20180228-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To Local Government Review Secretariat

1
This documents is not to be restricted for publication

Local Government Review Secretariat 28-2-2018
Phone: (03) 9948 8518
Email: local.government@delwp.vic.gov.au(External link)
20180228-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Local Government Review Secretariat
Sir/Madam,
first of all I hold that http://www.yourcouncilyourcommunity.vic.gov.au/exposure-draft
is in a sense utter rubbish. This as when I clicked on an item to download and then later click on
another items to download it turns out it is the same items. When this eventuate several times this to
me indicates that whomever did the website simply ignored to link the links.
Also, who really is the responsible body, meaning the Minister? I am left wondering if this is the
same rot like the North East Link Authority (NELA) that surveys a were sent out and after making a
detailed submission I discovered that none, I mean none, of any submissions were considered. (I got
this in writing from NELA!).
The title yourcouncilyourcommunity doesn’t to me whatsoever indicate this is a Ministerial issue.
It merely can be that the so called Local government body (unconstitutional) has set this up to
pretend this is a government initiative.
As a self-educated constitutionalist (see my blog www.scribd.com/inspectorrikati) and despite my
self-confessed Crummy-English I have ion various occasions comprehensively defeated the
Commonwealth such as on 2-12-2002 a court order regarding my s78B NOTICE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS (served upon all Attorney-Generals) that included challenging
the validity of the purported Australian Citizenship Act 1948, the usage of averment on 4 August
2005 in litigation, and also that compulsory voting is unconstitutional on 19 July 2006. On each
occasion the Commonwealth was represented by its legal team and I represented myself.
To understand what LOCAL GOVERNMENT stands for one must understand what the constitution
stand for as such the true meaning and application of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act 1900 (UK) within which the State in s106 are created “subject to this constitution”.
Let’s be clear about it, I succeeded where others (Like Derryn Hinch, now Senator) with legal teams
failed miserably) this is because so to say I do my homework.
Regretfully we do have judges who simply lack in my view the basic understanding what the true
meaning and application of the constitution is and are ruling like dictators and terrorist.
I am well aware that Federal, state and Territories have conventions that are unconstitutional but
nevertheless are persisted with. However, this doesn’t make it legally rights, this as no convention
can override the constitution!
Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each state
might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get £100,000 a year, or so much a year, from the
Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
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2
provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may be
amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have this
provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the Ministers of
the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask permission to
occupy a few minutes in discussing it.
END QUOTE
https://jade.barnet.com.au/Jade.html#!article=61502
QUOTE H. L. D’EMDEN v F. PEDDER – High Court of Australia
The Commonwealth and the States are, with respect to the matters which under the Constitution are within the
ambit of their respective legislative or executive authority, sovereign States, subject only to the restrictions
imposed by the Imperial connection and the provisions of the Constitution, either expressed or implied.
Where, therefore, the Constitution makes a grant of legislative or executive power to the Commonwealth, the
Commonwealth is entitled to exercise that power in absolute freedom, and without any interference or control
whatever except that prescribed by the Constitution itself.
END QUOTE
Hansard 2-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-
The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power of
amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary sovereignty.
No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the power of changing its
constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the parliaments of a federation
are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in one body. More than all that,
there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed with, instead of there being a high
court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary which towers above all powers,
legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter of the constitution.
END QUOTE

QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
The constitution of this federation will not be charged with the duty of resisting privileged classes, for the
whole power will be vested in the people themselves. They are the complete legislative power of the whole
of these colonies, and they shall be so. From [start page 106] them will rise, first of all, the federal constitution
which we are proposing to establish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the several
colonies. The people will be the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures, and the royal
prerogative exercised, in their interest and for their benefit, by the advice of their ministers will be practically
vested in them. They will exercise the sovereignty of the states, they will be charged with the full power and
dignity of the state, and it is from them that we must seek the giving to each of those bodies that will be in
existence concurrently the necessary powers for their proper management and existence. Each assembly, each
legislature, whether state or federal existing under this constitution, will be as Dicey again says-a merely
subordinate law-making body whose laws will be valid, whilst within the authority conferred upon it by
the constitution, but invalid and unconstitutional if they go beyond the limits of such authority.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-No, because the Constitution is not passed by the Parliament.
END QUOTE

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ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
QUOTE County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
QUOTE 19-11-2002 correspondence to Victorian Attorney-General
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Attorney General 19-11-2002
Victoria
Fax 9651 0577 AND TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
URGENT
Sir/Madam
Since 27-9-2002 I sought clarification about what, if any State citizenship I have as
to be able to obtain Australian citizenship, yet, in the recent 18 November 2002 response it
was stated;
“As explained in my previous letter, citizenship is a matter for the Commonwealth,
not the States. You indicated that you were naturalized in 1994. As result of that,
you are an Australian citizen.”
This utter ridiculous response was provided by RUVANI WICKS, Assistant Director, Civil
Branch of the Department of Justice.
Edmund Barton (later becoming the first Prime Minister of Australia and thereafter a judge of
the High Court of Australia) made very clear during the convention, that if it isn’t in the
Constitution, then the Commonwealth had no legislative powers.
RUVANI WICKS refers me to the Commonwealth Government to sort out matters, however
this is clearly unacceptable, this, as the State of Victoria and not the Commonwealth deals or
must deal with State Citizenship!
Unless you can point out when there was a reference of legislative powers from the State of
Victoria to the Commonwealth approved within Section 128 of the Commonwealth
constitution, I view, there never was and still is no constitutional legislative powers by the
Commonwealth to determine State or any other citizenship!
At most, the Commonwealth, could determine “citizenship” as the local law for the Act and
Northern Territory through the parliaments governing those Territories (being Quasi States) as
they are not limited to constitutional provisions, however there never was any Constitutional
powers for the Commonwealth to grant citizenship to any resident of a State, neither
determine citizenship of a citizen of a State!
If your Department nevertheless maintains that the Commonwealth has the legislative powers
to determine citizenship of residents of the State of Victoria then please do set out in which
Constitutional manner the Commonwealth had this power from on set, if any, and/or how it
obtained this legislative power since the formation of the Commonwealth!
If anything, the Department of justice ought to be well aware that unless it is done lawfully it
is ULTRA VIRES!
END QUOTE 19-11-2002 correspondence to Victorian Attorney-General
END QUOTE County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
It should be clear that the then Attorney-General Mr Rob Hulls had written that the
State of Victoria would accept the court’s ruling.
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QUOTE
The book exposes that Section 44 is not at all applicable to elections! Rather it is applicable to people after being
elected if then they can accept a seat as Member of Parliament! It also exposes the incorrect usage of “office of
profit”.
On 20 December 2002, the newly elected member for the Seat of Ivanhoe Lidia Argondizzo, then commented
that if it was done already for so long then why change it? People really wouldn’t be interested to change it, even
if it was in breach of legal provisions.
Then again Lidia Argondizzo also claimed (to me) that there is no such thing as State citizenship! Well, that may
indicate her level of understanding, being a member of parliament, about what is legally applicable, and
obviously she didn’t know how then a Victorian elector got the political rights!
END QUOTE
Because I challenged the validity of the purported Australian Citizenship Act 1948 then this is and
remains to be ULTRA VIRES Ab initio (NULL AND VOID) unless and until, if ever at all, a
competent court of jurisdiction hands down a judgment against it to declare it INTRA VIRES. This
never eventuated so far.
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-I think they would, because it is fixed in the Constitution. There is no special court, but
the general courts would undoubtedly protect the states. What Mr. Isaacs seeks to do is to prevent the
question of ultra vires arising after a law has been passed.
[start page 2004]
Mr. ISAACS.-No. If it is ultra vires of the Constitution it would, of course, be invalid.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).-The position of my honorable and learned friend (Mr. [start page 2092] Higgins)
may be perfectly correct. It may be that without any special provision the practice of the High Court, when
declaring an Act ultra vires, would be that such a declaration applied only to the part which trespassed
beyond the limits of the Constitution. If that were so, it would be a general principle applicable to the
interpretation of the whole of the Constitution.
END QUOTE
Without State citizenship there is no State franchise and without State franchise there can be no
State Members of Parliament to be elected, this as any Member of Parliament requires to have State
citizenship.
.
KING v. JONES ; McEWEN v. HACKERT ; JONES v. JONES. (1972) 128 CLR 221
Barwick C.J.(1), McTiernan(2), Menzies(3), Walsh(4), Gibbs(5) and Stephen(6)JJ.
QUOTE Barwick C.J.(1)
10. There are some basic propositions of constitutional construction which
are beyond controversy. The words of the Constitution are to be read in that
natural sense they bore in the circumstances of their enactment by the
Imperial Parliament in 1900. That meaning remains, beyond the reach of any
Australian Parliament, subject only to alteration by the means provided by s.
128 of the Constitution. The connotation of words employed in the Constitution
does not change though changing events and attitudes may in some circumstances
extend the denotation or reach of those words. These propositions are fully
documented in the reported decisions of this Court which has the task of
finally and authoritatively deciding both the connotation and the denotation
of the language of the Constitution. (at p229)
END QUOTE
":.. The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its
makers" Gaudron J (Wakim, HCA27\99)

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"... But … in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or connotations of its words should remain
constant. We are not to give words a meaning different from any meaning which they could have borne in
1900. Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed as language changes. "
Windeyer J (Ex parte Professional Engineers' Association)
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte

Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27 (17 June 1999)
QUOTE
Constitutional interpretation
The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its
makers[51]. That does not mean a search for their subjective beliefs, hopes or expectations. Constitutional
interpretation is not a search for the mental states of those who made, or for that matter approved or enacted,
the Constitution. The intention of its makers can only be deduced from the words that they used in the
historical context in which they used them[52]. In a paper on constitutional interpretation, presented at
Fordham University in 1996, Professor Ronald Dworkin argued, correctly in my opinion[53]:
"We must begin, in my view, by asking what - on the best evidence available - the authors of
the text in question intended to say. That is an exercise in what I have called constructive
interpretation[54]. It does not mean peeking inside the skulls of people dead for centuries. It
means trying to make the best sense we can of an historical event - someone, or a social
group with particular responsibilities, speaking or writing in a particular way on a particular
occasion."
END QUOTE
Court are constitutionally not the so called 3rd arm of the government. Court are to be impartial and
can only be part of the constitution!
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON.-Very likely not. What I want to know is, if there is anybody who will come under the operation
of the law, so as to be a citizen of the Commonwealth, who would not also be entitled to be a citizen of the state?
There ought to be no opportunity for such discrimination as would allow a section of a state to remain outside the
pale of the Commonwealth, except with regard to legislation as to aliens. Dual citizenship exists, but it is not
dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in each person. There may be two men-Jones and Smith-in
one state, both of whom are citizens of the state, but one only is a citizen of the Commonwealth. That
would not be the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and myself.
That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen of the Commonwealth; that is the dual
citizenship. That does not affect the operation of this clause at all. But if we introduce this clause, it is open to
the whole of the powerful criticism of Mr. O'Connor and those who say that it is putting on the face of the
Constitution an unnecessary provision, and one which we do not expect will be exercised adversely or
improperly, and, therefore, it is much better to be left out. Let us, in dealing with this question, be as careful as
we possibly, can that we do not qualify the citizenship of this Commonwealth in any way or exclude anybody
[start page 1764] from it, and let us do that with precision and clearness. As a citizen of a state I claim the right
to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not want to place in the hands of the Commonwealth
Parliament, however much I may be prepared to trust it, the right of depriving me of citizenship. I put this
only as an argument, because no one would anticipate such a thing, but the Commonwealth Parliament might say
that nobody possessed of less than £1,000 a year should be a citizen of the Federation. You are putting that
power in the hands of Parliament.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?

Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must rest this Constitution
on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every citizen of a state shall be a citizen of the
Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or restrict those
rights of citizenship, except with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to disabilities, as
aliens, and so on.
END QUOTE
As such it must be clear that the constitution of 1900 never was amended to provide the commonwealth with
legislative powers to declare/define citizenship.

6
Convention)
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.-
We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
END QUOTE

QUOTE Mr. SYMON (South Australia).-
That this is not like an Act of Parliament which we are passing. It is not in the position which Mr. Barton has
described, of choosing or setting up a code of laws to interpret the common law of England. This Constitution
we are framing is not yet passed. It has to be handed over not to a Convention similar to this, not to a
small select body of legislators, but to the whole body of the people for their acceptance or rejection. It is
the whole body of the people whose understanding you have to bring to bear upon it, and it is the whole
body of the people, the more or less instructed body of the people, who have to understand clearly
everything in the Constitution, which affects them for weal or woe during the whole time of the existence
of this Commonwealth. We cannot have on the platform, when this Constitution is commended to the
people, lawyers on both sides, drawing subtle distinctions, which may or may not be appreciated by the
people.
END QUOTE
As indicated above State constitutions are creating constitutional parliaments because the sovereign
Parliaments of the colonies are no more.
It means that the purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is no constitutional at all because it was
not approved by a State referendum. Neither is the purported Local Government Act 1989
constitutionally valid this as it seeks to create a level of government not authorized by the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
It must be understood that this judgement and neither the Queensland legislation can
circumvent the fact that constitutionally states since 121-11-1910 no longer had Land Taxation
legislative powers and so neither could delegate them to councils.
https://www.governmentnews.com.au/2018/02/new-retrospective-queensland-law-validates-council-rates/
QUOTE
New retrospective Queensland law validates

council rates
By Graeme Philipson on February 22, 2018 in Finance, Law, Local, State
Image not included
A law has been introduced in the Queensland Parliament which retrospectively validates council rates that
may have been improperly issued.
The new Local Government Legislation (Validation of Rates and Charges) Amendment Bill 2018 has been
formulated as a response to a Queensland Supreme Court ruling in November 2017. That ruling, known as
the Linville case, meant that many rates and charges levied local government authorities in Queensland in
recent years could be found to be invalid.
The case came to court when investment company Linville Holdings was taken to court by Fraser Coast
Regional Council for unpaid rates. Linville argued that the rates were invalid because the council had failed
to pass separate resolutions each year validating its rates and charges.
Linville won the case. The ruling, from Supreme Court Justice David Jackson, called into question the
validity of many separate rates and charges levied by councils all over Queensland. Brisbane paper The
Courier-Mail at the time identified Gold Coast, Brisbane, Sunshine Coast, Moreton Bay, Townsville and

7
Cairns as councils that had similarly failed to pass separate resolutions during annual budget meetings, and
that potentially all Queensland councils could be affected.
The Queensland Government acted very quickly to enact new legislation which would effectively
invalidate the court’s ruling. They new bill will pass quickly into law – Queensland is the only state in
Australia with no upper house of Parliament.
The Bill’s Explanatory Notes explain in detail what the Government believes to be the rationale for the
legislation, and contains a justification for retrospectivity, basically “the need to provide financial surety to
local governments and ratepayers.”
Brent Lillywhite and Samuel Volling from legal firm Corrs Chamber Westgarth have written an overview
of the legislation. They say that it was introduced because the Queensland Government recognised the
potentially serious implications of the Linville ruling.
“The Bill would insert new sections into the Local Government Act and the City of Brisbane Act with the
effect, in summary, that any rate or charge levied (and anything done in relation to the rate or charge e.g.
steps to recover the charge) for a financial year up to and including the year ending 30 June 2018 is not
invalidated merely because of a failure to make a specific resolution for the rate or charge.
“In so doing, the Bill would retrospectively validate rates or charges that, in light of the Linville case,
would otherwise be invalid.”
But they say councils should still be wary.
“The Bill would only apply to rates or charges up to and including the financial year ending 30 June 2018.
For future financial years, local governments will need to make specific resolutions levying rates and
charges, in line with the Supreme Court’s approach in Linville.
“Second, the Bill would only validate rates or charges that were invalid solely because of the failure to
make a specific resolution. If a rate or charge would have also been invalid for another reason, the Bill will
not validate it.”
Corrs-chamber-westgarth, fraser-coast-regional-council, linville-case, linville-holdings, news-6, polar-

slider, queensland-parliament
Government indecision a risk to social housing
Leadership needed on Sydney and Melbourne’s growth, says Infrastructure Australia
END QUOTE
I may also state that all and any radar equipment not approved by the Commonwealth are
constitutionally without legal force to be used. Likewise that rates by municipal/shire councils that
were as the High Court of Australia in Sydney Council v Commonwealth in 1904 stated were
delegated State land taxation powers in effect since 11 November 1901 became unconstitutional,
this as the moment the Commonwealth commenced the then Land Taxation Office (later becoming
the ATO –Australian Taxation Office) then the States no longer could exercise land taxation.
QUOTE
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: The moment the commonwealth exercises the
power, the states must retire from that field of legislation.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Mr. REID:

8
We must make it clear that the moment the Federal Parliament legislates on one of those points
enumerated in clause 52, that instant the whole State law on the subject is dead. There cannot be two laws,
one Federal and one State, on the same subject. But that I merely mention as almost a verbal criticism,
because there is no doubt, whatever that the intention of the framers was not to propose any complication
of the kind.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: We ought to be careful not to load the commonwealth
with any more duties than are absolutely necessary. Although it is quite true that this power is permissive,
you will always find that if once power is given to the commonwealth to legislate on a particular question,
there will be continual pressure brought to bear on the commonwealth to exercise that power. The
moment the commonwealth exercises the power, the states must retire from that field of legislation.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-Directly it is exercised it becomes an exclusive power, and there is no doubt that it will be
exercised.
END QUOTE
It is totally irrelevant if the Commonweal.th did or didn’t abolish land taxation laws as once a
Commonwealth exclusive legislative powers then always a Commonwealth legislative power.
While the constitution in s51(xxxvii) give the powers to the commonwealth to accept reference of
legislative powers of a state or States as French J (later French CJ) pointed out this section doesn’t
at all give any powers for the State to refer legislative powers as it merely provides the
Commonwealth to accept it. The 2-1-1901 gazette Victorian Governors Letters Patent makes clear
that the governor can only appoint an impartial administration of justice. As such this means there is
a separation of powers. This also means the State cannot refer legislative powers to the
Commonwealth which then includes the judicial powers of the Supreme Court of Victoria to be
diminished. Neither can the State Parliament refer legislative powers to the Commonwealth without
a Section 123 referendum.
Anyone who checked the Letters patents will become aware that State Governors are permitted to
provide for a pardon but the Governor-General has no such powers, this is because crimes allegedly
committed against the Commonwealth is to be conducted in State courts exercising federal
jurisdiction. As such the Governor-General has no place in this to provide any pardons.
Getting back to the legislative powers of the State/Commonwealth they were CONCURRENT
legislative powers only until the Commonwealth commenced to legislate as the moment the
Commonwealth did so it became EXCLUSIVE legislative powers.
The constitution doesn’t provide any vehicle to reverse any Commonwealth legislative powers back
to State legislative powers. This means the commonwealth can commence to legislate as to say
payroll tax that any employer shall pay no more but 1 cent per employee for payroll tax and then the
following day abolish this payroll tax. The effect being that because the Commonwealth legislated
upon payroll tax then it became an exclusive e Commonwealth legislative power and the fact it used
so to say a gimmick is irrelevant, and so also it abolishing the following day, this as the payroll tax
can never be reversed back to the States.
.
It is clear that the legal principle embedded in the constitution is that all monies must be paid into
one Consolidated Revenue Funds. And clearly council rates are not all paid into a Consolidated
Revenue Funds.
QUOTE
Mr. ISAACS.-I should hope that the expenditure caused by a bush fire would not be part of an annual
service.
Mr. MCMILLAN.-Would it not into the Appropriation Bill?

9
Mr. ISAACS.-Yes; but not as an annual service.
Mr. MCMILLAN.-The annual services of the Government are those which we distinguish from special
grants and from loan services. The difficulty is that we have got rid of the phraseology to which we are
accustomed, and instead of the words Appropriation Bill, we are using the word law.
Mr. ISAACS.-A difficulty arises in connexion with the honorable members proposal to place
expenditure incurred for bush fires in the ordinary, it would not be annual, and it would not be a service.
END QUOTE
The same applies to the States. Any monies paid out, such as with the grand Prix cannot be funded
from ordinary departmental funds but requires a special Appropriation Bill to be passed by both
Houses of the State Parliament. Remember S106 “subject to this constitution”?
Likewise the State Parliament cannot authorize for the so called Local Government being
municipal/shire councils to legislate their own kind of laws as this would violate the legal principles
embedded in the constitution.
.
Regarding Public Authority Misfeasance and non-feasance
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29 (31 May 2001)
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/high_ct/2001/29.html
In 2013 albeit unbeknown to me, Buloke Shire Council allegedly went to court litigating against
me, at least this is what its documents filed in court referred to. This even so the alleged offence did
not eventuate until November 2014. I in November 2013 albeit unbeknown to any litigation by
Buloke Shire Against me, commenced to prepare a file of evidence just in case Buloke Shire
Council were to litigate against me. It may be stated that no known court order of 2013 existed.
The issue was that Buloke Shire Council office claimed that my property and the nature strip had
not been properly maintained. The Municipal Fire Prevention Officer even produced in the 2015
litigation in the County Court of Victoria alleged evidence by way of photos of my property.
Buloke Shire Council was represented by a barrister I understand at a cost of $5,000.00 a day, and
an instructing solicitor regarding my appeal against a Magistrates Court order. In the end the
Magistrates Court order were set aside. No orders for cost. .However Buloke Shire Council claimed
to have spent $18,000 on legal cost against me.
I had in writing warned the witness being the municipal fire officer that I would cross-examine him.
He and another witness gave evidence in court.
Significant was that I outlined to the court that Buloke Shire Council legal representatives had
violated court rules and court orders, etc. I submitted that if I had but merely made one such error
my appeal would be dismissed. His Honour Carmody agreed he would have dismissed my appeal
had I made any such errors.

10
Mr Wayne Wall the Municipal Fire Prevention Officer gave evidence that photos that were made by
him and another council staff member were made from outside the property and that GPS locations
were shown where the photos were made. I submitted that some photos had been made by
trespassing onto my property. Mr Wayne Wall insisted that there had been no trespassing and the
GPS showed where they had been located making the photos. In any event that council workers are
entitled in enforcement of any law to enter private property. I disputed that right.
When I cross-examined Mr Wayne Wall at one stage I stated as I recall: I put it to you that you are
not telling the truth, are you?
Mr Wayne Wall then responded he was and His Honour really took notice of this.
I then asked him to look at the pictures he had in Evidence in chief claimed to be of my property
and asked him if they were of my property. He confirmed this.
I then pointed out that one had a clothes line with a tire and was a white building with a red roof
whereas the other was a totally different building and no tire around the clothesline. He then
admitted it was not of my property (the one without the tire). His Honour then asked about where
the photo was from and Mr Wayne Wall stated he didn’t know.
It is remarkable that a $5,000 a day barrister never noticed that there were 2 different houses on the
photos neither so did the instructing solicitor. More over all this rot about the GPS proving where
the photos had been taken was utterly rubbish as clearly Mr Wayne Wall didn’t know where a
photo was taken he had claimed was made from a GPS position. His Honour himself pointed out
the photos didn’t themselves show any GPS details. As such the claim that the photos were not
made as by trespassing clearly was nonsense where it relied upon the claimed GPS coordination’s.
Moreover, the notice had been issued that all combustible material was to be removed from the
property. This even so the County Fire authority Act specifically excludes building. And well who
can remove buildings and trees for a few months during fire season? Clearly the notice was in
violation to the legislation as well as that the nature strip is not private property and as such cannot
be part of the notice.
.
Photo (below) taken on 2 October 2013 just outside Berriwillock along the Calder Highway.
The weed/grass is level to the side mirror of my motor vehicle, that high!
Clearly over a metre high weed/grass!

