CHAPTER IV – RIGHT TO PRIVACY into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the

system.
DISINI vs SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
GR No. 203335, February 11, 2014 Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on
February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

FACTS ISSUES
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the
laptop or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their
other computers and enable him, among other things, to: commission as well as provisions that would enable the government to track down
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that and penalize violators. These provisions are:
he needs for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity; a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
for the general public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
or friends and read postings from them; d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
payments; f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail Cybercrimes;
address or telephone. j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of and R.A. 10175;
simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The l. Section 8 on Penalties;
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
and facility of communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail himself of p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully the latter by posting q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
defamatory statements against him that people can read. r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking and
into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him u. Section 26(a) on CICC’s Powers and Functions.
through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361,
trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography guileless children who have access and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
to the internet. For this reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate
the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. RULING
Section 4 of the Cybercrime Law
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses.– The following acts constitute the offense of
havoc to the computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful cybercrime punishable under this Act:
institutions as well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories of
innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual (c) Content-related Offenses:
dynamites that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and
memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these (1) Cybersex.– The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly
tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the
Prevention Act. aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating (2) Child Pornography. — The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1)
one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. – The transmission of commercial
electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or
administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users,
subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple,
valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further
commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely
disguise the source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely
include misleading information in any part of the message in order
to induce the recipients to read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications,
also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and
interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was
said to be making a "spam." The term referred to a Monty Python’s Flying Circus
scene in which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and Spam" when
reading options from a menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and
network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce
and technology, and interferes with the owner’s peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to one’s privacy since the person sending
out spams enters the recipient’s domain without prior permission. The OSG
contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic
ads reduce the "efficiency of computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the
age of computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads by mail. These
have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads.
What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these
mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete
or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech
is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection
as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is
nonetheless entitled to protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. — Law enforcement authorities, with
due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means
traffic data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by
means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities
in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon
written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or
record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be
incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected.
Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from
government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one
another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper governmental purpose
since a law may require the disclosure of matters normally considered private but
then only upon showing that such requirement has a rational relation to the purpose
of the law,79 that there is a compelling State interest behind the law, and that the
provision itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing regulations affecting privacy rights,
courts should balance the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional
guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for
there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public
good.82 To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be
able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or recording of traffic data
is a part, aims to provide law enforcement authorities with the power they need for
spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in cyberspace. Crime-
fighting is a state business. Indeed, as Chief Justice Sereno points out, the
Budapest Convention on Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt
legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect or record "traffic data,
in real time, associated with specified communications."83 And this is precisely what
Section 12 does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country to collect or
record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterday’s traffic data, like the scene of the crime after it
has been committed, adequate for fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time
data is superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who commit the
crimes of accessing a computer system without right,84 transmitting
viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or
consideration;86 and producing child pornography87 could easily evade detection and
prosecution by simply moving the physical location of their computers or laptops
from day to day. In this digital age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from
virtually anywhere: from internet cafés, from kindred places that provide free
internet services, and from unregistered mobile internet connectors. Criminals using
cellphones under pre-paid arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not
have listed addresses and can neither be located nor identified. There are many
ways the cyber criminals can quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child
pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law enforcement authorities
regarding their places of operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data
collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-issued search and
seizure warrant that can succeed in ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section 12 are too broad and
do not provide ample safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading the
people’s right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the Court
recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain constitutional guarantees work together
to create zones of privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and that
there exists an independent constitutional right of privacy. Such right to be left
alone has been regarded as the beginning of all freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the United States Supreme
Court classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational
privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making certain
important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right—the right to informational
privacy—that those who oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in
real-time seek to protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.91 In
determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court
has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the
right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter.
The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable.92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its
application to a particular person or group, petitioners’ challenge to Section 12
applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the
large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to
communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general public’s point of view. Without reasonable expectation of
privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who courses his
communication through a service provider, must of necessity disclose to the latter,
a third person, the traffic data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user.
For example, an ICT user who writes a text message intended for another ICT user
must furnish his service provider with his cellphone number and the cellphone
number of his recipient, accompanying the message sent. It is this information that
creates the traffic data. Transmitting communications is akin to putting a letter in
an envelope properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through the postal
service. Those who post letters have no expectations that no one will read the
information appearing outside the envelope.
