FREEDOM OF RELIGION
incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.
Art 3, Sec. 5. “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
[64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937]
Facts:
Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of
Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the
Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in
the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the
principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the
occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further
their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act
No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and
issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue:
Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.
Held:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious
toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous to the government”
does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not
inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They
were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps,
instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat XXXIII International
Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but
the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be
inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda
GARCES VS. ESTENZO
[104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981]
Facts:
Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration
every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San
Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said
projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash
donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be
the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image
would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his
successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church
during the celebration of the saint’s feast day.
These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were
implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of
the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return
the image to the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds
were used in its acquisition.
Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin
case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed
Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer
assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a
member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV 1 and Sec 18(2) Article
VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.
Issue:
Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.
Held:
No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The
image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for
the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of
the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a
layman’s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council’s funds
that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the
determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church,
there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has
some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA
[101PHIL 386; G.R. NO. 9637; 30 APR 1957]
Facts:
New York’s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks
free of charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The
Board of Education contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State
and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen)
from removing appellant’s members from office for failure to comply with the
requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of
textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the
statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed
the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals,
ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains
the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant).
Held:
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but
this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of
City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in
doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes
any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the
exercise of religious practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered
unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not
applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.
WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly
collected from it.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996]
Facts:
Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2
every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and
propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board
of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series
Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions
which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office
of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a
letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta
S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the
episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression
and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also
filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its
TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121
and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 1986 1 in
relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the
literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary
is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended
that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA
however reversed it hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a
form of religious exercise and expression.
Held:
Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is
the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this
case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and
tenets of other religions. RTC’s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of
speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. “attack” is different from
“offend” any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of
other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms,
however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of
the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their
followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion
prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor
the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even
if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of
freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the
marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an
immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that
infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm
the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm.
Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is
inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the
issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech.
Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the
causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be
established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification,
exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected
speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an
administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only
be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU
[219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR 1993]
Facts:
Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan,
Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities
expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the “Panatang Makabayan” required by RA1265. They are Jehovah’s Witnesses
believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their
teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades
protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that
we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of
religious significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of
religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-
discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This
exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic
consciousness and duties of citizenship.
Issue:
Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated.
Held:
Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right
to religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm
of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on one’s belief regulated and translated to external
acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present
danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent.
The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified.
The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and
teachers who refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and
religious profession and worship. Jehovah’s Witnesses may be exempted from
observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such
ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly
during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesn’t present any
danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner’s request is
exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion
of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen’s right
to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute
ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for
national heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school
curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified.
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED.
ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR
[492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006]

Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered
into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.
According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They
allegedly have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their
congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it
impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable
and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.
Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that
the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
PERFECTO V ESIDERA
The Facts:
In his administrative complaint against Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-
Esidera (respondent) of RTC Branch 20 Catarman City, Eladio Perfecto
(complainant), accused the judge of being first married to one Richard
Tepace on May 7, 1987. During their marriage, Alma gave birth to a
daughter with Renato Esidera. Her marriage to Richard was lated declared
void on January 27, 1992, and Alma married Renato on June 3, 1992. Eladio
further added that Alma falsified her daughter’s birth certificate to make it
appear that she and Renato were married on March 18, 1990 and their
daughter was a legitimate child. Verification, however, revealed that no
marriage took place on that day and Judge Desales-Esidera did not take
steps to rectify her daughter’s birth certificate. Eladio thus prayed for Judge
Desales-Esidera’s dismissal from the service for dishonesty.
