Gamboa vs Chan

July 14,2012

Facts:

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zeñarosa
Commission which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the
country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon
conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the office of
the President.

Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the
Philippine National Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her
aides and classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP
forwarded in the Report’s enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.

Gamboa’s association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of
media, publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated,
Gamboa filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the
unverified reports from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports
against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to
privacy. However, the RTC dismissed Gamboa’s petition for writ of habeas data saying that
Gamboa failed to establish the source of the information.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the
Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioner’s right to privacy
2. Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper

HELD:

Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the

Commission is NOT an intrusion of petitioner’s right to privacy

It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate
the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to
the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of
maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is
herein petitioner Gamboa.

This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained
in the report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial
court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful
act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was
rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the
Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.

Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER

In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the existence of report, but emphasized its
confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even
warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that PNP was
responsible for his unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy
of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.

Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. As public officials, they enjoy presumption of regularity, which she failed to
overcome. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
Nuñez vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayan on 21 February
and 26 March 1979 for the crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents committed in connivance with his co-accused, all public officials, in several cases.
Thereafter, on 15 May, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and
juridical grounds. A week later, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration was filed a day later, and was likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, claiming that Presidential Decree 1486, which
created the Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly
discriminates against the accused, in light of the difference of the procedures (especially
appellate) in the Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts.

Held: The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan,
with “jurisdiction over criminal a
nd civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public
officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.” It came into existence with
the issuance
in 1978 of a Presidential Decree. Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in
response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public service, the urgency of which cannot be
denied. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware
as far back as 17 January 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the omission
of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does not deprive protection of liberty. The
innocence or guilt of an accused in the Sandiganbayan is passed upon by 3-judge court of its
division. Moreover, a unanimous vote is
required, failing which “the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the
members of the Court to sit
temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices,
and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment.” If
convicted, the
Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was
committed to justify a reversal of the judgment

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo

Petitioner: Secretary of National Defense; Chief of staff, AFP

Respondent: Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo

G.R. No. 180906 / 7 October 2008

Ponente: CJ Puno

Facts:

CA Decision being appealed

1. The Manalo brothers filed, on 23 August 2007, a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against petitioners and their officers from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
 The Writ of Amparo was approved on Aug 24, 2007 and petitioners filed Motion to
Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition.

2. The CA rendered a decision in favor of the Manalo brothers and ordered the current
petitioners to:
 To furnish the Manalos and CA of all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file.
 To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of
M/SgtHilarioakaRollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
 To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports
of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the
petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian)
who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five
days from notice of this decision.

Ito natalaga

 Feb. 14, 2006 - Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, brothers and herein respondents,
were abducted by elements of the military (AFP and Citizen Armed Force
Geographical Unit or CAFGU) from their house in BuholnaMangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan.

o The abductors were looking for a certain “Bestre”. Manalo brothers were suspected of being
members of the NPA
o The white L300 van was driven by M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
o The brothers were repeatedly beaten and tortured and questioned about their knowledge of
the NPA.

 Sometime in the third week of detention, Raymond attempted to escape. He

discovered that they were in Fort Magsaysay (Palayan, Nueva Ecija). He was
however recaptured and tortured. Detention in Fort Magsaysay lasted for 3 and a
half months.
 One day, Rizal Hilario took the Manalo brothers to Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
and then beaten up. They remained there for one or two weeks.
 Then brought to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan to meet Maj. Gen. JovitoPalparan,
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division.
o Gen. Palparan told the Manalo brother to tell their parents to not go to rallies
and hearings regarding their disappearance. Instead, they should help in the
capture of “Bestre”.
o Respondents were then brought to their parents’ house to deliver Palparan’s
message. Their parents agreed out of fear.

 Manalo brothers were given medicine named “Alive”. Gen. Palparan said that this would
make them feel better, but the real effect was drowsiness and a heavy feeling after waking
up.
 After 3 months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson. He was ordered to clean
outside the barracks of the Army Rangers.
o Met SherlynCadapan, a UP student who was also abducted, tortured and raped by
the military.

