was gone, both Mary Ann Galedo and Narcisa Sumayo told their employers, the Mohnani spouses, that they were raped.
The latter later testified in court as to these statements. These were thus part of the res gestae since they were
spontaneously made after their harrowing experience, as soon as the victims had the opportunity to make them without fear for
or threat to their lives."

The Court is not unmindful of its ruling in People vs. Contreras,31 wherein the accused was acquitted in one of the many
statutory rape charges against him because, among other things, the prosecution failed to present the child-victim.

At first blush, the facts of that case are deceptively similar to those of the case at bar. However, upon careful scrutiny and
analysis of the two cases, we rule that the instant case is not on all fours with the Contreras case.

In Contreras, the main witness for the prosecution, Nelene Diaz, was not deemed by the Court to be in a position to
categorically state that the accused’s genitals had penetrated the victim’s vagina. In fact, what she saw was merely the
accused, with his zipper open and his penis exposed, facing the six-year-old victim who was sitting on his lap with her legs apart.
Although the victim had no underwear, it was, nevertheless, established that the witness did not see any genital contact
between the two as the genital organs were visibly apart. However, in the case at bar, the eyewitness saw the appellant, without
his briefs and pants, on top of the naked victim - a position conclusively indicating sexual intercourse.

In Contreras, there was positive testimony of the victim’s companions that the rape was prevented by the timely arrival of the
witness. This circumstance is not present in this case.

Furthermore, in Contreras, the victim’s statement that she had been sexually molested by the accused was not received under
the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, because her statement did not refer to the incident witnessed by Nelene but to a
general pattern of molestation of her and her companions by the accused. In contrast, Elizabeth’s declaration to her mother
regarding the then just concluded assault were so full of details specific to the incident that there could be no doubt she was
referring to the same incident witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.

Finally, in the Contreras case, the mother of the victim did not testify in court for no explainable reason. Here, Elizabeth’s
mother actively pursued the prosecution of appellant who is her own brother. No mother will falsely accuse a person of rape,
specially if it involves her own sibling, unless she is convinced it will vindicate the wrong done to her daughter.

Appellant attempts to cast doubt on Ricardo Tumulak’s testimony, branding the same as self-serving and devoid of any
evidentiary weight on the ground that Ricardo is the victim’s uncle.

This argument is flimsy.

First of all, a self-serving declaration is one that is made by a party, out of court and in his favor. It does not include the
testimony he gives as a witness in court.32

Second, Ricardo Tumulak’s testimony was credible. He harbored no ill-motive against appellant which could have impelled him to
fabricate a story so repulsive as to attach a stigma on his niece, the victim, for the rest of her life. Appellant himself admitted
that, prior to the rape incident, he had been a friend of Ricardo.

Blood or conjugal relationship between a witness and the victim does not per se impair the credibility of a witness. On the
contrary, relationship itself can strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it is unnatural for a relative of a victim to falsely
accuse someone other than the actual culprit.33

The guilt of the appellant having been established, we now delve into the extent of his culpability, the stage of consummation of
the crime of rape.

Appellant insists that the medical report of the prosecution witness, Dr. Solaña, failed to support the finding of consummated
rape.

The Court, in People vs. Campuhan,34 laid down the parameters of genital contact in rape cases, thus:

In People v. De la Peña, we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker’s penis merely touched the
external portions of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of
full penetration. Where the accused failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could
not fit into the victim’s vagina, the Court nonetheless held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim’s testimony
that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of
her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, or that the penis of the accused touched the middle part of
her vagina. Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of
organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mans pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which
are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mans pubis or the vaginal surface,
to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching
the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis,
labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that
becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of
the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin or the outer convex surface is covered
with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous
glands. Directly beneath the labia majora are the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered
for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape.
Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis,
there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ," but also
progressed into being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, or the "bombardment of
the drawbridge." But, to our mind, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as
earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion."

As can be drawn from the above ruling, the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora of the pudendum is
sufficient to consummate rape.

The Court is convinced that the medical report and testimony of Dr. Solaña provided enough bases to prove that appellant’s
sexual assault on the victim had reached the gynecological threshold for rape. The labia minora are directly beneath the labia
majora, thus, the contusion in labia minora of the victim’s vagina and the pain she felt as reported by Dr.Solaña were decisive
indications that appellant was able to enter the labia majora. Clearly, this is way beyond the mere "shelling of the castle of
orgasmic potency" or the "strafing of the citadel of passion".