11
Photo (below) taken on 2 October 2013 just outside Berriwillock, along the Calder Highway.
Clearly over a metre high weed/grass!
Moreover, photos I had made in 2013 in anticipation of a possible future court case, showed that the
weed/grass along the highway ac cross my property was higher than my side mirror of my vehicle.
His Honour asked Mr Wayne Wall if this was a fire danger and he confirmed this was. Mr Wayne
Wall claimed that he had written Vicroad and left it by this. This even so the legislation provides for
the municipal fire officer to act to have work performed at cost of the public authority/council.
As I showed the grass on my property was next to nothing other than apiece about 80 metres from
the highway. Even Blind Freddy would be aware that where weed/grass along the highway is up to
1 1/2 metres high that surely is a fire danger (as admitted by Mr Wayne Wall) and not somehow
weed/grass some 80 metres from the highway.
Below a picture of conditions along Calder Highway in Buloke Shire, year after year, and never
cleared up as if this is not a fire danger.

12
The last 2 pictures are some of many areas where dead wood is left year after year as a fire danger
along the Calder highway.
I created this signage (and recommended it to Vicroads and Buloke Shire Council as well as to
the State Government) but so far to my knowledge the council didn’t use it nor for that any
authority of the State Government. This, even so I understand many grass fires commence
after a motor vehicle pulls over into the dry grass where the driver doesn’t realise the hot
exhaust under the car can cause a fire.

13
The concern in it was that Mr Wayne Wall and so his lawyers argued that council officers can enter
any private property (under the disguise) of law enforcement as they like. In my view this would be
an absurd situation as a person may be bathing a child and some council officer could be perving
through a window and then claim that by some kind of legislation he merely is investigating if the
child is not in danger. Where the High Court of Australia has ruled that a police officer is permitted
to enter a property to alert a property occupier by travelling from the entrance of the property by the
most direct route to the front door bell and no further as otherwise it constitute trespassing then I
view the council officer likewise cannot do any trespassing. Where then I have placed a signage at
my property and Mr Wayne Wall was aware no one resided at the property as he would correspond
to me to my Melbourne address then clearly he had no need to enter my property.
The problem being that Mr Wayne Wall in my view neglected his duties as a municipal fire
prevention officer to ensure that the high weed/grass along the highway (and we are referring to
over 100 kilometres) was cleared was going out of his way to pester residential properties by his
own admission issuing about 500 notices a year. One I understood man in a wheelchair was issued
with an about $1,500 Infringement Notice. Another who had the property mowed nevertheless was
issued with a $1,500 infringement notice, etc.
.
I discovered that Mr Wayne Wall, (using the false claimed property photo to build a case against
me), in my absenteeism had obtained a magistrates Court order without any evidence before the
court. As His Honour Mulaly of the County Court of Victoria (October 2015) claimed that the court
doesn’t need evidence to convict. What kind of impartial court (administration of justice) do we
have if a person can be convicted without any shred of evidence before the court, I wonder
What appears to me to be the issue is that Mr Wayne Wall is fabricating ground for an Infringement
Notice and then proceed in court without presenting evidence so that Buloke Shire Council can get
about $1,500 plus legal cost for every case they file. This while the real fire danger is left by Mr
Wayne Wall himself.
I have collected hundreds of photos along Calder Highway where over the years one can see the
same large dead branches to lie along the road as a severe fire danger but never have been cleaned
away.
Over the decades I did warn the local fire brigades along Calder Highway of fires and yet Mr
Wayne Wall as municipal Fire Prevention officer does nothing to have the huge number of dead
branches and high grass/weed to be cleared away.
.
It was my understanding from cross-examining him that he was not even properly trained as a
municipal fire prevention officer. What appears to be is that the lure of more than $1,500 per
infringement notice is what is the drive and nothing to do with protecting the local community
against fire dangers.
Again the Magistrates orders were set aside.
F9or sure one wouldn’t give the council officers more powers to willy nilly enter any private
property where the police as a local enforcement officer are not permitted to do so but are restrained
to observe the rights of property occupiers/property owners.
Central government versus Local government
QUOTE Mr. THYNNE:
The union of these colonies must take place in either one or two ways, namely, either by a unification under one
all-powerful parliament, or by a federation which gives to the central federal parliament certain limited powers
and reserves to the other parliaments all other powers. As I think we may be in danger of overlooking some of
the first principles connected with federation, I may be pardoned if I briefly define some of the characteristics of
a federation. I shall quote from Mr. Dicey's recent work, which is very clear in its language. He says:

14
One of the characteristics of a federation is that the law of the constitution must be either legally
immutable or else capable of being changed only by some authority above and beyond the ordinary
legislative bodies, whether federal or state legislatures, existing under the constitution.
END QUOTE
Convention)
QUOTE Dr. COCKBURN:
We know the tendency is always towards the central authority, that the central authority constitutes a
sort of vortex to which power gradually attaches itself. Therefore, all the buttresses and all the ties
should be the other way, to assist those who uphold the rights of the states from being drawn into this
central authority, and from having their powers finally destroyed. The whole history of federation in
America, whether it be the United States or Canada, has proved this: that the tendency is towards
centralisation, and away from that local government which is inseparable from freedom. I have heard it
said that those who advocate state rights are taking a conservative view of the question. I would like to
know since what time have centralisation and democracy been associated? Those who advocate state
rights advocate local government, under whose shadow alone democracy can exist. There is nothing in
common between centralisation and democracy, and if you handicap a house, which is erected, to
preserve state rights, what have you to prevent the establishment, in this huge island of Australia, of a
strong central government which is local only to one portion of the continent, and as far as the rest of the
continent is concerned is distant and central? I maintain that a central government, just inasmuch as it
never can be associated with the power of the people, is inseparably associated with tyranny, arising
either from ignorance or design-frequently from ignorance-because a central and distant government
can never properly appreciate the local conditions for which it is to legislate. I [start page 708] am
surprised that any one in this Convention should for one moment say that to strengthen in every way the
rights of the states, as such-to protect in every way the local institutions-is the conservative mission. The
whole history of federation has proved it is otherwise. It was in the name of state rights, when the
question of the Constitution of America was being discussed, that the most fervent appeals to liberty that
ever stirred the human breast were made, and all those opposed to state rights were the conservatives,
the monarchists of that time. The strongest upholders of state rights from time to time have been those
in favour of government by the people, and it is only when you have state rights properly guarded, and
safeguard local government, that you can have government by the people. Government at a central and
distant part is never government by the people, and may be just as crushing a tyranny under republican
or commonwealth forms as under the most absolute monarchy. I do hope that hon. members will not
allow themselves to be hoodwinked in this matter. It seems that the crushing majority in favour of the
state rights that are essential to federation, which we had at the commencement of this discussion, has
dwindled away. I maintain that unless the state rights are in every way maintained-unless buttresses are
placed to enable them to stand up against the constant drawing towards centralisation-no federation can
ever take root in Australia. It will not be a federation at all. It will be from the very start a
centralisation, a unification, which, instead of being a guardian of the liberty of the people, will be its
most distinct tyrant, and eventually will overcome it.
END QUOTE
Again
QUOTE
The strongest upholders of state rights from time to time have been those in favour of government by the
people, and it is only when you have state rights properly guarded, and safeguard local government, that
you can have government by the people.
END QUOTE
As such “Central Government” is the Federal Government and “Local Government” is

constitutionally State Government.
What I discovered in the litigation issue was the mayor of Buloke Shire Council and other
councillors didn’t have a clue what was legally applicable and Local Law Officer (Mr Wayne
Wall during cross-examination by me admitted not to be a lawyer, and was from
SouthAustralia)
So, here there was a man who was a South Australian, got a job with Victorian Buloke Shire
Council and obviously was an alien to Victorian Laws in general is made a Local Council legal
officer and bullies citizens.

15
Moreover, whereas legal proceedings should have been instituted nearest to the alleged offender
residence being Heidelberg or the place of alleged offence being Swan Hill he however commenced
to litigate in St Arnaud magistrates Court which clearly was a gross injustice to me.
Another thing was that the lawyers acting for Buloke Shire Council in their correspondence with a
complaint advised me that I should direct myself to Mr Wayne Wall the legal officer of Buloke
Shire Council and their letterhead omitted the address of the lawyers themselves.
As such, the appearance was given that Mr Wayne Wall was a lawyer acting for the firm of
solicitors whereas during cross-examination he admitted to the court he was not a lawyer.
One has to ask why engage lawyers when they rely upon anon-lawyer?
Mr Wayne Wall also in his writings claimed he had no authority at all to have the weed slashed on
properties of the Ministry of Housing. As such, he simply didn’t know the law at all this as the
county fire authority clearly provided him with the power to have it done at cost of the Ministry of
Housing.
With at times roadside fires it means that in my view the conduct of Mr Wayne Wall as legal officer
and as municipal fire prevention officer he was grossly incompetent and placed the lives of ordinary
citizens at uncalled risk and at the peril of roadside fires.
Regretfully Buloke Shire Council is not the only what I consider grossly incompetent council.
At Banyule City Council a purported enforcement officer in 2008 issued an Infringement Notice
that I had exceeded 3 hour parking limit. Upon my complaint the council provided me with a photo
of my motor vehicle and despite that the time frame of times recorded by the enforcement officer
showed a time being totally 2 hours and 24minuitesd it appears that the enforcement officer didn’t
know how to calculate times on a clock and so claimed it was 3 hours and 24 minutes. Despite the
evidence from the enforcement officer himself that I was parked for 2 hours and 24 minutes the
Local Law officer advised me that my appeal was dismissed and no further appeal was possible and
the matter would be going to court. I then wrote that if he wanted to make an idiot of himself to go
to court then so be it. Upon this I was advised that my (second) appeal was upheld and the
Infringement Notice was withdrawn. One then has to ask if this enforcement officer wrongly issued
Infringement Notices, as he clearly proved to do with me, then how many other times did he do so
then against other motor vehicle owners?
I have in the litigation challenged the constitutional validity of the purported Infringement Act (Vic)
and this has not been overruled.
Within our constitutional system, and again S106 of the constitution states “subject to this
constitution” the Framers of the constitution embedded the legal principle:
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the point.
All that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must be heard.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes; and the process of law within that principle may be [start page 689] anything the
state thinks fit. This provision simply assures that there shall be some form by which a person accused will
have an opportunity of stating his case before being deprived of his liberty. Is not that a first principle in
criminal law now? I cannot understand any one objecting to this proposal.
END QUOTE
As such, ex parte hearings (where a person has not been provided with an opportunity to defend his
case) are unconstitutional. As is clear that the Governor by the terms of the Letters Patent can only
appoint judges for an “impartial” administration of justice. Hence, the Infringement court being not
an “impartial” court as the accused is not provided with any opportunity to place his case before
the court, then is unconstitutional.
While the State Revenue Office (SRO) admitted that it holds $218.00 in regard of overcharged bill
by the water authority at time of the settlement in 2000 it nevertheless refused to refund the total
amount to my wife. If the Infringement Court was an “impartial” court then my wife ought to be
able to obtain orders against the State of Victoria, however it is in my view no more but a STAR
CHAMBER COURT outlawed by the Act Interpretation Act 1980 (Vic).

16
When in February 2011 the Victorian Police alleged that I had been speeding 5 km/h I immediately
challenged the validity of the Infringement Notice, the constitutional validity of the purported
Infringement court, etc. Any competent lawyer would be well aware that the moment a accused
challenge the jurisdiction of a court/purported court then all issues in dispute comes to a halt and the
only legal powers such court/purported court has is to determine the THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT/PURPORTED COURT. Only if this court/purported court dismissed the objection to
jurisdiction by handing down orders and a reason of judgment why it dismisses the objection to
jurisdiction can the court/purported court commence to hear and determine the issues in dispute.
What we had however is that the Infringement Court never followed those legal proceedings and
simply issue an unconstitutional court order and subsequently an unconstitutional warrant upon
which I notified the Sheriff’s Office on various occasions that it lacked any legal powers to enforce
the purported warrant. It may be stated the Sheriff’s Office never attempted to enforce the warrant,
which expired after 5 years.
Hat is demonstrated however is that where I legally challenged the purported Infringement Act
(Vic) and as this act was not just legislated against my person but against anyone subjected to an
Infringement Notice, then for all purposes and intent the purported Infringement Act is and remains
ULTRA VIRES Ab initio in regard to any accused. It means any purported Infringement Court
order is and remains ULTRA VIRES. Yet, we have what I view the Sheriff’s Office terrorizing
motorist to clamp their vehicles and do roadside armed hold-ups to enforce unconstitutional
purported Infringement orders/warrants.
Greensborough project!
Banyule City Council planned to have a $400 million Greensborough project, of which I was the
only lone objector on constitutional grounds. Banyule City council claimed it could afford to
engage in such expensive project. Nevertheless the project was abandoned as I objected to the
commonwealth to fund it being unconstitutional. However, Banyule City Council already had
demolished the local swimming pool which now had to be rebuild. It became some sort of wave
swimming pool, which was more like a commercial operation than a public issue.
Next however Banyule City Council as well as Buloke Shire Council pursued to increase the rates
beyond the cap because of needing the monies. Buloke Shire Council was able to increase it by a
total of about $56,000. Considering the years following as a flow on effect this is a lot more. This,
while it wasted against me alone $18,000 on litigation.
Clearly there is no proper accountability for municipal/shire councils to prove they need an increase
beyond the rate cap as they squander monies.
Banyule City Council who had claimed to be able to afford the $400 million Greensborough
project, after it was cancelled couldn’t afford the mere $40 million swimming pool rebuilding cost.
It ought to be clear that there is something very basically wrong and municipal/shire councils are so
to say taking everyone by the nose.
Whereas there is a constitutional system in place for a “responsible” Minister and a process to
elect Members of parliament to the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council such system
doesn’t exist within a council.
The separation of powers doesn’t exist at all.
As I have set out above we have in my view grossly incompetent persons as council officers who
then place cases before the unconstitutional Infringement Court or wrongly litigate otherwise and
there is simply no one competent enough to address such an issue, this even so as was proven with
Buloke Shire Council, motor vehicle drivers and their passengers and others have their lives left at
the peril of avoidable roadside fires.
When I very successfully represented Mr Colosimo in appeals then also I exposed how the council
had persisted in litigating (represented by lawyers) in defiance of Mr Colosimo’s constitutional
rights. From onset council had acted in blatant violation of legal requirements, etc. Mr Colosimo
former barrister had failed totally to expose this. Hence I took over not fearing to expose the rot.

17
We have already major problems with municipal/shire councils and as such the last thing anyone
would want to do is to somehow give it more authority.
Municipal/shire councils were recognized by the Framers of the Constitution as being corporations
whereas State government (see above) were considered to be “Local Government”. As such you
cannot have 2 levels of Local government. While as the High Court of Australia indicated the State
can delegate land taxation powers to a council, however it cannot delegate legislative powers. Any
delegated powers must in the end comply with the constitutional structure applicable and so all and
any monies raised must go into the States Consolidated Revenue Funds and only by special
Appropriation Bills can the State Parliament allow for monies to be drawn for the yearly
expenditure of municipal/shire councils. To allow otherwise would enable rip offs, rorts, etc.
Ministers could use municipal/shire councils for kickbacks if monies are not appropriately
accounted for.
Where properties are ordinary sold as FEE SIMPLE then no amount of legislation can undermine
the right of FEE SIMPLE holders as in essence the FEE SIMPLE holder of the property has the
same rights as what the Monarch had.
It means that trespassing cannot be circumvented by State legislation to allow purportedly
municipal/shire councils to legislate at will, this, as neither the State nor councils can interfere with
the FEE SIMPLE rights of a property owner. I actually canvassed this issue very successfully in
the Colosimo case.
As such the powers granted to a State Government is no more but to provide on behalf of the
Monarch the transfer of FEE SIMPLE rights over a particular property. As like a lawyer acting for
a person the lawyer cannot say sell a property and then place his own personal conditions upon the
purchaser so he obtains a personal interest beyond his authorized involvement to facilitate the sale
of the property. It is very obvious that the push for a republic is so the State can get into its hands
the right to modify FEE SIMPLE rights, this whereas under our constitutional system now
applicable it has no such powers. Likewise the nonsense that the Registrar of Titles can simply
amend the Title ownership of property holders is utter and sheer nonsense this as the registrar has
no more power but to record the transfer according to legal procedures between the vendor and the
purchaser, as such cannot simply say transfer unilaterally properties to the State.
Conflict of interest; council to represent ratepayer’s interest versus State Government
interest.
Again, the levels of government, other than the British Parliament /European Union Parliament,
legislating where it is complimentary to the constitution and/or the British Parliament legislating for
an Amendment Constitution act to amend the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
(UK) only the State as Local Government and the Federal Government as the Central Government
are permissible.
HANSARD 19-4-1897 Constitution Convention
QUOTE Mr. CARRUTHERS:
Mr. Barton first of all recites Dicey to show what occurs under the unwritten Constitution of England.
But here we are framing a written Constitution. When once that Constitution is framed we cannot get
behind it.
END QUOTE
Because our constitutional system is based upon a written constitution it cannot be amended/altered
by a mere High Court of Australia judgment as all the High Court of Australia can do is to
“interpret” the true meaning and application of the constitution as it always was since federation.
Hence, the Sue v Hill judgment not being such kind of “interpretation” therefore fell outside the
jurisdiction of the court.
QUOTE

18
Mr. SYMON.-A written Constitution is not exhaustive. We have implanted responsible government in
this Constitution, but we have not said so in so many words.
END QUOTE

QUOTE Mr. MUNRO:
. I quite admit that the United States system suits them; and if we are simply going to form a republic, and
to establish an institution in which the executive will not be in Parliament, and will not be responsible, the
state of affairs will be totally different. But I am contemplating that this Convention has in view the formation
of true responsible government.
END QUOTE

QUOTE Mr. ISAACS:
There is a line up to which concession may become at any moment a sacred duty, but to pass that line would
be treason; and therefore, when we are asked solemnly and gravely to abandon the principle of responsible
government, when we are invited to surrender the latest-born, but, as I think, the noblest child of our
constitutional system-a system which has not only nurtured and preserved, but has strengthened the liberties of
our people-then,
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Mr. MUNRO:
We have come here to frame a constitution, and the instructions that were given to us, I am happy to say,
are very clearly laid down by the hon. member, Mr. Baker, in the book which he was good enough to
distribute amongst us. He puts it in this form: That it is desirable there should be a union of the Australian
colonies. That is one of the principles that has already been settled by all our parliaments. Second, that such
union should be an early one-that is, that we should remove all difficulties in the way in order that the union
should take place at as early a date as possible. Third, that it should be under the Crown. Now, I am quite sure
that is one of the most important conditions of all with which we have to deal-that the union that is to take place
shall be a union under the Crown. Fourth, that it should be under one legislative and executive government.
That also is laid down by our various parliaments.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-this Constitution is to be worked under a system of responsible government
END QUOTE
The entire council and the CEO and others (and so the citizens within the municipality/shire) all
rely upon this untrained and grossly incompetent person to is supopoorsed to know the laws better
than they do as a Council By-law officer and fire prevention officer, etc, then we do have a major
disaster on our hands, as I proved in court.
Worse is that I warned Mr Wayne Wall beforehand I would cross-examine him to get to the truth it
turned out he and another council employee had colluded to pervert the course of justice, seemingly
to try to outsmart me. Well, they had a thing coming. When I had cross examined Mr Wayne Wall
and he admitted that certain evidence he had given in examination in Chief (when examined by the
barrister) then subsequently the next council witness appeared and the first thing he stated from the
witness box when giving evidence in chief was as I recall, it: I agree with everything Mr Wayne
Wall has stated. Well, later he too had to admit that a photo with a building claimed to be on my
property and relating to the GPS actually was not at all on my property. I spend more than 35 years
at the bar table, and while I am not a lawyer I represented at times also lawyers (including
barristers) and already was given in 1985 by a trail judge the nickname TRAPDOOR SPIDER
because of the manner I draw evidence out of opponent witnesses. And a barrister complained that I
was surgically taking apart his witness affidavit. As such, I was well known to get to the bottom of
things and warning witnesses before hand I always expected they would then collude to try to get
their evidence matching unaware this was precisely I expected them to do. For example exposing
that an exhibit an affidavit refers to actually was burned a day after the Affidavit was sworn, and as
such couldn’t have been existing when the Affidavit was sworn. And numerous other such instances
I would expose.

19
What we end up with is too many in power as councillors, CEOs and By-law officers and law
enforcement officers who simply are in my view totally incompetent and yet they then want to be
an Authority and be a level of government to terrorise citizens even more?
Hansard 5-3-1891 Constitution convention Debates
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN:
The people of Victoria are under many obligations to their distinguished Chief Justice and especially for his
judgment in this suit, in which he has displayed the acumen of the lawyer, the eloquence of the orator, and the
grasp of the statesman. Chief Justice Higinbotham said:
It was the intention of the Legislative Council to provide a complete system of responsible government in
and for Victoria, and that intention was carried into full legislative effect with the knowledge and approval
and at the instance of the Imperial Government by the "Constitution Statute," passed by the Imperial
Parliament.
END QUOTE
Hansard 5-3-1891 Constitution convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN:
Mr. Justice Holroyd considers that we have only a measure of self-government, and two other judges concur.
My colleague, Mr. Wrixon, who argued the case with great force and ability before the Privy Council, says:
If the reading put by the Supreme Court in Victoria upon our Constitution Act be correct, then not only
in the colony of Victoria, but in all the groups of Australasian colonies, the governments which we now
enjoy are without warrant of law.
That is a strong statement, and the judgment of the majority of our Supreme Court justifies me in asserting that
this Convention cannot too soon face the issue involved in it. I take it that the people of Australasia will not be
satisfied with any "instalment" or any "measure" of responsible government, or any limitations, except such
as are necessary to the unity of the empire. We claim, without shadow of doubt or vestige of qualification, all
the powers and privileges possessed by Englishmen. The governor-general, as representative of the Queen in
these federated colonies, should be clothed by statute with all the powers which should belong to the
representative of her Majesty; he should be above all risk of attack, because he should act only on the advice of
responsible ministers, who should be prepared either to obtain the sanction of Parliament for their acts or
vacate office. Parliament, in its turn, should be brought into intimate relation with the electorates. This is true,
popular government.
END QUOTE
As such when we have that a “responsible” Minister can delegate duties, obligations and legislative
powers to a municipal/shire council then why have a state government at all? After all the
“responsible” Minister will blame whomever at a council for what went wrong rather than to be
responsible for his/her gross incompetence. We see this ongoing how the elderly in nursing homes
are even ending up death and the “responsible” Minister merely blames the nursing homes rather
than to accept responsibility.
We can do without this passing the buck system. We need to make sure that Ministers who are
getting paid a lot of moneys from public revenue are actually doing the job they are commissioned
to do. If they can’t or do not desire to do the job then get rid of them, but we cannot delegate
legislative powers to some council where the check and balances now supposed to exist in a
Parliament are basically already non-existing.
We already have that councillors are giving away tens of thousands of dollars of citizens moneys to
their pet project that are actually outside the for public purposes doctrine.
Councillors already are rorting the system and all they would want is more pay and more travel and
other rots and when it comes to for example safety of the community they are too busy rorting the
system then to care less about dangers.
QUOTE
Sub-clause 19. The status in the commonwealth of foreign corporations, and of corporations formed in any state
or part of the commonwealth.

