The Impeachment of Andrew Johnson

The Honorable Salmon P. Chase Presiding

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF THE IMPEACHMENT

OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Background : Johnson Impeached

The House of Representatives impeached Andrew Johnson, the seventeenth President of United
States at five o’clock p.m. on February 24, 1868 by a vote of 126 yeas to 47 nays. On February
25, Thaddeus Stevens and John A. Bingham appeared in the Senate chamber. Mr. Stevens
spoke, "In obedience to the order of the House of Representatives and of all the people of the
United States. We do impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes
and misdemeanors in office; and we further inform the Senate that the House of
Representatives will in due time exhibit articles against him, and make good the same, and in
their name we demand that the Senate take order for the appearance of said Andrew Johnson to
answer said impeachment."
Challenge: Retrial by You
The Senate will reassemble as a court on March 23, 1868. You, dear students, will play the key
roles in this great historical event. In our class the "trial" of Andrew Johnson will begin on
____________________. Pretrial papers of no more than two pages will be due a few days
earlier on ____________________. These papers should focus on two issues: 1) the major
factors underlying the dispute between President Andrew Johnson and Congress before the
summer of 1867--"Setting the Scene" and 2) the substance of your anticipated testimony if you
are a witness or your opening statement before the Senate if you are an attorney.

Interviews
On _____________________ the six attorneys and President Johnson will interview the
prospective witnesses in class and determine which witnesses they plan to call on their behalf
and the order of the witnesses. (The teacher, who will also double as Chief Justice Salmon
P.Chase who presided over the trial, will ensure that all witnesses are called.)

Trial
The next day, on _____________________the trial will begin. The charges against President
Johnson are as follows:

A) Dismissing Edwin M. Stanton as Secretary of War in violation of the Tenure of Office Act

B) Attempting to bring into disgrace, ridicule and contempt the Congress of the United States
by grossly intemperate language

Your Roles
All students except those playing the attorneys, President Johnson or the newspaper editors will
double as Senators; they will shed their previous persona and vote on each charge separately
and at the end of the trial write a paper defending their vote by citing evidence introduced in
the course of the trial. That paper will be due ten days after the impeachment proceedings close.

Your Vote
In the real trial of President Andrew Johnson the Senate fell one vote short, 35-19, of the two-
thirds required for dismissal from office. Our class will use the same Constitutional
requirement of a two-thirds vote. The outcome, however, may be different.

Who wins?
The team presenting the most persuasive argument wins the trial. The winners in this game will
depend on YOUR final vote!
 Pre-Trial Papers
The first thing that everyone in class will do is compose pre-trial papers. The purpose of these papers
is to provide background knowledge on the conflict between Andrew Johnson and Congress. Your
paper should include discussion of the following:

• What was President Johnson's Reconstruction plan? Why did it so anger the Senate?
• Explain the Tenure of Office Act.
• Why did President Johnson believe the Tenure of Office Act to be an unconstitutional
abridgment of his power?

Your essay should be no more than two pages. It is due __________________________.

Parts and Roles

All students in class will have a role to play, although some roles will be bigger than others. Here are a
list of the parts available:

• Reporters: each reporter will write an editorial each day of the trial summarizing what is going
on (they are free to interview witnesses and attorneys to find out information, and can provide
general summaries of the events as well)
◦ William Blunt: a fictional newspaper editor who supports Andrew Johnson
◦ Martina Wader: a fictional newspaper editor who supports the Radical Republicans
• Attorneys: attorneys will conduct the trial; they will responsible for submitting an opening
statement and a closing statement; they must also talk to their witnesses and prepare testimony
◦ Prosecuting attorneys (3)
◦ Defense attorneys (3)
• Witnesses: witnesses will be called by their respective side to testify their knowledge and
opinions about the President; each witness will turn in a document detailing what their
contribution to the trial is, and their conversations with their attorney
◦ Andrew Johnson: the person at the center of the trial, accused of violating the Constitution
by firing his Secretary of War without Congressional authorization
◦ John Logan: one of the House's leading proponents of impeachment [prosecution witness]
◦ Lyman Trumbull: a Northerner who was sympathetic to Johnson [defense witness]
◦ Thaddeus Stevens: Radical Republican who opposed the President [prosecution witness]
◦ Ulysses S. Grant: Union general and Lincoln ally who (begrudgingly) supported
impeachment [prosecution witness]
◦ Edwin Stanton: Secretary of War who was dismissed from his position by the President
[prosecution witness]
◦ James Brooks: Northern Democrat who favored a lenient Reconstruction policy [defense
witness]
• Senators: everyone remaining in class will comprise the Senate, and will be voting on whether
or not to convict Andrew Johnson of his crimes; each Senator will write a biography of Andrew
Johnson
 The Trial Itself
Please right down your part on the line so you do not forget: __________________________

Senators will be responsible for writing a biography of Andrew Johnson, in order to get a sense of the
man and how his background shaped the decisions that he made. Your biography should include the
following:

• Describe his early life. How do you think his experiences helped shape him, in particular
making him hostile to other members of the Senate?
• As a Southerner, why do you think he called Confederates “traitors”?
• Ultimately, do you think that Andrew Johnson is unfairly viewed as a “difficult” president? Or
does he deserve the scorn that has been heaped on him by historians? Explain.

Witnesses will be responsible for writing up their testimony; essentially, you are composing a loose
“script” of what you plan on saying on the stand. Thus, the witnesses need to read the documents
presented to understand how their character feels about Andrew Johnson and the Tenure of Office Act.
Then, they need to communicate with their attorney and develop the questions that the attorney will ask
them while on the stand. The testimony and questions will be turned in for a grade.

Attorneys will be responsible for developing both an opening statement and closing argument, as well
as sitting down with the witnesses and writing the questions they will ask on the stand. The opening
statement should:

• Provide the theme of the case (why are we here?)

• Briefly preview the expected testimony
• Set the scene for the jury; what will they be hearing about in the day's testimony?
• In your last sentence, summarize the case in one sentence

The closing argument should:

• State the basis of the case

• Highlight the key parts of testimony or law that benefit your side
• Make your arguments clear and succinct

Reporters will write an editorial on each day of events in the trial (both the trial itself AND on the pre-
trial days when attorneys are consulting with their clients). The reporters are allowed to talk
to/interview the attorneys and witnesses if they want (but ONLY the people on their “side”, so the
reporter from the North is only allowed to talk to the prosecution and their witnesses). They are also
allowed, and encouraged, to give their own thoughts about the trial, how it is being conducted, and who
should win.

Trial Procedure
• Opening statement by prosecution
• Opening statement by defense
• Prosecution witnesses and cross-examination
• Defense witnesses and cross-examination
• Closing argument by prosecution
• Closing argument by defense
 Documents for Senators
Harper's Weekly, May 13th, 1865
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON
Andrew Johnson, the seventeenth President of the United States, was born in Raleigh, North Carolina,
December 29, 1808. His father died while he was yet scarcely advanced beyond infancy, and the family
was thus left in extreme poverty. At ten years of age Andrew was apprenticed to a tailor.

Here a casual circumstance gave direction to his whole after-life. Among his master’s customers was an
eccentric gentleman who habitually visited the shop and read aloud from books or newspapers to the
journeymen. The boy soon learned to read from this gentleman, and after the long day’s work was over
he regularly devoted two or three hours to study. Upon the expiration of his term of apprenticeship he
was seventeen. He then left Raleigh, and pursued his trade for two years at Laurens Court House, South
Carolina. Thence he returned to Raleigh, and very soon after moved westward with his mother to
Tennessee, and at Greenville again appears as a tailor. Here he married, and his choice of a partner
proved exceedingly fortunate for his future prospects. He knew now how to read. But his wife taught
him writing and arithmetic.

It was in 1829 that Mr. Johnson held his first office – that of Alderman. He was elected Mayor in 1830,
and served in that capacity three years. In 1835 he was sent to the State Legislature. His politics were
those of the party then known as Democratic. His first speech was against a measure for internal
improvement. In 1841 he was elected to the State Senate, and two years afterward representative in
Congress. In regard to the admission of Texas into the Union, the Mexican war, the Tariff of 1846, and
the Homestead Bill, Mr. Johnson took very strong Democratic ground. In 1851 he was chosen
Governor of Tennessee, to which office he was re-elected in 1855. In 1857 he was elected to the United
States Senate for the full term, which ended in 1863.

Mr. Johnson’s record during the revolutionary period out of which we are now passing at first may be
said to have fluctuated in certain respects, but it was never for a moment doubtful as to the necessity of
the Union. In a speech of his delivered December 19, 1860, while he was defiant against the threat of
Southern States to force the Border States into the Confederacy, he also gave some ambiguous
utterances as to the insult which would be offered to any State by the threat of coercion from the North.
But in that speech his argument against secession was very strong as affecting Southern interests. He
predicted that disunion must destroy slavery; that a hostile or even alien government upon the border of
the slaveholding States would be the natural haven of rest to the hunted slave. He said that if one
division was allowed others would follow; "and," said he, "rather than see this Union divided into
thirty-three petty governments, with a little prince in one, a potentate in another, a little aristocracy in a
third, a little democracy in a fourth, and a republic somewhere else – a citizen not being permitted to
pass from one State to another without a passport or a commission from his government – with
quarreling and warring among the petty powers, which would result in anarchy – I would rather see this
government to-day – I proclaim it here in my place – converted into a consolidated government."