Computer data—messages of all kinds—travel across the internet in packets and in
a way that may be likened to parcels of letters or things that are sent through the
posts. When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken up into packets
and around each of these packets is a wrapper or header. This header contains the
traffic data: information that tells computers where the packet originated, what kind
of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call, video, internet chat messages, email,
online browsing data, etc.), where the packet is going, and how the packet fits
together with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic data sent through the
internet at times across the ocean do not disclose the actual names and addresses
(residential or office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded internet
protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from one computer system to another
where their contents are pieced back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of
the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his cellphone, the service
provider’s communication’s system will put his voice message into packets and send
them to the other person’s cellphone where they are refitted together and heard.
The latter’s spoken reply is sent to the caller in the same way. To be connected by
the service provider, the sender reveals his cellphone number to the service
provider when he puts his call through. He also reveals the cellphone number to the
person he calls. The other ways of communicating electronically follow the same
basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the United States Supreme
Court reasoned that telephone users in the ‘70s must realize that they necessarily
convey phone numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a call. That
Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that phone numbers one dials should
remain private, such expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they cannot communicate or
exchange data with one another over cyberspace except through some service
providers to whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed for a
successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance of this data takes them out
of the private sphere, making the expectation to privacy in regard to them an
expectation that society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion that when seemingly
random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they
reveal patterns of activities which can then be used to create profiles of the persons
under surveillance. With enough traffic data, analysts may be able to determine a
person’s close associations, religious views, political affiliations, even sexual
preferences. Such information is likely beyond what the public may expect to be
disclosed, and clearly falls within matters protected by the right to privacy. But has
the procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn narrowly enough to
protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with due cause," to collect or
record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point
out that the phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence and that
whether there is due cause or not is left to the discretion of the police. Replying to
this, the Solicitor General asserts that Congress is not required to define the
meaning of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law through statutory
construction. But the cybercrime law, dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at
the meaning it intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General suggests
that "due cause" should mean "just reason or motive" and "adherence to a lawful
procedure." But the Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not even
bother to relate the collection of data to the probable commission of a particular
crime. It just says, "with due cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It
is akin to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which data collection will be
used. Will the law enforcement agencies use the traffic data to identify the
perpetrator of a cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an
identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and
lacks restraint. While it says that traffic data collection should not disclose identities
or content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly, nothing can prevent
law enforcement agencies holding these data in their hands from looking into the
identity of their sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will
unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or, worse, to extortion from
certain bad elements in these agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with
specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to
privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to authorize collection of
traffic data "in real time" because it is not possible to get a court warrant that would
authorize the search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless search is
associated with a police officer’s determination of probable cause that a crime has
been committed, that there is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless
the search is immediately carried out, the thing to be searched stands to be
removed. These preconditions are not provided in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section 12 provides minimal
protection to internet users and that the procedure envisioned by the law could be
better served by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance that law
enforcement authorities will not abuse the provisions of Section 12 is of course not
enough. The grant of the power to track cyberspace communications in real time
and determine their sources and destinations must be narrowly drawn to preclude
abuses.
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for being violative of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine and the overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines
however, have been consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech
cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor punishes any type of speech.
Therefore, such analysis is unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the government and kindred
institutions to monitor individuals and place them under surveillance in ways that
have previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the forces of a
technological age x x x operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society." The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these
technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the
rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to
computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.— When a computer data
is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall
issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General
concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a
presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed
violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as
well as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having
to go into a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is
indisputable that computer data, produced or created by their writers or authors
may constitute personal property. Consequently, they are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures, whether while stored in their personal
computers or in the service provider’s systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in
one’s papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under
its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order
cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case,
Section 19 operates as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace.
Certainly not all forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within
constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as illegal. But for an
executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial
warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates
some law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into
one.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on
speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of
interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any
provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can
actually be made to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into
consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the 2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D and CONSTITUTIONAL only in
searches and seizures. relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES: System
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
unsolicited commercial communications; squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
data in real-time; and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data. Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct
without right; application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION
transmission of viruses; of the crimes of:
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring 1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section
domain name over the internet in bad faith to the prejudice of 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
others; constitutes a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or as
misuse of identifying information belonging to another; 2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for favor or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the
consideration; same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID and
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when
crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code are committed with
the use of information and communications technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require
service providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber
information as well as specified content data for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data
under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and examination
of computer data under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of previously
preserved computer data after the expiration of the prescribed
holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to
cybercrime investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions;
and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes libel.