20
Mr. MUNRO: We have agreed to sub-clause 13, dealing with the incorporation of banks, and I do not see why
a similar provision should not be made in regard to the incorporation of companies. Why should they not be
under the control of federal officers? At the present time the law as to incorporation is different in the different
colonies, and the result is [start page 686] extremely unsatisfactory in many cases. I do not see why we
should not make the same provision in regard to the incorporation of companies as we have made in regard to
the incorporation of banks. We might introduce at the commencement of the sub-clause words to this effect:
"The registration or incorporation of companies."
Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: I do not think we should. There are a great number of different corporations. For
instance, there are municipal, trading, and charitable corporations, and these are all incorporated in different
ways according to the law obtaining in the different states.
Mr. MUNRO: But as to trading corporations!
Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH: It is sometimes difficult to say what is a trading corporation. What is important,
however, is that there should be a uniform law for the recognition of corporations. Some states might require
an elaborate form, the payment of heavy fees, and certain guarantees as to the stability of members, while
another state might not think it worth its while to take so much trouble, having regard to its different
circumstances. I think the states may be trusted to stipulate how they will incorporate companies,
although we ought to have some general law in regard to their recognition.
Sir JOHN BRAY: I think the point raised by the hon. member, Mr. Munro, is worth a little more
consideration than hon. members seem disposed to bestow upon it. We know what some of these corporations
are; and I think joint-stock companies might be incorporated upon some uniform method. In South Australia, a
banking company is not allowed to be incorporated under the Companies Act; still, there is nothing in Victoria of
which I am aware to prevent a banking company from being registered there as a limited company and opening a
branch in South Australia a few days afterwards. I think it is necessary, therefore, to have some uniform law.
There is nothing in which the public should have more confidence than in banks which are in any way
recognised by the state; and I think we should have some uniform system of incorporating banks. Many
companies, although doing business under different names, are, in reality, banks.
Mr. MUNRO: The banks are incorporated under the Companies Act in Victoria!
Sir JOHN BRAY: You can establish financial companies, which you do not call banks, but which answer all
the purposes of banks. We have provided that the federal parliament shall legislate as to the incorporation
of banks; but there is nothing to prevent the incorporation by the states themselves, quite apart from the federal
parliament, of trading companies which will do all the ordinary business of banks. If it is desirable to intrust
legislation as to the incorporation of banks to the federal government, there is no reason why we should not say
that the registration of financial companies doing all the business of banks should be dealt with in the same
manner.
Sub-clause agreed to.

END QUOTE
However when the State incorporate water provider such as GWMWater then this incorporation is
accountable as any other corporation.
Where municipal/shire councils are incorporated then they too fall under Federal legislative
powers regardless if the states were to create them as authorities.
A clear example is where GWMWater is providing UNTREATED water to the Mallee area
regardless that the then Minister for Health in 2003 made clear that all Victorians were entitled to
Safe Drinking Water. Well in 2018 numerous towns are still without Safe Drinking Water.
http://tex.parliament.vic.gov.au/bin/texhtmlt?form=jVicHansard.dumpall&db=hansard91&dodraft=0&house=ASSEMB
LY&speech=23716&activity=Second+Reading&title=SAFE+DRINKING+WATER+BILL&date1=7&date2=May&dat
e3=2003&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'safe'%0a%09and+data+contains+'water'+%29
QUOTE
Mr ANDREWS (Mulgrave) - It is a pleasure to speak in support of the Safe Drinking Water Bill. This bill forms part of the
government's strategic approach to water management, with specific attention being paid to water quality and risk management
as matters of public health. It is worth noting that this is a debate about public health and about making sure that each
community across our state has access to the highest quality water. It is also worth noting that this bill has been introduced by
the Minister for Health as a matter of public health.

21
The bill has four specific objectives. Before going on to those I welcome the support shown by the Liberal and National parties
for this bill. Every endeavour has been made to try to provide as much information as possible.
END QUOTE
Obviously the fact that as I understand it GWMWater is owned by the State of Victoria and it must
be so to say be a ‘model citizen’ then I view there can be no excuse for GWMWater not providing
since 2004 at the very least ‘safe drinking water’.
Below I quote a copy of a 22-8-2017 correspondence to GWMWater.
I may add that the dispute with GWMWater is already raging on for about 25 years. I had the water
meter from the residential property removed about 25 years ago but still had the water meter at the
adjourning vacant property. As GWMWater itself acknowledged in writing it cannot charge me for
the vacant property. Yet it never the less did so and now I make clear I demand my monies back
and not prepared to pay monies where legally I do not need to do so. GWMWater engaged a Debt
collector who after personally speaking to me decided not to proceed against me. Nevertheless
GWMWater now seeking about $3,000 plus for providing UNTREATED WATER against my will
seeks to claim about $360 a year for doing so to the vacant property.
And this is how GWMWater and likewise other corporations/authorities operate. They place
themselves above the rule of law knowing that so to say the judiciary is corrupt in making orders
against innocent people and even if they lose a case they are not personally harmed while the
wrongly accused persons suffers financially and otherwise considerably.
A clear example is the absurdity of Mr Wayne Wall and yet no repercussions for him wasting
$18,000 in legal cost to litigate against me. And this is where the system stinks because the
accountability for the wrongdoers is non-existing. They lie, they cheat, they commit perjury, pervert
the course of justice and violate court orders and court rules and yet not a single strand of
accountability for their elaborate wrongdoing.
As I indicated above despite my writings to the mayor, councillors and others including the lawyers
they ignored it all and litigated against me at the tune of $18,000 using deceptive conduct,
perverting the course of justice, committing perjury, violating court rules and court orders, etc. And
they never recovered a single cent against me. Surely this gang of losers couldn’t be deemed
competent enough to be some authority? And again I use Buloke Shire Council and Banyule City
council as mere examples but as the Colosimo case also proved it is widespread with similar
conduct and well councils and their staff basically are in my view taking their position they are
above the rule of law.
I about a year ago formally requested the mayor of Banyule city council as to how the property was
rated. He refuse to give any explanation other than that I can file a complaint by the relevant
authority. Moment, I didn’t say I wanted to complaint, as after all unless I get the relevant details
how an assessment is made I have no ground of complaint. Yet the mayor will not provide the
details. Now, it could very well that the property was wrongly rated and I view I am entitled to be
informed if my property is correctly rated or perhaps part of my neighbours property might be
included or whatever. Clearly, I am entitled to know the facts. And this just underlines that Banyule
City Council cannot care less what I am entitled upon and if I am overcharged rates. However it
does want to get the powers that if in its opinion I failed to pay 3 years rate is can then sell my
property. Where is NATURAL JUSTICE and DUE PROCESS in all this?
Yes, they are both legal principles embedded in the constitution and again the states are created
within s106 of the constitution “subject to this constitution”.
QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
terms that are just to both.
END QUOTE

22
Hence, any legislation by the Parliament that robs a citizen of his/her rights in violation to the
embedded legal principles then such legislation is NULL AND VOID Ab inito for so far it
trespasses beyond the true meaning and application of the constitution.
Unbeknown to most politicians/judge, etc, the acquisition provision in the constitution as a legal
principle applies to the States as much as it does to the Commonwealth.
One so to say must have a hole in the head for municipal/shire council to be able to acquire
properties for whatever reason it may deem fit. It may just do so to make a handsome profit with
kickbacks to councillors to allow a builder to get access to a private property. There are already
ample of Authorities on the record where councils tried to take over private property for the benefit
of some building company. FEE SIMPLE is precisely what it means, as it is the power of the
Crown that goes with the Title to the new owner. The government is merely a facilitator to register
the change of ownership of the property much as a real estate agent provide services when selling
for and on behalf of the property owner (vendor) a property.
See also 1923-1924.
[HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA.]
THE COMMONWEALTHOF AUSTRALIA Plaintiff ; AGAINST THE STATE OF NEW SOUTH MALES
Defendants. AND ANOTHER .. . . .
(the word MALES should be WALES)
Constitutional Law—Land vested in Commonwealth on transfer of Departments— Land acquired by
Commonwealth for public purposes—What passes to Common wealth—Royal metals—Other
minerals—Powers of Commonwealth Parliament— Acquisition of Property—“Land "—“Crown land
”—“Fee simple ”—Notification of acquisition — Registration of title of Commonwealth — Right to
certificate of title—Ultra vires—Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (63 & 04 Viet. c.
12), sec. V.—The Constitution, secs. 51 (xxxi.), (xxxix.), 52, 85, 109, 125—Lands Acquisition Act
1906 (No. 13 f 1906), secs. 5, 13-17, 20, 27, 62—Lands Acquisition Act 1912 (No. 39 of 191), sec.
2—Real Property Act 1900 (A'.S.IF.) (No. 25 of 1900), secs. 13, 14, 32, 35, 39, 46 — New South
Wales Constitution Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vid. c. 54), sec. 2.
QUOTE Privy Council Appeals from High Court of Australia Decisions

W R Moran Pty Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) [1940]
UKPCHCA 3; (1940) 63 CLR 338 (30 May 1940) PRIVY COUNCIL
W. R. Moran Proprietary Limited Appellant; and The Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) and
Others Respondents.
Privy Council
On appeal from the High Court of Australia.
30 May 1940
Viscount Maugham, Lord Atkin, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Wright, Lord Porter.
Viscount Maugham delivered the judgment of their Lordships, which was as follows:—
This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Full High Court of Australia dated 7th June 1939,
consisting of the Chief Justice Latham, Mr. Justice Rich, Mr. Justice Starke, Mr. Justice Evatt and Mr. Justice
McTiernan[1]. By the judgment it was ordered that the respondent (plaintiff in the action) do recover against the
appellant the sum of £85 12s. for flour tax and additional tax alleged to be due to the Commissioner of Taxation
under the provisions of two Commonwealth Acts entitled the Flour Tax (Wheat Industry Assistance) Assessment
Act 1938, No. 48, and the Flour Tax (Stocks) Act 1938, No. 50. The grounds of defence were that the appellant
was not indebted as alleged for the reason that the two Acts were invalid and ineffective as being ultra vires the
Commonwealth Parliament. This defence raises questions of great constitutional importance.

23
It is not in dispute that the two Acts mentioned, together with several other Acts to be referred to later, were
passed to give effect to a scheme which had been agreed between the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth and
the Premiers of the six States after a conference at Canberra. The scheme is in fact mentioned in a preamble to
one of the Acts in question. Its object and purpose was to ensure to wheat growers in all the States a payable
price (as it was called) for wheat, and to raise the necessary sum by imposing a tax upon flour sold in Australia
for home consumption. The Premiers on behalf of the States undertook to co-operate in the scheme by passing
Acts in the States fixing prices for flour sold for home consumption and providing for the distribution of the
proceeds of the tax among wheat growers in proportion to the quantities of wheat respectively produced by them.
The millers, it was assumed, would pass on the tax to the consumers, so that the ultimate result of the scheme
would be that bread and other products of flour would be a little dearer than before, while the growers of wheat
would be enabled to continue in business with the assistance of payments by the Commonwealth securing to
them a payable price for their wheat. But here there arose a difficulty. Tasmania was in a special position,
inasmuch as she alone of the States of the Commonwealth imports wheat from other States, and does so because
the quantity of wheat grown in Tasmania is relatively insignificant. The result of this circumstance is that the
people of Tasmania, if treated like the other States, would in the end have to bear the excise duty on flour by
paying an increased price for bread and other wheat products whilst that State or its inhabitants would receive
very little advantage from the distribution of the proceeds of the taxes which were being imposed on flour. This
difficulty was by agreement to be met in this way. The scheme was to provide that the tax on flour was to be
levied on flour consumed in Tasmania at the same rate as on flour consumed in the other States; but provision
was to be made for the relief of Tasmania as a State to an amount not greater than the tax on flour collected in
Tasmania. It was intended (following a course which had been previously adopted in Tasmania) that persons
who paid the flour tax there would obtain relief out of the sums to be paid by the Commonwealth to Tasmania in
the manner hereafter described.
Their Lordships agree with the High Court in the view that in the circumstances of the case there can be no
objection to examining the scheme, including the record of what was done at the conference at Canberra; and
they also agree that an examination of that record does not add anything to what is apparent upon the face of the
Federal and State statutes. There has been no attempt to disguise, still less to conceal, what has been done in this
matter and the reasons for doing it. The scheme admittedly could not have been carried out by the
Commonwealth Parliament alone, and the main question is whether in the course of taking the predominant part
in carrying out the scheme that Parliament has infringed the Constitution. Their Lordships however think it right
to add that, at any rate in such a case as the present, where there is admittedly a scheme of proposed legislation,
it seems to be necessary when the "pith and substance" or "the scope and effect" of any one of the Acts is under
consideration to treat them together and to see how they interact. The separate parts of a machine have little
meaning if examined without reference to the function they will discharge in the machine. In the present case the
purpose and substance of the Acts as a whole, which means little more than their scope and effect, may properly
be looked at. The purpose in this sense is inseparably connected with the substance. This does not mean that the
court is to seek out the objects, or the purpose, still less the intentions of the members of the Parliament or the
members of the government responsible for passing the measure, but that, just as in construing a statute it is
often necessary to ascertain the mischief which it was sought to remedy, so in such a case as the present it is
necessary to examine the scheme, and to have regard to its ultimate effect or its function as shown in the various
Acts, and also of course to its substance: See the majority judgment in R. v. Barger[2].
The scheme, as will shortly appear, was carried out by six Commonwealth Acts and by certain State Acts passed
by the various States. The Acts passed by the Commonwealth Parliament imposing taxation provide, as the
Constitution requires, for uniform taxes throughout the Commonwealth; but it is contended by the appellants that
those Acts are "part of a scheme of taxation operating and intended to operate by way of discrimination between
Tasmania and the other States," and that such Acts and taxes are accordingly contrary to the provisions of sec. 51
(ii.) of the Constitution and are therefore ultra vires the Commonwealth and void.
It is convenient to mention here that a number of other objections to the Acts and the taxes were raised before the
High Court of Australia and are dealt with in the judgments of that court; but they were not raised before this
Board and need not be further mentioned.
On 2nd December 1938 the Commonwealth Parliament passed four Acts imposing taxes upon flour and wheat
and also an Act providing the machinery for the assessment of such taxes. These Acts are entitled and briefly
provide as follows:—The Flour Tax Act 1938 (No. 49), which imposed a tax on flour manufactured in Australia
by any person, and on or after 5th December 1938 sold by him or used by him in the manufacture of goods other
than flour. The Flour Tax (Stocks) Act 1938 (No. 50), which imposed a tax on flour in excess of 1,000 lbs. held
in stock on 5th December 1938 by any person other than the manufacturer of the flour. The Flour Tax (Imports
and Exports) Act 1938 (No. 51), which imposed a tax on flour imported into Australia and on or after 5th
December 1938 entered at the customs for home consumption and also a tax upon wheat exported from Australia
on or after a date to be fixed by proclamation. The Wheat Tax Act 1938 (No. 52), which imposed a tax on wheat

24
grown in Australia and on or after a date to be fixed by proclamation sold to a wheat merchant. The Flour Tax
(Wheat Industry Assistance) Assessment Act 1938 (No. 48), which provided the machinery relating to the
imposition, assessment, and collection of the above taxes.
These Acts were designed according to the scheme to raise money by taxing flour and flour products so as to
provide a fund available for the payment of moneys to farmers of wheat. The tax was fixed upon the basis that
5s. 2d. per bushel of wheat on rail at Williamstown was a remunerative price, and the Acts were framed so as to
secure to the wheat farmers a payment upon the basis of 5s. 2d. per bushel on rail at Williamstown. If the price
of wheat rose above that amount a tax was to be imposed on wheat so as to form a fund out of which moneys
could be paid to millers.
On the same day the same Parliament passed another essential part of the scheme, the Wheat Industry Assistance
Act 1938 (No. 53). There is a preamble to this Act which briefly details (but without reference to Tasmania) the
circumstances under which the Acts were passed and the general nature of the scheme which it was hoped to
carry into effect. The preamble is in the following terms:—
Whereas at a conference between the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth and the Premiers of the States held
in Canberra, at the request of the Premiers, on the twenty-ninth day of August One thousand nine hundred and
thirty-eight, the co-operation of the Government of the Commonwealth was sought in putting into operation a
scheme to ensure to wheat growers a payable price for wheat: And whereas the Premiers on behalf of their
respective States undertook that, if the Commonwealth agreed to co-operate in the said scheme, legislation
would be passed by the said States providing for the fixing of such prices for flour sold for home consumption in
Australia as would provide for wheat growers a payable average price on all the wheat produced by them: And
whereas in order to ensure a payable price in respect of the wheat sold for home consumption in Australia, it was
represented at the said conference that it would be necessary that a tax be imposed upon flour sold for home
consumption in Australia and that the proceeds of the tax be distributed among wheat growers in proportion to
the quantities of wheat respectively produced by them: And whereas the Prime Minister on behalf of the
Commonwealth agreed that the Commonwealth would co-operate in the said scheme and that any legislation
necessary on the part of the Commonwealth would be submitted to the Parliament of the Commonwealth: And
whereas legislation has been passed by the Parliaments of the States providing for the fixing of prices for flour
sold for home consumption in Australia.
The most material sections of the Act were to the following effect:—Sec. 5 provided for the creation of a Wheat
Industry Stabilization Fund into which should be paid all moneys to be collected under the Flour Tax (Wheat
Industry Assistance) Assessment Act, No. 48, and this covered flour tax under the Flour Tax (Stocks) Act, No. 50.
Secs. 6 and 7 provided for payment out of the said fund of certain payments to the States respectively in the
nature of financial assistance. Sec. 14 provided for payment out of the said fund to the State of Tasmania of such
amount in each year by way of financial assistance as the Minister should determine, but so that the amount so to
be paid in any year should not be greater than the sum by which the amount collected in that year for flour tax
under the assessment Act, No. 48, in respect of flour consumed in that State exceeded the total paid to that State
in respect of that year under secs. 6 and 7 aforesaid and no amount should be payable under sec. 14 in respect of
any year during which no tax (subject to an exception therein mentioned) was collected under the assessment
Act, No. 48.
It will be noted that sec. 14 provides for special grants to the State of Tasmania in accordance with the scheme,
and these are the payments (the greater parts of which were intended to be repaid to the millers) which it is
asserted in effect amount to a discrimination in favour of Tasmania.
The State Parliaments had either passed, or had an applicable statute in operation, enabling them to fix the prices
(at least maximum prices) of flour and bread in their States. The Tasmanian Act was entitled the Flour Tax
Relief Act 1938, and like all the other Acts was assented to on 2nd December 1938. It provided that persons in
the State who paid flour tax to the Commonwealth might apply to a State official for relief and might thereupon
obtain a payment by way of relief in respect of the flour tax paid by them or at least a large part of it.
The result of the scheme of Federal and State legislation is admirably summarized in the judgment of Latham
C.J.:—"A Federal excise duty is imposed upon flour which is paid upon the same basis by persons in all States.
The proceeds of the duty go into the Federal consolidated revenue. An equivalent sum is then taken from the
consolidated revenue and is paid by the Commonwealth by way of financial assistance to the States of the
Commonwealth, upon condition that the States apply the moneys in the assistance and relief of wheat growers.
In the case of Tasmania, however, a special grant is made by the Commonwealth which is not subject to any
Federal statutory conditions, but which, in fact, is applied, and which it was known would be applied, by the
Government of Tasmania in paying back to Tasmanian millers and others nearly the whole of the flour tax paid
by them in respect of flour consumed in Tasmania"[3]. Its ultimate purpose or effect, whichever word is
preferred, is to enable growers of wheat to continue in business.

25
The first question to be considered is whether inasmuch as the Federal taxation Acts (Nos. 48 and 50 of 1938,
above shortly stated) do not in any way discriminate between States or parts of States there is anything to
invalidate those Commonwealth taxation Acts as being ultra vires. Sec. 51 (ii.) of the Constitution provides that
the Commonwealth Parliament shall have power to make laws "with respect to taxation; but so as not to
discriminate between States or parts of States." This it is truly said relates only to the law-making powers of the
Commonwealth. The ultimate discrimination in favour of Tasmania in this case arises, it is contended, from the
Tasmanian Act above mentioned; and the action of that legislature in relation to the sums paid to the State by the
Commonwealth cannot be an infringement of sec. 51 (ii.), because that section does not apply to the Parliament
of Tasmania. Anything, it is suggested, will be intra vires provided that the Commonwealth's taxation Act or
Acts do not infringe the terms of sec. 51 (ii.). With the greatest respect to those judges in Australia who may
have accepted this contention, it seems to their Lordships to go too far and certainly much further than is
necessary for the decision of the present case. It would seem to justify every case in which there is a taxation Act
containing no discriminatory provisions followed by an appropriation Act or a tax-assessment Act passed by the
Commonwealth Parliament authorizing exemptions, abatements or refunds of tax to taxpayers in a particular
State. It was argued before their Lordships that this would be intra vires. In the view of this board it is
impossible to separate such an appropriation or tax-assessment Act from the taxation Act in considering the
effect of sec. 51 (ii.), or to turn a blind eye to the real substance and effect of Acts passed by the Federal
Parliament at or about the same time, if it appears clear from a consideration of all the Commonwealth Acts that
the essence of the taxation is discriminatory. Laws imposing taxation must deal with one subject of taxation only
(sec. 55 of the Constitution), and the established practice in Australia is to follow the taxation Act with an
"assessment" Act providing for the collection and recovery of the tax, for exemptions and for refunds in
appropriate cases. In the opinion of their Lordships these Acts are all laws "with respect to taxation," all "relate
to taxation," and taken together must not discriminate between States or parts of States.
In the present case however the matter is not so simple. The discrimination in favour of Tasmania, if it should be
so described, is effected by the exercise in combination of three powers. One is that of the Commonwealth
Parliament derived from sec. 51 (ii.) already mentioned; another is that contained in sec. 96 of the Constitution
under which the Commonwealth Parliament can grant financial assistance to any State or States so long as that
power remains in force. The third power is that of the Tasmanian Parliament to distribute the financial assistance
obtained from the Commonwealth in giving relief to persons within the State who pay flour tax. A
discrimination brought about in this way is asserted to be unobjectionable, since it is not within the prohibition
on Commonwealth powers contained in sec. 51 (ii.).
The first answer of the appellants to this contention is that sec. 51 (ii.) contains a constitutional prohibition
against any discrimination as regards taxation between States or parts of States, from which it is said to follow
that no grant of financial assistance can be made to any State which would have the effect directly or indirectly
of creating such a discrimination. It is impossible to accept the contention in this wide form, for sec. 51 relates to
a number of powers which are conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament as regards the laws which may be
made by Parliament for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth and these powers are
expressly made "subject to this Constitution," a qualification which must include the power under sec. 96 (for a
period which might be limited) to grant financial assistance to any State. So far from sec. 96 being subordinate to
sec. 51 (ii.), or it may be added to sec. 51 (iii.), it would be more plausible to contend that powers conferred by
sec. 51 are subordinate to sec. 96, and that the power of the Parliament under that section can be exercised even
so as to effect a plain discrimination. The question then arises whether this view can be accepted with or without
qualification.
In dealing with the true construction of a constitutional Act such as we are now considering it is necessary to
bear in mind that it substitutes a Federal Commonwealth for a number of separate colonial governments with
their own legislative assemblies and powers of self government. Such matters as tariffs, taxation, bounties,
intercommunications have to be agreed between the constituent States before federation is possible, and it is
evident that the constitution ultimately agreed upon will contain certain prohibitions intended to provide fair and
equal treatment between the States so far as that is reasonably possible in a written constitution. Without
travelling into the history of the making of the Australian Commonwealth during the years from 1889 to 1900 or
the special circumstances of the six States which by referendum agreed to the bill which contained the
Constitution ultimately embodied in The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, there can be no
doubt as to the necessity for the important restrictions or powers contained in the sub-clauses of sec. 51:—"(ii.)
Taxation; but so as not to discriminate between States or parts of States. (iii.) Bounties on the production or
export of goods, but so that such bounties shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth."
On the other hand no one can suppose that these qualifying sentences were ever regarded as affording protection
against inequality as between the States in the incidence of taxation or in the advantages to be gained from
bounties. The Commonwealth is very rich in minerals of many kinds, but they are, of course, unequally
distributed between the States. Moreover, the climatic and soil conditions and the state of development are very