 Reynaldo was brought to Camp Tecson a week later. Other captives (Karen Empenñ o and
Manuel Merino) also arrived.
o All the captives were chained every night. They were told that their families would
be killed if they escaped.
o Cadapan, Empenñ o and Merino would later on be killed. Merino would even be
burned.
o November 22, 2006 – the captives were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry
Battalion in Limay, Bataan. They were continually beaten and made to do chores.
o Here, respondents witnessed how soldiers killed an old man suspected of harboring
the NPA and also of an Aeta who was subsequently burned.
 The captives were then brought to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. They were brought
back to Limay on June 2007 by Caigas, the commander of the 24th Infantry Battalion.
 June 13, 2007 – Respondents were brought to Pangasinan to farm the land of Caigas. Here,
they started to save their earnings to aid in their escape. When they saved 1000 pesos, they
were able to acquire a cellphone.
 August 13, 2007 – Reynaldo and Raymond Manalo were able to escape and board a bus
bound for Manila.
 The respondents were able to corroborate each other’s affidavits.
 Dr. Benito Molino also corroborated the accounts of the Manalo brothers. He specializes in
forensic medicine. He conducted a medical exam on the respondents
  After their escape. The scars and wounds of respondents were consistent with their account
of physical injuries inflicted on them. He followed the Istanbul Protocol in the medical
exam.
 Petitioners also submitted affidavits
 Gen. Palparan and M/Sgt. Hilario filed their affidavits late.
 Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall and witness for the petitioner, conducted an
investigation on May 29, 2006, from 8am to 10pm.
 All 6 persons (CAFGU members) implicated in the abduction denied the allegation. They
had alibis (some were building a chapel, some were just at home)
 Discovered that “KaBestre” is actually Rolando Manalo, elder brother of the
respondents.
 Recommendation was for the dismissal of the case.

Issue:

WON the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly given

Dispositive: Petition dismissed. CA decision reaffirmed.

Held:

History of the Amparo Rule

 The adoption of the Amparo Rule is a result of the two-day National Consultative Summit on
Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17,
2007.
o It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate
rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights

 “Amparo” literally means “protection” in Spanish

o Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with
the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which
prevails in Mexico.
 o It enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in
particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to make law for the entire
nation
 This concept evolved into the (1) amparolibertad for the protection of personal freedom,
equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparocasacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparoadministrativo for the judicial
review of administrative actions; and (5) amparoagrario for the protection of peasants’
rights derived from the agrarian reform process
 In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been constitutionally
adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under
military juntas.
 In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of
amparo, several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause,
provides for the judicial power “to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” The Clause accords a similar general protection to
human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparocasacion, and
amparoadministrativo. Amparolibertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found
in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Was the grant proper? YES

 Promulgated in October 24, 2007. First time that the Supreme Court exercised its expanded
power in the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules to protect the people’s constitutional
rights (life, liberty, property)
 Coverage of which is confined to:
o Extralegal killings – killings committed without due process of the law
o Enforced disappearances – an arrest, detention or abduction by the government;
refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts places him outside the
protection of the law
 “Amparo” literally means protection in Spanish. Writ of Amparo originated in Mexico
(Yucatan State). Eventually incorporated into the Mexican Constitution in 1847. Spread
across the Western hemisphere and eventually to the Philippines.
 Provides for swift relief because of the summary nature of its proceedings. Only substantial
evidence is required.
 There is still a threat to the life, liberty, and a violation of their right to security of the
Manalo brothers because their captors, whom they escaped from, still remain at large.
o Right to security is in Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
o It is the right to enjoyment of life.

 Three ways of exercising right to security:

o Freedom from fear.
 Enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) Article 3
 Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
 It is the “right to security of person” as the word “security” itself
means “freedom from fear.
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Art. 9 (1)
  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
 “Freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. (PH is a signatory to
both conventions)
o Guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.
 Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees against search
without warrant
 ELKs and EDs involve Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe
invasion of bodily integrity.
 It constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the
dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will
 Note: The consti also guarantees against torture
o Guarantee of protection of one’s right by the Government
 The writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to
life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the
right to securityof person under Article III, Section 2.
 Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of ELKs and EDs as
well as their families
 Right to security of persons can exist independently of the right to liberty.
(the court cited several cases here, Delgado Paez v. Colombia; Bwaya v.
Zambia; Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea)
 They have a positive duty to protect right to liberty and not just a prohibition
for arbitrary deprivation of such rights. (ECHR in Kurt v. Turkey)

 The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is apparent. This threat vitiates
their free will because they are forced to limit their movements and activities. Threats to
liberty, security, and life are actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.
 The military failed to provide protection for the respondents. They were even the ones who
actually tortured them. The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was limited,
superficial and one-sided.
 “In sum, we conclude that respondents’ right to security as “freedom from threat” is violated
by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective
investigation and protection on the part of the military.”
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y
ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, defendants-appellants.