In most cases of rape committed against young girls where total penetration of the victim’s organ is improbable due to the small
vaginal opening, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim’s organ nor rupture of the hymen is not required. 35

We now come to the critical and crucial part as we discuss the propriety of the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty.

Article 335 as amended by R.A. 7659, provides:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances.

xxx xxx xxx

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the
third degree of consanguinity.

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law
enforcement agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.

The Court is convinced with moral certainty that appellant Gorgonio Villarama raped 4-year-old Elizabeth Tumulak on November
2, 1996. We, however, hold that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on him. Appellant can neither be convicted
for incestuous rape under the first paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, nor for rape of a child
below 7 years old under the fourth paragraph of the same provision.

Under paragraph 1, although Elizabeth was less than 18 years at the time she was raped and the offender was her uncle, the
information failed to categorically state that said offender was a relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree. Jurisprudence dictates that if the offender is merely a relative, not a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or
common-law spouse of the mother of the victim, the information must allege that he is "a relative by consanguinity or affinity
(as the case may be) within the third civil degree". It is not enough for the information to merely allege that appellant is the
"uncle" of the victim even if the prosecution is able to prove the same during trial.36

Under paragraph 4, it is true that the penalty for raping a child below 7 years old is death. However, in the case at hand, even if
Elizabeth was only 4 years old when the appellant committed the dastardly crime, the prosecution did not present, other than
the testimony of the mother, independent evidence proving her age.

Court decisions on the rape of minors invariably state that, in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty, there must
be independent evidence showing the age of the victim. Testimonies on the victim’s age given by the prosecution witnesses or
the lack of denial of the accused or even his admission thereof on the witness stand is not sufficient. This Court has held that,
to justify the imposition of the death penalty for rape committed against a child below 7, the minority of the victim must be
proved with equal certainty and clarity as the crime itself. The failure to sufficiently establish the victim’s age with factual
certainty and beyond reasonable doubt is fatal and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form. 37
In the case at bar, the victim was presented in open court during the testimony of the mother to establish Elizabeth’s age:

Q How about the victim Elizabeth Tumulak, is she your daughter?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q How old is she at the time of the incident?

A Four (4) years and eleven (11) months.

Q Will you please point her out

INTERPRETER

(The witness pointed to a child and when asked about her name, she answered, Elizabeth Tumulak) 38

The above-quoted testimony, however, is not sufficient for the court to take judicial notice of the victim’s age. In People vs.
Liban39, citing People vs. Tundag40 , the Court declared that, in cases calling for a conviction of rape in its qualified form, the age
of the victim, without qualification, is not a matter of judicial notice, whether mandatory41 or discretionary42 . Judicial notice of
the issue of age without the requisite hearing under Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules on evidence would not be sufficient to
establish the age of the victim to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.

The matter of appreciating the age of the victim, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, was settled
when the Court, in the case of People vs. Pruna,43 laid down the following guidelines:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than
18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim44 .
It is clear then that even the admission of appellant as to the age of the victim could not be taken against him in the case at bar
because of the foregoing guidelines. Paragraph 4 which allows the appreciation of the testimony of the complainant as to the
victim’s age provided the same is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused, must be applied in relation to paragraph 3(a)
which dispenses with the presentation of independent proof of age only when the victim is below 3 and the age sought to be
proved is less than 7. In this case, the unfortunate victim was 4, a year too old.

In view of the moral uncertainty of the victim’s exact age on account of the failure of the prosecution to present the birth
certificate or similar authentic document (such as her baptismal certificate) and to make a positive and unequivocal
manifestation that the victim was indeed 4 years old, not to mention the absence of a categorical finding by the trial court of
the victim’s minority, the Court hesitates to impose the penalty of death upon appellant.

As we affirm the appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant for the crime of rape, we, however, make the
following modifications: the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion pertpetua and P50,000 as moral damages is awarded to the
offended party aside from the P 50,000 as civil indemnity already awarded to her by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Ormoc City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
appellant Gorgonio Villarama is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the offended party
Elizabeth V. Tumulak the sum of P50,000 as civil indemnity and the additional amount of P50,000 as moral damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116918. June 19, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONFILO MARTINEZ y DE LA ROSA, JOHN DOE and PETER
DOE, accused.