26
different in these various areas. Uniform taxes on selected metals or, for example, on the coal produced in the
States may impose a heavy burden on some States whilst leaving other States wholly untouched or only slightly
affected; and the same remark is true as to the agricultural produce or the products of stock-raising in the various
States: See R. v. Barger[4]. This was and is obvious, and it would be a mistake to regard the restrictions
contained in sec. 51 (ii.) and (iii.) as providing for equality of burden as regards taxation or equality of benefit as
regards bounties. That could perhaps have been achieved by provisions of a very different nature which would
have had regard to the amounts raised by taxation or the amounts of the bounties received in the different States.
There was no attempt to do this in the Constitution, and sub-sec. ii. provides only that taxation shall be such that
it does not discriminate between States. As Isaacs J. observed in R. v. Barger[5]—a statement approved in
Cameron v. Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation for Tasmania[6],—"the pervading idea is the preference
of locality merely because it is locality, and because it is a particular part of a particular State. It does not include
a differentiation based on other considerations, which are dependent on natural or business circumstances, and
may operate with more or less force in different localities; and there is nothing, in my opinion, to prevent the
Australian Parliament, charged with the welfare of the people as a whole, from doing what every State in the
Commonwealth has power to do for its own citizens, that is to say, from basing its taxation measures on
considerations of fairness and justice, always observing the constitutional injunction not to prefer States
or parts of States."
We must now consider sec. 96, which is found in chapter IV., "Finance and Trade." It is in these terms:—
"During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter until the Parliament
otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as
the Parliament thinks fit." There are no restrictions whatever in this section, and it is clear that while the section
remains in operation, the Parliament—apart from the restrictions contained in sec. 51 which must be considered
in a moment—may in the matter of financial assistance discriminate between States as much as it thinks fit.
Their Lordships have accordingly to bear in mind, first, that sec. 51 (ii.) prohibits discrimination between
States or parts of States, but is not concerned to deal with the matter of equality of burden, and, secondly,
that sec. 96 does not prohibit discrimination. It is difficult to see any ground for an attack on the scheme,
or on the various Acts which carry it into effect, in so far as that attack is really based on the exercise by
the Commonwealth Parliament of its powers under sec. 96. Those powers are plainly being used for the
purpose of preventing an unfairness or injustice to the State of Tasmania or indirectly to some or all of its
population. Such discrimination as may result between millers or their customers in Tasmania and in the
other States is a by-product, so to speak, of the endeavour to equalize the burden of the legislation by
diminishing the special burden on Tasmania; and it is of first importance to note that this is brought
about by an exercise of power under sec. 96 which does not itself prohibit discrimination. Great reliance
was placed by the appellants on the scheme; but in the view of their Lordships the scheme adds nothing to
the argument; for there is nothing in sec. 51 to prevent the Commonwealth Parliament from passing
measures in concert with any State or States with a view to a fair distribution of the burden of the taxation
proposed, provided always that the Act imposing taxes does not itself discriminate in any way between
States or parts of States, and that the Act granting pecuniary assistance to a particular State is in its
purpose and substance unobjectionable. In other words it seems to their Lordships, as it seemed to the
High Court, that the various Commonwealth and State Acts, if considered together as part of an organic
whole, contain nothing which is prohibited in the Constitution.
In coming to this conclusion their Lordships wish to make it clear that, as at present advised, they do not
take the view that the Commonwealth Parliament can exercise its powers under sec. 96 with a complete
disregard of the prohibition contained in sec. 51 (ii.), or so as altogether to nullify that constitutional
safeguard. The prohibition is of considerable importance; and the Constitution should be construed
bearing in mind that it is the result of an agreement between six high contracting parties with in some
respects very different needs and interests. Cases may be imagined in which a purported exercise of the power
to grant financial assistance under sec. 96 would be merely colourable. Under the guise or pretence of assisting a
State with money, the real substance and purpose of the Act might simply be to effect discrimination in regard to
taxation. Such an Act might well be ultra vires the Commonwealth Parliament. Their Lordships are using the
language of caution because such a case may never arise, and also because it is their usual practice in a case
dealing with constitutional matters to decide no more than their duty requires. They will add only that, in the
view they take of the matter some of the legislative expedients—objected to as ultra vires by Mr. Justice Evatt in
his forcible dissenting judgment—may well be colourable, and such Acts are not receiving the approval of their
Lordships. In the present case there seems to be no valid ground for suggesting that the sums payable to the
Government of Tasmania pursuant to sec. 14 of the Wheat Industry Assistance Act 1938 (No. 53) are not in the
nature of genuine financial assistance to the State, paid for the purpose of equalizing the burden on the
inhabitants of Tasmania of taxation which was being imposed on all the millers throughout the Commonwealth
for an end which might reasonably be considered to be both just and expedient.

27
Having regard to the view above expressed it is not necessary to deal with the point on which Mr. Justice Starke
primarily relied, namely, that even if sec. 14 of the Wheat Industry Assistance Act 1938 (No. 53) was invalid, it
could be treated as severable and distinct from the other provisions of that Act, and that its invalidity would not
affect the legislation as a whole. On this difficult point their Lordships prefer to express no opinion.
In the result their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed.
The appellants will pay the respondent's costs. The interveners will bear their own costs.
[1] [1939] HCA 27; (1939) 61 C.L.R. 735.
[2] [1908] HCA 43; (1908) 6 C.L.R. 41, at pp. 74, 75.
[3] (1939) 61 C.L.R., at pp. 756, 757.
[4] (1908) 6 C.L.R., at p. 70.
[5] (1908) 6 C.L.R., at p. 108.
[6] [1923] HCA 4; (1923) 32 C.L.R. 68.

END QUOTE Privy Council Appeals from High Court of Australia Decisions
As I did refer to above regarding the exclusive legislative powers for the Commonwealth regarding
land taxation, Land Tax Act 1910 (Cth) and the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910 (Cth), there is no
constitutional provision to reverse this back to the States however this seems to be overlooked in
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/2003/65.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="State%20land%20tax
" Paliflex Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (NSW) [2003] HCA 65; 219 CLR 325;
202 ALR 376; 78 ALJR 87 (12 November 2003)
http://www.business-standard.com/india/storypage.php?autono=266257
QUOTE `Public purpose` in land acquisition
M J Antony: `Public purpose` in land acquisition

OUT OF COURT
M J Antony / New Delhi November 29, 2006
The ambiguity of the phrase attracts political discord and litigation.
Several infrastructure projects are currently stuck in land acquisition hurdles. The purpose of the
acquisition, the amount of compensation and the environmental impact are some of the major issues
which stall the takeover. Among them, the objective of the acquisition is perhaps the most contentious
question. The Land Acquisition Act is vague on this point and it attracts interference by politicians and
vested interests. Therefore, the comprehensive discussion on this subject in the recent Supreme
Court judgement, Daulat Singh vs First Land Acquisition Collector, is instructive.
In this case, the West Bengal government wanted to acquire a plot for housing the office of the deputy
commissioner of police. The government has ultimately won the decades-old case in the Supreme
Court. One of the points argued was whether the acquisition was for a “public purpose”. The term has
been defined in the Land Acquisition Act, but it is not exhaustive. Some of the grounds for acquisition
are: provision of land for planned development from public funds in pursuance of any scheme of the
government, provision of land for a corporation owned and controlled by the state and provision of
land for any other scheme of development sponsored by the government, or with the prior approval of
the appropriate government, by the local authority.
The power of the government to compulsorily acquire land is described as “eminent domain”, a term

28
originating in the 16th century. In the classical sense, the state may use the property of the citizens
and use it in the case of extreme necessity or for ends of public utility. Private rights must give way in
such sovereign intervention. The principle has survived with some modifications even now. Article 39
of the Constitution, in the Directive Principles of State Policy, enjoins the state to direct its policy
towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so
distributed as best to subserve the common good. The laws made with such objectives must be for
public purpose.
Several judgements, not only of the Supreme Court, but also of the English and American courts, have
found that the term public purpose is difficult to define. In the present judgement, the Supreme Court
said: “Public purpose is bound to vary with times and prevailing conditions in the community or locality
and, therefore, the legislature has left it to the state (government) to decide what is public purpose and
also to declare the need of a given land for the purpose. The legislature has left the discretion to the
government regarding public purpose. The government has sole and absolute discretion in the
matter.”
In one of the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court, State of Bihar vs Kameshwar Singh (1951), a
Constitution bench admitted that the expression public purpose was not capable of a precise definition
and has no rigid meaning. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the
general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.
Who will judge whether the acquisition is for a public purpose? In the first instance, the government is
the best judge in this matter, according to the Supreme Court in the present judgement. “But it is not
the sole judge. The courts have jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter whenever a
question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a public purpose,” the judgement
emphasised, citing precedents. It also pointed out that though the government was the best judge in
this matter, the rule is subject to one exception, namely, where there was a colourable exercise of the
power, the declaration would be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party.
What is the degree of public purpose which would justify the acquisition? According to the Supreme
Court judgement in Babu Barkya vs State of Bombay (1961), it is any purpose in which “even a
fraction of the community may be interested or by which it may be benefited.” However, in Satya
Narain vs District Engineer, (1962), it was clarified that a pure business undertaking though run by the
government cannot be classified as public service. If the activity is such that it can be carried on by a
private individual, it would not qualify for the term public service or purpose.
However, the ambiguity and vagueness of public purpose continue to dominate land acquisitions. The
Mysore expressway row reached the Supreme Court, which gave its green signal some time ago. In
another case reeking of politics, the small car project in Singur is also caught in land acquisition
pangs. In view of the futility of litigation, it would be wiser if such problems are settled outside the
courts.
END QUOTE `Public purpose` in land acquisition
QUOTE Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914 (SA)

Version: 21.5.1990
This version is not published under the Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002 1
South Australia
Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914
An Act to provide for the acquisition by the Crown of lands for public purposes, and for
purposes consequent thereon and incidental thereto.
Contents
1 Short title
2 Interpretation
3 Act not to apply to public parks
4 Governor may declare any purpose to be a public purpose
5 Appointment of promoter of undertaking and holder of lands
6 Power to acquire lands required for a public purpose
7 Incorporation of Compulsory Acquisition of Land Act 1925
8 Promoter of the undertaking to have powers of promoters under incorporated Acts
11 Proceedings to be adopted where land vests in His Majesty
17 Power to dispose of surplus land

29
18 Moneys to be paid out of funds voted by Parliament

Legislative history
The Parliament of South Australia enacts as follows:
1—Short title
This Act may be cited as the Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914.
2—Interpretation
In this Act, unless inconsistent with the context or some other meaning is clearly
intended—
convey means convey, transfer, release, assign, or otherwise assure, according to the
exigencies of the case;
land includes messuages, tenements, and hereditaments and houses and buildings, and
also includes any estate or interest (legal or equitable) in land, and any easement,
right, power, or privilege in, under, over, affecting, or in connection with land;
owner includes, with respect to any land, any person having any estate or interest
(legal or equitable) in the land, or any easement, right, power, or privilege in, under,
over, affecting, or in connection with the land, or by the Compulsory Acquisition of
Land Act 1925 enabled to sell and convey such estate, interest, easement, right, power,
or privilege;
Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914—21.5.1990
2 This version is not published under the Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002
proclamation means proclamation made by the Governor and published in the
Government Gazette;
promoter of the undertaking means the promoter of the undertaking appointed by the
proclamation with regard to the particular public purpose;
public purpose means a purpose declared by the Governor, by proclamation under this
Act, to be a public purpose.
3—Act not to apply to public parks
This Act does not apply to any lands which—
(a) are, or are situated within, a public park or park lands, or a place reserved or
dedicated for the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of the State, or any part
thereof; and
(b) are vested in, or are under the control of, any Municipal Corporation or
Municipal or District Council.
4—Governor may declare any purpose to be a public purpose
The Governor may by proclamation declare any of the following purposes to be a
public purpose, namely—
I the providing of offices and other buildings and premises for carrying on the
Government of the said State or any Department or Departments of the
Government of the said State;
II any work or undertaking which the Government of the said State are by any
Act or law empowered to carry out, but for which there is no power (except
this Act) to acquire land;
III any purpose which both Houses of Parliament, during the same or different
sessions of any Parliament, resolve shall be a public purpose within the
meaning of this Act,
and thereupon such purpose shall be deemed to be an undertaking within the meaning
of the Compulsory Acquisition of Land Act 1925 and the Acts amending that Act, as if
it were an undertaking authorised by Act of Parliament.
5—Appointment of promoter of undertaking and holder of lands
By the proclamation whereby a purpose is declared to be a public purpose, or by a
subsequent proclamation, the Governor—
(a) may appoint some person, or the holder for the time being of some specified
office, to be, in respect of such public purpose, the promoter of the
undertaking for the purposes of this Act; and

30
(b) may nominate a person, or the holder for the time being of a specified office,
being in the case of such holder a body corporate, to be the person to whom
all land to be acquired under this Act for the said public purpose shall be
conveyed, and in whom the same shall vest.
21.5.1990—Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914
6—Power to acquire lands required for a public purpose
When the Governor has, by proclamation, declared any purpose to be a public
purpose, the promoter of the undertaking may take and acquire, either by agreement or
compulsorily, any land which is required for the said purpose: Provided that—
(a) no land shall be taken or acquired under this Act unless the Governor has in
writing directed that the same shall be so acquired; and
(b) all land acquired under this Act shall be conveyed to and shall vest in the
person or officer, if any, nominated in that behalf by proclamation, as
provided by section 5, or, if no person or officer is so nominated, then to and
in His Majesty the King.
7—Incorporation of Compulsory Acquisition of Land Act 1925
(1) For the purposes of taking and acquiring land under this Act and for the purposes of
all matters incidental to or connected with such taking and acquiring the Compulsory
Acquisition of Land Act 1925 is incorporated with this Act, but where any provision of
that Act is inconsistent with any provision of this Act the provision of this Act shall
prevail.
(2) For the purposes of the said Act—
the promoter shall mean the promoter of the undertaking as defined by section 2 of
this Act and the special Act shall mean this Act.
8—Promoter of the undertaking to have powers of promoters under
incorporated Acts
Anything to be done or suffered, or which may be done or suffered, by the promoters
of an undertaking or any number of them, by virtue of the enactments incorporated
herewith, shall or may be done or suffered by the promoter of the undertaking as
defined by section 2 of this Act.
11—Proceedings to be adopted where land vests in His Majesty
(1) When any land acquired under this Act vests in His Majesty the King, the Governor
may cause the grant, duplicate certificate of title, or other muniment or muniments of
title, and the instrument or document whereby the land is conveyed to His Majesty, to
be lodged with the Registrar-General.
(2) The Registrar-General shall make any entry in the Register Book or other book in the
Lands Titles or General Registry Office necessary or proper to evidence the vesting of
the land in His Majesty.
(3) If any of such land is under the provisions of the Real Property Act 1886 the
Registrar-General shall, upon receiving the transfer or other instrument whereby the
same is conveyed to His Majesty, make an entry on the folium relating thereto in the
Register Book as follows: "Cancelled, the land [or part of the land] having been
acquired by the Crown". Thereafter the land referred to in this subsection shall, for the
purposes of the Real Property Act 1886 and until again alienated from the Crown, be
dealt with and regarded in all respects as if it had never been alienated from the
Crown.
Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914—21.5.1990
4 This version is not published under the Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002
(4) Upon receiving the grant or duplicate certificate of title of the land in any such case as
mentioned in subsection (3) of this section, the Registrar-General shall cancel the
same by endorsing thereon the words—"Cancelled, the within land [or part of the
within land] having been acquired by the Crown"; and if the land is not the whole of
the land comprised in the grant or certificate of title, the Registrar-General shall,

31
without fee, issue a fresh certificate of title for the balance of the land so comprised.
17—Power to dispose of surplus land
(1) When it appears to the Governor that any land taken or acquired for any public
purpose is no longer required for such purpose, such land may, with the consent of the
Governor—
(a) be used for any other public purpose; or
(b) be sold, exchanged for other land, or otherwise disposed of.
(2) For the purpose of carrying out any sale, exchange, or disposition of such land, the
person in whom the same is vested, or, if vested in His Majesty the King, the
Governor, may execute any and every assurance, deed, instrument, and writing, and
do all such other things as may be necessary or expedient; and it shall not be necessary
for the person paying any moneys in respect of any such transaction to prove the
consent of the Governor to such transaction, nor to inquire whether a proper case has
arisen for the exercise of any power under this section.
(3) Moneys received in consideration of the sale, exchange, or disposition of any such
land shall be paid into the General Revenue of the said State, unless such land was
paid for out of moneys voted by Parliament for some particular public purpose, in
which case such moneys shall be paid to the Treasurer to the credit of the said public
purpose.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to interfere with any power of leasing any
such lands by virtue of any enactment relating to Crown lands.
(5) The Governor shall in the month of July in every year cause a report to be prepared
stating—
(a) particulars of all lands (if any) with regard to which, during the period ending
on the preceding thirtieth day of June, any of the powers conferred by this
section have been exercised; and
(b) how such lands have respectively been dealt with under this section; and
(c) the price or other consideration, and the other terms and conditions (if any), in
each case.
Every such report shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament within fourteen days
after it has been prepared if Parliament is in session, and if not, then within fourteen
days after the commencement of the next session.
18—Moneys to be paid out of funds voted by Parliament
The moneys required for the purposes of this Act shall be paid out of moneys voted by
Parliament for the purposes of this Act, or out of moneys so voted for the public
purpose for which the particular land is taken or acquired.
21.5.1990—Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914
Legislative history
Legislative history
Notes
• For further information relating to the Act and subordinate legislation made under the
Act see the Index of South Australian Statutes.
Principal Act and amendments
New entries appear in bold.
Year No Title Assent Commencement
1914 1154 The Lands for Public Purposes
Acquisition Act 1914
24.9.1914 24.9.1914
1935 2246 Statute Law Revision Act 1935 19.12.1935 19.12.1935
1966 77 National Parks Act 1966 1.12.1966 26.1.1967 (Gazette 26.1.1967 p210)
1972 56 National Parks and Wildlife
Act 1972
27.4.1972 3.7.1972 (Gazette 29.6.1972 p2689)
1990 9 Real Property Act Amendment

32
Act 1990
12.4.1990 Sch—21.5.1990 (Gazette 17.5.1990
p1358)
Provisions amended since 3 February 1976
• Legislative history prior to 3 February 1976 appears in marginal notes and footnotes
included in the consolidation of this Act contained in Volume 5 of The Public General
Acts of South Australia 1837-1975 at page 570.
New entries appear in bold.
Provision How varied Commencement
s 11
s 11(3) and (4) amended by 9/1990 s 42 (Sch) 21.5.1990
END QUOTE Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914 (SA)
Unless there is a precise definition what “PUBLIC PURPOSE” stands for it will be everyone’s
game to seek to misuse/abuse it for ulterior purposes.
Not so fast… changes to compulsory acquisition processes in NSW ...

https://www.holdingredlich.com › Knowledge › Planning & Environment
Oct 19, 2016 - Where land is reserved for a public purpose under an environmental planning
instrument the Government can be compelled to acquire the land but only where the land owner is
able to demonstrate hardship. The changes will provide for merit based review of decision on hardship
applications. The review ...
Compulsory Acquisitions - Unified Lawyers Sydney

https://www.unifiedlawyers.com.au/conveyancer/compulsory-acquisitions/
Rating: 5 - 18 votes
In NSW an authority, such as a government body, can acquire privately owned lands and properties
compulsorily for public purposes. Some of these common purposes include construction of
infrastructure such as widening an existing road or building a new highway. If you have been affected
by a compulsory acquisition of ...
See also:
Not for Public Purpose-Mangioni Vince (Vincent.mangioni@uts.edu.au)
[PDF]Privatizing the 'Public Purpose Rule' in compulsory acquisition

soac.fbe.unsw.edu.au/2009/PDF/Mangioni%20Vince.pdf
by V Mangioni - 2009 - Cited by 1 - Related articles
Keywords: Public Purpose, Compulsory Acquisition, Economic Development, Value, Taxation.
Word Count: 5053 ... This paper is a critique of the privatization of the 'Public Purpose Rule' in the
compulsory acquisition of .... In 2007 the Council sent proposed acquisition notices to the owners
of the land located in the town ...
See also COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT PURPOSES

IN NEW SOUTH WALES
http://www5.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLawTD/1978/1.pdf
Let us not ignore the fact that ample of times builders have built a house on the wrong property and
councils have sold the wrong property and then made a handsome profit in the process. In one case
I rec all council hired out the property it wrongly had acquired for a telecommunication mast to be
build and gained more than it compensated the rightful owner. As such, a council could use this
trickery not as to sell the property of someone allegedly owing monies but selectively going through
the file of a nearby property, adjacent or otherwise, and then pretend to sell it for a debt it claims is
owed to council when in fact it all along is aware it is a property that had no outstanding debt at all
but council or some councilor is getting a kickback or otherwise making a profit from someone who
is interested in the particular property. With the lack of accountability/transparency as there is no
equivalent as a “responsible” Minister I view that we must not go down the path whatsoever to
increase the already disastrous way municipal/shire councils are violating citizens’ rights.

33
Municipal/shire councils were created to address particular local issues in certain areas which were
beyond the ability of a Local Government being a State government to specifically address. Those
municipal/shire councils as corporations were therefore to provide localized services such as
garbage COLLECTION, ETC. Well, I experienced that in Berriwillock (Mallee) the collection of
recycle material (at considerable cost) then later is simply dumped with the ordinary waste at the
garbage tip and set alight. I discovered that Sea Lake Tip, where salt is recovered after the tip has
been regularly flooded during rain periods, it is littered with medical and human body part waste
from the local hospital, dead animal bodies rotting away and car bodies leaking oil, etc. As such, the
salt recovered is highly contaminated with poison, etc and yet this is the conduct of Buloke Shire
Council to my experiences. And as set out above it pretends to care about fire danger, while really it
is after the $1,500.00 plus it charges with an infringement notice while blatantly as some images
reproduced in this submission, shows that where it comes to the responsibility of Buloke Shire
Council it couldn’t care less as to have a housekeeping of fire safety.
Municipal/shire councils have been eager to gain more and more power, and so accepted to look
after certain roads, etc, merely so to boost having more powers and by this the “responsible”
Minister can spend more time to attend to photo opportunities for electoral purposes then to do the
job as a “responsible” Minister.
I would prefer to see instead council powers to be curtailed that it only provide for real local issues.
I recall where Banyule City Council was charging local businesses for promoting the area. As one
business owner ( in a site street) explained to me he had no benefit from this promotion as his sales
didn’t increase what so ever and yet he was forced to pay towards it. What the council did was to
misuse public monies (for the part it paid into the promotion) to promote business not at all for the
interest of the public. The $40 million dollars spend to create a wave swimming pool in my view
was a gross abuse and misuse of public funding.
The same where a councilor reportedly used council special allowance to pay for the building of a
kitchen of a local football club. Mind you that anyone wanting to attend would have to pay to enter.
As such it is a private issue. Why on earth would I go about and renovate my own kitchen to avoid
expensive cost to have it done and then to end up contributing to some private club to get a new
kitchen?
The same with when Banyule City Council is engaging in modernization of parks, etc, where the
items are so to say top of the range at huge cost. Yet many citizens are struggling to pay the rates
unconstitutionally extorted from them.
As to fire safety let the following pictures show the facts!
The 4 pictures below are of Banyule City Council, how it seems to comply with the Fire Authority
Act 1958!
Look at the photo below how high the weed/grass is!