Further, the Court DECLARES:

1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original author of the post; but VOID
and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who simply receive the
post and react to it; and
OPLE vs TORRES
GR No. 127685, July 23, 1998
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to
prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men."[1] Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No.
308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System"
on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the
petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,
1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads
of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997,
we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO.
308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF
THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION."
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A
JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED
AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.
HELD: Yes. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution:
"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights
"Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law."
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized."
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety,
or public health, as may be provided by law."
"Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged."
"Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it
is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated
on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not
totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.
But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and
present danger. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and
computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness
of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent.
The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" null and void
for being unconstitutional.
ZULUETA VS CA
GR No. 107383, February 20, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner, Cecilia Zulueta is married to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin. That
petitioner accused her husband of infidelity.
That on March 26, 1982, petitioner went to the clinic of private respondent, who is a
doctor of medicine, without the consent of the latter. That on the same date
mentioned, petitioner opened the drawers and cabinet of her husband and took 157
documents and papers consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours. The documents found by petitioner were seized for use as
evidence in a case for legal separation filed by Zulueta. Dr. Martin brought this
action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The RTC, decided in favor of private respondent, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of properties described and ordering petitioner to return the
properties to Dr. Martin and pay him nominal and moral damages and attorney’s
fees, and cost of the suit. Furthermore, petitioner and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the
documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision made by the Regional Trial Court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the documents and papers in question are admissible in evidence.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987
Constitution) is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself
aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the provision in the
constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as provide by law. (Sec.3, Par.1, Art.III, 1987 Constitution) Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. (Sec.3, Par.2, Art.III,1987 Constitution)
A person, by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her. The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. (Sec.22,
Rule130, Rules of Court). Neither maybe examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. (Sec.24, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
PETITION DENIED
KMU vs ERMITA
487 SCRA 623 – Political Law – Control Power of the President
This case is consolidated with Consolidated with Bayan Muna vs Ermita
In 2005, Executive Order No. 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and
streamline the country’s id system. Kilusang Mayo Uno, Bayan Muna, and other
concerned groups sought to enjoin the Director-General from implementing the EO
because they allege that the said EO is unconstitutional for it infringes upon the
right to privacy of the people and that the same is a usurpation of legislative power
by the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to “adopt a
unified multi-purpose ID system.” Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as
part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs.
Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and
format. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the
government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data
collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
“President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices.” The same Section also mandates the President to “ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.” Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the
President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under
existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve
savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public.
The President’s constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need
any implementing legislation. Of course, the President’s power of control is limited
to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to
the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the
Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue
voter’s ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID
system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is
compulsory for all branches of government.
SABIO VS GORDON
504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res.
No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred
by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their
respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same
time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”
Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task.
Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is
rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily,
the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government,
being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation”
and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used
as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people
sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional
rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public
discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective
implementation.
G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Petition:
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the Court of
First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court.
Facts:
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates
inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his
picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was
merely standing on a barrel). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation , not only
in the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's
supposed wife
Suicide letter:
“Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a
cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery.
Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to burried among
Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of
your lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it
because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world
about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the
situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the
Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our
children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I
cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the
Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.”
Issue:
Whether or not the article published is a valid exercise of the right of freedom of
speech.
Held:
the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common
decency. More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency
in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government
and obedient to the laws."
Ratio:
the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not
"unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4"
the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not
"unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4"
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot fail to
impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's
simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the
readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and
the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not
"unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 4"
G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Petition:
Appeal for the decision convicting the accused for libel.
Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary charging
Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. they submitted this petition and
these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary.
1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los
Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would draw up
complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her
in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve
"gandus;"
2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on
trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain
the result of the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to
win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing,
and a few days later was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the
office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he
could still win if he would pay P50;
3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four
persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where he
secretly gave him (Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.
The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3
established. And acquitted Punsalan.
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first
instance granted the motion and reopened the hearing. The judge of first instance
ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted
on October 12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:
That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe,