In a speech made March 2, 1861, he said: "Show me those who make war on the Government and fire
on its vessels, and I will show you a traitor. If I were President of the United States I would have all
such arrested, and, if convicted, by the Eternal God I would have them hung!"

On the 4th of March 1862, after the capture of Nashville by the National forces, Mr. Johnson was
appointed by the President Military Governor of Tennessee, with the rank of Brigadier-General. The
acceptance of this position necessitated, of course, the resignation of his situation in the Senate. As
Military Governor Mr. Johnson was both just and firm. If he exacted a very rigorous test-oath from the
disloyal, it was because he was convinced that, in justice, all government must be in the interest of
loyal men. If he exacted from rich secessionists large sums of money for the support of the poor
citizens who had been impoverished by the rebellion, it was because those men were responsible for
the poverty which was thus alleviated.

As to Mr. Johnson’s future policy, his explicit statements leave us no room for doubt. Against
responsible, conscious traitors the law must take its course as against other criminals. They must not
only be punished, but impoverished. The problem of restoration is one for loyal men to solve. Except in
the abolition of slavery, the States are to retain the character which belonged to them before the war.
We are pledged, according to the requirements of the Constitution, to secure to these States a
republican form of government. In reply to the question, What constitutes a State? Mr. Johnson
answers, "Its loyal citizens." It is into the hands of these that the work of reconstruction be committed.

Mr. Johnson comes into power through a most melancholy occurrence, but he has entered upon the
duties of his office with a dignity and firmness that elicits at the same time the confidence of the
American people. May God spare his life and guide his steps!

There are points in the policy of reconstruction that have hitherto been little discussed, but which must
very soon assume important phases. The emancipation of four millions of slaves, it is thought, will but
partially effect the work of political regeneration in the South. If the reports which reach us have any
truth, it is certain that there is a large class in the South whose prejudice against the sentiments held at
the North is as strong as ever before. There are men and women there who will teach their children to
hate the name of Northern men. There are politicians of this class who will strive again for power,
which they will wield as unscrupulously as they have ever done. A barrier against the possibility of
such an exercise of power must be set at the very first, or we shall have no tranquil peace for many
years. The only remedy is to not simply free but also to enfranchise the negroes. Give the negroes a
vote and they will most certainly be courted by both parties at the South. It may be objected that they
will thus become merely the tools of politicians. But it must be remembered that freedom will excite
new activities in these black men. They will have leaders of their own; they will have sentiments of
their own; and the policy which they will most naturally adopt will be that which will bring them into
alliance with the poor loyal whites of the South. Besides, their memories of the past oppression of
which they have been the victims, their memory of the part which colored soldiers have played in the
war for the Union – all these will bind them to a purely Democratic policy.

Harper's Weekly, December 9th, 1865

The President's Fidelity
Those of the friends of the President who have feared that he would imperil the advantages won by the
war by a fatal leniency, or still worse, by joining a party which has been utterly repudiated by the
people of the country, have allowed their fears to obscure their perceptions. Whatever the President has
said has been full of a determination that the rights of freedom which the war has conferred upon a
certain class of the Southern population, and the class which is most friendly to the Government, shall
be maintained. He expresses himself in his own way, but he never varies the strain.

Thus, to the Governors and Legislatures and Committees of the unorganized States he has constantly
said: "Certain things are essential. The emancipation amendment and equality before the law are among
them. Farther I say nothing. My action will depend upon events." To Mr. Stearns he said that, as a
citizen of Tennessee, he should be in favor of negro suffrage there under certain conditions. But he said
nothing better than what General Fiske reported in his speech in Brooklyn. The General went to the
White House to offer his resignation. The President said to him:

"People say sometimes I was born South, and I will not treat the negro as a freeman; but I mean and
desire to carry out the views of the great and good Abraham Lincoln, and to see that these people have
a guarantee of their freedom. I may not believe with you in their ultimate attainments, but I mean they
shall have a fair chance. (Cheers) I wish the people of the North knew what I had to stand between.
Daily I receive telegrams and letters from all parts of the South of dreadful import. If they could but see
the difficulties of my position they would pity me and give me their prayers." This he said with tears in
his eyes; and I asked him if the Freedmen’s Bureau was to be discontinued – my resignation being
already in his hands – and he said to me, "Go back; go to your work, and see justice done to both white
and black. The Freedmen’s Bureau will only cease to exist when the Southern States are resolved to
deal honestly and justly by these freedmen." (Applause) And I came away from his presence with more
of faith and hope in Andrew Johnson than I have ever had.

It is apparently forgotten that during the war Andrew Johnson was at the front. He saw with his own
eyes the terrible details of the struggle. He measured the spirit of rebellion. He knew the conduct of
rebels, and he knew also that of the slaves. He proved the quality of their fidelity as every other Union
soldier proved it. It was Andrew Johnson who walked before the seats of Mason, Slidell, and the other
conspirators in the Senate, and shook his finger in their faces, denouncing men who should do what
they intended to do as traitors whom, had he the power, he would hang. It was Andrew Johnson who
told the colored men of Tennessee that he would be their Moses.

Such a man is not easily seduced. The blandishments of his enemies are not likely to dazzle a man who
has looked behind the servile manner and the smiling mask. No man knows better than he that the party
which sought to use him, and monopolize the reputation of regard for him and support of his policy, in
order to carry an election, and which disastrously failed, is a party which never relents or forgives. It
would no more adopt him as a candidate than it did Tyler or Fillmore. The future of Andrew Johnson is
linked with that vast body of loyal men who were the war party while the war lasted, and who intend,
now that it is over, to plant peace upon justice, and cement the Union by liberty.

Harper's Weekly, March 10th, 1866

The President's Speech
That the President of the United States should have been incited by a shouting crowd of his fellow-
citizens to denounce by name a Senator, a Representative, and a private citizen, and to speak of another
citizen in the slang of the stump, is something so unprecedented and astounding that, while every
generous man will allow for the excitement of passion, there is no self-respecting American citizen who
will not feel humiliated that the chief citizen of the Republic, in such a place, on such a day, should
have been utterly mastered by it.

Yet the servility which actually defends and approves such an outburst of passion is even more
deplorable. The President, excited and exasperated, may be charitably supposed unconscious of the real
scope of his words when he accused Mr. Sumner and Mr. Stevens of inciting to his assassination. It is
conceivable that he was too angry to weigh his words when, after calling for justice upon traitors -
meaning the gallows - he denounced those gentlemen as traitors. But for an editor to sit deliberately
down and elaborately justify so tragical an outrage of the plainest official propriety upon the ground
that the speaker said that he should "stand by the Constitution," is an offense so contemptible as to be
ludicrous. The President has taken a solemn oath to "stand by the Constitution," and nobody supposes
that he intends to perjure himself. But the Senator and Representative have taken quite as solemn an
oath, and their purpose is no less undoubted. Is it treason and deserving of death to differ from the
President’s view of constitutional duty? How if, because of a difference of opinion as to constitutional
obligation, the Senator and Representative had denounced the President by name as a traitor like
Jefferson Davis? Would they be excused on the ground that they declared they would "stand by the
Constitution?"
 Documents for Andrew Johnson
Harper's Weekly, March 3rd, 1866
The Veto Message
The Senate did wisely in adjourning after the Veto Message [note: the “veto” referred to in this
reading was Johnson vetoing legislation that would have continued to fund the Freedmen's Bureau]
was read. Legislation under such excitement is not likely to be dignified or sagacious. That the
Message was a sore disappointment to the truest friends of the President can not be denied. Their regret
may be measured by the rejoicing of those who would fain use him for their own purposes. Whether
those friends are to be found among those who most earnestly advocated his election, or those who
most strenuously opposed it, whether those who were in bloody rebellion at the South, and those who
heartily supported them at the North are really the wisest advisers upon the great problem of
reorganization, are questions which time will adequately answer.

Of the President’s sincerity there is no doubt. That he honestly wishes, as he says, to secure to the
Freedmen the full enjoyment of their liberty we fully believe. But he seems to us not entirely master of
his own positions. Thus he acknowledges the usefulness of the Freedmen’s Bureau as established by
the act of last March. But he regards it as a war measure, and war having ceased, he is of opinion that
the matter should be left to the States. Yet, if war has ceased, why does he support General Terry’s
military order reversing the action of the Virginia Legislature? So the President says that in his
judgment the late rebel States "have been fully restored, and are to be deemed to be entitled to enjoy
their constitutional rights as members of the Union." Yet if this be so, why in his late proclamation
restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus did he except the late rebel States? The Constitution
defines the conditions under which the right of suspending the privilege may be exercised. It is only
when in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. Yet he expressly exhorts us in the
Message not to suppose that the United States are in a condition of civil war.