34
Look at the photo below how the slashed weed/grass is left as a fire danger!
What this shows is grass/weed in excess of 1 metre high and the lower picture shows that what was
slashed/cut is simply left to dry out and rot, as another fire danger.
Remember the Buloke Shire Council litigation about my property?
How my property was left after slashing the weed/grass. (Photo below)
What is missing is the right of citizens to issue Infringement Notices against councils and then the
person responsible be personally accountable to pay the fines.
Only when such a scheme is introduced we may find that councils and their employees will get the
message that they too are legally responsible for the failure to act appropriately.
It is utter and sheer nonsense that any council can litigate about some minor growth some 80 metres
from a highway while it directly at a major highway has grass/weed for more than 100kilometre
stretch unattended to.
The underlying message therefore is that you do not give more power to in competent councils
but you rather reduce their powers and let them to be educated how to learn to manage the
duties and responsibilities they already have!
So to say anyone who were to vote to increase the powers of a municipal/shire council so to say has
a hole in the head and should not be a Member of Parliament, as the person simply do not
understand/comprehend what is constitutionally appropriate.

35
I recall that a council tree on the nature-strip was falling apart and so blocking half of the T-junction
I roadside at. It took many days after I notified council to finally clear the road way, albeit still not
clearing away the tree itself. Pedestrians were unable to used the footpath because it was blocked by
the fallen tree. Now if I had caused the same with a tree on my property no doubt immediately I
would have been on the receiving end of an Infringement Notice. And this just underlines the
DOUBLE STANDARDS applied.
There is that if a property occupier leave a rubbish bin out for too long then the property occupier
can be fined. Yet, we have that when garbage and recycling bins are put out the bins may turn out
not at all to be emptied, for whatever reason, until perhaps days later. Yet, a property occupier
cannot issue an Infringement Notice against council failing in its duties (for which it is paid) to
ensure the bins are emptied. Obviously council will blame whomever. And this underlines why we
have a lack of a proper system of accountability and responsibility.
As I indicated to Buloke Shire Council that whenever I attend to my Berriwillock property and
consumes the untreated water (even when boiled) then I have fallen severely ill. My last trip, late
last year, I took along from Melbourne 50 litres of drink water and avoided falling ill. But despite
my complaints Buloke Shire Council has done absolutely nothing as to ensure that local citizens
according to the provisions of the Safe Drinking Water Act 2003 they are provided with safe
drinking water. As such, we have councilors too busty rorting the system and doping whatever but
their jobs and then one day one might find that possible a bus full of school children having stopped
in the Mallee and unaware that the tap water is UNTREATED water THEN FALL ILL AND
SOME MAY END UP DYING. Well if it were to be your child or grandchild then no good to
complaint afterwards as essentially you are the murderer, even if indirectly, for having failed to act
to ensure safe drinking water was available.
Mind you in violation to legislative provisions GWMWater fails to have any marking on the
property inlet meters that there is UNTREATED water provided. As such, someone who happen to
drive past and stop in need of some drinking water would not be alerted to that the tap provides only
UNGTREATED water.
And Buloke Shire Council, despite my warnings has done absolutely nothing about it but are eager
to get more than $1,500.00 for pretended fire danger and trespassing upon private properties.
While I have provided special taps to prevent travellers to access UNTREATED WATER (see
images taken at my Berriwillock property) neither GWMwater or Buloke Shire Council let alone
the State government despite my numerous warnings are doing anything about it. But if some day
children or adults were to die then they all will seek to blame whomever but take responsibility for
their failures to act. Even Blind Freddy could see this coming.

36
Councilors and staff of councils would do better to consider that they place themselves and so their
private property rights at risk if they venture into issues/conduct that could make them personally
legally accountable.
.
QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.-
I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond the
substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say that
there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the Crown and
their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as any private
person would be.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE 26-3-2015 EMAIL
FW: Sydney City Council v Reid 1994 NSW Full Court councils do not represent the crown.
People
 David
 Mar 26 at 12:32 PM (26-3-2015)

To
 Davidkilife@gmx.com
Hide
Attachments
 SYDNEY_CITY_COUNCIL_V_REID (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 (21 Sept 1994) councils employees not Crown
employees..pdf
 Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Company - 55 U.S. 80 (1852) A Corporation cannot sue a human.doc
 Bropho v W. A [1990] HCA 24; 171 CLR 1 (20-6-1990) Bropho won. Abl land case. Govt or corporation
employees under Crown authority has no immunity if exceed duty..pdf

37
 Shaddock Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) 1981 HCA 59; 150 CLR 225 (28-10-1981)
Council liable for misinformation negligence.pdf
Download All
FYI. Sorry for sharing any case that you may have, but just in case please find the Sydney City Council v Reid
NSW Full Court case. I have included the Rundle v Delaware US Supreme Court case to which is very relevant
as a Corporation is a creature of Statute and thus cannot sue a human etc if you do not have this. Also I have
included Bropho v WA 1990 HCA case also concerning any employee acting under the authority of the Crown
has not immunity to criminal or civil action if they exceed their duty and the Shaddock case on councils
regarding negligence for stating false or misleading information.
Just to back up Bropho v WA HCA has been cited in some cases including Jacobsen v Rogers [1995] HCA 6;
(1995) 182 CLR 572; (1995) 69 ALJR 131; (1995) 37 ALD 321; (1995) 76 A Crim R 400 (17 February 1995)
MASON CJ, DEANE, DAWSON, TOOHEY AND GAUDRON JJ
13. It is, we think, important to recognize that the Crown, being relevantly the executive branch of government,
carries out in modern times multifarious functions involving the use and occupation of many premises and the
possession of many things. It carries out those functions through servants and agents who, notwithstanding
that they act with the authority of the Crown, have no immunity from the ordinary criminal law (15 See
Bropho v. Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR at 21, 26; A. v. Hayden [1984] HCA 67; (1984) 156 CLR 532
at 580-582). The Crown itself may not be subjected to criminal liability, save in the most exceptional
circumstances (16 See Cain v. Doyle [1946] HCA 38; (1946) 72 CLR 409 at 424), but those who actually
occupy Crown premises or hold Crown property are in a different position. There may exist on Crown premises
things which, whether the property of the Crown or not, will afford evidence as to the commission of an offence
or which are intended to be used for the purpose of committing an offence, whether the offence is one committed
or to be committed by a servant or agent of the Crown or someone else.”
Thanks to Darren for locating this NSW Full Court of the Supreme Court case of Sydney City Council v Reid
1994 who highlighted some important paragraphs on how councils do not represent or act under the Crown.
Darren has highlighted page 19, but I have read this case in depth right through and there are other cases listed
within that case.. The Justices were correct on some points, but obviously they do not read the Quick and Garran
1901 nor the Convention Debates 1890 to 1898 to actively determine who is local government. This is an
excellent case as a persuasive argument for the High Court on who is local government as no lawyers,
politicians, the courts and governors etc has done their homework in reference to this. The justices are correct
though that Parliament may amend the role of Councils and their employees. All this is an argument for the
High Court due to this Supreme Court Appeal court case. The Justices who all agreed are correct if councils are
elected by the people. But just like in Vic the Electoral Commission issue purported writs instead of Governors
for the purported elections. It is another argument to prove how council staff they represent the people when we
do not get a say usually at all and certainly most of the time, we are not informed.
Regards David
From: Darren
from page 19 of Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) NSW Full Court pdf
Whilst local government is indeed a form of government, it is also a creature of statute. Out of recognition of the
imperatives of democratic self-government, the statutory provisions have enacted the creation of largely
Page 19
independent corporations accountable (in the ordinary course) not to the minister (that is, the Crown), but to the
people who elect them. In this sense, the high measure of independence of statutory corporations, by which local
government is ordinarily carried out, is inconsistent with viewing theiremployees as servants of the Crown. The
exceptional powers of ministerial intervention remain that: exceptions. For the purpose of characterisation of the
nature of the service, it is more appropriate to catalogue it as being "in the service of local government
authorities" and not "in the service of the Crown".

38
This view also coincides with what must be deemed to have been the view of the drafter in making express
provision for other highly independent statutory corporations and adding them expressly to the list in Schedule 4
to the GREAT Act. If local government employees are to be regarded as "in the service of the Crown", so,
almost certainly, would be all of the employees of all of the employing authorities for whom express provision
was made in s 4 and Schedule 4 of the GREAT Act. It would render Schedule 4 unnecessary.
I do not say that local government employees should not be within the ambit of the GREAT Act. In a very real
sense, they are government employees. They carry on many activities which are governmental in character. They
do so under legislation of the State Parliament. But from the beginning of this form of statutory review, both
under the Crown Employees Appeal Board Act 1944 and under the GREAT Act, local government employees
have been excluded. As the terms of reference for the Bowen Committee suggest, this has been a deliberate
decision of succeeding governments and parliaments. That decision can be unmade. But in the end I have
concluded that it should be unmade by parliament, not by the court, reading into an admittedly ambiguous
provision an operation which fairly clearly was not intended.
MEAGHER JA. In this matter I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of the President. I agree
both with his Honour's reasons and with the orders he proposes. The issue with which the appeal is concerned
iswhether an employee of a local council can be said to be "in the service of the Crown". Manifestly he cannot.
Even the learned solicitor who argued the case for the respondent, Mr D M Bennett QC, did not advance so
farouche a submission that a municipal council was the Crown, or an arm of the Crown, or an emanation of the
Crown, or an agent of the Crown. The Whilst local government is indeed a form of government, it is also a
creature of statute. Out of recognition of the imperatives of democratic selfgovernment, the statutory provisions
have enacted the creation of largely
Page 19
independent corporations accountable (in the ordinary course) not to the minister (that is, the Crown), but to the
people who elect them. In this sense, the high measure of independence of statutory corporations, by which local
government is ordinarily carried out, is inconsistent with viewing their employees as servants of the Crown. The
exceptional powers of ministerial intervention remain that: exceptions. For the purpose of characterisation of the
nature of the service, it is more appropriate to catalogue it as being "in the service of local government
authorities" and not "in the service of the Crown".
This view also coincides with what must be deemed to have been the view of the drafter in making express
provision for other highly independent statutory corporations and adding them expressly to the list in Schedule 4
to the GREAT Act. If local government employees are to be regarded as "in the service of the Crown", so,
almost certainly, would be all of the employees of all of the employing authorities for whom express provision
was made in s 4 and Schedule 4 of the GREAT Act. It would render Schedule 4 unnecessary.
I do not say that local government employees should not be within the ambit of the GREAT Act. In a very real
sense, they are government employees. They carry on many activities which are governmental in character. They
do so under legislation of the State Parliament. But from the beginning of this form of statutory review, both
under the Crown Employees Appeal Board Act 1944 and under the GREAT Act, local government employees
have been excluded. As the terms of reference for the Bowen Committee suggest, this has been a deliberate
decision of succeeding governments and parliaments. That decision can be unmade. But in the end I have
concluded that it should be unmade by parliament, not by the court, reading into an admittedly ambiguous
provision an operation which fairly clearly was not intended.
aldermen of a council are elected by popular suffrage, not appointed by the Crown. They neither ask for, nor, in
general, receive, any assistance from the Crown in the discharge of their daily tasks. The extent to which the
Crown can interfere with their activities is slight, and the extent to which it does is minimal. In what sense, then
can it be said that an employee is "in the service of the Crown"? Because, as Mr Bennett said -- and said more
than once-- local government councils exercise what a political scientist might call"governmental functions": for
example, they might build roads, or conduct schools, or run hospitals. But, as is obvious enough, so can and do
many private persons and bodies. This suggested discrimen is inadequate.
POWELL JA. I have read, in draft, the judgment which has been prepared by Kirby P. I agree with his Honour's
conclusion that an employee of a local council is not to be regarded as being a person "in the service of the
Crown", and with his reasons for so concluding.
Page 21

39
Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 at 521 per Meagher JA, the Syd City Council was found by
the Court of Appeal not to be ‘the Crown, or an arm of the Crown, or an emanation of the Crown, or an agent of
the Crown; see also Crown Solicitor’s Advice to the Auditor-General in Auditor-General’s Report to
Parliament 1999, Vol 2, pp 403-407.
email me the significant parts and how you see it
thanks
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?locid=%27GST/GSTR20065/NAT/ATO%27
https://books.google.com.au/books?id=apHcLfapqREC&pg=PA155&lpg=PA155&dq=Sydney+City+Council+v
+Reid+%281994%29&source=bl&ots=9t0Qc75ECe&sig=ThtKUcanYtNerRYcrLUZulH2-
fs&hl=en&sa=X&ei=CxntVI2rGInl8gXs4YKoAw&ved=0CDYQ6AEwBQ#v=onepage&q=Sydney%20City%2
0Council%20v%20Reid%20(1994)&f=false
Local governments
13. Local governments may be a State or Territory. As is the case for corporations, the Commissioner considers
that the principles developed by the High Court of Australia in cases concerning the meaning of 'a State' in
section 114 of the Constitution, as described at paragraphs 8 to 12 of this Ruling, also apply in determining
whether a particular local government is a 'State' or 'Territory' for the purposes of the GST Act.
14. There have been several cases in which the Courts have considered whether a local government is a 'State'
for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution.
15. In The Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth 23 (' Municipal Council of Sydney' ), in three
separate judgements, all judges of the High Court agreed that the Municipal Council of Sydney was the 'State'
for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. The power delegated to the Council, by State legislation,
which allowed the Council to levy rates, was the determinative factor in that case.
15A. In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v. State Bank of New South Wales ,24 the High Court referred to
the Municipal Council of Sydney decision and said:
Indeed, the decision in Sydney Municipal Council v The Commonwealth is direct authority for the proposition
that a corporation exercising governmental functions is 'a State' for the purposes of section 114.
15B. The Full Federal Court's decision in Greater Dandenong City Council v. Australian Municipal,
Administrative, Clerical and Services Union 25 (' Dandenong City Council ) is another instance where a local
government was considered to be a 'State' for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution, albeit that it was
the constitutional immunity under paragraph 51(xxxv) of the Constitution that was the key focus of that case. In
his judgement, Finkelstein J referred to the Municipal Council of Sydney decision and considered several aspects
of the statute under which the Council was established in reaching the conclusion that the Council was a 'mere
instrumentality of the State'. 26
15C. The Municipal Council of Sydney decision and the Dandenong City Council decision both turned upon the
specific features of the particular Councils involved; those specific features being bestowed upon them by State
legislation.
15D. These decisions demonstrate that the legislation constituting a particular local government must be
considered to determine whether it is a State for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. These decisions
do not stand for a general proposition that local governments are a State for the purposes of section 114 of the
Constitution.
15E. The decisions in Municipal Council of Sydney and Dandenong City Council are contrasted with decisions
where the Court has determined that local governments do not operate as instrumentalities of a State or Territory
Crown, and therefore are not considered to have the immunities of the Crown. 27 However, the principles for
determining whether an agency or instrumentality represents the 'Crown' and has been endowed with the
privileges and immunities of the 'Crown' for a particular purpose are different to the principles applied to
determine whether a body is a 'State' for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. 28 Therefore, a local
government that does not share the immunities of the Crown may, nevertheless, be the State for the purposes of
section 114 of the Constitution and may, similarly, be the State or Territory for the purposes of the GST Act.

40
 4 Attachments
 View all
 Download all
 SYDNEY_CITY_COUNCIL_V_REID (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 (21 Sept 1994) councils employees not Crown
employees.
.pdf
Download View
 Rundle v. Delaware & Raritan Canal Company - 55 U.S. 80 (1852) A Corporation cannot sue a human
.doc
Download View
 Bropho v W. A [1990] HCA 24; 171 CLR 1 (20-6-1990) Bropho won. Abl land case. Govt or corporation
employees under Crown authority has no immunity if exceed duty.
.pdf
Download View
 Shaddock Associates Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council (No 1) 1981 HCA 59; 150 CLR 225 (28-10-1981)
Council liable for misinformation negligence
.pdf
Download
END QUOTE 26-3-2015 EMAIL
ATO v Melton Council

QUOTE Mr. GORDON.-
The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on
the Constitution we will have to wipe it out."
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS (Victoria).-
In the next sub-section it is provided that all taxation shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth. An
income tax or a property tax raised under any federal law must be uniform "throughout the
Commonwealth." That is, in every part of the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. MCMILLAN: I think the reading of the sub-section is clear.
The reductions may be on a sliding scale, but they must always be uniform.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Sir GEORGE TURNER: No. In imposing uniform duties of Customs it should not be necessary for the
Federal Parliament to make them commence at a certain amount at once. We have pretty heavy duties in
Victoria, and if the uniform tariff largely reduces them at once it may do serious injury to the colony. The
Federal Parliament will have power to fix the uniform tariff, and if any reductions made are on a sliding
scale great injury will be avoided.
END QUOTE

41
.
QUOTE Mr. BARTON.-
But it is a fair corollary to the provision for dealing with the revenue for the first five years after the imposition
of uniform duties of customs, and further reflection has led me to the conclusion that, on the whole, it will be a
useful and beneficial provision.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE Mr. BARTON.-
On the other hand, the power of the Commonwealth to impose duties of customs and of excise such as it may
determine, which insures that these duties of customs and excise would represent something like the average
opinion of the Commonwealth-that power, and the provision that bounties are to be uniform throughout the
Commonwealth, might, I am willing to concede, be found to work with some hardship upon the states for some
years, unless their own rights to give bounties were to some extent preserved.
END QUOTE

QUOTE Sir SAMUEL GRIFFITH:
2. Customs and excise and bounties, but so that duties of customs and excise and bounties shall be uniform
throughout the commonwealth, and that no tax or duty shall be imposed on any goods exported from one state to
another;
END QUOTE

QUOTE The CHAIRMAN.-
Taxation; but so that all taxation shall he uniform throughout the Commonwealth, and that no tax or duty
shall be imposed on any goods passing from one state to another.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I am saying now that I do not think there is any necessity for clause 95 in its present form.
What I am saying however, is that it should be made certain that in the same way as you provide that the
Tariff or any taxation imposed shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth, so it should be provided
with reference to trade and commerce that it shall be uniform and equal, so that the Commonwealth shall not
give preference to any state or part of a state. Inasmuch as we provide that all taxation, whether it be
customs or excise duties, or direct taxation, must be uniform, and inasmuch as we follow the United States
Constitution in that particular-in the very same way I argue that we should protect the trade and commerce sub-
section by not doing anything which will limit its effect. That is the real logical position.
END QUOTE
.
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. ISAACS (Victoria).-What I am going to say may be a little out of order, but I would like to draw the
Drafting Committee's attention to the fact that in clause 52, sub-section (2), there has been [start page 1856] a
considerable change. Two matters in that sub-section seem to me to deserve attention. First, it is provided that
all taxation shall be uniform throughout the Commonwealth. That means direct as well as indirect
taxation, and the object I apprehend is that there shall be no discrimination between the states; that an
income tax or land tax shall not be made higher in one state than in another. I should like the Drafting
Committee to consider whether saying the tax shall be uniform would not prevent a graduated tax of any kind? A
tax is said to be uniform that falls with the same weight on the same class of property, wherever it is
found. It affects all kinds of direct taxation. I am extremely afraid, that if we are not very careful, we shall get
into a difficulty. It might not touch the question of exemption; but any direct tax sought to be imposed
might be held to be unconstitutional, or, in other words, illegal, if it were not absolutely uniform.
END QUOTE
While municipal/shire councils acting under delegated powers may be exempt from GST it is
not however in regard to any enterprise the municipal/shire council engages in that are not
delegated State powers. And yet the Federal court of Australia issues an order ass if by
consent the ATO and Melton legal representatives can engage the court to circumvent
constitutional provisions. In my view the orders is beyond constitutional powers and so

42
beyond judicial powers! This also because a corporation is liable as much as any person to
pay taxes and cannot have a special tax exemption.
This also is sheer and utter nonsense this as the Court cannot circumvent the constitution!
Melton Shire Council and for that any other council can only operate for exclusion of GST where it
exercises delegated State powers and not beyond this.
As such where a council was to engage in a commercial enterprise GST would be applicable as like
against any other person.
The following is a 02 March 2011 claim by the NSW Government that it that there was a returned
taxation powers. However it doesn’t disclose at all by which section of the constitution (none to my
knowledge existing) it claims that such legislative land taxation powers was returned to the State.

43
As set out above already, the constitution doesn’t provide for any reversal of legislative
powers from the Commonwealth to the States. While municipal/shire councils could collect
for and on behalf of the Commonwealth land taxation, it could only do so if the land taxation
(rates) were UNIFORM throughout the Commonwealth! And that is not occurring and
neither can the States then legislate as to any cap or diversion from a UNIFORM rate/land
tax.