Pampanga, P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with
malicious intent to prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at
said time and place justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province,
wrote, signed, and published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious,
defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace Mr. Roman Punsalan
Serrano (according to the petitioner the petition executed was libelous)
Issue:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right
to free speech and free press.
Held:
defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified
privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of
punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should
rather commend them for their good citizenship.
Ratio:
It is to the credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling
antedated by thirty-six years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States
Supreme Court, 5 to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise survive
the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the
guarantees of free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not
inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an
approach. The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not
denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue
to be so.
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to
criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public
concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for
proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a
duty which everyone owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of
any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to
bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish
them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of
republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly
means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect
to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a
redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course,
assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure
and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if
it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in
pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are
probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by
the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think
that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the
motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to
be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to
microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
Petition:
Appeal.
Facts:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a
citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in
the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the
administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a
number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he
has killed our independence."
He was Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation
of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority. The trial judge found as a fact, and we think
with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused made use of the language stated in the beginning of this decision and set
out in the information and he was convicted thereof.
Perez has appealed the case to this court.
Issue:
Whether or not the words uttered by Perez is protected by the freedom of speech
and the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances.
Held:
The words uttered is is not protected because there is a seditious tendency
in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a
state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government
and
Ratio:
Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government.
Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the
Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be
seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield
to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the
supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity
from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this
instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free
speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could
easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible
with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
G.R. No. L-38753 August 25, 1982
RAFAEL S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON
CITY and VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, respondents.
Petition:
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceeding to quash an information for libel
quoted in full the alleged offensive telegram.
Facts:
On October 14, 1972, petitioner (Rafael) filed a letter-complaint
with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent
(VIRGINIA), for alleged grave violations of the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service
rules. Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the aforementioned administrative
complaint by petitioner against the private respondent, the said petitioner sent the
subject libelous telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communication, which reads as:
“Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and [Communications]
Manila
In line with President Marcos appeal to give information on undesirable employees
in the government service to achieve the objectives of the New Society request that
investigation image of the activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public Service
Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru corrupt
practices considering that she has properties and spending above what her salary
can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust you
take necessary action stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano
Cuenco Quezon City and I will give further details stop Expecting prompt action on
this matter. “
Rafael Mercado
The telegram or communication was indorsed for investigation to the Board of
Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of the said Department
Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board of Transportation.
On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an amended administrative complaint
against the private respondent with the same Board of Transportation charging the
private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices,
and misconduct or discourtesy. The private respondent, submitted her answer to
the said administrative charges, and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation
rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as
innocent of the charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her.
The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative charges,
and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26,
1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of the charges, and
dismissing the complaint filed against her.
On July 17, 1973 petitioner, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Board of Transportation, but the said Board denied said motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the Board
of Transportation, petitioner, to further harass and malign the good character and
reputation of the private respondent, filed a complaint accusing the private
respondent and of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped and a
complaint for corrupt practices against the private respondent both complaints was
dismissed for lack of evidence.
Issue:
whether or not the telegram being qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the
special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Held:
petition is dismissed.
Ratio:
United States v. Bustos, 4 as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is
to the credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by
thirty-six years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme
Court, 5 to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of
whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and
free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly
meaningful, certainly calls for such an approach.ït¢@lFº The judiciary lives up to its
mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before.
It should continue to be so.
2 . Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege,
and this is one such instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." 6 His opinion
continues: " 'A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is
privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it
contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and
actionable.' 7 He then gave what was referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration
of the application of qualified privilege, " namely, "a complaint made in good faith
and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even
when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in
their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may
still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements must be made under an
honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not
necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if
it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in
pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by
the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further
element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should
be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some
natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such
unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege." 8 What casts doubt on
the good faith of petitioner is a summary of his conduct, viz a viz private
respondent: a letter complaint for grave violation of Republic Act No. 2260 and civil
service rules was filed by him with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation on
October 14, 1972. Fourteen days later, on October 28, 1972, the telegram subject
of this litigation, was sent to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Then on November 23, 1972, there was an amended complaint with the Board of
Transportation to include such charges as dishonesty, pursuit of private business or
corrupt practices and misconduct. The Board of Transportation found private
respondent innocent, in an order of June 26, 1973. There was a motion for
reconsideration on July 17, 1973 filed by petitioner. It was denied on August 29,
1973 and during the pendency of such administrative case, petitioner not content,
filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group a complaint against private
respondent and her husband, a relation, accusing them of selling a Ford Willys
