4. People v. Bustinera, G. R. No.
G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004, FACTS: An Information for qualified theft was filed against petitioner Ryan Viray before the RTC. Accused
FACTS: On December 25, 1996, Bustinera reported for work as a taxi driver. It was agreed that he would drive
the taxi from 6AM to 11PM, and after which he would return the car and remit the boundary fee of Php780 per
day. Bustinera, however, did not return the taxi, and it was found abandoned in Lagro, Quezon City.
Bustinera does not deny that he did not return the taxi as he was short of the boundary fee. He
however claims that he did not abandon the taxi, but returned it on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book,
which was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer P2,500.00 as partial
payment for the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
RTC: GUILTY OF QUALIFIED THEFT – RECLUSION PERPETUA
ISSUE: Whether Bustinera is guilty of Qualified Theft?
Ruling:
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under 310 of RPC. However, ART. 310 has been modified
with respect to certain vehicles, by R.A. No 6359 (AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING
CARNAPPING). When statutes are in pari materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the
same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose
or object, the rule dictates that they should be construed together. Every statute must be so construed and
harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)
that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done
with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by
a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises
of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken
on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines carnapping as the
taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. The elements of carnapping are thus:
(1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is
done with intent to gain.
Carnapping is that taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the
latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
Carnapping is essentially robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery, and carnapping being the same.
While the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicle, it excepts coverage
certain vehicles such as roadroller, tolleys, lawn mowers, amphibian trucks, etc. By implication, the theft or
robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by ART. 310 of the RPC.
In the case at bar, since the appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it
is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle
does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law. While the nature of appellants
possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof,
his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and against the owner’s consent
transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one.
Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 6539, as amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not
more than 17 years and 4 months.
5. Viray v. People, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013,
Ryan Viray was employed as a dog caretaker of private complainant Zenaida Vedua (Vedua) and was never
allowed to enter the house. Vedua maintains seventy-five (75) dogs at her compound & Viray was employed
to help with the feeding and cleaning of the cages. He reports for work from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.
On October 19, 2006, at around 6:30AM, Viray arrived for work. At 7AM, Vedua left for Batangas.
Before leaving, she locked the doors of her house, and left Viray to attend to her dogs. When Vedua got
home, she noticed that her earrings were missing, and so were her her jacket inside her closet and her other
pieces of jewelry (rositas) worth PhP 250,000, a Gameboy, a compact disc player, a Nokia cellular phone and a
Nike Air Cap, amounting to PhP 297,800. Vedua discovered that the main doors of her house were
destroyed. A plastic bag was also found on top of her stereo. The plastic bag contained a t-shirt and a pair of
shorts later found to belong to Viray.
One of the witnesses, Nimfa Sarad, the laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbor, testified seeing Viray
at Vedua’s house at 6:00 a.m. By 11:00 a.m., she went out and saw Viray with an unidentified male companion
leaving Vedua’s house with a big sack.
Viray averred that he did not report for work on the alleged date o as he was then down with the
flu. His mother even called up Vedua at 5:30 a.m. to inform his employer of his intended absence. Around
12MN of October 20, 2006, Vedua called Viray’s mother to report the loss of some valuables in her house and
alleged that Viray is responsible for it. Petitioner’s sister and aunt corroborated his version as regards the fact
that he did not go to work on October 19, 2006 and stayed home sick.
RTC: Guilty of robbery
CA: Guilty of qualified theft; The appellate court found that the Information filed against Viray shows that the
prosecution failed to allege one of the essential elements of the crime of robbery, which is “the use of force
upon things.” Thus, to convict him of robbery, a crime not necessarily included in a case of qualified theft,
would violate the constitutional mandate that an accused must be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Nonetheless, the CA held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is warranted
considering that Viray enjoyed Vedua’s confidence, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets.
Issue: Whether Viray is guilty of qualified theft or robbery?
Ruling: Simple Theft
The crime charged against petitioner is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of qualified
theft, this Court has stated that the following elements must be satisfied before the accused may be convicted
of the crime charged:
1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force
upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

The prosecution had proved the existence of the first four elements enumerated above beyond reasonable
doubt.
 First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties. Second,
these properties belong to Vedua. Third, circumstantial evidence places petitioner in the scene of the crime
during the day of the incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in Vedua’s house and his clothes were found
inside the house. Fourth, Vedua had not consented to the removal and/or taking of these properties. With regard
to the fifth and sixths elements, however, the RTC and the CA diverge in their respective Decisions.
RTC CA
Taking committed by petitioner was not
The breaking of the screen and the door could not be
qualified by grave abuse of confidence, rather
appreciated to qualify petitioner’s crime to robbery as
it was qualified by the use of force upon
such use of force was not alleged in the Information.
things.
 Rather, breaking of the door is an indication of
In fact, Vedua made sure that she locked the
petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by private
door before leaving.
complainant.
Hence, Viray was compelled to use force to
Viray enjoyed the confidence of the private
gain entry into Vedua’s house thereby
complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets.
committing the crime of robbery, not theft.
SC: Simple Theft
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the
breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we disagree from its finding that the
same breaking of the door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence. Instead, We are one
with the RTC that private complainant did not repose on Viray “confidence” that the latter could have abused
to commit qualified theft.
The very fact that petitioner “forced open” the main door and screen because he was denied access to private
complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant.