The Freedmen’s Bureau is exceptional, but it is so only because the condition of the country is
exceptional. All the President’s acts in initiating the reorganization of the late rebel States were
exceptional. But the question of the hour is very simple in itself, however difficult it may be to answer.
How can the United States most surely and judiciously and temperately secure the fruit of the victory
they have won? Having given liberty to millions of slaves, how can the authority that conferred it
maintain its perpetuity? To suppose that a coerced adoption of the Emancipation Amendment, without
any specific method of enforcing it, will produce this result is as idle as to imagine that a declaratory
resolution would effect it. The Constitution itself contains a guarantee of free speech for every citizen,
but it did not secure it in half the country. Why should we expect of an amendment a virtue which does
no inhere in the original instrument? The President says that a system for the support of indigent
persons was never contemplated by the authors of the Constitution. Certainly not, and this bill is no
more such a system than an appropriation for military hospitals would be. It is a simple necessity of the
situation. Shall these homeless, landless, forlorn persons be left to the mercies of those who despise and
hate them, or shall the United States say, "We cut the bonds that bound you to the ground, and we will
protect you while you are struggling to get upon your feet?"

If the President believes that the word of the nation sacredly pledged to the freedmen will be kept by
the black codes of South Carolina and Mississippi, his faith would remove mountains. And if he
proposes to abandon the freedmen to civil authorities created exclusively by those who think that the
colored race should be eternally enslaved, who deny the constitutionality of emancipation, and who
have now a peculiarly envenomed hostility to the whole class, we can only pray God that the result
may be what we have no doubt he honestly wishes it to be. We believe that he is faithful to what he
conceives to be the best interest of the whole country. And while upon this question we wholly differ
from him, we differ with no aspersion or suspicion.
Harper's Weekly, October 27th, 1866
WHAT NEXT?
The President has for some months declared plainly that, in his judgment, Congress is not a
constitutional body; and the air has been full of rumors and surmises as to his probable action upon the
meeting of Congress...

The case will bear to be constantly stated. The President differs with Congress as to the conditions of
restoration which ought to be imposed upon the late rebel States. He speaks of their "exclusion," and of
their "right" to be represented, and of the "usurpation" of Congress in requiring conditions, but it is
nevertheless true that he himself united in such exclusion; that he denied their "right" to representation
by exhorting them to form governments which should be satisfactory to Congress; and that he imposed
certain terms satisfactory to himself. The theory now adopted by him is utterly subversive of the
Government and of a harmonious Union, for it allows any State to make war upon the Union, and at
any moment, by laying down its arms, to resume all its relations within it without any guarantee
whatever of future security.

That such is not the theory of the people who have maintained the Government during the war is made
perfectly clear by the autumn elections, and nothing is plainer than that they will not submit to its
practical enforcement. If the President should undertake to withstand their resolution, he could succeed
only by totally overpowering them, and surrendering the Government to its most envenomed enemies
and the Union to the care of those who hate it. His success would, of course, be the present end of the
American Union, and the discomfiture of the principle of popular government. But as his chief reliance
in the struggle would be upon the late rebels, it would be for him and his friends to remember that his
opponents would be the mass of the lately victorious people of the loyal States together with all the
Union men of the South of every color.

Every patriotic and thoughtful man is naturally unwilling to believe that so grievous a contest is
possible; but with a man like the President everything is possible. No fear of being an alarmist should
prevent every man from looking steadfastly at the facts, or from considering the drift of the situation.
The President has not ceased to vituperate Congress as an illegal body. The difference between them
has been presented to the people, and they have declared every where for Congress. That is not a result
which is likely to pacify such a man as the President. He knows that he is openly threatened with
impeachment. Mr. Boutwell, at a meeting in Faneuil Hall in Boston, announced that he should move in
Congress an inquiry looking to impeachment. Mr. Loring, in supporting the nomination of General
Butler, says that he is pledged to the same course. Is it probable that the President will meet Congress
and send in his Message as if nothing had happened? If he be persuaded that he is likely to be
impeached, is it not possible that he might endeavor to gain the advantage in advance over the
impeaching body?

But we hope sincerely that the President may not only hear but fully understand the result of the
elections. He has constantly asserted his faith in the people, and certainly he has now heard from the
people. But as the spiritual medium always insists when the experiment fails that the conditions are not
favorable, so the President may contend that "the people" means the whole voting population of the
country at the South as well as at the North. If, however, he plants himself upon that ground, he should
remember that even then the majority of an entire Congress must be held to indicate the popular will,
and that that has decided against him.

Since it has so decided, the President may now wisely and properly say and do what he did when the
Civil Rights Bill was passed over his veto. He may declare that he differs, but at the same time he may
submit to the superior will. It is well for us all to anticipate that action upon his part, without losing
sight of the possibilities of which we have spoken. That is the plain way of peace, and his own
satisfaction in walking in it would be beyond his most ambitious dreams...
 Documents for John Logan
Harper's Weekly, September 30th, 1865
General Logan Upon Reorganization
General John A. Logan, the old leader of the Douglas Democrats in Illinois, and one of the most
distinguished soldiers of the war, lately made a speech at Jacksonville, Illinois, reviewing the events of
the last four years:

"With reference to the reconstruction policy pursued by the Government, he said that it was but an
experiment, and so long as there was any hope of its success he would yield a hearty support to the
President. He confessed, however, that he had his doubts as to the wisdom of pardoning arch rebels by
the wholesale. He thought it better to wait and test the sincerity of their repentance. He was opposed to
the restoration of the rights of citizenship to men whose skirts had hardly been cleansed of the
defilement of treason, and whose fingers were yet dripping with the blood of the martyrs of the Union.
He would wait and see whether they brought forth fruit meet for repentance before granting them the
privileges of the elective franchise."

Harper's Weekly, September 30th, 1865

The President's Experiment
We elsewhere call attention to a remarkable speech of General John A. Logan’s in Jacksonville, Illinois.
The General says that the policy of reconstruction adopted by the Administration is an experiment, and
that it is the duty of all good citizens to stand heartily by the President until it is proved a failure.

That is precisely the ground which a true Conservatism now occupies. The Democratic Conventions, in
breathless haste to eat their own words of the last few years, vociferate their adherence to the
President’s policy, and amiable poets of the morning press behold vast hosts of Jacobins marshaling
under blood-red banners to oppose it. But as the President is merely trying an experiment, it is rather
premature vehemently to support or rancorously to oppose his policy; nor is any country in a very
"parlous state" when its Jacobins are the most intelligent, conservative, and substantial part of its
population.

The President, acting from the necessity of the case and for the public safety, has set aside the civil
officers elected in various States under their Constitutions, and has appointed provisional Governors of
his own. He has further prohibited thirteen certain classes of voters under the Constitutions of those
States from exercising the right of suffrage, and has authorized a certain number, who are also qualified
by the State Constitutions, to vote for members of a Convention. This Convention is to remodel the
existing State Constitutions, and to proceed, under them, to elect State Officers and representatives in
Congress. The Constitutions and, by consequence, the validity of the officers elected, are to be
submitted to the Government for approval. In the President’s words, the Convention is "to present such
a republican form of State Government as will entitle the State to the guaranty of the United States
therefore, and the people to protection by the United States against invasion, insurrection, and domestic
violence."

This is all that the President has done. This is his whole policy thus far. It is, as General Logan says,
"an experiment." The President virtually says to certain persons in the States, "See what you can do.
Suggest your plan." But he does not say that the plan shall be adopted. He does not promise that the
Constitution shall be approved and the elections under it legitimated. The very object he has in view is
to try the temper of the class of the population which he selects. To prove whether the local political
power of the States may be safely confided to them. Nor does he assume finally to decide so vital a
question. He leaves it. Where it belongs, to the nation itself, to the representatives of the people.
The Democratic resolutions and the amiable chatter about opposition assume that it is not an
experiment: that the President has declared the Constitution framed by the voters he has selected, and
the elections held under it, to be the law without further process or approval. This is exactly what he
has not done, and could have no pretense of authority for doing. If he had done it, if he had said that a
certain class of persons in the States named by him should elect a convention, that that convention
should frame a Constitution, that the elections should be held under the Constitution, and that
thereupon that State should be recognized as having resumed all its relations in the Union, and its
Representatives and Senators should be admitted to Congress as a matter of course, then, indeed, he
would have laid down a policy, and the whole country would have crackled in opposition to it.

But the President is much too sagacious a man to have declared within less than two months after the
surrender of Lee that a Constitution for South Carolina such as Mayor Macbeth or Wade Hampton
might devise should be accepted by the loyal people of the United States. He said, simply, "Let us find
out where we are. If Mayor Macbeth and Wade Hampton should happen to be wise, so much the better.
There is no harm in trying. If they are not wise, we can try again."

Thus far the President is merely trying an experiment, and whether we think the principles upon which
it proceeds promise success or failure, we ought loyally and patiently to await the event. So says
General Logan; so says Maine; so says Vermont; so says California; so say we all.
 Documents for Lyman Trumbull
Harper's Weekly, June 6th, 1868
THE DISSENTING SENATORS
Whoever has read the opinions of Senators Fessenden, Grimes, and Trumbull, however he may regret
the conclusions to which they come, will not deny the ability, dignity, and candor with which their
views are stated. They all knew the storm of obloquy that was sure to follow their action, but they leave
no doubt that, however they may differ with many of their party friends upon the particular point
involved in the Impeachment, they are still in hearty sympathy with the great purposes of the party.