engine, which was carnapped. After due hearing, a resolution was issued
recommending that said case be closed for lack of evidence. Again, during the
pendency of such administrative complaint, petitioner filed with the Criminal
Investigation Service, a complaint for corrupt practices against private respondent,
likewise found without support in the evidence submitted. The tenacity with which
petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would seem to indicate that a
doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner.ït¢@lFº The
prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving malice.
Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand.
In People v. Monton, 9 the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a
qualified privilege should be upheld was decided adversely against the claim of
those accused of libel, This Court made clear that malice can be shown. It "simply
puts the burden of doing so on the prosecution." 10 The ponencia of then Justice,
later Chief Justice, Makalintal distinguished the Bustos decision, thus: "That case is
not here applicable, because the acquittal of the accused therein on the ground that
the defamatory imputation was qualifiedly privileged was adjudged only after trial,
wherein the prosecution tried to establish, although unsuccessfully, the element of
malice." 11 Further, the opinion stated: " It need only be added that in the instant
case the information alleges that the defendants, appellees here, wrote and sent the
subject letter to the President 'with malicious intent and evil motive of attacking,
injuring and impeaching the character, honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of
one Jose J. Monteclaro ... and with malicious intent of exposing (him) to public
hatred, contempt, ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive.'
Under the foregoing allegation, the prosecution is entitled to go to trial and present
the necessary evidence to prove malice; and the denial, to it of the opportunity to
do so, upon the defendants' motion to quash, constitutes reversible error." 12
1. G.R. No. 107566. November 25, 2004]
BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND
GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA AND CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-
CHIEF, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (AND RAMON LABO,
JR., respondents.
Petition:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals, dated 07 January 1992, and the Resolution,[2] dated 29
September 1992, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dated 14
June 1990, which dismissed herein private respondents claim for damages.
Facts:
Before the 18 January 1988 local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her
column a series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective
positions in Baguio City. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from said articles, as well
as the respective dates when they were published in the Baguio Midland Courier:
January 3, 1988
. . . Of all the candidates for mayor, Labo has the most imponderables
about him, people would ask, Can he read and write? Why is he always
talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a Japanese Senator
or a barrio kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18 million aid to
Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the Midland
Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last
time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all advertisements
for him if he pays his old accounts first.[4]
January 10, 1988
I heard that the Dumpty in the egg is campaigning for Cortes. Not
fair. Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo, because
he has not also paid their medical services with them. Since he is donating
millions he should settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant
amount of P27,000 only. If he wins several teachers were signifying to
resign and leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of
Baguio.[5]
Claiming that the aforequoted portions of petitioner Afables column were tainted
with malice, private respondent instituted separate criminal and civil actions for libel
against herein petitioners. On December 26 1988, the Department of Justice
dismissed the criminal case due to insufficiency of evidence[6] while the civil suit was
raffled off to RTC, Branch 6, Baguio City.
In the complaint for damages, private respondent alleged that in her 03 January
1988 and 10 January 1988 columns, petitioner Afable made it appear that he could
not comply with his financial obligations; that Yuko Narukawa Labo (Narukawa
Labo), his co-plaintiff in the case before the trial court, was accused of
misrepresenting her social status to the general public thereby subjecting her to
public ridicule; that the subject articles were written solely for the purpose of
destroying his reputation, integrity, and personality as well as that of Ms. Narukawa
Labo; and that said articles were false, untrue, libelous, and published with evil
intent.
In their answer,[12] petitioners Baguio Midland Courier and Hamada denied that
petitioner Afables 03 and 10 January 1988 articles were libelous. They also claimed
that per their companys records, private respondent still owed them a certain sum
of money for the political ads and campaign paraphernalia printed by Baguio
Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., during private respondents 1984 campaign, and
that the 03 January 1988 column did not accuse Ms. Narukawa Labo of
misrepresenting herself before the public. Moreover, they asserted that petitioner
Afables write-ups were fair comments on facts and reports that were of public
interest as private respondent was a mayoralty candidate at that time.
In her answer,[13] petitioner Afable also denied that the quoted portions of her 03
and 10 January 1988 column were libelous, insisting that they were devoid of
malice and at most contained valid and timely doubts.[14] She also contended that
the contents of her column were protected by the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press and that the same were privileged as they dealt
with a public figure.
In its decision, dated 14 June 1990, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit. According to the trial court, the article in question was privileged and
constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity,
reputation, and honesty of private respondent who was a candidate for local elective
office at that time.
This decision of the trial court was, however, reversed by the appellate court.
Issue:
Whether or not the 10 January 1988 article of petitioner Afable was
defamatory. Held:
we hold that petitioner Afables article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of
public interest as it dealt with the character of private respondent who was running
for the top elective post in Baguio City at the time. Considering that private
respondent assured his would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of
his own money, petitioner Afables column with respect to private respondents
indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his financial status
which, in all probability, was still unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the
information might have dissuaded some members of the electorate from voting in
favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable result of the application of the
law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but public
interest in this case far outweighs the interest of private respondent.
Ratio:
 It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself
as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at
least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous
publication. Plainly, private respondent has the bounden duty to
present before the court evidence that a third person could easily
identify him as the person libeled. In this case, private
respondent has utterly failed to dispose of this responsibility.
 Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the
time the 10 January 1988 article was published. Nevertheless,
this fact does not remove said article from the mantle of
protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provision of
the Constitution. Indeed, as early as 1909, in the case of United
States v. Sedano,[44] this Court had recognized the publics right to
be informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of
candidates for public office.
“It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and
qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to
society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that
they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct
may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield
to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public
benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private character so
small, that such discussion must be privileged.
...
In such a case the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any
one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go
remediless. The privilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes
matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.”
It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and
qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to
society of such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived are so great, that
they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct
may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield
to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public
benefit from publicity is so great, and the chance of injury to private character so
small, that such discussion must be privileged.
GR No: 172203: Dionisio Lopez v People of the Philippines and Salvador
Escalante
Facts:
That sometime in November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Dionisio Lopez had allegedly
intended to injure its mayor, Salvador Escalante by putting up billboards and
signboards along the fence of Cadiz Hotel that read:
CADIZ FOREVER, _______________ NEVER
It was enough to garner enough attention and curiosity from bystanders and
residents. Eventually, a few days after, the accused affixed the nickname of the City
Mayor who was nicknamed “Bading” and the name of the City of Sagay making it
appear as:
CADIZ FOREVER
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER
City Mayor Salvador Escalante then filed a complaint against Lopez for libel, stating
it was a direct offense to his integrity and honor.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Lopez.
Issue:
Whether or not Lopez is guilty of libel
Ruling:
The court contended that the degree of the statement comes as a personal attack
and offensive on the part of the respondent, it is grossly insufficient to make it
actionable by itself.