In her Comment, Judge Desales-Esidera prayed for the complaint’s dismissal
for failure to comply with the elements of personal knowledge, failing which,
the allegations were mere “tsismis” or hearsay. She claimed that Eladio
secured the documents in connivance with persons involved in or were
related to parties in other administrative cases. They wanted her out of the
judiciary so they could continue their illegal activities in the office. She
claimed that the charges against her were personal, not judicial. She did
not participate in the preparation of her daughter’s birth certificate; she had
wanted to correct it but did not do so for the best interest of the child. She
admitted being married on Mach 18, 1990, but only in accordance with
recognized Catholic rites. The person who officiated the ceremony had no
license to solemnize marriages under civil law. While her religious marriage
was done before the declaration of nullity of her first marriage, the
prevailing jurisprudence at that time was that there was no need for a
judicial decree to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. When she
married for the first time, it was not their intention to live together as
husband and wife. They planned a church wedding for later but it did not
push through because Richard’s mother was sick and his father , a Chinese
would not agree because it was then the Year of the Dragon. They never
lived together as husband and wife. They both wanted it quits. Then she
met Renato. She realized it was unfair to live in a marriage that was never
consummated. She wanted very much an annulment, but it was a long and
tedious process. Then she got pregnant. Being both religious, they
consulted priests who were knowledgeable in canon law. Because of the
separation of Church and State, civil marriages are not recognised by the
Catholic Church; couples who are civilly married are considered living in sin
and may be excommunicated. Her marriage to Richard Tang was not
recognised by the Catholic Church. Further, as a foreign citizen, Richard
needed to secure a certificate of legal capacity before she can secure a
marriage license. Not having presented the certificate before securing the
marriage license, Richard’s marriage to her was void. At that time, there
was no need to secure a judicial declaration to establish the invalidity of a
marriage. The logical conclusion, according to the judge, was that there
was no impediment for her and Renato to get married, although she needed
to cancel the registration of the first marriage. While waiting for the
outcome of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage, they proceeded
with the Catholic marriage to continue living in a state of grace. Her
daughter’s pregnancy was very complicated, and it was Renato, a non-
lawyer who prepared the birth certificate. To Renato, their union was
blessed by God, and their daughter was a legitimate child. She had always
wanted to correct her daughter’s birth certificate, but decided against it for
the best interest of the child, who may not understand why she is different
from her other siblings. The date of marriage indicated in her birth
certificate is the days she and Renato received the sacrament of
matrimony. The officiating priest had no license to solemnize marriages in
the country. While she is being charged with immorality, the judges argues
that the test of morality are those set by whatever religion one has. In her
case, it was the Ten Commandments which she violated but which she
rectified by availing of the Sacrament of Reconciliation and Matrimony.
Finally, she never kept the status of her daughter a secret, a fact which
could not have escaped scrutiny when she applied in the Judiciary. The first
civil marriage was never consummated; the second marriage was purely a
sacramental rite in obedience to the Law of God, and the third marriage was
to formalize their status in the eyes of the law of man.
The Office of the Court Administrator in its findings found that Judge
Desales-Esidera condoned the misrepresentation made on her child’s birth
certificate and engaged in an “illicit affair” and contracted a second
marriage while another marriage subsisted. She contracted the second
marriage knowing that there were legal impediments to that marriage.
Judge Desales-Esidera “did not comport herself according to her Roman
Catholic faith.”
The Issue:
Whether or not Judge Desales-Esidera should be held administratively
liable.
The Ruling:
We find that Judge Desales-Esidera’s omission to correct her child’s birth
certificate is not sufficient to render her administratively liable under the
circumstances. The error in the birth certificate cannot be attributed to her.
She did not participate in filling in the required details in the document. The
birth certificate shows that it was her husband who signed it as informant. 1
Judge Desales-Esidera is also not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct
under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In
Estrada v. Escritor,2 this court described morality as “how we ought to live’
and why.”3
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral
prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion.
Religion, as this court defined in Aglipay v. Ruiz,4 is “a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator.” 5 A conduct is
religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the
divine set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any divine
moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does not
derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral
sense shared as humans.