Senator Trumbull said:

"In coming to the conclusion that the President is not guilty of any of the high crimes and
misdemeanors with which he stands charged, I have endeavored to be governed by the case made
without reference to other acts of his not contained in the record, and without giving the least heed to
the clamor of intemperate zealots who demand the conviction of Andrew Johnson as a test of party
faith, or seek to identify with and make responsible for his acts those who from convictions of duty feel
compelled on the case made to vote for his acquittal. His speeches and the general course of his
administration have been as distasteful to me as to any one, and I should consider it the great calamity
of the age if the disloyal element, so often encouraged by his measures, should gain political
ascendancy. If the question was, is Andrew Johnson a fit person for President? I should answer no; but
it is not a party question, nor upon Andrew Johnson’s deeds and acts, except so far as they are made to
appear in the record, that I am to decide…In view of the consequences likely to flow from this day’s
proceedings, should they result in convictions on what my judgment tells me are insufficient charges
and proofs, I tremble for the future of my country. I cannot be an instrument to produce such a result;
and at the hazard of the ties even of friendship and affection, till calmer times shall do justice to my
motives, no alternative is left me but the inflexible discharge of duty."

Harper's Weekly, January 27th, 1866

A Long Step Forward
The order of General Grant, defining the military authority of the United States in the late rebellious
States, should reassure our friends who fear that the Government is too ready to imperil the public
peace by delivering the whole authority of those States unconditionally into the hands of a class which
can not be expected to use it in good faith.

The General’s reply to the request of Governor Parsons, of Alabama, that the national forces should be
withdrawn and the local militia armed, is also significant and sensible. It is as follows:

"For the present, and until there is full security for equitably maintaining the right and safety of all
classes of citizens in the States lately in rebellion, I would not recommend the withdrawal of the United
States troops from them. The number of interior garrisons might be reduced, but a movable force
sufficient to insure tranquility should be retained. While such a force is retained in the South, I doubt
the propriety of putting arms in the hands of the militia."

The bill of Senator Trumbull’s continuing the Freedmen’s Bureau and extending its operations to every
part of the country in which freedmen are to be found in large numbers, is the complement of these
military orders. It will undoubtedly be approved by the President and become a law. This is another of
the plain signs that neither the President nor Congress wish to make haste unwisely, and should
certainly tend to temper the acrimony of debate upon the general subject.
Senator Trumbull’s bill recognizes two vital and fundamental truths of the situation. First, that the
National Government means to protect and secure the personal liberty which it has conferred; and
second, that it is essential the freedmen should become landholders. Without that provision every other
device will be futile.

At this moment, it should be remembered, the freedmen, excepting those settled upon the sea islands by
General Sherman, and whose freehold Mr. Trumbull’s bill confirms, are without land and without the
means of buying it. They are helpless in the midst of a population which is generally hostile to them,
and they have no chance of livelihood except from the landowners who may choose to employ them.
Any landholder may say to them: "You are free to go. I do not wish to employ you. Get off my land."
That all will not and do not say this, is true. But vast numbers do. And the laborer has no remedy. He
must "move on," and beg, steal, or starve. The tragedy of his situation can hardly be exaggerated; and
although the feeling against him may mellow with the lapse of time, and although the necessities of the
case will gradually persuade the landholders not to quarrel with their bread and butter, yet meanwhile,
under these winter skies, and among those wintry hearts, the suffering of the freedmen is terrible and
incalculable, and the duty of the country is plain and imperative.

The freedmen are placed by General Grant’s timely order under the protection of the military power.
But that power can not feed them, nor house them, nor enable them to work and be paid for working.
Mr. Trumbull’s bill authorizes the President to reserve for them 3,000,000 acres of good, unoccupied
land in Florida, Arkansas, and Mississippi. Each laborer or family is to have forty acres at a rent agreed
upon by the Commissioner and the freedmen. Afterward the tenants may buy the land at a price to be
named by the Commissioner and approved by the President. Meanwhile the pauper freedmen are to be
provided with such lands as the United States may buy in any district, and necessary schools and
asylums are to be built upon them; while as the paupers become productive laborers the land may be
sold to them under fair conditions.

The necessity of immediate and decisive action upon the subject is urgent. Give the freedmen land from
which they can not be expelled; protect their rights against all aggressors by the national power; and
Time, the great mediator and educator, will gradually show the present class landholders in the late
rebel States that their interest is one with that of their late slaves, now become citizens; while the
occupancy of land, the laws of labor, and the education for which the freedmen are so anxious and so
ripe will develop the self-respecting and independent manhood which will fit them for the political
power which can not long be withheld.
 Documents for Thaddeus Stevens
Harper's Weekly, May 12th, 1866
The Congressional Plan of Reorganization
The propositions of the Reconstruction Committee will strike every thoughtful citizen as perfectly
reasonable. They seem to us to justify the hope of the most truly intelligent and patriotic persons that
Congress would propose no policy upon which the whole Union party of the country, including the
President, might not agree. Some concessions of opinion were inevitable upon all sides. Those who
held with Mr. Thaddeus Stevens that there should be general confiscation, or with Mr. Sumner that
impartial suffrage should be immediately established throughout the country, or with the President that
no farther conditions whatever were necessary, must have seen that the opinion of the country did not
support them, and that all must meet upon some firm and moderate middle ground such as the
Committee now offer.

The objection to what is called the President’s policy is plain and conclusive. It is that, by allowing the
late rebel States to resume their full relations in the Union immediately, and without further provision,
those States would have actually gained political power by the rebellion. This gain arises from the fact
that every colored man, as a slave, counted as three-fifths of a man in the basis of representation; but as
a freeman he counts as five-fifths. In a State like South Carolina, therefore, where the colored
population is half or even more than half of the whole, and where that half is disfranchised, every voter
has practically twice the power of a voter in a State like Connecticut. This is an absurdity and injustice
so conspicuous as to demand instant adjustment.

On the other hand, the objection to the imposition of equal suffrage by the National Government as a
precedent condition of resumption of full rights in the Union is practical and twofold. In the first place,
it is hardly to be presumed that the States which prohibit equal suffrage, or deny it to a colored skin
altogether, would insist upon its adoption by the suspended States; and, in the second place, such a
proposition would have been very widely regarded as a radical blow at the most sacred of State rights,
and a consummation of centralization. Moreover, there are many of the most faithful and liberty-loving
Union men, who are the steady advocates of equal suffrage, and who, under the circumstances, do not
doubt the entire competency of Congress to require this or any other condition which might seem to it
necessary, but who doubt the wisdom of this method, and question the expediency of such a
requirement, and who could not therefore heartily sustain it.

But we see no good reason for supposing that all reasonable and patriotic men should not sincerely
unite upon the propositions presented. They have reference exclusively to national relations. They do
not interfere in the State economy, except in defense of national rights. They declare simply, in the first
place, that no State shall abridge the privileges of citizens of the United States. Such a proposition is its
own irresistible argument. A citizen of this country should be equally a citizen every where in it; this is
plain, and therefore all his civil rights as a citizen of the United States should be sacred wherever the
national flag floats. Can the President, with all his war convictions of the sanctity of States, object to so
obviously just a provision?

In the second place, whenever the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of the male citizens
of a State who are of age, except for crime or participation in the rebellion, the basis of representation
shall be reduce in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age. In other words, if South Carolina shall
choose to disfranchise 100,000 of her citizens because of their color, or New York shall choose to do
the same thing because of want of property, then each of those States shall suffer in the national
representation just in that proportion. Such a provision stimulates every State to enlarge the suffrage,
and to extend education in order to make the suffrage safe. It is strictly harmonious with the President’s
expressed wish to base representation upon the number of voters.

In the third place, the Committee recommend that until the 4th of July, 1870, four years hence, all
persons who voluntarily adhered to the rebellion shall be excluded from voting at national elections.
This article we presume is introduced to embody the President’s desire that "treason shall be made
odious," and that in the great work of reorganization the late rebel leaders shall "take back seats." In his
frequent and vehement expression of that desire the President unquestionable spoke for the loyal
country, and his sentiments are still further incorporated in the proposed bill to render certain of those
leaders ineligible to office under the government of the United States. This third proposition is the one
which seems to us likely to occasion most difference of opinion. That it is in strict accordance with
President Johnson’s frequent suggestions is true, but it is a point of doubtful policy, not essential to the
general plan, and, it seems to us, might be safely omitted.

The fourth proposition is a matter of course, that neither the United States nor any State shall assume to
pay any debt incurred in aid of the rebellion, or for any claim for compensation of loss of slaves, and
Congress is authorized to enforce the provisions of this article.

These are the propositions of the Committee, which we trust will be unanimously adopted by the Union
vote in Congress, because they are perfectly just and moderate, and because they do not claim to reap
more than has been sown. They simply define and secure the legitimate result of the war as recognized
by the general conviction of the loyal country, and as it has been often strongly stated by President
Johnson. They contain nothing vindictive, and if the Government of the United States has any right
whatever to do any thing whatever to prevent the late rebel States from gaining political power by their
rebellion, it may challenge the whole world and its late domestic enemies to show any thing
unprecedented, unjust, or ungenerous in the settlement it proposes. We believe that the vast body of the
Union party of the country which carried the war successfully to the end, and which triumphantly
elected Lincoln and Johnson, will most cordially sustain this policy of reorganization and gladly appeal
to the country to ratify it. And however anxious the President may be to see loyal men from the late
disturbed States admitted to Congress, we shall be very slow to believe that he will refuse his sincere
co-operation to a plan which does not conflict with any of his known opinions, and which secures the
admission of loyal members to Congress with the heart-felt welcome and congratulation of the whole
loyal country.