Personal hurt, or embarrassment of offense, even if real, does not automatically

constitute to defamation. The fact that the language is offensive to one does not
make it actionable by itself. The Court also stated that the policy of a public official
may be attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or
ingenuity invent. A public official must not be too sensitive to comments as it is the
nature of their office to be open to public scrutiny.

Lopez was acquitted by the high court.

AM NO. 10-15-5-SC:

RE: Petition for Radio and Television Coverage of the Multiple Murder Cases
Against Maguindanao Governor Zaldy Ampatuan

Facts:

Due to the sensitive and grueling nature of the Maguindanao Massacre, including its
weight on public interest and its effect on the essence of press freedom in the
country, a petition was filed by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines
(NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the
victims, individual journalists from various media entities and members of the
academe to have live television and radio coverage of the trials. The petition prayed
that members of the media be given permit to record the trials.

That while live television and radio coverage of court proceedings are absolutely
banned, the petitioners cited the cases of Aquino and Estrada; the two instances
where media coverage was allowed in a court proceeding.

Issue:

Whether or not media coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre trials be allowed.

Ruling:

The Court granted pro hac vice, allowing the regulated media coverage of the trials
with a set of conditions to be complied with.

The Court contended that the matter at hand is once again a question of how to
uphold the right to public information, the freedom of the press, the rights of the
accused and the power of the court to control its proceedings to ensure a fair and
honest trial. Given the demands of the modern world, it is indeed about time for the
judiciary to come up of a win-win situation in safeguarding the following
fundamental rights. Law and technology can work to the advantage and furtherance
of the various rights involved. Technology also tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a
transparent, open and public trial.