BONFILO MARTINEZ y DELA ROSA, accused-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

REGALADO, J.:

In an information filed before Branch 121 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant
Bonfilo Martinez and two other unidentified persons were charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 28th of December, 1991 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent of gain and by means of
violence and intimidation employed upon the persons of MICHAEL BUENVINIDA Y SOLMAYOR, POL BONGGAT, SHERWIN
SOLMAYOR, JONATHAN BONGGAT, JUNIOR SOLMAYOR, GLORIA SOLMAYOR and GLORIVIC BANDAYANON Y QUIAJO
while the aforesaid persons were inside the house of ERNESTO BUENVINIDA viewing television program, said accused, all
armed with guns of unknown caliber, tied the hands of the occupants of the house, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away the following articles belonging to ERNESTO BUENVINIDA, to wit:

1. Radio Cassette Recorder worth P3,000.00

2. Assorted imported perfumes 30,000.00
3. Assorted imported canned goods 5,000.00
4. Cash money amounting to 8,000.00
5. Cash money in U.S. Dollar $1,000.00
that in the course of said robbery, said accused, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with one GLORIVIC BANDAYON Y QUIAJO, against the latters
will and without her consent.[1]

Although the two Does remained unknown and at large, appellant was arrested on March 3, l994 for soliciting funds for a
fictitious volleyball competition.[2] After his arrest, he was confined at the Bagong Silang Sub-station detention cell for an hour
and was later transferred to the Caloocan City Jail.[3] Appellant entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment in Criminal
Case No. C-46704 (94) on March 21, 1994.[4]

As collated from the transcripts of the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Glorivic Bandayanon[5] and Michael
Buenvinida,[6] the indicated coverage of which yield the particular facts hereunder narrated, the circumstances attendant to
the crime charged are detailed in the paragraphs that follow.

Michael Buenvinida, Michelle Buenvinida, Gloria Solmayor, Sherwin Solmayor, Junior (JR) Solmayor, Paul Bonggat, Jonathan
Bonggat and Glorivic Bandayanon were in Ernesto and Cornelia Buenvinidas house situated at Lot 25, Block 20, Wallnut St.,
Rainbow Village, Caloocan City when the crime was committed on December 28, 1991.

Michael and Michelle are the children of Ernesto and Cornelia. Gloria is a sister-in-law of Cornelia who was in the house for
a visit, while Sherwin, Junior, Paul and Jonathan are Cornelias nephews. Glorivic is a friend of Cornelia who volunteered to look
after the latters children while she is in Sweden. Ernesto was at the office at the time of the commission of the crime.

While the occupants of the house were watching a television show in the living room at around 6:30 P.M., Michael noticed a
man wearing short pants and holding a handgun jump over the low fence of their house. The man entered the house through its
unlocked front door and introduced himself to the surprised group as a policeman. The intruder then told them that Michaels
father got involved in a stabbing incident in the local basketball court. As if on cue, two men followed the first man in entering
the house and promptly thereafter covered their faces with handkerchiefs. These two were wearing long pants and also carried
handguns. The first man who entered the house did not cover his face.

With guns pointed at them, the occupants of the house were brought to the masters bedroom where they were tied and
detained by the three intruders.

Later, one of the armed men, identified by Michael as herein appellant, untied Michael and ordered him to pull out the
plugs of the appliances in the house, such as the television set, the V.H.S. player and the radio cassette recorder. Appellant and
the other masked man then began to search the house for valuables in the living room and in the kitchen.

Meanwhile, the first man remained in the masters bedroom and found cash money, in pesos and dollars, and bottles of
perfume. The men then placed in a big bag the radio cassette player, canned goods, money and perfumes that they had found
inside the house.

Thereafter, the first intruder, whom Glorivic referred to as the mastermind of the group, returned to the masters
bedroom and asked the terrified group for jewelries. Unable to get any jewelry, he brought Glorivic to the childrens (Michael
and Michelles) bedroom opposite the masters bedroom. Upon entering the room, the man turned on the lights there. In the
meanwhile, his two masked companions continued looking around the house for other valuables.