That the proposed settlement of the committee should be greeted with sneers and anger by those who
have persistently declared that Congress is a bloody, factious, revolutionary body is natural. These
objectors have counted upon overthrowing the President and destroying the Union party by fomenting
every real or asserted difference between them. But here is the utter refutation of their calumnies. Here
is the plain proof that Congress seeks only the speediest reorganization of the Union upon the most
temperate and reasonable conditions. For we assume that there will be little delay in ratifying the
report; and then, so great and unprecedented is the occasion, we trust that the Legislatures of the States
will be immediately summoned in special session to act upon the proposed amendment, that Congress
and the country and the world may know the will of the loyal people of the United States upon this
most vital point of national policy.

Harper's Weekly, June 23rd, 1866

The Report of the Congressional Committee
The Report of the Congressional Committee upon Reconstruction is so able and conclusive that we
wish it might be universally read. It is the Constitution and common sense applied to the situation; and
after the passionate and pettifogging spirit in which Reconstruction, the most important of all our
present questions, has been so often discussed its tone is manly and dignified. There is nothing exactly
new in the arguments of the Committee, but the Report is an unanswerable statement of the conclusions
to which the common sense of the loyal part of the country had arrived, and upon which, as we believe,
it now reposes.

Those conclusions are in brief that the rebellious States were left, at the close of the war, without other
valid government than the military authority of the United States, directed by the President as
Commander-in-chief; that the civil government of those States could become valid only upon
recognition by Congress, and that the resumption by those States of their relations in the Union can
occur only upon such conditions as Congress may prescribe. The folly of the assumption of Alexander
H. Stephens and the late allies of the rebellion, that the moment a rebel State was forced by arms to
surrender it regained untouched and without condition every right and privilege it had enjoyed as a part
of the Union is conclusively exposed by the Committee. "To admit such a principle for one moment
would be to declare that treason is always master and loyalty a blunder. Such a principle is void by its
very nature and essence, because inconsistent with the theory of government and fatal to its very
existence.

To know the condition of the late rebel States it was necessary either to take the opinion of the
President solely, or to sift the evidence upon which that opinion was founded and enlarge the range of
testimony. This latter course was adopted, and the impression left upon the Committee is again that of
the great mass of Union men in the country. The condition of the States in question is precisely what
was to be expected. It is a feeling of intense regret that the struggle could not be prolonged, and of
bitter hostility toward the Government. But while this is natural to any party defeated in so fierce a
contest, the Committee find that it is peculiarly strong in the States in question. "The conciliatory
measures of the Government do not seem to have been met even half-way. The bitterness and defiance
exhibited toward the United States under such circumstances is without a parallel in the history of the
world." It is remarkable that Mr. Seward in his Auburn speech states that situation exactly the other
way. "The work of reconciliation," he says, "has outrun expectation. Indeed, it has never had a parallel
in human affairs." We presume that the private conviction of most of us, based upon all the various
public and private evidence of the year, will confirm the Committee’s judgment rather than Mr.
Seward’s.

After the most careful consideration upon ample evidence the Committee believe that adequate security
should be required for future peace and safety, and they suggest, as the result of mutual concession, the
amendment determining civil rights, equalizing representation, disqualifying certain persons for office
under certain conditions, and disowning the rebel debt. This amendment has been already adopted by
the Senate in a moderate and generous form, and will undoubtedly be approved by the House. As there
is nothing in it which is not strictly in consonance with the views which the President has often
expressed, we hope that for the sake of harmony he will not oppose it. If, however, a bill should be
offered for his signature, postponing the admission of any late rebel State to Congress until the
amendment had become a part of the Constitution and had been ratified by the State, he would
undoubtedly veto it. It seems to us, for many good reasons, advisable that each suspended State should
be restored upon its individual acceptance of the condition, and we hope that such may be the final
judgment of Congress.

Thus this most important Committee concludes its labors, and concludes them worthily. It has been
fiercely derided and insulted by the most malignant enemies of the Union and Government at the North
and South; and even the President’s impatience has betrayed him into vituperation of it. But we
challenge any caviler to produce from history an instance of a settlement by a victorious government so
honorable, so reasonable, so free from vengeance, so tenacious of the spirit of a truly free government.
There is no lately rebellious citizen of the United States who "acquiesces" honestly in the situation who
can declare it ungenerous or unjust, while every faithful citizen will heartily commend it as the true
popular platform. The substance of the Report is sure to be filtered through editorials and speeches, so
that it will become familiar to the country.
 Documents for Ulysses S. Grant
Harper's Weekly, January 4th, 1868
GENERAL GRANT’S LETTER
The letter of General Grant to the President upon the removal of Stanton and Sheridan is characteristic
of the man. It shows the same supreme good sense which distinguishes Grant as it did Lincoln; the
same sagacity and moderation, but clearness and firmness which endear him more and more to the
country. In regard to Mr. Stanton the General reminds the President that the Tenure of Office Bill was
intended especially to protect the Secretary of War, and concludes quietly: "The meaning of the law
may be explained away by an astute lawyer, but common-sense and the views of the loyal people will
give to it the effect intended by its framers." In speaking of Sheridan he gives him high praise in
saying: "He is universally and deservedly beloved by the people who sustained this Government
through its trials, and feared by those who would still be the enemies of the Government."

It seems to be impossible for any man to pretend further that he does not know what Grant’s views and
sympathies are. Could he make them more clear, could he awaken profounder public confidence if he
should write a letter advocating certain details of policy? On the contrary, if there be any thing which
would disturb the feeling which the vast body of faithful Union men in the country entertain for
General Grant, it would be a letter from him "defining his position." Deep and permanent faith in
public men at such a period as this is not founded upon what they say for a particular purpose, but is the
result of the impression of their whole career.

This letter, written under a strong sense of public duty, shows that the General’s opinion of the policy
of reconstruction which has been adopted is that of the most intelligent men in the country. Supporting
his friend Sheridan against the rebel pressure to which the President gladly yielded, he says that the
assertion constantly made that the administration was dissatisfied with Sheridan "emboldened the
opponents of the laws of Congress within his command to oppose him in every way in their power, and
has rendered necessary measures which otherwise may never have been necessary." Those laws are to
be repealed, or they are to control reconstruction. The Democratic Party will go into the election
clamoring for its repeal, and insulting Sheridan and all the "satraps" who enforced the law. The
Republican Party will insist that the principle of the law, namely, the equal rights of all the citizens,
shall continue to inspire reconstruction. One of the two parties will succeed. There will not be a new
party, and, of course, if the Republicans repeal the law they retire from the contest. Can there be any
doubt, then, that General Grant will be the Republican candidate as the representative of the
Republican policy? He will be the President elected by the principle which maintained the war to its
triumphal close.

Harper's Weekly, August 31st, 1867

SECRETARY GRANT
When the President as Commander-in-Chief directed General Grant to take charge of the War
Department ad interim the General had the alternative of obeying or resigning. He chose to obey, and
he chose wisely. Had he resigned Lieutenant-General Sherman would have been at the head of the
army under Andrew Johnson, and that is a result which is not to be desired. General Grant in obeying
the order to assume the charge of the Department avoids a consequence which we must consider a
misfortune, and secures an element of confidence and safety in the Cabinet. The correspondence
between him and Mr. Stanton shows a mutual respect and trust which are very agreeable to the country
as well as honorable to themselves. The General informs the Secretary that he has been assigned as
Acting Secretary of War, and, in notifying him of the fact, expresses his appreciation of Mr. Stanton’s
"zeal, patriotism, firmness, and ability." In reply, Mr. Stanton denies the right of the President to
suspend him, yields to superior force, and cordially reciprocates the sentiments of the General.
General Grant is now Secretary of War. In that office he is no more subject to the dictation of the
President than Mr. Stanton. He is to administer his office in the manner which he considers best for the
interests of the service and of the country. If the President should order him to neutralize and oppose
the policy of Congress, and to defeat the intention of the law by the appointment of officers notoriously
hostile to it, General Grant will of course, decline, as Mr. Stanton would, and upon the President will be
thrown the responsibility of suspending him as he has suspended his predecessor. To suppose that
General Grant is to be the tool of Andrew Johnson is simply to misunderstand him altogether.

If, after an interval longer or shorter, the President should appoint some such person as Rousseau or
Steedman to the War Department, it will be impossible to accuse General Grant of complicity with his
designs. That can be justly done only in the case we have mentioned of furthering those designs. If it
should be alleged that, if General Grant considers that he has been "assigned" to the War Department
by his military superior, he must therefore obey that superior’s orders during his assignment, we reply
that, with what is know of the General’s character, it is impossible to suppose that he would take any
serious step inconsistent with his views of the true radical policy of reconstruction.

If he did? if his views of military subordination are such that he would not hesitate to do any thing
which the President might order, the country would never have been so deceived in any man whatever;
and the universal popularity of the General would be changed into an equally universal amazement and
sorrow at his profound misconception of the popular feeling and purpose.
 Documents for Edwin Stanton
Harper's Weekly, August 24th, 1867
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
If the request of the President to Mr. Stanton that he would resign the Secretaryship of War means that
he is about undertaking to change all the military personnel under the Reconstruction bill, substituting
men like Steedman and Rousseau for Sheridan and Schofield and Sickles, the deluge will not be after
Mr. Johnson, but upon him. We do not believe that the country will submit to such a plain paralysis of
its purpose.