The non-establishment clause6 bars the State from establishing, through
laws and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. Prohibitions
against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of
religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality
must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular
purpose.7
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of
morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment
on secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or
immorality, courts should be careful not to overlook the distinction between
secular and religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding
constitutionally guaranteed rights.8
There is the danger of “compelled religion” 9 and, therefore, of negating the
very idea of freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when
religious morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies. As
explained in Estrada v. Escritor:10
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion”
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious
freedom therefore requires that government be neutral in matters of
religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification is inconsistent
with this policy of neutrality.11
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that we find respondent
judge guilty of immoral conduct based on, among others, her alleged affair
and her failure to comport herself according to the Roman Catholic faith.
This court may not sit as judge of what is moral according to a particular
religion. We do not have jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to
determine which conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction
over matters of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the
public or its interest.
Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and
judges, “immoral conduct” should relate to their conduct as officers of the
court. To be guilty of “immorality” under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer’s conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the
public’s confidence in the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding
whenever this court decides the administrative liability of lawyers and
persons under this court’s supervision. At best, religious morality weighs
only persuasively on us.
Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of
contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first
marriage and having an alleged “illicit” affair are “immoral” based on her
Catholic faith. This court is not a judge of religious morality.
We also do not find that respondent judge’s acts constitute immorality for
purposes of administrative liability. Under the circumstances, respondent
judge’s second marriage and her alleged affair with her second husband
were not of such depravity as to reduce confidence in the Rule of Law.
Respondent judge and her first husband never really lived together as
husband and wife. She claimed that her first husband did not want to have
a church wedding. She and her husband did not have a child. She claimed
that this marriage was not recognized by her church. Eventually, their
marriage was declared void, 12 and she was wed civilly to her second
husband, with whom respondent judge allegedly had an affair.
Moreover, respondent judge’s acts were not intrinsically harmful. When
respondent judge married her second husband, no harm was inflicted upon
any one, not even the complainant. There was no evidence on the records
that the first husband, who was the most interested person in the issue,
even objected to the second marriage.
While we do not find respondent judge administratively liable for
immorality, we can determine if she is administratively liable for possible
misconduct. The Code of Professional Responsibility directs lawyers to obey
the laws and promote respect for the law.13
We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative
liability, respondent judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and
her second husband conducted a marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990.
Respondent judge claimed that this marriage was merely a sacramental
marriage entered into only to comply with the requirements of their
religious beliefs. It was valid only under the Roman Catholic Church but has
no legal effect. Their solemnizing officer was not licensed to solemnize
marriage from the National Archives or from the civil government. 14
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a second or subsequent
marriage before the legal dissolution of a first marriage:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
The second or subsequent marriage contemplated under this provision is
the marriage entered into under the law. Article 1 of the Family Code
defines marriage as “a special contract of permanent union between a man
and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life[.]”
Thus, the validity of the second marriage, if not for the subsistence of the
first marriage, is considered one of the elements of the crime of bigamy.
The elements of bigamy are:
(a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony
is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.15 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Respondent judge’s act of participating in the marriage ceremony as
governed only by the rules of her religion is not inconsistent with our law
against bigamy. What the law prohibits is not second marriage during a
subsisting marriage per se. What the law prohibits is a second marriage that
would have been valid had it not been for the subsisting marriage. Under
our law, respondent judge’s marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the
solemnizing officer’s lack of authority.
Marriages entered into in accordance with the law may or may not include
marriages recognized in certain religions. Religious marriages are
recognized in and may be governed by our laws only if they conform to
legal requirements. Religious marriages that lack some or all the
requirements under the law are invalid. 16 They are not considered to have
been entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits, consequences, and
incidents of marriage provided under the law.
The lack of authority of the officer that solemnized respondent judge’s
marriage in 1990 renders such marriage invalid. It is not recognized in our
law. Hence, no second marriage can be imputed against respondent judge
while her first marriage subsisted.