44
Councils are corporations and do not need permission to borrow monies.

QUOTE
Colonel SMITH: A municipal corporation can borrow without the consent of the state parliament, and why
should not the state parliament have a similar power?
Mr. MUNRO: The hon. member is going away from the question with which I am dealing. The municipal
corporations that borrow upon the security of their own assets can only do so upon the authority of an act of
parliament giving them that power; but the parliament that gives the power to borrow did not take over their
debts.
END QUOTE
If municipal/shire councils were to be made authorities within the State government then it
borrowing rights might be seriously curtailed. Effectively citizens may have to form new
corporations as being councils that represent their interest and not that of the state government.
State has separation of legislator-executive-judiciary whereas council do not have this.
Whereas the State government itself let the enforcement of laws generally over to Departments we
would have with municipal/shire councils that they would themselves enforce their own laws and so
the very legal principle of separation of powers would be destroyed. Actually it would be
unconstitutional to do so, as it is embedded in the constitution as a legal principle.
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-They do not require to get authority from home, for this reason: That the local
Constitutions empower the colonies separately to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of
the community, and that is without restriction, except such small restrictions as are imposed by the
Constitutions themselves, and, of course, the necessary restriction that they can only legislate for their own
territory. The position with regard to this Constitution is that it has no legislative power, except that which
is actually given to it in express terms or which is necessary or incidental to a power given.
END QUOTE
Again, as the States are created in s106 “subject to this constitution” which includes separation of
powers then the states are bound by this and cannot create some Authority that would defy this
constitutional embedded legal principle.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-I think that the reason of the proposal is obvious. So long as each state has to do only with
its own citizens it may make what laws it thinks fit, but we are creating now a new and a larger citizenship. We
are giving new rights of citizenship to the whole of the citizens of the Commonwealth, and we should take
care that no man is deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law.
Mr. GORDON.-Might you not as well say that the states should not legalize murder?
Mr. OCONNOR-That is one of those suppositions that are against the first instincts of humanity.
Mr. GORDON.-So is this.
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it is not. We need not go far back in history to find cases in which the community,
seized with a sort of madness with regard to particular offences, have set aside all principles of justice. If a
state did behave itself in that way, why should not the citizens of the Commonwealth who did not belong
to that state be protected? Dr. Cockburn suggested in so contemptuous a way that there could be no
reason for this amendment, that I got up to state again what had been stated before.
Dr. COCKBURN.-Not contemptuous.
Mr. OCONNOR.-I know the honorable member meant nothing personal, but I thought it necessary to state the
reasons of what, had it not been for the honorable member's statement, would have seemed to be a perfectly
obvious proposition. Mr. Clark, of Tasmania, thought the amendment of importance, and pointed out that it had

45
been put in the United States Constitution. It should also be put in this Constitution, not necessarily as an
imputation on any state or any body of states, but as a guarantee for all time for the citizens of the
Commonwealth that they shall be treated according to what we recognise to be the principles of justice and of
equality.
END QUOTE
HANSARD18-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.-
The right of a citizen of this great country, protected by the implied guarantees of its Constitution,
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- Of course it will be argued that this Constitution will have been made by the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. That will be true in one sense, but not true in effect, because the provisions of this
Constitution, the principles which it embodies, and the details of enactment by which those principles are
enforced, will all have been the work of Australians.
END QUOTE
The following will also make clear that the Framers of the Constitution intended to have CIVIL
RIGHTS and LIBERTIES principles embedded in the Constitution;
QUOTE Mr. CLARK.-
the protection of certain fundamental rights and liberties which every individual citizen is entitled to
claim that the federal government shall take under its protection and secure to him.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-Suppose the sentry is asleep, or is in the swim with the other power?
Mr. GORDON.-There will be more than one sentry. In the case of a federal law, every member of a state
Parliament will be a sentry, and, every constituent of a state Parliament will be a sentry.
As regards a law passed by a state, every man in the Federal Parliament will be a sentry, and the whole
constituency behind the Federal Parliament will be a sentry.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: Local freedom and government by the people are inseparable.
END QUOTE
HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN.-

What a charter of liberty is embraced within this Bill-of political liberty and religious liberty-the liberty
and the means to achieve all to which men in these days can reasonably aspire. A charter of liberty is
enshrined in this Constitution, which is also a charter of peace-of peace, order, and good government for
the whole of the peoples whom it will embrace and unite.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).- We who are assembled in this Convention are about to commit to the people
of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to commit this new Magna Charta for their
acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole history of
the peoples of the world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of Australia to
vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This new charter is to be
given by the people of Australia to themselves.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON (South Australia).- We who are assembled in this Convention are about to commit to the people
of Australia a new charter of union and liberty; we are about to commit this new Magna Charta for their

46
acceptance and confirmation, and I can conceive of nothing of greater magnitude in the whole history of
the peoples of the world than this question upon which we are about to invite the peoples of Australia to
vote. The Great Charter was wrung by the barons of England from a reluctant king. This new charter is to be
given by the people of Australia to themselves.
END QUOTE

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.- We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of the
Constitution. . It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under it; but it
is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-the
Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of this
kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow degrees
you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the guarantees
of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense, the court you are
creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a tribunal as will preserve the
popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of constitutional action, the
Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the sphere of the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE 19-1-2015 correspondence to Premier Daniel Andrews – Part only

Daniel Andrews Premier Victoria 19-1-2015
daniel.andrews@parliament.vic.gov.au
Cc: Bill Shorten Bill.Shorten.MP@aph.gov.au

Mr Tony Abbott PM C/o josh.frydenberg.mp@aph.gov.au
Senator George Brandis senator.brandis@aph.gov.au
George Williams george.williams@unsw.edu.au
Mr Clive Palmer Admin@PalmerUnited.com
Jacqui Lambie senator.ketter@aph.gov.au
The mayor & councillors Buloke Shire Council buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
The mayor Craig Langdon & councillors Banyule City Council enquiries@banyule.vic.gov.au
Ref; 20150119-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Premier of Victoria Mr Mr Daniel Andrews –Re council rates-state land taxes-etc
Daniel,
as a CONSTITUTIONALIST I ask;
How much intelligence exist within the Victorian Parliament (and other state
Parliaments) by Members of Parliament, their legal advisors and those army of lawyers
working in or for the Parliaments when none of them seems to understand that
municipal/shire “council rates” are a delegated power of land taxation?
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1904/50.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=title(Sydney%20Municipal%20Council%2
0v%20Commonwealth%20)
QUOTE
Sydney Municipal Council v Commonwealth [1904] HCA 50; (1904) 1 CLR 208 (26 April 1904)
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
H C of A
26 April 1904
Griffith, C.J.
In this action the Municipal Council of Sydney claims to recover from the Commonwealth municipal rates in
respect of land situate within the City of Sydney, and occupied by the defendants for the purposes of the
Departments of Customs, Posts and Telegraphs, and Defence, the land having become vested in the defendants
by virtue of sec. 85 (1) of the Constitution upon the transfer of those departments to the Commonwealth. The
defendants claim that the rates in question, which were made since the date of transfer, are within the prohibition
of sec. 114, which provides that "a State shall not without the consent of the Parliament of the Commonwealth ...
impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth." For the plaintiffs it is contended, first,
that a municipal rate is not a tax within the meaning of sec. 114, and, secondly, that, if it is, the provisions of the

47
Sydney Corporation Act 1879, by which (sec. 103, re-enacted as sec. 110 of the Sydney Corporation Act 1902)
(1902 No. 35) Crown lands were expressly declared to be liable to rates, were continued in force by sec. 108 of
the Constitution until the Parliament of the Commonwealth should think fit to legislate in a contrary sense, when,
it is said, the provisions of sec. 109 of the Constitution would come into operation, and the State law, being
inconsistent with the Federal law, would cease to have effect. No such Federal law has yet been passed. A
subsidiary contention was that, in determining whether the rate, assuming it to be a tax within the meaning of
sec. 114, was valid or not, regard should be had to the date of the passing of the New South Wales Statute,
and not to the dates when the particular rates in question were made, and that, therefore, the rates for
1901 and 1902, made under the Act of 1879, which was passed before the establishment of the
Commonwealth, were valid, even if those made under the Act of 1902 were invalid, which, however, was
not conceded. There can be no doubt that the right of taxation is a right of sovereignty. It may be
exercised upon all persons, and in respect of all property, within the jurisdiction of the sovereign power
which exercises it. Municipal taxation springs from this sovereign right, and is an exercise of it by
delegation to the municipality. No other origin for it can be suggested. It follows that if the authority
which assumes to create such a delegation does not itself possess the power, the delegation is void, since
the spring cannot rise higher than its source. A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot have any greater
power to impose taxation than the State by which it is created, and by which its own powers are
conferred. It is true that the word "tax" is sometimes used in the limited sense of an enforced levy for the
purposes of the general government, but, if a State itself has no power to make such a levy, it cannot
confer the power under another name. In a constitutional instrument, therefore, defining and limiting the
power of constitutional authorities, the word "tax" must be construed in the wider sense, and a
prohibition of the imposition of a tax must be held to include a prohibition of any such imposition by a
delegated authority, by whatever name the tax is called. The Sydney Corporation Act does not, of itself,
purport to impose rates, but merely requires the Municipal Council to make an annual assessment of the
values of land within the municipality, and to make an annual rate of such amount as they think proper,
within prescribed limits. The grant of the power, which is the act of the State, and the exercise of the
power, which is the act of the corporation, are essentially different. The Statute operates as a delegation of
the taxing power of the State, coupled with a direction when and how to use it. The assessment of land and
the striking of a rate together operate as municipal legislation in exercise of the power. It is clear,
therefore, that under this Act the imposition of a rate is the act of the corporation, and not of the State,
and that the tax is imposed from time to time when the rate for the year is made. It follows that the
prohibition of sec. 114, if applicable, applies to the rate for every year in which it is sought to levy it.
It is manifest from the whole scope of the Constitution that, just as the Commonwealth and State are regarded as
distinct and separate sovereign bodies, with sovereign powers limited only by the ambit of their authority under
the Constitution, so the Crown, as representing those several bodies, is to be regarded not as one, but as several
juristic persons, to use a phrase which well expresses the idea. No better illustration can be given than is afforded
by the lands now sought to be rated, which, having originally been "property of the State," i.e., lands of the
Crown in New South Wales, have become "vested in the Commonwealth," i.e., vested in the Crown in right of
the Commonwealth. The change in constitutional ownership is accurately and unmistakeably denoted by the
language of sec. 85 in which it is expressed.
The term "the Crown" as used in the Sydney Corporation Act must be taken to mean the Crown in its capacity as
representing the State of New South Wales. In the Act of 1879, passed before the establishment of the
Commonwealth, it obviously had that meaning, and no wider one can be given to it in the re-enactment of 1902.
The argument, therefore, sought to be founded upon the assent of the Crown, given through the Governor of
New South Wales, to the taxation of Crown lands, fails, since land vested in the Commonwealth or in the Crown
in right of the Commonwealth is not Crown land within the meaning of the Sydney Act. Nor, in my judgment,
can the liability of the land, while Crown land of New South Wales, to municipal taxation be regarded as a
liability running with the land, any more than if the land had afterwards been granted for a purpose which would
exempt it from such liability.
END QUOTE
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1904/50.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=title(Sydney%20Municipal%20Council%2
0v%20Commonwealth%20)
Sydney Municipal Council v Commonwealth [1904] HCA 50; (1904) 1 CLR 208 (26 April 1904)
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA H C of A 26 April 1904
QUOTE
For the plaintiffs it is contended, first, that a municipal rate is not a tax within the meaning of sec. 114, and,
secondly, that, if it is, the provisions of the Sydney Corporation Act 1879, by which (sec. 103, re-enacted as sec.
110 of the Sydney Corporation Act 1902) (1902 No. 35) Crown lands were expressly declared to be liable to
rates, were continued in force by sec. 108 of the Constitution until the Parliament of the Commonwealth should

48
think fit to legislate in a contrary sense, when, it is said, the provisions of sec. 109 of the Constitution would
come into operation, and the State law, being inconsistent with the Federal law, would cease to have effect. No
such Federal law has yet been passed
END QUOTE
So let us look at Commonwealth legislation.

QUOTE LAND TAX ABOLITION C1952A00081
LAND TAX ABOLITION.
No. 81 of 1952.
[Assented to 6th November, 1952.]
B E it enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, the Senate, and the House of Representatives of the
Commonwealth of Australia, as follows :-
1. This Act may be cited as the Land Tax Abolition Act 1952.
2. This Act snall be deemed to have come into operation on the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred and
fifty-two.
3. Land tax shall not be levied and paid for the financial year which commenced on the first day of July,
One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, or for any subsequent financial year.
4. Section fifteen of the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1952 does not apply in respect of the financial year which
commenced on the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, or in respect of any subsequent
financial year.
END QUOTE LAND TAX ABOLITION C1952A00081
While the Commonwealth abolished the payment of land taxation it did however also show:
This part of the law remains in force and so also the right of “uniform” taxation (land tax)
throughout the Commonwealth, and no land taxation can be applied and any State (delegated
municipal/shire council rates are therefore in violation of this part of the act!
Further, constitutionally while the States can refer to the Commonwealth within s51(xxxvii)
legislative powers the constitution (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
doesn’t allow for a reversal of legislative powers.
Further, in Sydney Council v Commonwealth (1904) the High Court of Australia held that council
rates were a delegated State power of land taxation.
At that time State land taxation was valid however when the Commonwealth commenced the Land
Tax Office on 11 November 1910 then State land taxation and so the delegated municipal/shire
council rates no longer ware legally permissible.
Nevertheless municipal/shire councils continue to charge rates (a form of land taxation) in defiance
of s109. As the Framers of the Constitution made clear any taxation collected without legal
justification has to be refunded.
I recall in the past having raised with Buloke Shire Council the issue of unconstitutional rates and as
such Buloke Shire Council having nevertheless ignored this I view would have a case to answer.
QUOTE Mr. HOWE.-
The sub-section would not interfere with the right of any state to act in the meantime until the Federal
Parliament took the matter in hand.
END QUOTE
Clearly it is only “until” the Commonwealth legislates upon a subject that the states have
“concurrent” legislative powers. The moment the Commonwealth commenced to legislate it was a
different legislative area, that of the Commonwealth. Only the Commonwealth could have re-
introduced any land tax system. And it can only do so in a “uniform” manner. Hence, it couldn’t
retrospectively validate non-uniform rates.

49
Again:
As this is a law that is still in force then s109 of the constitution applies.
QUOTE Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
109 Inconsistency of laws
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail,
and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
END QUOTE
For the above the Abolition of land taxes was more than just to abolish land taxes as it also
prohibited any further land taxation!
Below is a mere few quotations of a long record of correspondences but which may clarify what is
wrong with how state government perceive matters, as shown above Commonwealth legislation
remains in force!
This as section 4 clearly in itself abolished land taxation as from 1 July 1952 and “or in respect of any
subsequent financial year.” And as such section 3 was not required unless it specifically prohibited any
future land taxation.
4. Section fifteen of the Land Tax Assessment Act 1910-1952 does not apply in respect of the financial year which
commenced on the first day of July, One thousand nine hundred and fifty-two, or in respect of any subsequent
financial year.
In University of Wollongong v Mohamed Naguib Fawzi Ahmed Metwally & others [1984] HCA
74; (1984) 158 CLR 447 (22 November 1984) the High Court of Australia held that when the
Commonwealth abolished a certain law then the states can continue to apply its previous legislation
which so to say was held to be on hold where it violated s109 of the constitution,. However, this I
view is an incorrect reading of s109 and the court at no time in fact referred to or quoted the
Hansard records of the Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the
National Australasian Convention) but instead sought to analyse the wording in the constitution
as to what might be applicable in other jurisdictions.
As one judge stated in University of Wollongong v Mohamed Naguib Fawzi Ahmed Metwally & others [1984]
HCA 74; (1984) 158 CLR 447 (22 November 1984
QUOTE
In its express stipulation of invalidity, the section has no parallel in the Constitutions of the United States
or Canada and there is little point in looking to decisions of the Supreme Courts of those countries for
assistance in the resolution of the question involved in the present case
END QUOTE
Indeed, one must first consult Hansard records to gather the intentions of the Framers of the
Constitution and then it is very clear that any s52 of the constitution subject matter upon which the
Commonwealth legislate then be comes as like s52 an “exclusive” legislative power.
While the constitution in s51(xxxvii) provides for the States to refer legislative powers to the
Commonwealth the reverse is not provided for.
The Commonwealth cannot allow States to legislate on its behalf, as some of the judges of the High
Court of Australia seemed to imply as once under Commonwealth law then only Commonwealth
can legislate. Neither could the Commonwealth retrospectively repeal section 3 of the LAND TAX
ABOLITION C1952A00081, as a way to try to pursue to legally justify municipal/shire delegated
taxation powers of land taxes(rates) or the States themselves having legislated for land taxation in

50
addition to the municipal/shire councils already doing so (as such doubling up land taxation – Land
Tax Act 2005 Victoria) this as all landholders currently have the legislative right for “uniform”
taxation, so land taxes and as council/shire rates are held by the High Court of Australia in Sydney
Council v Commonwealth (1904) to be a State delegated power of taxation then such
retrospective validation of double land taxation can neither be legally justified.
Neither can the Commonwealth authorise the States (so also or as delegated land taxation powers)
the municipal/shire councils retrospectively having applied land taxers (including rates) for and on
behalf of the Commonwealth, this as all land taxes (rates) must be uniform throughout Australia,
and also all taxes must be paid into the Commonwealth Consolidation Revenue Funds and monies
could only be drawn by way of Appropriation Bills.
What I have sought to show ( see the extensive set out below regarding s92 and the usage of
“commerce” is that the High Court of Australia at times is too legalistic rather than to apply
ordinary common sense that an unlettered person would do, for which the constitution was drafted
as such. And the same problem we have with an issues such as that where the Commonwealth
commences to legislate upon a certain subject matter in s51 then the powers become an “exclusive”
legislative power of the Commonwealth, as those listed in s52 of the constitution, and the States
must retire from that field and can make “no new laws”.
Hence, “land tax” became an “exclusive’ Commonwealth legislative power in 1910 and yet this has
been ignored by the States as well as the Commonwealth.
And as with the Victorian legislation as to radar detection devices they must be deemed
unconstitutional this as the Commonwealth having legislated as to “weights and measures” then
this became an “exclusive” Commonwealth legislative power and if the States desired to have the
Commonwealth to certified a certain radar speed detection unit then it simply has to convince the
commonwealth of doing so, but it cannot so to say take the law into its own hands and legislate and
enforce such unconstitutional legislation no matter what.
Below, I have quoted various parts of what purports to be the Victorian Land Tax Act including
about Greater Melbourne “Banyule City Council” and the exclusion of land tax to residential
properties. Yet, “Banyule City Council” nevertheless charges rates (land taxes).
It simply is that no one in the Parliament seems to get it let alone understand/comprehend that
“council rates” as a form of Land Taxation! The current mayor of “Banyule City Council” is
former State Member of Parliament Craig Langdon! As I understand it he was the Government
whip when the land Tax Bill was introduced on 8 September 2005! So why do we have so many
Members of Parliament WHEN ALL THEY DO IS SO TO SAY BEING MINDLESS AND
VOTE LIKE ZOMBIES HOW THEY ARE TOLD TO VOTE WITHOUT ANY
INDEPENDENT MENTAL AWARENESS OF WHAT MIGHT BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL/INAPPROPRIATE.
LY&speech=42705&activity=Second+Reading&title=LAND+TAX+BILL&date1=8&date2=September&date3=2005
&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'land'%0a%09and+data+contains+'tax'+%29%0a%09and+%28+house+
contains+'ASSEMBLY'+%29
QUOTE
Title LAND TAX BILL
House ASSEMBLY
Activity Second Reading
Members BRUMBY
Date 8 September 2005
Page 717

51
This bill provides that for the purposes of the Taxation Administration Act 1997, the Land Tax Act 2005 is a 'taxation law'. A
central purpose of this bill is to bring land tax under the Taxation Administration Act 1997.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
I wish to make a statement under section 85(5) of the Constitution Act 1975 of the reasons of altering or varying that section by
this bill.
Clause 115 of the bill provides that it is the intention of sections 5, 12(4), 18(1), 96(2) and 100(4) of the Taxation Administration
Act 1997, as those sections apply after the commencement of clause 115, to alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act
1975. These provisions preclude the Supreme Court and VCAT from entertaining proceedings of a kind to which these
sections apply, except as provided by those sections.
This bill provides that for the purposes of the Taxation Administration Act 1997, the Land Tax Act 2005 is a 'taxation law'. A
central purpose of this bill is to bring land tax under the Taxation Administration Act 1997. The intent of clause 115 is to ensure
that the current limitations of the Supreme Court referred to in section 135 of the Taxation Administration Act 1997 will apply to
land tax. In this sense the same reasons will apply as to why the provisions referred to in section 135 of the Taxation
Administration Act 1997 alter or vary section 85 of the Constitution Act 1975 as did apply when the Taxation Administration Act
1997 was first enacted.
Section 5 of the Taxation Administration Act 1997 defines the meaning of non-reviewable in relation to the Taxation
Administration Act 1997 which now also applies to land tax.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
The bill continues the government's commitment to a streamlined taxation system that is fair and equitable for taxpayers, that is
readily understood, that reflects current legislative standards and that adds certainty to the taxation responsibilities of all
Victorians, and I commend the bill to the house.
END QUOTE
Version No. 051 Land Tax Act 2005 No. 88 of 2005 Version incorporating amendments as at 1 December 2014
TABLE OF PROVISIONS
QUOTE
END NOTES
1. General Information
Minister's second reading speech—
Legislative Assembly: 8 September 2005
Legislative Council: 20 October 2005
The long title for the Bill for this Act was "to re-enact and modernise the law relating to land tax, to repeal the
Land Tax Act 1958, to amend the Taxation Administration Act 1997 and other Acts and for other purposes."
The Land Tax Act 2005 was assented to on 29 November 2005 and came into operation on 1 January 2006:
section 2.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
PART 9—FURTHER AMENDMENTS, REPEALS AND TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

52
116 Repeal of Land Tax Act 1958

The Land Tax Act 1958 is repealed.
* * * *
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Division 2—General
106 Stating case to Supreme Court

(1) The Commissioner may state a case for the opinion of the Supreme Court on any question of law that
arises with regard to any matter under this Act.
(2) The Supreme Court may give its judgment on the case stated and make any orders, including orders for
costs, the Court thinks fit.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
5Taxation Administration Act 1997
This Act is to be read together with the Taxation Administration Act 1997 which provides for the
administration and enforcement of this Act and other taxation laws.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
SCHEDULES
SCHEDULE 1
Sections 35(1), 36(3), 37(3)
LAND TAX RATES
PART 1—GENERAL RATES OF LAND TAX
1.4 Land tax for 2009 and subsequent years

The rate of land tax for 2009 and each subsequent year is set out in Table 1.4.
TABLE 1.4
Column 1 Column 2
Taxable Taxable
value not value less Column 3
Item less than than Rate of land tax
$ $
1 0 250 000 Nil
2 250 000 600 000 $275 and 02% of the
taxable value that
exceeds $250 000
3 600 000 1 000 000 $975 and 05% of the
taxable value that
exceeds $600 000
4 1 000 000 1 800 000 $2975 and 08% of
the taxable value that
exceeds $1 000 000

53
Column 1 Column 2
Taxable Taxable
value not value less Column 3
Item less than than Rate of land tax
$ $
5 1 800 000 3 000 000 $9375 and 13% of
the taxable value that
exceeds $1 800 000
6 3 000 000 $24 975 and 225%
of the taxable value
that exceeds
$3 000 000
END QUOTE
QUOTE
SCHEDULE 2
Section 64(1)
GREATER MELBOURNE
PART 1
Banyule City Council

Bayside City Council
Boroondara City Council
Darebin City Council
Glen Eira City Council
Maribyrnong City Council
Melbourne City Council
Monash City Council
Moonee Valley City Council
Moreland City Council
Port Phillip City Council
Stonnington City Council
Whitehorse City Council
Yarra City Council
PART 2
Brimbank City Council

Cardinia Shire Council
Casey City Council
Frankston City Council
Greater Dandenong City Council
Hobsons Bay City Council

54
Hume City Council

Kingston City Council
Knox City Council
Manningham City Council
Maroondah City Council
Melton City Council
Mitchell Shire Council
Mornington Peninsula Shire Council
Nillumbik Shire Council
Whittlesea City Council
Wyndham City Council
Yarra Ranges Shire Council
END QUOTE
The following also may underline the need to stop this rot on land taxation by the States, as an
innocent tenant can end up with a land tax bill even so paying rent to the property owner.
What an utter nonsense! Just imagine to move into a property and then get slugged with
perhaps a $40,000 land Tax Bill! And again the then Government Whip Craig Langdon now
is mayor of Banyule City Council!
QUOTE
Division 2—Recovery of land tax
98 Recovery from lessee, mortgagee or occupier

(1) If a tax default occurs in relation to land tax, the Commissioner may require a lessee, mortgagee or
occupier of the land to pay land tax that is payable but remains unpaid.
(1A) The Commissioner cannot require a lessee or occupier—
(a) to pay an amount of land tax under this section that is greater than the amount of rent the lessee
or occupier is required to pay the taxpayer; or
(b) to pay an amount of land tax under this section before the day on which the lessee or occupier is
required to pay rent to the taxpayer.
(1B) Subsection (1A) does not apply to a lessee or occupier that is a related corporation or relative of the
taxpayer.
(2) The Commissioner's requirement is to be made by notice in writing.
(3) A copy of the notice must be served on the taxpayer.
(4) The tax must be paid to the Commissioner on receipt of the notice or by the date specified in the
notice, whichever is the later.
(5) Section 45 of the Taxation Administration Act 1997 applies to tax payable under this section as if the
person required to pay the tax were the taxpayer.
(6) A person who pays an amount of tax under this section is entitled to recover that amount from the
taxpayer as a debt, or to set off the amount against any money owing to the taxpayer.
(6A) If a lessee or occupier pays an amount of tax under this section—
(a) the amount is deemed to have been paid to the Commissioner by the taxpayer; and
(b) the lessee or occupier is deemed to have paid an equal amount of rent to the taxpayer under the
lease or agreement or under any applicable tenancy law.

