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Constitutional Rights of Corporations STONEHILL V. DIOKNO:
 42 search warrants were issued against petitioners seeking to search the persons of the Stonehill et al. and the premises of various corporations of which the same were officers, in relation to alleged violations of Central Bank Laws, as well as other tariff, customs and tax laws.
RD:
 1. No standing- even as officers, petitioners have no standing to assail the legality of the search warrants as they have a distinct personality from the corporation they represent. It can only be invoked by the corporation itself. 2. Nevertheless, the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants as it lacked the allegation of a specific offense. In addition, the warrants issued were also in connection with more than one allegation, in contravention of the Rules of Court, as well as lacking in particularity of things or papers to be seized. (cf. Moncado-non-exclusionary rule abandoned).
BASECO V. PCGG:
 The PCGG was tasked with the sequestration of petitioner private corporation through Executive Orders. Accordingly, the former sought to obtain various corporate books and documents to achieve its purpose of taking over the corporation. BASECO invokes the right against self-incrimination.
RD:
 1. Juridical persons- being creatures of the State vested with certain privileges and franchises are subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter(Wilson v. US). In the exercise of its sovereignty, through a right reserved in the legislature, it has the power to investigate whether such a franchise has been abused and accordingly, demand the production of its books, documents and papers.
Liability for Torts PNB V .CA:
 PHILAMGEN, as surety seeks to recover an amount paid to PNB, from a bond executed in favor of Tapnio et al, the same being secured by the standing crops of the latter. Tapnio avers however, that the bank- having a lien on the crop-placed obstacles that denied the consummation of a lease contract over her excess sugar quota. PNB through its board of directors had wanted to raise the rental rate before granting its approval to the lease contract. This in turn, resulted in a loss of income for Tapnio as the potential lessee eventually refused to agree to the proposed terms.
RD:
 CF. Article 21, CC- Having known that the agricultural year was about to expire and the quota would be wasted if unused, the bank failed to observe the required diligence and prudence and subsequently caused injury to Tapnio as the latter was unable to utilize the same.
“A corporation is civilly liable in the same
manner as natural persons for torts, because "generally speaking, the rules governing the liability of a principal or master for a tort committed by an agent or servant are the same whether the principal or master be a natural person or a corporation, and whether the servant or agent be a natural or artificial person. All of the authorities agree that a principal or master is liable for every tort which he expressly directs or authorizes, and this is just as true of a corporation as of a natural person, A corporation is liable, therefore, whenever a tortious act is committed by an officer or agent under express direction or authority from the stockholders or members acting as a body, or, generally, from the directors as the governing
body’”.
 
Criminal Liability of a Corporation PEOPLE V. TAN BOON KING:
 Defendant was the manager of a corporation who had failed to pay the correct taxes.
RD:
 A corporation can only act through its agents and officers and when the same is liable for a felony, everyone involved in it may be punished.
 Entitlement to Moral Damages MAMBULAO V. PNB:
 Plaintiff corporation applied for a loan with the defendant bank and despite repeated demands, it failed to fulfill its
 
obligation to pay. Accordingly, PNB requested the co-defendant sheriffs herein to foreclose the mortgaged property of the corporation. Mambulao Lumber seeks moral damages as the sheriffs sold the properties in Camarines Norte as opposed to have the same conducted in Manila, as provided for in the agreement.
RD:
 An artificial person such as a corporation may not suffer from anguish, wounded feelings, shock or humiliation which are the bases for moral damages. Moreover, it had already ceased its operations by the time defendant-sheriffs took possession of its properties and any damage to its reputation would be irrelevant (NOTA BENE:Court granted
exemplary for the sheriffs’ acts).
 