Inside the bedroom, the ostensible leader of the gang untied Glorivic and ordered her to search the room for
jewelries. After Glorivic failed to find any, the man directed her to remove her clothes and pointed his gun at Glorivics
head. Despite her pleas and cries, the man removed the shirt, long pants and underwear of Glorivic while keeping the gun leveled
at her. Shortly after, the man put the gun on top of the ironing board beside the bed, then pushed Glorivic towards the bed and
lay on top of her. Glorivics resistance proved to be futile as the man was able to violate her chastity.

Before the first man could leave the room, another member of the group entered and pushed Glorivic again to the bed
when she was just about to put on her dress. Upon entering the room, the second mans cloth cover tied around his face fell and
hang around his neck. After threatening to kill her, the man put a pillow on her face, forcibly spread Glorivics legs and has
sexual congress with her. Glorivic would later point to appellant during the trial as this second man.

After the second man was through, the third man came in. While Glorivic was still sitting on the bed and crying, the third
man took the bed sheet and covered her face with it. Just like what his companions did before him, the third man had sexual
intercourse with Glorivic through force and intimidation, but not without first removing the handkerchief tied over his face.

Michael was able to see the three malefactors enter and leave the room one after the other as the door of the masters
bedroom was left open. He was also able to hear Glorivic crying and her implorations to her tormentors in the opposite room.
 After the consummation of the odious act, the third man told Glorivic to dress up. Glorivic felt blood flowing down her
thighs as she put on her clothes. Thereafter, the third man tied her up and brought her back to the company of the other
occupants of the house. Michael saw Glorivic with disheveled hair and wearing her pants turned inside out, with blood on the
lower parts.

The felons left after intimating to the group by way of a threat that they were going to explode a hand grenade. Around
five minutes later, after ascertaining that the culprits had left, Michael and the others untied each other. Thereafter, they
went to the house of his fathers friend located two blocks away and, from there, they proceeded to the Urduja police
detachment.

Glorivic met appellant again on March 7, 1994. Policemen came to her place of work and asked her to come with them as
they had a person in custody whom they suspected to be herein appellant. At the Caloocan City Jail, Glorivic was made to face
eight detainees. She was able to readily recognize appellant among the group because of the mole on his right cheek. Before she
picked him out from the other men, she carefully saw to it that the one she pointed out was really appellant.

On the part of Michael, he stated that he was fetched by policemen on March 7, 1994 at his school to make an
identification at the Dagat-Dagatan police station. Appellant was with six other inmates when they arrived at the
station. Michael pointed to appellant as one of the robbers who entered their house, after readily remembering that he was the
one who ordered him to unplug the appliances. Michael could never be mistaken in appellants identity because he could not
forget the prominent mole and its location on appellants right cheek.

Testifying at the trial,[7] appellant denied any participation in the robbery with rape committed in the Buenvinida
residence. Appellant claimed that it was only on March 7, 1994 that he first met Glorivic Bandayanon and insisted that he does
not know Michael Buenvinida.

He claimed that he was in his house in Wawa, Paraaque together with his wife and children the whole day of December 28,
1991. He moved to Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in 1993 after he was able to find work as a mason under his brother who lives in
the same district. On cross-examination, appellant denied having visited his brother at Bagong Silang from 1991 to
1992. However, upon further questioning by the public prosecutor, appellant admitted that he made several visits to his brother
in 1991. Moreover, he explained that it usually took him three hours to travel to Caloocan City from Paraaque by public utility
bus.

Giving credence to the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and rejecting appellants defense of alibi, the trial
court[8] found appellant guilty of the composite crime of robbery with rape. Although the proper imposable penalty is
death,[9] considering the lower courts finding of two aggravating circumstances of nocturnidad and use of a deadly weapon,
appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua in observance of the then constitutional prohibition against the imposition of
capital punishment. With regard to his civil liabilities, appellant was ordered to indemnify Ernesto Buenvinida in the sum
of P73,000.00 as the value of his stolen and unrecovered personal properties, and to pay Glorivic Bandaya P30,000.00 by way of
moral damages, plus the costs of suit.[10]

In this present appellate review, appellant inceptively faults the lower court for convicting him despite the supposedly
undependable and untrustworthy identification made by the eyewitnesses. He claims that Glorivic Bandayanon and Michael
Buenvinida could have been mistaken in their identification[11]because (l) of the long interval of time before they were able to
confront him; (2) his face was covered with a handkerchief as they themselves narrated in court; and (3) they could have been
so gravely terrified by the criminal act as to have their mental faculties impaired.