55
(7)If a mortgagee pays an amount of tax under this section, the amount is deemed to be secured by the mortgage in
addition to any other amount secured by it.
(8) This section does not apply to land tax on transmission easements.
Note
General provisions for the recovery of land tax can be found in Part 7 of the Taxation Administration
Act 1997.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Division 3—Prohibition on passing on land tax
99 Prohibition on passing on land tax

(1) A provision in a residential tenancy agreement entered into on or after 1 January 1998 to the effect that
the tenant is liable to pay, or to reimburse the landlord in respect of, any land tax payable by the
landlord in respect of the rented premises is void.
(2) In this section—
residential tenancy agreement means an agreement, whether or not in writing and whether express or
implied, under which a person lets premises as a residence.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
104A Notice of errors in notice of assessment of land tax
(1) A person who is served with a notice of assessment of land tax must notify the Commissioner of any
error or omission in the notice relating to—
(a) any land in Victoria owned by the person that is not specified in the notice;
(b) in the case of a notice of assessment for land jointly owned by two or more owners, any land in
Victoria owned by the joint owners that is not specified in the notice;
(c) any land specified in the notice as exempt land.
(2) Notice of the error or omission must be given to the Commissioner within 60 days from the date of
issue of the notice of assessment.
(3) If there is more than one owner of the land specified in the notice of assessment, it is sufficient
compliance with this section if one of the owners provides the required information on behalf of all of
them.
105 Land tax certificates
(1) An owner, purchaser or mortgagee of land may apply to the Commissioner for a certificate under this
section.
(2) An application must be accompanied by the prescribed fee.
(3) If an application is duly made, the Commissioner must issue a certificate showing if there is any land
tax due and unpaid on the land described in the application.
(4) The Commissioner may include any other information in the certificate that he or she thinks
appropriate.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
PART 2—IMPOSITION OF LAND TAX
Division 1—Imposition of land tax
7 General imposition of land tax

Land tax is imposed in respect of each year on all taxable land in Victoria.

56
Note
This Act also imposes land tax on transmission easements (see Division 4) and special land tax
(see Division 5).
8 Who is liable for land tax?
The owner of taxable land is liable to pay land tax on the land.
9 When must land tax be paid?
The day specified in a notice of assessment of land tax must be not less than 14 days after the day the
notice is served on the taxpayer.
Note
Section 14 of the Taxation Administration Act 1997 provides for notices of assessment and provides
that tax is payable on or before the day specified in the notice.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Division 4—Land tax on transmission easements
24 Imposition of land tax on transmission easements

Land tax is imposed in respect of each year on all transmission easements in Victoria other than
exempt transmission easements.
25 Who is liable for land tax on transmission easements?
The transmission easement holder is liable to pay land tax on a transmission easement.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
26 When must land tax be paid?
The day specified in a notice of assessment of land tax on transmission easements must be not less than
14 days after the day the notice is served on the taxpayer.
Note
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Division 5—Special land tax
29 Imposition of special land tax

Special land tax is imposed in accordance with this Division on certain land that ceases to be exempt
land.
30 What land is subject to special land tax?
(1) Special land tax is imposed on the following land that ceases to be exempt land—
* * * * *
(c) land referred to in section 72 (sporting, recreational or cultural land);

(d) land referred to in section 75 (rooming houses);
(e) land referred to in section 76 (residential care facilities and supported residential services);
(ea) land referred to in section 76A (residential service);

57
(f) land referred to in section 77 (caravan parks);

(g) land referred to in section 80(1) (land owned by public statutory authority);
(h) land referred to in section 86(1) (land used as a mine).
(2) Special land tax is not imposed on a parcel of land referred to in subsection (1)(g) if at the time the
land ceases to be exempt land—
(a) the taxable value of the parcel does not exceed $249 999; and
(b) it is used or proposed to be used exclusively by the owner, or by any one or more of joint
owners, as his, her or their principal place of residence.
(3) Special land tax is not imposed if the land ceases to be exempt land only because the relevant section
referred to in subsection (1) is amended or repealed.
(4) Special land tax is not imposed if the land ceases to be exempt land only because—
(a) the land vests in an authority that acquires it under a compulsory acquisition law; or
(b) an authority that is acquiring the land under a compulsory acquisition law takes possession of
the land.
(5) In subsection (4)—

authority means a person who or body that is given power to acquire land under a compulsory
acquisition law;
compulsory acquisition law means a law of Victoria or the Commonwealth that provides for the
compulsory acquisition of land.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
33When must special land tax be paid?
The day specified in a notice of assessment of special land tax must be not less than 14 days after the
day the notice is served on the taxpayer.
Note
END QUOTE
QUOTE
PART 3—ASSESSMENT OF LAND TAX
Division 1—Rate of land tax
35 What is the rate of land tax?

(1) The rate of land tax (other than special land tax) is set out in Schedule 1.
Note
Schedule 1 sets out 3 different rates of land tax. Part 1 sets out the general rates of land tax, Part 2 sets
out the rate of land tax on transmission easements and Part 3 sets out the land tax surcharge rates for
trusts—see also Division 2A of this Part.
(2) The rate of special land tax is 5% of the taxable value of the land.
END QUOTE
QUOTE

58
Division 4—General
51 Reassessments
The Commissioner may make a reassessment of land tax under section 9 of the Taxation
Administration Act 1997 more than 5 years after the initial assessment.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
55A Deferral of tax for residential land to be used during tax year
(1) The Commissioner may determine that land tax in respect of land for a year is not payable until the
expiry of a 6 month period that begins and ends in that year if—
END QUOTE
QUOTE
57 Exemption continues on death of resident
(1) If land is used and occupied as the principal place of residence of a person and the person dies, liability
for tax is to be assessed as if the person had not died but had continued to use and occupy the land as
his or her principal place of residence.
(2) Subsection (1) operates only until the earlier of—
(a) the third anniversary of the person's death or the expiry of the further period approved by the
Commissioner under subsection (3); or
(b) the day on which the person's interest in the land vests in another person under a trust; or
(c) the day on which the person's interest in the land vests in a person (other than the person's
personal representative) under the administration of the person's estate.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a), the Commissioner may approve a further period in any particular
case.
58 Exemption continues if land becomes unfit for occupation

(1) If land that is exempt land under section 54(1) becomes unfit for occupation as the principal place of
residence of a person because of damage or destruction caused by an event such as fire, earthquake,
storm, accident or malicious damage, the land continues to be exempt land while the owner continues
to own the land as if it had continued to be used and occupied as the person's principal place of
residence.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
60 Sale of old principal residence
(1) Land owned by a person is exempt land in respect of a year if—
(a) either—
(i) the land was exempt land under section 54(1) for the preceding year; or
(ii) the person used and occupied the land as his or her principal place of residence for a
period of at least 6 months during the preceding year; and
(b) as at 31 December in the preceding year, the person was the owner of other land that he or she
used and occupied as his or her principal place of residence.
Note
In this situation, the land referred to in paragraph (b) will be exempt land in the circumstances set out in section
54(1)(a).
61 Unoccupied land subsequently used as principal residence

(1) An owner who was assessed for and paid land tax in respect of a year in respect of land that is not
occupied as the principal place of residence of the owner is entitled to a refund of that land tax if—

59
(a) the owner was unable to occupy that land as his or her principal place of residence as at
31 December in the preceding year because a residence was being constructed or renovated on
it; and
(ab) once construction or renovation of that residence has been completed, the owner continuously
uses and occupies the land as his or her principal place of residence for at least 6 months
commencing in that year; and
(b) an application for a refund is made before the end of the next following year.
(2) A trustee who was assessed for and paid land tax in respect of a year in respect of land that is not
occupied as the principal place of residence of a vested beneficiary in relation to the land is entitled to
a refund of that land tax if—
(a) the vested beneficiary was unable to occupy the land as his or her principal place of residence as
at 31 December the preceding year because a residence was being constructed or renovated on
it; and
(b) once construction or renovation of that residence has been completed, the vested beneficiary
continuously uses and occupies the land as his or her principal place of residence for at least 6
months commencing in that year; and
(c) an application for a refund is made before the end of the next following year.
(3) If—
(a) an owner or trustee is entitled under subsection (1) or (2) to a refund of land tax in respect of a
tax year in respect of land; and
(b) the owner or trustee was assessed for and paid land tax in respect of that land in respect of the
year preceding the tax year; and
(c) the owner or trustee was not entitled to an exemption under this Division in respect of any other
land in respect of the year preceding the tax year—
the owner or trustee is entitled to a refund of the land tax referred to in paragraph (b).
(4) If—
(a) an owner or trustee is entitled under subsection (3) to a refund of land tax in respect of the first
year preceding the tax year referred to in that subsection (the first year) in respect of land; and
(b) the owner or trustee was assessed for and paid land tax in respect of that land in respect of the
year or 2 years immediately preceding the first year; and
(c) the owner or trustee was not entitled to an exemption under this Division in respect of any other
land in respect of the year or years referred to in paragraph (b)—
the Commissioner may refund to the owner or trustee the land tax paid in respect of the year or years
referred to in paragraph (b) in a particular case if the Commissioner is satisfied that there has been an
acceptable delay in that case.
* * * * *
(5) Subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4) do not apply if the owner or trustee derived any income from the land
at any time during which it was not occupied as a principal place of residence of the owner or of a
vested beneficiary in relation to land, as the case may be.
(6) For the purposes of calculating the amount of a refund under this section, the land referred to in
subsection (1), (2), (3) or (4) is to be taken to have been exempt from land tax in respect of the tax year
in respect of which the refund is payable.
Example
At midnight on 31 December 2005, A owned a block of unoccupied land valued at $100 000 and an
investment property valued at $250 000. A's land tax for 2006 will be calculated on the aggregated value
of both landholdings, that is $350 000. If A occupies the block as A's principal place of residence for at
least 6 months commencing at some time in 2005, A's refund under subsection (1) will be calculated as if
the block had been exempt from land tax for 2005. Therefore, A's refund will be the difference between
the land tax A paid on a land value of $350 000 and the land tax A would have paid on a land value of
$250 000.
END QUOTE

60
QUOTE
Division 3—Sporting, recreational and cultural land
71 Land leased for sporting, recreational or cultural activities by members of the public
(1) Land vested in a person or body is exempt land if the Commissioner determines that—
(a) it is leased for outdoor sporting, outdoor recreational, outdoor cultural or similar outdoor
activities and is available for use for one or more of those activities by members of the public;
and
(b) the proceeds from the leasing are applied exclusively by the person or body for charitable
purposes.
(2) To obtain an exemption from land tax under this section, the owner of the land must—
(a) apply to the Commissioner for the exemption; and
(b) give the Commissioner any information the Commissioner requests for the purpose of enabling
the Commissioner to determine whether the land is exempt under this section.
72 Sporting, recreational or cultural land owned by certain non-profit organisations

(1) This section applies to land owned—
(a) by a non-profit organisation; or
(b) in the case of a non-profit organisation that is unincorporated, by a person on trust for the non-
profit organisation.
(2) The land is exempt land if the Commissioner determines that—
(a) the land is used by the non-profit organisation primarily or substantially for—
(i) sporting activities; or
(ii) outdoor recreational, outdoor cultural or similar outdoor activities; and
(b) the primary purpose or objective of the non-profit organisation is to conduct the sporting
activities or outdoor recreational, outdoor cultural or similar outdoor activities for which the land
is primarily or substantially used.

non-profit organisation means a body (whether incorporated or not) that—
(a) applies its profits in promoting its purposes or objectives; and
(b) prohibits the payment of any dividends to members—
but does not include a body that promotes or controls horse racing, pony racing or harness racing
in Victoria.
73 Concessional tax rate for club land
(1) Land or part of land that is owned and solely occupied by a club is not liable for land tax at a rate
greater than 0357% of the taxable value of the land or part.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) and assessing land tax on any part of the land that is not solely
occupied by a club, the land tax that is or that would be, but for the operation of subsection (1),
attributable to a part of land is the proportion of the land tax that would, but for the operation of
subsection (1), be payable on the whole of the land owned by a club.
(3) In this section, club means a society, club or association that—
(a) is not carried on for the purposes of the profit or gain to its individual members; and

61
(b) is carried on exclusively for one or more of the following purposes—

(i) providing for the social, cultural, recreational, literary or educational interests of its
members;
(ii) promoting or controlling horse racing, pony racing or harness racing in Victoria.
Division 4—Charities and health services
74 Charitable institutions and purposes

(1) Land is exempt land if the Commissioner determines that—
(a) it is used by a charitable institution exclusively for charitable purposes; or
(b) it is—
(i) owned by a charitable institution; and
(ii) vacant; and
(iii) declared by its owner to be held for future use for charitable purposes.
(2) If the Commissioner is satisfied that only a part of land is used by a charitable institution exclusively
for charitable purposes—
(a) land tax is assessable on the remaining part of the land, unless another exemption applies to that
part; and
(b) section 22 applies, if necessary, for that purpose.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Division 6—Public, government and municipal land
79 Crown land
(1) Land is exempt land if it is—
(a) the property of the Crown in right of Victoria; or
(b) vested in a Victorian Minister.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to land that is held by—
(a) a person who is entitled to the land under a lease of Crown land, unless the lease is a retail
premises lease within the meaning of the Retail Leases Act 2003; or
(b) a licensee of vested land under Part 3A of the Victorian Plantations Corporation Act 1993; or
(c) a person who is entitled to the land under a licence of Crown land under which the person has a
right, absolute or conditional, of acquiring the fee simple.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
81 Municipal and public land
(1) Land is exempt land if it is—
(a) owned by a municipal council; or
(b) vested in trustees appointed under an Act and held in trust for a municipal purpose; or
(c) vested in trustees appointed under an Act and held in trust for a public purpose.

62
(2) Despite subsection (1), land or a part of land referred to in that subsection is not exempt land if the
land or part is leased or occupied for any business purposes by a person or body other than—
(a) a municipal council or trustees of a kind referred to in subsection (1)(b) or (c); or
(b) a person or body referred to in section 72(1), 80(1), 83(1) or 84(1).
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to land or part of land—

(a) that is leased or occupied under or in accordance with an arrangement made with a municipal
council for the purpose of promoting or assisting a decentralised industry; or
(b) that is used or occupied by persons carrying on business in movable stalls in a market during
some but not all of the ordinary business hours in a week; or
(c) that is used exclusively for or in connection with a business the primary purpose of which is to
provide outdoor sporting or recreational facilities.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply to land vested in or held in trust for, or for the purposes of, or for
purposes that include the purposes of, a trade union, trades hall or council of trade unions.
END QUOTE
In my view Section 83 is unconstitutional in that the State cannot legislate as to service personnel as
this is Commonwealth legislate territory. If the State could legislate as to exclusion of Land taxes
then it could also legislate against service personnel!
QUOTE
83 Armed services personnel
(1) Land is exempt land if—
(a) it is owned by, or held in trust for, an association of armed services personnel or the dependants
of armed services personnel; and
(b) it is used by the members of the association for the purposes of the association.
(2) Despite subsection (1), land or a part of land referred to in that subsection is not exempt land if the
land or part is leased or occupied for any business purposes by a person or body other than—
(a) an association referred to in subsection (1); or
(b) a person or body referred to in section 72(1), 80(1), 81(1) or 84(1).
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to land or part of land that is leased or occupied under or in accordance
with an arrangement made with a municipal council for the purpose of promoting or assisting a
decentralised industry.
armed services personnel means members or former members of—
(a) the armed forces of the Commonwealth; or
(b) the armed forces of any current or former ally of the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
PART 5—RELIEF FROM OR POSTPONEMENT OF LAND TAX
Division 1—Preliminary
89 Definition
In this Part, Board means the Land Tax Hardship Relief Board referred to in section 95.
90 Arrangements for payment of tax
Nothing in this Part limits the operation of section 49 of the Taxation Administration Act 1997.

63
Division 2—Relief
91 Taxpayer may apply for relief

(1) A taxpayer may apply for relief from the liability to pay land tax on one of the following grounds—
(a) if the taxpayer is a natural person—
(i) the taxpayer has suffered such a loss, or is in such circumstances, that payment of the full
amount of the land tax would cause serious hardship; or
(ii) the taxpayer has died and his or her dependants are in such circumstances that payment of
the full amount of the land tax would cause serious hardship;
(b) if the taxpayer is a company, persons holding more than 60% of the issued share capital of the
company are in such circumstances that payment of the full amount of the land tax would cause
serious hardship.
(2) An application for relief must—

(a) be in writing; and
(b) be made to—
(i) the Commissioner, if the land tax assessed for the applicant taxpayer for or in a tax year
does not exceed $1000; or
(ii) the Board, if the land tax assessed for the applicant taxpayer for or in a tax year exceeds
$1000; and
(c) be made within—
(i) one month after notice of assessment of the land tax has been given to the taxpayer; or
(ii) a further time allowed by the Commissioner or the Board, as the case requires.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a reference to the issued share capital of a company does not include a
reference to any part of it that carries no right to participate beyond a specified amount in a distribution
of either profits or capital.
92 Relief granted by the Commissioner

(1) The Commissioner may grant relief from the liability to pay land tax to a taxpayer on application under
section 91 if the Commissioner is satisfied that the grounds for the application are made out.
(2) Before granting relief, the Commissioner must obtain the approval of the Treasurer.
(3) In granting relief, the Commissioner may—
(a) waive the payment of the land tax either wholly or in part;
(b) make a reassessment of the land tax;
(c) impose any conditions on the grant of relief that he or she considers appropriate.
93 Relief granted by the Board
(1) The Board may grant relief from the liability to pay land tax to a taxpayer on application under
section 91 if the Board is satisfied that the grounds for the application are made out.
(2) If the Board decides to grant relief, it may direct the Commissioner to make a reassessment of the land
tax and—
(a) postpone the payment of the land tax either wholly or in part until whichever of the following
occurs first—
(i) the date the land is sold;
(ii) the expiration of a specified period of up to 5 years from the date the taxpayer applies for
relief; or
(b) waive the payment of the land tax either wholly or in part.
(3) The Board may grant relief subject to any conditions that the Board considers appropriate.

64
94 Reconsideration of postponed land tax

(1) This section applies if the Board directs the Commissioner to postpone the payment of land tax under
section 93(2)(a).
(2) The Board must reconsider the application for relief as soon as convenient after the date to which the
payment of the land tax was postponed.
(3) If, at the time of reconsideration, the Board is satisfied that the grounds for the application are still
made out in relation to the amount of land tax postponed, the Board may direct the Commissioner to—
(a) waive the payment of the postponed amount of land tax either wholly or in part; and
(b) make a reassessment of the land tax.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
PART 6—SECURITY, RECOVERY AND ENFORCEMENT
Division 1—Security for land tax
96 Land tax is a first charge on land

(1) Unpaid land tax (including special land tax) is a first charge on the land on which the tax is payable.
(2) The charge has priority over all other encumbrances to which the land is subject.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to—
(a) land tax on Crown land or vested land under Part 3A of the Victorian Plantations Corporation
Act 1993; or
(b) land tax on transmission easements.
(4) If a person—
(a) is a bona fide purchaser for value of land; and
(b) obtains a certificate from the Commissioner under section 105 in respect of the land—
the charge does not secure any amount of land tax on the land in excess of the amount set out in the
certificate.
END QUOTE
One has to ask how can the State government assigning a debt to a person who has no interest in a
property other than renting it?
END QUOTE 19-1-2015 correspondence to Premier Daniel Andrews – Part only
QUOTE 22-8-2017 correspondence to GWMWater

Chairman Peter Vogel 22-8-2017
(And other members of the Board of Directors) GWMWater
info@gwmwater.org.au
Ref: 2305224
Sir,
despite my various writings, upon which I rely upon, you didn’t even seem to bother to respond
to my 25-1-2016 correspondence. Neither to my 24-1-2015 and other correspondences
appropriately.
GWMWater and the ATO ruling that water service charge is not a tax but a fee for service.
The document can be downloaded from:
https://www.scribd.com/document/332203277/20161125-GWMWater-Charman-Peter-Vogel-and-
Ors-Re-2305224-Creditcollect-369335

65
I also draw your attention to my writings earlier today:

Why ignore billions of unpaid taxes but pursue the inheritance of an innocent child, I
wonder?
The document can be downloaded from:
https://www.scribd.com/document/356864666/20170822-G-H-Schorel-Hlavka-O-W-B-to-
Australian-Government-Solicitors-File-Ref-16006527
I now received a demand (WARNING NOTICE) alleged account number 2305224.

It should be clear that when I purchased the properties of Lot 10 and Lot 12 Anderson Avenue
Berriwillock each had and still have its own Title. The properties are generally referred to as 10
Anderson Avenue, Berriwillock. However either property could be sold without any need for
change in Title for this purpose as no land division is needed.
Both properties under separate land titled had their water meters. Lot 10 is and always was a vacant
land that only was used for sheds. Lot 12 is with the house on it.
Not long after I purchased the properties in the 1980’s I requested that the water meter at 12
Anderson Avenue be removed and this eventuated. I subsequently removed all underground water
pipes. At no time was I advised that Lot 10 being a vacant property (as it only has sheds on it) was
not subject to any water rate charges as a residential block that is connected with a water meter. As
such I view by deception I was charged water charges that should be refunded.
My children have n been residing on the property of 12 Anderson Avenue after I left in 2001 and
the last child to do so was my son Richard. When he moved in GWMW indicated I had to consent
for the account to be transferred to Richard (Richard Schorel). GWMW didn’t at all notify me that
as Lot 10 was a vacant property no water account should be applicable.
In any event I understood that the account was transferred to him.
Unbeknown to me Richard left years ago from the property and left the house unlocked, as were the
sheds. The new hot water system he had installed was unauthorised removed. My tools and
equipment were also unauthorised removed. The house was vandalised big time that it needs either
to be bulldozed or an expensive renovation be done.
Despite that I made known that the Richard had moved out GWMW kept pestering me with bills.
And then I view fraudulently changed the account from R Schorel to G Schorel pretending it now
became my account. This even so my lawful surname is Schorel-Hlavka.
It was so to say a trick by GWMWater but later claimed that it was so because my surname was
Schorel on the Titles. Well, that means that GWMWater knows that there are 2 Titles and not just
one.
I was also advised by GWMWater that if the property was derelict then no charges were applicable.
GWMWater claimed that because the properties had one postal address then they were considered
one property. Yes, that is why there were 2 separate water meters, one for each property for
decades, before I had the water meter from Lot 12 the residential property removed.
Both properties had their own electricity supply, as they were separate properties by separate Titles!
I had the electricity supply removed from Lot 10 vacant property as I had no need for any electricity
on the vacant lot. Since Richard left the power supply to Lot 12 was cut off.
While GWMWater might like to play about with details just to try to get me to pay alleged bills I
have no desire to do so.
I had originally indicated willing to pay for water usage, but despite my notifications I found that
the main tap remained leaking water.
I fitted on the property recycling taps which cannot be opened unless one has a special key, as to
prevent water stored in the water tank to be unlawfully drained.
GWMWater failed to install any recycling coded water fittings despite that it continues to provide,
against my desire, recycled untreated water.
I refer to part of my 24-1-2015 correspondence:
END QUOTE 24-1-2015 CORRESPONDENCE

66
Daniel Andrews Premier of Victoria 24-1-2015

Cc: Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria ewovinfo@ewov.com.au
Chairman Peter Vogel (And other members of the Board of Directors) GWMWater
info@gwmwater.org.au Ref: 2305224
Credit Collect creditcollect@creditcollect.com.au Ref 369335
Ref; 20150124- G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Daniel Andrews Premier of Victoria
-Re EWOV2004-317-570-etc-
Daniel,
regretfully it appears you have as yet not responded to my 31-12-2014 correspondence but to
ensure you that I am at least so to say still on the job I will below set out further matters.
QUOTE 31-12-2014 CORRESPONDENCE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Daniel Andrews Premier of Victoria 31-12-2014
Ref; 20141231- G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. to Mr Daniel Andrews Prenmier of Victoria

-Re Safe Drink Water Act 2003-etc-
Daniel,
after the recent state election you made clear that you wouldn’t change from what you had
stated during the election (regarding the east-west link) and I seek the same commitment as to what
you stated in the Parliament.
LY&speech=23716&activity=Second+Reading&title=SAFE+DRINKING+WATER+BILL&date1=7&date2=May&dat
e3=2003&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'safe'%0a%09and+data+contains+'water'+%29
QUOTE
Mr ANDREWS (Mulgrave) - It is a pleasure to speak in support of the Safe Drinking Water Bill. This bill forms part of the
government's strategic approach to water management, with specific attention being paid to water quality and risk management
as matters of public health. It is worth noting that this is a debate about public health and about making sure that each
community across our state has access to the highest quality water. It is also worth noting that this bill has been introduced by
the Minister for Health as a matter of public health.
The bill has four specific objectives. Before going on to those I welcome the support shown by the Liberal and National parties
for this bill. Every endeavour has been made to try to provide as much information as possible.
END QUOTE
One of the issues the EWOV has claimed (on behalf of GWMWater) is that GWMWater as an
authority can charge me as a landholder (property owner) regarding water supply irrespective if I
am or not connected to water supply.
It is clear that the Safe drinking water Act 2003 was enacted that ALL VICTORIANS were entitled
to safe drinking water as from 1 January 2004.
GWMWater was created in 2004 but blatantly as a government owned corporation ignored the rule
of law. It did so also in 2005, 2006 and 2007 when they it got the Minister to provide an exemption
during that year.
The problem is that as I was given the understanding by residents of Berriwillock (farmers) was that
if they agreed to keep supply of untreated water then they would keep a cheaper water rate.
Basically go to hell for the consumer who uses the grain grown in Berriwillock and surrounding
areas where toxic untreated water is accumulating and so compounding the toxicity of grain that is
sold in breakfast cereals as healthy!