ANTONIO, J.:

This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial
District, Branch VII, Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario
Comayas y Cudillan, MelecioCudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused MelecioCudillan, ,Jesus Medalla, Ramiro

Alegre, and Mario Comayas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE, committed with four (4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of
death, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify
jointly and severally the heirs of AdlinaSajo in the amount of P350,000.00,
representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and
severally also the heirs of AdelinaSajo the amount of P12,000.00. and to pay the
costs.

With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review,
pursuant to law.

During the pendency of this appeal, MelecioCudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison
Hospital on August 16, 1970, and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal
liability is concerned, was dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to
appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla.

This case arose from the death of AdelinaSajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was
found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the
early morning of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual
strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen to twenty-two hours before
12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.

Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several
cabinets were open, and some personal garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor.
No witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with
relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay
City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that
same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.

During the latter part of July, 1966, MelecioCudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the
act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he
came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and
robbery of AdlinaSajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of
Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was written in
the English language, MelecioCudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus
Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte;
one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran Sub-province; and one "Rammy, "
another Leyteno. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay City police
headquarters, MelecioCudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A ", "A-1 " to "A-
6" on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1,
1966. In this second statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the crime
of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami" and "Mario." According to said statement, the
declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division,
and Identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as
Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned
extrajudicial confession of MelecioCudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by
the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez, alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan,
Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, MelecioCudillan y Arcillas, and one John
Doe."

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, MelecioCudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro
Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them,
however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the
decision under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of
MelecioCudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the crime were taken from
the "Pasay Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented
by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and
Hernando Carillo.

The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was
investigating MelecioCudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus
Medalla as his companions in the commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just
stared at him (MelecioCudilla) and said nothing."

Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to

confront the accused MelecioCudillan with the other suspects'?

A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.

Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused

MelecioCudillan and other suspects whom do you refer to as other
suspects?

A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario.

There was another person Eduardo Comayas. He was also one of
those suspects but MelecioCudillan failed to point to him as his
companion.

Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by

MelecioCudillan in the Police Department of Pasay City as his
companions?

A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.

 Q. When MelecioCudilla pointed to these persons what did these
three persons do?

A. They just stared at him and said nothing. (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing
of October 28, 1966).

According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested
vigorously and not merely kept their silence."

Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants
admitted to him that they took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the
deceased, viz.:

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is inside the court room, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left
who, upon being asked, gave his name as Ramiro Alegre.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where?

A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.

Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?

A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also anticipated in

the commission of the killing of AdelinaSajo.

Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?

A. About the middle of June.

Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?

A. That he was also inside the room when they killed AdelinaSajo.
Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus
Medalla, when did that take place, more or less?

A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.

Q. What year?

A. 1967.

Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you know him?

A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other.
Q. If he is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out?

INTERPRETER:

Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as

Mario Comayas.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario
Comayas?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. When was that, more or less?

A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.

Q. And what did you talk about?

A. Regarding this case of AdelinaSajo and he admitted to me that he

was one of those who planned and killed AdelinaSajo.

Q. I see! And what, else did he tell you, if any?

A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to
by the door.

Q. How about the other accused MelencioCudillan, do you know him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?

 INTERPRETER:

Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name

as MelecioCudillan.

ATTY. DEPASUCAT:

Q. Why do you know MelecioCudillan?

A. Because he is with me in one cell.

Q. Were you able also to talk with MelecioCudillan?

A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.

Q. When have you talked with MelecioCudillan, more or less?

A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up

to about the first week of June, 1967.

Q. And what did the accused MelecioCudillan tell you about this
case?

ATTY. RAMIREZ:

Objection, Your Honor, leading.