When an accused assails the identification made by witnesses, he is in effect attacking the credibility of those witnesses
who referred to him as the perpetrator of the crime alleged to have been committed. [12]The case then turns on the question of
credibility.

It has long been a well-entrenched rule of evidence and procedure that the issue of credibility of witnesses is almost
invariably within the exclusive province of a trial court to determine, under the principle that the findings of trial courts
deserve respect from appellate tribunals.[13] The foregoing rule notwithstanding, we expended considerable time and effort to
thoroughly examine the records and objectively assay the evidence before us, considering the gravity of the offense
charged. However, we find no compelling reasons to overturn the lower courts conclusion on the accuracy and correctness of the
witnesses identification of appellant as one of the persons who robbed the house of the Buenvinidas and raped Glorivic.

The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the prosecution were not only consistent with and corroborative of each
other. The transcripts of stenographic notes which we have conscientiously reviewed, further reveal that their narrations
before the lower court were delivered in a clear, coherent and unequivocal manner.
 There was no perceptible hesitation or uncertainty on the part of Glorivic and Michael when they unerringly identified
appellant during the trial. The unhurried, studious and deliberate manner in which appellant was identified by them in court
added strength to their credibility[14] and immeasurably fortified the case of the prosecution.

The records also show that the memory of these witnesses were not in any way affected by the passage of two years and
three months since the tragedy. Glorivic categorically stated on the witness stand that the lapse of those years did not impair
her memory and she could still identify those who raped her.[15] Michael asserted that he could still positively identify appellant
because of the latters mole, as well as the several opportunities of the former to take a good look at appellants face during the
robbery,[16] and the same is true with Glorivic. Appellants mole on his right cheek provided a distinctive mark for recollection
and which, coupled with the emotional atmosphere during the incident, would be perpetually etched in the minds of the
witnesses.

It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to ascertain the appearance of their assailants and
observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailants create a
lasting impression on the victims minds which cannot be easily erased from their memory.[17]

While appellant claims that his face was covered during the commission of the crime, there were providential points in time
when the two witnesses were able to freely see his face and scan his facial features closely to as to enable them to identify him
later on.

Although appellant placed a pillow on her face. Glorivic declared that when the latter two offenders raped her, their faces
were no longer covered. In the case of appellant, the handkerchief on his face fell upon his entering the room and he left it that
way while he raped Glorivic.[18] And when the latter two transgressors entered the house, their faces were then exposed and it
was only when they were already inside the house that they covered their faces with handkerchiefs.[19] These circumstances
gave Michael and Glorivic sufficient time and unimpeded opportunity to recognize and identify appellant.

There is no evidence to show that the two eyewitnesses were so petrified with fear as to result in subnormal sensory
functions on their part. Contrarily, in a recently decided case, we held that fear for ones life may even cause the witness to be
more observant of his surroundings.[20] The ample opportunity to observe and the compelling reason to identify the wrongdoer
are invaluable physiognonomical and psychological factors for accuracy in such identification.

The records do not disclose any improper motive on the part of the witnesses to falsely point to appellant as one of the
robber-rapists. Appellant even admitted that he did not know Glorivic and Michael prior to the commission of the crime. It is
doctrinally settled that in the absence of evidence showing that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motive,
their identification of the accused as the assailant should be given full faith and credit.[21]

Where conditions of visibility are favorable, as those obtaining in the Buenvinida residence when the crimes were
committed, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be
accepted as trustworthy.[22]

For his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court should not have ordered him to pay the value
of the unrecovered personalties to Ernesto Buenvinida, damages to Glorivic Bandayanon, and the costs of suit because he is not
criminally liable as shown by the failure of the witnesses to properly identify him.

We find speciosity in this second contention of appellant because such argument flows from the premise that he is not
guilty. As the trial court found, and with which we resolutely agree as already explained, appellant is culpable beyond reasonable
doubt for the special complex crime of robbery with rape committed in the early evening of December 28, l99l at Caloocan City.