67
And so to residents in the townships who have no need to have a lower water price for ‘untreated’
water where they then are considerably out of pocket to pay for drinking water. Yes do a round trip
of 40 kilometres or more to purchase water bottles and see how much cheaper this is concerning the
lower water rates for ‘untreated’ water.
And the Department of Health itself on its website warns against consuming ‘untreated’ water.
I warned all state members of parliament on 15 July 2016 and also against on 21 December 2016
specifically about possible mass murder naming ‘Bourke Street Mall’ specifically. Well not a single
member of parliament, including the premier bothered to take appropriate action. And then on 20
January 2017 some 6 people were killed in Bourke Street, and another more than 2 dozen injured.
My written warnings are now part of the coroners Court inquest!
I suspect the same tragic end may result if some say school bus travels in the Berriwillock area and
small children at a stop drink the ‘untreated’ water and may not just fall seriously ill but even die. I
then would like to see the board of GWMWater all be charged with manslaughter! It cannot be
involuntary manslaughter because I made warning after warning and still question if my Uncle G.
Schorel (we had the same Christian and surnames) died within hours of arriving at Berriwillock due
to the consuming of ‘untreated’ water albeit at that time it was never considered as an issue.
However in view that I fell violently ill in my last three trips to Berriwillock I view that there is an
association to the ‘untreated’ water. I did bring along my own drinking water for the time I
(attended to the property however never realised that when I visit friends (neighbours) they then use
‘untreated’ water for making coffee. As the boiling of ‘untreated’ water doesn’t get rid of the
toxins in the water, it must be clear that coming from Melbourne it easily caused health problems to
me.
I also noticed that the notice states that a ‘penalty interest of 5.5% per annum now applies’. I
understood that the State of Victoria sold its State Bank and as such I view this is a fraudulent
charge as without a State
Bank the state cannot apply any interest charges.
The legal doctrine of “ex turpi causa non oritur action” denies any remedy to a litigant (including
a prosecutor) who does not come to court with clean hands.
If your own action is very unlawful and very unethical, if you come to court with “Dirty Hands”
best not to question others legality, morality, and ethics!
Using a fraudulent charge in my view defeats also the entire claim!

I understand that in the case of MORIATY v LONDON, CHATMAM & DOVER RY Queen’s
Bench 1870 L.R. 5 Q.B. 314;39 L.T.Q.B. 109;22 L.T. 163;34 J.P. 692;18 W.R. 625 in which the
plaintiff sued a railway company for personal injuries sustained and this plaintiff has gone about
suborning false evidence and it was held by the Court that even so the plaintiff would have had a
genuine and justify to case to sue normally, by the plaintiff conduct to suborn false evidence this
was seen by the Court that this conduct amounted to an admission that he had no case.
I understood from Mr Bruce Godwin that GWMWater went around asking them if they wanted safe
drinking water or maintain to continue to use the same untreated water as that was cheaper.
Allegedly the farmers opted for the continued cheaper water. However, in my view this holds no
water, this as the legislation doesn’t provide for this. It is not for some people to vote and deny
others their rights to safe drinking water. Neither can it be claimed by GWMWater that there was no
monies for upgrading since 2003, this as I understood the Government provided about $467 million
for the upgrading of water supplied to comply with the legislation.
What we therefore seem to have a massive payout for directors to run as Government owned
corporation which flaunts the law from onset. Then uses deceptive/fraudulent conduct to seek
exemption from compliance.

68
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958). "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against
the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it." The constitutional theory is that we the people are the
sovereigns, the state and federal officials only our agents." "The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for
the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the
state; but, the individual's rights to live and own property are natural rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot
be imposed."
Redfield v Fisher, 292 P 813, at 819 [1930] "...an officer may be held liable in damages to any person injured in
consequence of a breach of any of the duties connected with his office...The liability for nonfeasance, misfeasance,
and for malfeasance in office is in his 'individual' , not his official capacity..."
70 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 50, VII Civil Liability
“Fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,”
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S 426. “Fraud vitiates everything”
Boyce v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210 "Fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents
and even judgments."
U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61 WHEREAS, officials and even judges have no immunity (See, Owen vs. City of
Independence, 100 S Ct. 1398; Maine vs. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502; and Hafer vs. Melo, 502 U.S. 21; officials and
judges are deemed to know the law and sworn to uphold the law; officials and judges cannot claim to act in good faith
in willful deprivation of law, they certainly cannot plead ignorance of the law, even the Citizen cannot plead ignorance
of the law, the courts have ruled there is no such thing as ignorance of the law, it is ludicrous for learned officials and
judges to plead ignorance of the law therefore there is no immunity, judicial or otherwise, in matters of rights secured
by the Constitution for the United States of America. See: Title 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. "When lawsuits are brought
against federal officials, they must be brought against them in their "individual" capacity not their official capacity.
When federal officials perpetrate constitutional torts, they do so ultra vires (beyond the powers) and lose the shield of
immunity."
Williamson v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 815 F.2d. 369, ACLU Foundation v. Barr,
952 F.2d. 457, 293 U.S. App. DC 101, (CA DC 1991).
"It is the duty of all officials whether legislative, judicial, executive, administrative, or ministerial to so perform every
official act as not to violate constitutional provisions."
Montgomery v state 55 Fla. 97-45S0.879
a. "Inasmuch as every government is an artificial person, an abstraction, and a creature of the mind only, a government
can interface only with other artificial persons. The imaginary, having neither actuality nor substance, is foreclosed
from creating and attaining parity with the tangible.
The legal manifestation of this is that no government, as well as any law, agency, aspect, court, etc. can concern itself
with anything other than corporate, artificial persons and the contracts between them."
As such directors, etc, can stand trial for any harm inflicted upon people, including myself having
provided directly/indirectly ‘untreated’ water that caused me to become ill.
QUOTE Sir JOHN DOWNER.-
I think we might, on the attempt to found this great Commonwealth, just advance one step, not beyond the
substance of the legislation, but beyond the form of the legislation, of the different colonies, and say that
there shall be embedded in the Constitution the righteous principle that the Ministers of the Crown and
their officials shall be liable for any arbitrary act or wrong they may do, in the same way as any private
person would be.
END QUOTE
As I made known years ago, my wife, not the mother of Richard, offered to settle the account for
$300.00 but that was never accepted by GWMWater, but as I understand it instead it was sold for

69
less to a Creditcollect a debt collector. However, they came to my residence and I explained matters
and after that they didn’t bother me again.
It should be clear I reject the supply of ‘untreated’ water and cannot be forced to pay for something
I did not desire. I am however entitled to safe drinking water, which GWMWater I view unlawfully
refuses to supply.
While GWMWater claimed that by law it can charge water supply, etc, as I pointed out and even
cited the address of someone who has a property in Victoria and has no water bills at all. As such it
appears to me GWMWater is using dishonest tactics also.
.
Again, it is to my understanding a legal requirement that recycled water is provided through special
coloured code pipes. GWMWater fails to do so, at least to my Berriwillock properties.
As such GWMWater has placed itself above the rule of law!
My 24 November 20126 correspondence did set out the failure of appropriate signage by
GWMWater, etc.
My 7-4-2015 correspondence also was about toxic water.
GWMWater itself raised the issue to involve the Ombudsman only for the Ombudsman to indicate
it is a legal issue the Ombudsman could not deal with.
.
http://www.srw.com.au/Files/General_publications/1010032_Are_you_using_unsafe_river_water_WEB.pdf
QUOTE
Are you using unsafe

river water in your home?
this information sheet is designed to inform people living in or visiting rural
communities about the health risks associated with taking water from rivers and
streams for domestic use.
END QUOTE
LY&speech=22882&activity=Second+Reading&title=SAFE+DRINKING+WATER+BILL&date1=10&date2=April&
date3=2003&query=true%0a%09and+%28+data+contains+'safe'%0a%09and+data+contains+'water'+%29
10 April 2003 ASSEMBLY SAFE DRINKING WATER BILL Ms PIKE (Minister for Health)
QUOTE at Page 982
The principal objectives of this bill are to:
protect public health in Victoria in relation to drinking water supplies;

create a consistent statewide regulatory framework for drinking water quality;
establish and implement comprehensive risk management strategies for drinking water
quality that covers the overall delivery chain from the catchment to consumer supplies;

70
give Victorians access to objective information about the quality of drinking water that they
receive;
provide communities with the opportunity to establish local non-health-related standards for
drinking water quality;
ensure that proposed drinking water standards are subjected to a rigorous benefit-cost analysis;
provide clarity of roles of the various parties who may be involved in the management of
incidents concerning drinking water.
Key aspects of the bill
END QUOTE
Again:
protect public health in Victoria in relation to drinking water supplies;
create a consistent statewide regulatory framework for drinking water quality;
and
provide communities with the opportunity to establish local non-health-related standards for
drinking water quality;
In my view “untreated water” supplied by GWMWater is in clear violation with what the Minister
presented to the Parliament and I view not intended to be allowed by the Minister.
As you may recall I wrote in the past:

.QUOTE 21-3-2013 CORRESPONDENCE
Well that may be your choice, but I can assure you I am going to campaign for the human rights of people living
in the GWMWater service area, as well as others denied the same right of access to suitable drink water!
GWMWater may not consider the human value relevant, and merely interested to make a buck from struggling
farmers, and others, disregarding their human rights, but I can assure you I am not a person going to drop this
issue.
.
. END QUOTE 21-3-2013 CORRESPONDENCE

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

71
GWMWater 17-2-2013
info@gwmwater.org.au
Ref: 2305224
Cc: creditcollect
creditcollect@creditcollect.com.au Ref 369335
Sir/Madam,
further to my 23-12-2012 correspondence I noted that as yet you failed to respond
appropriately, that is to me, as to refunding to me the monies which GWMWater overcharged for
numerous years. Obviously, I also seek interest for the falsely claimed and obtained monies by
GWMWater, and to consider that the many of the bills that were on account of and addresse to and
forwarded to Richard Schorel and later to myself refer to:
“Untreated water supply not suitable for drinking or food preparation without further
treatment”
. END QUOTE 17-2-2013 CORRESPONDENCE
As I understand it, we have such a thing as a “Victoria's Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities”, and that has been in existence for some years now.
.
With GWMWater seeking to rely upon legislative provisions then consider also that you are bound
by the correct interpretation of the legislation. Hence, any discrimination is unlawful. So where the
legislation
QUOTE Water Act 1989-Vic-89-80a099B
domestic and stock use, in relation to water,
means use for—
(a) household purposes; or
(b) watering of animals kept as pets; or
(c) watering of cattle or other stock; or
(ca) in the case of the curtilage of a house and any outbuilding, watering an area not
exceeding 1·2 hectares for fire prevention purposes with water obtained from a spring
or soak or water from a dam; or
(d) irrigation of a kitchen garden— but does not include use for dairies, piggeries, feed
lots, poultry or any other intensive or commercial use;
END QUOTE Water Act 1989-Vic-89-80a099B
Clearly the legislation provides for “Domestic and stock use”which includes “household purposes”,
whereas the bills provided to Richard as well as to myself provides for:
treatment”
I therefore seek further and better particulars regarding the qualification of what constitutes “drink
water” “household usage” “domestic usage”, etc.
Why indeed can the legislation purportedly applying to all Victoria have a different application in
different parts of Victoria? After all, in Melbourne my water bills do not disclose

72
treatment”
Therefore, it appears to me that there is a discrimination going on between city residents and those
in the country. And this while the Wanthaggi desalination plant is not used to supply suitable
drink water. it is beyond me why GWMWater has not sourced water from this idle desalination
plant to ensure it wouldn’t discriminate against citizens in country area’;s.
You cannot pick and choose which parts of the legislation you selectively seeks to rely upon while
blatantly disregarding others.
What was/is the strategy of GWMWater to provide suitable drinking water to all Victorians that are
served by it?
Why indeed, should Victorians have to purchase drink water from other sources and incur a huge
cost in addition to what GWMWater already is charging?
.
There are such a things the “National Groundwater Action Plan - Victorian Projects”,
“Environment Protection Act 1970 70-8056a172” and “Sustainable Water Strategies” to name a
view, and my wife’s late husband Mr Jaroslav Hlavka M.I.E. Aust CP ENG extensively wrote about
how groundwater could be in a sufficient manner used for supplying all Victorians with drink water,
this while he was employed with Melbourne Water (as it then was called)..
As for concession issues, let make it very clear I took the Department of Human Services to the
Supreme Court of Victoria when it unlawfully had obtained a warrant to arrest my 2 year old
daughter and defeated them in court. In fact the trail judge made clear the warrant was unlawful, as
it sought to undermine earlier Supreme Court of Victoria court orders. As such, the Department of
Human Services all along was aware I was entitled to concessions because it provided the
concession card to me in the first place, in 1986! and it was on the Berriwillock address, until 28
March 2001, being then my principle residential address. And as far as I recall it GWMWater was
at the time notified about the concession card, but seemingly ignored to take appropriate action
about it. I do not run the office in GWMWater and so do not hold me accountable for its errors and
failures, as I have no ordinary access to its files anyhow to check up what it has or hasn’t on the
files documented. Safe to say that GWMWater to my understanding overcharged me for year after
year and where GWMWater seems to charge interest on overdue monies then likewise a customer
wrongly overcharges is entitled on compounding interest. and those overdue monies are coming
rightfully to me and not to be confused with Richard’s contract with GWMWater and any overdue
payments by him to GWMWater.
Neither do I agree with the reference of the section of the Water Act that somehow the bills
(Richard’s Account Holders Bills) can be put against me, as the section doesn’t pursue it as such,
rather that you are taking it out of context.
I understand that GWMWater was created in 2004. I will now include some details from
GWMWater website:
QUOTE
GWMWater: Home
www.gwmwater.org.au/
6 days ago - GWMWater is a government-owned statutory corporation established in 2004
with a responsibility to provide, manage, operate and protect ...

73
http://www.gwmwater.org.au/about-us/mission-vision-and-values
Mission, Vision and Values

Last Updated: 23 December 2016
Our mission, vision and values are an essential part of our culture at GWMWater. We incorporate these
into every action we take - whether it's providing assistance over the phone, fixing a service fault, or
encouraging regional growth for our local communities.
Our mission
Providing innovative and affordable services through partnerships with stakeholders, customers and the
community.
Our vision
Sustainable water for regional growth, a healthy environment and vibrant communities.
Further information...
About us
GWMWater is a government-owned statutory corporation established in 2004

with a responsibility to provide, manage, operate and protect water supply and
sewerage systems for our community.
END QUOTE

74
http://www.gwmwater.org.au/about-us/executive-management-team
QUOTE
Executive Management Team
Last Updated: 03 July 2017
Our experienced Executive Management Team brings a wealth of experience, diversity and innovation
to GWMWater.
The Executive Team ensures the smooth day-to-day operation of GWMWater, as well as implementing
strategic direction as determined by the board. They're responsible for managing key business areas
such as stakeholder management, finances, service delivery and infrastructure. Leading our dedicated
and expert staff, the Executive Team ensures that GWMWater maintains its reputation as an
outstanding water corporation.
END QUOTE
It may be stated to my knowledge no sewerage system exist in regard if GWMWater, as it simply

has not provided for this.
What this indicates is that GWMWater uses its standing as a Government owned corporation to
avoid the rule of law. This is also why my various complaints so to say fell on deaf ears as
politicians were simply ignoring it. They rather place the safety and wellbeing and so the lives of
people at risk then themselves comply with the rule of law. After all we saw this result with Bourke
Street mall killings. Well you may desire to litigate against me as did the commonwealth for years
on end only to be comprehensively defeated in both appeals on 19 July 2006, or try like Buloke
Shire Council which wasted a reported $18,000.00 on litigating against me.
Then again you may just realise that you are on a slippery slope and refund me the unlawful past
charges I paid and stop the rot. And you might even, before perhaps some of your own family
members fall ill or even die from drinking untreated water, get of your backside and fix up the
darn system to comply with the rule of law that every Victorian is entitled to safe drinking water
supply. Don’t forget the sewerage system either!
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL ®
(Our name is our motto!)

END QUOTE 22-8-2017 correspondence to GWMWater
What needs to be considered is that if municipal/shire councils were to become authorities within
the provisions of the state government, as such a Department, then can the State government
nevertheless have councilors being elected by local citizens or will this need to be abolished as
such? After all, other heads of Departments are not elected. And should then those councilors be
caused to compete on basis of qualifications and competence with others so that instead of
incompetent councilors we may actually achieve persons to become councilors who have proper
training and education in the relevant fields? Or in the alternative if councilors nevertheless within
an Authority are elected then all heads of Departments such as VicRoads, etc, are all subjected to be
elected by the community?
Would then councils being Authorities lose their incorporation status as to represent the local
community and hence a new form of council would be required to be created by the local
community being one who represent the local community and not the State government?

75
Should we then also provide the U.S.A system that all members of a tribunal are elected by the
community as those members of tribunals are not independent as judges of the judiciary?
I will not delve too deep into the judiciary separation of powers too much albeit one may note that
former Chief Justice themselves have made clear there is a separation of powers.
Regardless what claims are made by GWMWater and/or any council about transparency, etc, in the
end I have proven time and time again that it is non0-existing. GWMWater in general doesn’t
respond to my writings and refuses to refund wrongly extorted monies as it hides behind the ability
to engage debt collectors as if there is a debt without any court judgment for this. As such it has
placed itself to be judge, jury and executor. Likewise with Banyule City Council and Buloke City
Council they both have blatantly disregarded my written request for a refund of all
unconstitutionally charged rates (purported delegated land taxation). As such they also proved to
place themselves above the rule of law. After all they have the might of the stolen monies they
obtained by terrorizing local residents to pay the unconstitutional rates or face debt collectors and
lose their properties, while those terrorist themselves hide behind a wall of secrecy and being
immune from prosecution. Well, with me I am different as Buloke Shire Council discovered the
hard way in court wasting $18,000.00 on legal fees that could have been avoided had there be even
one person with some common sense been representing the council. The fact that debt collectors
previously backed away from taking me on may also underline they realized I am not some walk-
over in litigation. However, is this fair to the general community where many are unable to defend
themselves against such erosion of their constitutional rights? Is this the kind of climate the Stater
government desires to create with elevating councils as Authorities? And then perhaps like in The
Netherlands where as I understand it municipal/shire councils are independent entities and the State
Government itself becomes authorities without any Members of Parliament because the
municipal/shire councils have completely taken over the function of the State Government. I
understand that a particular political party all along pursued to abolish State government in such
manner and that the Federal Government would prefer this also, this as to divide a strong State
government in a multitude of municipal/shire governments mean it can transform the federation into
a confederation. State Members of Parliament better be aware they may just put their own
positions on the line if they proceed with turning municipal/shire councils into Authorities!
I for one stand my ground and will pursue that any Member of Parliament who supports for council
employees to trespass (without the consent of the property occupier) upon private property are listed
last in any political ballot as they obviously do not care less to respect the rights of their
constituents. It would be far better is instead of the State of Victoria elevating municipal/shire
councils to a position well beyond their duties and obligations as to represent their local
communities, were to engage in communication with relevant communities how to get a better and
more competent local representation of municipal/shire councilors who are competent performing
what they are paid for and so also councils staff. That we never again have a council engaging a
legal representatives who then in turn relies upon a council worker not qualified at all as a lawyer to
represent both the legal representatives as well as the council. Stop the power hungry councilors and
put in place a system they finally learn how they should conduct themselves to their duties and
obligations and have a system in place that where a local resident makes a request then they are
obligated to provide an appropriate response, irrespective it the council may or may not concede to
a request.
This documents is not to be restricted for publication, and as such permitted to be published in full!
This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to refer to all details/issues.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O. W. B. (Friends call me Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL®

(Our name is our motto!)

20180228-G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. To Local Government Review Secretariat

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1

This documents is not to be restricted for publication

p1 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

Hansard 6-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 9-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

p2 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2

p3 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

(ISBN 0-9580569-6-X prior to 1-1-2007) ISBN 978-0-9580569-6-0

Hansard 9-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

p4 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte

Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?

p5 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Hansard 22-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

New retrospective Queensland law validates

p6 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Corrs-chamber-westgarth, fraser-coast-regional-council, linville-case, linville-holdings, news-6, polar-

p7 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Mr. MCMILLAN.-Would it not into the Appropriation Bill?

p8 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Mr. ISAACS.-Yes; but not as an annual service.

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As such “Central Government” is the Federal Government and “Local Government” is

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Hansard 5-3-1891 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 26-3-1897 Constitution Convention Debates

HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

p18 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

Hansard 5-3-1891 Constitution convention Debates

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Mr. MUNRO: But as to trading corporations!

Sub-clause agreed to.

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QUOTE Privy Council Appeals from High Court of Australia Decisions

On appeal from the High Court of Australia.

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[1] [1939] HCA 27; (1939) 61 C.L.R. 735.

[3] (1939) 61 C.L.R., at pp. 756, 757.

[4] (1908) 6 C.L.R., at p. 70.

[5] (1908) 6 C.L.R., at p. 108.

[6] [1923] HCA 4; (1923) 32 C.L.R. 68.

M J Antony: `Public purpose` in land acquisition

M J Antony / New Delhi November 29, 2006

The ambiguity of the phrase attracts political discord and litigation.

p27 28-2-2018 © G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

QUOTE Lands for Public Purposes Acquisition Act 1914 (SA)

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18 Moneys to be paid out of funds voted by Parliament

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