The services of Mr. Stanton to this country are incalculable. It is not easy to conceive of a more
efficient Secretary of War at a time when that office was of the very highest importance. The faults
which were popularly ascribed to the Secretary, his abruptness, his brusqueness, were often merely a
necessary decision and rapidity of action. A man in such an office at such a time may be pardoned if he
does not stop to make bows, and if he speaks too crisply for common courtesy. Coming into the War
Department at a time when the headquarters of General George B. M’Clellan were fast becoming the
head bureau of the Government, and when even the President went to the General, instead of requiring
the General to come to him, the Secretary of War taught General M’Clellan that the President was to be
respected as his Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Stanton was never deceived in the character or the capacity
of General M’Clellan. The Secretary’s comprehensive grasp of the vast duties of his office, his
unquailing energy, his exhaustless industry, his silent fidelity, were no less remarkable than his heroic
faith in the people and his inflexible determination that the war should be fought to an unconditional
overthrow of the rebellion. When that result was almost accomplished he instantly repudiated the
immense error of General Sherman; and when President Lincoln was murdered, and there was a
moment of inexpressible confusion, it was the steady hand of the Secretary of War which seized the
government and passed it to Mr. Lincoln’s lawful successor. During the melancholy and humiliating
administration of Mr. Johnson, which has sought in every way to defeat the national victory and to
demoralize the national mind, Mr. Stanton has tenaciously clung to the real issue, and he alone in the
Cabinet has represented the national conviction and the national purpose. He, therefore, has been the
especial object of the President’s hostility, and after a thousand rumors of his designed or attempted
removal the President has at last formally summoned him to resign.

Mr. Stanton’s retirement would be a national misfortune. Upon the part of the President it would be
another impotent blow at the purpose of the country, which he can not change. But if, as we said, he
should go further, and by appointing his own creatures show an evident intention to defeat the objects
sought by the Reconstruction bill, he would be hoist with his own petard.

Harper's Weekly, August 13th, 1867

A DESPERATE MAN
Andrew Johnson is a desperate man. Conscious of the total failure of his administration and of the
universal public censure, he would gladly do something to revenge himself upon fortune. His only
opportunity is to remove the General of the Military Departments under the Reconstruction bills, and
see what would follow the appointment of persons who would nullify the law. But the President has
nothing to gain by such a course except impeachment and removal with the consent of the whole loyal
country. Should he persist in the course which his suspension of Mr. Stanton implies, every man, who
upon various grounds has opposed impeachment, would accept it as a choice of evils.

That the President would try other and more perilous measures, if he could, we can have no doubt. The
story of the organization in Maryland that asked for batteries which the President wished to send and
which Mr. Stanton refused, points to an armed organization upon which it has been rumored the
President was willing to rely for ulterior purposes. Yet, although the tale as told be untrue, it will not be
rejected because of its supposed inconsistency with the probable wishes or wisdom of the President.
That there is some fire under the smoke every one will be willing to agree. But there is no great body of
persons in the country so interested in renewing civil war as the vast multitude of the population are in
trampling out the least spark of such an intention. This is not a truth which the President can apprehend,
for he apprehends nothing. But it is the truth, nevertheless.

It is evident that those who distrusted Mr. Johnson most were the wisest men; and that Congress,
having once discovered his character, should not have separated except to meet again promptly upon
the proper summons. Had this course been adopted he would not have attempted the removal of Mr.
Stanton, or, if he had, Congress would instantly have assembled to know the reason. No man can be
considered harmless who holds even a restricted authority as President, when his spirit and purpose
have been fully revealed. It is the old story. The Parliament that would check a false king becomes a
long Parliament. The Congress that would protect the popular will from the interference of a hostile
President must be always ready to lay its hand upon him.

The President may now proceed to thrust out his whole Cabinet and to replace them with whomsoever
he will. He may remove the Generals in the unorganized States, and so delay the due registry and
obedience to the laws of Congress. More he can not well do. He will hardly undertake forcibly to
prevent Congress from assembling; and when it does assemble, if it finds that he has been palpably
nullifying the laws which he is sworn to execute, it will impeach him, and the country, longing for
peach, will cry Amen. It would not be a question of hair-splitting nor of technicality. The country
would ask, through Congress, does he faithfully execute the laws, or does he try to paralyze and defeat
them? The evidence which would be demanded would be and ought to be the most conclusive. And if
such evidence were produced? if his whole career showed that he intended so far as possible to
substitute his own will for the law of the land? he would be removed, and again the country would cry
Amen.
 Documents for James Brooks
Harper's Weekly, March 7th, 1867
THE PRESIDENT AND THE LAW
Before this paper is issued the question of impeachment will probably be decided. The offense of the
President is plain. He assumes to put himself above the law, upon the ground that in his judgment the
law is unconstitutional. A plea more preposterous can hardly be conceived, for if he be the judge of one
law he is the judge of all, and no law will be executed until he approves it. Mr. James Brooks, in the
very unwise and braggadocio speech which he made in the House upon the presentation of the
resolution of impeachment, said that the President had as much right to judge of the constitutionality of
the Tenure-of-Office Act as the Senate or the House. Undoubtedly he has; but the Constitution
expressly declares that if the President objects to an act upon the ground of want of constitutionality, or
upon any other ground, if he can not persuade Congress to agree with him, and the act is again passed
by a two-thirds vote, it becomes the law of the land, notwithstanding the judgment of the President.

The New York Times echoes the remark of Mr. Brooks in saying of the President: "But it can scarcely be
unlawful for him to perform an act in violation of an unconstitutional law, which is simply no law at
all; and until the validity of this law shall have been decided by the Supreme Court the question of the
President’s guilt or innocence can scarcely be entertained." That is to say, if the President vetoes a bill,
and it becomes a law despite the veto, the President may set it aside until the Supreme Court declares it
to be valid. Now if the President is not bound by the law, nobody else is; and the Times declares that no
law is binding, even if passed by a two-thirds vote of Congress, until the Supreme Court has approved
it. Such a theory reduces the function of the representatives of the people to the mere initiation of laws,
and vests the real power of the Government exclusively in the Executive and Judiciary.

The Tenure-of-Office Act was passed by Congress, vetoed by the President, passed over his veto by the
constitutional majority, and became the law. The President acknowledged it to be a law by conforming
to its requirements, and explaining to the Senate why he had suspended the Secretary of War. The
Senate did not approve the suspension, and there the matter should have ended. But by subsequently
assuming to remove the Secretary the President deliberately and distinctly violates the law which
forbids the removal of any civil officer appointed with the consent of the Senate without its
concurrence if it be in session. There could not be a more flagrant defiance of law or usurpation of
authority. If the President, as we have said, may do it in the case of one law, however constitutionally
enacted, until the Supreme Court had passed upon it, and the consequent confusion and uncertainty
would be intolerable. The assumption of Mr. Brooks and of the New York Times that a law may be held
unconstitutional until pronounced otherwise by the court is subversive of the government and of civil
order; and the question ought, therefore, to be distinctly settled whether the President has the power of
dispensing with the laws? a power which the English two hundred years ago dethroned King James II
for claiming.
 Documents for Attorneys
Harper's Weekly, March 21st, 1868
THE REMOVABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
President Johnson, in deciding to remove Mr. Stanton, accepted the construction put upon the
Constitution by the first Congress, that the power of removal is an Executive power, and rejected that
of the last Congress that it shall be exercised only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. He
did this with his eyes open, in clear view of the fact that the House which impeaches, and the Senate
which tries, had, as legislators under the solemnity of an oath to support the Constitution, asserted the
policy in the Tenure-of-Office Act which he deliberately spurned and contemned. He knew full well
that the Court of Impeachment were judges of the law and of the fact—no higher tribunal having been
created by the people—and that it was improbable that they would reject as members of the Court what
as Senators they had solemnly avowed. He can not complain, therefore, of the situation, as he chose it
voluntarily and defiantly—acting in conjunction with those who seek to defeat the general policy of
Congress. He was the head of the Government; he had sworn to see the laws faithfully executed, but he
placed himself in direct opposition to their execution. Congress could not retain the support of the
people, or secure respect for the laws in any quarter, if an instance so signal and flagrant of contempt
for their authority, involving a threat of repetition, were overlooked.

The First Congress was undoubtedly influenced in its decision by the exalted character of the President,
and the probability that the succession for a long course of years would devolve on the revolutionary
patriots who constituted the supports of Washington. Mr. Madison said, in the debate on the motion to
strike out the words "to be removable by the President " in the act creating the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, that "If the Constitution is silent, and it is a power the Legislature have a right to confer, it will
appear to the world, if we strike out the clause, as if we doubted the propriety of vesting it in the
President of the United States." Mr. Smith, member from South Carolina, observed, "Perhaps
gentlemen are so much dazzled with the splendor of the virtues of the President as not to be able to see
into futurity. The framers of the Constitution did not confine their views to the first person who was
looked up to, to fill the Presidential chair."

The prudence of the several incumbents of the Presidency to, and including, John Quincy Adams, in
exercising the power of removal, satisfied the country with the decision thus made. The instance during
the administration of Mr. Adams, of the attempted removal of Jonathan Thompson, Collector of this
port, is well remembered. A Committee consisting of important citizens of New York, headed by
Charles King, went to Washington for that object. Mr. Adams expressed his willingness to gratify them,
and they were about leaving. "But, gentlemen," said he, "you have not mentioned the objections you
have to Mr. Thompson." "Why," said Mr. King, "he is against your Administration." Mr. Adams,
finding there was no other objection, answered, that Mr. Thompson had a perfect right to his own
opinion; and if there were no other reasons he should not be removed.