However, respondent judge may have disobeyed the law, particularly Article
350 of the Revised Penal Code, which prohibits knowingly contracting
marriages against the provisions of laws. Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
ART. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. – The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next
preceding article, shall contract marriage knowing that the requirements of
the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of
a legal impediment. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent judge knew that the solemnizing officer during her and her
husband’s marriage in 1990 had no civil authority to solemnize marriages. It
is clear from her Comment that she and her husband’s only consideration
for their 1990 marriage was the recognition from the Roman Catholic
Church. She stated that:
Fr. David Tither had no license to solemnize marriage from the National
Archives or from the civil government. Hence, he was not under obligation
to register our marriage. It was a purely sacramental marriage rite, without
legal effect but definitely valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic
Church. It is called “matrimona de conciencia.” 17
However, Article 350 may be of doubtful constitutionality when applied to
religious exercise and expression insofar as it prescribes upon individuals
and religious communities formal requirements for the conduct of their
religious ceremonies. It puts a burden18 upon the exercise of beliefs by
criminalizing marriages performed in accordance with those beliefs, but
lacks some or all the requisites of a valid marriage under the law. These
requirements include not only age and consent, but also formal requisites
such as marriage license and civil authority of the solemnizing officer even
though violence, fraud, or intimidation was not present under the
circumstances. It may, therefore, limit religious exercise and expression to
the formalities of law.
Thus, unless respondent judge’s act of participating in a marriage ceremony
according to her religious beliefs violates other peoples’ rights or poses
grave and imminent danger to the society, 19 we cannot rule that respondent
judge is administratively liable for her participation in her religious marriage
ceremony.20
In Estrada,21 this court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of
benevolent neutrality should be applied. Under the test of benevolent
neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against a compelling state interest:
Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular
goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty
to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 22 (Emphasis in the
original)
We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit respondent
judge’s right to participate in religious and merely ceremonial acts that are
non-violative of other people’s rights and with no legally binding effect. The
institution of marriage is not threatened when we accommodate respondent
judge’s freedom to participate in such ceremonies even if they have secular
counterparts under our laws.
In any case, respondent judge did not ask that she and her husband be
given the same rights as civilly married partners before their civil wedding
in 1992. She does not ask that our laws recognize her marriage in 1990 as
valid. Respondent judge also does not seem to be against civil marriages.
She and her husband were even civilly wed after her marriage with her first
spouse was declared void.
However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot
shield respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our laws.
Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first
husband. She knew its effects under our laws. She had sexual relations with
her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting.
Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in sexual relations with
another person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of her
religious expression. Legal implications and obligations attach to any person
who chooses to enter civil marriages. This is regardless of how civil
marriages are treated in that person’s religion.
Moreover, respondent judge, as a lawyer and even more so as a judge, is
expected to abide by the law. Her conduct affects the credibility of the
courts in dispensing justice. Thus, in finding respondent judge
administratively liable for a violation of her marriage obligations under our
laws, this court protects the credibility of the judiciary in administering
justice. In the words of Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion in Estrada:
Court employees, from the highest magistrate to the lowliest clerk, are
expected to abide scrupulously with the law. They are held to a higher
standard since they are part of the judicial machinery that dispenses
justice. [T]here exists a compelling state interest to hold Escritor to the
same standards required of every court employee. If unsanctioned,
Escritor’s unlawful conduct would certainly impair the integrity and
credibility of the judiciary.23
Lawyers are not and should not be expected to be saints. What they do as
citizens of their faiths are beyond this court’s power to judge. Lawyers,
however, are officers of court. They are expected to care about and sustain
the law. This court’s jurisdiction over their actions is limited to their acts
that may affect public confidence in the Rule of Law. Our state has secular
interests to protect. This court cannot be expected to condone misconduct
done knowingly on account of religious freedom or expression.
Finally, the Office of the Court Administrator and the Administrators of lower
courts should look into the motives of persons who file complaints against
our judges and officers of court when allegations point to possible
administrative violations. This is not to say that complainants’ motives are
relevant to their causes of actions. However, complainants who come to
court with unclean hands should not be spared from liability just because
they were the first to submit their accusations.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera
guilty of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Judge Desales-Esidera is SUSPENDED from judicial service for
one (1) month with a warning that repetition of a similar offense will be
dealt with more severely. She is STERNLY WARNED that repetition of the
same violations in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Office of the Court Administrator is ORDERED to conduct an
investigation regarding respondent’s claims of illegal court activities.