But to warrant the conviction and imposition of penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the
information and proof that there existed between the offended party and the accused such high degree of
confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused. The
allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended party does not by itself create the
relation of confidence and intimacy required by law for the imposition of the penalty prescribed for qualified
theft. Hence, the conclusion reached by the appellate court that petitioner committed qualified theft because he
“enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets” is without legal
basis.
Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force in
breaking the door was not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held accountable for the crime of
simple theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.
6. Quinao v. People, G.R. No. 139603. July 14, 2000
Facts:
On February 2, 1993 at around 9AM, witness Bienvenido Delmonte stated that whilehe was busy working in
the agricultural land which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases
and Conchita Quinao, together with their other close relatives suddenly appeared. With the use of force, violence
and intimidation, accused usurped and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their
inheritance from their ascendants. They gathered coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant, Francisco
Delmonte, was forcibly driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try
to return to the land in, something will happen to him. Francisco Delmotne was thus forced to seek assistance
from the Lapinig Philippine National Police. Both the accused and Francisco Delmonte are claiming ownership
over the land in question.
RTC: Accused was found Guilty of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property
CA: Affirmed RTC decision
Issue: Whether accused is guilty of usurpation of real right in property?
Ruling:
Yes. Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of usurpation of real property as
follows:
Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property.—Any person who, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall usurp
any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of
violence executed by him shall be punished by a fine from 50 to 100 per centum of the gain which
he shall have obtained, but not less than P75 pesos. If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a
fine from P200 to P500 pesos shall be imposed.
The elements of the offense are (1) occupation of another’s real property or usurpation of a real right belonging
to another person; (2) violence or intimidation should be employed in possessing the real property or in usurping
the real right, and (3) the accused should be animated by the intent to gain. real property occupied or usurped
belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and that the possession of the usurper was
obtained by means of intimidation or violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property. In the
case, the matter on the ownership of the lot in question, however, had long been settled when, in Civil Case No.
3561 (ownership of real property) involving the predecessors-in-interest of private complainant.
The two (2) other requisites are: the employment of violence in acquiring possession, over the real
property or in usurping the real right and accused was animated by intent to gain. The RTC and the CA ruled
in the affirmative citing the testimony of prosecution witness Bienvenido Delmonte; that “on February 2, 1993
at around 9AM, witness Bienvenido Delmonte stated that whilehe was busy working in the agricultural land
which he owns in common with complainant Francisco Delmonte, accused Salvador Cases and Conchita
Quinao, together with their other close relatives suddenly appeared. With the use of force, violence and
intimidation, accused usurped and took possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their
inheritance from their ascendants. They gathered coconuts and made them into copra. Complainant, Francisco
Delmonte, was forcibly driven out by the accused from their landholding and was threatened that if he will try
to return to the land in, something will happen to him.”
7. People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, Aug 30, 2001 – avoid the Constitutional Law issues. Concentrate
on the Criminal Law issues such as the gravamen of Piracy, Territoriality, Persons Liable for the offense and
Conspiracy, etcetera; *take note of the story of Cheong San Hiong
Facts: In the evening of March 2, 1991, “M/T Tabangao,” a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation, loaded with petroleum products with a total value of P40,426,793.87, was sailing off the
coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island. The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto
Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, by seven fully
armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. were armed with guns and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the
vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name “Galilee,” with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew
was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.
On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area
presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to
the Philippines. The “M/T Tabangao” again sailed to Singapore where another vessel called “Navi Pride” was
anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of “M/T Tabangao” to transfer the vessel’s cargo to
“Navi Pride.” Accused- appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of “Navi Pride” in receiving
the cargo.
On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning
not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise
they would be killed. On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called
the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. A series of arrests was thereafter
effected. an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in
Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants.
Cheong San Hiong’s version:
On March 2, 1991, the day before “M/T Tabangao” was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong’s
name was listed in the company’s letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore
government as the radio telephone operator on board the vessel “Ching Ma.” Hiong was assigned to supervise
a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan, a
Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars.
Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong was asked twice to supervise the transfer of oil purchased by the Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto
firm from “M/T Galilee” to “Navi Pride.” Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines.
cargo in Singapore.
*Does this constitute a violation of accused- appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the
RTC: Accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice
doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct
No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
Issues: a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of “M/T Tabangao” and its cargo;
(1) Did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of “M/T Tabangao” and its cargo;
accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy? (c) and that his act was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of “M/T Tabangao” and its cargo. The ruling
(2) Did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong? of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the
(3) Can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal. Any doubt as to the participation of an individual in the
acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory? commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility. In the case at bar, accused-appellant
Ruling: Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of
(1 & 2) Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads: piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters.—The penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters,
shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize
the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement
or passengers.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
d. Piracy.—Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof
or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of
the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy.
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be
committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses
committed “in Philippine waters.” On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including “a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel in Philippine waters.” Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any person is
covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree
No. 532. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations.
(3) The attack on and seizure of “M/T Tabangao” (renamed “M/T Galilee” by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where
its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong’s
direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and
its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters. Moreover, piracy
falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not
with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532
which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters.
We likewise uphold the trial court’s finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8,
Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution
of the conspiracy. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the “M/T Tabangao” off Lubang,
Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from
the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew
and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had
to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and
seizure of “M/T Tabangao” since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-
appellants. Of notable importance is the connection of accused- appellants to one another. Accused-appellant