However, we deem worthy of elucidation the matter of the value of the items established to have been stolen from the
house of the Buenvinidas. Incidentally, appellant claims in his brief that the amounts alleged in the information as the bases of
his civil liability for robbery were just concocted and founded on speculation and conjectures.[23]

To prove the value of the burglarized properties, the prosecution presented an affidavit executed by Ernesto
Buenvinida[24] on March 7, 1994, containing a list of the stolen movables and with their corresponding values, as now found in the
information. This affidavit was identified and marked as Exhibit H[25] for the prosecution during the testimony of SPO4 Abner
Castro,[26] the police officer who conducted an investigation of the incident on December 28, 1991. In addition to testifying on
the arrest and investigation of appellant, Castro repeated in open court the respective values of the personal properties as
explained to him by Ernesto Buenvinida and how he helped Ernesto in the preparation thereof.[27] The same was formally
offered in evidence[28] to prove, among others, the facts and amounts contained therein and as testified to by witness
Castro. Although objected to by appellant as self-serving,[29] the lower court admitted said document for the purpose for which
it was offered and as part of the testimony of said witness.[30]
 It may be theorized, and in fact appellant in effect so postulates, that the prosecution has failed to prove the value of the
stolen properties and, for lack of evidence thereon, the civil liability therefor as adjudged by the court below may not be
sustained. It is true that the evidence presented thereon consisted of the testimony of the investigator, Abner Castro, who
based his evaluation on the report to him by Ernesto Buenvinida. These are legal aspects worth discussing for future guidance.

While it is claimed that hearsay testimony was involved, it is actually and not necessarily so. The rule that hearsay
evidence has no probative value does not apply here, since SPO4 Abner Castro was presented as a witness and testified on two
occasions, during which he explained how the value of the stolen properties was arrived at for purposes of the criminal
prosecution. During his testimony on his investigation report and the affidavit of Ernesto Buenvinida on the amounts involved,
appellant had all the opportunity to cross-examine him on the correctness thereof; and it was this opportunity to cross-examine
which negates the claim that the matters testified to by the witness are hearsay. And, said documents having been admitted as
part of testimony of the policeman, they shall accordingly be given the same weight as that to which his testimony may be
entitled.

Again, even under the rule on opinions of ordinary witnesses, the value of the stolen items was established. It is a standing
doctrine that the opinion of a witness is admissible in evidence on ordinary matters known to all men of common perception, such
as the value of ordinary household articles.[31] Here, the witness is not just an ordinary witness, but virtually an expert, since his
work as an investigator of crimes against property has given him both the exposure to and experience in fixing the current value
of such ordinary articles subject of the crime at bar. Incidentally, it is significant that appellant never dared to cross-examine
on the points involved, which opportunity to cross-examine takes the testimony of Castro out of the hearsay rule, while the lack
of objection to the value placed by Castro bolsters his testimony under the cited exception to the opinion rule.

Also not to be overlooked is the fact that the trial court has the power to take judicial notice, in this case of the value of
the stolen goods, because these are matter of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration.[32] The lower
court may, as it obviously did, take such judicial notice motu proprio.[33] Judicial cognizance, which is based on considerations of
expediency and convenience, displace evidence since, being equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is
intended to achieve.[34] Surely, matters like the value of the appliances, canned goods and perfume (especially since the trial
court was presided by a lady judge) are undeniably within public knowledge and easily capable of unquestionable demonstration.

Finally, as a matter of law and not on the excuse that after all appellant cannot satisfy his civil liability, the real value of
the asported properties would nonetheless be irrelevant to the criminal liability of appellant. Insofar as the component crime of
robbery is concerned, the same was committed through violence against or intimidation of persons, and not through force upon
things, hence the value of the property subject of the crime is immaterial.[35] The special complex crime of robbery with rape
has, therefore, been committed by the felonious acts of appellant and his cohorts, with all acts of rape on that occasion being
integrated in one composite crime. The value of the objects of the apoderamiento relates only to the civil aspect, which we have
already resolved.

One final complementary disposition is called for. Victim Glorivic Bandayanon was subjected by appellant and his co-
conspirators to multiple rape, and under humiliating circumstances equivalent to augmented ignominy since she was abused by
the three accused successively and virtually in the presence of one after the other. The award of P30,000.00 for moral
damages made by the court below should accordingly be amended.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED in full, with the sole MODIFICATION that
the damages awarded to the offended party, Glorivic Bandayanon, is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.