On the inauguration of General Jackson the doctrine that to the victors belong the spoils was
announced, and in one year from his inauguration on the 4th of March, 1829, the removals amounted to
eight in the diplomatic corps, thirty-six in the Executive departments, and one hundred and ninety-nine
in important civil posts, whereas during the eight years of Washington’s administration only nine
officers in the whole had been displaced. "This extraordinary change," said Judge Story, "has awakened
general attention and brought back the whole controversy with regard to the Executive power of
removal to a severe scrutiny. Many of the most eminent statesmen in the country," he continues, "have
expressed a deliberate opinion that it is utterly indefensible, and that the only sound interpretation of
the Constitution is that avowed upon its adoption; that is to say, that the power of removal belongs to
the appointing power" – meaning the Senate conjointly with the President.
The Constitution expressly provides that the appointment of all inferior officers may be devolved upon
the President alone, the Heads of Departments, or the Supreme Court. The appointment of all officers
below the grade of the Heads of Department may thus be provided for by Congress, which might
confer the authority on the Heads of Departments and the Supreme Court alone as to all officers
respectively under them. This constitutional provision could not be satisfied if the President might
remove such appointees at his pleasure. As to all such appointments, the power of removal would
follow the appointing power, for otherwise perpetual conflict might exist between the two authorities,
one insisting upon appointing, the other upon removing. Here, then, it must be admitted, is an
exception which Congress may make to the universality of the rule authorizing removals, claimed as
appertaining to the Presidential office. The character of this power, to be exercised by the Heads of
Departments under the Constitution, furnishes a strong argument against the position that they
themselves may be displaced by the President. The power of the President over them expressed in the
Constitution is that "he may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the
Executive departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices." The
expression of this power would be wholly unnecessary if the Constitution, by necessary implication,
gave the President alone power to remove these very officers, for this would have embraced entire
control over their action. The Heads of Departments have duties to perform most intimately connected
with Congress. Treaties are to be made by and with the advice, and subsequently by and with the
consent of the Senate, provided two-thirds of those present concur. The Secretary of State, whose duties
relate chiefly to foreign affairs, represents both the President and the Senate in this duty. The Secretary
of the Treasury makes his report directly to Congress, not to the President. This is done to enable
Congress to employ the proper means to meet the public expenditure. The Secretary of War is equally
the representative of the Legislative and of the Executive Department. The power to declare war is
wholly Legislative under our Constitution, differing in that respect from the British, under which it is
wholly Executive. The controversy between Congress and the President with respect to the mode of
tying up the ends of the war, in which he seeks to defeat their will constitutionally expressed—for in a
civil war the terms of peace are fixed by Congress in its discretion—proves the necessity of exempting
the Secretary of War from the President’s power of removal, except with the advice and consent of the
Senate. If Congress may fix the tenure of any of these executive offices in a way to prevent the exercise
by the President of the power of removal, it puts an end to the implication claimed in his behalf.

The power claimed for the President would enable him to defeat the action of the Senate in the matter
of appointments, and thus in effect destroy the constitutional provision by which it is required. On the
adjournment of the Senate the President, by removing the person appointed on their advice and
consent, might substitute another and an unsuitable person—one to whose appointment such advice and
consent had been refused. If to this it is answered, that the President would subject himself to
impeachment, then we say that the offense committed more certainly deserves this remedy.

The theory that removal follow the appointing power, or if it do not, that Congress which creates may
fix the precise tenure of office when not otherwise specified in the Constitution, reconciles provisions
which on the opposite doctrine must be deemed utterly inconsistent. The power conferred on the
President in terms to issue commissions in case of vacancy happening during the recess of the Senate is
not in harmony with power claimed as implied that he may make and fill a vacancy at any time. The
power conferred on Congress to devolve the appointment of inferior officers on the President alone, or
the Supreme Court, or the Heads of Departments, can not be exercised consistently with the broad
ground claimed for the President, that he, independently of Congress, may remove all executive
officers even if their appointment and removal be devolved by Congress on the Heads of Departments
alone.

The removability of executive officers by the Chief Executive derives its origin from the peculiarities
of the British Constitution. It has been transplanted here not by express grant but by implication against
the popular branch of our Government, and in favor of one against which our jealousies were aroused.
In England the Queen has an inheritable estate in her office, which she needs to support by
extraordinary power. But this power is allowed to her only on the condition that the great offices in the
realm shall be filled in complete sub-serviency to the principles of the Parliamentary majority. When in
a minority, the ministry resign. The President expects to have the benefit of the Queen’s prerogative,
without submitting to the obligation which the Queen is obliged to concede of a ministry harmonious
with Parliament. The denial of this obligation in England would produce a revolution. It can scarcely be
expected that a bold defiance of the clearly and legally expressed will of Congress can go unredressed
under our Government.

Harper's Weekly, March 28th, 1868

THE PRESIDENT’S POWER OVER THE CABINET
The Impeachment of the President is earnestly resisted on the ground that he is entitled to a Cabinet in
unison with him. We have already shown in previous articles that the Constitution did not contemplate
the creation of a Cabinet, but that one has grown up from the custom of successive administrations. We
repeat, however, the whole of the clause conferring on the President power over the Heads of
Departments: "He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive
Departments upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices."

This power clearly negatives the idea that a much higher power over them was intended to be
conferred, and negatives that also that it was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to create a
Cabinet. The duties of the officers indicated by the description of "the principal officer in each of the
Executive Departments" are not specified in the Constitution; but Congress, under the power "to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution"… the "powers vested by this
Constitution… in any department or officer thereof," have, from time to time, created various
departments and changed those duties at pleasure. Did the Constitution intend that the President at all
times and under all circumstances, shall have in those departments such officers as he shall think
proper? The power conferred on him in the selection of the Heads of Departments is that he shall
"nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate appoint" them. It was intended that he
should take the advice of the Senate on that head, and after obtaining their consent appoint. General
Washington construed the Executive power "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make
treaties," as intending that he should in advance take such advice. In the proceedings, in 1789, of the
First Congress, will be found a note from General Washington, addressed to the Senate, informing them
that he would meet them at their chamber, to take their advice on the formation of an Indian treaty, for
which purpose the Senate passed a resolution to receive him at the time mentioned. They met and
consulted together; and such was no doubt the intention of the Constitution. The language of the power
with respect to officers is somewhat different; but that the Senate was to advise with the President on
that subject is very clear. The practice has doubtless been abandoned from the multiplicity of
nominations and appointments. The language contemplated intimate relations between the Senate and
the President on that subject. It will be recollected that Mr. Stanton, under the Tenure-of-Office Act,
was suspended by President Johnson, and that General Grant was appointed Secretary ad interim under
the authority of that act. The suspension of Mr. Stanton was reported to the Senate as having been made
for some of the causes of objection which the act enumerates, but they were deemed insufficient, and
Mr. Stanton was restored. This action amounted to the Senate’s advice on that subject, and was
equivalent to the refusal of the Senate to consent to Mr. Stanton’s removal. In defiance of such advice
and of the plain intent of the Tenure-of-Office Act, the President removed Mr. Stanton. This, as we
have seen, constitutes one of the grounds of impeachment.

Mr. Stanton’s removal was proof not only of a want of cordiality between the President and the Senate,
but of a wide difference between them, and it is scarcely to be expected that the Senate, which is
invested with the power "to advise and consent" to appointments, would use the power in order to arm
the President with an officer in hostility—in the gravest matters of public concern—not only to the
Senate, but also to the House of Representatives. Such an officer, if appointed, would add to the power
of the President to obstruct the action of Congress. Indeed, with the complete command of the War
Department and of the army and all the material of war, the President might defy the popular branch of
the Government. The President’s course furnished just grounds of suspicion that his motives in
appointing General Thomas to the control of that Department were such as could not be tolerated. All
laws conflicting with the Tenure-of-Office Act having been in terms repealed by it, there was no such
office as the "Secretary of War ad interim," except in the contingency of suspension. Removal, not
suspension, was resorted to, and hence the chief clerk was to act as custodian of the books and papers if
a vacancy had occurred, which it did not; but the President chose to assume that there was a vacancy
against the fact, and to order General Thomas to fill it. The order was in the nature of a military order
from the commander-in-Chief to a subordinate, who was directed in a wholly illegal manner to take
possession of the Department. These extraordinary proceedings show that Congress was right in
withdrawing from the President the power of removal which the act of 1789 assumed that he possessed,
and in declaring that it should be exercised only by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Secretary of War is, in ordinary times, when there is perfect accord between all the branches of the
Government, as important to Congress as to the President. It is in the power of Congress at any time to
abolish the office, and to create it again at their pleasure. If they can destroy and create at pleasure, may
no Congress say that this officer shall not be removed except by the same ceremonies that were
required before appointment? — that is to say, the Senate’s advice and consent.

Mr. Madison undoubtedly argued in Congress in favor of the President’s power; but, as he was one of
the recognized authors of the Federalist, he was clearly committed to the doctrine advanced in the 77th
No. of that work, that "the consent of that body (the Senate) would be necessary to displace as well as
to appoint." The names of the several authors were not at the time of their publication announced, and
hence it may be said (although Mr. Hamilton was the author of that article) that Mr. Madison
abandoned, when supporting Washington’s administration, a position which he advanced to secure the
adoption of the Constitution.