COURT:

Witness may answer, there is already a basis.

A. That they were the ones who planned and killed AdelinaSajo.
(t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July 21, 1967).

However, during the trial, MelecioCudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn
statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel when he was investigated by the police. Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas
denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in question. they
were attending the internment of the deceased child of CiriacoAbobote. According to Jesus Medalla,
he and his companions left the Maravilla compound at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1966
to attend the internment. 'They left the cemetery at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon and
proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas
confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were at the house of CiriacoAbobote in the morning of July 25,
1966, until after 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was
employed to resume his work.

Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense.
Thus, Urbano Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project
of David M. Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the
construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the foreman and
timekeeper in the project. He Identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo
Villanueva and Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o'clock in the morning up to 4:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at
Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1")
which contained the number of hours he actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.

Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of
MelecioCudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the
alleged "Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by MelecioCudillan as "his companions" in
the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and credence to the
testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the
crime.

The extrajudicial confessions of MelecioCudillan (Exhibits "A", "A- I " to "A-6" and "F", "F-1" and "F-
2"), on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how MelecioCudillan committed the
crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants
Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter aliosactaalterinocere non
debet" 1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2 As a general rule, the extrajudicial
declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative
value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are
concerned. 3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in
the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking
the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their
implications of the crime made by MelecioCudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando
Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.

II

The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police
custody, in the face of statements of MelecioCudillan implicating them as his companions in the
commission of the crime, could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation
therein.

The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to
testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, 4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating
question. 5 It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as
evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as
evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. 6 The leading case of Miranda v.
Arizona 7 held that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed
his privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial
interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement
implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission
of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his
constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of
his predicament. 8 Other courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not
render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person
under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is
free to answer if he chooses. 9

We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny
statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to
comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of
his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his
silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused
against self-incrimination.

The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self- incrimination is a fundamental
right. It is a personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The
privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man's struggle for liberty. It
reflects man's fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized
men to subject those' suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment and
abuses, and the respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life." 10

In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals: 11

... this right is 'not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to
the discretion of the court;' it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and
substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice ...

Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will
an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory
disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the
crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is
his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.

It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws
governing the rights of an accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the
administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are sworn to uphold the rights
of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against compulsory testimonial self-
incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent,
to have counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to force, violence,
threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in the course of one's detention, and the
safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence. 12The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right to silence. Thus, in
Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence."

This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right
of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will,
and to suffer no penalty for such silence. 13

This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, now Chief justice, in Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 14 thus:

The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as
1905, we had occasion to declare: 'The accused has a perfect right to remain silent
and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt.' Only last year, in
 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the
doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant 'to forego testimony, to remain silent,
unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of
his own free, genuine will.'

Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual
explained that the privilege against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force to surrender to its detriment."

We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under
police custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of MelecioCudillan, the conclusion that the
aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility
of the extrajudicial confession of MelecioCudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining
evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is
insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein
appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a
casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly
denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.

WHEREFORE, the judgement appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y
Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime with which they are charged. Their immediate release from detention is ordered, unless they or
any one of them is otherwise held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez Guerrero, Abad
Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., concur in the result.

COMMENDADOR VS. DE VILLA [200 SCRA 80; G.R. NO. 93177; 2 AUG 1991]

Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the
AFP were directed to appear in person before the Pre-Trial Investigating
Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to 9,
1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the
charges as mandated by Article of War 71. A motion for dismissal was
denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due
process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the
application was denied by GCM No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty.
However he was not released immediately. The RTC now declared that even
military men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right to bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for
habeas corpus on the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame
without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after hearing that
no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a
year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due process.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to bail.

Held: NO denial of due process. Petitioners were given several opportunities

to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled
hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their motion
of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit
their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for
reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. They had
been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-
affidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-emptory
challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of G/SCM)

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed
Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts
have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the
court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo warranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not
been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial is
given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year
from their arrest, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of
due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating
Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one
year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were
involved in the failed coup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In
G.R. No. 96948, the petition is granted, and the respondents are directed to
allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under
article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions
are also granted, and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of
the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No costs.