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST V. CA:
 The huge loans obtained by MMIC eventually led to its foreclosure. Cabarrus, a stockholder thereof, initiated a derivative suit and along MMIC, was granted moral damages by the Arbitration Commission, premised upon the theory that the assets seized by the government in foreclosure proceedings belonged to another corporation that was predominantly owned by Cabarrus.
RD:
 Despite being a derivative suit, MMIC was never impleaded and was a non-party; as such, it was improper for it to receive an award of moral damages. More notably, due to its inability to settle its obligations, it had no reputation to protect- its name would not be besmirched by the proceedings. Anent Cabarrus, the award was improper as well, the action involved being one in behalf of MMIC, an entity distinct from its shareholders.
ABS-CBN V. CA:
 An injunction was filed by ABS-CBN to prevent RBS from exclusively airing Viva films, on account that there existed a perfected contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA when its representative Del Rosario had already agreed to the proposed terms. RBS filed for a suit for moral damages alleging that its reputation had been besmirched when it failed to air the movies it had promised its viewers.
RD:
1. The Court had dismissed the pronouncement in Mambulao as mere obiter and upheld the doctrine that corporations may not be the subject of moral damages as it is unable to suffer anguish or wounded feeling. 2. Moreover, moral damages are only awarded on the existence of malice or bad faith (cf. Human Relation Provisions)- it was deemed that ABS-CBN had acted properly and in seeking a relief for injunction, was truly convinced of the merit of its case, absent malice.
JARDINE DAVIES V. CA:
 Purefoods, after due bidding, granted a contract to FEMSCO for the installation of generators. Subsequently, the former unilaterally rescinded the contract and awarded the same to Jardine Davies, thereby injuring FEMSCO. The court a quo granted moral damages to FEMSCO on the premise that the
latter’s reputation had been tarnished as it had
abruptly canceled orders from its suppliers.
RD:
 Due to the rescission of the contract, FEMSCO suffered damage and correctly deserved the award. It had ordered supplies due to the
project’s urgency and had its corporate identity
besmirched when it duly canceled the same.
 MERALCO V. TEAM ELECTRONICS:
 Meralco alleges that respondent had tampered with its electrical meters, resulting in incorrect readings. Respondent corporation denied the allegations, and refused to pay the differential billings. As
such, petitioner disconnected the latter’s
electricity.
RD:
 While the Court for the most part agreed with TEAM Electronics, it deleted the award of moral damages. As a general rule, corporations may not be awarded the same as they are incapable of suffering wounded feelings. An exception however exists in
instances where a corporation’s reputation is
besmirched and such claims must be duly proven. In this instance, the deletion of the award is proper as the respondent corporation never adduced evidence to support the grant of moral damages.
 Nationality of a Corporation ROD RIZAL V. UNG SUI SI TEMPLE:
 Petitioner Registrar refused the registration of a donation of land in favor of respondents, an unregistered religious organization whose three trustees
 
were Chinese.
RD:
 The refusal was proper, pursuant to the Constitutional prohibition limiting the alienation of lands to Filipino nationals or corporations at least sixty-percent owned by Filipinos. It is irrelevant that the respondent was a religious organization and had no capital stock as its controlling membership were of foreign nationality.
RCA DAVAO V. ROD DAVAO:
 Rodis executed a deed of sale in favor of petitioner. The respondent Registrar had refused on account that the corporation had failed to comply with the Constitutional requirement of having sixty-percent of its stock being owned by Filipinos.
RD:
 1. The RCA of Davao is a corporation sole, comprised of one person and his successors, who, for perpetuity, enjoy various capacities and advantages. 2. A corporation sole has no citizenship and is the administrator of various temporalities in behalf of the faithful. 3. The Corporation Law expressly allows the registration of lands by a corporation sole.
PEOPLE V. QUASHA:
 Defendant was a member of the Philippine Bar found guilty of falsification, having made it to appear that a certain Baylon owned sixty per centum of Pacific Airways. It is
alleged that Baylon’s share was paid for by an
American and was a mere trustee of foreigners, resulting in a contravention of the Constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership. As such, the defendant interposes this appeal.
RD:
 1. For falsification to be appreciated, it must be shown that there existed a) an obligation to disclose the truth; and b) an intent to injure a third person. Quasha however, was under no obligation to reveal that Baylon was a mere trustee as the Constitutional prohibition refers to existing entities, and avoids the formation of public utilities with foreign capital. 2. In addition, a corporation entirely formed with foreign capital may subsequently transfer the same to Filipinos, in compliance with the law. The important thing is that it complies with such nationality requirements upon the application for its franchise or any other authority. 3. An impossible crime may also not be appreciated as the alleged prohibition does not exist.
FILIPINAS COMPANIA V. CHRISTERN:
 Respondent corporation sought the satisfaction of its claim against insurer-petitioner. Filipinas denied the same on the ground that the contested policy had ceased to be in effect upon the declaration of war against Germany and pursuant thereto, as Christern was controlled by German citizens, was an enemy. The prevailing law at the time- the Philippine Insurance Law- denied insurance coverage to those considered as public enemies.
RD:
 1. The Court applied the controlling test (Clark v. Ubersee) and determined that as the majority of shareholders who controlled Christern, et al. Incorporated were Germans, the same should be treated as an enemy corporation. 2. As the insured goods had perished after the corporation had become an enemy, it cannot avail of the indemnity provided by the insurance contract. 3. In the interest of equity, premiums paid after the corporation had become an enemy should be returned.
PALTING V. SAN JOSE:
 Respondent San Jose Petroleum, a Panamanian corporation, filed an application to have its shares traded in the Philippines, the proceeds therefrom to be applied to the operations of San Jose Oil, a domestic entity. Palting et al. contest the subsequent authorization granted to the respondent on the ground that the agreement between SJP and SJO would be in contravention of the Constitutional prohibitions on foreign ownership and other laws, as SJP owns 90% of SJO. In response, San Jose cites the Laurel-Langley Agreement as basis for its parity agreement.
RD:
 1. The Constitution restricts the ownership of corporations engaged in the exploitation of natural resources to companies with sixty percent Filipino ownership, alongside American citizens or corporations (by virtue of the parity amendment). As the respondent corporation herein is of Panamanian origin and is even further owned by two Venezuelan companies, they fall beyond the purview of what the law allows. 2. In addition, the

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