"Where a man"(said Mr. Hamilton)"in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a
new President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable to
him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring
some degree of discredit upon himself."

These are the words of one of the authors of the Constitution, of its most distinguished commentator,
and of a Cabinet officer afterward of the highest authority. They do not sustain the haughty claims
made in the President’s behalf, as if he were "the sole disposer of offices." The President has
encroached upon this distribution of power in face of the advice of the Senate deliberately given, in
face of the solemn decision of Congress, and, it now appears, in face of the true meaning of the
Constitution.

Harper's Weekly, November 2nd, 1867

"DISREGARDING" THE LAW
One of the most preposterous reports that has been lately sent from Washington is the assertion that the
President proposes to disregard the Tenure of Office Bill, and treat it as a nullity until the Supreme
Court decides whether it is constitutional. "Here’s richness" again; and the Copperhead Doctors [note:
“Copperheads” was the term for a Northern Democrat who opposed the Civil War] shake their heads
approvingly over the report, and exclaim, "Nothing could be more absurd than to dispute the right of
the President to bring laws which he believes unconstitutional to a judicial test."

The President, as President, has nothing whatever to do with the constitutionality of laws after he has
opposed them by his veto. His sole duty in regard to them after they are passed over his veto is to see
that they are faithfully executed. Then, if any body feels himself to be aggrieved, he will bring an
action in the Supreme Court. But if the President, having exhausted his veto, proposes to treat all laws
which he does not approve as unconstitutional, and refuse to see to their execution until they are
legitimated by the Supreme Court, nothing can be plainer than that every law passed by Congress must
be sent into the Supreme Court room and approved before the President will take care that it is
faithfully executed. Nothing could be more absurd than such a view of the duty of the Executive except
all the rest of the President’s theories.

Of course, as the Copperhead Doctors truly remark, this appeal to determine the constitutionality of a
law "is a right possessed by every citizen." But to say that nobody is bound to obey a law until some
Court has decided it to be constitutional, is simply to declare chaos come again. The Tenure of Office
Bill is a law—and not a very wise one; and the President has just as much right to disregard it as he has
to nullify every other law upon the statute-book. He is a citizen of the United States like the rest of us;
and if he disobeys the law he will inevitably suffer the penalty.
 Pre-Trial Documents
The Tenure of Office Act

The Tenure of Office Act, passed over the veto of President Andrew Johnson on March 2, 1867,
provided that all federal officials whose appointment required Senate confirmation could not be
removed without the consent of the Senate. When the Senate was not in session, the Act allowed the
President to suspend an official, but if the Senate upon its reconvening refused to concur in the
removal, the officila must be reinstated in his position. It was not entirely clear whether the Act applied
to cabinet officials appointed by a previous president, such as Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, a
Lincoln appointee.

In the summer of 1867, with Congress not in session, Andrew Johnson decided the time had finally
come to replace Edwin Stanton with a new secretary of war. Stanton had become increasingly at odds
with Johnson and the rest of his cabinet, and had been conspiring with Radical Republicans in
Congress to thwart Johnson's policies on Reconstruction, which were considered too soft by the
Radicals. On August 5, 1867, Johnson sent Stanton the following message: "Public considerations of
high character constrain me to say that your resignation as Secretary of War will be accepted." Stanton
refused to resign, forcing Johnson to send Stanton a second letter suspending him from office, ordering
that he cease all exercise of authority, and transferring power to a new secretary of war, Ullysses S.
Grant.

On January 3, 1868, the new Congress met and refused to concur in the removal of stanton by a vote of
35 to 16. The President, however, refused to accept the Senate's decision, believing the Tenure of
Office Act to be an unconstitutional infringement on the power of the executive. Hoping to obtain
judicial review of the Act's constitutionality, Johnson on February 21, 1868 appointed General Lorenzo
Thomas, Adjutant General of the Army, to the post of secretary of war. Stanton balked at leaving the
office he had reoccupied since January. Charles Sumner, one of the Senate's leading Radical
Republicans, sent Stanton a one word telegram: "Stick." Impeachment proceedings began within days.

Although both Presidents Ullysses Grant and James Garfield complained strenuously about the Tenure
of Office Act, the Act was not repealed until 1887, at the urging of then President Grover Cleveland.

In 1926, in the case of Myers vs. United States, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft,
held unconstitutional a law requiring the consent of the Senate for removal of certain non-Cabinet
officials.

Harper's Weekly, March 16th, 1867

THE VETO OF THE RECONSTRUCTION BILL
If the moderation and propriety of tone which mark the Veto Messages of the President were ever to be
found in his speeches he would be at least respected by the country, although his views might be
rejected. The Messages, indeed, have no individual character, no raciness and quaintness, like those of
his predecessor, but they are decorous and inoffensive, and becoming his position. They are all
disheartening, however, from the narrow technical grasp and total want of the vital comprehension
which the situation demands. They are the special pleas of a dull advocate who has taken a side; not the
words of a statesman who regards only the commonwealth.

The veto of the Reconstruction bill illustrates what we say. It is a long paper, but it begs the whole
question from beginning to end. There is not a good suggestion in it which is not wholly inapplicable.
Being asked what he thinks of an eagle, the President proceeds to prove that a buzzard is not a
nightingale. He makes an assertion contradicting the fundamental assertion of the bill, and goes on with
his argument from premises which no one but himself concedes. The bill declares that there is no
lawful government in any of the late rebel States. The President replies that "to pronounce the supreme
law-making power of an established State illegal is to say that law itself is unlawful." What is an
established South Carolina? If not, how is there any establishment there which is valid in the view of
the National Government? And if the President’s will established the State, where does the
Constitution, which he so earnestly commends, grant him the authority? Having thus assumed the
whole case the President sweeps on with generalizations which have no relation to the facts, and
statements which are disproved by the most ample evidence.

The President argues at great length that the Constitution does not authorize military depostisms in the
States of the Union in a time of peace. He shows in detail that despotic will is the will of the despot. He
quotes the late Indiana decision of the Supreme Court that in a time of peace the only valid military law
is the Congressional law for the government of the army, and declares that the bill denies the right of
trial by jury to nine millions of citizens. He points out that the bill enfranchises the negroes, who have
not asked to be enfranchised, and that the Constitution gives no power to Congress to legislate upon
suffrage in the States. Then he shows that the bill invalidates the governments of ten States which have
already adopted the Emancipation Amendment, and that the Amendment falls if their assent was illegal.
Finally, he celebrates the excellence of the Constitution itself, and its adequacy to every emergency.

Throughout this long document there is no sign of the least consciousness that the country is not at
peace, but is settling the conditions of peace. It is not, indeed, bello flagrante [Latin for “during
hostilities” or “while the war was waging”], but it is bello cessante [war has ceased]. The President has
proclaimed that the rebellion has ceased, but that no more makes peace than his appointment of
Provisional Governors establishes States. Congress alone can declare war and raise and support armies
and navies, and Congress alone therefore can say when war has ceased. The President as usual returns
to the Congressional declaration of July, 1861, that the war was not for subjugation, and he argues that
it was merely the suppression of an insurrection. But the Supreme Court, upon which he relies, has
decided that it was a war, and when a insurrection has proceeded upon the scale of the late war it is for
Congress, and Congress alone, to decide when it has ended. The President merely repeats Alexander
Stephen’s doctrine of the continuous right of States. There has been a riot, he says, like the Shay
rebellion in Massachusetts, like the whisky insurrection in Pennsylvania, and the riot being suppressed,
every thing reverts to its previous condition. And this is urged by a man who insisted, after the
surrender of Lee, that "traitors should take a back seat in the work of restoration," and who declared
that if there were five thousand men in Tennessee loyal to the Constitution, to freedom, and to justice,
they should absolutely control the work of reorganization, while every rebel should be "subjected to a
severe ordeal before he is restored to citizenship." The President who says that the rebellion of a State
does not destroy or interrupt its relations in the Union is the same President who, within two years,
required the rebel States to adopt the Emancipation Amendment, to repudiate their rebel debt, and to
disavow their secession ordinances as conditions of their return to the Union.

Every argument of the Veto Message is fatal to the policy which the President has pursued; every
assertion is contrary to the express evidence, and every appeal to the Constitution is futile from a man
who denies to the people in Congress a power which he alone has not hesitated to exercise. It is plain
that the President has nothing more to say. His position has been as fully and ably explained as it can
be, and it is utterly and indignantly repudiated by the people. Since, then, his oath binds him to execute
the laws, and since the most vital laws, in his judgment, are unconstitutional, why does he consent to be
an instrument of what he considers fatally destructive measures? He tells us that he is a patriot. Do
patriots remain in place when they think that they are to be used to destroy the liberties of their
country?
 Andrew Johnson’s Reconstruction Plan

• Pardons would be granted to those taking a loyalty oath

• No pardons would be available to high Confederate officials and persons owning property
valued in excess of $20,000
• A state needed to abolish slavery before being readmitted
• A state was required to repeal its secession ordinance before being readmitted.

Most of the seceded states began compliance with the president’s program. Congress was not in
session, so there was no immediate objection from that quarter. However, Congress reconvened in
December and refused to seat the Southern representatives.